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sentative to sign the treaty without a reservation as to ratification and would contradict the full powers. A Government would so rarely withdraw in that way the order given in the full powers that there seemed to be no point in providing for it under the general law of treaties.

51. The Italian amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.81) was an improvement, and made the subsequent confirmation in article 7 more or less superfluous. Perhaps the Drafting Committee could consider excluding the possibility of expressing during the negotiations something contradictory to the full powers.

52. He presumed that no Government would accept full powers or an instrument of ratification unless fully signed. Likewise, a treaty should always be fully signed unless it was completely and formally clear that that was not intended. He therefore supported the Belgian amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.100).

53. Mr. FINCHAM (South Africa) said that paragraph 1 (*b*) might cause difficulties if signature were to have a binding effect. According to paragraph (3) of the commentary, that was simply a question of demonstrating the intention from the evidence, but it was often anything but simple to establish the subjective elements of intention. In the interests of greater clarity, that paragraph might be redrafted to read " The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its representative when the negotiating States expressly so agree, whether in the treaty or otherwise".

54. If it were decided to maintain three sub-paragraphs in paragraph 1 of the article, sub-paragraph 1 (*b*) might be reworded to read " the negotiating States expressly so agree " and the words " was expressly stated during the negotiations " might be substituted for the words " was expressed during the negotiation " in sub-paragraph 1 (*c*). Those changes might meet the difficulty mentioned by the Italian representative; similar modifications would have to be introduced in articles 11 and 12.

55. He could not support the nine-State amendment, since he was convinced that the draft should not contain references to the internal law of States; that was something which was often difficult to determine.

56. Though he was in sympathy with the Belgian amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.100), he considered that it did not go far enough.

57. Mr. BLIX (Sweden) said he could not support the Italian amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.81), which would only permit a signature expressing the State's consent to be bound if that intention had been formally manifested during the negotiations.

58. If the proposal by Poland and the United States (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.88 and Add.1) for a new article 9 *bis* were adopted, the unusual case dealt with in paragraph 1 (*a*) would have been covered.

59. He could not support the nine-State amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.107), because States should not be required to study the internal law of other States in order to determine whether a treaty was an administrative or executive agreement; such a task was difficult enough for national lawyers and would be much more so for foreigners.

60. The Spanish amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.108) could be referred to the Drafting Committee.

61. The CHAIRMAN said he would first put to the vote the nine-State amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.107).

The nine-State amendment was rejected by 60 votes to 10, with 16 abstentions.

62. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Austrian oral amendment to delete the words " or was expressed during the negotiation," in paragraph 1 (*c*).

The Austrian amendment was rejected by 37 votes to 10, with 30 abstentions.

63. The CHAIRMAN said he assumed that the remaining amendments could be referred to the Drafting Committee.

It was so agreed.[7]

Proposed new article 10 bis (Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by an exchange of instruments constituting a treaty)

64. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the new article 10 *bis* (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.89) proposed by Poland, which read:

> *" Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by an exchange of instruments constituting a treaty*
>
> " The consent of States to be bound by a treaty embodied in two or more related instruments is expressed by the exchange of such instruments, unless the States in question otherwise agreed."

65. Mr. NAHLIK (Poland) said that his delegation's proposal for a new article 10 *bis* was a logical complement to its proposal for a new article 9 *bis* (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.88). Articles 10, 11 and 12 in the Commission's draft did not cover all the methods whereby a State could express its consent to be bound, and notably the most frequent of them, namely, an exchange of notes, not necessarily signed, where that exchange alone expressed the consent of the parties. That process was quite distinct from the exchange of ratifications or other documents referred to in article 13, which was only the final stage in a two-stage procedure.

66. Mr. JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA (Uruguay) said he supported the Polish proposal, which constituted a rule of progressive development.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.

[7] For resumption of the discussion on article 9, see 59th meeting.

EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Tuesday, 9 April 1968, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria)

Consideration of the question of the law of treaties in accordance with resolution 2166 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 1966 *(continued)*

Proposed new article 10 bis (Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by an exchange of instruments constituting a treaty) *(continued)*[1]

1. Mr. BEVANS (United States of America) said he supported the Polish proposal (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.89)

[1] For text, see 17th meeting, para. 64.

for a new article 10 *bis* dealing with treaties embodied in two or more related instruments. Many agreements were, in fact, concluded by an exchange of notes, and some by *notes verbales* without signature. The draft convention did not cover that case and the gap should be filled.

2. Although the word " instruments " in the Polish proposal seemed too formal, particularly for *notes verbales*, it was in line with the terminology defined in article 2 of the draft. The text proposed by the Polish delegation might call for a few drafting changes, but its substance should be approved.

3. Mr. BINDSCHEDLER (Switzerland) objected that the Polish amendment would not achieve the desired result, for legal reasons. It seemed to be based on a confusion between a State's consent, which was a unilateral act whereby it agreed to be bound by a treaty, and the entry into force of a treaty. Consent was given by signature or initialling; it could not be expressed by a material act such as an exchange of instruments. It was the entry into force of the treaty that was determined by the exchange of instruments, though the date of entry into force might also be that of the later instrument, if they were not dated identically, or might be laid down in the agreement itself. The Polish amendment would be more appropriate in the context of article 21 of the draft. The Swiss delegation could not support it in its present form.

4. Mr. CARMONA (Venezuela) thought the amendment would be acceptable if a clear distinction was made between secondary or procedural questions and matters of substance; for it would be dangerous to allow the proposed procedure for substantive questions. The Drafting Committee could be asked to make that distinction in the text.

5. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Polish proposal for the insertion of a new article 10 *bis*, on the understanding that the Drafting Committee would make the necessary drafting changes.

The Polish proposal (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.89) was adopted by 42 votes to 10, with 27 abstentions.

Question of a residuary rule in favour of signature or of ratification (resumed from the previous meeting)

6. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the amendments in documents A/CONF.39/C.1/L.38 and Add.1 and 2, L.87 and L.105, which called for the insertion of a residuary rule requiring signature or ratification. The delegations concerned had met in order to work out a compromise formula, and he asked those delegations to report on the result of their consultations.

7. Mr. SMEJKAL (Czechoslovakia) said that despite the extremely constructive attitude of all concerned, it had been impossible, as might have been foreseen, to reconcile the positions taken by those in favour of signature and those in favour of ratification. But the talks had enabled delegations to discuss in detail certain aspects of the various amendments and had, in his opinion, confirmed that, owing to the wide divergence of views, only a solution involving no presumption could secure sufficiently wide agreement.

8. Consequently, the Czechoslovak delegation, in agreement with the co-sponsors, withdrew its amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.38 and Add.1 and 2) and accepted the solution adopted in article 10 of the International Law Commission's draft.

9. The CHAIRMAN said that the sponsors of the Latin American joint amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.105) had asked for a vote on it.

10. Mr. ALVAREZ (Uruguay) proposed that the Committee should first vote on the principle of including in the draft a residuary rule requiring ratification, instead of voting separately on the Latin American amendment and the Swiss amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.87). If the principle was approved, it could be formulated by the Drafting Committee.

11. In reply to a question by Mr. JAGOTA (India), the CHAIRMAN explained that if the principle was not adopted, the Swiss and Latin American amendments would be regarded as rejected.

12. Mr. KRISPIS (Greece) and Mr. BINDSCHEDLER (Switzerland) supported the voting procedure proposed by the Uruguayan representative.

13. Mr. VIRALLY (France), explaining the vote to be cast by the French delegation, said he still thought that a rule establishing the principle of ratification would settle any difficulties that might arise in practice. But after the attempts at compromise and the withdrawal of their amendments by some delegations, it seemed clear that the adoption of such a rule would give rise to strong objections. The French delegation therefore considered that it would be better to adhere to the solution adopted by the International Law Commission.

14. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the principle of inserting a residuary rule in favour of ratification.

At the request of the Uruguayan representative, the vote was taken by roll-call.

The representative of the Republic of Korea, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Republic of Korea, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Peru.

Against: Republic of Viet-Nam, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana, Holy See, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal.

Abstaining: United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines.

The principle of inserting a residuary rule in favour of ratification was rejected by 53 votes to 25, with 16 abstentions.

Article 11 (Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or approval) *(resumed from the 16th meeting)*

15. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider article 11.[2]

16. Mr. CASTRÉN (Finland) explained that his amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.60) made no substantive change in article 11. It merely changed the order of the subparagraphs and improved the drafting. The amendment could be referred to the Drafting Committee; if it was accepted, the text of article 10 should also be revised.

17. Mr. CUENCA (Spain) said that his delegation's amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.109) dealt mainly with a point of drafting.

18. Paragraph 2 of the present text of article 11 stated that " The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or approval under conditions similar to those which apply to ratification". He could not see the advantage of dividing the article into two paragraphs, one dealing with expression of consent by ratification and the other with expression of consent by acceptance or approval; nor could he understand why conditions similar to those which applied to ratification were mentioned in connexion with acceptance or approval.

19. There was no denying that ratification was the traditional procedure by which a State expressed its consent to be bound by a treaty; but in recent years acceptance and approval had been given the sanction of practice as new procedures enabling States to become parties to a treaty, so that they performed the same function as ratification.

20. The expression " conditions similar to " might give a false impression of the real value of the two new procedures. If the three procedures performed the same function, they should be placed on an equal footing, as proposed in the Spanish amendment.

21. The Spanish delegation considered that the terms of article 11, paragraph 1(*b*) were too rigid because they required that the existence of an agreement at the time of the negotiations should be established, whereas that agreement might not have been established by a formal act. The text of article 12 of the International Law Commission's 1965 draft[3] was more appropriate. The reference to agreement in paragraph 1(*b*) might perhaps call for some modification of article 6, because in that article the powers of the negotiators, in the absence of special full powers, related only to the adoption of the text. The express agreement referred to in articles 10 and 11 would thus go beyond the scope of the full powers provided for in article 6.

22. Mr. COLE (Sierra Leone) said he approved of article 11 in principle, but he did not understand why the International Law Commission had made a distinction between ratification, on the one hand, and acceptance or approval, on the other. The Drafting Committee might consider whether it would not be preferable to group the three notions together in a single paragraph.

23. Mr. ALCIVAR-CASTILLO (Ecuador) pointed out that the Ecuadorian delegation, when introducing its amendment to the definition of a treaty (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.25), had stressed the need to refer clearly in that definition to the basic elements for the validity of a treaty; but except for capacity, those elements were not stated clearly enough in the draft.

24. An examination of articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 confirmed that view. Those articles referred to the formal elements required for the validity of a treaty: signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession and exchange or deposit of instruments. The word " consent " also appeared in those articles and the members of the International Law Commission had certainly meant to use it in its true sense; but it would be preferable to specify the meaning in order to avoid any ambiguity for the sake of future interpretation of the legal rules being drafted.

25. Consent with the meaning of " consensus ", that was to say the concurrence of wills with a view to performing a contractual act, was a basic element in the essential validity of a treaty, whereas articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 related to formal validity. The grounds for invalidation of a treaty differed in the two cases and could not be merged.

26. Consequently, the Ecuadorian delegation wished to ask the Drafting Committee to clarify the interpretation of the articles he had mentioned. It also requested that its statement should be mentioned in the report of the Committee of the Whole.

27. The CHAIRMAN observed that the amendments submitted raised points of drafting and proposed that they should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

It was so decided.[4]

Article 12 (Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession)[5]

28. Mr. MYSLIL (Czechoslovakia) said that the amendment submitted by the Czechoslovak delegation raised a question of principle, which also arose in connexion with other amendments, and especially with regard to article 5 *bis* (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.74).[6] As the Committee had decided to defer consideration of that general question, the Czechoslovak delegation proposed that the Committee should not discuss its amendment until it had taken a decision on the principle involved.

It was so decided.

[2] For a list of the amendments to article 11, see 16th meeting, footnote 2. The joint amendment by a group of Latin American States (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.105) had been rejected as a result of the vote recorded in the preceding paragraph. The Venezuelan amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.71) had been withdrawn.

[3] *Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1965,* vol. II, p. 161.

[4] For resumption of the discussion on article 11, see 61st meeting.

[5] An amendment to article 12 had been submitted by Czechoslovakia (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.104).

[6] See 13th meeting, paras. 1 and 2.

29. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should approve the existing text of article 12 and refer it to the Drafting Committee.

It was so decided.

30. Replying to a question by Mr. KOVALEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the CHAIRMAN explained that article 12 in its present form had been approved subject to subsequent reconsideration in the light of the Czechoslovak amendment.

31. Mr. ALVAREZ (Uruguay) asked at what stage the Committee would be called upon to vote on the question raised by the Czechoslovak delegation.

32. The CHAIRMAN said that negotiations were in progress, and the question would be referred to the Committee as soon as they had been concluded.[7]

Proposed new article 9 bis (Consent to be bound by a treaty) *(resumed from the 15th meeting)*

Proposed new article 12 bis (Other methods of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty)

33. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the proposed new articles 9 *bis*[8] and 12 *bis* dealt with similar matters. Article 12 *bis* had been proposed by Belgium (A/CONF. 39/C.1/L.111) and read as follows:

"*Other methods of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty*

"In addition to the cases dealt with in articles 10, 11 and 12, the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by any other method agreed upon between the contracting States."

34. Mr. DE TROYER (Belgium), introducing the Belgian delegation's amendment, said that articles 10, 11 and 12 referred to the traditional methods by which States expressed their consent. In contemporary practice, however, other methods of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty were accepted, and some 30 per cent of the agreements concluded by Belgium in 1964 contained clauses stipulating procedures not covered by those articles. Thus there was a gap there, which ought to be filled. Some progress had already been achieved through the adoption of the Polish amendment (A/CONF. 39/C.1/L.89),[9] which provided for the consent of a State to be expressed by an exchange of letters or notes. But there was a whole series of bilateral and even multilateral agreements which stipulated that consent should be established, not by an instrument of ratification, but merely by notification, which might, for example, take the form of a letter from an ambassador or a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country becoming a party to the agreement. As it was impossible to enumerate every possible case, the new article should not be too detailed. The broad wording used in the Belgian amendment could also cover the class of agreements in simplified form with exchanges of letters or notes referred to in the Polish amendment, though those agreements had such special features that it did not seem inappropriate to devote a separate article to them. The Belgian delegation realized that its amendment did not solve the problem of treaties which gave no indication of the form of consent. That defect could be remedied simply by adding at the end of the amendment the words "In the absence of any indication of the intention of the States concerned, consent is expressed by ratification" or "In the absence of any indication of the intention of the States concerned, consent is expressed by signature".

35. The CHAIRMAN said that the question had already been discussed in connexion with the new article 9 *bis*, and he had suggested either inserting a new article or adding a paragraph to article 12. The Committee might wish to approve in principle the proposal contained in the two amendments relating to articles 9 *bis* and 12 *bis*, respectively, and to refer the matter to the Drafting Committee.

It was so decided.[10]

Article 13 (Exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession)[11]

36. Mr. MAKAREWICZ (Poland) introduced his delegation's amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.93/Rev.1). Draft article 13 specified the moment when the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty was established. That provision was necessary because the expression of consent to be bound by a treaty and the establishment of a State's consent on the international plane did not necessarily coincide. There were, in fact, two separate acts. It therefore seemed necessary to recast article 13 so as to express a general presumption as to the moment when consent to be bound by a treaty was established on the international plane.

37. In his opinion, draft article 13 did not deal with the exchange or deposit of the instruments it referred to, but with the time when consent was established. Hence the title seemed to be at variance with the content of the article. The article also gave the impression that instruments of ratification should be subject to notification in accordance with sub-paragraph (*c*). However, that provision reflected the practice that it was the fact of ratification, acceptance, etc. which had to be notified, not the instruments as such. The Polish delegation hoped that its suggestions, which related mainly to points of drafting, would help to improve the text of the article.

38. Mr. McKINNON (Canada) explained why his delegation had submitted an amendment to article 13 (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.110). It often happened that, for administrative reasons, a State stipulated in an instrument of ratification or accession that such ratification or accession would take effect at a date other than that on which the instrument was deposited. The insertion of the words "or instrument" proposed in the Canadian amendment allowed for the practice followed by certain

[7] At the 80th meeting the Committee decided to defer consideration of all amendments relating to "general multilateral treaties" until the second session of the Conference. Further consideration of article 12 was therefore postponed.

[8] For the text of the new article 9 *bis* (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.88 and Add.1) proposed by Poland and the United States of America, see 15th meeting, para. 42.

[9] i.e. article 10 *bis*.

[10] For resumption of discussion, see 59th meeting, under article 9 *bis*.

[11] The following amendments had been submitted: Poland, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.93/Rev.1; Canada, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.110.

States in that respect. The amendment could be referred to the Drafting Committee.

39. The CHAIRMAN observed that the two amendments to article 13 related to drafting and proposed that they be examined by the Drafting Committee.

It was so decided.

Article 14 (Consent relating to a part of a treaty and choice of differing provisions)

Article 14 was approved and referred to the Drafting Committee.[12]

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

[12] For the Drafting Committee's report, see 61st meeting.

NINETEENTH MEETING

Tuesday, 9 April 1968, at 3.15 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria)

Consideration of the question of the law of treaties in accordance with resolution 2166 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 1966 *(continued)*

Article 15 (Obligation of a State not to frustrate the object of a treaty prior to its entry into force)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider article 15 of the International Law Commission's draft.[1]

2. Mr. GUSTAFSSON (Finland) said that the purpose of the amendment in document A/CONF.39/C.1/L.61 and Add.1-4 was to confine the obligation of good faith to cases where the rule *pacta sunt servanda* might have wider application. The difficulty created by sub-paragraph (*a*) was that it called for the use of subjective criteria to determine what acts would tend to frustrate the object of a treaty. The provision was too far-reaching and ought to be dropped. Until the content of a treaty was known, it would be too early to allege that an action to frustrate it was possible.

3. If, however, sub-paragraph (*a*) were retained, it should be laid down that a State which had agreed to enter into negotiations could be released from its obligations if it withdrew from the negotiations. It would be contrary to the interests of negotiating States if the obligation laid down in article 15 were binding on a State when the other party was unwilling to continue.

4. Mr. CARMONA (Venezuela) said that sub-paragraph (*a*) laid down a new principle of international law. It was impossible to anticipate what the results of negotiations would be, and the freedom of States to reach agreement must not be fettered. Acceptance of sub-paragraph (*a*) might inhibit negotiations and act as a deterrent.

5. Mr. BINDSCHEDLER (Switzerland) said that sub-paragraph (*b*) and (*c*) of the International Law Commission's text were acceptable and conformed to general rules of international law, but the rule in sub-paragraph (*a*) was new and seemed to go beyond the scope of codification. It would undoubtedly restrict the freedom of States and might render them less inclined to enter into negotiations. The rule ought to be rendered more flexible and that was the purpose of the Swiss amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.112) which added the condition " and the principle of good faith so requires." He hoped that that modification might render it more acceptable to the majority.

6. Mr. AVAKOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that article 15 was well balanced and his delegation had no desire to alter it in a radical way. The purpose of its amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.114) was to facilitate the practical application of the article and to cover the situation when a Government decided not to continue negotiations. From that moment it would be released from its obligations.

7. Mr. ARIFF (Malaysia) said his delegation fully appreciated that while negotiating States must be restrained from frustrating the object of a treaty prior to its entry into force, it felt that there must be some limit to the imposition of such restraint. To impose on a State an obligation to refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of a treaty, while the treaty was still in the making and while negotiation was still in progress, was asking too much. The terms of sub-paragraph (*a*) were too rigorous and might tie the hands of parties to negotiations. He was therefore in favour of dropping that sub-paragraph and clarifying the meaning of the article in a recast sub-paragraph (*a*), as was done in his delegation's amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.122).

8. Mr. PHAN-VAN-THINH (Republic of Viet-Nam) said it was necessary to stipulate that States were under an obligation not to frustrate, distort or restrict the object of a treaty prior to its entry into force. That was the sense of his delegation's amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.124).

9. Sir Francis VALLAT (United Kingdom) said his delegation's amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.135) proposed the deletion of the whole article because, though it agreed with the underlying principle that States in their treaty relations and in negotiations should act in good faith, the principle was difficult to formulate and there was little State practice to offer guidance. He fully agreed with the criticism brought against sub-paragraph (*a*), since it would be difficult to determine what acts tended to frustrate the object of a treaty and the provision would be virtually impossible to apply in practice. To require that a State which had entered into negotiations or signed a treaty should not take any step contrary to the text of the treaty would severely curtail the sovereign rights of that State. There seemed, moreover, to be some inconsistency between sub-paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) inasmuch as, once the negotiations had been

[1] The following amendments had been submitted: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Guinea and Japan, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.61 and Add.1-4; Greece and Venezuela, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.72 and Add.1; Switzerland, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.112; Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.114; Malaysia, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.122; Republic of Viet-Nam, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.124; Australia, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.129; United Republic of Tanzania, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.130; Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.131 and Add.1; United States of America, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.134; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.135; Congo (Brazzaville), A/CONF.39/C.1/L.145.