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Seventh report on State responsibility, by Mr. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur

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STATE RESPONSIBILITY

[Agenda item 3]

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Seventh report on State responsibility,
by Mr. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur

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Introduction

1. The present report consists of two chapters. Chapter I deals with the legal consequences of the internationally wrongful acts characterized as international crimes of States in article 19 of part one of the draft articles. It also contains the proposed draft articles relating to the said consequences. Chapter II addresses a few outstanding issues relating to the draft articles on the regime of countermeasures and contains an additional draft article of part three relating to dispute settlement following countermeasures against crimes.

For the text of articles 1-35 of part one adopted on first reading by the Commission, see Yearbook ..., 1980, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 30 et seq.
CHAPTER I

The legal consequences of internationally wrongful acts characterized as crimes in article 19 of part one of the draft articles

A. Introduction

2. The debate carried out at the forty-sixth session of the Commission on the basis of the fifth and sixth reports, particularly on the basis of chapter II of the fifth and sixth reports, indicates that in dealing with the legal consequences of the so-called “international crimes of States”, the Commission is facing—apart from questions of terminology, degree or emphasis—two interrelated problem sets of problems. One of them is the identification—de lege lata or de lege ferenda—of the “special” or “supplementary” consequences of the internationally wrongful acts in question as compared to the internationally wrongful acts generally known as international “delicts”. This could be defined as the merely normative aspect of the consequences of international crimes of States. The other problem, or set of problems, is the identification of the entity or entities which is or should be called upon, in a measure to be decided, to determine and/or implement the said special or supplementary consequences. This could be called the institutional aspect.

3. With regard to the normative aspect, the debate has amply shown that the members of the Commission favouring the retention of the distinction set forth in article 19 of part one accept the obvious and inevitable implication of that distinction. The implication is that, for the said distinction to have any sense or purpose, some special or supplementary consequences are or should be attached to international crimes as opposed to international delicts.

4. As for the institutional aspect, the debate has shown with equal clarity that the members favouring the retention of the distinction believe that the implementation of any special or supplementary consequences requires or should be made to require some form or forms of intervention by one or more international bodies in order to reduce, if not exclude altogether, the arbitrariness that might otherwise characterize the implementation of the said consequences by individual States or groups of States operating without any form of control.

5. Less articulately but no less surely, two further major points emerged from the debate at the forty-sixth session. One point was the close interrelationship between what has been called the merely normative aspect and the institutional aspect. The extent to which special or supplementary consequences of crimes—namely aggravations of the consequences of delicts—can be credible de lege lata or acceptable de lege ferenda depends largely on the extent to which adequate instruments or devices can be envisaged, de lege lata or de lege ferenda, for their proper and above all not arbitrary implementation. A minimum condition for any significant aggravation would be, in the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, some form of objective, juridically dependable determination as to the existence of a crime and its attribution to a State. Although only a few members made specific suggestions with regard to the precise nature of the instrumentality to be relied upon for such a determination, the debate at the forty-sixth session showed that most members favouring the retention of article 19—whatever their reservations on various aspects of the matter—considered that an objective determination as to the existence and attribution of a crime should be a prerequisite for the implementation of any special regime. This was recognized also by members who opposed the retention of the distinction.

6. Another point that seems implicit in the views of most members favouring the retention of article 19 is that the special regime to be proposed for crimes could hardly be envisaged as a matter of strict codification. Although the existence of particularly serious internationally wrongful acts sanctioned by aggravated consequences was rightly considered by the Commission as a part of international law at its twenty-eighth session, when article 19 was adopted on first reading, it seems clear that the precise identification and formulation of the special consequences of such wrongful acts and the determination of an implementation regime for such consequences are bound to impose upon the Commission an effort of progressive development more pronounced than in any other area of State responsibility.

7. Because of the close interrelationship between the identification of the special or supplementary consequences and the devising of an implementation regime, one may well wonder whether it would not be better to deal with the institutional problem before dealing with the purely normative one. Two reasons, however, lead to preference for the reverse order. First of all, it is better to determine what is ultimately to be implemented before thinking of ways and means of implementation. Second, while both areas surely involve important issues of progressive development, the determination of the special or supplementary consequences seems to involve

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4 See Yearbook ... 1976, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 95 et seq.
8. Section B of the present chapter is thus devoted to the identification of the special or supplementary legal consequences of international crimes and to the formulation of the provisions that should be added to the articles of part two relating to the legal consequences of international delicts. Section C deals with the institutional aspect. Section D contains concluding remarks.

B. The special or supplementary consequences of international crimes of States

1. General

9. The distinction set forth in article 19 of part one of the draft articles between two kinds of internationally wrongful acts is based upon the higher degree of gravity of international crimes as compared to international delicts. It follows as a matter of course that this difference should be reflected in the consequences attached (de lege lata) or to be attached (de lege ferenda) to the internationally wrongful acts categorized as crimes. The starting point obviously lies in the articles of part two provisionally adopted to date.5

10. The relevant articles of part two, namely articles 6-8, 10, 10 bis, 11, 13 and 14, are formulated in such terms as to cover the consequences of virtually any internationally wrongful act regardless of its categorization under article 19 of part one. This applies both to articles 6-10 bis on substantive consequences and articles 11-14 on instrumental consequences. None of these articles refers in fact to one or the other of the two categories of breaches established in article 19. The underlying idea, however, is a different one. Having accepted, as a matter of method, the Special Rapporteur’s suggestion that the problem of the special or supplementary consequences of crimes should better be approached at the last stage of the elaboration of part two of the draft articles (this in view of the particular complexity of the subject), the Commission has covered essentially, in articles 6-14, the consequences of delicts. It has kept in abeyance, so to speak, the special or supplementary consequences of crimes.

11. It follows that, although formulated in broad terms encompassing prima facie the consequences of any internationally wrongful act, articles 6-14 cover exhaustively, in principle, the consequences of delicts but not the consequences of crimes. More specifically, the Commission, in elaborating those articles, has left open two issues:

(a) First, if any of the consequences of internationally wrongful acts contemplated in articles 6-14 extends to crimes and, in the affirmative, whether any such consequence should be modified, either by way of strengthening the position of the injured States or by way of aggravating the position of the wrongdoing State;

(b) Secondly, if any further consequences are or should be attached to crimes over and above those contemplated in articles 6-14.

The following paragraphs deal with each of those two issues, first with regard to the substantive consequences and then with regard to the instrumental consequences. In both cases, the best method is to proceed in the order followed in articles 6-14.

2. Substantive consequences

(a) General

12. The general substantive consequence is reparation in the broadest sense, extending to cessation and inclusive of restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. Considering that an obligation to provide reparation in a broad sense is in principle a consequence of any internationally wrongful act regardless of its degree of gravity, it could hardly be doubted that such an obligation is also incumbent upon any State which has committed a crime. Any such State would therefore be subject to the general duty of cessation/reparation set forth in articles 6 and 6 bis of part two of the draft articles.5

13. Considering further that, in the case of crimes, all States are injured States under the definition formulated in article 5 of part two, especially paragraph 3 of that article, any State should be entitled to obtain cessation/reparation (in the above broad sense) from the State which has committed or is committing a crime.

14. The active and passive aspects of the responsibility relationship could therefore be covered in an article 15 of part two which would be the introductory provision of the special regime governing the substantive consequences of international crimes of States.

15. The special regime is introduced (together with that on instrumental consequences) by a chapeau provision, namely article 15 (see section E in the present chapter, below).

16. The provision extending to the case of crimes the general obligations of cessation and reparation set forth in article 6 appears in paragraph 1 of draft article 16 (see section E in the present chapter, below). It will be followed by provisions adapting to crimes the provisions on cessation and reparation contained in articles 6 bis to 10 bis.

(b) Cessation of wrongful conduct

17. Nothing needs to be modified about cessation of wrongful conduct (art. 6) obviously applicable indifferently to crimes and delicts.
18. As contemplated in article 7 of part two of the draft articles, the obligation to provide restitution in kind is subject to a number of mitigations set forth in subparagraphs (a)-(d). Of these mitigations, the first (material impossibility) and the second (breach of an obligation arising from a peremptory norm of international law) seem to be no less appropriate in the case of crimes than in the case of delicts. The same does not seem to hold true, however, for the exceptions contemplated in subparagraphs (c) and (d) of article 7.

19. The exception of subparagraph (c), according to which the injured State would not be entitled to claim restitution in kind where that would involve “a burden out of all proportion to the benefit which the injured State would gain from obtaining restitution in kind instead of compensation”, should not apply in the case of a crime. Considering the *erga omnes* relationship deriving from such a serious internationally wrongful act, most injured States (in the sense of paragraph 3 of article 5 of part two) would probably not derive any individual substantive benefit from compliance, by the wrongdoing State, with its specific obligation to provide restitution in kind. There would thus be little or no sense in establishing a comparative relationship between the situation of the wrongdoer, on one side, and that of one or a few injured States, on the other side. The prevailing consideration should be that the wrongdoing State must restore to the fullest possible extent a state of affairs the maintenance of which is of essential interest—in conformity with the notion set forth in article 19 of part one of the draft articles—to the international community, and this even if a heavy burden is thus placed on the State which has jeopardized that state of affairs by infringing fundamental rules of international law.

20. A similar doubt arises, although to a more limited extent, with regard to that further mitigation of the obligation to provide restitution in kind which is set forth in article 7 (d) of part two. The reference is to the safeguard of the wrongdoing State’s “political independence or economic stability”.

21. The preservation of economic stability, despite its great importance for the people as well as the State concerned, does not seem to present, when assessed against the sacrifice of the injured States’ interest to obtain restitution, quite the same degree of essentiality. With all due consideration for economic sovereignity and economic self-determination, it is questionable whether the States injured by a serious infringement of a rule safeguarding an essential interest of the international community should be deprived totally or in part of restitution in kind because such a remedy might jeopardize the stability of the wrongdoing State’s economy. Such a contingency would not justify relieving the wrongdoing State of the elementary obligation to restore, to the extent materially feasible, the situation pre-existing the breach. However, the waiver of the mitigation should be tempered by a proviso safeguarding the vital needs of the wrongdoing State’s population.

22. Notwithstanding its apparent severity, the suggested waiver of the economic stability safeguard, which is the subject of article 7 (d) of part two, would be particularly appropriate in a situation where the wrongdoing State had enhanced its economic prosperity by the very crime it had committed. An example could be the case of a State having drawn a major economic advantage, in the area of trade relations with other States, from a policy of exploitation or slave labour to the detriment of an ethnically, ideologically, religiously or socially differentiated part of its population in massive breach of obligations relating to fundamental human rights. Another example could be that of a colonial Power enhancing its economic prosperity by pursuing a policy of ruthless exploitation of the resources and the population of a dependent territory. The wrongdoing State could not in such cases be relieved of the obligation to provide restitution in kind, namely to restore the original situation of the unlawfully exploited population or territory by invoking that compliance with this obligation. This would have—as it might well have—a substantial negative impact on its economic stability.

23. Some consideration should also be given, as regards the mitigating factor contained in article 7 (d) of part two, to the possibility of distinguishing, within the general concept of “political independence”, political independence and political regime. Surely, one thing is the independence of a State, namely its existence as a distinct sovereign entity alongside its peers and as a distinct person of international law—and the preservation of that status—another thing is the so-called “freedom of organization” which every sovereign State is entitled to enjoy in the choice of its form of government and in the appointment of its leaders. The two concepts are of course closely interrelated, “freedom of organization” being precisely among the principal manifestations and consequences of the existence of an entity as an independent, sovereign State. There may well be a difference, however, from the viewpoint of the mitigating factor under discussion.

24. If it may be admitted that political independence in the first sense—namely in the sense of independent statehood—would have to be preserved, together, it is to be assumed, with territorial integrity, even at the price of relieving a “criminal” State from the obligation to provide restitution in kind, the same may not be true for the “freedom of organization”—namely for the regime—of such a State. Especially in the case of aggression (a wrongful act frequently perpetrated by dictators or despotic governments), it is far from sure, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, that the obligation to provide full restitution in kind could be mitigated simply because compliance with it could jeopardize the continued existence of a condemnable regime. It should not be overlooked that the preservation of a regime responsible for serious breaches of essential international obligations such as those relating to self-determination, decolonization or human rights may constitute by itself an internationally wrongful act of a very serious nature. Although they cannot be considered as real precedents of individual claims of States for international crimes, illustrations of demands of restitution in kind in cases connoting the type of crimes under paragraph 3 (b) of article 19 of part
25. Whether or not the limitation related to the survival of a political regime falls within the ambit of the mitigating factor set forth in article 7 (d) of part two, it should be excluded in the case of any one of the four kinds of crimes contemplated in paragraph 3 of article 19 of part one.

26. The above considerations lead to the conclusion that the mitigation of the obligation to provide restitution in kind contained in article 7 (d) should not be applicable in the case of a crime, except where full compliance with that obligation would put in jeopardy:

(a) The existence of the wrongdoing State as a sovereign and independent member of the international community or—it is assumed—itits territorial integrity; or

(b) The vital needs of its population in a broad sense, namely, the essential requirements, of a physical or moral nature, of the survival of the population.

27. The provision on restitution in kind as adapted to crimes is set forth in paragraph 2 of draft article 16 (see section E of the present chapter, below).

(d) Compensation

28. No adaptation seems to be necessary with regard to compensation as contemplated in article 8 of part two of the draft articles. Based as it is upon the concept of reparation by equivalent of any economically assessable injury or damage (inclusive of moral damage to private parties), it applies in full in the case of crimes as it does in the case of delicts.

6 Examples are the demands of restitution in kind addressed by the Security Council to States whose behaviour connotes *grasso modo* categories of crimes contemplated in article 19, paragraph 3. Examples of demands of *restitutio* that might affect economic stability are provided by the Security Council resolutions relating to the colonial policies of Portugal and requiring that State to proceed to the immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence. See also, for more detailed requests, paragraph 5 (a), (d) and (e) of Security Council resolution 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963 and resolutions 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 322 (1972) of 22 November 1972.

With regard to the "excessive onerousness" (as provided under article 7 (c) of part two), one may recall the demands addressed to South Africa for the adoption of urgent and effective measures to put an end to the political system of racial discrimination (see especially Council resolutions 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963, 392 (1976) of 19 June 1976, 417 (1977) of 31 October 1977, 473 (1980) of 13 June 1980, 554 (1984) of 17 August 1984, and 556 (1984) of 23 October 1984). Similarly, in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the Council has not only declared the total constitutional illegitimacy of the declaration of independence and other legislative enactments of the Ian Smith regime; it has also stated quite explicitly that the end of that regime was the first prerequisite for the re-establishment of legality in the territory of Southern Rhodesia (see, especially, Council resolutions 423 (1978) of 14 March 1978, 445 (1979) of 8 March 1979 and 448 (1979) of 30 April 1979).

On the question of the "onerousness" of demands addressed to South Africa, see also the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur (footnote 2 above), p. 44, para. 180.

(e) Satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition

29. Another rule on reparation to be reviewed in connection with crimes is paragraph 3 of article 10 of part two relating to that special form of reparation which is satisfaction, a remedy closely interrelated and frequently confused with the guarantees of non-repetition contemplated in article 10 *bis.*

30. Paragraph 3 of article 10 rules out any demands that "would impair the dignity" of the wrongdoer State. The idea is to exclude demands compliance with which would affect, rather than just the dignity, the existence and the sovereignty of the wrongdoer State, namely, its independence, its liberty or its form of government. Although it is expressed only with regard to satisfaction in a narrow sense, this restriction is presumably applicable also to the closely related area of the so-called guarantees of non-repetition. In both areas a differentiation between international crimes of States and delicts seems to be called for.

31. Whether dignity is understood in a narrow or a broad sense, the Special Rapporteur would consider it inappropriate to extend the benefit of that safeguard to a State which is the author of a crime of the kind contemplated in paragraph 3 of article 19 of part one. It would be absurd to allow such a State to rely on dignity in the narrow sense and invoke an image or majesty it has itself offended by wilful wrongful conduct. But it would be equally absurd to allow a State which has committed or is committing an international crime to evade particular demands of satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition by invoking such broad concepts as sovereignty, independence or liberty. As in the case of demands of restitution in kind, the only restrictions which such demands could reasonably be subjected to are those which could be indispensable for the safeguard of:

(a) The continued existence of the wrongdoer State as a sovereign and independent member of the international community and—it is assumed—itits territorial integrity; and

(b) The vital needs of the wrongdoer State’s population, the concept of vital needs being taken in a broad sense, encompassing the population’s essential requirements of a physical or moral nature.

32. Unless areas such as these are affected, the State which committed or is committing a crime should not be permitted to evade, by invoking its sovereignty or independence, not only demands for disarmament, demilitarization, dismantling of war industry, destruction of weapons, acceptance of observation teams, or change to a form of government not incompatible with fundamental freedoms, civil and political rights and self-determination as may be addressed to it following a crime of aggres-

7 It is indeed difficult to distinguish, among the forms of satisfaction, those that are called for only as a matter of thoroughness of reparation and those which may operate as guarantees of non-repetition.
sion,² but also demands that could be justified as forms of satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition further to the commission of crimes of the kinds contemplated in paragraph 3 (b), (c) or (d) of article 19 of part one. The Special Rapporteur is thinking of demands for abrogation of discriminatory, racial or segregationist legislation, popular consultations such as free elections or plebiscites, restoration of fundamental rights and freedoms, dismantling of environmentally dangerous plants and comparable with the aut dedere aut judicare principle with regard to individuals accused of delicta juris gentium.¹⁰ Demands such as these would affect neither the wrongdoing State’s existence (and in that sense its political independence) nor the vital needs of its population. This applies particularly to the obligation of the wrongdoing State not to refuse demands of fact-finding, including in its territory, in order to permit control of full compliance with its obligations of cessation/reparation and guarantees of non-repetition (compare, in this regard, paragraph 31 (b) above).

33. The relevant provision is to be found in paragraph 3 of draft article 16 of part two (see section E of the present chapter, below).

3. INSTRUMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

(a) General

34. Whatever specific features the regime of countermeasures against crimes may have to assume in order to be consistent with the special or supplementary substantive consequences—to all States. This seems to be an inevitable consequence of the fact that, while only some kinds of delicts involve violations of erga omnes obligations, all crimes consist of infringements of erga omnes obligations.¹¹ This is recognized in paragraph 3 of article 5 of part two of the draft articles, whereby, in the case of a crime, all States are injured States. It follows that, subject to any qualifications that the Commission may


Other examples borrowed from the practice of the Security Council are resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 and 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 by which the Council established an International Criminal Tribunal for the trial of persons allegedly responsible for grave violations of humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In particular, the obligation of the possibly responsible State or States to deliver such persons would represent (leaving aside here again the legal merits of the whole matter) a “supplementary” consequence of considerable impact upon the sovereignty-independence of the target State or States (especially in view of the combination of the State and individual liability). See, inter alia, Graefrath and Mohr, loc. cit., p. 130.

deem appropriate to introduce in extending the said option to all States, a State committing a crime is in principle considerably more exposed to countermeasures than a State committing a breach. There is thus an increase in the virtual or actual pressure exercised by the law upon any potential or actual “criminal” States.

37. Like the rules concerning the substantive consequences, the provisions relating to the instrumental consequences of crimes could usefully be preceded by a general opening provision echoing the general provision concerning delicts contained in article 11 of part two. This opening provision should set forth the general principle that any State injured by an international crime of a State whose demands are not met with an adequate response on the part of that State is entitled to resort to countermeasures under the conditions and subject to the limitations specified in subsequent provisions—which provisions would adapt to the case of crimes, where necessary, the provisions of articles 11-14 of part two.

38. Considering that article 11 has only been tentatively adopted, the Special Rapporteur hopes that its formulation could be reviewed, taking into account the specificity of crimes, in two respects, namely:

(a) The “response” from the wrongdoing State; and
(b) The function of countermeasures.

39. The provision on crimes corresponding to article 11 is the subject of paragraph 1 of draft article 17 (see section E of the present chapter, below).

(b) Dispute settlement and prior communication

40. The first problem will be to determine whether and possibly to what extent the conditions of lawful resort to countermeasures spelled out in article 12 of part two of the draft articles,13 should apply also in the case of a crime. The Special Rapporteur is referring to summation or notification and, more particularly, to prior resort to available means of dispute settlement.

41. To begin with the requirement of prior resort to available means of dispute settlement, an adjustment seems to be indispensable. As indicated in the present report (paras. 4-5 above and paras. 85-109 below), the taking of countermeasures against a State which has committed or is committing a crime should be preceded by some form of pronouncement by one or more international organs, as to at least the existence of a crime and its attribution. Such a pronouncement, whatever its nature and whatever the nature of the international body, should suffice for any injured States to be entitled severally or collectively to resort to countermeasures, regardless of whether dispute settlement means are available or used. The basic condition set forth in article 11 of part two of the draft articles—namely, the absence of an “adequate response”, particularly the failure of the wrongdoing State to desist from the unlawful conduct—should suffice for the injured States to be entitled to react.

12 The close relationship between the substantive and instrumental consequences of crimes (close to the point of abolishing a distinction already tenuous in some forms of ordinary satisfaction) manifests itself in some features of the regime imposed upon Iraq by United Nations resolutions following the Gulf war. Without entering into the merits of the individual measures (on which he reserves here his opinion), the Special Rapporteur refers in particular to the creation by the Security Council, under resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, of a compensation fund financed by Iraqi oil exports and the further specifications deriving from Council resolutions 705 (1991) and 706 (1991), both of 15 August 1991, and 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992. Although it cannot be categorized as a countermeasure in a narrow sense, the United Nations Compensation Commission arrangement secures—whatever its legal merits—the institutionalized implementation of the substantive consequences of a crime of aggression. The substantive and instrumental consequences are both aggravated by the circumstance that the arrangement subjects the economy of Iraq to a particularly stringent international control. Also on these aspects, see Graefrath and Mohr, loc. cit., p. 121; Gowlland-Debba, “Security Council enforcement … “, p. 82, and Dupuy, “Après la guerre du Golfe”, p. 636.

13 For the text of draft article 12 (Conditions of resort to countermeasures) as proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report, see Yearbook … 1992, vol. II (Part One), p. 1, document A/CN.4/444 and Add.13; for the text of draft article 12 (Conditions relating to resort to countermeasures) as adopted by the Drafting Committee at the forty-fifth session of the Commission, see Yearbook … 1993, vol. I, 2318th meeting, para. 3.
42. It will be recalled that paragraph 2 (b) of article 12 of part two leaves open the possibility for the injured State to resort to “urgent, temporary measures as are required to protect the rights of the injured State or limit the damage caused by the internationally wrongful act” even before resorting to the available dispute settlement procedures. This issue does not arise in the present context, bearing in mind that the condition of prior resort to dispute settlement procedures would not apply in the case of a crime. A problem does arise, however, with regard to the requirement of a prior pronouncement by an international body, referred to in the preceding paragraph and in the relevant article, as a prerequisite for lawful reaction on the part of any one of the omnes States injured by a crime. It seems reasonable to say that although, prior to such pronouncement, the omnes States injured by a crime are not entitled to resort to full countermeasures, they are nonetheless entitled to resort to such urgent interim measures as are required to protect their rights or limit the damage caused by the crime. The Special Rapporteur is referring to measures aimed at securing immediate access to the victims for purposes of rescue and/or aid or preventing the continuation of a genocide, measures concerning humanitarian convoys, anti-pollution action, passage facilities, etc.

43. The corresponding provision is to be found in paragraph 2 of draft article 17 of part two (see section E of the present chapter, below).

44. However, the option to resort to countermeasures should obviously be closed altogether in case of submission of the matter by the alleged wrongdoing State to the binding third party adjudication procedure to be envisaged in part three.14 By analogy with the provisions of part three as proposed for the settlement of post-countermeasure disputes relating to delicts, the competent third party would be empowered to indicate interim measures with binding effect. The option to resort to countermeasures would revive in case of failure of the wrongdoing State to comply with a third party indication of interim measures or with its obligation to pursue the adjudication procedure in good faith.

45. As for article 12 of part two and its requirement of timely communication, it does not seem that it should apply in the case of a crime, except perhaps in relation to particularly severe measures which might have adverse consequences for the wrongdoing State’s population. A State which has committed or is committing a wrongful act of the degree of gravity of the crimes singled out in article 19 of part one,15 presumably involving a measure of wilful intent, should not be entitled to a warning that might reduce the effectiveness of the countermeasures. Considering anyway that as noted (see para. 36 above) and as proposed (see section C, paras. 100 et seq., below), any special form of reaction to a crime on the part of individual States or groups of States would be preceded by open debates within one or more international bodies, it is unlikely that a wrongdoing State would be unaware of the possibility that injured States could resort to countermeasures.

46. Although bearing at least one half of the responsibility for the formulation at the forty-fifth session of the Commission of article 13 of part two of the draft articles,5 the Special Rapporteur has come to entertain serious doubts, after reconsidering that provision in connection with the instrumental consequences of crimes, as to the appropriateness of the said formulation. He is referring to the clause according to which proportionality should be measured in relation to “the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the effects thereof on the injured State”. Prompted initially by the difficulty of applying such a criterion to countermeasures against the author of a State crime, his doubts now extend, to an almost equal degree, to the implications of the clause in question in relation to delicts. The Special Rapporteur recommends therefore that the Commission give more thought to the matter on the basis of the following considerations.

47. The degree of gravity of an internationally wrongful act should be determined by reference to a number of factors, including the objective importance and subjective scope of the breached rule, the dimension of the infringement, the subjective element, inclusive of the degree of involvement of the wrongdoing State’s organizational structure and of the degree of fault (ranging from culpa levissima to negligence, gross negligence and wilful intent) and, ultimately, the effects of the breach upon both the injured State and the “object of the protection” afforded by the infringed rule.15

48. The Special Rapporteur is of course aware that his colleagues have so far rejected his suggestion that, even for delicts, the subjective element should be taken into more explicit consideration, in determining the degree of gravity and the consequences, than it is in paragraph 2 (c) of article 10 (Satisfaction) of part two.16

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14 As understood in the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 above), the draft articles of part three proposed by this Special Rapporteur left deliberately untouched the problem of post-countermeasures dispute settlement in the case of crimes (see Yearbook ... 1993, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 45 et seq., footnotes 116–117, 121–123 and 125). The proposed provision shall be found in chapter II below. See also, however, section C, para. 109, of the present chapter.

15 To illustrate the effects upon the “object of protection” (or “protected object”), reference may be made to the damage, injury or harm suffered by individuals as a consequence of the violation of human rights obligations. Another example is the damage to the common parts of the human environment caused by a violation of obligations relating to the safeguard of the environment.

16 Among the authors who believe that the element of fault or the wilfulness of the State which has committed a wrongful act is relevant in determining the consequences other than strictly compensatory of the wrongful act (satisfaction, guarantees of non-repetition, countermeasures), the Special Rapporteur recalls Ago, “La colpa nell’illecito internazionale”, p. 302; Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, p. 354; Luzzatto, “Responsabilità e colpa in diritto internazionale”, p. 63; Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, (Continued on next page.)
49. Whatever the attitude with regard to delicts, the Special Rapporteur presumes that a different opinion might well prevail—as he believes it should—with regard to the relevance of the subjective element of crimes. There is hardly any question that willful intent (dolus as the gravest degree of fault) is an essential, sine qua non feature of a crime. It is a point which the Special Rapporteur has occasionally referred to in his reports. Should not, then, this element be considered more explicitly than it was in the cited provision of article 10? Can we, when dealing with proportionality, ignore this element? What about the objective importance and subjective scope of the infringed rule? Is it appropriate, anyway, to refer explicitly to the “effects”—and the effects upon the injured State (or States)—while mentioning neither the importance of the rule, nor culpa or dolus, nor the effects upon the “protected object” (human beings, peoples, the environment)? Are we sure that by expressly mentioning specific factors for the assessment of gravity (such as the effects of the wrongful act upon given subjects, as opposed to objects) while remaining silent on other factors, a misleading message is not conveyed that may affect the proper evaluation of the degree of gravity by stressing certain factors to the detriment of others?

50. The problem is compounded by the difference between delicts and crimes. To speak of the effects of the breach on the injured State may be relatively appropriate (despite the noted emphasis on one factor to the detriment of others) in the case of most delicts. In the area of delicts, the injured party is likely to be a single State but even there, it will not always be so. In the case of an erga omnes delict, the gravity of the effects may well vary from one injured State to another. Assuming that this

would not be a major difficulty, what about an erga omnes violation of human rights obligations? What effect does such a violation have on each and every State? In terms of physical damage, the effect may be minimal. In terms of injury (to be measured against the importance of the rule and of the infringed human right or freedom), the effect is in principle very significant for omnes States involved; but what about the States’ diverse perceptions of the injury? For a State whose legal system is highly developed in the area of human rights and public opinion very sensitive to violations by other States, the effect will be very significant. For a State in a different situation, it may be minor or inexistent. Crimes being always erga omnes, the assessment of gravity on such a subjective basis as that suggested by the article 13 formula may lead to difficulties. First, there may be considerable variations depending on differences in the extent of damage or differences of perception among the omnes injured States. Secondly, there may well be damage to a “protected object” transcending the degree of injury suffered or perceived by any one of the injured States.

51. Once more one is confronted with maximalistic and minimalistic theoretically conceivable solutions. An ambitious solution would be to attempt an enumeration, as complete as possible, of the multiple relevant factors of gravity. This would lead too far into a revision of article 13, with little chance of success. Another solution would be to leave article 13 as it stands for delicts and try a different formulation for crimes. Considering, however, that the “effects on the injured State” clause is also inappropriate for delicts and that a drastically different treatment of delicts and crimes in that respect might be misleading for the interpreter, a better solution would be simply to drop that clause for both delicts and crimes. For both, the rule would be article 13 as amended through the elimination of the words “effects on the injured State”.

52. For delicts as well as crimes, the proportionality criterion would thus remain the gravity of the wrongful act alone as a whole. Instead of mentioning some factors of gravity and omitting others, article 13 would refer to the whole range of those factors as reflected in the term “wrongful act” as an all-embracing concept. It will be for the commentary to explain the choice of the Commission: a choice that appears logically more correct and more adaptable to the multiplicity and variety of the concurring factors of gravity of a wrongful act.

53. The concept of the gravity of the effects upon one or more given States—the so-called directly or more directly injured States—would obviously be subsumed under the comprehensive concept of gravity of the violation, encompassing all factors like those tentatively listed in paragraph 47 above.

54. The relevant provision is to be found in paragraph 3 of draft article 17 of part two (see section E of the present chapter, below).

(d) Prohibited countermeasures

55. As regards prohibited countermeasures, no significant departure from the text of article 14 of part two of
the draft articles, as adopted by the Commission at its forty-sixth session, seems to be called for in relation to crimes.

56. It can hardly be doubted that the prohibitions contained in article 14 (a)–(b) of part two, extend to countermeasures in response to a crime. The Special Rapporteur is referring to the prohibition of countermeasures consisting in the threat or use of force and the prohibition of forms of extreme economic or political coercion.

57. The prohibitions contemplated in the preceding paragraph apply, of course, neither to the forcible measures decided upon by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations nor to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. Both exceptions are covered by draft article 20 (see section E of the present chapter, below).

58. Equally applicable to crimes seem to be the prohibitions contained in the last three subparagraphs of article 14. The Special Rapporteur is referring to the prohibitions which are intended to safeguard the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premières, archives and documents (art. 14 (c)), basic human rights (art. 14 (d)) and the obligations deriving from a peremptory norm of international law (art. 14 (e)).

59. Although they were originally intended to apply to countermeasures following upon mere delicts, the said prohibitions must extend, in view of the high importance of the “protected objects”, to countermeasures in response to crimes. As a result, of course, the kinds of measures that injured States may take against a “criminal” State will be significantly reduced. In the case of crimes as opposed to that of delicts, however, the constraints deriving from the three prohibitions will be counterbalanced by the increase in the number of States—omnes injured States—entitled to resort to those countermeasures which are not covered by the prohibitions. This is not without importance given the multiplicity of actors—not to mention the “hue and cry” effect of a finding of crime by competent international bodies. The best illustration of the range of measures not involving the use of force that may be taken is provided by Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations which, although pertaining to a context different from that of international responsibility, can offer, mutatis mutandis, useful guidance to any one of the omnes injured States in determining their reaction. According to that provision, non-forcible measures may include “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”. Taken by a number of States, which may amount to the totality of the members of the international community, measures such as these (which, it is true, also encompass measures of mere retortion) would—combined with moral condemnation—constitute a far more effective reaction and deterrent than any similar measures taken by one or a few States injured by a delict.

18 The exception to the prohibitions set forth in article 14, paragraph 1 (a)–(b), of part two in the case of measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations is clearly confirmed by the practice of the Security Council. This applies both to the use of force and to the use of severe economic measures:

(a) With regard to the use of force, one may recall, in addition to the major example of resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 authorizing the use of force against Iraq, a number of Security Council resolutions providing similar authorizations in order to impose compliance with substantive obligations of the wrongdoing State. Examples are Council resolutions 678 (1990), 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 773 (1992) of 26 August 1992. These resolutions, all concerning the aftermath of the Gulf war, reiterate the Security Council’s decision to guarantee with all necessary means compliance by Iraq with its reparation obligations, the inviolability of the Iraqi-Kuwait border and the maintenance of the demilitarized zone established in the border area. The use of force is also authorized in other resolutions intended to ensure the effectiveness of measures adopted by the Council under Articles 40 (provisional measures) and 41 (economic sanctions) of the Charter. A well-known precedent is resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966 which requested the British Government to prevent, “by the use of force if necessary”, the arrival at the harbour of Beira, Mozambique, of oil supplies for Southern Rhodesia. Of a similar purpose are resolutions 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 and 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993 relating to the enforcement of economic measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Other authorizations to use force have been issued by the Security Council in order to enforce protective measures of a humanitarian character. Such is the case of resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 813 (1993) of 26 March 1993. For a review of Security Council practice, see Freidenschuh, “Between unilateralism and collective security: authorizations of the use of force by the UN Security Council”.

(b) A departure from article 14, paragraph 2 (b), seems to be envisaged when economic measures available to the Council under Article 41 of the Charter, whenever the intensity, scope, and duration of such measures attain the level of “extreme measures of economic coercion”.

19 However, some thought should be given by the Commission to the problem of those countermeasures that may affect the sovereignty-independence (exclusive of territorial sovereignty), the liberty or the domestic jurisdiction of the wrongdoing State. Although such elements are not mentioned in article 14 of part two of the draft, they may be implied either in the prohibition of military force and extreme forms of political or economic pressure or in the prohibition safeguarding peremptory rules (jus cogens). Assuming—as the Special Rapporteur assumes—that such is the correct solution with regard to delicts, can the same thing be said with regard to crimes? Are there not, for example, situations or circumstances in which one or more of the omnes injured States could lawfully violate under article 11 of part two (provided they did not infringe the prohibition of force or extreme political or economic measures) the sovereignty-independence or domestic jurisdiction of a State which has committed or is committing a crime? Examples could be the imposition of protected areas, no-fly zones, in loco fact-finding and control and other forms of intrusive action in the criminal State’s territory vis-à-vis private parties or government officials, or the arrest or seizure of the criminal State’s merchant ships on the high seas et similia. Would it not be showing undue leniency towards an aggressive State to bar the application to that State, by the omnes injured State, by the act of aggression, of countermeasures infringing upon the said State’s independence or domestic jurisdiction except on the basis of Security Council measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and, of course, self-defence? When we speak of “domestic jurisdiction” we have in mind (at least within the present context) not the area in which the wrongdoing State would be free from international obligations but the sphere of inter-individual relations within the State, subject to the public and private law of that State and to the exclusive competence or jurisdiction of...
60. In conclusion, article 14 of part two, as adopted, does not call for any adaptation to be applicable to crimes.

4. OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMES

61. The special regime of the consequences of crimes should be completed by adding two further sets of provisions. One set of provisions should specify that the State which has committed or is committing a crime shall not be entitled to oppose fact-finding operations and control missions in its territory for the verification of compliance with the obligations of cessation and reparation. A second set of provisions should cover a number of special obligations of omnes injured States, broadening the scope of the proposals made by the preceding Special Rapporteur, Mr. Riphagen, in his draft article 14.20 The object of such obligations would be to ensure consistency, solidarity or cooperation among States in condemning the crime, censuring the conduct of the law-breaking State and otherwise reacting thereto.

62. The obligations of injured States referred to in the preceding paragraph should be intended to ensure that:

(a) The law-breaking State does not find any support for the maintenance or legitimization of the situation created in its favour by the perpetration of the crime; and

(b) The actions of other States lawfully seeking to reinstate the infringed right are not hindered.

To that end the proposals of Mr. Riphagen could be used, subject to some important additions and adjustments.

63. According to Mr. Riphagen’s draft article 14, paragraph 2, the States would be under the obligation:

(a) Not to recognize as legal the situation created by the crime;

(b) Not to render aid or assistance to the State which has committed such crime in maintaining the situation created by such crime;

(c) To join other States in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the obligations under subparagraphs (a) and (b).

64. Subparagraph (a) could usefully and appropriately be reinforced through the addition of a clause specifying that ex delicto jus non oritur should apply to both the national and the international legal effects that may have derived or be deriving from the situation created by the internationally wrongful act. National and international law should both be expressly mentioned.21

65. Subparagraph (b) could with advantage be more forcibly worded.22

66. Subparagraph (c) is per se satisfactory—notwithstanding possible drafting improvements—as it expresses the duty of all States to assist each other in complying with the obligations set forth in subparagraphs (a)-(b).23 In addition, it might be useful to provide that the omnes injured States should coordinate, insofar as possible, their respective reactions.

67. The enunciation of the positive obligation to cooperate could usefully be supplemented by a mention of the more precise and perhaps more significant duty not to

(Footnote 19 continued.)

21 The basic obligation concerned has found expression in the Security Council’s practice. Faced with situations possibly belonging in the category of international crimes, the Council called States not to recognize (and to consider null and void) all legal effects deriving therefrom. See, for instance, resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, in which the Council condemned the unilateral declaration of independence by the regime of Southern Rhodesia and called upon States “not to recognize this illegal racist regime”; resolution 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, in which the Council called upon States not to recognize the legal effects of the Iraqi declaration of annexation of Kuwait; and resolution 554 (1984) of 17 August 1984, in which the Council declared void and without legal effects the new constitution and the elections carried out in that country by the Government of South Africa. Moreover, the Council itself declared in explicit terms the radical nullity of all acts taken by the wrongdoing State with regard to the unlawful situation. Compare in addition resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 on Southern Rhodesia, and resolutions 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990 and 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, concerning respectively the nullity of the Iraqi decrees of closure of foreign diplomatic missions in Kuwait and declarations by Iraq concerning its external debts. On these points, see Gowlland-Debbas, “Security Council enforcement ... “, pp. 74–76.

22 Here too, illustrations are provided by Security Council practice. In addition to the resolutions cited above in footnote 21, see the explicit terms of resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965, by which the Council urged all States “to refrain from offering ... the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration”.

23 As for these obligations, reference may be made to Security Council resolution 402 (1976) of 22 December 1976 in which the Council, after commending Lesotho for its decision not to recognize the so-called independence of Transkei granted by South Africa, appealed to all States “to provide immediate financial, technical and material assistance to Lesotho so that it can carry out its economic development programmes and enhance its capacity to implement fully the United Nations resolutions on apartheid and bantustans” (see also resolution 535 (1983) of 29 June 1983). The practice of the Council seems to confirm that such assistance takes mainly the form of economic aid and support offered to countries particularly exposed to the negative impact of the political and economic isolation of the law-breaking State. Relevant in this respect are the various cases of assistance afforded by the Council on the basis of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations (see, inter alia, resolutions 386 (1976) of 17 March 1976 and 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990). Concerning the mutual assistance obligation, it should also be possible to remedy the problem deriving from resort to countermeasures (or other forms of political pressure) which may, because of their intensity, affect the rights of States other than the law-breaking State.
hinder in any way the action of the States which choose to exercise their right to react to a crime. Such a provision would more clearly outlaw the conduct of any State which not only abstains from reacting to a grave infringement of a fundamental legal interest of the international community but thwarts—by action or omission—the measures put into effect by other States or otherwise reduces their effectiveness.24

68. Further useful additions would be:

(a) A provision concerning the implementation of the *dedere aut judicare* principle vis-à-vis individuals accused of “connected” *delicta juris gentium*;

(b) A provision relating to cooperation with international bodies which may be involved in the reaction to a crime;

(c) A provision under which the *omnia* injured States should facilitate the adoption and implementation of lawful measures called for by emergencies caused by the crime.

69. The relevant draft article 18 (see section E of the present chapter, below) covers the two sets of provisions referred to in paragraph 61 above.

C. The indispensable role of international institutions

1. General

70. Aside from being objectively more severe, the substantive and instrumental consequences of crimes present, as noted, the difference reflected in article 5, paragraph 3, of part two of the draft articles. Reference is made to the difference inherent in the fact that while most—or not all—delicts involve only one or a few injured States, any crime may involve, possibly (albeit not always) in different degrees, all States as injured States.

71. The fact that all States are involved as injured States does not mean, on the other hand, that the implementation of the consequences of crimes is structurally different from the implementation of the consequences of most delicts. In both cases the actors are States. This is obvious for those consequences of internationally wrongful acts which are common to both categories of wrongful acts and are equally true for those special or supplementary consequences which have been considered in the previous section as attaching exclusively to crimes. In the predominantly inorganic condition of the inter-State system, even the implementation of the consequences of internationally wrongful acts resulting—in the words of article 19, paragraph 2, of part one1—from the breach of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole seems to remain in principle, under general international law, in the hands of States.

72. This obvious corollary of the absence, in the inter-State system, of authoritative institutions for the enforcement of the law is of course not surprising. Even in the area where States have entrusted an international institution with the far-reaching function of taking direct forcible measures for the maintenance of peace, it is always through the action of States that effective enforcement actually takes place. The concept of an organized international community is, indeed, an overstatement.25

73. Considering the gravity of crimes and the severity of their special or supplementary consequences, very serious difficulties might arise from a universalization of the status of injured State. The risks of arbitrariness, inconsistencies and conflict involved in deciding on the existence of a crime and its attribution and in subsequently implementing the consequences will be very high. Unlike the implementation of responsibility for delict which normally concerns two or a few States, the implementation of responsibility for crimes involves the *omnia* injured States and the risks of arbitrariness and conflict increase geometrically.26

74. The Commission would therefore be ill-advised if it did not try to reduce the area of potential discord in implementation. The debate at the forty-sixth session shows that all the members of the Commission—including those who advocated the abandonment of the distinction embodied in article 19 of part one—are fully aware of the importance of the issue.

75. Some of the institutional problems which could arise in connection with the implementation of the rules relating to international crimes of States were discussed


26 Some of the problems were identified by a number of speakers at the Florence symposium of 1984 (see *International Crimes of State—A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility*, J. H. H. Weiler, A. Cassese and M. Spinedi, eds. (Berlin, New York, 1989)). An example is Stein’s “Observations on ‘crimes of States’”, pp. 198 et seq.
in the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur; and institutional problems have been evoked more or less explicitly—although rather vaguely—in the course of the debate at the forty-sixth session and not only by members favouring the distinction embodied in article 19 of part one. A closer look at the possible options now seems indispensable.27

76. From the debate itself and from an analysis of the reactions of States and international bodies to breaches akin to those singled out in the four subparagraphs of paragraph 3 of article 19, there emerges a number of theoretical options (more or less innovative) which should be explored.

77. The conceivable options seem to be:

(a) A high degree of institutionalization—through resort to existing international organs or to organs to be created—of the totality or the greater part of the process of implementation of the consequences of crimes, starting from the decision on the existence and attribution of a crime and moving to the determination of the actual substantive and instrumental consequences of the breach. Within the framework of the same option, one step further could be taken in the direction of institutionalization and entrusting even the actual application of any or all of the special or supplementary consequences to the same or to another international organ;

(b) A more or less reduced degree of institutionalization through resort to existing international organs. This option would include any formula other than the most ambitious ones, the minimal solution being to entrust to one or more existing international bodies the determination that triggers any process of implementation of the consequences of a crime, namely the determination as to whether a crime has been or is being perpetrated and as to whether the breach is attributable to one or more given States.

2. INSTANCES OF “ORGANIZED” REACTION TO VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

78. Important instances of institutional reaction to gross violations of international obligations akin to those which would be condemned as crimes under article 19 of part one of the draft articles can be found in the practice of the General Assembly and Security Council. The Special Rapporteur deems it necessary to make clear, however, that in referring to any such instances in the present chapter he shall let aside both the merits of the United Nations reactions in each particular instance, on one side, and the precise legal qualification of case from the viewpoint of State responsibility, on the other side.

79. To begin with the reaction of the General Assembly in cases probably falling under article 19, paragraph 3 (a), of part one, suffice it to recall the numerous resolutions by which the Assembly strongly condemned during the 1960s and 1970s, the aggressive policies carried out by some colonial or racist States—such as Portugal, South Africa or the minority regime of Southern Rhodesia—towards dependent populations or neighbouring States on the African continent.28 Mention may also be made—again without taking a stand on the merits of each situation—of several resolutions by which the Assembly condemned armed attacks by Israel against the territory of Lebanon, or explicitly qualified as aggressive the policy of that State in the territories occupied after 1967.29 Other important instances of vigorous condemnation of acts of aggression by the Assembly include Israel’s armed attack against the Iraqi nuclear installations,30 the United States of America’s bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi,31 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ intervention in Afghanistan.32 More recently, the Assembly strongly condemned the continuing violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia

27 The problem of the possible forms of “institutionalization” reaction to violations of erga omnes obligations which could fall under the category of international crimes has been deeply debated in literature; see, inter alia, Frowein, “Collective enforcement of international obligations”, especially pp. 73–77; Hailbronner, “Sanctions and third parties and the concept of public international order”, pp. 2 et seq.; Simma, “Does the UN Charter provide an adequate legal basis for individual or collective responses to violations of obligations erga omnes?”; Picone, “Nazioni Unite e obblighi ‘erga omnes’”; Annacker, loc. cit., especially pp. 156 et seq.

28 See, for instance, the preambular part of General Assembly resolution 3113 (XXVIII), in which it “condemned the repeated acts of aggression committed by armed forces of Portugal against independent African States, which constitute a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those States, and found these activities likely to “seriously disturb international peace and security”; in the same vein, see also Assembly resolutions 2707 (XXV) and 2795 (XXVI). Similar findings are reflected in resolutions 31/154 A and 32/116 in connection with the armed attacks conducted by the Rhodesian regime against the territories of Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. As for South Africa, the Assembly condemned in an impressive series of resolutions what it qualified as acts of aggression perpetrated by that Government from the non-independent territory of Namibia against Angola, Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia; see, inter alia, resolutions 31/146, 32/9 D, 33/182 A, 33/206, 38/17, 38/36 A, 39/50 A, 40/25, 40/97 A, 41/39 A and 42/14 A.

29 Particularly explicit are the terms of General Assembly resolution 38/17, by which it “strongly condemn[ed] the massacre of Palestinians and other civilians in Beirut and the Israeli aggression against Lebanon, which endangers stability, peace and security in the region”, and the terms of its resolution 37/123 A, by which the Assembly declared that “Israel’s decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Golan Heights constitutes an act of aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX)” and found “all Israeli policies and practices of, or aimed at, annexation of the occupied Palestinian and other occupied territories of Lebanon to be in violation of international law and of the relevant United Nations resolutions”. On the question of Lebanon, see also resolutions 35/207, ES–7/5, 37/43 and 40/25. For further condemnations of the allegedly illegal and aggressive Israeli policies in occupied territories, see, inter alia, resolutions 38/180 A, 39/146 B, 40/168 B, 41/162 B, 42/209 C, 43/54 B, 44/40 B and 45/83 B.

30 See General Assembly resolution 36/27, in which the Assembly “strongly condemns Israel for its premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct, which constitutes a new and dangerous escalation in the threat to international peace and security”.

31 See General Assembly resolution 41/38.

32 See General Assembly resolution ES–6/2.
and Herzegovina and asked for the immediate cessation of such aggressive and hostile acts.

80. The General Assembly also reacted in a number of situations probably falling under article 19, paragraph 3 (b), of part one, dealing with colonial occupation and domination maintained in breach of the principle of self-determination. At the general level, the Assembly asserted in a number of resolutions the “criminal” character of such policies and described them as a potential threat to international peace and security. The Assembly did not hesitate to denounce explicitly the individual States it considered to be responsible for such practices. Sufficient to it recall—without, here again, entering into the merits of each case—the colonial rule of Portugal in the African territories under its administration, the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia, the rule of the minority regime of Southern Rhodesia and the policy of Israel in the Palestinian occupied territories.

81. As for the type of crime provided for in article 19, paragraph 3 (c), of part one, namely, a “serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being”, a well-known example is the General Assembly’s reiterated condemnation of the racial regime of South Africa and the Assembly’s call to the Security Council for the adoption of measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Most recently, the Assembly also reacted to massive violations of human rights coming under the concept of genocide: repression of the Kurdish and Shi’ite minorities in Iraq, “ethnic cleansing” and other systematic mass violence and abuse in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

82. Examples of institutional reactions to situations likely to fall under the category of international crimes may also be found, of course, in the practice of the Security Council. With regard to aggression, the two precursors of the Korean war and the Gulf war may be recalled. In both cases, the Council reacted so strongly—after determining that a breach of international peace had occurred—as to recommend or authorize the use of armed force by Member States. Short of such extreme reactions, strong condemnations of instances of aggression were voiced by the Council in a number of other cases, some of which have already been mentioned with reference to the General Assembly. More recently, the Council found that the continuing acts of aggression directed against the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Serbian army were likely to constitute a grave threat to international peace and security and, on that basis, imposed a series of enforcement measures against the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for its assistance to irregular Serbian units.

83. Not differently from the General Assembly, the Security Council has uttered strong condemnations of the colonial and repressive practices violating the principle of self-determination. In some instances, it has also adopted measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

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33 See, for example, General Assembly resolution 47/121.
34 Compare the set of General Assembly resolutions devoted to the question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, inter alia, resolutions 2189 (XXI), 2326 (XXII), 2465 (XXIII), 2548 (XXIV), 2621 (XXV), 2708 (XXV), 2878 (XXVI), 2908 (XXVII), 3163 (XXVIII), 3328 (XXIX), 3481 (XXX), 31/143, 32/42, 33/44, 33/95, 35/118 and 35/159.
35 See, for instance, paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2270 (XXII), in which it “strongly condemns the colonial war being waged by the Government of Portugal against the peaceful peoples of the Territories under its domination, which constitutes a crime against humanity and a grave threat to international peace and security”. See also, in the same vein, resolutions 2107 (XX), 2395 (XXII), 2707 (XXV), 2795 (XXVI) and 3113 (XXVIII).
36 See, inter alia, General Assembly resolutions 2074 (XX), 2145 (XXII), 2325 (XXII), 2403 (XXIV), 2517 (XXIV), 2678 (XXV), 2871 (XXVI), 3031 (XXVII), 3111 (XXVIII), 3295 (XXIX) and also the resolutions cited above (footnote 28).
37 See, inter alia, General Assembly resolutions 2022 (XX), 2151 (XXII), 2383 (XXIII), 2508 (XXIV), 2632 (XXV), 2946 (XXVII), 3115 (XXVIII), 3116 (XXVIII), 3297 (XXIX), 3298 (XXIX) and 3396 (XXX).
39 See, inter alia, General Assembly resolutions 2202 A (XXI), 2307 (XXIII), 2296 B (XXIV), 2671 F (XXV), 2775 F (XXVI), 2923 E (XXVII), 3151 G (XXVIII), 3324 E (XXIX), 31/11, 32/105 K, 33/24, 38/11 and 41/35 A.
40 See General Assembly resolution 46/134.
41 See General Assembly resolutions 47/147 and 48/88.
42 For the Korean case, see in particular Security Council resolutions 82 (1950), 83 (1950) and 84 (1950); for the Gulf war, see in particular resolutions 660 (1990) and 678 (1990).
United Nations. One may recall the Portuguese policies in overseas territories, the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and the minority regime of Southern Rhodesia.  

84. The Security Council reacted similarly to massive violations of human rights. Noteworthy in this respect are the resolutions condemning the policy of apartheid of the South African Government and those related to genocide in Iraqi Kurdistan and “ethnic cleansing” in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

3. CONCEIVABLE OPTIONS FOR AN “ORGANIZED” DETERMINATION OF EXISTENCE/ATTRIBUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME

85. Going back to the problem and to the possible solutions considered (para. 77 above), the first option indicated does not seem to be practical. Although such a degree of institutionalization of the reaction of an “organized international community” to crimes may be theoretically desirable, and might occasionally be achieved in limited, specific areas, it would require a major development of the inter-State system which is very unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.

86. On the other hand, the alternative option indicated is worthy of serious consideration. Although it would also involve a relatively high degree of progressive development, it seems much less problematic. Express or implied indications in comparable directions did emerge from the debate at the forty-sixth session of the Commission.

87. That debate shows conclusively, in particular, that the most crucial problem to be faced in the application of any rules that the Commission may adopt (de lege lata or de lege ferenda) with regard to the special or supplementary consequences of crimes, relates to determination of the existence of any such wrongful act and its attribution to one or more States. Surely, this problem arises for any internationally wrongful act, whatever its degree of gravity; and it becomes particularly acute whenever the breach—even if it constitutes a mere delict—involves more than one injured State. But the exceptional gravity of crimes and the fact that they involve all States as injured States requires imperatively that some form of collective determination be made, by an international body, as regards the prerequisite for implementation of the consequences of a crime, namely the existence of a breach and its attribution. A number of solutions could theoretically be envisaged in the light of the specific functions of available international organs.

(a) A determination made exclusively by the International Court of Justice, General Assembly or the Security Council?

88. Prima facie, the most appropriate choice should be dictated by the essentially judicial nature of the determination in question. This would thus lead to the obvious conclusion that, although the implementation of the consequences would remain—as in the case of delicts—in the hands of States, the determination as to the existence and attribution of the breach should emanate from the most authoritative and representative judicial body at present in existence, namely, ICJ. It is the only existing permanent body possessing, in principle, the competence and the technical means to determine the existence, attribution and consequences of an internationally wrongful act.

89. Such a solution, obviously implying the acceptance (in the future convention on State responsibility) of the compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ, would come across at least two serious obstacles. In the first place, no international institution performing the task of a prosecutor is to be found, at the side of a strictly judicial organ like ICJ. The Court itself would not be in a position to “filter” or “screen” the allegations levelled against allegedly criminal States. Secondly, once ICJ were endowed with the indispensable compulsory jurisdiction, even for the limited purpose of the basic determination in question, it would be difficult to confine such a general jurisdictional link to the area of hopefully infrequent internationally wrongful acts defined as crimes. Any State could, by alleging that another State has committed or is committing a crime, bring that State before the Court for the purpose of determining the existence of a mere delict.


48 See the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur (footnote 2 above), p. 49, para. 214.
90. Another theoretically conceivable option would be that the future convention entrust the determination in question to the General Assembly or to the Security Council.

91. The General Assembly would seem to be particularly appropriate for a number of reasons. Compared to the Security Council in particular, the General Assembly is generally considered to be more “democratic”. Furthermore, the quasi-universality of the United Nations results in the Assembly being the most representative spokesman not only of the so-called “organized international community” but of the international community itself. The Assembly appears thus to be more qualified than any existing international body to impersonate, so to speak, that inter-assembly appears thus to be more qualified than any existing community” but of the international community itself. The Assembly is thus clearly competent to deal—de lege lata as well as de lege ferenda—with all four areas where serious breaches such as those characterized as crimes in article 19 may occur.

92. A further feature of the General Assembly which makes it particularly suitable for the purpose under consideration is the very broad range of its competence ratione materiae, which encompasses not only—albeit with very different powers—the main and far more focused area of responsibility of the Security Council, i.e. the maintenance of international peace and security, but also areas of international cooperation governed by rules the most serious infringements of which correspond to the three classes of international crimes contemplated, in addition to this, in article 19, paragraph 3, of part one. The Special Rapporteur is referring to such areas as economic, social and cultural cooperation and such rules as those relating to self-determination, human rights, the protection of the environment, not to mention the progressive development and codification of international law. The Assembly is thus clearly competent to deals—de lege lata as well as de lege ferenda—with all four areas where serious breaches such as those characterized as crimes in article 19 may occur.

93. On the other hand, the General Assembly has no competence to make determinations in the area of State responsibility. In addition, the Assembly does not have the power to take binding decisions, except in specific areas, for example, for the purposes of Articles 5, 6, and 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, and in procedural matters. Although procedural questions surely could cover the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary bodies to investigate, for example, facts possibly amounting to an international crime, mere recommendations by the Assembly would not carry sufficient weight to form the basis of an authoritative legal determination as to the existence of a crime and its attribution. The Assembly would not, therefore, seem to be—despite its relatively more representative character—the appropriate body to be made solely responsible for the determination in question.

94. Moving to the Security Council, the determination of the existence of an act of aggression, a function entrusted to the Council by the Charter of the United Nations—albeit not for establishing State responsibility—could be considered to provide the basis for the implementation by States of the consequences of the crime defined in article 19, paragraph 3 (a), of part one. A role could also be envisaged for the Council with regard to the kinds of crimes covered by article 19, paragraph 3 (b), (c) and (d), bearing in mind the Council’s competence to determine, under Article 39 of the Charter, breaches and threats to the peace, and particularly the latter. The practice of the Council reveals in fact instances of findings of threats to the peace—albeit in principle, it is true, for the exclusive purposes of Chapter VII—in the context of situations comparable to those involving crimes under article 19, paragraph 3 (b), (c) and (d), and the written or unwritten primary rules implied therein.50

95. Without prejudice, of course, to the Security Council’s powers relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, it does not seem that the Council could, any more than the General Assembly, be made solely responsible for the basic legal determination that should be a prerequisite for the implementation by States

of the consequences of crimes. That determination pertains appropriately to the application of the law of international responsibility rather than the maintenance of international peace and security.51

96. Despite the interaction between these two crucial areas of inter-State relations, requiring the Security Council solely to proceed to the basic determination in question would be at least as problematic as asking the General Assembly singly to discharge that same function. The Council might appear better equipped to do so in view of the binding force of its decisions, but it would be less suitable than the Assembly because of its restricted membership and the specificity of its competence ratione materiae.

97. Whatever the considerations respectively applicable to the General Assembly and the Security Council, the main difficulty resides for both in the political nature of their composition and role:

(a) Both bodies operate with a high degree of discretion. They act neither necessarily nor systematically in all the situations that would seem to call for the exercise of their competence. They operate, instead, in a selective and at times very selective way;

(b) Neither body is bound to use uniform criteria in situations which may seem quite similar. Consequently, situations of the same kind and gravity can be treated differently or not treated at all;

(c) The very nature of their determinations seems to exclude any duty on their part to motivate their choices (in the form of decision, action or inaction) from the viewpoint of international law;

(d) The discretionary and possibly arbitrary character of their choices is further aggravated by the fact that, in the absence of legal motivation, no contemporary or subsequent verification of the legitimacy of actual choices and no comparison between such choices are possible.52

98. From the above features it is clear that neither the involvement of the General Assembly nor that of the Security Council could satisfy the most elementary requirements of a legal determination as to the existence and attribution of an internationally wrongful act, let alone of an international crime of State. Much as concession must be made to the unique structure of the inter-State system, any ascribing of responsibility should presuppose, as shown by the history of the law of national societies:

(a) Subjection to the rule of law, at the procedural as well as substantive levels;

(b) Continuity, systematization and impartiality—or non-selectivity—with regard to the infringements of the law.53

99. The Special Rapporteur also briefly considered, in his fifth report,2 whether recent practice might not indicate that the scope of the Security Council’s competence had undergone an evolution with regard precisely to the “organized reaction” to certain types of particularly serious international delinquencies. However, that practice could only be viewed as having endowed the Council with a competence in the area of State responsibility for crimes if it could be convincingly established that it was a juridically decisive practice. Such a conclusion would at all events be very problematic to reach de lege lata,54 and it does not appear that a solution of the kind would be appropriate as a matter of progressive development of the law of international organization.55

(b) Political and judicial roles combined

100. The features of ICJ, the General Assembly and the Security Council considered in the preceding paragraphs seem thus to suggest that none of those bodies could properly discharge by itself, individually, the delicate function of determining the existence of an international

51 This distinction was stressed by the Special Rapporteur at the forty-fourth session of the Commission when he contested his predecessor’s formulation of article 4 of part two of the draft articles where the law of State responsibility seemed to be unduly subordinated to the provisions and procedures of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security (see Yearbook ... 1992, vol. I, 2277th meeting, and ibid., vol. II (Part Two), p. 38, paras. 260–266.

The matter is closely interrelated with the distinction between the powers of the Security Council under Chapters VII and VI of the Charter of the United Nations, the latter powers being confined to mere recommendation. In this respect, see also Yearbook ... 1992, vol. I, 2267th meeting, in fine. See also Graefrath, loc. cit., pp. 190 et seq.; and paragraphs 137–139 below.


As noted by the Government of Switzerland with respect to a well-known problem arising within the framework of the topic entitled “Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind”, “To suggest that decisions of the Council, a political organ if ever there was one, should serve as a direct basis for national courts when they are called upon to establish individual culpability and determine the severity of the penalty does not seem to be in keeping with a sound conception of justice” (see the thirteenth report of the Special Rapporteur on the topic (document A/CN.4/466 and Corr.1), para. 40).


53 See the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur (footnote 2 above), p. 48, para. 211.

54 Ibid., paras. 212–213.

crime of State and its attribution as prerequisites for the implementation of the consequences contemplated in the relevant articles of the draft articles on State responsibility. A different solution must, therefore, be devised: and that solution seems to be dictated by the respective features of the three main United Nations bodies.

101. On the one hand, the General Assembly and the Security Council are too exclusively political to be entrusted with such an eminently juridical function as that of determining the existence and attribution of an international crime. On the other hand, ICJ, while endowed with the necessary juridical capacity, is not endowed with the equally indispensable specific competence; and it would be inappropriate, as explained, to confer upon it an unconditional, direct competence with respect to crimes, that would inevitably develop into an unwanted generalized compulsory jurisdiction with regard to delicts as well. The only solution seems to lie in a combination of the political element with the judicial element in such a manner as to avoid the drawbacks of both an exclusively political and an exclusively judicial determination. It could be a political assessment, by the Assembly or the Council, of the allegation of the accusing State (or States) aimed at determining if the allegation is serious enough to justify the serious concern of the international community; such a political pronouncement would then open the way to a possible involvement of ICJ.

102. As regards the political body’s role, it should consist in the adoption of a resolution by a qualified majority. For the General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur is thinking of a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. For the Security Council, two possibilities could be envisaged as a matter of principle. The first theoretical possibility would be to require a mere two-thirds majority, without further qualification. Such a solution would call into question the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members and could only be considered within the framework of a revision of the Charter of the United Nations. The second possibility would be to provide that, in conformity with the principle set forth in Article 27 of the Charter, “a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting”. This alternative seems to be a fair and realistic one.

103. The nature of the ICJ pronouncement could be envisaged in different ways of unequal juridical appeal. One possibility would be to involve the judicial body in its consultative capacity. Any Member State of the United Nations party to the convention on State responsibility alleging that a crime has been or is being committed would be entitled to submit the matter to the General Assembly or the Security Council. Either political body would debate the matter and, upon finding that the allegation of the accusing State (or States) is serious enough to justify the involvement of the international community, would decide to submit the issue to ICJ for an advisory opinion. A negative pronouncement of the Court would put the matter to rest (without prejudice, of course, to issues relating to the existence, attribution or consequences of a delict). A positive pronouncement of the Court accepted by the requesting body would allow any State party to the convention on State responsibility to implement the provisions relating to the legal consequences of a crime as set forth in part two of the draft articles.

104. Another possibility would be to involve the judicial body in its contentious function. The debate of the General Assembly or the Security Council following upon an allegation of crime would conclude not with a request for an ICJ advisory opinion but with the adoption of a resolution finding that the allegation deserved serious consideration by the international community. The adoption of such a resolution by a qualified majority of either political body—in the sense explained—would enable, on the strength of the convention on State responsibility, any participating Member State (including the alleged “criminal”) to bring the matter to ICJ for it to decide on the existence of a crime and its attribution. In other words, the resolution of the Assembly or the Council, by virtue of the convention on State responsibility, create among the participating Member States, the “jurisdictional link” necessary for ICJ to have compulsory jurisdiction.

105. A number of reasons seem to militate in favour of the second alternative.

106. First, the seriousness of an allegation of crime and the gravity of the eventual consequences suggest that it would not be appropriate to rely, for the basic determination in question, upon a consultative opinion.

107. Much as one may consider the ICJ pronouncements as essentially equivalent in authority, regardless of whether they are labelled advisory opinion or judgment, there are marked differences.\(^{56}\) One difference lies in the extent to which issues of fact are of importance for all consultative opinions as they are in all contentious cases.\(^{57}\) Another, more important, difference lies in the fact that, while the Court’s pronouncement in a contentious case normally settles the issue or issues in the sense that it decides the merits of a dispute in its entirety—thus operating, in a way, as the decisive utterance on the issue or issues at stake—the Court’s pronouncement in an advisory case is normally intended to give guidance on an issue for the addressee ultimately to act upon the iss-
sue. A further difference lies in the fact that the advisory procedure does not involve, as a rule, fully-fledged contentious proceedings between litigant States.

4. AN ICJ DECISION ON EXISTENCE/ATTRIBUTION AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION BY STATES OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN INTERNATIONAL DELICT

108. In the light of such considerations, the Special Rapporteur would be inclined to believe that the legal determination as to the existence and attribution of an international crime should be the result of a contentious procedure before ICJ which would be initiated by any one of the omnes injured States following the political body’s resolution and would give accusers and accused the possibility of thoroughly confronting each other within the framework of full and direct adversary proceedings.

109. A further and apparently decisive reason to make an ICJ judgment a prerequisite for the implementation by States of any legal consequences of an international crime derives from the features of the post-countermeasures dispute settlement procedure presumably to be envisaged for crimes in part three of the draft articles. In view of the high degree of gravity of crimes, the Special Rapporteur plans to propose, for the relevant provision of part three, not just conciliation or arbitration (as was done for delicts) but a direct compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ over any disputes arising from the implementation of the legal consequences of a crime (namely, post-countermeasure disputes relating to a crime). Considering further that the present proposals envisage a preliminary pronouncement of ICJ upon the existence/attrIBUTION OF A CRIME AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE LAWFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY CONSEQUENCES THEREOF, that pronouncement could not consist of a mere consultative opinion. As the Court could be called upon (under the relevant provision of part three) to pronounce itself, in that phase, in a situation where it would be obliged either to confirm passively its previous advisory opinion or to reverse that advisory opinion in the judgment.

110. The relevant provision appears in draft article 19, paragraph 2, of part two (see section E of the present chapter, below).

111. This being said, one should bear in mind that the effects to be thus attributed by the future convention on State responsibility to resolutions of the General Assembly or Security Council and to judgments of ICJ should be without prejudice to the Council’s functions under the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations of Member States deriving therefrom. The application of Article 51 of the Charter should also remain unaffected.

112. The relevant provision is covered by draft article 20 of part two (see section E of the present chapter, below).

5. FURTHER ISSUES

(a) The possible involvement of ICJ under instruments other than the future convention on State responsibility

113. The provision whereby ICJ would have compulsory jurisdiction (as amongst the participating States of a future convention on State responsibility) to determine the existence and attribution of a crime once a General Assembly or Security Council resolution in the sense indicated (para. 102 above) had been adopted, would not, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, exclude the possibility that the compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ for the same purpose might be instituted otherwise. It could in fact derive, for example, from a multilateral instrument among participating Member States characterizing a particular wrongful act as an international crime of State. Compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (namely, jurisdiction involving the possibility of unilateral application) is contemplated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (art. IX), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (art. 22), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (art. 29) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 30). The International Convention for the Elimination and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (art. XII) is less clear. Furthermore, an ICJ competence could also derive, although less plausibly, from a bilateral dispute settlement instrument envisaging the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction in such terms that either party could seize ICJ with the claim that the other party has committed or is committing an international crime of State. Three interrelated questions would arise if any such “jurisdictional links” were used:

(a) Quid juris, for the purposes of the convention on State responsibility, where any State or States availed themselves of a jurisdictional link arising, for example, from one of the above-mentioned multilateral conventions in order to bring to justice an alleged wrongdoer?

(b) Should the applicant State or States be bound to comply, for the purposes of the convention on State responsibility, with the requirement of a (successful) prior recourse to the General Assembly or Security Council?

(c) What would be, following such a judicial initiative taken outside the framework of the convention on State responsibility, the position of the “third” omnes States participating in the said convention?

114. The first question should be answered, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, in the sense that, if the conven-

58 As stated by ICJ in an advisory opinion, “[t]he Court’s opinion is given not to the States but to the organ which is entitled to request it” to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71).
tion on State responsibility were to provide, as proposed, that an ICJ finding of international crime fulfills the condition for the implementation of the consequences of that crime by the omnes injured States, an ICJ judgment to that effect should be considered to fulfill that condition, irrespective of the legal basis of the Court’s jurisdiction. The fact that under the convention on State responsibility the authority of ICJ to decide the issue of the existence/attributio n of an international crime would be subjected to the prerequisite of a United Nations political resolution should not restrict in any way the possibility that that ICJ function be validly performed on the basis of any titles of jurisdiction under Article 36 of the Court’s Statute other than the convention on State responsibility.

115. As a logical consequence, the second question should be answered in the sense that, in case ICJ were seized on the basis of a jurisdictional link originating from an instrument other than the convention on State responsibility, it would not be necessary to go through the preliminary political phase before the General Assembly or the Security Council. The requirement of an Assembly or Council resolution is designed (see para. 89 above) to avoid the provision of the convention on State responsibility relating to the Court’s role with respect to international crimes resulting in the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction being extended to issues other than the existence/attributio n of an international crime (e.g. the existence/attributio n and consequences of a delict). Obviously, once the Court were endowed with compulsory jurisdiction on the basis of an instrument other than the convention on State responsibility, that requirement would become superfluous.

116. As to the third question, it seems appropriate, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, that an ICJ finding of international crime be considered as fulfilling the condition for the ab omnibus tertius implementation of the special consequences of crimes, whatever the source of the ICJ competence to deal with the question of existence/attributio n. All the Member States participating in the convention on State responsibility would thus be entitled to avail themselves of an ICJ judgment based on a jurisdictional link unrelated to the convention on State responsibility and deriving, for example, from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment or the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. However, the extension to omnes tertio s would of course only apply to the part of the ICJ judgment covering the existence/attributio n of an international crime. It would not extend to any parts of that judgment concerning only the State or States having seized the Court on the strength of a jurisdictional link unrelated to the convention on State responsibility. Any part of the Court judgment relating either to the existen ce/attributio n or the consequences of a possible mere delict or the consequences of the crime itself would not extend beyond the parties between which the proceedings were initiated. In other words, only the original applicant State or States, together with the defendant allegedly wrongdoing State or States, would be subject, in conformity with Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, to any parts of the Court’s judgment other than the part relating to the existence/attributio n of an international crime.

117. A problem could of course arise with regard to the position of “third” States in any ICJ proceedings initiated by one or more States on the strength of a jurisdictional link originating in an instrument other than the convention on State responsibility. Under that convention, as explained, any participating Member State would, following the adoption of the political body’s resolution, be entitled to initiate proceedings before the Court and to participate therein. As “third” States vis-à-vis the case brought to ICJ on the basis of a jurisdictional link deriving from a source other than the convention on State responsibility, those States would not be entitled in principle to participate in the Court proceedings. This situation should therefore be covered by some special rule in the draft. The most appropriate solution would be to provide that:

(a) In the hypothesis under consideration, any “third” State—namely any Member State of the United Nations participating in the convention on State responsibility other than the State or States which seized ICJ on the basis of a jurisdictional link unrelated to the said convention—shall be entitled to participate fully, by unilateral application, in the Court proceedings relating to existence or attribution of the crime, such States to participate as principals and not as intervening parties under Articles 62 and 63 of the ICJ Statute;

(b) Once ICJ has ruled positively on the existence and attribution of a crime, the condition for the implementation of the special consequences of the crime shall be deemed to be fulfilled ipso facto for any Member State participating in the convention on State responsibility, notwithstanding the absence of a prior political pronouncement by the General Assembly or the Security Council.

(b) The respective roles of the General Assembly, the Security Council, ICJ and omnes States

118. No difficulties would seem to arise from the fact that accusing States under draft article 19, paragraph 1, of part two (see section E of the present chapter, below) may seize either the General Assembly or the Security Council or both at the same time. As the Special Rapporteur sees it, there would be here a case of concurrent competence between the two bodies. For the initiative of the accusing State to be successful, it would suffice that one or the other body reach an affirmative conclusion. Considering, anyway, that the resolution of the political body is only intended to open the way to a pronouncement by ICJ (further to an application by one or more States), any divergence between the Assembly and the Council would be settled by the Court’s decisive—positive or negative—judgment on existence and attribution.

119. A formula combining a resolution from a political body (General Assembly or Security Council), an ICJ judgment and the omnes injured States’ implementation
of the legal consequences of a crime is the best—or the least unsatisfactory—that can be offered at the present stage of development of the so-called “organized international community”, with a view to a civilized approach to the problem of the reaction to international crimes of States. The function of the political body is the closest possible approximation to a preliminary investigation of the degree of credibility of allegedly injured States’ charges, failing which it would be improper to let the matter be brought to the judge. It is, in other words, the closest possible approximation—although a very remote one—to the prosecutorial function.59 In its turn, the ICJ pronouncement following a fully-fledged contentious procedure is the closest possible approximation to a proper and fair trial of the case insofar as the basic conditions of existence and attribution are concerned. That the subsequent, ultimate implementation of the articles on the legal consequences of the crime would have to remain in the hands of injured States—omnes States—is an inevitable consequence of the continuing low degree of institutionalization of the inter-State system. This snag should not however be seen by the Commission as a reason not to pursue imaginatively the course of action it embarked upon in 1976, when it adopted article 19 of part one.1

120. Of course, the involvement of a hopefully large number of States in the reaction to a crime may be a source of differences, controversies and even dispute. Although such difficulties may also arise in the case of delicts (whenever the wrongful act consists of a violation of an erga omnes obligation), they are likely to be more serious and frequent in the case of crimes. The only remedy conceivable at present is either reliance on the possibilities of coordination afforded by the General Assembly, the Security Council or other international bodies exercising competence in the relevant area, or reliance on possible ad hoc arrangements among the omnes injured States, or any groups thereof. This difficult problem is tentatively covered by draft article 18 (c)-(g) of part two (see section E of the present chapter, below).

D. Concluding remarks

I. OBJECTIONS TO ARTICLE 19 OF PART ONE1

121. The moment has now come to consider the proposed solution, in the light of the objections which have been raised so far, to the inclusion, in the draft on State responsibility, of the notion of international crimes of States.

122. Those objections are based on a number of interrelated and partially overlapping arguments. One set of arguments is that States are by nature susceptible neither of criminal liability nor of penal sanction, penal liability and sanction being appropriate only for individuals. This set of arguments is based upon the maxim societas delinqvere non potest.60 Closely related is the argument that the inter-State system is endowed neither with a prosecutorial institution nor with a court of criminal law with compulsory jurisdiction for State crimes vis-à-vis any State.

123. To begin with, the first set of arguments in the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report discussed the weight of the maxim societas delinqvere non potest as applied to States as participants in international relations and subjects of international law. In the first place, it is not quite correct to say that legal persons are not susceptible—mutatis mutandis—to more than merely civil liability and sanction. Secondly, States are not quite the same thing as juristic persons of national law, anyway. As international persons they look more like factual collective bodies than juristic persons; and they like to call themselves “powers”: a term unknown to the law and practice of both private corporate bodies and public subdivisions of States, including member states of federal States.61 Thirdly, and most importantly, States frequently behave in such manner as to breach legal and moral obligations that are so essential for the peace, survival and welfare of other States and peoples that their breach is considered universally as materially and morally far more serious than the gravest delinquencies committed by private individuals, groups or corporations.

124. As regards the argument that liability for exceptionally serious international breaches should be envisaged only for individuals, the Special Rapporteur appreciates, despite the serious reservations which have been recently raised by Governments over important elements of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the role that such an instrument could play, if adopted, in curbing violations of fundamental international obligations. Apart from the fact, however, that the draft Code expressly provides that prosecution of an individual “does not relieve a State of any responsibility” (art. 5), thus leaving open the question of the State’s liability,62 the gravest among the individual crimes contemplated in the draft Code are envisaged as ascribable to individuals holding authoritative positions at the summit of a State or close thereto.63 It follows that, in the most

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59 In the language of Zimmern, the political body’s function—surely neither judicial nor conclusive—would be, according to draft article 19, to set up a “hue and cry” (The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935, p. 451). The resolution—not even a recommendation—of that body—would merely identify a State as suspected of an alleged crime (as the old League of Nations Assembly was to do in the case of aggression), leaving it to all States to pursue the matter: the lawful follow-up—prior to any implementation of consequences—would be to bring the allegation before ICJ for a decision on the existence of a crime.

60 See the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur (footnote 2 above), pp. 54–58, paras. 250 et seq.

61 Ibid., p. 59, para. 253.

62 Paragraph (2) of the commentary to article 5 of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind refers expressly to the commentary to article 19 of part one of the draft articles on State responsibility, which excludes that the punishment of individuals who are organs of the State exhaust “the prosecution of the international responsibility incumbent upon the State ...” (Yearbook ... 1991, vol. II (Part Two), p. 99).

63 See, for example, paragraph (4) of the commentary to part two of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (ibid., p. 101).
important cases, criminal proceedings under the draft Code will heavily involve the State within whose establishment the accused individuals operated. Unless the State’s establishment manages to disassociate itself convincingly from the accused parties, the individual crime will easily appear to be so closely connected with the reprehensible conduct of other organs that the individual crime will be recognized as a crime of State of the same or very similar denomination. Two factors may frequently concur in making such an outcome inevitable. One is that the infringed rule is basically identical in both cases, as is also the dimension of the wrongful act or acts, i.e. the actions or omissions constituting the “objective” or “external” element of the crime. The other factor relates to the so-called “internal” or “psychological” element, namely the wilful intent (dolus). Even assuming that the draft Code soon becomes a juridical reality despite the many hurdles that should be overcome for its ratification and implementation (with or without an international criminal court), the notion of the criminal responsibility of the individual at the international level does not significantly reduce the raison d’être of article 19 of part one of the draft articles on State responsibility and the part two and three provisions that are necessary for a proper implementation of that article.

125. Be that as it may of individual delicta juris gentium and the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, it must be acknowledged that breaches of the kind of obligations referred to in article 19, paragraph 3, of part one of the draft articles on State responsibility have now for some time attracted general condemnation on the part of the international community and international forums. Examples of wrongful acts so condemned have been given (see paras. 78-84 above). They indicate that all the wrongful acts in question are generally viewed as: (a) infringing erga omnes rules of international law, possibly of jus cogens; (b) being injurious to all States; (c) justifying a generalized demand for cessation/reparation; and (d) eventually justifying a generalized reaction in one form or another on the part of States or international bodies. It would seem therefore highly appropriate that something be done by the Commission in order to bring such reaction under some measure of more specific legal control within the draft articles on State responsibility.

126. Article 19 of part one, as adopted on first reading by the Commission at its twenty-eighth session, represented a preliminary step in that direction. A second step was article 5 of part two, as adopted on first reading by the Commission at its thirty-seventh session, which entitles all States to demand cessation/reparation and eventually to resort to countermeasures.

127. Draft articles 15-20 of part two (see section E of the present chapter, below), lay down the rules which the Special Rapporteur deems indispensable in order to specify the conditions, modalities and limits of the said generalized reaction. Those draft articles are meant to provide the legal control of that reaction within the framework of the law of State responsibility to which the matter properly belongs (see paras. 137-139 below).

128. Coming now to the second set of objections, namely to the “institutional” problem, it is of course undeniable that the inter-State system—or, for that matter, the rather undefined or ill-defined “international community” (of men, of nations, of peoples or of States)—is not endowed, and is not likely to be endowed soon, with such institutions as a public prosecutor’s department and a court of criminal jurisdiction (not to mention an effective enforcement machinery). It is, however, simplistic to argue on that basis against the singling out of some internationally wrongful acts as calling for a more severe legal condemnation. The inter-State system is indeed still a very inorganic one. But isn’t this argument applicable to all areas of international relations and international law?

129. The inter-State system is not less inorganic—to remain in the area of State responsibility—with regard to the consequences of delicts. The whole process, starting with the decision as to the existence and attribution of a delict and continuing with demands of cessation and reparation and eventual resort to countermeasures, is in principle—namely, under general international law—in the hands of States. The only exceptions derive from the regretfully infrequent and mainly bilateral conventional arrangements for “third party” settlement procedures. A few more exceptions would result from the provisions proposed in the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur— for the articles of part three of the draft articles that have been sent to the Drafting Committee—and from the Special Rapporteur’s draft article 12 of part two.

130. Moving to an even more crucial chapter of international law, the institutional gap is even more evident—and dramatic—in the area of the maintenance of international peace and security. Despite the remarkable innovations embodied in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the international community appears not to be so “organized” in this area after all. The Security Council has not succeeded so far in placing directly at its disposal the armed forces indispensable for a really effective action of its own. Although security measures are recommended or decided upon by the Council—a restricted body which can hardly be considered to represent the entire international community—they are carried out by States, and, at that, only by some States. To recognize this reality as reflective of the balance of power in the inter-State system is one thing; to speak of an “organization” of collective security is quite another. For good or evil, the maintenance of international peace and security

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64 It is indeed hard to imagine how the combination of actions/omissions and intent would not coalesce, at one and the same time, into a wrongful act of the individual and of the State, and presumably a crime of both. Only exceptionally would the crime of an individual involve a mere delict on the part of the State.

65 See Spinedi’s valuable writings on the subject, particularly the comprehensive introductory study in the volume on the symposium held in Florence in 1984 (see footnote 26 above); and “Contribution à l’étude de la distinction entre crimes et délits internationaux”.

is in the hands of the major Powers just as it was a cen-
tury ago: but this, surely, would not be a good reason to
do away with collective security as administered through
the only body available, however imperfect.

131. A different situation exists of course in some spe-
cial areas such as the protection of human rights. How-
ever, the most effective international institutions in the
area of human rights do not really operate at the level of
inter-State relations. They operate rather, so to speak, at
an infra-State level as common organs of the States par-
ticipating in each human rights system. Inter-State rela-
tions in a proper sense remain, even in this area, essen-
tially inorganic.

132. It follows, in the view of the Special Rapporteur,
that the inter-State system or the “international commu-
nity” does not seem to be any less organized, in the area of
the legal control or coordination of reactions to crimes of
States than in other areas. In this area as in any other areas,
States are still the main actors. It is for States to accuse and
it is for States to demand cessation/reparation from a
wrongdoing State and to resort eventually to counter-
measures. So far, nothing is different from the successive
phases in the handling of a delict, i.e. determination of
existence and attribution, demand of cessation/reparation
and eventual countermeasures.

133. If the greater severity of the legal consequences
of crimes calls for some measure of institutional control, it
does not necessarily follow that that control should be so
broad and intrusive as to abolish the role of States. Existing
institutions offer neither a public prosecutor’s de-
partment nor a court of full criminal jurisdiction, nor an
organized enforcement mechanism. They offer nevertheless
good possibilities of reducing the arbitrariness of the
omnes injured States’ unilateral or collective reactions.
The procedure described in the preceding paragraphs and
envisioned in draft article 19 of part two (see section E of
the present chapter, below) is intended precisely to per-
form that function.

134. The Special Rapporteur deems it indispensable to
stress, at this point, two essential features of the solution
proposed in the present report.

2. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION AND THE MAIN
EXISTING INSTRUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION

135. One essential feature is that the proposed two-
phased procedure does not involve any modification of the
two main existing instruments of international organiza-
tion. The Special Rapporteur is referring to the Charter of
the United Nations and the ICJ Statute. By envisaging
a General Assembly or Security Council resolution as
a precondition of ICJ jurisdiction under Article 36 of the
ICJ Statute, the future convention on State responsibility
would affect neither the Charter nor the Statute.

136. As regards the Charter of the United Nations, it
would not be the first time that an international treaty other
than the Charter itself requires specific action on the part of
the General Assembly or the Security Council for the
treaty to produce given effects of its own. Familiar exam-
pies are, for the Assembly, article VIII of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide and articles VI and VIII of the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. It follows that the proposed solution does not
imply any institutional modification in the existing struc-
ture of the so-called “organized international community”.

A future convention on State responsibility would merely
put to use, on its own juridical strength, the existing politi-
cal and judicial organs of the United Nations.

3. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS
COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

137. The second essential feature concerns the relation-
ship of the proposed solution with the collective security
system embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
Two distinct systems would coexist. On the one hand there
would be the political role performed under the Charter by
the Security Council and the General Assembly—but
mainly by the former—with regard to the maintenance of
international peace and security. On the other hand, there
would be the role entrusted by the convention under elabo-
ration to either political body—and to ICJ—in the area of
State responsibility. In the area of collective security—
namely, the reaction to any violations of Article 2, para-
graph 4, of the Charter—there are the purely political
functions performed respectively by the Council and the
Assembly, functions that in principle are not meant to
interfere with the law of State responsibility and its appli-
cation. In the area of State responsibility for international
crimes, would be found, on the strength of the convention
on State responsibility, the preliminary political evaluation
by the Assembly or the Council of the seriousness of the
accusing State’s or States’ allegation. Such evaluation
would eventually be followed by the decisive pronounce-
ment of ICJ as the condition required by the convention
for the implementation by omnes States of the conse-
quences of an international crime.67

138. The Charter of the United Nations system of col-
lective security and the international responsibility sys-
tem of the future convention on State responsibility
would thus operate independently in conformity with their
respective essential features. In the area of security,
where discretionary power and urgency of action are of
the essence, the decision would ultimately rest solely
with the Security Council in its restricted membership.
But in the area of State responsibility for very serious
breaches of fundamental international obligations, where
the judicial application of the law is instead of the es-
sence, the decision, prior to that of the omnes States

67 The importance of the role of ICJ with regard to the crime of
genocide is stressed, for example, by the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in its recent comments
(see the thirteenth report of the Special Rapporteur for the draft Code
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (document
A/CN.4/466 in the present volume), para. 60).
themselves, must rest ultimately with ICJ. As regards the preliminary role of either political body, absolute impartiality is obviously unattainable. A relatively high degree of impartiality can however be expected from the General Assembly due to the two-thirds majority requirement, from the Council due to the mandatory abstention of the parties in the dispute. The area pertains to Chapter VI of the Charter and not to Chapter VII.\footnote{It could thus be hoped that, at least for the purposes of State responsibility for international crimes, no State, in either body—as before ICJ—would be more equal than others.} It might be hoped that, at least for the purposes of State responsibility for international crimes, no State, in either body—as before ICJ—would be more equal than others.

139. The Special Rapporteur trusts that the above considerations will reduce the objections to the notion of State crimes based upon the lack of a prosecutorial institution and a criminal court. Those objections appear to beg the question. The question is whether States will be willing to accept article 19 of part one of the draft articles and its minimal implications set forth in the present report. As in other areas of progressive development and codification of international law, it is for the Commission to take the initial technical step. It will hopefully be an imaginative step.

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E. Articles 15 to 20 of part two of the draft articles on State responsibility

140. The Special Rapporteur proposes the following draft articles 15 to 20 below for part two:

**Article 15**

Without prejudice to the legal consequences entailed by an international delict under articles 6 to 14 of the present part, an international crime as defined in article 19 of part one entails the special or supplementary consequences set forth in articles 16 to 19 below.

**Article 16**

1. Where an internationally wrongful act is an international crime, every State is entitled, subject to the condition set forth in paragraph 5 of article 19 below, to demand of the State which is committing or has committed the crime that it should cease its wrongful conduct and provide full reparation in conformity with articles 6 to 10 bis, as modified by paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

2. The right of every injured State to obtain restitution in kind as provided in article 7 shall not be subject to the limitations set forth in subparagraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 of the said article, except where restitution in kind would jeopardize the existence of the wrongdoing State as an independent member of the international community, its territorial integrity or the vital needs of its people.

3. Subject to the preservation of its existence as an independent member of the international community and to the safeguarding of its territorial integrity and the vital needs of its people, a State which has committed an international crime is not entitled to benefit from any limitations of its obligation to provide satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition as envisaged in articles 10 and 10 bis, relating to the respect of its dignity, or from any rules or principles of international law relating to the protection of its sovereignty and liberty.

**Article 17**\footnote{The formulation of this article depends in some measure on the formulations of articles 11, 12 and 13 (of part two) as finalized by the Drafting Committee (see footnotes 5 and 13 above).}

1. Where the internationally wrongful act of a State is an international crime, every State whose demands under article 16 have not met with an adequate response from the State which has committed or is committing the crime is entitled, subject to the condition set forth in paragraph 5 of article 19 below, to resort to countermeasures under the conditions and restrictions set forth in articles 11, 13 and 14 as modified by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present article.

2. The condition set forth in paragraph 5 of article 19 below does not apply to such urgent, interim measures as are required to protect the rights of an injured State or to limit the damage caused by the international crime.

3. The requirement of proportionality set forth in article 13 shall apply to countermeasures taken by any State so that such measures shall not be out of proportion to the gravity of the international crime.

**Article 18**

1. Where an internationally wrongful act is an international crime, all States shall, subject to the condition set forth in paragraph 5 of article 19 below:

   \[(a)\] Refrain from recognizing as legal or valid, under international or national law, the situation created by the international crime;

   \[(b)\] Abstain from any act or omission which may assist the wrongdoing State in maintaining the said situation;

   \[(c)\] Assist each other in carrying out their obligations under subparagraphs \((a)\) and \((b)\) and, insofar as possible, coordinate their respective reactions through available international bodies or ad hoc arrangements;

   \[(d)\] Refrain from hindering in any way, by act or omission, the exercise of the rights or powers provided for in articles 16 and 17;

   \[(e)\] Fully implement the aut dedere aut judicare principle, with respect to any individuals accused of crimes against the peace and security of mankind the
commission of which has brought about the interna-
tional crime of the State or contributed thereto;

(f) Take part, jointly or individually, in any law-
ful measures decided or recommended by any inter-
national organization of which they are members
against the State which has committed or is commit-
ting the international crime;

(g) Facilitate, by all possible means, the adoption
and implementation of any lawful measures intended
to remedy any emergency situations caused by the
international crime.

2. Subject to the conditions set forth in para-
graph 5 of article 19 below, the State which has com-
mited or is committing an international crime shall
not oppose fact-finding operations or observer mis-
sions in its territory for the verification of compliance
with its obligations of cessation or reparation.

Article 19

1. Any State Member of the United Nations Party
to the present Convention claiming that an interna-
tional crime has been or is being committed by one or
more States shall bring the matter to the attention of
the General Assembly or the Security Council of the
United Nations in accordance with Chapter VI of the
Charter of the United Nations.

2. If the General Assembly or the Security Coun-
cil resolves by a qualified majority of the Members
present and voting that the allegation is sufficiently
substantiated to justify the grave concern of the in-
ternational community, any Member State of the
United Nations Party to the present Convention, in-
cluding the State against which the claim is made,
may bring the matter to the International Court of
Justice by unilateral application for the Court to de-
cide by a judgment whether the alleged international
crime has been or is being committed by the accused
State.

3. The qualified majority referred to in the pre-
ceding paragraph shall be, in the General Assembly,
a two-thirds majority of the members present and
voting, and in the Security Council, nine members
present and voting including permanent members,
provided that any members directly concerned shall
abstain from voting.

4. In any case where the International Court of
Justice is exercising its competence in a dispute be-
tween two or more Member States of the United Na-
tions Parties to the present Convention, on the basis
of a title of jurisdiction other than paragraph 2 of the
present article, with regard to the existence of an
international crime of State, any other Member State
of the United Nations which is a Party to the present
Convention shall be entitled to join, by unilateral
application, the proceedings of the Court for the pur-
pose of paragraph 5 of the present article.

5. A decision of the International Court of Justice
that an international crime has been or is being com-
mitted shall fulfil the condition for the implementa-
tion, by any Member State of the United Nations
Party to the present Convention, of the special or
supplementary legal consequences of international
crimes of States as contemplated in articles 16, 17 and
18 of the present part.

Article 20

The provisions of the articles of the present part
are without prejudice to:

(a) Any measures decided upon by the Security
Council of the United Nations in the exercise of its
functions under the provisions of the Charter;

(b) The inherent right of self-defence as provided
in Article 51 of the Charter.
CHAPTER II

Settlement of disputes relating to the legal consequences of an international crime

141. As indicated in the third, fourth and fifth reports of the Special Rapporteur and in the present report (para. 109 above), the proposed draft articles for part three, as submitted at the forty-fifth session only cover the settlement of disputes following the adoption of countermeasures against a State which committed a wrongful act of the kind characterized as delict in article 17 of part one. Only for such disputes do the proposed draft articles 1-6 of part three envisage the procedures of conciliation and arbitration (with a possible role for ICJ in case of failure to establish an arbitral procedure or alleged breach of fundamental rules of arbitral procedure by the arbitral tribunal). The said draft articles do not cover the disputes possibly arising following the adoption of countermeasures against a State which has committed or is committing a crime.

142. Considering the gravity of international crimes of States, the procedure which commends itself for any disputes arising between two or more States following the adoption of countermeasures as a consequence of an international crime is judicial settlement before ICJ. Such procedure should notably be envisaged as a compulsory one, in the sense that it could be initiated by unilateral application by any one of the parties to the dispute, including, of course, the State which has committed or is committing the international crime. The parties should be at liberty, however, to opt for arbitration.

143. As regards the scope of the competence of ICJ at this (post-countermeasures) stage, it should be less broad than that of the conciliation and arbitration procedures envisaged in draft articles 1 and 3 of part three. It should cover the issues of fact or law relating to the legal consequences—substantive or instrumental—of the international crime. This would encompass any issues arising under articles 1-35 of part one.

144. As stated in the relevant draft articles and in the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur the competence of the two procedures envisaged in draft articles 1 and 3 of part three should embrace not only issues relating to the application of the rules relating to the regime of countermeasures (such as those arising under articles 11-14 of part two), but also any issues which may arise in the application of any provisions of the draft articles on State responsibility, including those of articles 1-35 of part one and those of articles 6-10 bis of part two.

145. Such an extension of the scope of the “third party” procedure would not be appropriate for the competence of ICJ at present in question.

146. Considering that ICJ would have already pronounced itself by a judgment (as envisaged in paragraphs 108-111 above and in draft article 19 of part two (see chapter 1, section E, above) upon the existence/attribution of the international crime, the Court’s competence in the post-countermeasures phase should not extend to that issue. It should cover the issues of fact or law relating to the legal consequences—substantive or instrumental—of the international crime. This would encompass any issues arising in the application of any provisions of articles 6-19 of part two. The competence of ICJ should thus not extend, in principle, to any issues arising under articles 1-35 of part one.

147. The relevant draft article of part three—namely, article 7—should read as follows:

1. Any dispute which may arise between any States with respect to the legal consequences of a crime under articles 6 to 19 of part two shall be settled by arbitration on either party’s proposal.

2. Failing referral of the dispute to an arbitral tribunal within four months from either party’s proposal, the dispute shall be referred unilaterally, by either party, to the International Court of Justice.

3. The competence of the Court shall extend to any issues of fact or law under article 19 of part two other than the question of existence and attribution previously decided.