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Volume II

Documents of the second part of the seventeenth session and of the eighteenth session including the reports of the Commission to the General Assembly

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## LAW OF TREATIES

[Item 2 of the agenda for the seventeenth session]

DOCUMENT A/CN.4/183 and Add.1-4

Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldo, Special Rapporteur

[Original text: English]


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## Introduction

1. At the first part of its seventeenth session the Commission re-examined the articles on the conclusion, entry into force and registration of treaties contained in part I of its draft articles on the law of treaties, which it had prepared at its fifteenth session and submitted to Governments for their observations. The Commission provisionally adopted revised texts of twenty-five articles. One of these (article 3(bis)) was an article in part II (article 48), relating to treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations or which have been drawn up within international organizations, which it decided to include among the “general provisions” at the beginning of the draft articles. The Commission deleted four articles and postponed until the resumption of its seventeenth session in January 1966 its decision on articles 8, 9 and 13, relating respectively to participation in a treaty, opening of a treaty to the participation of additional States and accession.

2. At the first part of the session the Commission also had before it the Special Rapporteur’s observations and proposals regarding the revision of the first three articles of part II, articles 30-32 (A/CN.4/177/Add.2). Owing to shortage of time, however, the Commission was unable to begin its re-examination of these articles.

3. At the second part of the session, therefore, the main task of the Commission will be to re-examine the whole of part II of the draft articles and to conclude its re-examination of articles 8, 9 and 13.

### The basis of the present report

4. The basis of the present report is the same as that set out in paragraph 5 of the Special Rapporteur’s fourth report (A/CN.4/177), namely, the written replies of Governments, the comments of delegations in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and the observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur resulting therefrom. The comments of Governments and delegations on part II of the draft articles are contained in the

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### Section 3: Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties

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two mimeographed volumes of Secretariat document A/CN.4/175 and in addenda 1-4 to that document. 2

5. The Commission, for reasons of convenience, is re-examining the draft articles in the same general order as that in which they were provisionally adopted at the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions. In paragraph 27 of its report on the work of the first part of its seventeenth session, however, the Commission has recognized that, in rearranging the draft articles as a single convention, it will be necessary to give further consideration to the order in which the various articles should be placed. The Special Rapporteur, in paragraph 7 of his fourth report (A/CN.4/177), has already expressed the view that in the final draft the articles concerning observance, interpretation and application of treaties should be placed before those concerning invalidity and termination, i.e. before the present part II. This view is based on a number of different considerations. First, to place the rules concerning invalidity and termination immediately after conclusion, entry into force and registration may seem to give too much importance to grounds of nullity and termination and to give pacta sunt servanda the appearance almost of a residuary rule. Secondly, termination ought logically to follow, not precede, application of treaties, and it is at the same time convenient to deal with invalidity in juxtaposition to termination. Thirdly, termination has affinities with modification of treaties, which also should logically follow, not precede, application. Fourthly, there is some advantage in stating the rules regarding interpretation of treaties early rather than late in the draft articles, since these rules affect the meaning to be given to certain other articles.

6. The final structure and order to be given to the draft articles was not a matter of great moment in re-examining part I, because most of the articles contained in that part find their natural place at the beginning of the draft. The Commission may prefer not to arrive at any settled conclusions on this matter until its re-examination of the draft articles is further advanced. Nevertheless, in approaching the re-examination of parts II and III it seems desirable for the Commission to have in its mind a general perspective, however provisional, of the probable structure and order of the articles which it will ultimately adopt; for in these parts the arrangement of the different topics may in some cases influence the drafting of the articles.

7. The general arrangement of the draft articles which the Special Rapporteur tentatively envisages for their ultimate form is as follows: part I—“General provisions”, consisting of articles 0, 1, 2 and 3 (bis); part II—“Conclusion, entry into force and registration of treaties”; consisting of articles 3, 4 and the remaining articles of the existing part I; part III—“Observance and interpretation of treaties”, consisting of article 55 (pacta sunt servanda) and articles 69-73; part IV—

8. The structure, title and arrangement of the present part II

9. Title. The existing title of the present part II, which reads “Invalidity and termination of treaties”, does not fully cover the contents of the part, which also deals with the suspension of the operation of treaties. Accordingly, it seems preferable to call the part: “Invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties”.

10. Arrangement of the articles. The emphasis placed by Governments in their replies—and indeed by members of the Commission during the fifteenth session—on the need to safeguard the security and stability of treaties leads the Special Rapporteur to think that it may be advisable to place certain of the articles which limit or regulate the right to invoke grounds of invalidity, termination or suspension before, rather than after, the substantive articles dealing with these grounds. It will then be made apparent at the outset of the part dealing with invalidity and termination that specific rules restrict the freedom of States to have recourse to grounds of invalidity and termination for the purpose of resiling from their treaty obligations. The desirability of putting these rules before, rather than after, the substantive articles dealing with the grounds of invalidity and termination is also indicated by the fact that in their comments on fraud and error certain Governments have advocated the imposition of a time-limit on invoking these grounds, without apparently taking into account the relevance of article 47 regarding the loss of a right to allege grounds of invalidity or termination as a result of waiver or préclusion.

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2 Addendum 5, containing comments submitted later by the Governments of Pakistan and Yugoslavia, was issued on 23 February 1966. The written comments by Governments are reproduced in this volume (see annex to document A/6309/Rev.1).
11. The Special Rapporteur accordingly suggests that the present part should begin with a section entitled “General rules” and comprising: article 30 (Presumption as to the validity, continuance in force and operation of a treaty); article 49 (Authority to denounce, terminate or withdraw from a treaty or suspend its operation); article 46 (Separability of treaty provisions); article 47 (Loss of a right to invoke a ground of invalidity, termination or suspension).

12. A number of Governments have underlined the importance which they attach to the possibility of independent adjudication with regard to the matters dealt with in certain of the articles. This question was much discussed at the fifteenth session and ultimately the Commission adopted in article 51 a general provision regarding the procedure for invoking a ground of invalidity, termination, etc., which represented the highest measure of common agreement in the Commission on the solution of disputes concerning the application of the articles in the present part. The question therefore arises whether to transfer this article also to section 1. There is, however, a larger question as to whether the procedure laid down in article 51 should be given a more general application to all disputes concerning the application of the present article. This question is examined in the Special Rapporteur’s observations on article 51, which he has preferred not to deal with among the general articles in section 1.

Revision of part II of the draft articles in the light of the comments of Governments

Title—Invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties

Proposal of the Special Rapporteur

The Special Rapporteur, for the reason given in paragraph 9 of the introduction to this report, proposes that the title of the part should be enlarged so as to cover “suspension of the operation of treaties”, which is one of the topics dealt with in this part.

SECTION 1: THE TITLE

Proposal of the Special Rapporteur

The existing title to section 1 is “General provision” and the sole article which the section contains is article 30. The Special Rapporteur, in accordance with his observations in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the introduction, proposes that the section should now be entitled “General rules” and should include four articles (articles 30, 49, 46 and 47). The title “General rules” is proposed because there is already a title “General provisions” at the beginning of the draft articles.

Article 30.—Presumption as to the validity, the continuance in force and operation of a treaty

The observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur regarding this article are contained in addendum 2 to his fourth report (A/CN.177/Add.2).

Article 49.—Authority to denounce, terminate or withdraw from a treaty or suspend its operation

Comments of Governments

Portugal. The Portuguese Government expresses its general acceptance of the principle that the power of a person to represent his State for denouncing, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty should be governed by the same rules as those laid down in article 4 for concluding a treaty.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government observes that article 4 made a distinction in certain circumstances between, on the one hand, authority to negotiate, draw up and authenticate a treaty and, on the other, authority to sign; but that it did not employ the word “conclude”, which is found in article 49. The result, in its view, is to leave it uncertain whether under article 49 the rule applicable to authority to denounce is that relating to authority to negotiate, draw up and authenticate or that relating to authority to sign.

United States. In the view of the United States Government, article 49 constitutes a useful clarification of the position regarding authorization, or evidence of authorization, in the cases covered by the article.

Cypriot delegation. The Cypriot delegation agrees that the rules laid down in article 4 should also apply to evidence of authority to perform acts with regard to the nullity of a treaty. 3

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The point made by the United Kingdom as to the lack of precision in the present formulation of article 49 appears to be well-founded. Moreover, article 4, which article 49 applies mutatis mutandis, has itself undergone extensive revision at the first part of the seventeenth session, so that article 49 would in any event require reconsideration.

2. The rules governing the authority of a person to represent the State in the negotiation and conclusion of treaties are now expressed in article 4 in terms of the cases in which the production of an instrument of full powers is required. This does not, however, appear to make them any less suitable for application in the context of article 49. The real problem, as the comment of the United Kingdom indicates, is whether to apply the rules governing negotiation or those governing signature—or perhaps those governing the expression of consent to be bound.

3. The Special Rapporteur suggests that it may be necessary to differentiate between: (a) evidence of authority to invoke a ground of invalidity, termination, etc., which may be regarded as an opening of negotiations for the converse purpose of annulling or terminating a treaty, and (b) evidence of authority to carry out the definitive act of annulling, terminating, etc., a treaty which may be regarded as the expression of the State’s will not to be bound. In other words, it may be necessary to make the parallel between article 49 and article 4

even closer by providing different rules for the negotiation of the annulment, termination, etc., of a treaty and for the performance of the act expressing definitely the will of the State not to be bound. This would seem to be at once more logical and more consistent with principle.

4. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur proposes that article 49 should be revised to read as follows:

Evidence of authority to invoke or to declare the invalidity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty

1. The rules laid down in article 4 regarding evidence of authority to represent a State for the purpose of negotiating a treaty apply also to representation for the purpose of invoking a ground of invalidity, termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty.

2. The rules laid down in article 4 regarding evidence of authority to represent a State for the purpose of expressing its consent to be bound by a treaty apply also to representation for the purpose of expressing the will of a State to denounced as invalid, terminate, withdraw from or suspend the operation of a treaty.

Article 47. — Loss of a right to allege the nullity of a treaty as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel makes four points with regard to this article. First, it observes that the word “nullity”, which occurs in the opening phrase, is not in fact used in any of the articles to which reference is made in the present article. Secondly, it draws attention to the fact that the case of a right to require the suspension of the operation of a treaty is omitted from the article. Thirdly, it expresses the view that, the principle of article 47 being one of general application, the article should distinguish between that general principle and the specific concept of tacit consent as employed in part I of the draft articles (see paragraph 2 of its comments on part I). Fourthly, it feels that the drafting of the opening phrase of the article could be simplified by being worded more positively on the following lines:

“A State may not rely upon articles 31 to 35 and 42 and 44 if that State, after having become aware of the facts giving rise to the application of those articles, shall have elected by conduct or otherwise to consider itself bound...”.

This text would also, it suggests, have the advantage of making redundant the specific reference to “waiver”, which it feels to be a complicating factor in the article, and of avoiding the phrase “debarred from denying”, which it feels to be awkward. It further suggests that the commentary should make it clear that the “election” of the State under the article would be presumed after the lapse of a reasonable period of time, the period being dependent on all the circumstances of the case.

Jamaica. Although not making any point in regard to the present article, the Jamaican Government in its comments on article 33 expresses the opinion that a defrauded party should take steps to invalidate its consent to the treaty within a stated time after the discovery of the fraud; and that, if it does not, it should be deemed to have subsequently acquiesced in the fraud.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government considers that this article should be made applicable also to article 31 (failure to comply with provisions of internal law). In its view, restricting the ple of invalidity follows inherently from the primacy of international law. It further queries whether article 47 should not also apply to cases under article 36 (coercion of a State by the threat or use of force). On the assumption, however, that the word “force” in article 36 means only “armed agresion”, the Netherlands Government is prepared to concur in the view that article 36 should not be brought within the rule in article 47.

Portugal. While generally approving the principle contained in the article, the Portuguese Government calls attention to what it feels must be an inexactitude in the text where the draft refers to articles 32 to 35 rather than to articles 31 to 34. Having noted that the principle can be relevant only when the application of a treaty is dependent on the attitude of the parties, it points out that article 35 (personal coercion of a representative) provides for the absolute nullity of the treaty, not for a right to invoke the fact of coercion; and it does not see how article 35 can be affected by the principle in the present article. At the same time, since article 31 (provisions of internal law regarding competence to enter into treaties) provides that the validity of consent may be disputed by a State whose representative acted in manifest violation of its domestic law, it does not understand why that article should be excluded from the operation of the principle.

Sweden. The Swedish Government considers that this article is an indispensable complement to the rest of the draft; and that it should be extended to cover cases falling under article 31.

United States. The United States Government expresses the view that provisions along the lines of article 47 are essential to prevent abuses of the rights set forth in the articles to which it refers. Indeed, it suggests that the article should be placed earlier in the draft, in front of the articles to which it applies, or, alternatively, that each of those articles should contain an express reference to article 47, in order to avoid any risk of their being interpreted out of context. It also suggests that the text would be clearer if it used the phrases “articles 32 to 35” and “articles 42 to 44” instead of “articles 32 to 35” and “articles 42 to 44”. In addition, in its comments on articles 33 (fraud) and 34 (error) it suggests the desirability of laying down specific time-limits for invoking those grounds of invalidity.

Salvadorian delegation. The Salvadorian delegation remarks that in the Spanish text the word “perdida” used in the title has no specific legal meaning and should be replaced. It further draws attention to paragraph 5 of the commentary, where the Commission states that the governing consideration for the application of the principle contained in the present article would be that of good faith, and that the principle would not operate.
if the State in question had not been aware of the facts giving rise to the right, or had not been in a position freely to exercise its right to invoke the nullity of the treaty. It thinks that this consideration requires careful study if it is not to give rise to serious errors. 4

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. Place and scope of the article. The Special Rapporteur, in paragraph 10 of the introduction to this report, has suggested that the present article should be placed in section I as a "general rule". The reason is that the article appears to affect the operation of all the articles which recognize rights to invoke particular grounds of invalidity or termination. If it does not affect cases of "jus cogens" falling under articles 36, 37 and 45, that is only because these articles provide for the automatic avoidance of the treaty in those cases. One advantage of transferring article 47 to section I is that it will indicate at the outset that a right to invoke the invalidity or termination of a treaty is not unrestricted and that the security and stability of treaty relations are also to be taken into account. Otherwise, it might be desirable, as one Government has suggested, to make express reference to the rule in article 47 in each of the articles which are subject to it.

Article 47, as at present formulated, does not apply to article 31, which relates to invalidity on the ground of a failure to comply with a provision of internal law. A number of Governments, in comments on this article or on article 31, have questioned the omission of article 31 from the operation of the rule in article 47, and the Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that article 31 clearly ought to be brought within that rule.

2. The Government of Israel's objection to the use of the word "nullity" is well-founded, since the Commission in drafting articles 31-35 decided to speak of "invalidation" of the consent rather than of the "nullity" of the treaty. It is therefore desirable here, as in article 30, to replace the word "nullity", in the title and in the opening phrase, by "invalidity" in order to bring the language into line with that used in the substantive articles. The same Government's point that the article omits to cover cases of "suspension of the operation of a treaty" is also well-founded and has to be taken into account in revising the text.

3. The Government of Israel's suggestion that the article should distinguish between the general principle which it contains and "the specific concept of tacit consent as employed in part I" seems, however, to raise unnecessary problems. Admittedly, the rule formulated by the Commission regarding "tacit consent" to reservations, which now appears in paragraph 5 of article 19 of the revised draft, may be viewed as a rule concerning the loss of a right to object to a reservation. It is also true that the rule in the present article can be viewed as one concerning implied consent to accept a treaty, or part of a treaty, which might otherwise not be binding by reason of a ground of invalidity, termination, or suspension. But although similar legal concepts may underlie paragraph 5 of article 19 and the provisions of the present article, that does not seem to call for nice distinctions of principle to be drawn between the two cases in the present article, however appropriate it might be to do so in a code. Article 19, paragraph 5, formulates a special rule for the special context of reservations, and there seems to be no need to refer to it or distinguish it when formulating an analogous but not identical rule in the different contexts of invalidity and termination.

4. The Special Rapporteur also has doubts about the same Government's suggestion for simplifying the drafting of the opening phrase of the article. If this suggestion were adopted, it would be necessary, before the rule would operate, to establish affirmatively that the State in question had "elected by conduct or otherwise to consider itself bound by the treaty". Although the broad scope of the rule might not be very different, its content would have been slightly modified. It is not quite the same thing to be required to show affirmatively that a State has by its conduct actually elected to accept something as it is to be required to show that it is precluded by its conduct from denying that it has so elected. Article 47 was intended by the Commission to apply to certain grounds of invalidity and termination a rule giving effect to the principle of prélusion (estoppel) found in cases such as that concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear. In the Temple case the rule was expressed by the Court in negative form: "Thailand is now precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did not accept it". The effect of the principle of prélusion may equally be stated in positive form in terms of an implied agreement to be bound notwithstanding a right originally to invoke a particular ground of invalidity or termination. In some cases there may be evidence of an actual agreement. But, having regard to the nature of the principle of prélusion, it seems desirable, if the article were to be framed in an affirmative form, to refer specifically to cases both of express agreement and of agreement implied from conduct. The term "waived the right" used in sub-paragraph (a)—a term familiar in this context in common law systems—was, of course, designed to cover cases of express agreement. Though no "complicating factor" is thought to be introduced by this term, it may be preferable to use a more mundane expression.

5. Two Governments, in their comments on articles 33 (fraud) or 34 (error), have suggested that a specific time-limit should be stated within which the right to invoke the ground of invalidity must be exercised; and the Government of Israel has suggested that the commentary should make it clear that the election of a State to be bound would be presumed after the lapse of a reasonable period of time, the period being dependent on all the circumstances of the case. The Commission, it is true, has thought it appropriate to lay down a specific time-limit of one year in the particular case of the right to

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6 *I.C.J. Reports 1962*, p. 32.

7 In the *Temple* case, in addition to applying the principle of prélusion, the Court held that there had been an actual acceptance of the erroneous map.
object to reservations. But there the context within which the principle of prélusion or tacit consent operates is well-defined and limited. Article 47, however, covers a variety of cases in which the context for the operation of the principle may differ widely; e.g. the case of a fundamental change of circumstances is quite different from that of fraud or error. Moreover, even within each class of case the circumstances may vary almost infinitely. Accordingly, it does not seem either possible to lay down a general time-limit for all cases or advisable to attempt to lay down a particular time-limit for each ground of invalidity, termination or suspension. No doubt, as the Government of Israel implies, the fundamental concept is that a State must invoke a ground of invalidity, termination or suspension within a reasonable period of time, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case. But the Commission has manifested a certain aversion to formulating rules expressly in terms of what is “reasonable”. On the other hand, in article 17 it has had recourse to the concept of “undue delay”, and may find this expedient an appropriate solution also in the present article.

6. The basic problem is whether the rule should be stated in the terms of a prélusion or in terms of an implied agreement. The Special Rapporteur is inclined to think that, if article 47 is transferred to section 1 as a “general rule”, it may be better to formulate it in terms of an implied agreement. In that event and in the light of the foregoing observations the title and the text might be revised to read as follows:

Relinquishment of the right to invoke a ground of invalidity, termination, withdrawal or suspension

A State may not invoke any ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 31 to 35 inclusive or articles 42 to 44 inclusive if, after becoming aware of the facts giving rise to such ground, the State:

(a) shall have agreed to regard the treaty as valid or, as the case may be, as remaining in force; or

(b) must be considered, by reason of its acts or its undue delay in invoking such ground, as having agreed to regard the treaty as valid or, as the case may be, as remaining in force.

Article 46.—Separability of treaty provisions for the purposes of the operation of the present articles

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel considers that article 32 should be included among the articles covered by the rule laid down in the present article.

Netherlands. The comments of the Netherlands Government are set out in an annex to its reply, and are expressed in a form which makes it difficult to present an exact analysis of them. While approving of the inclusion of the article, the Netherlands Government appears to make the following main points. First, it considers that the rule in article 46 should be made applicable to further articles, e.g. articles 31, 32, 36, 37 and 39. Secondly, it considers that both the “objective” and the “subjective” tests of separability contained in paragraph 2 of the article involve certain difficulties. As to the “objective” test in paragraph 2(a), it says that cancellation of part of a treaty, although it might not “interfere with the operation of the remaining provisions”, might nevertheless run counter to the object and purpose of the treaty. As to the subjective test, it interprets paragraph 2(b) as requiring the fact that acceptance of the clauses in question was not an essential condition of the consent to the treaty as a whole to be proved either from the text of the treaty or from statements made by both parties, and maintains that this is not very rational. It says that what may be essential to one party may be precisely the opposite to the other; that if, during the negotiations, no difficulties arise in regard to certain texts, there will be nothing whatever to indicate what is essential to them and what is not; and that the parties may well change their minds, during the period of the treaty’s operation, regarding the value they attach to particular clauses. It further says that, if difficulties arise after a treaty has been concluded, a solution will either be found by the parties themselves or it will not; and that no provisions of a convention on the law of treaties, if they are just and not merely designed to cut Gordian knots, could ever be so clear-cut as to exclude the possibility of each party’s invoking them in support of its contentions. In its view, therefore, the question is whether the courts should be given directives in the draft articles as to the solution of difficulties.

The Netherlands Government suggests that a broadly worded article on the following lines might meet the case:

“1. Except as provided in the treaty itself, the nullity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty or withdrawal from a treaty shall in principle relate to the treaty as a whole.

“2. If a ground mentioned in articles 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44 and 45 for nullity, termination, suspension of the operation of a treaty or withdrawal from a treaty, applies only to particular clauses of a treaty, and a party to the treaty wishes to uphold the remainder of the treaty, the other party or parties shall accept the continuing validity and operation of the remainder of the treaty, unless such acceptance cannot reasonably and in good faith be required from such other party or parties.

“3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not apply if:

(a) the clauses in question are not separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application; or

(b) it appears either from the treaty or from the statements made during the negotiations that acceptance of the clauses in question was an essential element of the consent of a party to the treaty as a whole.”

It observes that paragraphs 1 and 3 of the suggested article are largely modelled on the Commission’s draft, and are accordingly open to the same objections as it has raised to the corresponding parts of the Commission’s text. However, it believes that these objections are practically eliminated by paragraph 2 of its text, which makes the whole matter subject to the rules of good faith between the contracting parties.

Portugal. On the basis of the balance established by the conditions set out in paragraph 2, the Portuguese
Government has no fundamental objection to the principle of indivisibility provided for in the article.

Switzerland. The Swiss Government feels that the article is on the whole a most useful and necessary complement to the exposition of grounds of nullity and termination. At the same time, it draws attention to the apparent—and presumably inadvertent—reference in sub-paragraph 1 to the possibility of a treaty's containing provisions about its own nullity.

United States. The United States Government thinks that the article is useful in clarifying, to some extent, the manner in which the articles mentioned in it are to be applied. However, it finds the expressions “articles 33 to 35” and “42 to 45” somewhat misleading, even although their meaning can be ascertained by studying the articles in question. It would prefer the text to read “articles 33 through 35” and “42 through 45.” In addition, it considers that article 37, if it is retained, should be made subject to the present article.

Bulgarian delegation. The Bulgarian delegation considers that the Commission was quite right, while taking the principle pacta sunt servanda into account, to subject the severability of clauses to the double condition set forth in paragraph 2 of the present article.

Cypriot delegation. The Cypriot delegation notes that paragraph 1 makes it clear that the principle of severability does not apply in cases of coercion of the State (article 36) or jus cogens (article 37).

Syrian delegation. After noting the effect of the Commission's proposals regarding severability the Syrian delegation observes that there is no reason why the Syrian Government should be deprived of the benefit of provisions to which no one objects. It further calls attention to its proposal that the operation of the principle should be extended to article 20, dealing with the effect of reservations.

Uruguayan delegation. In so far as the article is directed towards fostering respect for treaty obligations, it has the support of the Uruguayan delegation.

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. Place and scope of the article. The Special Rapporteur, in paragraph 10 of the introduction to this report, has suggested that this article should be included in section 1 as a "general rule." It is true that the article, as at present formulated, is expressed to govern only cases falling under articles 33 to 35 and 42 to 45. However, the suggestion made by two Governments that the rule contained in the present article should be extended so as to cover article 32 appears to be sound. There may also be a case, as the Netherlands Government considers, for extending the rule to cover article 31, because certain types of failure to comply with a provision of internal law might relate to a particular clause of a treaty and not to the conclusion of the whole treaty. If article 46 is transferred to section 1, it will have the advantage of making it unnecessary to make express reference to the "separability" rule in the substantive articles setting out grounds of invalidity, termination, etc.

Both the Netherlands and the United States Governments maintain that the rule in article 46 should be made applicable to cases falling under article 37 (conflict with a norm of jus cogens). Some members of the Commission expressed the same view at the fifteenth session during the discussion of article 37. The majority, however, considered that in the case of a conflict with a norm of jus cogens, the invalidity should attach to the whole treaty and that it should be left to the parties to bring the treaty into harmony with international law by making the necessary changes in its terms. That being so, the Special Rapporteur confines himself to drawing attention to the opinion of the two above-mentioned Governments. The Netherlands Government maintains that yet another article, namely article 39, which deals with denunciation or withdrawal under a right implied from the character of the treaty or from the circumstances of its conclusion, should be brought within the rule. This may perhaps be thought to introduce an extra complication into an already delicate problem of interpretation. On the other hand, there does not seem in principle to be any reason why the rule of separability should be excluded in these cases. Accordingly, in preparing his revised draft the Special Rapporteur has included within the rule cases falling under article 39.

2. The Special Rapporteur feels considerable doubt regarding the reformulation of the article proposed by the Netherlands Government. It may be true that the so-called "objective" and "subjective" criteria contained in paragraphs 2(a) and (b) of the Commission's text are not so clear-cut as to exclude the possibility of each party's invoking them in support of its contention. This may also be said of some other provisions of the draft articles and, indeed, of many rules both of international law and municipal law. But it does not diminish the value of laying down as exact criteria as possible which, when applied in good faith by the parties, may provide the basis for determining their legal rights. The Netherlands Government appears to go too far in implying that the "directives" contained in article 46 can only serve a useful purpose when the question of separability comes before a court. The Commission, in formulating the draft articles, is entitled to assume that the parties will respect the rule pacta sunt servanda and will interpret and apply the treaty in good faith. It is also entitled to assume that in applying the provisions of the present articles the parties will equally act in good faith. This being so, the Special Rapporteur believes that the criteria laid down as the test of separability in the Commission's text of article 46, if not so precise as to exclude any possibility of dispute, are nevertheless meaningful and useful.

3. The new provision—paragraph 2—which is the basis of the Netherlands Government's proposal appears for the same reason to be open to question. Its chief

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6 Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Sixth Committee, 788th meeting, para. 11.
9 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 23.
10 Ibid., 786th meeting, para. 14.
11 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 22.
purpose is to make explicit the element of good faith in the application of the rule of separability. As stated in the previous paragraph, this element is already present, and doubly present, in article 46: first, because the rule *pacta sunt servanda* governs the application of the treaty between the parties; and secondly, because it also governs the application of the present articles. If, on the other hand, the reference to "good faith" is intended to add a further requirement additional to the two criteria laid down by the Commission, then it seems to introduce an element of *ex aequo et bono* into the rule which might deprive those criteria of much of their value. Other Governments appear to have considered paragraphs 2(a) and (b) of the Commission’s text to be satisfactory.

4. The Special Rapporteur suggests, however, that the formulation of article 46 needs reconsideration from a different point of view. At present the rule regarding separability of treaty provisions is stated partly in article 46, which specifies the general conditions necessary for separation to be possible, and partly in the individual articles which lay down whether separation is admissible with respect to each particular ground of invalidity, termination, etc. Clearly, if the rule of separability is to be transferred to section 1 and formulated as a general rule, the new article will have to state both the general conditions and the specific cases in which separation is or is not admissible. At the same time, the existing provision in the individual articles appears to the Special Rapporteur to be formulated in a way which is a little equivocal on the question whether separation is in each case an option or the rule. For example, in article 34 (error) and article 44 (fundamental change of circumstances) it is provided that, under the conditions specified in article 46 (the separability conditions) an error or a fundamental change which relates to the particular clauses may be invoked with reference to those clauses alone. It is not clear what will be the position if one party invokes the error or fundamental change as invalidating or terminating particular clauses while the other claims that it affects the whole treaty; nor what will be the position in the reverse case where one party invokes it with reference to the whole treaty and the other then claims to limit it to particular clauses. In short, the question is whether, when the conditions for it exist, separation is a matter of law or discretion.

5. The Special Rapporteur considers that, in the interests of the security and stability of treaties, the general principle should be that, whenever the conditions for separability exist, the scope of a ground of invalidity, termination, etc., should be limited to the particular clauses to which it relates. To this principle, however, there would be some exceptions. Thus, in cases of fraud by one party (article 33) or of personal coercion exercised by one party on the other's representative (article 35) the party whose confidence has been thus gravely abused by the other party should, it is thought, have the option to invalidate, terminate, etc., the whole treaty or the clauses to which the other party's misconduct particularly relates. In addition, the Commission decided at the fifteenth session that in cases of the coercion of the State itself by the threat or use of force (article 36) or of conflict with a rule of *jus cogens* (article 37) the principle of separability should not be applicable at all. Subject to these exceptions, it would seem logical that separation should be the rule, not a mere option.

6. The Special Rapporteur thinks it desirable, however, to draw attention to the possible impact of the separability rule on one other article, namely, on article 41, which deals with the termination of a treaty by implication from entering into a subsequent treaty. At both the fifteenth and sixteenth sessions the Commission gave careful consideration to the relation between the question of implied termination through entering into a subsequent incompatible treaty and that of the application of treaties having incompatible treaty provisions. It concluded that, although they may overlap to a certain extent, the two questions are distinct; and in consequence the “termination” aspect has been dealt with in article 41 and the “application” aspect in article 63. The problem is whether the provisions of article 63 make it either unnecessary or undesirable to apply the separability rule to the cases of implied termination dealt with in article 41. The Commission's conclusion as to the distinction between “implied termination” and application of incompatible provisions seems to hold good for particular clauses as well as for the whole treaty. Accordingly, it seems logical to admit the operation of the separability rule in cases of implied termination under article 41; and, in consequence, the revised draft of article 46 formulated in the next paragraph does not except article 41 from its provisions.

7. In the light of the above-mentioned considerations, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the present article should be transferred to section 1 and revised to read as follows:

Grounds for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation only of particular clauses of a treaty

1. A ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty which relates to particular clauses of the treaty may be invoked only with respect to those clauses when:

   (a) the said clauses are clearly separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application; and

   (b) it does not appear from the treaty or from the circumstances of its conclusion that acceptance of those clauses was an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to the treaty as a whole.

2. However, in cases falling under articles 33 and 35 the State entitled to invoke the fraud or the personal coercion of its representative may do so with respect either to the whole treaty or only to the particular clauses as it may think fit.

3. Paragraph 1 does not apply in cases falling under articles 36 and 37.

Section 2: Invalidity of treaties

Article 31.—Provisions of internal law regarding competence to enter into treaties

The observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur regarding this article are contained in addendum 2 to his fourth report (A/CN.177/Add.2).
In his observations on articles 46 and 47 the Special Rapporteur has also proposed that the application of the provisions of the present article should be made subject to those articles.

Article 32.—Lack of authority to bind the State

The observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur regarding this article are contained in addendum 2 to his fourth report (A/CN.177/Add.2).

In his observations on articles 46 and 47, the Special Rapporteur has also proposed that the application of the provisions of the present article should be made subject to those articles.

Article 33.—Fraud

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel suggests that the article should be placed after article 34 "in order to distinguish the reprehensible from the non-reprehensible vices de consentement and place the former in ascending order of calumny". In paragraph 1 it suggests that in lieu of "fraudulent conduct" it would be better to say "fraudulent act or conduct". In paragraph 2 it suggests the omission of the word "only". Otherwise the paragraph might, it feels, be open to the interpretation that it excludes any option for the injured State to invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to the whole treaty or to the particular clauses to which the fraud relates, as it may prefer. At the same time it notes that the Commission's intention, as appears from paragraph 6 of its commentary, was to allow such an option.

Jamaica. The Jamaican Government considers that a defrauded party should take steps to invalidate its consent to the treaty within a stated time after the discovery of the fraud; and that, if it fails to do so, it should be precluded from invoking the fraud as a reason for the termination of the treaty, unless the conditions for its termination are agreed upon by both parties.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government suggests that, in paragraph 2, the reference to "the State in question" is not sufficiently clear; and that the phrase "the injured State" should be used instead. Paragraph 2 should, it believes, be deleted if its proposals for the revision of article 46 are adopted (see its comments on that article).

Portugal. The Portuguese Government examines the provisions of the article seriatim and appears to agree with the Commission's treatment of the question of fraud. As to paragraph 2, it appears to consider the Commission's proposals as providing a reasonable rule regarding partial nullity in cases of fraud.

Sweden. The Swedish Government observes that this article, like article 34 concerning error, deals with contingencies that must be very rare, and that for this reason there may be a question whether the article is really needed at the present stage. At the same time, it says that the actual formulation of the article appears to be unobjectionable.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government doubts the need for this article. If the article is included, it believes that provision should be made for independent adjudication on its interpretation and application.

United States. The United States Government feels that the article might create more problems than it would solve. In its view, a serious question arises as to when an injured State is required to assert the existence of the fraud in order to take advantage of it. If it waits two or ten years after discovering the fraud, the United States Government thinks it extremely doubtful whether the State should be entitled to invoke the fraud. It suggests that, if the article is retained, a clause should be added to the following effect "provided that the other contracting States are notified within —— months after discovery of the fraud". It also suggests that it would be highly desirable to include a requirement that the fraud should be determined judicially.

Brazilian delegation. Stressing the difficulty of finding a satisfactory definition of fraud and the absence of recorded instances of fraud, the Brazilian delegation thinks it inadvisable to give approval to provisions which might raise more difficulties in practice than they would solve.13

Bulgarian delegation. The Bulgarian delegation regards the separate treatment given to fraud and error by the Commission as a remarkable innovation not always admitted in the opinions of international jurists.14

Colombian delegation. In view of the diversity of meanings attributed in internal law to fraud as a ground for invalidating consent, the Colombian delegation considers that the term "fraud" should be given as precise and uniform a definition as possible for purposes of international law.16

Ecuadorian delegation. The Ecuadorian delegation considers the article to be generally acceptable, but feels that its scope should be extended to cover a fraudulent act as well as fraudulent conduct. It does not believe that the failure of States in the past to invoke absence of consent on the ground of fraud is a sufficient reason for omitting the article.16

French delegation. The French delegation takes the view that, in including the principle which is the subject of the present article, the Commission is acting in accordance, and not in conflict, with article 15 of its Statute.17

Iraqi delegation. The Iraqi delegation considers that the fact that fraud is very rare is no reason for failing to declare that it vitiates consent. It also considers that fraud does not necessarily consist of fraudulent conduct but may arise from one fraudulent act.18

Pakistan delegation. The Pakistan delegation is of the opinion that a time-limit should be placed on the right to invoke fraud, as otherwise the question of determining

13 Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Sixth Committee, 793rd meeting, para. 16.
14 Ibid., 788th meeting, para. 9.
16 Ibid., 763rd meeting, para. 10.
18 Ibid., 782nd meeting, para. 3.
17 Ibid., 787th meeting, paras. 2 and 7.
18 Ibid., 788th meeting, para. 20.
when the injured State is required to assert the defect in the consent will give rise to difficulties.  

Peruvian delegation. The concept of fraud is not thought by the Peruvian delegation to be applicable in international law.

Salvadorian delegation. The Salvadorian delegation observes that the article does not specify whether the fraudulent conduct of a third party may be invoked as invalidating consent. It also suggests that the expression “fraudulent conduct” should be replaced by “fraudulent act.”

Syrian delegation. The Syrian delegation approves the Commission’s decision to draw up separate articles on fraud and error in order to demonstrate the differences in the effect of these two defects in the consent.

Thai delegation. The Thai delegation appears to consider that, despite the Commission’s explanations in paragraph 3 of its commentary, the influence of English private law is predominant in the drafting of the article.

Venezuelan delegation. The Venezuelan delegation thinks that the Commission was wise not to attempt to define the word “fraud” in view of the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory definition.

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. Although some Governments and delegations are against making fraud a distinct ground of invalidity separate from error, the majority are either in favour of such a course or do not voice any objection to it. At the fifteenth session some members of the Commission would have preferred to amalgamate fraud and error in a single article and the Commission will, no doubt, now re-examine this question in the light of the comments of Governments. At that session the Commission concluded that, on balance and despite the rarity of fraud, it is advisable to keep it distinct from error in a separate article. It said:

“Fraud, when it occurs, strikes at the root of an agreement in a somewhat different way from innocent misrepresentation and error. It does not merely nullify the consent of the other party to the terms of the agreement; it destroys the whole basis of mutual confidence between the parties.”

2. If the article is retained, the Special Rapporteur considers that the Government of Israel’s suggestion of reversing the order of articles 33 and 34 so as to place “fraud” after “error” should be adopted. “Fraud” is, as it were, an “aggravated” ground of invalidity more akin to coercion than to innocent forms of misrepresentation and mistake.

3. One delegation considers that in paragraph 1 the term “fraud” should be given as precise and uniform a definition as possible for purposes of international law. In general, however, Governments and delegations appear to share the view expressed by the majority of the Commission at the fifteenth session that “it would be better to formulate the general concept of fraud applicable in the law of treaties in as clear terms as possible and to leave its precise scope to be worked out in practice and in the decisions of international tribunals.” On the other hand, a number of the comments make the point that it is not enough to mention “fraudulent conduct”, because a single act may suffice to accomplish a fraud. Although the Commission is thought by the Special Rapporteur to have been justified in thinking that the phrase “fraudulent conduct” covers a single act as well as a series of acts of fraud, it seems desirable in the light of the comments of Governments and delegations to expand the phrase to read “fraudulent act or conduct.”

4. In paragraph 2 the Government of Israel suggests the deletion of the word “only”, in order to remove any possibility of the paragraph’s being interpreted as obliging the defrauded State to invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent only to the particular clauses, without giving it the option to claim that its consent to the whole treaty is affected. If paragraphs 1 and 2 are read together, as they must be, the Special Rapporteur does not think that paragraph 2 is really open to the suggested interpretation; nor does he think that, if it is regarded as open to that interpretation, the deletion of the word “only” would have the effect of removing the difficulty. On the other hand, the comment of the Netherlands Government that the phrase “the State in question” is not sufficiently clear appears to be justified, as two States are mentioned in paragraph 1. However, if the Special Rapporteur’s proposals for the revision of article 46 and its transfer to section 1 are accepted by the Commission, it will not be necessary to retain paragraph 2, as the question of separability will have already been covered in article 46.

5. As to the suggestion of the Jamaican and United States Governments that a specific time-limit should be laid down for invoking the invalidity of a treaty on the ground of fraud, this has been examined in the Special Rapporteur’s observations and proposals regarding the revision of article 47.

6. In the light of the above observations, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the article should be revised to read as follows:

If a State has been induced to enter into a treaty by the fraudulent act or conduct of another contracting State, it may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

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19 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 28.
20 Ibid., 789th meeting, para. 17.
21 Ibid., 782nd meeting, para. 3.
22 Ibid., 786th meeting, para. 16.
23 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 4.
24 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 16.
26 Ibid., p. 195, article 33, paras. (2) and (3).
27 Ibid., p. 195, article 33, paras. (2) and (3).
Article 34.—Error

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel observes that paragraph 1 speaks of an error relating to "a fact or state of facts", whereas paragraph 7 of the commentary does not appear to take so limitative a view of errors which may vitiate consent. It suggests that the text of the article should be brought into line with the commentary. In paragraph 4 it suggests that the words "mistake" and "error" should be transposed, so that the paragraph would then read:

"When there is no error as to the substance of a treaty but there is a mistake in the wording of its text, the mistake shall not affect the validity of the treaty and articles 26 and 27 then apply."

Commenting further on paragraph 4, the Government of Israel cites the judgment of the International Court in the Case concerning sovereignty over certain Frontier Land as authority for the view that a mistake in transcription can vitiate the treaty (as opposed to invalidating a party's consent), subject to the necessary proof being forthcoming; and also for the view that, in any event, such a mistake can be cured by subsequent ratification of the treaty, its publication, and by acquiescence. It suggests that the language of paragraph 4 and, if necessary, also of articles 26 and 27, should be adjusted accordingly. If paragraph 4 is redrafted in the manner which it proposes, it notes that, by way of consequential amendment, it would be necessary to amend the title to section V of part I and articles 26 and 27 by substituting the word "mistake" for the word "error" wherever the latter appears.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government merely observes that, if its proposed amendment to article 46 is adopted, this will affect the drafting of paragraph 2 of the present article.

Portugal. The Portuguese Government interprets paragraph 7 of the commentary as stating that an error of law is admissible on the same footing as one of fact and, on that basis, it questions the statement. It also maintains that, in making the treaty void ab initio, the article clashes with "the theory most in vogue which even in cases of annulment on the ground of error does not allow such effects".

Sweden. The Swedish Government observes that this article, like article 33 concerning fraud, deals with contingencies that must be very rare, and that for this reason there may be a question whether the article is really needed. At the same time, it says that the actual formulation of the article appears to be unobjectionable.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government considers that independent adjudication would be necessary for the interpretation and application of this article; and it invokes the cases referred to in the Commission's commentary as underlining this need.

United States. In this article, as in the previous article dealing with fraud, the United States Government considers it essential to impose some time-limit within which the defect in the consent — the error in this case — must be asserted after its discovery. It also considers that provision should be made for judicial determination of cases of "error".

Brazilian delegation. The notion of error, which is so important in matters of contract, is thought by the Brazilian delegation to lose much of its force in contemporary international law, particularly as treaties are now frequently formulated at international conferences in which a large number of countries take part. The Brazilian delegation thinks it inadvisable to give approval to provisions which might raise more difficulties in practice than they would solve.

Bulgarian delegation. The Bulgarian delegation appears to think that error and fraud should be dealt with together (see its comments on article 33).

Ecuadorian delegation. The Ecuadorian delegation thinks it difficult to determine precisely the practical scope of the provisions of paragraph 1.

Iranian delegation. The Iranian delegation observes that the article deals with errors of fact, but not with errors of law.

Iraqi delegation. The Iraqi delegation considers that it is logically necessary to include an article dealing with error in a body of rules relating to the validity of treaties; and that the fact that error is infrequent is no reason for failing to declare that it vitiates consent.

Pakistan delegation. The Pakistan delegation is of the opinion that a time-limit should be placed on the right to invoke an error, as otherwise the question of determining when the injured State is required to assert the defect in the consent will give rise to difficulties.

Peruvian delegation. The concept of "error" is not thought by the Peruvian delegation to be applicable in international law.

Salvadorian delegation. The Salvadorian delegation commends the drafting of the article. At the same time, it expresses the view that it may be necessary to determine not only whether there has been an error on the part of a contracting State, but also whether that error relates to a state of facts involving a third State.

Syrian delegation. The Syrian delegation approves the Commission's decision to separate "error" from "fraud".

Thai delegation. The Thai delegation considers the scope of the exception provided for in paragraph 2 to be too wide and to have the effect of rendering paragraph 1 ineffective. It also observes that the map in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, mentioned in para-

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graph (4) of the commentary, was neither a treaty nor part of a treaty because it had been drawn up by one party and not authenticated by the other party. In its view, therefore, the treaty could not be considered a treaty within the meaning of part I of the draft articles. 49

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. Two Governments express doubts as to the advisability of including an article on error. But cases of error in the conclusion of treaties are by no means rare and, whatever view may be taken as to the need to devote a specific article to "fraud", the Special Rapporteur feels that the omission of any provision regarding cases of "error" would leave an unacceptable gap in the draft articles.

2. The statement of the main rule in paragraph 1 speaks of cases where the error related to a "fact or state of facts" assumed to exist at the time when the treaty was entered into. In paragraph (7) of its commentary to the article the Commission said:

"The Commission did not intend the requirement that the error must have related to a "fact or state of facts" to exclude any possibility that an error of law should in some circumstances serve to nullify consent. Quite apart from the fact that errors as to rights may be mixed questions of law and fact, the line between law and fact is not always an easy one to draw and cases are conceivable in which an error of law might be held to affect consent. For example, it may be doubtful how far an error made as to a regional or local custom is to be considered as one of law or of fact for the purposes of the present article, having regard to the pronouncements of the Court as to the proof of a regional or local custom. Again, it would seem clear on principle that an error as to internal law would for the purposes of international law be considered one of fact." 40

The Government of Israel suggests that the text of the article ought to be brought into line with the commentary, by which it presumably means that paragraph 1 should be expanded so as to deal explicitly with the points mentioned in the above passage from the commentary. The Portuguese Government, on the other hand, interprets that passage as putting errors of law on the same footing as errors of fact and questions its correctness.

3. The Commission, according to the Rapporteur's understanding, had no intention of putting errors of law on the same footing as errors of fact. Its intention in paragraph (7) of the commentary was rather to enter a caveat that, in certain circumstances, an error which may be said to involve an error as to a matter of law may constitute an "error related to a fact or state of facts", and for that reason fall within the article. As each case will tend to depend on its own special facts, the Special Rapporteur doubts whether it would be advisable to attempt to expand paragraph 1 of the article in the manner apparently suggested by the Government of Israel. It seems preferable to state the basic rule contained in paragraph 1 and leave the special cases to be determined by reference to that general rule. On the other hand, when the final text of the commentary is drawn up, it may be desirable to modify paragraph (7) so as to leave no possibility for misunderstanding.

4. One Government considers the scope of the exceptions provided for in paragraph 2 to be too wide and to have the effect of largely nullifying paragraph 1. The formulation of paragraph 2, as stated in the commentary, was taken from the Court's judgment in the Temple case. The language of the exception is certainly strict and the words "or could have avoided it" have, no doubt, to be reasonably interpreted as meaning no more than "or could with due diligence have avoided it".

5. If the Special Rapporteur's proposals for the revision of article 46 and for its transfer to section 1 as a general rule are accepted by the Commission, paragraph 3 will become unnecessary as the question of separability will have already been covered in article 46.

6. In paragraph 4 two suggestions of the Government of Israel require consideration. The first is that the words "error" and "mistake" should be transposed. The idea presumably is that, as in the English text of article 26 the word "error" is used in connexion with the correction of errors in texts of treaties, the same word should also be used in the present article in that connexion and the word "mistake" be employed for errors of substance. Although the words "error" and "mistake" are synonymous, the Special Rapporteur agrees that uniformity in the terminology is desirable. He thinks it preferable, however, to use the same word "error" throughout rather than to appear to make a distinction in the use of the two words which is not found in the terminology of English-language legal systems. Another consideration is that in the French and Spanish texts the same word—"erreur", "error"—is used both in article 26 and throughout the present article.

7. The second suggestion is that paragraph 4, and if necessary also article 26, should be adjusted so as to give effect to the following propositions:

(a) A mistake in transcription may vitiate the treaty (as opposed to invalidating a party's consent), subject to the necessary proof being forthcoming; and

(b) A mistake in transcription may be cured by subsequent ratification of the treaty, its publication and by acquisition.

Both these propositions are said to be involved in the Court's judgment in the Frontier Land case on pages 222-6. 41 Both these propositions, in the view of the Special Rapporteur, oversimplify, and in a certain measure distort, the judgment of the Court in the Frontier Land case. The facts of that case were very special. A "minute"—the so-called communal minute—was drawn up between the communes of Baerle-Duc (Belgium) and Baarle-Nassau (Netherlands) purporting to record their agreement as to the commune to which two plots of land

41 I.C.J. Reports 1959.
ap pertained. The Belgian-Netherlands Mixed Boundary Commission then purported in a so-called “descriptive minute” to transcribe word for word the agreement in the communal minute. Then the descriptive minute was incorporated by reference in the Belgian-Netherlands Boundary Convention of 1843. The Netherlands Government claimed that the terms of the communal minute had been wrongly transcribed in the descriptive minute and ought to have attributed the two plots to the Netherlands, not Belgium. The Court found as a fact that there had been two versions of the communal minute, one attributing the plots to the Netherlands and the other to Belgium. It further found that the version which the Mixed Boundary Commission had intended to transcribe was the one attributing the plots to Belgium, not the one relied on by the Netherlands; and that in consequence there was no mistake in the descriptive minute and no mistake in the Convention of 1843. It is true that the Court added that the Convention had been “confirmed by the Parliament of each State and ratified in accordance with their constitutional processes”; and that its terms had been “published in each State”. But it did so only by way of finding confirmation for its conclusion that no case of mistake had been made out by the Netherlands Government. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur does not feel that the case supports the propositions which are drawn from it in the comments of the Government of Israel.

Moreover, independently of the Frontier Land case, the inclusion of the two propositions does not appear to be advisable. To lay down that a mistake in transcription may, as such, vitiate a treaty is to obscure if not eliminate the distinction which the Commission has been so careful to draw — and rightly — between cases of error under article 26 and those under the present article. Again, while it may be possible for an erroneously transcribed agreement to be accepted and acted on by the parties as the treaty binding upon them, this will be a case not of “curing” an error but of substituting a new agreement for the original one. So far as it may involve any element of error, it will be an error as to the substance of the treaty; and so far as any curing of an error is involved, the case will fall under article 47.

8. In the light of the above observations, the Special Rapporteur proposes that the article should be revised to read as follows:

**Error**

1. A State may invoke an error respecting the substance of a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty where the error related to a fact or state of facts assumed by that State to exist at the time when the treaty was entered into and forming an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty.

2. Paragraph 1 above shall not apply if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error.

3. When there is no error as to the substance of a treaty but there is an error in the wording of its text, the error shall not affect the validity of the treaty and articles 26 and 27 then apply.

*Article 35.—Personal coercion of representatives of States*

**Comments of Governments**

**Czechoslovakia.** The Czechoslovak Government notes with satisfaction that article 35 declares null and void ab initio treaties concluded through personal coercion of representatives of States. Its delegation recalls the tragic events which had followed the imposition on Czechoslovakia of the Munich Agreement.

**Israel.** The Government of Israel observes that there is a possible inconsistency between the absolute expression “without any legal effect” in paragraph 1 and the relative, partial, invalidation of the consent under paragraph 2; and that it is not clear whether any difference is intended between the expression “shall be without legal effect” in paragraph 1 of this article and the expression “shall be void” in article 36. It suggests that paragraph 1 should be revised to read as follows:

“If an individual representative of a State is coerced... the State whose representative has been coerced may invoke the coercion as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.”

In paragraph 2, it suggests the omission of the word “only”. Otherwise the paragraph might, it feels, be open to the interpretation that it excludes any option for the injured State to invoke the coercion as invalidating the consent to the whole treaty or to the particular clauses to which the coercion relates, as it may prefer.

**Netherlands.** The Netherlands Government merely observes that, if its proposed amendment to article 46 is adopted, this will affect the drafting of the present article.

**Portugal.** The Portuguese Government comments on the legal principles underlying this and the following article. Although stressing the novel character of this article, it considers the Commission's approach to the question of personal coercion to be praiseworthy. It also considers paragraph 2 to provide a reasonable rule regarding partial nullity in cases of personal coercion.

**Sweden.** The Swedish Government observes that, like articles 33 (fraud) and 34 (error), the present article deals with a contingency that is most unusual. However, as there have been some well-known cases of the kind contemplated by the article, and as the rule proposed has a good deal of support in “doctrine”, it thinks that an express provision on the matter may be desirable.

**United Kingdom.** The United Kingdom Government observes that it is not clear whether paragraph 1 would cover the case of signature of a treaty which is subject to ratification and, if so, whether a signature procured by coercion is capable of being ratified.

**United States.** The United States Government feels that paragraph 1 goes too far in providing that an expression of consent obtained by means of coercion “shall be without any legal effect”; and that it would be better to provide that it may be treated by the injured State as being without legal effect. This would prevent the coercing State from asserting the invalidity of the treaty on the basis of the coercion. Nor, in the opinion of the United States Government, ought the injured State to be required to take the view that the treaty is
without any legal effect; for it may conceivably wish to ignore the coercion if its interest in maintaining the security of the treaty is dominant. Furthermore, if paragraph 1 is revised in the way it suggests, the United States Government thinks that it will have the advantage of helping to prevent third States from attempting to meddle in a situation where the parties immediately involved are content to continue the treaty.

**Colombian delegation.** The Colombian delegation endorses the distinction drawn by the Commission between personal coercion of representatives and coercion of the State itself. 48

**Ecuadorian delegation.** The Ecuadorian delegation suggests that the provisions of article 35 should be extended to cover members of the families of representatives. 49

**Iraqi delegation.** The Iraqi delegation approves the position adopted by the Commission on the present article. 43

**Pakistan delegation.** The Pakistan delegation suggests that, in paragraph 1 the word “shall” should be replaced by “may”. 43

**Spanish delegation.** The Spanish delegation opposes the amendment suggested by the United States Government that the treaty should not be invalid unless the injured State invokes the coercion as a ground for considering the treaty to be invalid. 46

**Thai delegation.** The Thai delegation welcomes the progressive character of the article. 47

**Venezuelan delegation.** The Venezuelan delegation thinks that it would be better to include in the article itself a provision that “representatives” include families of representatives instead of leaving this point to be covered in the commentary. 48

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. Four Governments suggest that paragraph 1 should be revised so as to give the State the right to invoke the coercion as invalidating its consent rather than automatically to render the expression of consent obtained by coercion “without legal effect”. The Spanish Government, on the other hand, opposes this suggestion. The Commission at the fifteenth session took the view that “the use of coercion against the representative of a State for the purpose of procuring the conclusion of a treaty would be a matter of such gravity that the article should provide for the absolute nullity of a consent to a treaty so obtained”.

2. The Special Rapporteur is inclined to doubt whether the absolute nullity of the consent is necessarily called for in cases covered by the present article. Cases of the coercion of the State itself are dealt with in article 36, under which any treaty procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter is declared to be void. Those are indeed cases of the utmost gravity. But, although they may sometimes also involve direct coercion of high officers of the State, it is in the forcible compulsion of the State that the extreme gravity of those cases consists. The cases of personal coercion exercised upon a representative in his individual capacity with which the present article deals appear, on the other hand, to be more akin to cases of “fraud” than to the cases under article 36. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur feels that it would be quite justifiable to accept the suggestion that, as in cases of “fraud”, the State whose representative had been subjected to personal coercion should have the option to accept the treaty as valid, or to reject it as invalidated by the coercion or, in appropriate cases, to regard as invalid only the particular clauses to which the coercion relates. In that event, it would seem natural to use the same formula as in previous articles, i.e. “the State may invoke the coercion as invalidating its consent to be bound”.

3. If paragraph 1 is revised in the manner just indicated, the problem posed by the United Kingdom as to whether a signature procured by coercion is capable of ratification will become comparatively easy of solution. Ratification of such a signature would then be possible, as in the case of a signature procured by fraud, but it would not preclude the State from afterwards invoking the coercion as invalidating its expression of consent unless the ratification were effected or were confirmed after the State had become aware of the coercion. In other words, ratification would be definitive and bind the State only if the case came within the provisions of article 47. In order to cover this point, however, it will be necessary to speak not of an “expression of consent to be bound” but of a signature’s having been procured by coercion.

4. If the Special Rapporteur’s proposals for the revision of article 46 and its transfer to section 1 as a general rule are accepted by the Commission, paragraph 2 of the present article will become unnecessary, since the question of separability will already have been covered in article 46.

5. The Special Rapporteur accordingly proposes that the article should be revised to read as follows:

   If the signature of a representative of a State to a treaty has been procured by coercion, through acts or threats directed against him in his personal capacity, the State may invoke such coercion as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

**Article 36.—Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force**

**Comments of Governments**

**Czechoslovakia.** The Czechoslovak Government notes with satisfaction that the article declares null and void ab initio treaties concluded through coercion of a State by the threat or use of force. It expresses the opinion that this article, together with article 37, pronounces the invalidity of unequal treaties which, in its view, constitute a serious obstacle to the attainment of complete independence and sovereignty by a number of developing
countries and a source of conflicts. It also considers that article 36 should explicitly prescribe the invalidity of treaties imposed by such forms of coercion as, for example, economic pressure.

Israel. The Government of Israel suggests that the article should be completed by adding a provision to the effect that the article also applies where the participation of a State in an existing treaty was procured by the threat or use of force.

Jamaica. The Jamaican Government considers that the scope of the article should be extended to cover circumstances where the threat or use of force does not, strictly, involve any violation of the principles of the Charter but is none the less a material factor in bringing about the conclusion of a treaty. In its view, an improper use or concealed threat of force may be so manipulated as to avoid violation of the principles of the Charter and yet violate the essential elements of consent in much the same way as fraud. In such cases it suggests that the treaty should be regarded not as void ab initio but as voidable at the instance of the injured State.

Netherlands. While fully endorsing the principle underlying the article, the Netherlands Government stresses two points. First, it says that the rule contained in the article is only acceptable and only capable of being applied in practice if the term “use of force” is understood in its strict sense of “armed aggression”, to the exclusion of all forms of coercion of an economic or psychological nature. In its view, however reprehensible such forms of coercion may be in certain circumstances, under present international conditions they cannot be included in a single general rule prohibiting coercion without creating rather than clearing away uncertainties — without making the rule ineffective even in its strict sense. Secondly, it raises the question of the retrospective operation of the article and asks whether it is to be assumed that the “principles of the Charter” did not become valid until the entry into force of the Charter in 1945.

Poland. The Polish Government considers that “coercion” for the purposes of this article should include not only the threat or use of force but also some other forms of pressure, in particular, economic pressure. In its view the latter represents a typical kind of coercion sometimes exercised in the conclusion of treaties.

Portugal. Although stressing the novel character of the article, the Portuguese Government considers the Commission’s approach to the question of coercion to be praiseworthy. It appears to endorse the Commission’s decision to define coercion in terms of the principles of the Charter and to leave the precise scope of the acts covered by the definition to be determined in practice by interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter.

Turkey. The Turkish Government considers that it would be helpful to define the threat or use of force envisaged in this article. Otherwise, it feels that the principles involved will in general be interpreted in connexion with the solution of political questions and that such a political interpretation can hardly be expected to possess the degree of clarity required in juridical matters. It also observes that this interpretation may not be acceptable to countries not members of the United Nations.

Uganda. The Government of Uganda is very much in favour of the article in that it eliminates coercion as an element in the conclusion of treaties.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government considers that this article should be subject to independent adjudication. Its delegation accepts the Commission’s view that the principle stated in article 36 is lex lata. It also shares the view of the Commission that the notion of coercion should be confined to a “threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter”. In its opinion, to widen that notion might lessen the effectiveness of the article and give rise to pretexts for the evasion of treaty obligations.

United States. The United States Government considers that, with certain safeguards, the article would constitute an important advance in the rule of law among nations. It agrees with the Commission that the rule should be restricted to the threat or use of physical force since, in its view, it is this which is prohibited by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. On the other hand, it considers that the Commission should deal in its commentary with the important question of the application of this provision in terms of time. The traditional doctrine prior to the League Covenant was that the validity of a treaty was not affected by the fact that it had been entered into under the threat or use of force. With the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, this traditional doctrine came under attack; with the Charter it was overturned. In the view of the United States Government, it was therefore only with the coming into effect of the Charter that the concept of the illegitimacy of threats or uses of force in violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, was accepted. Accordingly, the United States Government considers it doubtful whether invalidity due to an illegitimate threat or use of force should be applied retroactively. Otherwise, the validity of a large number of treaties, notably peace treaties, might be thrown into question. Indeed, the United States Government thinks it open to question whether such a provision should have effect from 1945 or, alternatively, from the conclusion of a convention on the law of treaties incorporating this rule. In general, it considers that retroactivity of the article would create too many legal uncertainties.

Algerian delegation. The Algerian delegation considers that economic pressure may sometimes be more effective in reducing the power of self-determination of a country, above all in the case of a country with single-crop farming or whose economy depends on the export of one product only. In its view, recognition that economic pressure is a cause of nullity of treaties is not a threat to their stability but increases the confidence of the newly independent States in international law.

Bolivian delegation. The Bolivian delegation, in the light of the commentary, interprets the article as applying not only to future treaties but to all treaties without
exception; for a treaty procured by the threat or use of force is to be regarded as void *ab initio*. It also stresses that the Commission has not enumerated all possible forms of coercion, since it had felt that the scope of the Charter is sufficiently broad. 50

_Brazilian delegation._ The Brazilian delegation notes that, in paragraph 1 of its commentary, the Commission has concluded that the invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or use of force is a principle which is *lex lata* in present-day international law. 51

_Bulgarian delegation._ The Bulgarian delegation unreservedly supports the notion embodied in the article and hopes that the work of the Commission will continue along the same lines. In particular, it considers that leonine treaties running counter to the principle of the sovereign equality of States and to the liberation of countries and peoples should disappear. 52

_Belorussian delegation._ The Belorussian delegation considers the nullity of the principle of leonine treaties to be of great contemporary importance from the point of view of the eradication of colonialism in all its forms and of the protection of new States from unequal treaties. In its view, colonialist Powers are now resorting to more subtle forms of coercion, for example, under the guise of economic assistance. 53

_Chinese delegation._ While welcoming the inclusion of the article, the Chinese delegation feels that difficulties may arise in its application unless the Commission solves the question of determining the presence of the threat or use of force at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and works out safeguards to ensure that “coercion” is not used as a pretext for violating a treaty. 64

_Colombian delegation._ The Colombian delegation observes that articles 35 and 36 mark a step forward in the preservation of freedom of contract, which may, it thinks, be endangered not only by acts of violence against diplomatic representatives but also, and more seriously, by indirect means of coercion incompatible with the sovereign equality of States. 65

_Ecuadorian delegation._ After setting out its views regarding the absolute character of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter except in case of self-defence, the Ecuadorian delegation expresses the opinion that the Commission should take account of the proposal of the Iraqi delegation that article 36 should be extended to cover economic and political pressure. 66

_Ghanaian delegation._ While generally welcoming the Commission’s proposals regarding coercion, the Ghanaian delegation notes the absence of any provision relating to the economic pressure that may be put upon a State to compel it to sign a treaty. 67

_Guatemalan delegation._ The Guatemalan delegation approves the principle stated in article 36, which it considers to be *lex lata* in the international law of today. 68

_Hungarian delegation._ The Hungarian delegation does not share the view that article 36 applies only to cases involving the threat or use of force. It considers that all types of duress should be taken into account and that the article should be redrafted to prevent an unduly narrow interpretation. 69

_Indonesian delegation._ In general, the Indonesian delegation supports the Commission’s conclusion regarding the effect of coercion, but observes that the Commission does not seem to have anticipated the case where the threat or use of force is applied by a third country rather than by one of the contracting parties. It considers that the expression “threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter” covers all forms of coercion employed to induce a State to act against its own interests and, in particular, to a threat to strangle the economy of a country. In its view, the fact that the expression “armed force” is used in the seventh paragraph of the Preamble to the Charter but not in Article 2, paragraph 4, demonstrates clearly that the latter is not limited to cases of armed force; and also by the fact that in the third paragraph of the Preamble “justice” is mentioned before “respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law”. 60

_Iraqi delegation._ While approving the principle adopted by the Commission, the delegation finds that there is one omission. In its view, if a restricted interpretation of the expression “threat or use of force” is adopted, many forms of real coercion will not come under article 36 and treaties which have been imposed by force, for example, treaties imposed by political or economic pressure, will remain valid. An article the purpose of which is to put treaties on a healthier basis and to guarantee the freedom of the parties must therefore declare as a ground of nullity every and any form of coercion, whether a threat or use of force or any other unlawful pressure, economic or political, likely to compel the consent of a State. The Iraqi delegation considers that pressure which may pass unperceived is more to be feared today than threats or the use of physical force, which can easily be denounced; and that by clearly defining the rules relating to the vitiation of consent and coercion, the risks of unequal treaties will be reduced. Without fraud, without error, and without coercion there would, it believes, scarcely be any unequal treaties, except between States having unequal international juridical status; and here again vitiation of consent or coercion might often be noted. 61

_Moroccan delegation._ While noting that article 36 represents an important step towards the establishment of the rule of law among States, the Moroccan delegation thinks that the Commission should give further study to the question whether the article should apply as from 1945 or from the date when a convention on the law of treaties comes into force. It also thinks that the Commis-
tion should consider other forms of pressure. Economic pressure, for example, often influences the attitude of a country which is aware of the unfavourable position in which it is placed by entering into a treaty but feels compelled by circumstances to sign it; e.g. when a State's economy depends on that of another powerful State which controls either its national production or the international market for its products. 62

Nigerian delegation. The Nigerian delegation considers that the Commission should examine the question of treaties signed by dependent States just before receiving their independence; for the signing of such treaties is often a condition of the granting of independence. In its view, therefore, such treaties are signed under a form of duress and are void. 63

Panamanian delegation. The Panamanian delegation commends what it refers to as the Commission's successful revision of traditional doctrine concerning the use of force. 64

Philippine delegation. While saying that article 36 represents a notable step forward, the Philippine delegation considers that the Commission should not have confined the notion of coercion to the threat or use of force. On that basis there would be no protection against measures such as economic strangulation, to which, in its view, many countries, and especially the developing countries, are particularly vulnerable. The delegation shares the anxiety of those who think that an excessively wide definition of coercion may be used as a pretext for avoiding treaty obligations. But it feels that such abuses can be avoided by inserting detailed provisions to prevent them and to permit easy ascertainment of the facts, rather in the manner in which possible abuses of the rebus sic stantibus principle are prevented in article 44 by the limitations in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of that article. 65

Romanian delegation. The Romanian delegation concurs in the text of article 36. In its view, any treaty concluded in violation of the general principles of present day international law are ipso facto void and without effect for all the parties. 66

Spanish delegation. The Spanish delegation supports the principle stated in the article. While agreeing that both the threat of starvation through economic warfare and the threat of destruction by atomic warfare are prohibited by the text of the article, it does not consider that there is any need to make the article more explicit on the point. In its view, it would be best to leave the matter to be interpreted in practice in the spirit of the Charter. 67

Syrian delegation. The Syrian delegation endorses the Commission's decision to recognize as void treaties the conclusion of which has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter. 68

Thai delegation. The Thai delegation welcomes article 36. In its view, it is the more necessary to consider the principle laid down in the article as a rule of international law that small nations have in the past suffered greatly from the threat or use of force. 69

USSR delegation. The USSR delegation considers that, to secure respect for treaties, leonine treaties such as exist, in its view, between some new States and former colonial Powers must be prohibited. It considers that to accompany a grant of independence with reservations is contrary to the principle of equality of peoples and States proclaimed in the Charter. 70

United Arab Republic delegation. The delegation of the United Arab Republic endorses the Commission's extension of the notion of coercion in article 36 and thinks that a sound theory regarding vitiation of consent could contribute greatly to the solution of the problem of unequal treaties. 71

Uruguayan delegation. The Uruguayan delegation considers article 36 to be of fundamental significance as the first clear statement in international law that treaties secured by force are invalid. It says that, although Articles 17 and 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States contain certain provisions regarding the use of force and other means of coercion, the Organization has not yet adopted so forthright principles as those in article 36. 72

Venezuelan delegation. The Venezuelan delegation fully supports the inclusion of article 36. At the same time it feels that there should be a fuller definition of what is meant by "force" so as to avoid restrictive interpretations which may prejudice what, in its view, is the article's true intention of condemning coercion in all its forms. 73

Yugoslav delegation. The Yugoslav delegation considers that the narrowness of the definition given for coercion in the article shows that the language of Article 2, paragraph 4, needs elaboration in order that it may cover all the varied, often indirect or concealed, forms in which pressure may now be brought to bear on a State. 74

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur
1. A number of Governments suggest that the article should be expanded so as to make it cover other forms of pressure, e.g. political and economic pressure. Certain other Governments endorse the Commission's view that coercion of the State as a ground of invalidity should be limited to cases of a threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter.
2. The Commission dealt with this question in paragraph (3) of its commentary, where it said:

"If the notion of coercion is confined, as the Commission thinks it must be, to a threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter, the possibilities of a plausible abuse of this ground of invalidity

62 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 16.
63 Ibid., 790th meeting, paras. 2 and 3.
64 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 31.
65 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 9.
66 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 32.
67 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 8.
68 Ibid., 786th meeting, para. 13.
69 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 5.
70 Ibid., 787th meeting, para. 15.
71 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 15.
72 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 26.
73 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 18.
74 Ibid., 782nd meeting, para. 15.
do not appear to be any greater than in cases of fraud or error or than in cases of a claim to terminate a treaty on the ground of an alleged breach or of a fundamental change in the circumstances. Some members of the Commission expressed the view that any other forms of pressure, such as a threat to strangle the economy of a country, ought to be stated in the article as falling within the concept of coercion. The Commission, however, decided to define coercion in terms of a ‘threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter’, and considered that the precise scope of the acts covered by this definition should be left to be determined in practice by interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter.” 76

At the fifteenth session, as the Special Rapporteur understands it, the Commission was unanimous in thinking that a treaty procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter should be stated to be void; but equally it thought that it should not, in codifying the law of treaties, seek to pronounce upon the precise scope and effect of Article 2, paragraph 4, and other relevant provisions of the Charter. It felt that the full content of the principle contained in the present article should be left to be determined in practice by interpretation of the provisions of the Charter. In the same way it preferred in article 37 to state in general terms the rule that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a rule of *jus cogens* and to leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.

3. In the interval since the Commission's fifteenth session, the General Assembly has established, by resolution 1966 (XVIII), a “Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States”, composed on the basis of “the principle of equitable geographical representation and the necessity that the principal legal systems of the world should be represented”. Among the principles referred to the Special Committee by the General Assembly for study with a view to their progressive development and codification was “the principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. In other words, among the topics referred by the General Assembly to the Special Committee was the precise content of the general principle which forms the basis, in the particular context of the law of treaties, of the rule formulated in the present article.

4. The Special Committee studied the principle at its session in Mexico City in November 1964, when it debated a number of different problems regarding its interpretation and application. Among these was the question whether the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of “force” embraces “economic, political and other forms of pressure or coercion”. No conclusion was reached on this question, and the report of the Committee summed up the result of the discussion as follows:

“The Special Committee debated in considerable detail whether the term ‘force’ embraced pressures of the foregoing nature, and was unable to arrive at any consensus on this point, which was considered in the light of (a) the interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 4, both in its context in the Charter and with reference to other relevant Articles; (b) the legislative history of Article 2, paragraph 4, and (c) developments since the Charter and the current requirements of the world community.” (A/5746, para. 47).

5. In the circumstances, the Special Rapporteur feels that the appropriate course for the Commission is to retain the general formulation of the rule which now appears in the draft article. Under this general formulation the article is, as it were, open-ended: any interpretation of the principle that States are under an obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter which becomes generally accepted as authoritative will automatically have its effects on the scope of the rule laid down in the present article. On the other hand, if the Commission were itself to attempt to elaborate the rule contained in the article by detailed interpretations of the principle, it would encroach on a topic which has been remitted by the General Assembly to the Special Committee and the detailed study of which would seem to belong rather to the topic of State responsibility.

6. The United States and Netherlands Governments raise the question of the time element in connexion with the application of the rule contained in the article and the former expresses the view that to give retroactivity to the rule would be creative of too many legal uncertainties, especially with regard to peace treaties. The operation of the rule in point of time would seem naturally to fall under the so-called inter-temporal law: the rule that “a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it”. 76 A comparable problem arises under article 37 in regard to invalidity resulting from conflict with a rule of *jus cogens*. There, in order to take account of the inter-temporal law the Commission dealt with the subject in two separate articles: (1) article 37, covering conflict with an existing rule of *jus cogens*, and (2) article 45, covering invalidity resulting from a new rule of *jus cogens*. The latter it treated as a case of termination of the treaty through the emergence of the rule, thereby recognizing the validity of the treaty under the law in force prior to the emergence of the rule of *jus cogens*. Articles 37 and 45 concern the legality of the objects of the treaty—the legality, that is, of its performance; and for that reason the validity of the treaty at any given time is affected by the evolution of the law and is determined by the law then in force. The present article, on the other hand, concerns the conditions under which a treaty may validly be concluded—the conditions, that is, for the creation of the legal relation between the parties to the treaty. An evolution of the law governing the conditions for the accomplishment of a legal act does not, under the inter-temporal law, operate to deprive of validity a legal act already accom-

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plished in conformity with the law previously in force. Consequently, a peace treaty or other treaty procured by coercion prior to the emergence of the rule codified in the present article would not, under the inter-temporal law, be deprived of its validity by the operation of that rule.

7. The Netherlands Government inquires whether it may be assumed that the “principles of the Charter” did not become valid until 1945. As to the actual date from which the rule in the present article should be considered to govern the conditions for the conclusion of a valid treaty, the United States Government, on the other hand, thinks it “open to question” whether the date should be 1945 or the date of the conclusion of a convention on the law of treaties. In paragraph 1 of its commentary to the present article the Commission pointed out in 1963 that with the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris there began to develop a strong body of opinion which advocated that treaties procured by force ought no longer to be recognized as valid; and that this opinion had been reinforced and consolidated by the charters of the allied military tribunals for the trial of Axis war criminals and by the clear-cut prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. The Commission further stated that, in its view, these developments justified the conclusion that “the invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or use of force is a principle which is lex lata in the international law of today”, and this view has not been questioned in the comments of Governments. Accordingly, it would seem illogical to formulate the principle as one applicable only from the date of the conclusion of a convention on the law of treaties. The precise date at which the rule contained in the present article may be said to have become accepted as a general rule of international law is a matter on which, perhaps, different opinions may be held. But it is beyond question that the entry into force of the Charter and the establishment of the United Nations mark the beginning of the new era of international relations and international law which followed the Second World War. Whatever may be their opinions about the state of the law prior to the establishment of the United Nations, the great majority of international lawyers consider that Article 2, paragraph 4, together with other provisions of the Charter, authoritatively declares the modern customary law regarding the threat or use of force. The Commission itself, by formulating the present article in terms of “the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations” appears by implication to have recognized that the present article is applicable at any rate to all treaties concluded since the entry into force of the Charter. On the other hand, it hardly seems to be the function of the Commission, in codifying the modern law, to specify at what precise date in the past an existing rule of international law came to be generally accepted as such. The Special Rapporteur, therefore, doubts whether the Commission need or should attempt to go beyond the broad indication of the time-element contained in the reference to “the principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.

8. There remains the proposal of the Government of Israel that the article should be revised so as to make it cover a participation in an existing treaty procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter. Although such cases may rarely occur today, it seems logical that they should be governed by the article. Accordingly, it is suggested that the article should be reworded so as to read as follows:

Any treaty and any act expressing the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty which is procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations shall be void.

**Article 37.**—Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)

**Comments of Governments**

**Israel.** The Government of Israel suggests that it should be made clear in the commentary that for a rule of *jus cogens* to exist the two elements set out in the article must subsist simultaneously, as appears to be already implicit in paragraph 4 of the commentary.

**Luxembourg.** The Luxembourg Government considers that the article is likely to create a great deal of uncertainty. Assuming, as appears from the commentary, that peremptory norms may be norms established by treaty as well as by usage, it says that the article will have the effect of introducing the whole question of the conflict of rules resulting from successive treaties. It also argues that, if the present article were to be combined with the rule *pacta sunt servanda*, which it considers to be undoubtedly a peremptory norm, any treaty incompatible with a previous treaty could be said to be null and void, except in cases where the parties to the later treaty have the power to abrogate the first treaty. Moreover, in its view, there will be no less uncertainty in regard to the substance, since there is no authority competent to define the norms which are peremptory and those which are not. Having regard to the contractual nature of all treaties, the Luxembourg Government thinks it arguable that all rules formulated by treaty are peremptory; for each one is an undertaking of a State towards other States. It interprets the Commission’s object as being to introduce as a cause of nullity criteria of morality and “public policy” such as are used in internal law to determine the compatibility of private contracts with fundamental concepts of the social order; and it questions whether such concepts are suitable for transfer to international relations which are characterized by the lack of any authority, political or judicial, capable of imposing on all States standards of international justice and morality. Consequently, in the view of the Luxembourg Government, it is not possible in the present state of international relations to define in legal terms the substance of peremptory international law. In addition, it asks who would be entitled to invoke the ground of nullity dealt with in the article, the parties or third States. If the former, the Luxembourg Government says that this would mean...
that a party, which had itself contributed to the conclusion and entry into force of a treaty, would contradict its own act; in short, that it would be a case of *venire contra factum proprium*. On the other hand, if a third State were to be considered entitled to invoke the nullity of the treaty, the Luxembourg Government says this would be inconsistent with the principle of relativity which, in the absence of any supranational authority, continues still to dominate the whole subject of treaties.

**Netherlands.** The Netherlands Government endorses the principle underlying the article. At the same time it feels that it is a pleonasm to say "a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted".

**Portugal.** The Portuguese Government considers that the position adopted by the Commission is a balanced one and that it would be difficult to go further in the definition of *jus cogens*. A mere enumeration of examples would involve the risk of rendering the interpretation of the article difficult in cases not expressly mentioned. Nor does it think that the inclusion of acts constituting crimes against international law or other offences constituting violations of human rights or of the principle of self-determination would be helpful; for it considers that these notions have become corrupt in reality and that any reference to them would not assist in removing the confusion which surrounds them.

**Turkey.** The Turkish Government considers that the article, which at first glance appears essential and useful, cannot easily be applied without modification. In its view, the examples cited in the commentary are not compatible with reality, since States do not conclude treaties dealing with the use of force, with crime, traffic in slaves and genocide. What is meant by *jus cogens* not being defined in the article, the Turkish Government thinks that it will be possible for each State to interpret it to fit its own needs. Indeed, it feels that this is just what has happened; and that, in the absence of machinery for compulsory jurisdiction, these different interpretations will merely give rise to new misunderstandings. It considers that it would be wrong to include the notion of *jus cogens* in the law of treaties without first establishing effective machinery for settling differences arising between States regarding *jus cogens*.

**United Kingdom.** The United Kingdom Government considers that, if this article is accepted, its application must be very limited; for in its present form the article calls for a great deal of elucidation and, in particular, as to its relation to Article 103 of the Charter. In its view, it would be useful if examples of peremptory norms contained in the Charter or found in the remainder of the Commission's draft articles on the law of treaties could be given. Moreover, it considers that, in any event, the article would have to be made subject to independent adjudication.

**United States.** The United States Government considers that the concept embodied in this article would, if properly applied, substantially further the rule of law in international relations; and that the provisions of the article should be supported if it can be made certain that they will not conduce to abuse and undesirable disruption of treaty relations. It finds the examples given in points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph (3) of the commentary readily acceptable. On the other hand, it feels that even in these cases the application of the article retroactively might result in injustices to one or more of the parties concerned, and might disrupt beneficial relations on the basis of clearly acceptable treaty provisions which are included amongst others that have long been recognized by the parties as obsolete but which, under the concept stated in article 37, would render the entire treaty void. It suggests that the Commission should reconsider the provisions of the article and all aspects of the manner in which it might be applied, particularly the question as to who would decide when the facts justify application of the rule. In its comments on article 45 the United States Government reiterates that under article 37 a *jus cogens* rule developed after the conclusion of many early treaties may avoid the provisions of those treaties "if, as appears to be the case, the provisions of that article apply retroactively". It adds that article 37 could not be accepted unless agreement is reached as to who is to define a new peremptory norm and to determine how it is to be established.

**Algerian delegation.** The Algerian delegation endorses the approach of the Commission to the question of *jus cogens*. It observes that, while it may be difficult to find an exact criterion for defining rules having a *jus cogens* character, the United Nations has already developed a number of peremptory norms of morality and public policy in international relations—norms which will be defined and developed in State practice. It also observes that it is on the basis of these norms that the Organization of African Unity would seek the annulment of agreements existing between racist and colonialist States in southern Africa.  

**Brazilian delegation.** The Brazilian delegation considers that, whatever doctrinal divergencies there may be, the evolution of international society since the Second World War shows that it is essential to recognize the peremptory nature of certain rules. It observes that the notion of *jus cogens* raises the question of the hierarchy of the sources of international law; that in internal law this question is solved in accordance with a formal criterion, but that in international law, where the weight of a rule is not determined by whether it has been established by treaty or by custom, a positive criterion has to be found. In its view, the Commission was wise to limit itself to merely stating the principle and leaving it to State practice and to the jurisprudence of international tribunals to develop the content of the rule.

**Bulgarian delegation.** The Bulgarian delegation expresses the opinion that the debate in the Sixth Committee on the principles governing friendly relations between States would help to give certainty to the content of the rules of *jus cogens* and provide a more satisfactory foundation for article 37.

**Cypriot delegation.** The Cypriot delegation regards article 37 as a constructive contribution to the progressive
development of international law, and considers it prudent to leave the full content of the article to be worked out by State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. The article, in its view, would have the effect of invalidating a provision which, whether directly or by implication, contemplates the threat or use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of a State or one which purports to confer upon one or more States the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another State. In the second connexion it cites the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case.

Czechoslovak delegation. The Czechoslovak delegation considers the provision in article 37 to be in harmony with the legal convictions of States and to represent a remarkable step forward in the development of the law of treaties. In its view, that provision is largely supported by State practice and international law and is endorsed by many authorities as, for example, C. C. Hyde.

Ecuadorian delegation. The Ecuadorian delegation endorses the initiative of the Commission in including a violation of *jus cogens* as a ground for invalidating a treaty.

French delegation. Codification, in the view of the French delegation, does not consist in anticipating everything, but merely in formulating general rules and leaving the rest to time, experience and the interpretation of the courts. In this respect it considers that article 37 is one of the genuinely key provisions of the draft articles.

Ghanaian delegation. The Ghanaian delegation endorses the Commission’s approach to the concept of *jus cogens*.

Guatemalan delegation. The Guatemalan delegation welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the existence of certain peremptory norms and rules of international law.

Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian delegation welcomes the principle enunciated in article 37, and finds it impressive that ideological differences did not prevent members of the Commission from reaching a solution that meets the needs of practice.

Indonesian delegation. The Indonesian delegation shares the Commission’s hope that the precise criteria by which to identify norms having the character of *jus cogens* may be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.

Iraqi delegation. The Iraqi delegation observes that the notion of *jus cogens* raises the question of the hierarchy of the rules of international law; that in internal law this question is solved according to a formal rule; but that this does not apply in international law where the fact that a rule is conventional or customary does not determine its value. In its view, it is necessary to adopt a material standard which will show the substance of the rule, its necessity and its importance. It considers that, while there is great need for prudence, the notion of *jus cogens* is indisputable; and this notion derives from positive law, not from natural law; and that it is not a matter of immutable and permanent norms but of a rule that has a particular value at a particular moment.

Italian delegation. The Italian delegation endorses the Commission’s recognition of the existence of rules of *jus cogens*. Their existence, in its view, was challenged in the past only because a contractual idea of international law still prevailed; but as a result of the evolution of international law since the establishment of the United Nations, that idea could not continue to prevail.

Moroccan delegation. The Moroccan delegation notes that the Charter has established several peremptory norms of general international law and has rendered them binding upon Member States under Article 103.

Panamanian delegation. The Panamanian delegation agrees wholeheartedly with article 37, considering that it would be absurd for the principle of freedom of contract to retain its absolute sway in international law when in internal law it is being constantly restricted through the application of the principles of social justice.

Philippine delegation. The Philippine delegation welcomes the Commission’s decision to recognize the existence of peremptory norms of international law. It also expresses satisfaction that in paragraph (3) of the commentary the Commission recognizes human rights and self-determination as of the essence of *jus cogens*, violation of which may lead to a treaty’s being declared void.

Polish delegation. The Polish delegation underlines that the notion of *jus cogens* is not new. As to the question of identifying *jus cogens* rules, it recalls the proposal made in the Sixth Committee that a declaration should be drafted on the fundamental principles of international law.

Romanian delegation. The Romanian delegation concurs in the article.

Spanish delegation. The Spanish delegation considers the Commission to have been wise not to attempt to identify the rules which possess a *jus cogens* character. In its view, such rules are readily recognized in practice, as in the case of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) condemning certain violations of human rights.

Syrian delegation. The Syrian delegation endorses the Commission’s decision to recognize the existence of peremptory norms of general international law, and also its decision not to draw up a list of *jus cogens* rules. In

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81 I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 35.
82 Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Sixth Committee, 783rd meeting, para. 18.
83 Ibid., 787th meeting, para. 25.
84 Ibid., 789th meeting, para. 26.
85 Ibid., 787th meeting, para. 5.
86 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 35.
87 Ibid., 785th meeting, para. 4.
88 Ibid., 789th meeting, para. 11.
89 Ibid., 785th meeting, para. 9.
90 Ibid., 788th meeting, para. 22.
91 Ibid., 793rd meeting, para. 11.
92 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 17.
93 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 31.
94 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 10.
95 Ibid., 788th meeting, para. 36.
96 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 32.
97 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 9.
its view, the rule in article 37 is all the stronger for being stated in general terms. 98

Thai delegation. The Thai delegation notes with great interest the insertion of the *jus cogens* principle in the law of treaties. This it considers to be a new rule recognizing in positive international law the existence of superior norms in the hierarchy of international rules. 99

Ukrainian delegation. The Ukrainian delegation considers that article 37 should prove an adequate criterion by which to indentify treaties incompatible with the principles of the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)). In its view, unjust treaties conflict with the affirmation in the Preamble to the Charter of faith in the equal rights of nations large and small. It observes that Article 103 of the Charter provides that, in the event of a conflict between obligations under the Charter and obligations under any other international agreement, the former are to prevail; and that article 37 appears to it to be completely in accord with that principle. It further observes that unjust treaties designed as instruments of colonial oppression and exploitation also conflict with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and with General Assembly resolutions 523 (VI), 626 (VII), 1314 (XIII) and 1515 (XV). 100

USSR delegation. The USSR delegation notes that article 37 states that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law; and that leonine treaties such as existed between some new States and former colonial Powers must be prohibited. In its view, treaties granting independence but accompanied by reservations are contrary to the principle of equality of peoples and States proclaimed in the Charter. 101

United Arab Republic delegation. The delegation of the United Arab Republic endorses the decision of the Commission to recognize the existence of rules having the character of *jus cogens*. It notes that the Charter contains several incontestable norms of international public law; that Article 103 makes these obligatory at any rate for Member States; and that as a quasi-universal set of norms the Charter has helped considerably to make the idea of *jus cogens* an international reality. In its view, the recognition of the notion of *jus cogens* by the Commission marks the transition from the classical international law to the modern law of the United Nations. 102

Uruguayan delegation. The Uruguayan delegation considers it to be of the greatest significance that the Commission, representing jurists from many different legal systems, has agreed to include so vital a principle in a multilateral convention on the law of treaties. It notes that, up to date, Article 103 constitutes the most far-reaching legal text applicable to the question, and that it establishes a hierarchy of norms in international law.

In its view, article 37 represents a substantial advance over Article 103 of the Charter, in that it not only recognizes the existence of peremptory norms, but also provides a penalty for derogation from them in the form of the nullity of a treaty. At the same time it considers that the article also raises questions. Is the article, it asks, considered by the Commission to be the codification of an accepted principle or the progressive development of a new principle? If the former, it thinks that the Commission should cite previous cases in which the principle of *jus cogens* has been reflected in United Nations solutions of international problems. Another question it raises is the date upon which article 37 should become effective, and whether it should be retroactive. It suggests that there are three possible solutions to this question: (1) the article should affect only future treaties signed after a specified date; (2) it should take effect as soon as it is adopted as part of a convention on the law of treaties; or (3) it should be applicable not only to treaties signed after its adoption but also to those signed at any time in the past. In its view, either of the last two solutions would give rise to great difficulties, but the Commission should consider the whole question. 103

Venezuelan delegation. The Venezuelan delegation considers the recognition of the principle of *jus cogens* by the Commission a milestone in international law. 104

Yugoslav delegation. The Yugoslav delegation welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the existence of peremptory norms of international law and its recognition of the fact that these norms are constantly developing and changing with the times. It regards this as an important step in the progressive development of international law. 105

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. Although certain Governments express doubts as to the advisability of the inclusion of this article unless it is backed by a system of independent adjudication, the principle contained in the article appears to meet with a large measure of approval. Indeed, only one Government — the Luxembourg Government — really questions the existence today of a concept of rules of *jus cogens* in international law. Since the comments of this Government do not appear to raise any new points not taken into account by the Commission, it is thought sufficient to draw attention to them. 106

2. The Netherlands Government suggests that it may be a pleonasm to say “a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted”. This point, which is primarily one of drafting, received careful consideration at the fifteenth session. The term “peremptory norm” might, no doubt, suffice by itself to convey the notion of a rule of a *jus cogens* character, if there were an existing usage clearly giving that meaning to the term. But this is not

98 Ibid., 786th meeting, paras. 13 and 16.
99 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 6.
100 Ibid., 784th meeting, paras. 8 and 13.
101 Ibid., 787th meeting, para. 15.
102 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 16.
the case. Moreover, all general rules of international law have a certain peremptory character in the sense that they are obligatory for a State unless and until they have been set aside by another lawfully created norm derogating from them. A general rule possesses a *jus cogens* character only when individual States are not permitted to derogate from the rule at all—not even by agreement in their mutual relations. In short, a *jus cogens* rule is one which cannot be derogated from but may only be modified by the creation of another general rule which is also of a *jus cogens* character. Accordingly, in formulating the article, the Commission considered it essential to speak not merely of a “peremptory” norm but of one “from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”.

3. The United Kingdom Government raises the question of the relation between the present article and Article 103 of the Charter, which provides: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”. Article 103 of the Charter, as its terms specify, is a provision which essentially lays down a rule not for States generally but for “Members of the United Nations”. In formulating article 63 of the draft articles regarding the application of incompatible treaty provisions, the Commission viewed Article 103, like similar provisions found in certain other treaties, as directed to establishing the priority of the obligations of Members under the Charter rather than the invalidity of treaty clauses incompatible with those obligations. The Commission decided, in stating the rules regarding the application of incompatible treaties, to recognize the overriding character of Article 103 of the Charter—in other words, it recognized the primacy of the rule in Article 103 in the context of the relative priority of incompatible treaty obligations. 

4. The United States Government, as in the case of the previous article, questions the advisability of allowing any retroactive operation to the rule enunciated in the article. It fears that otherwise injustices may result to one or more of the parties concerned and that there may be a disruption of treaty provisions which are clearly beneficial and acceptable, but are included amongst other provisions which, although long recognized to be obsolete, would render the whole treaty void under the present article. As the Special Rapporteur has already pointed out in paragraph 6 of his observations on article 36, the Commission has taken account of the temporal element by dealing with the subject of *jus cogens* in two separate articles: (1) the present article, covering conflict with a rule of *jus cogens* existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, and (2) article 45, covering invalidity resulting from the emergence of a new rule of *jus cogens*. If these two articles are read together, they make it clear that the provisions which they contain regarding conflict with a rule of *jus cogens* are not intended to give rules of *jus cogens* any retroactive operation. A treaty is void *ab initio* and wholly void under the present article, only if it conflicts with a rule of *jus cogens* existing at the time of its conclusion. Under paragraph 1 of article 45, if a new rule of *jus cogens* is established subsequently to the conclusion of a treaty, the treaty only becomes void and terminates at that later time. Moreover, under article 53, paragraph 2, a situation resulting from the previous application of the treaty will retain its validity to the extent that it is not in conflict with the new rule of *jus cogens*. Nor will the whole treaty become void and terminate under article 45 when it is only certain of its clauses that are in conflict with the rule of *jus cogens*. Under paragraph 2 of the article the rest of the treaty, if properly severable from the void clauses, will remain valid.

5. Article 37, as drafted, does not state expressly that it concerns cases where a treaty conflicts with a rule of *jus cogens* existing at the time of its conclusion. The Commission assumed that this would be clear from reading its provisions together with those of article 45; and it also assumed that the inter-temporal law would preclude article 37 from being interpreted as invalidating retroactively past treaties concluded prior to the emergence of a conflicting rule of *jus cogens*. However, having regard to the distinctions made by the Commission in the operation of the present article and that of article 45, the Special Rapporteur feels that it may be desirable, in order to leave no possibility of misunderstanding, to make explicit in the text of the present article that it relates to treaties which conflict with a rule of *jus cogens* existing at the time of their conclusion.

6. Admittedly, if the rule embodied in article 37 were to be regarded as a total innovation in international law, the time-element would present itself in a different light. On that hypothesis, the application of the article would logically be confined to treaties concluded after the entry into force of a general convention on the law of treaties incorporating the rule. The Special Rapporteur does not, however, understand the Commission to have intended in article 37 to propose a completely new rule of treaty law. In paragraph 1 of its commentary, the Commission “concluded that in codifying the law of treaties it must take the position that today there are certain rules from which States are not competent to derogate by a treaty arrangement”. In other words,

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it recognized that some rules of *jus cogens* already exist in international law and in article 37 merely drew the logical consequences from that fact. The concern as to the possibility of retroactive effects is thought really to arise from doubts, first, as to precisely which norms have become norms of *jus cogens* and at what dates and, secondly, by whom these points are to be authoritatively determined. At its fifteenth session the Commission considered its correct course to be to leave the full content of the rule—the identification of the norms which have become norms of *jus cogens*—to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. It felt, *inter alia*, that if it were to attempt to draw up, even selectively, a list of norms of *jus cogens*, this might involve a prolonged study of matters which belong to other branches of international law. The second point—the authority by whom norms are to be determined to be norms of *jus cogens*—is connected with the problem of the procedure for resolving disputes which the Commission sought to cover in article 51. This point, which is a general one, will necessarily come up for consideration when that article is re-examined; and the particular significance of the point in connexion with the present article will, no doubt, be borne in mind by the Commission.

7. Having regard to the observations in paragraph 5 above, it is suggested that the opening phrase of the article should be revised so as to read:

A treaty is void *ab initio* if at the time of its conclusion it conflicts...etc.

**SECTION 3: TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES**

**Article 38.—Termination of treaties through the operation of their own provisions**

**Comments of Governments**

**Burma.** The Burmese Government suggests that consideration should be given to including the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* as an additional clause in this article.

**Finland.** The Finnish Government considers that the main provisions of this article are self-evident and could be omitted. On the other hand, it favours the retention of paragraph 3(b) which, in its view, embodies an important principle.

**Israel.** The Government of Israel suggests that, in order to avoid the impression that the article merely states the obvious, the title and the opening phrase should be revised so as to make the article relate more specifically to the time of termination.

**Portugal.** The Portuguese Government observes that, in paragraph 2, and paragraph 3(a), the references to the “date of denunciation” do not furnish a very precise formula because the date of termination may be a difficult question of interpretation. At the same time it doubts whether a more precise principle could be laid down. The rule stated in paragraph 3(b) it finds commendable, since that rule will ensure greater certainty in the application of the clauses with which paragraph 3(b) deals.

**Sweden.** The Swedish Government thinks the need for paragraphs 1, 2 and 3(a) of the article to be somewhat doubtful. Paragraph 3(b), on the other hand, it considers to be a useful residuary rule.

**United States.** In the view of the United States Government, the rules spelled out in article 38 are self-evident and axiomatic, so that the article could well be omitted, if the draft convention on the law of treaties were to be simplified. The formulation of the rules in the draft article it considers to be satisfactory.

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. The article, as at present formulated, still reflects the “code” concept of the Commission’s work on the law of treaties; and four out of the six Governments which have commented upon it appear to feel that some of its provisions are too self-evident to require statement. The Government of Israel suggests that the self-evident character of those provisions might be avoided by making the title and the opening phrase relate more specifically to the time of termination. The Special Rapporteur doubts whether this solution would be satisfactory, because the articles in section 3 deal essentially with the grounds or causes of termination, just as those in section 2 deal with the grounds or causes of invalidity. He feels that the best course may be to reduce paragraphs 1, 2, 3(a) and the first sentence of 3(b), which are simply a matter of the application of the terms of the treaty, into a single paragraph. On the other hand, the second sentence of paragraph 3(b), as three Governments note, contains a rule of some importance on a point which might otherwise give rise to uncertainty, and this sentence might then become paragraph 2.

2. The article, as at present formulated, is limited to the termination of a treaty under its own provisions, whereas the suspension of its operation or the conditions for the withdrawal of individual parties may equally find mention in the treaty. It therefore seems desirable that the article should also cover both these possibilities.

3. The Special Rapporteur accordingly suggests that the article might be revised to read as follows:

Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under its own provisions

1. A treaty terminates or its operation is suspended or the withdrawal of a party from the treaty takes effect on such date or on the fulfilment of such condition or on the occurrence of such event as may be provided for in the treaty.

2. A multilateral treaty does not terminate by reason only of the fact that the number of the parties falls below the number specified in the treaty as necessary for its entry into force.

**Article 39.—Treaties containing no provisions regarding their termination**

**Comments of Governments**

**Israel.** The Government of Israel suggests that provision should be made for the possibility of suspending the operation of the treaty in the circumstances mentioned in the article as an alternative to terminating it. It observes that this might be done by an addition on the lines of paragraph 3 of article 40.
Luxembourg. In the first sentence of the article, the Luxembourg Government proposes that the reference to “statements of the parties” should read “concordant statements of the parties”. The purpose of the proposal is to prevent a party from invoking its own unilateral statements in order to secure a right to denounce or withdraw from a treaty.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government considers that, with the exception of some old treaties, cases are seldom found where contracting parties are so careless as simply to “forget” to include any provision regarding the termination or denunciation of the treaty. In its view, failure of the parties to mention the subject is normally to be ascribed to their having deliberately avoided it. Reference to the travaux préparatoires would, it thinks, show almost invariably that the question was indeed discussed but that for political reasons they did not think it opportune to mention the conditions under which the treaty should cease to operate, or that they had disagreed about those conditions, or that they took the effect of such conditions as a matter of course, or that there were other reasons why they refrained from inserting any stipulations on the subject in the treaty. Accordingly, it considers that the parties may be assumed in all cases to have had the possible termination of the treaty in mind but often only in exceptional circumstances. It does not feel that all the provisions intended but not actually made by the parties can be replaced by the single provision that any treaty may be terminated by giving one year’s notice. It suggests that, in order to make the article suitable for existing and future treaties, the end of the first sentence and the beginning of the second should be revised to read:

“...intended to admit under certain conditions denunciation or withdrawal. Under those conditions, a party may denounce or withdraw...”

Poland. In the first sentence of the article the Polish Government proposes that the phrase from “character of the treaty and from the circumstances of its conclusion” should be revised so as to read “or” instead of “and”. In its view, the relevant intention of the parties may result from the nature of the treaty alone or from the circumstances of its conclusion alone or from the statements made by them.

Portugal. The Portuguese Government thinks it reasonable to establish, as is done in this article, a negative principle (i.e. against a right to denounce or withdraw from a treaty) while admitting the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal on the basis of three factors: (1) the character of the treaty; (2) the circumstances of its conclusion; and (3) the statements of the parties made either before or after the treaty’s conclusion. In its view, the summary of the basic elements of interpretation contained in article 39 leaves a sufficient latitude for the application of the relevant principles; and the requirement of not less than twelve months’ notice is a justifiable means of safeguarding the interests of the other parties to the treaty.

Sweden. In the view of the Swedish Government, the article offers a reasonable and partly new solution to the problem of treaties containing no provisions regarding their termination.

Turkey. The Turkish Government does not think that the exceptions in article 39, under which denunciation is allowed in certain conditions, exactly reflect the needs of our times. It believes that it will be for the benefit of the international community if in the exceptional cases envisaged in the article each party were to be given the right to request the reviewing of the treaty instead of the right of termination or withdrawal.

United States. In the opinion of the United States Government, the article has the merit of overcoming the alleged presumption that a treaty may be denounced unilaterally where there is no provision regarding denunciation. At the same time, it considers that, in the first sentence of the article, the word “clearly” should be inserted before “appears” in order to emphasize that the intention to permit denunciation or withdrawal should be a clear intention.

Algerian delegation. The Algerian delegation suggests the advisability of including the possibility of a revision of the treaty as a third possible solution which would, in its view, be more practical in the case of some treaties no longer effective under the conditions prevailing. 110

Colombian delegation. The Colombian delegation’s view is that a right of denunciation or withdrawal should be admitted only if explicitly provided for and that, failing any provision, the treaty should be presumed to be of indefinite duration. It considers that to seek the intention of the parties in documents other than the treaty itself would place treaty-making on an insecure basis. It favours the maintenance of the principle contained in the Declaration of London of 1871 that denunciation or withdrawal is admissible only if provided for in the treaty or consented to by all the other parties. 110

Cypriot delegation. The Cypriot delegation is inclined to share the view of some members of the Commission that in certain types of treaty, such as treaties of alliance, the presumption as to the intentions of the parties was that a right of denunciation or withdrawal after reasonable notice should be implied unless there were indications of a contrary intention. 111

Indian delegation. The Indian delegation considers that the article may give rise to difficulties of interpretation and application, particularly in view of the observation in paragraph 5 of the commentary that the reference to “statements of the parties” embraces statements subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty. 112

Panamanian delegation. The Panamanian delegation shares the Commission’s opinion that under certain conditions a treaty may be denounced unilaterally although it does not contain an express denunciation clause. It does not, however, consider that the intention of the parties is the sole factor determining the question since, in its view, all the circumstances should be taken into account.

111 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 11.
112 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 19.
113 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 4.
into account, especially in the case of treaties of military alliance.  

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The great majority of Governments appear to approve of the principle of this article, opposition to it being voiced by only one delegation. The Netherlands Government, however, proposes that the words “under certain conditions” should be inserted after “intended to admit”. It considers that the parties ought always to be assumed to have given their minds to the question of the termination of the treaty and to have contemplated denunciation or withdrawal only in exceptional circumstances. The Special Rapporteur doubts whether this assumption is altogether justified, and also whether the proposed amendment is really necessary in order to take account of the point that the parties may have contemplated the possibility of termination only in certain conditions. The principle of the article is that denunciation or withdrawal is admitted only if such appears to have been the intention of the parties. Clearly, if what appears from the treaty or from the circumstances of its conclusion is an intention to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal only in particular circumstances, that intention will prevail. He feels that a slightly different revision of the article on the lines proposed in paragraph 7 below should suffice to cover this point. As to the suggestion of the United States Government that the word “clearly” should be inserted before “appears”, no objection is seen by the Special Rapporteur to this extra emphasis on the need to establish the intention of the parties. On the other hand, the insertion of that word hardly seems essential, and in revising articles 4, 11, 12 and 19 the Commission has consistently used the word “appears” without any qualifying adverb.

2. The Luxembourg Government proposes that, in order to prevent a party from relying on a unilateral statement, the phrase “statements of the parties” should be amended to read “concordant statements of the parties”; and the Indian delegation suggests that the article may give rise to difficulties of interpretation, having regard particularly to the fact that “statements of the parties” is open to objection, he considers that some provision not that of a single party, which is relevant; and a unilateral statement to which no objection was made may in certain circumstances be evidence of a common understanding. Again, while any question of ascertaining intention may sometimes give rise to difficult cases, subsequent statements and conduct of the parties may be helpful in showing the common understanding of the parties regarding the terms of the treaty, as the Commission has recognized in paragraph 3 of article 69.

3. Although for these reasons the Special Rapporteur does not feel that the reference to the “statements of the parties” is open to objection, he considers that some revision of the first sentence of the article is desirable.

When the text of the present article was considered by the Commission, articles 69 and 70 had not yet been formulated. Article 69, which lays down the general rules of interpretation of treaties, provides, inter alia, that together with the context there are to be taken into account (a) any agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty and (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which clearly establishes the understanding of all the parties regarding its interpretation. Article 70 then provides that recourse may be had to the “preparatory work” of the treaty and to the circumstances of its conclusion in order to verify or confirm the meaning resulting from an interpretation under article 69 or to determine the meaning when that interpretation leaves it ambiguous or obscure. An interpretation of the treaty in accordance with those articles therefore covers all that is included in the phrase “unless it appears from the character of the treaty or from the circumstances of its conclusion or the statements of the parties”. In other words, it is arguable that it would be sufficient in the present article to say “unless it appears... etc.”, leaving all the rest to the operation of articles 69 and 70; or, alternatively, to say “unless the interpretation of the treaty in accordance with articles 69 and 70 shows...etc.”. Probably, where the treaty is silent on the matter and the rule is expressed in terms of a particular intention of the parties, the first alternative may be thought too laconic. The second alternative, on the other hand, may have certain attractions as a general formula for use in cases where the rule has to be expressed in terms of a particular intention. As the Special Rapporteur pointed out in his fourth report, it will in due course be desirable for the Commission to review all the provisions where phrases such as “unless it appears from the treaty or from the circumstances of its conclusion” occur in order to ensure that their language is fully correlated with the provisions of articles 69 and 70.

4. At the first part of the present session, when revising article 12 regarding the conditions under which consent to be bound is expressed by ratification, the Commission spoke in paragraph 1(b) of the intention appearing “from the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty” and in paragraph 1(d) of its “being expressed during the negotiations”. In short, it selected the phrases which it thought most suitable for the case under consideration and did not simply rely on the operation of articles 69 and 70. Accordingly, while reserving the general question of terminology in this type of provision, the Special Rapporteur has retained the mention of the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty in the present article. Having regard, however, to the separate mention in article 70 of “preparatory work” and “the circumstances of conclusion”, it seems necessary here to make specific mention of “preparatory work”; otherwise it might be possible to contend that reference to “preparatory work”, including statements made by the parties during the negotiations, to ascertain the intention of the parties is not admissible under the present article.

112 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 33.


This seems all the more necessary in that recourse to "preparatory work" and "the circumstances of conclusion" under article 70 is expressed to be permissive. Under article 69, paragraph 3, on the other hand, the subsequent practice of the parties, including their subsequent statements, is automatically to be taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty, so that specific mention of subsequent "statements" of the parties in the present article does not appear to be necessary.

5. One Government proposes that the article should provide for a right to request the reviewing of the treaty rather than a right of termination or withdrawal. The difficulty is that a right to request the review of a treaty is an imperfect "right" since, if the other party is unwilling to accept a modification of the treaty, the "right" is somewhat illusory. At the same time, there is nothing to prevent a party from proposing a revision of the treaty at any moment and, if the other party is willing to entertain the possibility of a revision, it can be negotiated by mutual agreement. As pointed out in paragraph (6) of the Commission's commentary to article 44 (fundamental change of circumstances), a right of termination may, in fact, often serve the purpose of a lever to induce a spirit of compromise in the other party and in that way facilitate a revision. But revision of a treaty always depends on mutual acceptance of the modification (see articles 66-68). Consequently, the Special Rapporteur believes that the Commission was right to state the present article, as also article 44, in terms of a right of termination, not of requesting revision.

6. There remains the Government of Israel's suggestion that a paragraph should be added, along the lines of article 40, paragraph 3, providing for the possibility of suspending the operation of the treaty in the circumstances mentioned in the article as an alternative to terminating it. The simplicity of this suggestion is, perhaps, a little deceptive. Article 40 does not deal with the intention of the parties regarding the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty. It deals with the procedural requirements of an agreement to terminate or suspend a treaty's operation and merely provides that the requirements for termination apply also to suspension. In short, not only is the context different in article 40, but there is no question in that article of "suspension" being made an alternative to termination. In the present article it seems doubtful whether parties who intended to admit a right of denunciation or withdrawal can be assumed automatically to have intended to admit a unilateral right to suspend the operation of the treaty as an alternative to termination; for suspension sets up a more complex relation than termination. The Special Rapporteur, in short, thinks that suspension of the operation of the treaty could not be regarded as admissible—unless it appeared that this particular right had been specifically envisaged by the parties. Consequently, if it is considered that suspension of the operation of the treaty should be included in the article, the Special Rapporteur feels that it should be introduced into paragraph 1 alongside termination, denunciation and withdrawal, and made dependent on the specific intention of the parties.

7. It seems preferable, simply as a matter of drafting, to state the rule in the first sentence in the form "may...only if" instead of in its present form "is not...unless"; and also to make the second sentence a separate paragraph. On this basis, and in the light of his observations in previous paragraphs, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the text of the article might be revised so as to read as follows:

Treaties containing no provisions regarding their termination or the suspension of their operation

1. When a treaty contains no provision regarding its termination and does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal or for the suspension of its operation, a party may denounce, withdraw or suspend the operation of the treaty only if it appears from the treaty, from its preparatory work or from the circumstances of its conclusion that the parties intended to admit the possibility of such denunciation, withdrawal or suspension of the treaty's operation.

2. A party shall in every case give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce, withdraw or suspend the operation of the treaty under the provisions of paragraph 1.

Article 40.—Termination or suspension of the operation of treaties by agreement

Comments of Governments

Australia. The Australian Government suggests that the period of years to be specified in paragraph 2 of the article should be twenty-five. In this connexion it observes that a number of cases have occurred of multilateral treaties which for years have languished, with few parties, but have then proved popular.

Canada. The Canadian Government suggests that, in paragraph 2, a reasonable period would be ten years; and that this period, as in article 9, should be expressed to run from the date of the adoption of the text, i.e. from the time when the treaty was opened for signature. It also feels that the period of years should be the same in both articles.

Finland. The Finnish Government shares the view of the Commission that the termination or the suspension of the operation of a multilateral treaty should require the consent of not less than two-thirds of the States which drew it up, as well as the agreement of all its actual parties. As to the period of years to be specified in paragraph 2, it suggests that a period of from three to five years after the entry into force of the treaty would not be unreasonable.

Israel. The Government of Israel suggests that, in view of the definition of "treaty" in article 1, paragraph 1(a), the reference to a new "treaty" in paragraph 1 of the commentary to the present article may not be consistent with the reference to an "agreement" in paragraph 1 of the article. It considers that the text of the article is acceptable if it includes the possibility of termination by the tacit agreement of all the parties. It further suggests that in paragraph 1, after the words "A treaty", there should be inserted the phrase "in whole or in part". In paragraph 2, it considers that the
period to be specified should correspond to the period adopted for article 9. It also raises the question whether, in the present article and in article 9, the rule should not refer to "two-thirds of the States which drew up the treaty, including two-thirds of the parties". Finally, it considers that the function conferred on the depositary under paragraph 1(b) would require an appropriate modification in article 29—dealing with the functions of depositaries.

**Luxembourg.** The Luxembourg Government does not think that the situation envisaged in paragraph 2 is a sufficient reason for laying down what, in its view, is too complicated a rule. It considers the contingency that a small number of States which have been the first to adhere to a multilateral treaty would wish to terminate it by mutual agreement to be highly improbable. If that contingency is to be guarded against, it would suggest a provision to the effect that States which have drawn up but not become parties to a treaty may still bring the treaty into force amongst themselves, even after its termination by the original parties. However, it would prefer to delete paragraph 2 altogether.

**Netherlands.** In paragraph 2, the Netherlands Government does not think that a single period can be laid down which would be reasonable for all the different kinds of treaties, and shares the view of the United States that the parties to a treaty should be at liberty to lay down shorter or longer periods to suit the circumstances of the case. It feels that the best general period would be ten years, because a shorter period might mean, especially in technical treaties, that some States were still preparing the necessary internal legislation to enable them to become parties when the parties were discussing its termination. It proposes that the final phrase of the paragraph should be revised to read: "however, after the expiry of ten years, or such other period as the treaty may stipulate, the agreement... etc.

**Poland.** The Polish Government considers that, in paragraph 2, the period to be specified should be as short as possible and, in any event, should not be longer than four years. This would avoid excessive dependence on the will of countries that have not undertaken any obligations under the treaty and yet be sufficient for carrying out in the countries concerned the procedure necessary for ratification or adoption of the treaty.

**Portugal.** The Portuguese Government considers that in paragraph 2 the period to be specified should not exceed five years. In its view, the operation of the treaty over this period should normally be sufficient to enable States to decide whether or not to become parties; and thereafter no principle concerning the protection of their interests could justify the need for their consent to the termination of the treaty.

**Sweden.** While doubting whether paragraph 1 is really necessary, the Swedish Government thinks that paragraphs 2 and 3 contain useful innovations regarding the termination or suspension of the operation of multilateral treaties.

117 The reference to paragraph 1(b), in the comments of the Government of Israel as circulated in document A/CN.4/175, is assumed by the Special Rapporteur to be a clerical error.

**Turkey.** In the view of the Turkish Government, the period to be specified in paragraph 2 should be ten years.

**United States.** The United States Government observes that paragraph 2 embodies a new concept, and that it would permit parties to a multilateral treaty to terminate it by agreement, without regard to any of the provisions of the treaty concerning termination, if after the expiry of the given period of years they found it desirable to do so. It feels that there may be great difficulty in deciding upon the period of years which would be practicable with respect to all treaties. It accordingly suggests that the final phrase might be revised to read as follows: "however, after the expiry of...years, or such other period as the treaty may provide, the agreement only of the States parties to the treaty shall be necessary".

**Cyprus.** The Cypriot delegation notes that, according to paragraph 2 of the commentary, parties might express their consent to termination through the diplomatic channel.

**India.** The Indian delegation thinks that paragraph 2 confers an unnecessary privilege on States which have not become parties, and that the article should accordingly be amended so as to make the consent of the parties the only prerequisite for the termination of a multilateral treaty.

**Salvador.** The Salvadorian delegation considers that in the Spanish text the opening words "Tratado que termina" should be replaced by "Tratado que se extingue".

**Somalia.** In the view of the Somali delegation, paragraph 2 should be deleted. It considers that, even if a particular multilateral treaty had been terminated, it would be possible for any interested States to re-establish the treaty either in its original or in a modified form.

**United Kingdom.** The United Kingdom delegation considers that paragraph 2 is likely to complicate the process of terminating a treaty, particularly in cases where there have been changes affecting the international personality of the original contracting parties and intricate problems of State succession may be involved.

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. One Government expresses doubt as to whether paragraph 1 is really necessary. The Special Rapporteur, while inclined to agree with respect to the two sub-paragraphs, considers that the rule in the opening sentence—requiring the agreement of all the parties for the termination of a treaty—contains a point of substance which should be retained.

2. The Government of Israel, pointing to the reference to a new "treaty" in paragraph 1 of the commentary,
in effect queries whether the language of paragraph 1 is satisfactory on the question of the form of the agreement. It suggests that the existing text is acceptable only if it admits the possibility of termination by the tacit agreement of all the parties. The difficulty arises partly from the terms of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and partly from paragraphs (1) and (2) of the commentary. Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) provide that the agreement to terminate may be embodied either (a) in an instrument or (b) in communications made by the parties to the depositary or to each other. Their primary purpose is to discountenance the thesis favoured by some jurists that an agreement terminating a prior treaty must take the same form as the treaty, or at least be in a treaty form of "equal weight". The Commission considered that it is for the parties in each case to select the appropriate instrument or procedure for bringing a treaty to an end and to take account of their own constitutional requirements. However, the terms of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and the references in the commentary to a new "treaty" and to a formal instrument or "treaty in simplified form" may, perhaps, give the impression that the Commission intended to exclude the possibility both of terminating a treaty by oral agreement and of doing so on the basis merely of tacit consent. The Special Rapporteur does not understand the Commission to have had this intention. If an agreement to terminate a treaty would normally be reduced to writing, it seems quite conceivable that certain kinds of bilateral treaty might be brought to an end by an oral agreement between Ministers or between a Foreign Minister and an ambassador acting on instructions. Similarly, where a large measure of agreement had been expressed for the termination of a multilateral treaty, it would seem perfectly legitimate for the depositary to notify States which had not evinced any interest in the matter that, in the absence of any reply by a given date, their agreement to the termination of the treaty would be assumed. The Special Rapporteur suggests that the best solution is to delete the two sub-paragraphs and to limit paragraph 1 to the first sentence, at the same time amending the commentary to take account of the abovementioned considerations.

3. The proposal of the same Government that the words "in whole or in part" should be inserted in paragraph 1 is considered to be well-founded. The case being one of termination by agreement, application of the rule in article 46 regarding the separability of treaty provisions would hardly be appropriate. Accordingly, the possibility of partial termination should, it is thought, be covered in the present article by the insertion of the words "in whole or in part".

4. Certain Governments are opposed to the inclusion of paragraph 2, either on the ground that it constitutes an unnecessary complication or on the ground that it is too favourable to States which have not yet become parties. The majority, however, appear to endorse the general principle embodied in the paragraph. The consideration which led the Commission to lay down this principle was that many multilateral conventions, especially those of a technical character, require only two or a very small number of ratifications or acceptances to bring them into force; and that it hardly seemed right that the first two or three States to deposit instruments should have it in their power to terminate the treaty without regard to the wishes of the other States which drew up the treaty. This consideration appears in itself to be valid, and it is not felt that there is great force in the United Kingdom’s objection that the paragraph may lead to complication "where there have been changes affecting the international personality of the original contracting parties and intricate problems of State succession may be involved". This complication may equally arise in the case of "parties" whose consent is certainly necessary under paragraph 1, as well as in every article the operation of which is dependent on the consent of the acts of "parties", for example articles 65 and 66 dealing with the amendment of treaties. On the other hand, the consideration which led the Commission to include paragraph 2 in the present article is one which is no less valid in the sphere of the amendment of treaties, and the Commission did not, in article 65, provide that the consent of two-thirds of the States which adopted the text should be necessary for the amendment of a multilateral treaty. It is therefore desirable that in re-examining the present article the Commission should at the same time have in mind the similar problem in article 65 with respect to this point. As to the Israel Government’s suggestion that the paragraph should be revised so as to read "two-thirds of the States which drew up the treaty, including two-thirds of the parties", this appears to be open to the objection that multilateral treaties are often open at an early date to accession by States which did not partake in drawing them up. In other words, it is not possible to speak of all the “parties” to a multilateral treaty as necessarily included amongst the States which adopted the text.

5. The opinions of Governments regarding the length of the period during which States that drew up the treaty should continue to have a voice on the question of its termination show wide variations: Australia, twenty-five years; Canada, the Netherlands and Turkey, ten years; Finland, Poland and Portugal, periods of the order of three, four or five years. Finland specifies a period of from three to five years after the entry into force of the treaty; all the other Governments appear to contemplate the periods as running from the date of the adoption of the text. The United States and Netherlands Governments propose that a single period of years may not be suitable for all treaties and suggest that, in order to make the provision more flexible, it should be amended to

124 This complication does not appear to have constituted any insuperable obstacle to the success of the efforts of the United Nations to amend general multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations and to open them to the new States. For an illuminating account of the practice of the Secretary-General in this regard, see the Secretariat’s memorandum on “Succession of States in relation to General Multilateral Treaties of which the Secretary-General is the Depository” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1962, vol. II, p. 106.). Cf. also chapter III of the report of the Commission for its fifteenth session, paragraphs 36-38 (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1963, vol. II, pp. 220-221).
read “after the expiry of...years or such other period as the treaty may stipulate”. This proposal is considered acceptable, since a provision in the treaty actually specifying a period for this purpose ought obviously to prevail. The period to be specified in the present article as the general rule should, it is thought, be such as, without being too long, will give States which participated in drawing up the treaty a full opportunity to have become parties before its expiration. The constitutional processes for obtaining the necessary parliamentary and other consents to ratification may in some countries be somewhat drawn out. Having regard to this consideration and to the different periods proposed in the comments of Governments, the Special Rapporteur suggests that six years may be a suitable period to specify for the general rule.

6. Paragraph 3, as at present drafted, applies the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 regarding termination of a treaty also to the suspension of the operation of a treaty. The Special Rapporteur, however, doubts whether this is appropriate in the case of paragraph 2; for it does not seem necessary to obtain the consent of anyone other than the parties to the suspension of the operation of a treaty. He therefore suggests that (1) paragraph 3 should be deleted; and (2) paragraph 1 should be widened so as to apply also to suspension of the operation of a treaty. Paragraph 2 would then apply only to cases of termination.

7. In the light of the foregoing observations and on the assumption that paragraph 2 is to be retained, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the article might be revised so as to read as follows:

1. A treaty may at any time be terminated or its operation suspended in whole or in part, by agreement of all the parties, subject to paragraph 2.

2. Until the expiry of six years from the adoption of its text, or such other period as may be specified in the treaty, the termination of a multilateral treaty shall also require the consent of not less than two-thirds of all the States which adopted the text.

Article 41.—Termination implied from entering into a subsequent treaty

Comments of Governments

Israel. In the light of paragraph 15 of the Commission’s report and paragraph 2 of the commentary to the present article, the Government of Israel believes that the article contains an inherent contradiction. It observes that, if the later treaty was intended to terminate the earlier treaty, then the termination of the later treaty would not bring about the revival of the earlier treaty; but that, if the later treaty was intended to suspend the operation of the earlier treaty, the termination of the later treaty will, following article 54, bring about the revival of the earlier treaty. In either event, the whole matter depends upon the interpretation of the intention of the parties to the later treaty. The Government of Israel suggests that, if the article is retained, the element of “suspension” should precede that of “termination”; and that the word “only” should then be omitted. In its view, the reconstruction of the article on the above lines might facilitate the placing of this provision in the draft articles.

Portugal. The Portuguese Government observes that, on a strict construction, the principle laid down in paragraph 2 is already contained in paragraph 1. Even so, it considers paragraph 2 to be useful as it underlines the importance of ascertaining the will of the States concerned.

Sweden. The Swedish Government considers that the article lays down a rule of construction that may be useful.

United States. In the view of the United States Government the article is sound in principle and, although its concept is self-evident, will be helpful in resolving questions in this area of treaties. [In the Sixth Committee the United States delegation had suggested that the article could be omitted from a simplified convention.]125

Indian delegation. The Indian delegation feels that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) may to some extent be redundant and suggests that their wording should be reconsidered.126

Salvadorian delegation. The Salvadorian delegation suggests that paragraph 2 might more appropriately be dealt with in a separate article.127

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The “inherent contradiction” seen by the Israel Government in this article does not seem to the Special Rapporteur to be evident in its text; nor does it seem to him to be made evident in the Government’s comments. Again, while the rules stated in the article are certainly dependent upon the interpretation of the intention of the parties to the later treaty, rules dependent on intention are to be found in quite a number of the draft articles and are, indeed, inevitable in the law of treaties. The real problem in the present article is its relation to, and possible overlap with, article 63 governing the application of treaties having incompatible provisions. The Commission for this reason decided to adopt the present article dealing with the “implied termination” aspect of incompatible treaties provisionally, to defer the general question of the application of treaties having incompatible provisions until its sixteenth session, and to reconsider the desirability and the placing of the present article at that session. At its sixteenth session the Commission adopted in article 63 general rules regarding the application of treaties having incompatible provisions, paragraph 3 of which contains a cross-reference to the present article. This paragraph draws a distinction between cases where the parties to the later treaty intend to terminate the prior treaty, which it leaves to be governed by article 41, and cases where they do not so intend, which raise a question of the priority of the obligations of the two treaties and are dealt with in article 63.

126 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 6.
127 Ibid., 782nd meeting, para. 5.
paragraph (12) of its commentary to article 63, the Commission explained the outcome of its re-examination of the question of implied termination as follows:

"Paragraph 3 deals with cases where all the parties to a treaty, whether with or without additional States, enter into a later treaty which is incompatible with the earlier one, and from a different angle it covers the same ground as article 41 adopted at the previous session. The provisional decision of the Commission in 1963 to characterize these cases as instances of implied termination of an earlier treaty was confirmed by the majority of members who took part in the discussion at the present session. On the other hand, the fact that the question of the 'implied termination' of the earlier treaty can be determined only after ascertaining the extent of the conflict between the two treaties gives these cases a certain connexion with the present article. It therefore seems desirable to mention these cases in paragraph 3, with a cross-reference to article 41. In examining the question at the present session the Commission felt that a minor modification to article 41 may be desirable so as to transfer cases of a partial conflict between two treaties from article 41 to the present article. As adopted in 1963, the opening phrase of paragraph 1 of article 41 speaks of termination 'in whole or in part', but the distinction between total and partial termination (or suspension) is not continued in the drafting of the rest of the article. Some modification of the wording of the rest of that article might therefore be necessary in any case. Without deciding at this stage on the final form of article 41, opinion in the Commission inclined to accept the view that the appropriate course would be to eliminate the words 'in whole or in part' from article 41 and to assign to article 63 cases of partial conflict in which there does not appear to be any intention to terminate the earlier treaty. Paragraph 3 therefore provides, in effect, that, where there is evidence of an intention that the later treaty should govern the whole matter, or where the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time, article 41 applies and terminates the earlier treaty, and that in other cases the earlier treaty should apply to the extent that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the later treaty."

Accordingly, while the relation between the matters dealt with in articles 41 and 63 will, no doubt, be reviewed by the Commission, the retention of article 41 in more or less its present form will be assumed by the Special Rapporteur for the purposes of the present report.

3. The Commission, as appears from the above-quoted passage of its commentary to article 63, was inclined at its 1964 session to take the view that the words "in whole or in part" should be deleted from the opening phrase of the present article. In referring to the point, the Commission had in mind the need to co-ordinate as closely as possible the provisions of articles 41 and 63 but preferred to postpone this question until it came to revise article 41.

4. When in this type of case the parties to the later treaty do not intend the earlier treaty to be wholly superseded, whether temporarily or definitively, by the later treaty, there will be two treaties in force and in operation which have incompatible provisions. Paragraphs 3 and 4(a) of article 63 then state that the earlier treaty shall apply only to the extent that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the later treaty. The practical effect of that paragraph, no doubt, is to negative and in that way to suspend the operation of the incompatible provisions of the earlier treaty so long as the later treaty is in force. But article 63 deals only with the priority of inconsistent obligations under treaties both of which are in principle to be considered as in force and in operation. That article does not apply to cases where it is clear that the parties intended the earlier treaty to be abrogated or its operation to be wholly suspended by the conclusion of the later treaty; for then there are not two sets of incompatible treaty provisions in force and in operation but only one, namely, those of the later treaty. In other words, article 63 comes into play only after it has been determined under the present article that the parties did not intend to abrogate, or wholly to suspend the operation of, the earlier treaty. The present article, for its part, is not concerned with the priority of treaty provisions which are incompatible. It deals with cases where it clearly appears that the intention of the parties in concluding the later treaty was either definitely or temporarily to suspend the régime of the earlier treaty by that of the later one. In these cases the present article terminates or suspends the operation of the earlier treaty altogether, so that it is neither in force in its operation is considered as wholly suspended.

5. The dividing line between cases of termination falling under paragraph 1 of the present article and cases falling under article 63 is clear enough. Under the present article, the earlier treaty is abrogated; it is not simply a question of priority and, even if the later treaty were to be terminated or suspended, the earlier one, having been abrogated, would still be inapplicable. Under article 63, it is simply a question of priority and, if the later treaty were to be terminated or suspended, the earlier treaty would recover its force and operation. The dividing line, on the other hand, between cases of "suspension" falling under paragraph 2 of the present article and cases of priority of incompatible provisions falling under paragraphs 3 and 4(a) of article 63 is not perhaps so clear; for article 63, by making the provisions of the later treaty prevail, in effect suspends the operation of the incompatible provisions of the earlier treaty. Even in these cases, however, the rule in the present article is broader in scope than that in article 63. Under the present article, even although only some provisions of the earlier treaty are incompatible with those of the later one, the operation of the whole treaty will be suspended if it appears from the later treaty, its preparatory work or the circumstances of its conclusion that such was in fact the intention of the parties. Accordingly, although the two articles may appear to some extent to overlap in these cases, they do not coincide.

6. Quite apart from the question whether the words "in whole or in part" should be retained, some revision
of the present article appears to the Special Rapporteur to be desirable in order to improve the text and to co-ordinate the article more fully with article 63.

In the opening phrase of paragraph 1, he suggests the deletion of: (1) the word “impliedly”, since the idea of “implication” is already contained in the words “shall be considered as”; and (2) the words “either with or without the addition of other States”, since their omission would not seem to effect any change in the rule stated in the paragraph.

In paragraph 1(a), it seems desirable to amplify the expression “the parties in question have indicated their intention” by specifying how this intention is to be ascertained, and at the same time to bring the language into line with that used in other articles where the law is stated in terms of the intention of the parties as ascertained from the treaty, its preparatory work or the circumstances of its conclusion. It also seems desirable to insert the word “exclusively” after “governed” in this sub-paragraph, in order to convey more explicitly the idea of the supersession of the earlier treaty by the later one. Paragraph 2, as at present drafted, merely negatives the termination of the earlier treaty when the intention of the parties was only to suspend its operation, and leaves it to be implied that in this event the earlier treaty will be only suspended in its operation. The Special Rapporteur suggests that it may be preferable to reformulate the rule in positive terms.

7. As to the words “in whole or in part” in paragraph 1, it is certainly possible to conceive of cases where a later treaty is concluded with the object of revising and superseding only one part of an earlier treaty, e.g., where the earlier treaty is one which deals with a number of different matters in separate “sections” or “chapters”. The question is whether such cases should be left to be covered by paragraphs 3 and 4(a) of article 63, or whether partial termination and partial suspension of the operation of a treaty should receive specific mention in the present article. An argument against providing for these cases here is that it may tend to increase the overlap between “suspension of operation” under the present article and the non-application of incompatible provisions of an earlier treaty under article 63. This argument is not, perhaps, very weighty, since there is a certain difference between a definite intention to suspend the operation of the earlier treaty and an intention to give priority to the provisions of the later treaty; and in any event the two articles give the same practical results. Moreover, if the Commission decides to endorse the Government of Israel’s proposal that article 40 should cover termination or suspension of operation by express agreement “in whole or in part”, it would seem logical to do the same in cases of implied agreement. On the other hand, as pointed out by the Commission in the passage from its commentary to article 63 cited in paragraph 2 above, the present text of article 41 refers to partial termination only in the opening phrase of paragraph 1, and does not carry the distinction between total and partial termination or suspension through the drafting of the rest of the article. It would not, therefore, suffice to leave the words “in whole or in part” in the opening phrase of the para-

8. In the light of the foregoing observations the Special Rapporteur considers that article 41 should be reformulated along the following lines:

Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied from entering into a subsequent treaty

1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it enter into a further treaty relating to the same subject-matter and:

(a) It appears from the later treaty, from its preparatory work or from the circumstances of its conclusion that the parties intended that the matter should henceforth be governed exclusively by the later treaty; or

(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time.

2. However, the earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it appears from the later treaty, from its preparatory work or from the circumstances of its conclusion that such was the intention of the parties when concluding the later treaty.

3. Under the conditions set out in paragraphs 1 and 2, if the provisions of the later treaty relate only to a part of the earlier treaty and the two treaties are otherwise capable of being applied at the same time, that part alone shall be considered as terminated or suspended in operation.

9. At the same time, the Special Rapporteur suggests that, in order to achieve a full co-ordination between article 63 and the present article, it may be desirable in due course to revise paragraph 3 of article 63 so as to read as follows:

When all the parties to a treaty enter into a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 41 of these articles, etc.

Article 42.—Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach

Comments of Governments

Australia. Paragraph 2(b) (ii) appears to the Australian Government to give a very large power which might, in its view, be out of proportion to the breach. It suggests that it might be better to use a longer form of words which would circumscribe the right more precisely. On the other hand, it would feel that the paragraph has sufficient safeguards if “common consent” is to be understood as meaning “unanimous consent”; and, if that is the intention, it would prefer the clearer word “unanimous” to be used.

Canada. The Canadian Government observes that the article does not provide, where there is a material breach, that another party shall have the right unilaterally (and not merely by common and perhaps unanimous agreement) to withdraw from the treaty. It interprets the commentary as indicating that the Commission considered
a right of suspension to afford adequate protection to a State directly affected by such a breach. It does not, however, feel that the recourse allowed to the individual State under paragraph 2 is sufficient in the case of a treaty where the parties agree to refrain from some action; for the individual State could not suspend its obligations vis-à-vis the violator (by doing what it had agreed not to do) without violating its own obligations to the other parties. It suggests that the article should be amended so as to allow an individual party to suspend the operation of the treaty *erhe omnes* without first obtaining the common agreement of the other parties. In support of this suggestion it recalls that the texts proposed by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the present Special Rapporteur, and by Mr. Castrén envisaged a unilateral right of withdrawal in these cases.

*Israel.* The Government of Israel observes that paragraph (8) of the commentary seems to suggest that the definition of breach in paragraph 3 is not exclusive.

*Netherlands.* In paragraph (a) the Netherlands Government does not think that the Commission’s intention, as expressed in paragraph (7) of the commentary, is entirely realized in the text of the article. Paragraph (a) attributes the right to invoke the breach to “any other party”, whereas the Netherlands Government interprets the Commission’s intention in paragraph (7) of the commentary as having been to restrict that right to an injured party. It proposes that paragraph (a) should be revised in the manner suggested by the United States delegation at the 784th meeting of the Sixth Committee: “Any other party, whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach...” etc. Paragraph (b) the Netherlands Government considers should be left as it is in the Commission’s text. It dissents from the suggestion of the United States delegation at the same meeting of the Sixth Committee that paragraph (b) should be similarly revised to read “The other parties, whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach...” etc. If this revision were made in the text of the paragraph, then paragraph (b) (i) would, in its view, have the same effect as paragraph (a), while paragraph (b) (ii) would allow a treaty to be terminated by fewer than all the other parties, which it considers undesirable. With regard to paragraph 4, the Netherlands Government notes that its observations on article 46 apply to this paragraph.

*Portugal.* With regard to paragraph 2, dealing with multilateral treaties, the Portuguese Government observes that a certain current of opinion among jurists makes a distinction, as far as concerns the parties affected by the breach, between contractual and law-making treaties. These jurists, while unhesitatingly admitting the right of an injured party to free itself from the treaty in the case of contractual treaties, hold that normative obligations continue in force despite the breach and despite the fact that the injured parties have also for their part temporarily given up complying with them. The Portuguese Government notes that paragraph 2 does not go beyond permitting the injured parties the alternatives of suspension or termination without distinguishing between the categories to which the treaty in question may belong; and it appears to advocate that this distinction should be introduced into the paragraph. It further maintains that the injured parties should not be left with a free choice between suspension and termination, but should be allowed to terminate the treaty only when the violation is of a certain character. This restriction it believes to be desirable in order to ensure greater stability of treaties and better discipline in international relations. It recalls that in its commentary the Commission mentioned the case where the breach has frustrated or undermined the operation of the treaty as between all parties; and it expresses the view that this concept should be embodied in an article or at least receive mention in paragraph (b) (ii).

*Sweden.* The Swedish Government endorses the limitation of the article to cases of “material breach” and considers the definition of that concept as acceptable. It questions, however, whether the procedure prescribed in article 51 for alleging a ground of termination, withdrawal or suspension offers an adequate and sufficiently rapid response to the urgent problem of breach of a treaty. With regard to paragraph 2, it notes that the draft limits an injured party to a multilateral treaty to a right to suspend or to terminate the treaty in relation to the party which has violated it, or to seek the agreement of the other parties in order to free itself wholly from the treaty. In its view, however, there may be circumstances in which the injured party ought to be allowed to suspend or terminate the treaty even unilaterally, e.g. if the participation of the State committing the breach was an essential condition for the adherence of the other State to the treaty.

*United Kingdom.* The United Kingdom Government expresses concern lest the article may be open to abuse in that a State may invoke an alleged breach in order simply to provide a ground for terminating a treaty. Whilst recognizing that article 51 affords certain safeguards, it considers that a State accused of a breach should be able to call upon the other State to establish objectively that a breach has, in fact, occurred before that other State may invoke the breach in the manner proposed in the article. In its view, provision for independent adjudication is required.

*United States.* The United States Government endorses the principle stated in paragraph 1 and thinks that it should be crystallized as a rule of conventional law. With regard to paragraph 2, it feels that the Commission’s text to a certain extent ignores the differing varieties of multilateral treaties. The paragraph may be appropriate enough

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132 Ibid., vol. I, p. 120.
133 This observation, which presumably refers to the phrase “main definition” in the final sentence of paragraph (8) of the commentary, does not appear to be well-founded. Paragraph 3 of the article contains two sub-paragraphs. The commentary, having dealt with sub-paragraph (a), refers to the “main definition” in sub-paragraph (b). This cannot properly be read as implying that the two sub-paragraphs together do not comprehend the whole definition.
134 Paragraph 2, as drafted, does not authorize unilateral termination of the treaty by one injured party.
in the case of law-making treaties on such matters as disarmament, where observance by all parties is essential to the treaty's effectiveness. But, in its view, it is questionable whether a multilateral treaty such as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—which is essentially bilateral in its application—should be subjected to the rules in paragraph 2 as now drafted. In such a case (and it mentions a convention for the exchange of publications as another example) it considers that, if Party A refuses to accord to Party B the rights set forth in the Convention, this should not entitle Parties X, Y and Z, in addition to the wronged Party B, to treat the Convention as suspended or no longer in force between themselves and Party A. The United States Government maintains that termination or suspension in the case of a multilateral treaty should follow the rule applicable to bilateral treaties; and that an injured party should not be required to continue to accord rights illegally denied to it by the offending party. Its specific proposals for the revision of paragraph 2 would have the effect of making it read:

"A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:

(a) Any other party, whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach, to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;

(b) The other parties, whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach, either:

(i) To apply to the defaulting State the suspension provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above; or

(ii) To terminate the treaty or to suspend its operation in whole or in part."

Ghanian delegation. The Ghanaian delegation considers that in paragraph 2 there is need for a provision which would enable an injured party to terminate the treaty unilaterally, for example after a period of notice during which the treaty would merely be suspended. Otherwise an injured party, if unable to persuade all the other parties to terminate the treaty, would be unable to do more than suspend it and would have theoretically to remain a party. 134

Guatemalan delegation. The Guatemalan delegation approves, in principle, the content of the article. 135

Panamanian delegation. The Panamanian delegation considers that the article places the defaulting State in a more favourable position than that which it enjoyed in traditional doctrine. In its view, the majority of jurists recognize that the breach of a treaty by one party gave the other party the right to abrogate it or suspend its operation, and no limitation ought to be placed on that right. 136

Uruguayan delegation. In its general comments, the Uruguayan delegation expresses approval of article 42 as strengthening the principle that treaties should be respected and rejecting the idea that a breach was sufficient to render a treaty null and void except under certain clearly defined conditions. 137

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. Apart from a point raised by the Netherlands Government in relation to paragraph 4, all the points made by Governments are directed at the provisions of paragraph 2 regarding the rights of the parties to a multilateral treaty in case of a material breach. One Government—that of Portugal—considers that this paragraph should make a distinction between contractual and law-making treaties. This distinction, as the Special Rapporteur pointed out at the fifteenth session, 138 is one which, however attractive in theory, it is difficult to draw in practice. Treaties not infrequently contain both normative and contractual provisions; nor is it always possible to draw a clear line between normative and contractual treaties. Moreover, the fact that normative treaties are not infrequently made subject to a unilateral right of denunciation irrespective of any antecedent breach by another party renders it difficult to differentiate between normative and contractual treaties with respect to the rights of the parties in case of breach.

2. The Netherlands and United States Governments both query the phrase "Any other party" in paragraph 2(a) and propose that it should read "Any other party, whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach", etc. The Netherlands Government observes that, in paragraph (7) of its commentary, the Commission itself appears to have envisaged paragraph 2(a) as concerned with the right of an injured party rather than with the right of all the parties. The United States Government goes further than the Netherlands Government and proposes that paragraph 2(b), as well as paragraph 2(a), should be revised so as to relate only to"parties, whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach". It takes the position that some multilateral treaties, e.g., the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations or a convention for the exchange of publications, are essentially bilateral in their application; and that in the case of these treaties it would be inadmissible that a breach of Party B's rights by Party A should ever entitle Parties X, Y and Z also to regard the treaty as suspended or no longer in force between themselves and Party A. In general, it thinks that the rule governing termination or suspension in the case of multilateral treaties should follow the rule applicable to bilateral treaties; and in the new draft which it proposes, it omits any reference to the need for the "common agreement" of the parties in paragraph 2(b). The Netherlands Government, on the other hand, expressly dissents from the United States Government's proposal respecting paragraph 2(b) and advocates the maintenance of the existing text of this paragraph.

3. The Netherlands Government is certainly correct in thinking that paragraph 2(a) is intended to refer primarily to the rights of parties whose own interests are affected by the breach, while paragraph 2(b) refers generally to

135 Ibid., 785th meeting, para. 4.
136 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 31.
137 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 22.
the other parties, whether or not their own interests are affected by the breach. The Commission, it is believed, assumed that, since paragraph 2(a) authorizes suspension of the operation of the treaty only bilaterally as against the offending State, only a party whose own interests are affected by the breach would be likely to wish to exercise the right provided for in this paragraph. However, if it is really thought—as the Netherlands and United States Governments appear to think—that the right provided for in paragraph 2(a) may be abused by a party not itself affected but anxious to find a pretext for suspending the operation of the treaty vis-à-vis the particular offending State, little objection is seen to limiting paragraph 2(a) specifically to parties whose interests are affected by the breach. At the same time, it seems necessary to bear in mind that the interests of one party may be seriously affected by the violation of the rights of another party; and also that every party to a multilateral treaty—even a treaty which is essentially bilateral in its application—has a certain interest in the observance of the provisions of the treaty by every other party. The basic hypothesis of the present article is, after all, that the offending State has committed a material breach of the provisions of the treaty, and it would seem undesirable to go too far in discouraging the other parties from showing solidarity with the party directly injured by the breach. In the light of these considerations, the Special Rapporteur suggests that, instead of the phrase “any other party, whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach”, proposed by the United States and Netherlands Governments, it may be preferable in paragraph 2(a) to say “any other party whose interests are affected by the breach”.

4. The Special Rapporteur shares the doubts expressed by the Netherlands Government regarding the United States proposals for the revision of paragraph 2(b), which would limit the application of this paragraph also to States whose rights or obligations are adversely affected and would at the same time remove the need for the agreement of the other States for the termination or suspension of the treaty. Presumably this proposal envisages a right of unilateral withdrawal from, rather than termination of, the treaty because parties whose rights and obligations are affected by the breach could hardly terminate the treaty for all the other parties without the consent of the latter. Even so, the proposal seems to be open to objection from two points of view. First, it appears to disregard the right which every party to a multilateral treaty has to the observance of the treaty by every other party. Secondly, it appears to authorize any party which is the object of a material breach to terminate or suspend its obligations vis-à-vis all the other parties without their agreement and irrespective of whether the performance of its rights and obligations vis-à-vis the other parties is in any way affected by the defaulting party’s breach of the treaty. At the fiftieth session members of the Commission attached particular importance to ensuring that the breach of a multilateral treaty by one party should not jeopardize the security of the rights and obligations of the other parties as between themselves, which would be the case if any individual party affected by the breach could unilaterally terminate or withdraw from the treaty. It was for this reason that the Commission proposed that an individual party’s right to react to a breach of a multilateral treaty unilaterally should be limited to the suspension of the operation of the treaty as between itself and the defaulting party; and that termination or suspension of the operation of the treaty vis-à-vis all the parties should require the agreement of the other parties.

5. The great variety of the purposes which multilateral treaties are designed to effect admittedly renders more difficult the formulation of general provisions which will at the same time safeguard the security of the treaty as between the parties generally and afford adequate protection to an individual party when a material breach of the treaty has occurred. The Canadian Government brings up the case of a treaty which requires the parties to refrain from some action. It says that in such a case an individual party cannot effectively suspend the operation of the treaty vis-à-vis the violator because, if it does what it has agreed under the treaty not to do, it will violate its own obligations to the other parties. It suggests that the individual party should in these cases be entitled to suspend the operation of the treaty erga omnes without the need first to obtain the common agreement of the other parties. The validity of the suggested exception to the rules proposed by the Commission seems open to question. When a multilateral treaty—and especially a general multilateral treaty—forebids certain action, it is frequently because that action is considered to be contrary to the general interests of the international community. In most cases the fact that one State has violated its obligations under the treaty—perhaps only with reference to one particular party—does not make it any the less desirable that the treaty should remain in full force as between all the other parties. It is only in special types of treaty, e.g., disarmament treaties, where a breach by one party tends to undermine the whole régime of the treaty, that the interests of an individual party may not be adequately protected by the rules proposed by the Commission. In short, the exception suggested by the Canadian Government appears to be too widely stated. The Swedish Government may have such special types of treaty in mind when it suggests that the injured party ought to be allowed to suspend or terminate the treaty even unilaterally, e.g., if the participation of the State committing the breach was an essential condition for the adherence of the other State to the treaty.

6. The Special Rapporteur in his second report sought to allow for these special types of treaty by a proviso which would have permitted any party to withdraw from the treaty if the breach was of such a kind as to frustrate the object and purpose of the treaty as between the parties generally. The Commission may wish to re-examine this point in the light of the comments of Governments, and the Special Rapporteur suggests, as a basis for discussion, the possible inclusion of a new paragraph—here numbered paragraph 2(bis)—on the following lines:

2(bis). Notwithstanding paragraph 2, if the provision to which the breach relates is of such a character that its violation by one

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138 Ibid., vol. II, p. 73, article 20, para. 4(b) and p. 77, para. 17
party frustrates the object and purpose of the treaty generally as between all the parties, any party may suspend the operation of the treaty with respect to itself or withdraw from the treaty.

7. There is perhaps a slight anomaly in the text of paragraph 2(b), as at present drafted, in that it authorizes the other parties by agreement to terminate the operation of the treaty altogether in the relations between all the parties but not to take the more limited step of terminating the participation in the treaty only of the defaulting State, i.e., of insisting upon its withdrawal from the treaty. The present text contemplates the possibility of a joint suspension of the operation of the treaty vis-à-vis the defaulter but not its termination. Although suspension may serve the purpose in most cases, it seems illogical to exclude even the possibility of taking the more drastic step of expelling the defaulter from the treaty. It is therefore suggested that the text of paragraph 2(b) should be modified in order to cover this possibility.

8. If the Special Rapporteur's proposals for the revision of article 46 and for the transfer of the article to section 1 as a general rule are accepted by the Commission, paragraph 4 will become unnecessary, since the question of separability will have already been covered in article 46.

9. In the light of the foregoing observations the Special Rapporteur suggests that the article might be revised so as to read as follows:

   1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one party entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.

   2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:

      (a) Any other party whose interests are affected by the breach to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;

      (b) The other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend or terminate the operation of the treaty either

          (i) only in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State or

          (ii) as between all the parties.

2(bis). Notwithstanding paragraph 2, if the provision to which the breach relates is of such a character that its violation by one party frustrates the object and purpose of the treaty generally as between all the parties, any party may suspend the operation of the treaty with respect to itself or withdraw from the treaty.

3. For the purposes of the present article, a material breach of a treaty by one of the parties consists in:

   (a) The unfounded repudiation of the treaty; or

   (b) The violation of a provision which is essential to the effective execution of any of the objects or purposes of the treaty.

4. The foregoing paragraphs are subject to any provisions in the treaty or in any related instrument which may regulate the rights of the parties in the event of a breach.

Article 43.—Supervening impossibility of performance

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel proposes that paragraph 2 of the article should be redrafted to read:

"If it is not clear that the disappearance or destruction of the subject-matter of the rights and obligations contained in the treaty will be total and permanent, the impossibility may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty."

The Government of Israel further suggests that it should be made clear that the article does not apply in the case where the impossibility is the consequence of the breach of the treaty by the party invoking the impossibility.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government, while having no comment on paragraphs 1 and 2, points out that its observations on article 46 apply to paragraph 3 of the present article.

Portugal. The Portuguese Government notes the provisions of the article with approval. It observes that the impossibility may be either physical or juridical. As an example of the latter, it mentions a case where performance of the treaty towards one party will, per se, be a breach of the treaty to the other party; for instance, when three States have entered into a treaty of alliance and two of them are now at war.

Sweden. The Swedish Government thinks that the article may be useful even although the contingency for which it provides may be rare.

United States. The United States Government raises the question of what is to be the position of the parties if certain of the provisions of the treaty have been executed while others remain executory. The instance given by it is where a cession of land is made by State A to State B on condition that State B will for ever maintain, and permit the use of, a navigable channel in a river, and then a natural event renders the river useless for navigation. It suggests that a new paragraph 4 might be added to the article on the following lines:

"The State invoking the impossibility of performance as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending the operation of the treaty may be required to compensate the other State or States concerned for benefits received under executed provisions."

Pakistan delegation. The Pakistan delegation supports the suggestion of the United States Government regarding cases in which some provisions have been executed while others remain executory (this suggestion had been presented by the United States delegation at the 784th meeting of the Sixth Committee). It also considers that provision should be made for cases where one party has deliberately created circumstances which made, or seemed to make, it impossible for that party to execute the treaty. It feels that the party in question should be compelled to restore the status quo and to execute the treaty, and points out that in private law a party may not take advantage of his own wrong to evade his contractual obligations. The delegation accordingly proposes the addition to the article of a new paragraph 5, which would read as follows:

"A party to a treaty may not plead impossibility of performance if the impleaded impossibility is based upon a change of circumstances deliberately brought about by that party. Such a party should be under an obligation to restore the status quo and to carry out its obligations under the treaty."

**United Kingdom delegation.** The United Kingdom delegation observes that there is a close connexion between articles 43 and 44, and that they might well be considered together.\(^{141}\)

**Venezuelan delegation.** The Venezuelan delegation suggests that allowance should be made in the text for possible cases in which one party obtains, through the execution of the treaty, permanent benefits not enjoyed by the other party or parties.\(^{142}\)

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. At the fifteenth session the Commission examined the question whether “supervening impossibility of performance” and “fundamental change of circumstances” should be dealt with in the same article. It decided that, although related, these are juridically distinct grounds for regarding a treaty as having been terminated, and that they should be kept separate. Another consideration which, it is thought, may reinforce this decision, is that the elements required to establish supervening impossibility of performance tend to be more objective and clear-cut than those on the basis of which a “fundamental change of circumstances” may be alleged. In consequence, cases falling under the present article are less open to the difficulty of subjective appreciations than those falling under article 44.

2. In paragraph 2, dealing with cases of temporary impossibility, the Government of Israel suggests that the text should repeat the phrase “the total and permanent disappearance or destruction of the subject-matter of the obligations contained in the treaty”, instead of referring merely to “the impossibility of performance”. The Special Rapporteur appreciates that the aim of this suggestion is to give as much precision as possible to the formulation of the rule. Nevertheless, he doubts whether the suggested formulation is really an improvement, because there is a certain ambiguity in the expressions “disappearance or destruction of the subject-matter of the obligations”. The disappearance or destruction of the original subject-matter may be permanent; but it may nevertheless be possible to replace the subject-matter. Moreover, juridically it is the resulting impossibility of performance rather than the destruction or disappearance of the subject-matter which is the ground for the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty. Accordingly, quite apart from the “heaviness” which would result from the repetition of the phrase “the total and permanent disappearance...etc.”, it seems more correct to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary character of the impossibility of performance. The Special Rapporteur in any event considers that it may be better to reverse the order of paragraphs 1 and 2 so as to deal with temporary impossibility of performance first. As the article is at present drafted, the rule in paragraph 2 appears as a qualification to the rule in paragraph 1, whereas it seems more logical simply to state two rules, one for cases of temporary and one for cases of permanent impossibility of performance. Accordingly, in the new text of the article which the Special Rapporteur proposes in paragraph 6 below, the order of the paragraphs is reversed, with some consequential changes in their drafting.

3. If the Special Rapporteur’s suggestions for the revision of article 46 and for its transfer as a general rule to section 1 are accepted, paragraph 3 of the present article will become unnecessary.

4. The Governments of Israel and Pakistan advocate the insertion of a provision to the effect that supervening impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground of termination where the impossibility is the result of a breach of the treaty by that party (Israel) or where that party has deliberately created circumstances which make, or seem to make, it impossible for it to execute the treaty (Pakistan). The general principle on which these proposals are based is indisputable; for it is a general principle of law, as the Permanent Court of International Justice itself recognized,\(^{143}\) that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong. The question is whether it is necessary to state the principle in the present article. A similar question arises in connexion with “fundamental change of circumstances” in article 44, and in his second report the Special Rapporteur included a provision negating the right to invoke a fundamental change of circumstances when it has been “caused or substantially contributed to by the acts or omissions of the party” in question. The Commission, although recognizing the validity of the principle, did not include it as part of the article. Having regard, however, to the anxiety expressed by a number of Governments concerning the possible dangers to the security of treaties which they consider the doctrine of “fundamental change of circumstances” to involve, it may be found desirable to give expression in that article to the limiting rule that a party may not invoke a change produced by its own acts or omissions in conflict with its treaty obligations. In that event, it would seem desirable to give expression to the rule also in the present article. The Government of Israel’s formulation, which precludes impossibility of performance from being invoked when it results from the party’s own breach of the treaty, appears more correct than one based on the criterion of an impossibility deliberately brought about. Accordingly, the statement of the rule in the new text of the article proposed in paragraph 6 below reflects the concept of the Government of Israel, rather than that of the Government of Pakistan.

5. The United States, Pakistan and Venezuelan Governments further suggest that special provision should be made for cases where part of the treaty has been executed and benefits have been obtained by a party before the impossibility of performance of the rest of the treaty supervenes. The question of an equitable adjustment of the interests of the respective parties in the event of the frustration of a partially executed contract is a familiar concept in municipal law; and it is presumably this concept which has inspired the proposal of the above-named Governments. As it is conceivable that such a question should also arise in the event of the frustration

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\(^{141}\) Ibid., 786th meeting, para. 8.

\(^{142}\) Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 20.

of a treaty, the Special Rapporteur has included in his revised draft for the consideration of the Commission a paragraph on the lines suggested by the three Governments.

6. In the light of the foregoing observations, the Special Rapporteur proposes that the article should be revised so as to read as follows:

1. If the total disappearance or destruction of the subject-matter of the rights and obligations contained in a treaty renders its performance temporarily impossible, such impossibility of performance may be invoked as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

2. If it is clear that such impossibility of performance will be permanent, it may be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply when the impossibility of performance is the result of a breach of the treaty by the party invoking such impossibility.

4. If part of the treaty has already been executed, a party which has received benefits under the executed provisions may be required to give equitable compensation to the other party or parties in respect of such benefits.

 ARTICLE 44.—Fundamental change of circumstances

Comments of Governments

Austria. In paragraph 2(b), the Australian Government suggests the insertion of the word “continuing” before obligations, on the ground that if a treaty has been carried out completely on both sides so that no obligations under it remain, it would be contrary to common sense and to the need for stability and certainty to admit the possibility of such a treaty’s being brought within article 44. In paragraph 3(a), the Australian Government considers that the exception should at least be extended to cover all other determinations of territorial sovereignty; for all determinations of territorial sovereignty must, in its view, be final.

Canada. The Canadian Government observes that paragraph 3(a) does not take into consideration the possible case of a treaty which establishes the boundary by reference to the thalweg of a river; and that in such a case it is conceivable that a fundamental change in circumstances might radically affect the boundary question. It suggests that the paragraph should be modified along the following lines:

“To a treaty fixing a boundary, except if such a boundary is based directly on a thalweg or other natural phenomenon the physical location of which subsequently significantly altered as the result of a natural occurrence; or...”.

Denmark. While agreeing with the rule stated in the article, the Danish Government considers that this is a field in which contracting parties are likely to evaluate factual circumstances differently and draw different legal conclusions from the facts. In its view, if the principle of the binding force of treaties is not to be unduly weakened, it is essential to include an additional provision to the effect that a State should not be entitled to withdraw from a treaty under the present article unless it is ready to submit any controversy arising under the article to the decision of an arbitral or judicial tribunal. It proposes that, even if no general clause of judicial settlement is ultimately added to the draft articles, such a clause should be attached to this specific article.

Israel. The Government of Israel suggests that in paragraph 2 the expression “fact or situation” should be made to coincide with whatever expression is ultimately used in article 34, which at present reads “fact or state of facts”. It further suggests that the article might also envisage the suspension of the operation of the treaty in whole or in part.

Jamaica. The Jamaican Government suggests that the exceptions under paragraph 3 might be extended to include “a fundamental change of circumstances which the parties could reasonably have foreseen and the occurrence of which they impliedly undertook not to regard as affecting the validity of the treaty”. It also recalls that, in 1963 in the Sixth Committee, its delegation mentioned the desirability of making allowance in the present article for the fundamental change of circumstances which may sometimes arise out of State succession. In this connexion it observes that a fundamental change of circumstances does not inevitably follow from State succession, but that instances may occur when a newly independent State finds the terms of a treaty so manifestly unjust or inequitable that that State may be justified in not recognizing such a treaty as one which it should inherit. While recognizing that this situation may be dealt with by the Commission when it examines the topic of succession of States, the Jamaican Government considers that the present article should also make provision for such a situation.

Netherlands. In paragraph 3(a), the Netherlands Government agrees with the exclusion of boundary settlements from the rebus sic stantibus principle. At the same time, it observes that boundary treaties often cover other points as well, e.g. the Netherlands-German Treaty of 8 April 1960 settling the boundaries and matters connected with them, which also contains provisions on matters not concerned with determining territorial boundaries, such as the maintenance of the waterways forming part of the frontier. Moreover, that treaty forms an integral part of a complex of greatly divergent regulations, all of which are embodied in a single general treaty. Accordingly, it proposes that paragraph 3(a) should be modified so as to read as follows:

“To stipulations of a treaty which effect a transfer of territory or the settlement of a boundary.”

The Netherlands Government also raises the question whether other “dispositive” treaties should be excluded from the rebus sic stantibus principle, i.e. treaties by which certain de facto conditions are created or modified, after which the treaties have served their purposes and only the conditions created by them remain. In its opinion, however, once these “executed” treaties have served their purpose, the true position is that the rebus sic stantibus principle can no longer be applied to them. It could only be applied to the condition created by the treaty, but that is outside the law of treaties. On the other hand, it does not feel that it would be realistic or in accord with the view of writers and the jurisprudence of international tribunals to regard the case of boundary
treaties as included in the category of dispositive treaties. It believes that treaties concerning the settlement of boundaries or transfer of territory should be regarded as constituting a separate category: treaties that regulate the territorial delimitation of sovereignty. All other treaties, including those that establish a so-called "ease-ment" or "servitude" regulate in some way or another the exercise of that sovereignty.

**Portugal.** The Portuguese Government observes that in this article the difficulty lies not in the acceptance of the principle of a treaty's being affected by fundamental change of circumstances, but in the terms in which the principle has to be formulated. In a detailed review of the provisions of the article, it underlines the importance of investing the principle with the character of an exceptional principle. It observes that the definition of "fundamental change" in paragraph 2, although not indisputable, is adequate in the present state of the evolution of this branch of the law. In its view paragraph 2(b) is, strictly speaking, covered by paragraph 2(a), but is nevertheless useful by reason of its positive reference to the change in the nature of the obligations. At the same time, it notes that paragraph 2 permits some doubts to subsist as to the effect of substantial political changes within each contracting State, but feels that it is better to retain a somewhat broad formula such as "fundamental change of circumstances" which will permit the consideration of the application of the principle to each particular case. In general, it endorses the provisions of the article.

**Sweden.** The Swedish Government refers in general terms to article 44, together with articles 36, 37 and 45, as articles which, though they represent a bold tackling of difficult problems and are welcome from the point of view of theory and progressive development, must necessarily be considered in the context of present-day organization of international society. Having expressed concern at the possible effects on the stability of international relations of the invalidation of many existing treaties under these articles, it also emphasizes its concern regarding the method by which the determination of the invalidity of a treaty is envisaged in the draft articles. It does not make any specific point with regard to the provisions of the present article.

**Turkey.** After observing that the principle dealt with in this article is one of the most controversial in international law, the Turkish Government states that it does not concur with the view that, under certain limitations, a change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, the United Kingdom Government considers that the article should not apply to all treaties. In its view, the article should be confined to treaties which contain no provision for denunciation (or which contain a provision which would not permit denunciation within, for example, twenty years of the fundamental change). It also expresses doubt as to whether a subjective change of policy or a change of government can ever be regarded as a fundamental change of circumstances. The United Kingdom Government further considers that the security of treaties would be impaired if procedural steps additional to those proposed in article 51 were not required. It takes the view that in the present connexion a party alleging a fundamental change of circumstances is under an obligation, before it may invoke the change in any way, to propose negotiations to the other party and, if these are not successful, at least to offer arbitration of the issue.

**United States.** The concept of *rebus sic stantibus* embodied in the present article appears to the United States Government to have long been recognized to be of so controversial a character and so liable to the abuse of subjective interpretation that it has reservations about the incorporation of the concept in the draft articles, at any rate in its present form. In its view, the absence of accepted law makes it questionable whether the concept is capable of codification, and it also doubts whether its incorporation in the draft articles would be a progressive development of international law. At the same time, it states that the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* would have unquestionable utility if it were adequately qualified and circumscribed so as to guard against the abuses of subjective interpretation. On the other hand, if applied with the agreement of the parties so as to give rise to a novation of the treaty, it would certainly be acceptable. Failing any agreement, if an international court or arbitral body were entrusted with making a binding, third party, determination of the applicability of the doctrine to the particular treaty, that too would be acceptable. But at the present juncture the United States Government desires to place on record its opposition to article 44 as now drafted.

**Algerian delegation.** While endorsing the Commission's efforts to define as objectively as possible the notion of fundamental change of circumstances, the Algerian delegation suggests the advisability of including in article 39 the possibility of a revision of a treaty as a third solution which would frequently be more practical in the case of certain treaties no longer valid under prevailing conditions. 144

**Bolivian delegation.** The Bolivian delegation considers that the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* applies also to imposed treaties which, for the very reason that they had been imposed, caused a change of circumstances in the sense that they created situations jeopardizing friendly relations among States. In its view, the doctrine of *pacta sunt servanda* obviously cannot apply to treaties which did not meet the conditions of article 36. The doctrine

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of rebus sic stantibus, it considers, gives practical expression to the idea of justice and has its place in the law of treaties where it became a principle of positive law. 146

Bulgarian delegation. The Bulgarian delegation notes that, while admitting in article 44 the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, the Commission had taken care to limit its application. 147

Cameroonian delegation. The Cameroonian delegation questions the provision in paragraph 2 excluding from the article treaties fixing a boundary. While many African States appear to agree with the status quo of their present boundaries, the delegation feels that it would be going too far to exclude this class of treaty altogether from the operation of the rule of rebus sic stantibus. In its view, this would be contrary to the principle of self-determination laid down in the Charter, especially in cases where the States had had their territorial boundaries forced on them without the slightest heed for geographical or ethnic considerations. 148

Chinese delegation. The Chinese delegation considers that a rigid rule of pacta sunt servanda could impede progress and lead to situations inconsistent with equity. Nevertheless, the application of a rebus sic stantibus clause presents, in its view, some dangers in the absence of an impartial authority to rule on all the issues involved. It should not be left to the subjective judgment of a State to decide whether a change of circumstances justified its release from treaty obligations. The delegation accordingly advocates further study of the problem with a view to developing safeguards against abuse of the principle. 149

Colombian delegation. In the view of the Colombian delegation the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has not been accepted in positive international law and is not unanimously approved even in academic circles. Paragraph 1 would, it believes, merely add another element of instability, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus having more often than not been invoked for political motives than on firm legal grounds. 150

Cypriot delegation. The Cypriot delegation considers that the application of the principle of fundamental change of circumstances, if properly delimited and regulated, would provide the law of treaties with an essential safety-valve. If the only legal way to terminate or modify a treaty is for the parties to conclude a further agreement, an undue burden would be imposed upon the dissatisfied party, which may feel obliged to seek relief outside the law. 151

Czechoslovak delegation. While endorsing the principle stated in the article, the Czechoslovak delegation emphasizes that its application should be regarded as an exceptional measure playing the part of a safety-valve in situations where the preservation of a treaty relation would be contrary to the realities of international life. 152

Ecuadorian delegation. The Ecuadorian delegation notes that in article 44 the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus would at last become part of the positive law of treaties. 153

French delegation. The French delegation observes that, although the rebus sic stantibus clause has hitherto been chiefly a subject of academic controversy, the situations which have given rise to it are wholly real. It considers that the Commission has set a problem which sooner or later must be solved. 154

Ghanaian delegation. The Ghanaian delegation considers that in article 44 the Commission has avoided abuse of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus and defined the circumstances in which it may properly be invoked. 155

Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian delegation endorses the Commission's decision to include the principle of fundamental change of circumstances, carefully delimited and regulated, and also its decision to exclude from the application of the rule treaties fixing boundaries. 156

Iranian delegation. The Iranian delegation asks that it should be made clear that the breaking off of diplomatic relations between two States does not affect treaties already concluded between them. 157

Iraqi delegation. The Iraqi delegation observes that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus to which the article refers exists in positive international law, despite the almost total absence of case law on the subject; and that if, like many customary principles, the doctrine lacks precision, the Commission has attempted to remove that disadvantage. In its view, the principle is one which tends to adapt law to facts. 158

Italian delegation. The Italian delegation characterizes the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as highly controversial, and questions whether the procedural safeguard provided in Article 51, paragraph 3, which simply refers to Article 33 of the Charter, is adequate. It observes that disputes regarding a fundamental change of circumstances would be legal disputes, but that neither Article 33 nor even Article 36, paragraph 3, provides for compulsory jurisdiction. In its view, international law should make the application of such an intrinsically vague notion as that of a fundamental change of circumstances subject to the appropriate procedures, just as under national law the duty of adjudicating upon the termination of a contract by reason of fundamental change of circumstances is entrusted to a competent judge. The Italian delegation considers that it would be unwise to adopt the basic rules stated in article 44 unless there is a clause providing for compulsory jurisdiction. It suggests, however, that the application of the fundamental principle of good faith might offer a compromise solution. Thus, it might be provided that in case of any objection's being raised to

146 Ibid., 793rd meeting, para. 21.
147 Ibid., 788th meeting, para. 12.
148 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 41.
149 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 13.
150 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 12.
151 Ibid., 783rd meeting, para. 21.
152 Ibid., 787th meeting, para. 28.
of the termination of a treaty on the ground of a funda-
mental change, the other party is to be considered as
having abandoned its attempt to establish its contentions
regarding the fundamental change, if it opposes the sub-
mision of the matter to the verdict of an impartial
authority. 169

Moroccan delegation. The Moroccan delegation en-
dorses the Commission’s decision to specify that the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is applicable only in certain
carefully defined circumstances. Nevertheless, it suggests
that further study should be given to this question, and
that the conditions proposed by the United States Govern-
ment should be taken into account. 160

Panamanian delegation. The Panamanian delegation end-
dorses the Commission’s decision to include the doc-
trine of rebus sic stantibus in the draft articles. With
reference to paragraph 6 of the Commission’s commen-
tary, the delegation expresses the view that it would be
the party which insists on the application of obsolete,
unequal and inequitable treaties which acts outside the
law rather than the State which invokes the doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus. 161

Philippine delegation. The Philippine delegation favours
the inclusion of the article, and considers that it contains
adequate safeguards against abuse. 162

Romanian delegation. The Romanian delegation fears
that the article, if adopted, may become a serious source
of misunderstanding. In its view, the article is unnecessary
and experience has shown that, whenever a party has
successfully invoked the principle of rebus sic stantibus,
it has been freed of its obligations by the application of
general principles of international law. 163

Spanish delegation. The Spanish delegation observes that
there has been no precedent which has dealt with the valid-
ity of the doctrine itself. It considers that, as the principle of
pacta sunt servanda is based on good faith, it cannot be
invoked to uphold the validity of leonine conventions. 164

Syrian delegation. The Syrian delegation notes with
approval the effort of the Commission to lay down for
the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus limits indispensable
to safeguarding the security of treaties. 165

Thai delegation. The Thai delegation endorses the inclu-
sion of the principle of rebus sic stantibus in the law of
treaties. 166

United Arab Republic delegation. The delegation of the
United Arab Republic endorses the Commission’s recogni-
tion of the principle of rebus sic stantibus and its for-
mulation of that principle as an objective rule of interna-
tional law. 167

Uruguayan delegation. The Uruguayan delegation sup-
ports the article and considers that the Commission has
succeeded in reducing the principle of rebus sic stantibus
to manageable proportions. 168

Venezuelan delegation. The Venezuelan delegation con-
siders the Commission’s recognition of the principle of
rebus sic stantibus to be a milestone in international law,
and the only doubts which it has regarding the article relate to the restriction on the principle contained in
paragraph 3(a). 169

Yugoslav delegation. The Yugoslav delegation considers
that articles 39, 43, 44 and other articles, by recognizing
the important principle of rebus sic stantibus, set the law
of treaties in tune with the realities of international
life. 170

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. Four Governments speak of the controversial char-
ter of the rebus sic stantibus principle in international law
and express doubts regarding its recognition as lex lata
in the Commission’s draft articles. The great majority
of Governments, however, appear to endorse the principle
and in general to approve the terms in which it is formul-
ated in paragraph 2 of the article, although a number of
them emphasize its dangers unless the application of
the article is made subject to some form of independent
adjudication.

2. One Government (Bolivia) considers that the prin-
ciple covers “imposed” treaties. But the invalidity of
treaties imposed by “coercion” is dealt with as an inde-
pendent rule under article 36, and it might only blur the
principles underlying the two articles if “imposed”
treaties were also to be subsumed under the present
article.

3. Another Government (Jamaica) suggests that the pre-
sent article should make provision for certain cases of
State succession. It takes the position that a funda-
mental change of circumstances does not follow inevi-
tably from State succession, but considers that cases where the
terms of a treaty are manifestly unjust or inequitable
for a newly independent State may give rise to a right
to invoke the termination of the treaty under the present
article. In 1963 the Commission adverted to the question
of State succession in connexion with the extinction of the
personality of a State as a cause of “supervening impos-
sibility of performance”. As stated in paragraph 14
of its report on the work of the fifteenth session and in
paragraph 3 of its commentary to article 43, the question
of succession of States to treaty rights and obligations is
a complex one which is under separate study by the Com-
mission. 171 The Commission, which had already appointed
Mr. Manfred Lachs as its Special Rapporteur for the
topic of State succession, thought it undesirable to pre-
judge in any way the outcome of that study by attempting
to formulate the conditions under which the extinction

168 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 28.
169 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 19.
170 Ibid., 782nd meeting, para. 16.
of the personality of a party would bring about the termination of a treaty. At the same time, it hoped to be able to undertake at any rate a preliminary examination of State succession in the field of treaties before completing its work on the general law of treaties, and it envisaged the possibility of taking the results of that preliminary examination into consideration when revising part II. In the event, owing to the Commission's heavy programme of work, that possibility has not materialized. This being so, the Special Rapporteur suggests that, both in article 43 and in the present article, the Commission should adhere to its decision not to prejudge the outcome of its work on State succession by entering into particular aspects of that topic in connexion with these two articles. Certainly, the reason which led the Commission to leave aside questions of State succession in dealing with "supervening impossibility of performance" appear to apply with equal force to "fundamental change of circumstances". Thus, the Jamaican Government's apparent assumption that a new State in principle succeeds to the treaty obligations of the preceding sovereign of the territory is one of the basic questions on which the Commission will have to pronounce in its study of State succession.

4. The Special Rapporteur doubts whether paragraph 1 need be retained in the final text of the article. It does no more than emphasize that a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for terminating a treaty only if the conditions laid down in the remaining paragraphs are fulfilled. As explained in paragraph 9 of the commentary, the paragraph was inserted primarily because many members of the Commission regarded the principle contained in the article, even when strictly defined, as representing a danger to the security of treaties, and its purpose was simply to underline the exceptional character of the rule. Although the Special Rapporteur in general shares the opinion of these members, he feels that their purpose can equally be achieved by a slight modification of the opening phrase of paragraph 2 so as to make it state that a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked etc. only if the conditions set out in paragraph 2 are satisfied. At present paragraph 1 almost duplicates the opening phrase of paragraph 2 and the Special Rapporteur's proposal is, in effect, that paragraph 1 should be merged in the opening phrase of paragraph 2.

5. In paragraph 2 itself, two drafting suggestions have been made by Governments. First, the Government of Israel suggests that the expression "fact or situation" should be correlated with the similar expression "fact or state of facts" found in article 34. The Special Rapporteur agrees with this suggestion. The concepts underlying the rules contained in the two articles have something in common and it seems better to use the same expression in both articles. Of the two expressions, the one used in article 34—"fact or state of facts"—seems preferable. Secondly, the Australian Government suggests that in sub-paragraph (b) the word "continuing" should be inserted before "obligations", in order to make it clear that the article does not apply to treaties whose provisions have already been fully executed on both sides. This suggestion also appears to be acceptable in principle. But the Special Rapporteur feels that it may be preferable to cover the point by changing the phrase "the obligations undertaken in the treaty" by "the obligations to be performed under the treaty".

6. Paragraph 3, as at present drafted, contains two clauses which negative altogether the right to invoke a fundamental change of circumstances in the cases of (a) a treaty fixing a boundary and (b) a change which the parties have foreseen and for the consequences of which they have made provision in the treaty. The second clause in sub-paragraph (b) states a point which seems to belong to the formulation in paragraph 2 of the conditions under which a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground of termination. The Special Rapporteur feels that, on balance, it would be preferable to transfer the point in sub-paragraph (b) to paragraph 2. If a treaty makes provision for the consequences of a change of circumstances, the will of the parties must prevail; and this would appear to form part of the general conditions for the operation of the article rather than to be an "exception".

7. As to paragraph 3(a), the Australian Government proposes that the exception should be extended to cover all other "determinations of territorial sovereignty", since all such determinations must, in its view, be final. The Netherlands Government also proposes that the exception should be widened so as to cover "stipulations of a treaty which effect a transfer of territory or the settlement of a boundary". It is thought that the slight widening of the exception which these Governments propose should be accepted. The Special Rapporteur in his second report formulated the exception in even broader terms so as to make it cover "stipulations of a treaty which effect a transfer of territory, the settlement of a boundary, or a grant of territorial rights"; and in a further sub-paragraph he added "stipulations which accompany a transfer of territory or boundary settlement and are expressed to be an essential condition of such transfer or settlement."172 The stipulations which the Special Rapporteur had in mind in the additional sub-paragraph were those creating frontier servitudes which not infrequently form an integral part of the settlement of certain types of boundary. The Commission preferred to limit the exception to "a treaty fixing a boundary". It seems logical, however, to deal with a treaty transferring territory on the same basis as one settling a boundary. A few Governments, it is true, express themselves as opposed to the exception in sub-paragraph (a), but the majority appear to endorse it. That being so, the Special Rapporteur proposes that it should be revised so as to cover transfers of territories. Both Governments, it is to be noted, refer not to treaties fixing a boundary etc. but to "stipulations of a treaty" fixing a boundary etc. and this formula is thought by the Special Rapporteur to be preferable.

8. The Canadian Government mentions the possibility that the boundary fixed by a treaty might be the thalweg of a river or some other geographical feature, and that the location of the thalweg or other geographical feature

might be significantly altered as a result of a natural occurrence. It suggests that, in order to take account of this possibility, the provision in paragraph 3 excepting treaties fixing a boundary from the application of the article should itself be qualified by a clause excluding such cases from the exception. The Special Rapporteur appreciates that an extraordinary flood, an earthquake or a landslide might conceivably alter the location of a thalweg, watershed or other feature used in a treaty delimitation of a boundary. But he doubts whether such a case could be said to raise a question of the termination of the treaty on the ground of a fundamental change of circumstances. It would seem rather to raise a problem as to the correct interpretation and application of the treaty in the light of the changed geographical facts.

9. If the Special Rapporteur’s proposals for the revision of article 46 and for its transfer to section 1 of the present part as a general rule are accepted by the Commission, paragraph 4 will become unnecessary as the question of separability will have been covered in article 46.

10. A number of Governments express serious anxiety regarding the danger to the stability of treaties which, in their view, the rule formulated in the present article involves; and they lay emphasis on the need for recourse to independent arbitration in the event of differences regarding the application of the article. The question of independent arbitration and the danger to the stability of treaties which certain articles in part II may involve is a more general one. Article 51 is the article which attempts to deal with this question and the Special Rapporteur does not think it appropriate to make special provision for it in the present article. Clearly, the Commission will require to re-examine the whole problem of the procedures for applying the articles relating to invalidity and termination of treaties in connexion with article 51.

11. In the light of the foregoing observations, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the article might be revised to read as follows:

1. A fundamental change which has occurred with regard to a fact or state of facts existing at the time a treaty was entered into may be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty only if:
   (a) The existence of that fact or state of facts constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty;
   (b) The effect of the change is to transform in an essential respect the character of continuing obligations undertaken in the treaty; and
   (c) The change has not been foreseen by the parties and its consequences provided for in the treaty.

2. A fundamental change may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty provision fixing a boundary or effecting a transfer of territory.

Article 45.—Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law

Comments of Governments

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government endorses in general terms the principle of this article.

Israel. The Government of Israel reserves its views, noting that the article has links with problems of inter-temporal law still to be considered by the Commission.

Luxembourg. In line with its comments on article 37, the Luxembourg Government considers the inclusion of this article to be undesirable in the present state of international law, and proposes its deletion.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government draws attention to its comments on article 46 regarding the principle of separability, and points out that if article 46 is modified in accordance with those comments, it will be possible to delete paragraph 2 of the present article.

Portugal. The Portuguese Government refers to the relation between the present article and article 37. It appears to endorse the rule contained in paragraph 1 of the present article as well as the application of the principle of separability provided for in paragraph 2.

Sweden. The Swedish Government concedes that a rule prescribing the invalidity of treaties violating emerging peremptory norms may be said to be required from the point of view of logic and consistency. But, as in the case of article 37, it voices its concern at the effect of such a rule on the stability of treaties; and it stresses what it considers to be the inadequacies of the method by which the invalidity of a treaty is to be determined under the provisions of article 51.

Turkey. In the absence of any system of compulsory jurisdiction, the Turkish Government finds the same objections to this article as it does to article 37.

United Kingdom. As in the case of article 37, the United Kingdom Government considers it essential that the application of the present article should be made subject to independent adjudication.

United States. In the opinion of the United States Government, considerable further study is needed to decide whether the “logical corollary” to article 37 which the present article contains is workable, just as it is also needed to decide whether article 37 itself is workable. It feels that the determination of precisely when a new rule of international law has become sufficiently established to be a peremptory rule is likely to be extremely difficult. It interprets article 37 as applying retroactively, so as to avoid earlier treaties concluded prior to the emergence of later peremptory norms. In general, it considers that the present article is unacceptable unless agreement is reached as to who is to define a new peremptory norm and to determine how it is to be established.

Cypriot delegation. The Cypriot delegation notes that the present article is a logical corollary to article 37.

Hungarian, Italian, Moroccan, Philippine, Syrian and Thai delegations.

178 Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Sixth Committee, 783rd meeting, para. 22.
179 Ibid., 789th meeting, para. 11.
180 Ibid., 793rd meeting, para. 11.
181 Ibid., 792nd meeting, para. 17.
182 Ibid., 790th meeting, para. 10.
183 Ibid., 786th meeting, paras. 13 and 16.
184 Ibid., 791st meeting, para. 6.
These delegations make their comments on the present article in conjunction with their comments on article 37. They all express their general approval of the inclusion of the two articles as part of the modern law of treaties.

**Salvadorian delegation.** The Salvadorian delegation expresses approval of the fact that the concepts of relative and absolute nullity of a treaty have both been taken into account in the Commission's commentary to the article. It suggests that the Spanish text of the article should begin with the words "Un tratado se extingue cuando...etc.". 180

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. The comments of Governments in regard to the rule in paragraph 1 of the present article are closely connected with their comments on article 37 and have already been taken into account by the Special Rapporteur in re-examining that article. Both articles will, no doubt, receive careful reconsideration by the Commission in the light of those comments, and in the meanwhile the Special Rapporteur confines himself to one purely verbal suggestion. This is to substitute the word "if" for "when". Having regard to the nature of the rule contained in paragraph 1, the conditional "if" seems more appropriate.

2. If article 46, dealing with the separability of treaty provisions, is revised in the manner proposed by the Special Rapporteur and is transferred as a general rule to section 1, it is arguable that paragraph 2 of the present article may be unnecessary. Paragraph 3 of article 46 specifically excepts articles 36 and 37, but not the present article, from the application of the principle of separability, and thus by implication places the present article under the operation of that principle. It may be desirable, however, to retain an express reference to the principle of separability in the present article in order to underline that, whereas the whole treaty is to be void in case of conflict with a *jus cogens* rule in force at the time of the treaty's conclusion, only the offending provisions will be void in case of conflict with a *jus cogens* rule which emerges at a later date. In view of this consideration, the Special Rapporteur suggests that paragraph 2 might be retained in the following slightly amended form:

   If certain clauses only of the treaty are in conflict with the new norm and the conditions specified in article 46, paragraph 1, apply, those clauses alone shall be void.

**Article 50.—Procedure under a right provided for in the treaty**

**Comments of Governments**

**Israel.** In paragraph 1, the Government of Israel considers that the notice should correspond in principle, and subject only to the rules of separability, to the requirements for instruments of ratification, accession, etc., which are contained in article 15, paragraph 1(b) (unless otherwise contemplated by the treaty the instrument must apply to the treaty as a whole). It further considers that this paragraph should be framed as a residual rule, operative in the event of the silence of the treaty. In addition, it suggests that at the end of the paragraph the phrase should read "to" instead of "through" the depositary.

**Netherlands.** The Netherlands Government observes that in paragraph 1 no mention is made of the fact that the notice must in the first place be given in the manner prescribed in the treaty. It suggests that the paragraph should be revised to read:

   "A notice to terminate, withdraw from or suspend the operation of a treaty under a right expressly or impliedly provided for in the treaty must, unless the treaty otherwise provides, be communicated through the diplomatic channel...etc."

**Portugal.** After noting the provisions of the article the Portuguese Government states that it considers the principle which they contain to be acceptable.

**Sweden.** The Swedish Government suggests that, in paragraph 2, the rule regarding revocation of a notice may have been framed in too general terms. It considers that, while the rule proposed may be reasonable in cases such as breach, it may not be acceptable for a normal notice in accordance with an express provision for notice of termination. The purpose of such a provision, it thinks, is to enable other parties to take suitable measures in good time to meet the new situation; and these measures could not be taken with confidence if notices of termination were susceptible of being revoked. It also feels that the rule proposed may have the effect of neutralizing provisions regarding advance notice, as the rule would make it possible in practice for a State to defer its decision to terminate until the day before the notice given by it under the treaty was due to take effect.

**United States.** The United States Government considers that paragraph 1 correctly states the procedures and principles normally applied. Paragraph 2, however, it considers to require reformulation. It observes that the reason for specifying a given period of time before a notice of termination becomes effective is to allow the other party or parties to adjust to the new situation created by the termination; and that in the case of a bilateral treaty, a State receiving such a notice is entitled to assume that the notice will stand and to prepare to adjust its affairs accordingly. It suggests that otherwise one party might avoid the giving of notice by the other, whom it knows to contemplate terminating the treaty, by the device of giving notice itself and then withdrawing it with a view to prolonging the treaty beyond the period contemplated by the other party; and it says that such a situation ought not to be contemplated. It considers that the most reasonable rule would be that where a notice of termination would bring the treaty to an end with respect to all other parties, withdrawal of it must be concurred in by at least a majority of the other parties. It accordingly proposes that paragraph 2 should be reformulated to read as follows:

   "Unless the treaty otherwise provides, the notice may be revoked at any time before the date on which it takes effect, except in a case in which the notice would have caused the treaty to terminate with respect to

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all parties. Where the notice would cause the treaty to terminate with respect to all parties, the notice of withdrawal will not be effective if objected to by the other party in the case of a bilateral treaty, or if objected to by more than one-third of the other parties in the case of a multilateral treaty.”

Polish delegation. The Polish delegation observes that withdrawal from a treaty involves the taking of a serious decision and that, especially in the case of a bilateral treaty, it may be a means of exercising political or economic pressure. In its view, paragraph 2 of the article does not take into account the need for other parties to adapt themselves to the situation created by the withdrawal of one State, the termination of the treaty, or conversely its continuation. It considers that in the interests of international co-operation the right to revoke a notice should be limited by linking it to the clear consent of the other party. 181

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The suggestion of the Israel and Netherlands Governments that paragraph 1 should be stated in the form of a residuary rule—a rule applicable if the treaty does not otherwise provide—is thought to be well-founded. The further suggestion of the Israel Government that a notice of termination given under a provision in the treaty must relate to the whole treaty, unless the treaty expressly contemplates partial termination is also thought to be well-founded.

2. The procedure for communicating a notice of termination to the other parties would appear automatically to be governed by the provisions of the new article 29(bis) (Communications and notifications to contracting States), approved by the Commission at the first part of the present session, 182 unless the treaty provides otherwise. A small modification therefore seems necessary in paragraph 1 of the present article in order to take account of article 29(bis). In addition, attention is drawn to the fact that article 15 (Exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, accession, acceptance or approval), approved at the first part of the present session, speaks of instruments of ratification, accession, etc. “becoming operative” by exchange, deposit or notification. 183 It would seem logical to state the rule in the present article also in terms of the notice “becoming operative” by communication.

3. Three out of the six Governments which have commented upon this article have criticized paragraph 2 as giving too wide a right to revoke a notice of termination at any time before it takes effect. These Governments emphasize that, as one of the chief reasons for inserting a provision regarding notice to terminate is to enable the other parties to take appropriate steps to adjust themselves to the situation created by the withdrawal of one party, an unrestricted right to revoke a notice to terminate might prejudice the interests of the other parties. The alternative rule preferred by the United States Government is felt by the Special Rapporteur to be rather complex and the simpler rule—proposed by the Polish Government—making revocation dependent on consent—is thought to be preferable.

4. In the light of the above observations, it is suggested that the article might be reworded as follows:

Unless the treaty otherwise provides:

(a) A notice to terminate, withdraw from or suspend the operation of a treaty given in pursuance of a right provided for in the treaty becomes operative by its communication to the other parties;

(b) After such communication, the notice may be revoked only with the consent of the other parties.

Article 51.—Procedure in other cases

Comments of Governments

Finland. The Finnish Government observes that, although acceptance of the procedure contained in this article would undoubtedly be of great importance, the article still fails to provide for cases where efforts to settle the dispute are unsuccessful. In its view, a particular difficulty arises from the fact that some States do not accept compulsory settlement of disputes, so that those which do accept it can only have recourse to an optional protocol, as in the case of the 1958 Geneva Conventions and the two Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular relations. However, it feels that, as a compromise, the status quo can be accepted subject to an additional stipulation to the effect that, if the party desiring to withdraw from the treaty offers to submit the dispute to arbitration and the offer is rejected, it has a right of denunciation. It also considers paragraph 1(b) to be defective in that no time-limit is fixed within which the answer must be given in urgent cases; and it suggests that a time-limit of two weeks or one month would be suitable.

Israel. The Government of Israel states that it has no observations to make on the article.

Luxembourg. The Luxembourg Government underlines that in international law there is no authority competent to determine whether a ground of nullity or termination is or is not invoked with good reason; and that this involves real dangers to the stability of treaties, more especially in the case of an alleged conflict with a jure cogens rule and in cases of an alleged violation of the treaty, impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstance. In its view, it is not possible in practice to admit the incorporation in a formal convention of provisions regarding grounds of nullity and termination, unless the parties at the same time undertake to submit the application of these provisions to compulsory adjudication. The solution which it proposes is that a new provision should be inserted at the end of the articles, authorizing parties to make a reservation under which articles 33 to 37 and 42 to 45 could not be invoked against them by States which have not accepted compulsory adjudication with respect to those articles. The effect of the provision, it explains, would be: (a) as between States accepting compulsory adjudication, the

181 Ibid., 788th meeting, para. 38.
183 Ibid., p. 161.
articles regarding nullity and termination would have full
force; and (b) in other cases, only the general rules of
international law would be applicable, so that the pro-
visions contained in the articles would serve only for
guidance and have no binding force. The text which it
suggests for this new provision reads as follows:

"Upon acceding to these articles, States parties may,
without prejudice to the general rules of international
law, exclude from the application of the provisions
relating to the defect in validity and the termination
of treaties any State that has not accepted in their
regard an undertaking concerning compulsory juris-
diction or compulsory arbitration, with respect to a
treaty of which a defect in validity or the termination
is alleged."  

The Luxembourg Government further says that, should
its proposal be adopted, the procedure laid down in
article 51 would no longer serve any purpose in the case
of a State which made the reservation contemplated in
the new provision; and article 51 would presumably
require to be modified to that extent.

**Portugal.** The Portuguese Government finds that the
procedure provided for in this article is set out in a
somewhat cautious and vague manner. At the same
time it feels that to go much further in the formulation of
the rule than what is contained in Article 33 of the Charter
would be to ensure in advance that the present article
would be a dead letter. That being so, it considers para-
graphs 1, 2 and 3 of the article to be acceptable. In para-
graph 4, on the other hand, it thinks that the reservation
of "the rights or obligations of the parties under any
provisions in force binding the parties with regard to the
settlement of disputes" is too broad. In its view, these
rights or obligations should be reserved only when they
are [not] incompatible with the Charter. Paragraph 5
it considers to be in accord with realities.

**Sweden.** The Swedish Government expresses concern
that, while the draft articles considerably develop and
specify the grounds on which treaties may be claimed to
be invalid, they do not similarly develop the methods
by which such claims may be examined and authorita-
tively decided. It considers that the present article,
although useful as far as it goes, does not offer any
safeguards against abuse claims of invalidity. It finds
particularly disconcerting the fact that the article does
not appear to answer the question whether a treaty is
to be subject to termination unilaterally or to remain
valid if the means of settlement indicated in Article 33
of the Charter have been exhausted without result. It
also draws attention to paragraph 5 of the article, saying
that this would reduce the already limited value of the
article if it means that a State, on discovering that an
error or change of circumstances has occurred, may
immediately cease to perform the treaty and merely
invoke the error or change of circumstances.

**Turkey.** The Turkish Government observes that, if
in the view of some members the adoption of compulsory
adjudication is not realistic, this is also true of other
articles. In its opinion, provisions which do not enjoy
the concurrence of all nations cannot be incorporated
in international law without first providing appropriate
guarantees. Accordingly, the Turkish Government pro-
poses that paragraph 3 should be complemented by the
addition of a paragraph to the effect that the parties shall
have the right to apply to the International Court of
Justice.

**United Kingdom.** The United Kingdom Government
considers paragraph 1 of the article to be of great import-
ance and value, but does not think that paragraphs 3 and
4 provide sufficient safeguards. In its view, the draft
articles on the invalidity and termination of treaties, while
they would in themselves mark an advance in the law of
treaties, may impair the security of numerous existing and
future treaties unless there are provisions for independent
international adjudication or arbitration. It considers
that possibilities of abuse exist in relation to practically
all the articles and, in particular, in relation to articles 36,
41, 42, 43 and 44. In its view, articles such as these would
be acceptable only if coupled with the protection of an
ultimate appeal to an independent judicial tribunal. This
view, it maintains, accords with Article 36, paragraph 3,
of the Charter, by which legal disputes should as a general
rule be referred by the parties to the International Court,
and with the intent of resolution 171 (II) of the General
Assembly. In general, the United Kingdom Government
suggests that the draft articles should be subject to inter-
pretation and application by the International Court or,
if such a provision is not generally acceptable, they should
be capable of being invoked against a State which has
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court only
if the State relying on the article is willing to submit
the issue to the Court.

**United States.** The United States Government regrets
that the Commission did not find it possible to incorporate
a rule subjecting the application of the articles regarding
invalidity and termination to compulsory judicial settle-
ment by the International Court. In its view, the rule of
law—which particularly in an area like the law of treaties—
argues most strongly for compulsory reference to the
Court. As article 51 stands, it considers that it is uncertain
whether the article will supply the safeguards that may
be required in connexion with some of the articles to
which it applies. It holds that a requirement of compul-
sory arbitration or judicial settlement in the absence of
settlement by other means is necessary, and hopes that the
Commission will give further consideration to this point.

**Bulgarian delegation.** The Bulgarian delegation com-
ments that the article prescribes a procedure for prevent-
ing a State from invoking a cause of nullity or termina-
tion of a treaty in order to evade its obligations unilaterally,
and that the article does not specify the authorities which
would decide the matter. It also feels that it was perfectly
reasonable for the Commission to confine itself to a
reference to Article 33 of the Charter.  

**Colombian delegation.** The Colombian delegation con-
iders that, although the article would eliminate some
risks to the security of treaties, the effect of para-

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184 The Special Rapporteur thinks that the negative must have
been inadvertently omitted from this sentence.

185 Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session,
Sixth Committee, 788th meeting, para. 14.
Accordingly, it feels that article 51, by jurisdiction would be both harmful at the time of codification of those articles to the compulsory jurisdiction of to have abandoned any attempt to prove the matters merits. It considers that it would be unwise to adopt the Italian delegation expresses the opinion that a refer-

sic stantibus, and of paragraph 3 of the present article, pacific settlement of disputes contained in the Charter.

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to take as its basis the carefully worked out approach to the was wise to refrain from adopting any rigid formulae and

which it alleged.

and HI of part II, it would be best to subject the applica-
tion under paragraph 2, while at the same time refusing

to agree to a decision by an international judge on the merits. It considers that it would be unwise to adopt the basic rules stated in article 44 regarding a change of circumstances, unless there is a clause providing for compulsory jurisdiction. It suggests a compromise solution based on the principle of good faith under which, if an objection is raised to the termination of a treaty under article 44 and the objection is not accepted, the party opposing the submission of the dispute to the verdict of an impartial authority would be considered to have abandoned any attempt to prove the matters which it alleged.

Pakistan delegation. The Pakistan delegation considers that, in order to guard against the danger to the security of treaties involved in the articles contained in sections II and III of part II, it would be best to subject the application of those articles to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court.

United Arab Republic delegation. The delegation of the United Arab Republic considers that the Commission was wise to refrain from adopting any rigid formulae and to take as its basis the carefully worked out approach to the pacific settlement of disputes contained in the Charter.

Uruguayan delegation. Commenting on article 30 and on other articles in part II, the Uruguayan delegation notes that, like article 46, the present article provides guarantees against arbitrary action by one party seeking to terminate a treaty. It adds that it supports the article in so far as it is directed towards fostering respect for treaty obligations.

Venezuelan delegation. The Venezuelan delegation considers that, in not prescribing the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court, the Commission wisely recognizes the practice at present followed in regard to international disputes.

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. Governments in their comments appear to be unanimous in approving the general object of the present article, namely, the surrounding of the various rights to invoke grounds of invalidity or termination with specific procedural safeguards against arbitrary recourse to these grounds for the purpose simply of getting rid of inconvenient treaty obligations. The comments of Governments differ, as did the opinions of members of the Commission in 1963, with respect to the question whether these safeguards should or should not include provision for some form of compulsory international adjudication of the dispute in the event of a deadlock. Of the sixteen Governments which have commented on the article, nine appear to consider that paragraphs 1-3 do not go far enough in their development of the procedural safeguards and to wish to see specific rules laid down for cases where the parties are unable to reach agreement. Seven Governments, on the other hand, appear to feel that paragraphs 1-3 represent the furthest that it is possible to go in the way of procedural safeguards in the present state of international relations and of international opinion regarding acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.

2. At its session of September 1964, the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1966 (XVIII), considered, inter alia, “The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered”. In considering this principle the Special Committee examined the various means of peaceful settlement of international disputes and, in particular, negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. Differences of opinion appeared also in the Special Committee regarding the appropriateness of the establishment of compulsory jurisdiction at the present juncture in international relations and in the present degree of the integration of the international community. The Special Rapporteur does not feel that it would serve any useful purpose to recapitulate the considerations advanced in the Special Committee for or against the establishment of compulsory jurisdiction, whether in general or in

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connexion with the interpretation and application of treaties. He considers it sufficient to mention that these differences of opinion were not resolved in the Special Committee and that the Committee recorded on page 104 of its report (A/5746) that it “was unable to reach any consensus on the scope or content of the principle” that “States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered”.

3. Consequently, although one or two recent multilateral conventions have contained clauses for the compulsory settlement of disputes, it hardly seems possible to say that there has been any significant change in the general state of international opinion on this question since the present article was adopted by the Commission in 1963. The Organization of African Unity, it is true, in article 19 of its Charter of 25 May 1963 made provision in its constitution for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. However, if the Charter of the Organization furnishes evidence of the importance attached by the African States to this means of peaceful settlement, it has not provided that the jurisdiction of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration should be compulsory.

4. Article 51, as provisionally adopted by the Commission in 1963, represented the highest measure of common ground that could be found in the Commission at its fifteenth session on the procedural safeguards to be attached to the articles relating to grounds of invalidity and termination. If the Special Rapporteur himself shares the opinion of those who favour making the application of these articles subject to some form of independent determination, he does not feel that the comments of Governments on the present article, divided as they are, or any other developments since the 1963 session would justify him in proposing a new text for the article, recognizing an ultimate right of recourse to compulsory means of settlement. While drawing the attention of the Commission to the concern expressed by certain Governments regarding the omission from the article of any reference to independent adjudication, the Special Rapporteur feels bound to examine the proposals of Governments on the basis of the maintenance of the present general structure and content of the article.

5. The Luxembourg Government proposes an intermediate solution. Any State becoming a party to the draft articles should be specifically authorized to make a reservation under which no other party could invoke articles 33 to 37 or 42 to 45 against it unless that party had accepted compulsory adjudication with respect to those articles. Then, if another party had not accepted compulsory adjudication, the general rules of international law would be applicable as between it and the reserving State, the provisions in the articles having no binding force and serving only for guidance. The efficacy of this intermediate solution may be doubted. As the Luxembourg Government recognizes, the general rules of international law regarding non-compliance with international law, lack of authority, fraud, error etc., would remain applicable. In consequence, the possibility of arbitrary recourse to grounds of invalidity or termination would still exist, and perhaps in aggravated form; for the strict definitions of the conditions for alleging grounds of invalidity or termination contained in the Commission's draft articles and the procedural safeguards at present contained in article 51 might be claimed not to apply. Indeed, a serious objection to the proposal is the very fact that it involves drawing a distinction between the general rules of international law on the subject and the rules laid down in the draft articles. Although some elements of “progressive development” may normally be expected to be present in any codifying convention, the Special Rapporteur feels that it would, in some measure, defeat the object of codification if the resulting convention drew a distinction between the provisions of the code and the “general rules of international law”.

6. The Italian and Finnish Governments—one from the point of view of the party alleging a ground of invalidity or termination, the other from the point of view of the party contesting the allegation—make similar suggestions for resolving cases of deadlock. The Italian Government suggests that, if a party alleging a ground of invalidity or termination opposes the submission of the question to arbitration, it should be considered to have abandoned all attempt to prove the matters which it alleges. The Finnish Government suggests that, if a party alleging a ground of invalidity or termination offers to submit the question to arbitration and the offer is refused, the party should automatically have the right to denounced the treaty. In other words, the refusal of a party to submit to arbitration would in either event be considered to raise a conclusive presumption that it was unable to make good its allegation or its objection as the case might be. The original proposals of the Special Rapporteur in his second report incorporated the concept that refusal of an offer to arbitrate should give rise to a presumption. Although the concept commended itself to some members of the Commission, others considered it as going too far in the direction of introducing into the article an element of compulsory submission to arbitration. The text which the Commission adopted as representing the greatest measure of common ground amongst members did not include this concept. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur does not feel that he would be justified in proposing its reintroduction.

7. The Finnish Government also suggests that in paragraph 1(b) a time-limit should be fixed within which the other party’s reply would have to be given in cases of “special urgency”; and it suggests a limit of two weeks or one month. This question, if the Special Rapporteur’s memory is correct, was considered in the Drafting Committee which, however, thought it difficult to fix in advance a rigid time-limit to apply to all cases of “special urgency”. In practice, cases of special urgency are likely to be cases arising from a sudden and serious violation of the treaty

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198 e.g. Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, 8 July 1965, article 16.
by the other party; and it seems possible to conceive of cases where even a time-limit of two weeks might be too long in the particular circumstances of the violation.

8. Paragraph 5 is questioned by the Swedish Government which fears that it may be interpreted as allowing a State, on discovering an error or change of circumstances, immediately to cease to perform the treaty and merely invoke the error or change of circumstances. This paragraph concerns cases where a demand is made for the performance of a treaty, or a complaint is made alleging a violation, and the other party desires to invoke a ground of invalidity or termination by way of answer to the demand or complaint. The Special Rapporteur does not understand it to have been the intention of the Commission in these cases to allow the other party merely to invoke the error and at once to act as if the treaty were invalid or terminated. What the Commission had in mind, as appears from paragraph 7 of the commentary to article 51, was only to make it clear that the mere fact that the other party had not previously given notice under the present article of a ground of invalidity or termination could not be represented as precluding it from invoking that ground when requested to perform the treaty or to answer for an alleged violation of it. If the article is read as a whole, it is doubted whether paragraph 5 is open to the interpretation feared by the Swedish Government. However, in order to discourage such an interpretation, the Special Rapporteur suggests that it may be preferable to reword paragraph 5 as follows:

Subject to article 47, the fact that a State has not previously made the notification prescribed in paragraph 1 shall not prevent it from making such notification in answer to a demand for the performance of the treaty or to a complaint alleging a violation of the treaty.
## Law of Treaties

### DOCUMENT A/CN.4/186 and Add.1-7

Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur

**[Original text: English]**

**[11 March, 25 March, 12 April, 11 May, 17 May, 24 May, 1 June and 14 June 1966]**

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Introduction

1. In the two parts of its seventeenth session the Commission re-examined in the light of the comments of Governments:

   (a) the articles on the conclusion, entry into force and registration of treaties prepared at its fourteenth session and included in part I of its draft articles on the law of treaties;

   (b) the articles on invalidity and termination of treaties prepared at its fifteenth session and included in part II of its draft articles on the law of treaties.

The Commission provisionally adopted revised texts of forty-four articles. It deleted five articles, namely articles 5, 10, 14, 27 and 38 (in some cases incorporating their substance in another article). It transferred article 48 to part I, renumbering it article 3(bis). It formed three new articles by separating provisions from existing articles, namely, article 0 (from article 2), article 4(bis) (from article 32, paragraph 1), and article 30(bis) (from article 53, paragraph 4); and, in deleting article 38, it retained one of its provisions as article 39(bis). It added one new article, article 29(bis).

2. In re-examining the articles contained in part I, the Commission postponed its decision:

   (a) on certain points in article 1 concerning the use of terms in the draft articles and on the inclusion in that article of a provision regarding the characterization or classification of international agreements under internal law;

   (b) on articles 8 and 9 (participation in a treaty) and 13 (accession).

3. In re-examining the articles contained in part II, the Commission postponed its decision:

   (a) on article 40 (termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty by agreement); and

   (b) on articles 49 (authority to denounce, terminate, etc.) and 50 (procedure under a right provided for in the treaty), instructing the Drafting Committee to present revised texts at the next session.

At the same time it instructed the Drafting Committee to consider what, if any, elements of article 38, paragraphs 2 and 3(a) should be retained and transferred to article 50.

4. The above questions still remaining undecided in parts I and II will necessarily have to be taken up again by the Commission at its forthcoming session when the

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4 This article has been deleted, paragraph 3(c) being transferred to a new article, article 39(bis).
draft articles on the law of treaties are to be completed and submitted to the General Assembly. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur will in due course present to the Commission or to the Drafting Committee, as may be appropriate, fresh proposals or revised texts in regard to each of these questions.

5. The time available to the Commission at the second part of its seventeenth session did not permit it to take up the re-examination of all the articles of part II of the draft articles, the articles not yet reconsidered by it being articles 51 to 54 inclusive. The Special Rapporteur, therefore, assumes that at the eighteenth session the Commission will begin with these articles. His observations and proposals regarding article 51 were presented to the Commission as part of his fifth report, and are to be found at the end of addendum 4 to that report (A/CN.4/183). Articles 52, 53 and 54, concerning the legal consequences of the invalidity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty, could not be covered in the fifth report, owing to lack of time, and the Special Rapporteur's observations and proposals regarding these articles are therefore presented to the Commission as the first instalment of this report. The articles on the application, effects, modification and interpretation of treaties contained in part III will then be dealt with in successive addenda to this first instalment.

The basis of the present report

6. The basis of the present report is the same as that of the Special Rapporteur's fourth and fifth reports, namely, the written replies of Governments, the comments of delegations in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and the observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur resulting therefrom. The comments of Governments and delegations on draft articles 52, 53 and 54 are contained in the Secretariat document A/CN.4/175 and in addenda 1-4 of that document, while their comments on part III of the draft articles are contained in document A/CN.4/182.

7. The Commission, for reasons of convenience, is re-examining the draft articles in the same general order as that in which they were provisionally adopted at the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions. In paragraphs 5 to 7 of his fifth report, and at the second part of the seventeenth session, the Special Rapporteur indicated to the Commission the reasons why a considerable rearrangement of the order of the articles appears to him to be necessary. The question of the order of the articles has now been referred to the Drafting Committee, which will make its recommendations to the Commission regarding it in the course of the forthcoming session.

Completion of the revision of part II of the draft articles in the light of the comments of Governments (section VI — articles 52-54)

The title to section VI

Proposal of the Special Rapporteur

The title to the section at present reads: “The legal consequences of nullity, etc.” The substantive articles concerning grounds of nullity, however, invariably speak of “invalidity”, and it therefore seems essential in the interests of consistency of terminology to substitute the word “invalidity” for “nullity” in the title to section VI.

Article 52.—Legal consequences of the nullity of a treaty

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel observes that the article attempts to deal with two distinct matters, namely: treaties which are a nullity ab initio and treaties the consent to which may be invalidated subsequently at the initiative of one of the parties. It feels that this distinction should be brought more sharply into focus. It feels that the resulting difficulties, and certain difficulties of a terminological character, would be reduced if the text were to be oriented not to the general concept of nullity but to the legal consequences of the application of the different articles of part II to which it relates. Subject to these observations the Government of Israel suggests that paragraph 1(a) should refer to the “legal consequences of acts performed in good faith by a party in reliance on the void treaty”. In its view, even making due allowance for the maxim omnia rite acta praesumuntur, the invalidation of the consent to be bound by a treaty ought not in itself to impair claims based upon the alleged illegality of acts performed in reliance on the treaty. In this connexion, it points to a passage of the Judgment of the International Court in the Northern Cameroons case as alluding to this principle in the context of the termination of a treaty. Paragraph 1(b) it thinks should be introduced by the word “Nevertheless”. In paragraph 3 it considers that the phrase “nullity of a State's consent to a multilateral treaty” should be replaced by “invalidation of a State's participation in a multilateral treaty” in order to make the language correspond more closely with that of articles 8 and 9.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government merely states that it has no comment on the article.

Portugal. The Portuguese Government analyses and appears to endorse the several provisions contained in the article.

Sweden. The Swedish Government observes that the article deals in very general and abstract terms with problems of great complexity. It suggests that a fuller discussion than that given in the commentary is desirable to illustrate and analyse the various cases that may arise. It adds that in paragraph 1(b) the expression “may be required” seems inadequate.

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5 See p. 49 above.
8 Ibid., 823rd meeting, para. 79.
10 I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 34.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government considers that the operation of paragraph 1(b) may be difficult in practice, especially if a treaty has been executed to a large extent or if formal legislative, or other internal, steps have been taken to give effect to it. Nor is it clear to the United Kingdom Government in what manner and by whom the parties may be required to restore the status quo ante.

United States. In the view of the United States Government, the provisions of the article are a useful clarification of the consequences resulting from the nullity of a treaty.

Salvadorian delegation. The Salvadorian delegation, while endorsing the article in general, states that it does not provide for the case where the fact that one party, having invoked its own error, is no longer bound to execute the terms of the treaty may prevent the other party from exercising it as well. In its view, provision should be made to enable the other party to continue to execute the treaty. It also feels that, if the treaty produces benefits for the parties, the question arises whether a party is not entitled to call upon the “erring” party to continue to implement those terms of the treaty which produce the benefits, notwithstanding that the nullity of the treaty has been invoked. It considers that the present article should be placed in part III since, in its view, the article deals with the effects of a treaty. 11

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The Government of Israel suggests that the article should distinguish more sharply between cases of nullity ab initio and cases in which consent to a treaty may be invalidated subsequently at the initiative of one of the parties. The original text of the article in the Special Rapporteur’s second report 12 did distinguish between cases of nullity ab initio and cases of subsequent invalidation of the consent of a party at its initiative for the purposes of their legal effects. The Commission, however, decided to treat all causes of invalidity as operating to nullify the treaty ab initio, except the emergence of a new rule of jus cogens which it dealt with as a special case akin to termination of a valid treaty. The Commission felt that any differentiation in the effects of the invalidity that would result from the application of articles 31-37 should be based rather on the different nature of the various grounds of invalidity.

2. The Government of Israel also suggests that the article should be formulated with reference to the particular articles creating invalidity rather than to the general concept of invalidity. If this is done, it feels that difficulties of a terminological character will be reduced. The Special Rapporteur in principle agrees with this suggestion, but from a drafting point of view it seems convenient to retain paragraph 1 in its present general form, and then in paragraph 2 to differentiate certain articles as special cases. This is already done partially in the present text, but the statement of the articles to which paragraph 1 does not apply should, it is thought, be made both more complete and more specific.

3. The distinction at present made in the article is between cases where the invalidity does not result from misconduct committed by one party in order to obtain the other’s consent (paragraph 1) and cases where it does result from one party’s having defrauded or coerced the other (paragraph 2). In the first category of cases, acts done in good faith are not rendered illegal by reason only of the invalidation of the treaty and each party is entitled to require the other to establish as far as possible the position that would have existed if the acts had not been performed. In the second category of cases, the wrongdoing party is not entitled to invoke either of these provisions. This category comprises cases falling under articles 33, 35 and 36, and it is thought that specific reference should be made to these articles.

4. The article as at present drafted does not in terms distinguish as a special case invalidity resulting from conflict ab initio with a rule of jus cogens, that is, cases in which both parties in concluding the treaty have transgressed a peremptory rule of international law. The Commission, it is thought, assumes that in these cases it would not be open to any party to speak of “acts performed in good faith in reliance on the void instrument”, so that these cases would automatically be excluded from the benefit of the relieving provisions contained in paragraph 1. However, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, it seems advisable specifically to except cases of jus cogens from the operation of paragraph 1 by adding a particular reference to article 37 in paragraph 2.

5. The further problem stems from the use of the phrase “becomes void” in article 45 to express the effect of the emergence of a new rule of jus cogens with which a treaty conflicts. Although the case is dealt with—and rightly dealt with—in that article as one of termination, the fact that the use of the word “void” introduces the terminology of invalidity gives rise to a certain awkwardness in the drafting of the present article. It is true that paragraph 2 of article 53 by implication indicates that cases of invalidity under article 45 are not intended to be embraced by the provisions of the present article. But there remains a logical inconsistency in the drafting. The easiest way of removing this inconsistency would be to express the rule in article 45 in terms of the treaty’s law rather than in terms of “nullity”. However, in 1963 the Commission showed a preference for emphasizing in article 45 that the treaty becomes “void” as a result of the emergence of the new rule of jus cogens. That being so, it may be desirable, purely for reasons of drafting, expressly to reserve cases of invalidity arising under article 45 from the application of the present article and to underline that it falls under article 53. This can easily be achieved by adding an appropriate clause in paragraph 2.

6. Another suggestion of the Government of Israel is that paragraph 1(a) should read: “The invalidity of a treaty shall not as such affect the legal consequences of acts performed in good faith etc.”. It maintains that the invalidation of the consent to be bound by a treaty ought not in itself to impair claims based upon the alleged illegality of acts performed in reliance on the treaty. The

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view taken by the Commission was that acts done in good faith in reliance on the treaty at a time when both parties conceived the treaty to be valid, and were conducting themselves on the basis of that assumption, ought not, as a general rule, to be converted into wrongful acts by reason only of the subsequent invalidation of the treaty. By inserting the words “as such”, it underline that the article deals only with the consequences of the invalidity, and does not exclude the possibility that illegality may attach to the acts for other reasons. In connexion with this point, the Special Rapporteur feels that the words “by itself” may perhaps be preferable to “as such”, as well as corresponding more exactly with the words in the French text.

The Special Rapporteur is not clear whether the Government of Israel thinks the Commission’s view to be unsound, or whether it is simply the expression “the legality of acts performed in good faith” to which it takes exception. At any rate, the observations of the International Court in the Northern Cameroons case do not appear to touch on any way the questions which arise under the present article, since those observations relate to the quite different situation of acts done at a time when the treaty was not only conceived by the parties to be valid, but was in fact valid and effective to create definitive legal rights and obligations. They concern the case of termination of a treaty, and may require consideration in connexion with article 53, but do not seem to the Special Rapporteur to introduce any new element into the examination of the present article. As to the expression “the legality of acts performed in good faith etc.”, the other expression “the legal consequences etc.”, preferred by the Government of Israel was in fact considered and rejected by the Drafting Committee in 1963. This is because it seems impossible to say that the invalidation of a treaty will not affect the legal consequences of an act performed in reliance on the treaty. Paragraph 1(b) is based on the very supposition that the legal consequences of the act are affected by the nullity of the treaty. If the Commission in 1963 did not find it altogether easy to find the right phrase, it came to the conclusion that the phrase “does not affect the legality of the acts”—“n’affecte pas le caractère légitime” in the French text—was the most appropriate to express the rule in paragraph 1(a).

7. In paragraph 1(b), two Governments query the adequacy of the expression “The parties to that instrument may be required”. To meet their criticism, and having regard to the classes of cases of invalidity with which paragraph 1 deals, it may be preferable to revise paragraph 1(b) so as to make it read: “The parties to the void instrument may require each other, etc.”.

8. In paragraph 2, as invalidity may result from two different kinds of coercion under two separate articles (articles 35 and 36), it seems desirable to specify the actual articles to which the paragraph has reference, and in that event to specify also the article dealing with fraud. It is also felt that the paragraph may read more smoothly if the second half of the sentence is placed first.

9. Since the texts of the substantive articles adopted by the Commission all speak of invalidity rather than nullity, the Special Rapporteur thinks it desirable that the same term should be used in the present article.

10. In the light of the above observations the Special Rapporteur proposes that the article should be revised on the following lines:

1. (a) The invalidity of a treaty shall not by itself affect the legality of acts performed in good faith by a party in reliance on the void instrument before the invalidity of the instrument was invoked.
(b) However, a party to the void instrument may require any other party to establish as far as possible the position that would have existed between them if the acts had not been performed.

2. A party may not invoke the provisions of paragraph 1 if the invalidity results:

(a) under articles 33, 35 or 36, from fraud or coercion imputable to that party;
(b) under article 37, from the conflict of the treaty with a peremptory norm of general international law;
(c) under article 45, from the emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law, in which case article 53 applies.

3. The same principles apply with regard to the legal consequences of the invalidity of an individual State’s consent to be bound by a multilateral treaty.

Article 53.—Legal consequences of the termination of a treaty

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel suggests that paragraph 1(b) should be revised to read: “Shall not affect the legal consequences of any act done in conformity with the provisions of the treaty while that treaty was in force or...”. Secondly, it suggests that, for reasons similar to those given in its comments on article 52, paragraph 1 might be clearer if it were to specify the articles of part II to which the present article relates. Thirdly, it reserves its position concerning paragraph 2 pending the Commission’s decision regarding the problems of the inter-temporal law which arise in connexion with article 45. In addition, it suggests that the commentary should make it clear that, once a treaty is terminated, it can only be revived by some formal treaty (in the sense used in the draft articles). It explains that in Israel, when an enactment repealing a former law is itself repealed, the repeal of the latter enactment does not revive the law previously repealed unless the later enactment expressly so provides; and that it assumes the position regarding treaties in international law to be the same.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government suggests that paragraph 3(c) should be modified so as to read:

“The legality of any act done in conformity with the provisions of the treaty prior to the date upon which the denunciation or withdrawal has taken effect and the validity etc.”.

In support of its suggestion, it points out that some treaties remain in force for a certain period after notice of termination has been given.
Portugal. The Portuguese Government expresses doubts regarding paragraph 2 which provides that, where a rule of *jus cogens* is the cause of the nullity of the treaty, a situation resulting from the operation of the treaty is to retain its validity only to the extent that it is not in conflict with the rule of *jus cogens*. In its view, it would be more equitable in these cases to apply the rule in paragraph 1 and to respect *in toto* situations legitimately created prior to the date when the nullity of the treaty supervened because of the development of a new rule of *jus cogens*. At the same time, it concedes that the solution proposed in paragraph 2 may accord better with the imperative nature of the supervening norm.

Sweden. The Swedish Government considers that the division between paragraph 2 of the present article and article 52 is not obvious and requires clarification. As article 52 deals with the nullity of treaties, it presumes that that article covers all treaties termed "void"—a term which is found in article 52, paragraph 1(a); yet article 53, paragraph 2, also refers to treaties which are void. It further suggests that, in paragraph 1(a) of the present article, it may be preferable to speak of releasing parties "from any further obligation to apply a treaty" rather than "from any further application of the treaty"; and it draws attention to the fact that the former phrase is the one used in article 54. In addition, it feels that, in paragraph 2 the expression "a situation...shall retain its validity" may be in need of improvement.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government comments that the article does not make provision with regard to the accrued obligations of a State under a treaty at the time of its denunciation by that State. In the Sixth Committee, the United Kingdom delegation also commented that paragraph 2 throws no light on the kinds of situation envisaged by it and that the application of the paragraph is likely to give rise to difficulties. In particular, it felt that where the treaty’s provisions have already been executed, it may be extremely difficult to restore the *status quo*.

United States. In the view of the United States Government the provisions of this article constitute a useful clarification of the consequences of the termination of a treaty.

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. In paragraph 1(a), the observation of the Swedish Government that it may be preferable to speak of releasing parties from "any further obligation to apply the treaty" is thought to be justified, as this phrase is perhaps more precise.

2. In paragraph 1(b), in line with its suggestion regarding the previous article, the Government of Israel suggests that the text should specify the articles of part II to which this sub-paragraph relates. In the present article, however, this does not seem necessary, since an exception is made only of one article—article 45 (emergence of a new rule of *jus cogens*)—and article 45 is already mentioned specifically in paragraph 2.

As in the previous article, the Government of Israel also suggests that the operative words should read: "shall not affect the legal consequences of any act etc.". The Special Rapporteur does not think that this change would be an improvement. The article is concerned with the legal consequences of the termination of a treaty, and not—at any rate directly—with the legal consequences of acts done under the treaty. On the other hand, the question does arise whether it is completely sufficient to provide that the termination of a treaty "shall not affect the legality of any act done in conformity with the provisions of the treaty or that of any situation resulting from the application of the treaty". It is here that the *Northern Cameroons* case, 14 already referred to by the Government of Israel in connexion with article 52, appears to call for consideration, as also the observation of the United Kingdom Government that paragraph 1 does not make provision with regard to "the accrued obligations of a State under a treaty at the time of its denunciation by that State". The Commission certainly assumed that obligations already accrued and rights already vested under the treaty before its termination could not be affected by the latter event, unless the treaty otherwise provided or the parties otherwise agreed; and this was intended to be implied from the provision, in paragraph 1(a), that the parties are released from any further application of the treaty. However, the implication from that provision may not be so unambiguous as to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding. Moreover, the very fact that there is an express provision in sub-paragraph (b) safeguarding the legality of acts done in conformity with the treaty may increase the need to include a provision regarding accrued rights and obligations so as to avoid any risk of doubt on the point. It is therefore proposed that a new sub-paragraph should be added to paragraph 1 preserving accrued rights and obligations.

3. In paragraph 2, the Swedish Government requests that the relation between the cases of invalidity under this paragraph and those under article 52 should be clarified. This request will, however, be met if the Commission endorses the Special Rapporteur’s proposal in paragraph 5 of his observations on the previous article; that is, if a clause is added to article 52, paragraph 2, underlining that cases of invalidity due to the emergence of a new rule of *jus cogens* fall under the present article.

The United Kingdom Government’s comment that the paragraph does not throw light on the kinds of situation envisaged by it appears to be a criticism of the uncertain content of *jus cogens* articles in line with its criticisms of articles 37 and 45, which the Commission has already had under consideration when revising those articles. Its further point that, where the treaty’s provisions have already been executed, it may be extremely difficult to restore the *status quo*, may be true as a statement of fact but it does not seem to touch the principle laid down in paragraph 2. Unlike paragraph 1(b) of article 52, paragraph 2 of the present article does not call for the restoration of the *status quo* as such. Its object is a quite different one. When a treaty terminates owing to its conflict with a rule of *jus cogens* subsequently established, it will be because any further performance of the treaty will have become contrary to a peremptory norm of general inter-

14 Ibid.
jus cogens. Accordingly, it seems desirable to look for jus cogens, or to its validity as a still living situation possible time-lag between the giving of a notice of
The Netherlands Government suggests, with reference to paragraph 1 to the special case of a single State's
4. Paragraph 3 applies the general principles laid down for consideration the following:
for the maintenance in force does not conflict etc. Nevertheless, it would be inadmissible to regard the emergence of the new rule of jus cogens as retroactively rendering void acts done at a previous time when they were not contrary to international law; and paragraph 1(b) of the present article accordingly preserves the legality of such acts. The purpose of paragraph 2 is only to underline that, by so doing, paragraph 1(b) is not to be understood as authorizing the further enforcement of a situation resulting from the application of the treaty, if such further enforcement would otherwise be illegal by reason of the new rule of jus cogens. In other words, paragraph 1(b) is not to be understood as recognizing vested rights to commit breaches of peremptory rules of general international law. This being so, the Portuguese Government's doubts about the rule laid down in paragraph 2 and its preference for the application of paragraph 1(b) in toto do not appear to be well-founded. On the other hand, the principle stated in paragraph 2 is not altogether easy to formulate, and the doubts expressed by Governments may partly concern the phrase "a situation resulting from the application of the treaty shall retain its validity only to the extent that it is not in conflict etc.". The Swedish Government, at any rate, expresses the view that the phrase "a situation...shall retain its validity" needs improving. The Special Rapporteur feels that this criticism may be justified since this phrase perhaps leaves it doubtful whether it refers merely to the situation's validity on the temporal plane of the law in force prior to the emergence of the new rule of jus cogens, or to its validity as a still living situation legally recognized under the régime of the new rule of jus cogens. Accordingly, it seems desirable to look for another phrase, and the Special Rapporteur suggests for consideration the following:

a situation resulting from the application of the treaty may be maintained in force only to the extent that its maintenance in force does not conflict etc.

4. Paragraph 3 applies the general principles laid down in paragraph 1 to the special case of a single State's denunciation of or withdrawal from a multilateral treaty. The Netherlands Government suggests, with reference to sub-paragraph (c), that account should be taken of the possible time-lag between the giving of a notice of denunciation or withdrawal and its taking effect; in other words, it suggests that the operative date for the application of sub-paragraph (c) is the date of "taking effect" and not necessarily that of "denunciation" or "withdrawal". This suggestion is clearly well-founded, but the Special Rapporteur thinks it equally clear that the point affects the whole paragraph and not merely sub-paragraph (c). At the same time, the Special Rapporteur feels that, as paragraph 3 simply restates in three sub-paragraphs the two general rules contained in paragraph 1, it should be possible to shorten the text by referring to paragraph 1 and adapting its rules to the context of a single State's denunciation or withdrawal. Accordingly, he suggests that the paragraph should be reconstructed so as to shorten it and to incorporate the point made by the Netherlands Government.

5. The Special Rapporteur also feels that it may be preferable to reverse the order of paragraphs 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the existing text state general rules for every-day situations. Paragraph 2, on the other hand, states an exceptional rule for a highly exceptional case. No doubt, the present order is justifiable on the logical ground that, like paragraph 1, paragraph 2 concerns the termination of the treaty between all the parties, whereas paragraph 3 concerns only a single party's denunciation or withdrawal. But on general grounds it may be better to state the normal rules first.

6. The Special Rapporteur has given consideration to the question whether it is necessary to make special provision for cases of termination in response to a breach of the treaty, that is, for cases under article 42. The chief point in these cases would seem to be to ensure that, by terminating the treaty, the injured party shall not prejudice the right to reparation accruing to it in consequence of the breach. The Special Rapporteur suggests that, if his proposal in paragraph 2 above for the addition of a third clause in paragraph 1 safeguarding accrued rights and obligations is accepted, the case of termination in response to a breach can conveniently be covered by specifying in that clause that accrued rights and obligations include those arising from a breach of the treaty.

7. Paragraph 4, as explained in the introduction to this section, is no longer necessary because its substance has been transferred to section I of this part as a general rule (article 30(bis)).

8. In the light of the above observations the Special Rapporteur proposes that the article should be revised to read as follows:

1. Subject to paragraph 3, and unless the treaty otherwise provides, the lawful termination of a treaty shall:

(a) release the parties from any obligation further to apply the treaty;
(b) not affect the legality of any act done in conformity with the treaty or that of a situation resulting from the application of the treaty;
(c) not affect any rights accrued or any obligations incurred prior to such termination, including any rights or obligations arising from a breach of the treaty.

2. In the case of a particular State's denunciation of or withdrawal from a multilateral treaty, paragraph 1 applies in the relations between that State and each of the other parties to the treaty from the date when such denunciation or withdrawal takes effect.

3. If a treaty terminates on account of its having become void under article 45, a situation resulting from the application of the treaty may be maintained in force only to the extent that its maintenance in force does not conflict with the norm of general international law the establishment of which has rendered the treaty void.

Article 54.—Legal consequences of the suspension of the operation of a treaty

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel begins by stating its assumption that this article does not refer to the consequences on the operation of a treaty of the suspension of diplomatic relations between the parties or, in
the case of a multilateral treaty, between some of the parties. It then makes the suggestion that the article should specify the substantive articles to which it refers. In this connexion, it points out that the suspension of the operation of a treaty is mentioned in articles 30, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 49 and 50; and that articles 42 and 43 also raise the possibility of the suspension of the operation of a part of a treaty. In addition, it makes the further suggestion that, having regard to the peremptory effect of the termination of a treaty, an option to suspend the operation of a treaty should be extended to cases falling under articles 39 and 44. This would, it thinks, have the advantage of rendering possible a later resumption of the operation of the treaty.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government merely states that it has no comments on this article.

Portugal. The Portuguese Government analyses the provisions of the article and appears in general to endorse them.

Sweden. The Swedish Government observes, that although the provisions of this article are less complex than those of the previous articles, further illustration of the effect of the abstract rules might provide useful clarification.

United States. The United States Government observes that, if one party to a multilateral treaty suspends the operation of the treaty with respect to one other party, only the latter party should be relieved of the obligation to apply the treaty, unless the nature of the treaty is such that the suspension affects the immediate interests of all parties. It accordingly recommends that paragraph 1(a) should read:

"Shall relieve the parties affected from the obligation to apply the treaty".

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The Government of Israel's assumption that this article was not designed to cover the consequences of the suspension of diplomatic relations on the operation of a treaty was, of course, correct. The Commission, when it drafted the article, had not yet considered the effect of the suspension of diplomatic relations on the treaty relations of the States concerned. This question was taken up at the sixteenth session, and the Commission adopted article 64 which, after laying down that the severance of diplomatic relations does not in general affect the legal relations established by the treaty, provided:

"However, such severance of diplomatic relations may be invoked as a ground for suspending the operation of a treaty if it results in the disappearance of the means necessary for the application of the treaty." 16

In short, article 64 now provides for a further case of suspension of the operation of a treaty very similar to that in the second sentence of article 43 (temporary impossibility of performance). Furthermore, article 64 also makes express provision for the application of the principle of "separability" to this case. Accordingly, it seems both logical and necessary that the provisions of the present article regarding the legal consequences of the suspension of a treaty's operation should be made applicable to article 64. Exactly in what way this should be done is a matter of drafting which is to some extent dependent on the place ultimately allotted to article 64 in the order of the draft articles. There are no compelling reasons why the article should be retained in its present position at the end of the section dealing with "the application and effects of treaties". Indeed, the Special Rapporteur would prefer to see it moved either to a position close after "pacta sunt servanda" or else to the section dealing with the termination and suspension of the operation of treaties. Whatever place is given to article 64 in the final scheme of the draft articles, a form of words can easily be found to bring it within the scope of the present article.

As to the Government of Israel's suggestion that the present article should specify all the substantive articles to which it has reference, this again is a matter of drafting which can perhaps best be decided when the final arrangement of the draft articles is more nearly settled. The present general form of the article would appear to be more elegant and even safer than one containing a long list of the articles which may give rise to cases of suspension. But the preferable course is thought to be to return to the point when the draft articles as a whole are nearer to completion.

2. The Swedish Government's suggestion that "further illustration of the effect of the abstract rules might provide useful clarification" seems to concern the commentary rather than the article itself. Since the draft articles are being prepared as a draft convention rather than as a code, illustrations could hardly find a place in the present article.

3. The United States justly draws attention to the fact that the text, as at present drafted, does not take account of cases of a suspension of the operation of a treaty as between only two parties to a multilateral treaty. The point is, indeed, a little broader than that since suspension may take place between a group of States, while article 42 (cases of breach) contemplates that all the other parties may, in certain circumstances, decide to suspend the operation of a treaty vis-à-vis a defaulting State, though not as between themselves. It therefore seems necessary to cover the point, as in articles 52 and 53, by the addition of a paragraph dealing specially with multilateral treaties. The Special Rapporteur accordingly proposes that a new paragraph should be inserted between paragraphs 1 and 2 in the following form:

In the case of the suspension of the operation of a multilateral treaty:

(a) with respect to one party, paragraph 1 applies only in the relations between that party and each of the other parties;

(b) between certain of the parties, paragraph 1 applies only in the mutual relations of those parties.

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Revision of part III of the draft articles in the light of the comments of Governments

Title and arrangement of the articles

The Special Rapporteur, as mentioned in paragraph 7 of the introduction to this report, has elsewhere given his reasons for thinking that a considerable rearrangement of the order of the draft articles is necessary. This rearrangement relates particularly to the articles in part III and the Special Rapporteur does not, therefore, think it useful to discuss in detail here the title of the part, the arrangement of the articles or their place in the final scheme of the draft articles. These matters must now await the general consideration of the final structure of the draft articles by the Drafting Committee and by the Commission when it has concluded its first revision of all the articles. Consequently, the Special Rapporteur will not at this stage comment on the titles to part III and its various sections or on the general arrangement of the articles.

Article 55.—Pacta sunt servanda

Comments of Governments

Cyprus. The Government of Cyprus endorses the inclusion of the words “in force” in the Commission’s formulation of the pacta sunt servanda rule: “A treaty in force is binding, etc.”, saying that the rule would be erroneous and misleading if stated without that qualification. It comments that article 55 must consequently be read subject to the considerable number of articles which may militate against a given treaty being in force, and especially those dealing with invalidity and termination. It also refers to the provision in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter that Members “shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter”, concluding that the difference in formulation between that provision and article 55 is not material. Then it discusses the particular cases of treaties which may be invalid on the grounds specified in articles 36 (coercion of the State) and 37 (conflict with jus cogens), or terminated under article 42 (response to a material breach), without, however, noting the role of article 51 in the application of these articles.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government comments that the pacta sunt servanda rule is of considerable significance for the strengthening of peaceful coexistence and co-operation in economic, technical, social and cultural fields. It suggests that either in the text or in the commentary it should be indicated that “treaty in force” means a treaty concluded freely and on the basis of equality in accordance with international law. In this connexion it recalls its Draft Declaration of the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (A/C.6/L.505) and suggests that the final text of the article should incorporate the results of the discussion in the General Assembly concerning the codification of the principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.

Finland. The Finnish Government suggests that there might be advantage if the article were also to state that a party must abstain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects and purposes of the treaty. In its view, this would complete the article by putting it in accord with provisions in other articles stating this point.

Israel. The Government of Israel believes the title to the article to be narrower than the scope of the article itself. It assumes that the article will ultimately be combined with article 30 (presumption as to the validity, continuance in force and operation of a treaty). It also considers that, having regard to its fundamental character, the pacta sunt servanda principle should be placed at the beginning of the draft articles; and it notes that in the Charter the principle appears in the preamble. At the same time, it considers that the principle of good faith has a broader scope than the “application and effects” of treaties and is particularly appropriate with regard to the application of the draft articles themselves. In its view, therefore, it is necessary to avoid formulating the present article in a way to give the impression that the principle of good faith is limited to the application of treaties.

The Government of Israel further suggests that some mention should be made—at least in the commentary—of the interrelation between the present article and article 24 concerning “provisional entry into force”. In these cases it assumes that the pacta sunt servanda principle would apply to the underlying agreement upon which the provisional entry into force is postulated.

The Government of Israel notes with approval the statement in paragraph 4 of the commentary that the Commission considers the duty of a party to abstain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects and purposes of the treaty to be implicit in the obligation to perform the treaty in good faith. It adds the somewhat cryptic observation that “it is not clear whether the discordance between the three versions is a reflection of transient difficulties”. This is presumably a reference to the difference in the formulation of the English text “A treaty in force etc.” as against the French and Spanish texts “Tout traité en vigueur” and “Todo tratado en vigor”.

Turkey. The Turkish Government considers the Commission’s restatement of the pacta sunt servanda rule to be useful and necessary “in view of the opinions which have been advanced during the last few years”; and that its effectiveness is enhanced if it is reinforced by the principle of good faith. It feels that the text is not fully satisfactory on the latter point and suggests the addition of a provision stipulating that the parties to a treaty must refrain from acts calculated to prevent the application of the treaty, on the lines of paragraph 2 of the Special Rapporteur’s original draft. It also suggests the desirability of including a provision, such as appeared in paragraph 4 of the Special Rapporteur’s original draft, regarding the responsibility under international law which attaches to a State in the event of its not respecting its treaty obligations.

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In this connexion, it points out that article 63, paragraph 5, contains a specific provision regarding State responsibility and suggests that this makes it the more necessary to include the point in the present article.

United States. The United States Government considers that the pacta sunt servanda rule is clearly and forcefully defined in the article, at the same time observing that it is “the keystone that supports the towering arch of confidence among States”.

Argentine, Byelorussian, Kenyan and United Arab Republic delegations. These delegations express in general terms their approval of the article.

Ecuadorian delegation. The Ecuadorian delegation, recalling Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter, stresses the element of good faith in the observance of obligations and points out that Article 2, paragraph 2, speaks of “obligations assumed...in accordance with the present Charter.” It then lists a number of principles contained in the Charter which in its opinion have become rules of jus cogens, cites Article 103 of the Charter and states that the rule pacta sunt servanda cannot redeem an international agreement which violates provisions of the Charter. It then makes certain observations concerning the application of the provisions of the Charter to treaties concluded by Members of the United Nations before and after its entry into force. Emphasizing that it has no intention of disavowing the principle of pacta sunt servanda, it maintains that recognition of the various causes of nullity will strengthen rather than weaken it.

Nigerian delegation. Commenting on the fact that the article limits the application of the pacta sunt servanda rule to treaties in force, the Nigerian delegation expresses the view that the rule should be stated in more categorical terms. It considers that the restrictive words should be dropped, more especially in view of the Commission’s adoption of article 30 (Validity and continuance in force of treaties).

Pakistan delegation. Underlining the importance which it attaches to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Pakistan delegation insists that care should be taken to ensure that it is not impaired or undermined in the rules formulated in the draft articles. In this connexion, it refers to the doctrine of the clausula rebus sic stantibus which, it says, should be understood as “a rule of construction which secures that a reasonable effect shall be given to a treaty, rather than the unreasonable one which would result from a literal adherence to its expressed terms only”. And it observes that, even as a rule of construction, it should be applied only by agreement of the parties or by an impartial agency, judicial or arbitral.

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The Government of Israel considers that the pacta sunt servanda principle should be placed at the beginning of the draft articles. It urges that the principle appears in the preamble to the Charter, and also that care must be taken in the formulation of the present article to avoid giving the impression that the principle of good faith is limited to the application of treaties. It observes that the principle of good faith has a broader scope than the application and effects of treaties and is particularly appropriate with regard to the application of the draft articles themselves. The Special Rapporteur has more than once indicated to the Commission his own view that the present article should be placed in an earlier position in the final scheme of the draft articles, and he believes that this view is widely held in the Commission. The supreme importance of the pacta sunt servanda principle in the law of treaties is common ground. On the other hand, it may be doubted whether the article formulating the principle would really gain much in legal content by being introduced prematurely out of its logical place in an orderly exposition of the law of treaties. Part I, as at present arranged, begins with general provisions, the effect of which is to explain and narrow the scope of the draft articles; and to precede these provisions with a staccato statement of the pacta sunt servanda rule might not seem very satisfactory from a scientific point of view. The Special Rapporteur feels that the appropriate place for the present article is immediately following part I, and that the preoccupation of the Government of Israel should be met rather by a strong paragraph in a preamble to the draft articles. It has not been the practice of the Commission to prepare texts of preambles for its draft articles. But there would not seem to be any objection to the Commission’s suggesting that, either in the language of the preamble to the Charter or in some similar form, the pacta sunt servanda principle should be given strong emphasis in a preamble to the draft articles.

As to the point about good faith, the Special Rapporteur doubts whether the draft articles as a whole could be said to give the impression of limiting the principle of good faith to the application and effects of treaties. Article 69 contains a strong affirmation of the principle of good faith in stating the general rule for the interpretation of treaties. In short, the draft articles provide expressly for “good faith” in both the interpretation and the application of treaties. In addition, article 17 (Obligation of a State not to frustrate the object of a treaty prior to its entry into force), although it does not now in its revised form actually mention good faith, specifically requires the maintenance of a certain standard of good faith between negotiating States, even before the conclusion and entry into force of the treaty. Good faith is, indeed, an element which is inherent in the legal relations of States; and it is not thought that by specifying it in general terms in the present article and in article 69 (general rule of interpretation), the draft articles can legitimately be interpreted as throwing doubt on the generality of the principle in the law of treaties. Indeed, there is not very much that cannot be brought within the concepts of “interpretation” and “application of treaties”.

20 Ibid., 842nd meeting, para. 34.
21 Ibid., 850th meeting, para. 37.
22 Ibid., 847th meeting, para. 28.
23 Ibid., 849th meeting, para. 37.
24 Ibid., 847th meeting, para. 16.
25 Ibid., 851st meeting, paras. 4 and 6.
But again, it would be possible to give supplementary emphasis to the principle of good faith by appropriate language in the preamble.

2. One Government (Cyprus) specifically endorses the inclusion of the qualifying words “in force” in the expression “A treaty in force is binding, etc.”. On the other hand, one delegation (Nigerian) feels that the words are restrictive and should be dropped, more especially in view of the adoption of article 30. In point of fact, article 30 has undergone some modification in the course of its revision at the second part of the seventeenth session and no longer takes the form of a presumption as to the validity, continuance in force and operation of a treaty. Apart from that, however, the question of including the words “in force” was discussed in 1964 when the arguments against doing so were before the Commission. On balance, as explained in paragraph (3) of its commentary, the Commission considered that, having regard to other provisions in the draft articles, it is necessary on logical grounds to include those words. Those provisions deal with entry into force, provisional entry into force, obligations resting on negotiating States prior to entry into force, and grounds of invalidity and termination. The Commission accordingly felt that, from a drafting point of view, it is really necessary to specify that it is to treaties in force that the pacta sunt servanda rule applies. A further consideration is that the term treaty is defined in article 1 as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form, etc.”, without any mention of the element of being “in force”; and the draft articles then go on to distinguish clearly between the two phases of treaty-making, “conclusion” and “entry into force”. Certain Governments and delegations link the words “in force” specially with grounds of nullity or termination, with the question of “equal” treaties, or with the provision in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter that Members shall “fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter”. The latter provision seems primarily to concern the obligations of Members under the Charter itself and only indirectly, through articles 36 and 37 of the draft articles, to affect the validity of treaties. In any event, the questions touched on by these Governments and delegations have been considered by the Commission in connexion with the various articles on the grounds of invalidity, and the present article naturally assumes the concurrent application of other provisions of the draft articles. In 1964, the Commission attached considerable importance to formulating the pacta sunt servanda rule in the simplest possible terms.

3. The Government of Israel suggests that mention should be made—at least in the commentary—of the interrelation between the present article and article 24, concerning “provisional entry into force”. And it indicates that, in its view, the pacta sunt servanda rule would apply to the “underlying agreement upon which the provisional entry into force is postulated”. Article 24 has in fact undergone some revision at the first part of the seventeenth session; but the Commission did not, either in 1962 or in 1965, seek to specify what precisely is the source of the parties’ obligations in cases of provisional entry into force. Article 24, as it now reads, states the law unambiguously in terms of the treaty’s entering into force provisionally; in other words, under article 24 the treaty is stated as being brought “into force”. Consequently, there does not appear to be any need in the present article to make special reference to “treaties provisionally in force”. Under the present article, the pacta sunt servanda rule is expressed to apply to every “treaty in force”, and that would seem to be sufficient. At most, a brief reminder in the commentary that treaties may be in force under article 24 as well as under article 23 (Entry into force of treaties) would seem to be indicated.

4. Two Governments (Finland and Turkey) suggest that a provision should be added to the article specifically requiring the parties to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects and purposes of the treaty. The original proposals of the Special Rapporteur in his third report did contain such a provision in the form: “good faith, inter alia, requires that a party to a treaty shall refrain from any acts calculated to prevent the due execution of the treaty or otherwise to frustrate its objects”. The Commission, however, considered that this obligation is implicit in the obligation to perform the treaty in good faith. Preferring to state the pacta sunt servanda rule in as positive and simple a form as possible, it decided not to spell out in the article this secondary aspect of the rule. The main argument for including a specific provision on the point is that indicated by the Finnish Government, namely, the fact that such an obligation is expressly laid upon States by article 17 in certain circumstances prior to the entry into force of a treaty. The argument is that a fortiori that obligation must be laid upon the parties to a treaty in force. But the very reason for dealing with the point in article 17 is the fact that in the circumstances there stated the treaty is not as such binding on the parties; and the case is quite different when the treaty itself is binding on the parties. In short, the Special Rapporteur shares the view of the Commission that this obligation is implicit in the pacta sunt servanda rule as formulated in the present article.

5. The Turkish Government also suggests that the article should include a provision, on the lines of paragraph 4 of the Special Rapporteur’s original proposals, regarding the international responsibility which attaches to a State in the event of its failure to comply with its treaty obligations. Although the point is not referred to in the commentary, it was fully considered by the Commission, which decided that it should be left to be covered in the draft articles on State responsibility. As the formulation of the point in paragraph 4 of the Special Rapporteur’s third report indicates, it is not possible to state such a rule without taking account of the detailed rules applicable to State responsibility. The Commission preferred not to trespass upon the law of State responsibility in any way in the present articles, which essentially concern the creation, interpretation, application, termination and modification of treaty obligations rather than the reparation to be made in the event of their breach. The

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27 Ibid., p. 7.
point made by the Turkish Government that article 63, paragraph 5, already contains a provision regarding State responsibility does not seem to the Special Rapporteur to be persuasive. This provision is concerned only with preserving any obligation to make reparation which may attach to a party under the law of State responsibility by reason of a breach of a treaty. It does not purport to provide for that obligation which it treats as belonging to the law of State responsibility.

6. Finally, there is the Government of Israel's point that the English version "A treaty" does not exactly correspond with the other versions "Tout traité"—"Todo tratado". Although the majority of articles refer to "a" treaty, the use of the word "every" seems appropriate in the present instance, in order to give maximum emphasis to the pacta sunt servanda rule. Accordingly, it is proposed that the English version should be brought into line with the others by changing the opening words to "Every treaty in force".

Article 56.—Application of a treaty in point of time

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel feels that the concordance of the three language versions requires further close examination. It also raises the question of the interrelation of this article with article 24 (provisional entry into force).

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government, having read paragraphs 5 and 7 of the commentary, is nevertheless not convinced of the desirability of employing a different expression from that used in the commentary concerning acquired rights resulting from the illegality of acts done while the treaty was in force. It then suggests that account should also be taken of acquired rights resulting from the operation of the treaty. To this end, it proposes that at the end of paragraph 2 the words "unless the contrary appears from the treaty" should be replaced by "unless the contrary appears to the treaty".

Chilean delegation. In commenting upon article 36 (coercion of the State) the Chilean delegation expresses the view that it should be stated whether the article is to take effect from 1945, the date of the adoption of the Charter, or from the date of the entry into force of the convention on the law of treaties. It observes that the first alternative, which might call in question most of the peace-treaties closing the Second World War, seems to be excluded by article 56. It prefers, however, that the draft articles should state explicitly that neither article 36 nor any of the other articles establishing grounds for invalidating a treaty would have retroactive effect.

Greek delegation. The Greek delegation thinks that the usefulness of the article lies chiefly in its emphasis on the exception to the principle of non-retroactivity; i.e., on the possibility that the parties may give a treaty retroactive effects if they so desire. As to paragraph 2, it finds it hard to see any exception to the rule that acts, facts or situations post-dating the expiry of a treaty do not fall within the scope of the treaty. In its view, if a treaty is applicable to such acts, facts or situations, it is in force. It interprets provisions like article XIX of the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships as in reality extending the force of the treaty beyond the date set for its duration. On this basis, it considers that the words "unless the treaty otherwise provides" should be deleted. In addition, it observes that the article does not settle the question whether the provisions of a treaty apply to facts, acts or situations falling partly within the period when it is in force, although paragraph (4) of the commentary answers the question in the affirmative. It considers that this is insufficient and that an explicit provision should be included to cover the point.

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The Government of Israel raises two general points with respect to the article. The first is the concordance of the versions of the article and the correct consideration of treaty rights and obligations in point of time but will remind draftsmen that a retroactive effect can be accomplished by a provision specifically designed or clearly intended for that purpose. With regard to paragraph 2, it draws attention to the remarks in paragraph (7) of the Commission's commentary concerning acquired rights resulting from the illegality of acts done while the treaty was in force. It then suggests that account should also be taken of acquired rights resulting from the operation of the treaty. To this end, it proposes that at the end of paragraph 2 the words "unless the contrary appears from the treaty" should be replaced by "unless the contrary appears from the treaty".

28 Ibid., p. 179.
31 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 845th meeting, paras. 34 and 35.
as the Commission found in 1964, are particularly difficult to express in any language. But he feels that it will suffice to draw the point to the attention of the Drafting Committee.

2. The second point raised by the Government of Israel is the interrelation of the present article with article 24, which concerns the entry into force of treaties provisionally. Admittedly, provisional entry into force is a special case and there may be doctrinal differences as to what precisely is the source of the obligations of the parties in such a case. But the provisions of the treaty by one process or another come into force for the parties; and subsequently either they cease to be in force without the treaty's ever having come into force definitively, or the treaty enters into force definitively and its provisions continue in force until the treaty itself terminates. The present article speaks in general terms of "the date of entry into force of the treaty" and of the period "after the treaty has ceased to be in force", and these expressions appear to be apt to cover both entry into force generally under article 23 and entry into force provisionally under article 24. The only question would seem to be the date which should be considered as the date of entry into force in those cases where a treaty first enters into force provisionally and later comes into force definitively. Having regard to the nature of the rule stated in paragraph 1 of the present article, it seems evident that the relevant date should be the date of provisional entry into force. In many cases, treaties which enter into force provisionally are never brought into force definitely at all, but the possibility of double dates of entry into force certainly exists. Accordingly, the Commission may think it desirable, for the sake of completeness, to cover the point in the article, and that might conveniently be done by adding a provision in a new paragraph 3 on the following lines:

3. In the case of a treaty which has first entered into force provisionally under article 24 and afterwards definitively under article 23, the date of the entry into force of the treaty for the purpose of paragraph 1 shall be the date when the treaty entered into force provisionally.

3. The Greek delegation proposes that an explicit provision should be included in the article to cover the question whether the provisions of a treaty apply to facts, acts or situations which fall partly within the period when it is in force. It interprets paragraph (4) of the commentary as indicating that the Commission considers that they do apply to such facts, acts or situations and it asks that this should be made clear in the article itself. To speak of a treaty's applying to facts, acts or situations which fall partly within the period when it is in force seems to the Special Rapporteur to over-simplify the matter and to read rather more into paragraph (4) of the commentary than the Commission intended. The main point made by the Commission in paragraph (4) was that "the non-retroactivity principle cannot be infringed by applying a treaty to matters that occur or exist when the treaty is in force, even if they first began at an earlier date". In these cases the treaty does not, strictly speaking, apply to a fact, act or situation falling partly within and partly outside the period during which it is in force; it applies only to the fact, act or situation which occurs or exists after the treaty is in force. This may have the result that prior facts, acts or situations are brought under consideration for the purpose of the application of the treaty; but this is only because of their causal connexion with the subsequent facts, acts or situations to which alone in law the treaty applies. Accordingly, the article is believed by the Special Rapporteur to be complete as a statement of the law without the addition of the special provision proposed by the Greek delegation. Moreover, it might not be easy to draft such a provision without giving rise to difficulties such as the International Court has experienced in interpreting clauses limiting its jurisdiction ratione temporis. 38

4. In paragraph 1, the Turkish Government suggests that the final words "unless the contrary appears from the treaty" should be replaced by "unless the treaty stipulates otherwise". Its argument is that exceptions to the non-retroactivity rule should be limited to specific and definite cases. The Commission weighed this point carefully in 1964 but felt that the formula proposed by the Turkish Government would be too narrow; for quite often the very nature of a treaty indicates that it is intended to have certain retroactive effects without specifically so providing (see paragraph (5) of the commentary). This is certainly the case, and the Special Rapporteur feels that for this reason the existing text is preferable.

5. In paragraph 2, the Netherlands Government questions the accuracy of the words "any situation which exists after the treaty has ceased to be in force", proposing that "which comes into existence" should be substituted for "which exists". This proposal does not seem to the Special Rapporteur to be acceptable, for the reason that the paragraph must cover not only cases where a situation comes into existence after the treaty terminates but also cases where a situation which arose during the currency of the treaty continues to exist after the treaty ceases to be in force. The words "which exists" were intended by the Commission to bring both those types of case within the rule stated in the paragraph.

6. The final phrase of paragraph 2 "unless the treaty otherwise provides" has attracted suggestions from three Governments. The most radical is that of the Greek delegation, which advocates the deletion of the phrase altogether. It does not think that there can be any exception whatever to the rule that acts, facts or situations post-dating the expiry of a treaty do not fall within the scope of the treaty; for, in its view, if a treaty is applicable to any such act, fact or situation, it must be considered to be "in force". The possibility of taking this view of the effect of stipulations which expressly provide for particular obligations to continue after the "termination" of the treaty was not overlooked by the Commission. However, that view was rejected because it scarcely seems admissible to disregard the expressed will of the parties in a case like article XIX of the Convention on

38 e.g. Phosphates in Morocco case, P.C.I.J. (1938) Series A/B No. 74, p. 24; Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case, P.C.I.J. (1939) Series A/B No. 77, pp. 81-82; and Right of Passage case, I.C.J. Reports 1960, pp. 33-36.
the Liability of the Operators of Nuclear Ships 33 that the treaty, as such, shall terminate although a particular provision is to continue to be applicable. These cases may be rare, but the Commission felt that it should make allowance for them in paragraph 2 by inserting at the end “unless the treaty otherwise provides”.

7. The Netherlands and United States Governments both propose, though for somewhat different reasons, that the final phrase should be changed from “unless the treaty otherwise provides” to “unless the contrary appears from the treaty”, in which event the final phrase of paragraph 2 would correspond to that of paragraph 1. The Netherlands Government considers that, just as “the very nature of a treaty” may indicate that the treaty is intended to have certain retroactive effects, so it may also indicate that the treaty is intended to have certain legal consequences even after its termination. The Special Rapporteur doubts whether the reason advanced for making the change is a sufficient one. Paragraph 2 is not concerned with legal consequences which may continue after a treaty terminates but with the further application of provisions even after the treaty itself ceases to be in force. The question of the legal consequences of the termination of a treaty is dealt with in article 53, and it seems advisable to keep that question quite separate from the question which is the subject of paragraph 2 of the present article. As to the present question, it does not seem easy to conceive of a case where the very nature of a treaty would indicate an intention that certain of its provisions should continue to apply after it had ceased to be in force.

The United States Government also appears to have in mind more the legal consequences of a treaty after its termination than the continued application of certain of its provisions after the treaty itself has ceased to be in force; for it suggests that account should be taken of “acquired rights” resulting from the operation of a treaty when it was in force. The preoccupation of the United States Government on this point may, perhaps, be due to the fact that article 53, which deals with the legal consequences of the termination of a treaty, does not in the form in which it was adopted in 1964 specifically mention acquired rights. In re-examining article 53 in the present report, however, the Special Rapporteur has proposed that a new clause should be added to paragraph 1 which would state that the termination of a treaty “shall not affect any rights accrued or any obligations incurred prior to such termination”. This provision, it is thought, should be adequate to cover the question of acquired rights. And paragraph 2 of the present article does not appear, on close examination, to touch the question of the survival of acquired rights, but to relate only to the further application of the treaty’s provisions after its termination. Vested rights of a kind which will survive the termination of the treaty, although they may have their origin in provisions of the treaty, acquire an independent legal existence of their own. When the treaty terminates, it is the rights which are afterwards enforceable rather than the provisions of the treaty which gave them birth.

8. Accordingly, neither the reason given by the Netherlands Government nor the point raised by the United States Government appear to call for the words “unless the treaty otherwise provides” at the end of paragraph 2 to be changed to the form “unless the contrary appears from the treaty”, which is used in paragraph 1. On the other hand, as the Special Rapporteur has more than once emphasized, both these phrases and other similar phrases will ultimately have to be re-examined carefully by the Commission in the light of its final conclusions regarding the general rules for the interpretation of treaties set out in articles 69 and 70.

9. In the light of the foregoing observations, the only change in the article which seems to require consideration is the possible addition of a new proviso on the lines indicated in paragraph 2 above.

Article 57.—The territorial scope of a treaty

Comments of Governments

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government endorses the formulation of the rule set out in this article, considering it more correct and precise than the wording often used in the past “all the territory or territories for which the parties are internationally responsible”. It holds that the latter formulation was contrary to the requirements for the speedy liquidation of colonialism. In its view, there is no place in modern international treaties for the so-called colonial clause or for any other form of discrimination aiming at a limitation of the validity of a treaty only to certain parts of the territory of a State. It considers that the phrase “unless the contrary appears from the treaty” found in the article can be applied only to bilateral or multilateral treaties governing specific interests of the contracting parties in limited areas, and never to a regime of a general contractual nature.

Israel. The Government of Israel states that it has no observations to make on this article.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government finds the rule stated in the article acceptable as a general principle, saying that it assumes that a subject of international law constitutes a unity. On the other hand, it underlines that treaties intended to apply mainly to the territories of the parties need not for that purpose be limited in their operation; e.g. with respect to ships and aircraft. It also mentions treaties which lend themselves to application by diplomatic or consular representatives in the territory of a State which is not a party, or to application on the continental shelf, which is not under the Geneva Convention “territory” of the coastal State. It suggests that in the latter case disputes may, for example, arise as to whether customs treaties relating to minerals won on the continental shelf, or to operational material placed on the shelf, are applicable. In its view, therefore, the article should take account of the operation of treaties outside the territory of the parties and it proposes the following revised text:

“The scope of a treaty extends to the entire territory of each party, and beyond it as far as the jurisdiction of the State extends under international law, unless
the contrary appears from the treaty or, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, from the act by which the State expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty."

The paragraph 2 referred to in this proposal would be a new paragraph designed to take account of special factors such as the federal structure of a State or the position of dependent territories. The Netherlands Government observes that protectorates, trust territories and colonies might be said not to form part of the "entire territory" of a State but that this cannot so readily be said of autonomous parts of a State, such as the Isle of Man, and also Zanzibar in certain respects, or of the component parts of a Federal State such as Cameroon, Nigeria and Switzerland. It adds that the autonomous or component parts of States with different constitutional structures are frequently seen to be competent to decide for themselves whether or not they shall be bound by treaties, and cites the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the three parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It considers that, where a treaty does not itself determine its territorial validity, a State may in the first instance wish to become a party for one of its territories, leaving it to the Government of each other part to decide whether or not the treaty should be accepted for that part too. In its view, if the treaty prescribes no other procedure, expression can be given to this territorial differentiation when the treaty is signed and/or ratified; and it would not be inappropriate in the law of treaties to lay down a rule preventing States from availing themselves of the opportunity of differentiating between their territories which existing international practice offers them. To do so would, it contends, curtail the autonomy of single parts of the State within the whole and obstruct the conclusion of treaties. It observes that, in practice, it is only federal structures and constitutions granting autonomy to the component parts with respect to treaty commitments that need this opportunity; and that federal governments should be required to make it clear whether they are becoming parties for the complete unit or for some only of the component States. Although the point might conceivably be covered under the articles on reservations, it feels that a territorial reservation is not normally a reservation in a material sense, i.e., a reservation to a provision in the treaty; and it does not think that the point should be covered in that way. For the above reasons, it proposes that a new paragraph should be added to the article on the following lines:

"A State consisting of parts which under constitutional provisions decide autonomously and individually whether they shall accept a treaty shall, provided that the contrary does not appear from the treaty, declare in the act by which it expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty to which of its constituent parts the treaty shall apply. This declaration shall not be regarded as a reservation within the meaning of article 18. In the absence of such a declaration the State shall be deemed to be bound by the treaty with respect to all the constituent parts of the State."

**United States.** The United States Government considers the definition of the scope of application of a treaty in the present article to be self-evident. On the other hand, it thinks that an important question is the effect of the provision on treaties recognizing rights and imposing obligations with respect to such areas as the high seas. Although it may be clear from the commentary that the application of a treaty is not necessarily confined to the territory of a party, the United States Government feels that the present article standing alone may imply that such is the intention. It proposes that the article should be reworded to read as follows:

1. A treaty applies throughout the entire territory of each party unless the contrary appears from the treaty.
2. A treaty also applies beyond the territory of each party whenever such wider application is clearly intended.

**Algerian delegation.** The Algerian delegation would prefer the article expressly to limit the application of a treaty to the metropolitan territory of the parties, unless the still subject peoples through a valid expression of opinion decide to accept the treaty and its effects. Otherwise the legitimate representatives of those peoples may have no alternative but to denounce treaties in which they have taken no part and which are, in its view, often detrimental to their interests. 34

**Finish delegation.** The Finnish delegation observes that the article does not take into account that the provisions of a treaty may be intended to be applicable outside the territories of the parties. It proposes that the article should be revised so as to cover treaties with extended territorial application or, alternatively, that it should be deleted. 35

**Greek delegation.** The Greek delegation states that the article creates a refutable legal presumption and queries whether the inclusion of such a provision is useful in a formal text. Since every treaty has an object and purpose related to various elements (territory, population, situation, etc.) it does not see why reference should be made only to the territorial element. 36

**Kenyan delegation.** The Kenyan delegation notes with approval what it refers to as the comprehensive and lucid wording of article 57 and its commentary. 37

**United Arab Republic delegation.** The delegation of the United Arab Republic also approves of the article. 38

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. The Greek delegation queries the need for the article, saying that it merely creates a refutable legal presumption. It also observes that every treaty has an object and purpose related to various elements (territory, population, situation, etc.) and asks why reference should be made only to the territorial element. This point of view was considered by the Commission which, however, concluded that a State's territory plays such an essential role in the scope of the application of treaties that it is desirable to

34 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 850th meeting, para. 2.
35 Ibid., 845th meeting, para. 38.
36 Ibid., 845th meeting, para. 36.
37 Ibid., 850th meeting, para. 28.
formulate a general rule on the matter. The rule may be liable to be set aside by the will of the parties; but it is none the less desirable to state what the legal position will be in the absence of specific provisions in the treaty.

2. The most substantial alteration proposed for this article is the suggestion of the Netherlands Government that a second paragraph should be inserted spelling out a right for a State composed of distinct autonomous parts to declare to which of the constituent parts of the State the treaty is to apply. This paragraph would at the same time provide that a declaration limiting a State's consent to be bound to certain parts only of the State is not to be regarded as a "reservation" within the meaning of article 18. In formulating this proposal, it should be said, the Netherlands Government makes it clear that it considers every subject of international law—and therefore every State—to constitute a unity.

The matter raised by the Netherlands Government has, in one aspect or another, been much discussed by the Commission in the context of "capacity" to conclude treaties (article 3), and in the context of the territorial application of treaties (the present article). It suffices to refer to the proceedings of the Commission at its fourteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth sessions. While in sympathy with much that is said in the comments of the Netherlands Government, the Special Rapporteur does not feel that those comments introduce any new elements into the discussion such as might call for a reconsideration of the whole question by the Commission. Moreover, the rule adopted by the Commission in 1964 is a flexible one which would not appear to give rise to difficulties in practice of the kind envisaged by the Netherlands Government. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur does not think that the case is made out for adding the proposed new paragraph.

3. Three Governments (Netherlands, United States and Finland) suggest that the article should also indicate that some treaties may be intended to apply beyond the territories of the parties. The Netherlands instances, inter alia, treaties applicable with respect to ships and aircraft or to the continental shelf, while the United States mentions treaties applicable with respect to the high seas. Outer space and Antarctica are other cases which might be mentioned. The Commission was, of course, aware of the existence of treaties of this kind applicable with respect to areas outside the territories of the parties. But it regarded the present article as concerned essentially with the application of treaties to the territories of the parties. The rule it contains is therefore limited to that aspect of the territorial scope of a treaty and, as formulated in 1964, it hardly seems open to the construction that by implication it excludes the application of a treaty beyond the territories of the parties. On the other hand, the title may give the impression that the article covers the whole topic of the territorial scope of a treaty; and, having regard to the suggestion of the three Governments, the Commission may wish to consider whether to add a clause providing for treaties designed to be applicable with respect to areas beyond the territories of the parties.

4. The Netherlands Government suggests that the point should be covered by a revision which would make the article read, excluding that part of the suggested revision which relates to the Netherlands proposal regarding autonomous territories of a State:

"The scope of a treaty extends to the entire territory of each party, and beyond it as far as the jurisdiction of the State extends under international law, unless the contrary appears from the treaty."

The United States Government, on the other hand, suggests that the point should be covered in a new paragraph reading:

"2. A treaty also applies beyond the territory of each party whenever such wider application is clearly intended."

The Special Rapporteur feels that, in order to maintain the simplicity and clarity of the principal rule regarding the territories of a State, it would be preferable to use a separate paragraph, if this point is to be added to the article. At the same time, it may be desirable to retain from the Netherlands draft the limiting element of competence, if misunderstanding is to be avoided. And the competence which is relevant would seem to be competence with respect to the matters dealt with in the treaty rather than with respect to the "areas" beyond the territory of the parties. Even on the high seas, a State may not generally contract except with respect to ships, aircraft or persons over which it has jurisdiction. In the case of Antarctica, the position is complicated by the fact that some of the parties have territorial claims while others do not, but the Antarctic treaty seems to assume a competence similar to that possessed by States on the high seas.

5. If the suggestion of the three Governments that cases of extraterritorial application should be covered commends itself to the Commission, the Special Rapporteur proposes that a new paragraph should be added on the following lines:

A treaty may apply also in areas outside the territories of any of the parties in relation to matters which are within their competence with respect to those areas if it appears from the treaty that such application is intended.

Article 58.—General rule limiting the effects of treaties to the parties

Comments of Governments

Cyprus. The Government of Cyprus, commenting on articles 58 and 59 in conjunction, expresses its agreement with the Commission's formulation of the two articles on the basis of the explanations given by the Commission in paragraph (1) of its commentary to article 59. It adds that the notion of duress and undue influence, and the

41 Ibid., 1965, vol. I, 779th, 780th, 811th and 816th meetings.
doctrine of unequal, inequitable and unjust treaties also applies to the case where a State finds itself having no free choice and is forced to undertake an obligation as a result of an agreement to which it is not a party. In its view, this is even more true when the third party has not yet reached the stage of statehood but is still under colonial domination.

**Czechoslovakia.** The Czechoslovak Government endorses the Commission's formulation of the article as respecting the sovereign equality of States which it considers the key principle of contemporary international law. In its view, any transfer of obligations or of rights to a third State necessarily requires its consent; and it is impossible either to oblige or to authorize a non-party without its consent, by a treaty *inter alios acta.*

**Netherlands.** The Netherlands Government observes that this rule does not apply to all treaties and instances treaties defining a frontier or transferring a piece of territory. In these cases the effect of the treaty is to alter the area over which the consuls of third States may exercise jurisdiction; and to make agreements formerly applicable in one area cease to apply there and to render other agreements applicable in that area. Another example which it gives is a demarcation of the continental shelf under article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which may have similar effects with respect to customs agreements affecting mineral resources. In general, treaties governing the territorial demarcation of sovereignty, in the view of the Netherlands Government, undoubtedly involve rights and obligations for third States and constitute a separate category. It suggests the addition of a clause to the present article making an exception in the case of this special category.

**United States.** The United States Government notes that the general principle stated in this article is the fundamental rule governing the effect of a treaty upon States not parties. It also comments that the difference of opinion in the Commission regarding the question whether a treaty may of its own force confer rights upon a third State necessarily requires its consent; and it is impossible either to oblige or to authorize a non-party without its consent, by a treaty *inter alios acta.*

**Algerian delegation.** The Algerian delegation would like the article to contain a provision declaring absolutely null and void any obligation imposed by a treaty upon a third State without the latter's assent.

**Greek delegation.** The Greek delegation considers that the article states a very simple rule too forcefully.

**Mexican delegation.** The Mexican delegation appears in general to endorse the provisions in articles 58 et seq. regarding the effects of treaties on third States.

**United Arab Republic delegation.** The delegation of the United Arab Republic approves of the manner in which the problem of the effect of treaties in relation to the parties and third States has been solved in articles 58-62.

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. This and the next four articles form a group covering the topic of the effect of treaties in creating obligations or rights for third States. Accordingly, in considering each of these articles, it is necessary to keep in mind the contents of the five articles as a whole.

2. The Special Rapporteur suggests that, having regard to the comments of the Netherlands Government on the article, the title is perhaps a little misleading and may require modification. That Government comments that the general rule formulated in the article does not hold good for all treaties, since treaties defining a frontier or transferring a piece of territory or delimiting a continental shelf may have effects for non-parties by changing the areas in which their treaty obligations and rights operate. This comment, if true enough as a statement of fact, is believed to be misconceived in relation to the rule laid down in the article. The rule does not concern the general question of the effects of treaties on third States; it concerns only the effect of a treaty in creating obligations and rights for third States under the treaty. The cases referred to by the Netherlands Government are not cases in which an obligation or right is created for a third State by the treaty, or by a provision in the treaty afterwards assented to by the third State; the third State's obligations and rights exist and were created wholly *dehors* the treaty and it is only their application which consequentially and as a matter of fact is affected by the treaty. The title to the article, on the other hand, in its present form does speak in general terms of a rule limiting the effects of treaties to the parties; and this may tend to invite misconceptions such as appears to have occurred in the comment of the Netherlands Government. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the title should be modified to read as follows: "General rule limiting to the parties the obligations and rights arising under a treaty."  

3. Two Governments (Cyprus and Algeria) emphasize the relevance in the context of the present article of the article 59 of the principle in article 36 which invalidates any treaty the conclusion of which was procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter. Their contention that a third State's agreement to be bound by a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party would be void if procured by the threat or use of force is clearly correct in principle. It again raises the question regarding the adequacy of the formulation of article 36 which was discussed when this article was re-examined at the second part of the seventeenth session. The Government of Israel, the Commission will recall, suggested that article 36 should be reworded so as to make it cover explicitly the procurement by the threat or use of force of a State's consent to be bound by an already existing treaty—in other words, of a subsequent act of consent to a treaty already in force. The Special Rapporteur proposed that the article should be slightly...
expanded so as to make it read "any treaty and any act expressing the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty which is procured, etc.". The Commission, however, preferred to formulate article 36 in the tersest and simplest terms; and it felt that the words "any treaty the conclusion of which has been procured" were sufficiently broad to cover subsequent acts of consent—such as accession—to an already existing treaty. In the present context the question as to the adequacy of the drafting of article 36 is perhaps even more pointed, because what is involved is not the acceptance of a "treaty" but an agreement to be bound by a provision without becoming a party to the treaty. On the other hand, under article 59 an obligation will arise from a provision of a treaty for a non-party, only if the non-party State has expressly "agreed to be bound" by the obligation proposed in the provision. Consequently, it may be said that the words "any treaty the conclusion of which has been procured, etc." cover the non-party State's agreement to be bound by the particular provision. The Special Rapporteur cannot avoid the feeling that, from a purely technical point of view, article 36 would be more complete if it included a second paragraph stating that the rule contained in the article applies equally to any act expressing the consent of a State to be bound by an existing treaty or by a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party. But he recognizes that the Commission has expressed itself definitely, on psychological grounds, in favour of the single short formulation of the rule which it adopted for article 36 in 1963 and which it reaffirmed during its recent session at Monaco in January.

Article 59.—Treaties providing for obligations for third States

Comments of Governments

Cyprus. In commenting on articles 58 and 59 together, the Government of Cyprus emphasizes its opinion that the notion of duress and undue influence, and the doctrine of unequal, inequitable and unjust treaties applies also to the case where a State finds itself forced to undertake an obligation as a result of an agreement to which it is not a party (see under article 58).

Hungary. The Hungarian Government notes with approval the statement in paragraph (3) of the Commission's commentary on the present article that a treaty provision imposed on an aggressor State does not fall under the rule of invalidity set forth in article 36; and it draws from that statement the conclusion that the consent of an aggressor is not needed to establish an obligation for it under a treaty to which it is not a party. It considers this exception to be highly important and suggests that it should be incorporated in the text of the article.

Israel. The Government of Israel considers that the French text—especially in the conditional clause—expresses the substance of the rule somewhat better than the English. In general, it suggests that further attention should be given to the language used for expressing the rule; and in the English text it would prefer the last five words to be replaced by "agreed to be bound by that obligation". It further suggests, without giving reasons, that the order in which this and the following article are placed should be reversed.

USSR. The Soviet Government emphasizes that there are cases where obligations under a treaty may be extended to a third State without its consent. It instances cases where a treaty, in conformity with the principle of State responsibility, imposes obligations on an aggressor State guilty of launching and conducting a war of aggression.

United States. The United States Government questions whether the concept embodied in paragraph (3) of the commentary—that treaty provisions imposed on an aggressor State fall outside the principle contained in the present article—is covered by the text of the article. It feels that, without the commentary, the text may be misleading on this point. It also feels that the article leaves entirely open the question as to the time at which assent by the third party must be indicated.

Cameroonian delegation. The Cameroonian delegation regrets that no precise definition of "contracting parties" has yet been arrived at by the Commission, and considers it necessary to re-examine completely the application and effects of treaties in regard to third States.

Greek delegation. The Greek delegation considers that articles 59 and 60 should have been combined in a single article or, at the very least, worded in a more similar fashion.

Nigerian delegation. In the view of the Nigerian delegation, articles 59 and 60, in their present wording, might mistakenly be invoked in order to impose upon a third State an obligation arising out of treaties not general in character and by which it did not wish to be bound.

Ukrainian delegation. The Ukrainian delegation observes that international law recognizes exceptions to the principle of free consent where treaties impose obligations on aggressor States guilty of unleashing aggressive wars. It suggests the Commission should further clarify the rule in article 59 on this point.

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The comment of the Cyprus Government regarding the relevance of the notion of duress and undue influence has already been taken into account in paragraph 3 of the Special Rapporteur's observations on the previous article.

2. The article is at present formulated in permissive terms: "an obligation may arise". This form is perhaps reminiscent of a code rather than of a convention, and the Special Rapporteur suggests that the more categorical form "arises" would be preferable and more exact. When a State "agrees to be bound" by an obligation provided

50 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 845th meeting, para. 4.
51 Ibid., 845th meeting, para. 38.
52 Ibid., 847th meeting, para. 16.
53 Ibid., 843rd meeting, para. 44.
for in a treaty to which it is not a party, the obligation unquestionably “arises”, and it seems better to say so without equivocation.

3. The Government of Israel’s suggestion that the French text may express the substance of the rule better than the English is considered by the Special Rapporteur to be justified in so far as concerns the phrase “if the parties intend the provision to be the means of establishing, etc.”. The French use of the subjunctive “soit un moyen d’aboutir à la création” may better express the notion that the parties cannot themselves establish the obligation but only propose it. The final words of the French text “consent expressément à être lié par cette obligation” are also more exact than the English “has expressly agreed to be so bound”. On the other hand the French phrase “Si les parties entendent qu’une telle disposition soit le moyen, etc.” is not as exact as the English text “intend the provision, etc.”. These are matters for consideration in the first instance by the Drafting Committee, and similar questions of terminology arise also in the Spanish text. However, in the light of a comparison of the three texts, the Special Rapporteur thinks it right to suggest that the English text should be modified so as to read as follows:

An obligation arises for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend that the provision may be a means of establishing the obligation and the State in question expressly agrees to be bound by that obligation.

4. A point of substance is raised by four Governments (Hungary, USSR, United States and Ukraine), which consider that the reservation in paragraph (3) of the Commission’s commentary regarding the imposition of an obligation upon an aggressor is not enough and would like to see the point incorporated in the text. In article 36, the point is covered by implication in the text of the article, since it is only “coercion by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter”, which is expressed to render a treaty void. Here, however, there are no such saving words and, when articles 58 and 59 are read together, they may be open to the interpretation that the express agreement of the third State is always necessary before it can be bound by a provision in a treaty to which it is not a party. On the other hand, the exception in the case of an aggressor stems not from the law of treaties but from the law of State responsibility; and the policy of the Commission is to avoid as far as possible prejudging matters of State responsibility, which will fall to be decided when it takes up that topic in 1967. Accordingly, if an express reservation regarding the case of an aggressor is thought to be desirable, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the appropriate way of dealing with the point may be to add the following proviso to the present article as paragraph 2:

Nothing in the present article or in article 58 precludes a provision in a treaty from being binding on an aggressor State, not a party to the treaty, without its consent if such provision is imposed on it in accordance with the law of State responsibility and with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 60.—Treaties providing for rights for third States

Comments of Governments

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government considers that the faculty of “implied assent” by the third State admitted in paragraph 1(b), combined with the ban imposed by article 61 on revoking or amending the provision conferring the right without the third State’s consent, may place an unduly heavy burden on the parties to the treaty. This combination, it suggests, may be particularly unfortunate in the case of a treaty that accords rights to a large group of States or to the community of States in general, like treaties regarding freedom of shipping in an international waterway. To give a voice in matters concerning the regulations operative for those waterways to a State which has not reacted in any formal fashion to the conclusion of the treaty and whose nationals have only occasionally availed themselves of the rights accorded would, in its view, be going further than is compatible with reasonable practice. Another objection, it feels, is that the parties to the treaty might be unable to find out which States have given their “implied assent” to the provision conferring the right. In consequence, the Netherlands Government suggests that the words “or impliedly” should be deleted from paragraph 1(b).

Turkey. The Turkish Government, while recognizing the general principle contained in the article regarding treaties providing rights for third States, considers that the conditions prescribed for the latter’s enjoyment of such rights are unsatisfactory. It interprets paragraph 2 as restricting the power of the parties to the treaty to conclude a new treaty to the extent that the third State has acquired vested rights. In its view, this not only constitutes a restriction of the powers of sovereign and independent States but also “causes an imbalance and injustice between their responsibilities”. The Turkish Government further expresses the view that the parties may amend the rights recognized to third States subject to certain conditions by concluding a new treaty similar to the original one but not based on its provisions. Paragraph 2, as at present drafted, it considers to run contrary to the changing requirements of international life and it would like to see the words “or established in conformity with the treaty” replaced by “or established by a new treaty”.

In addition, in its comments on article 61 the Turkish Government intimates that that article would be acceptable to it only if the words “or impliedly” are deleted from paragraph 1 of the present article (see article 61).

United States. The United States Government feels that paragraph 1, as at present worded, might be understood as preventing two or more States from dedicating by a treaty a right to all States in general without that dedication’s being subject to the condition that each State wishing to exercise the right should have first assented thereto. It proposes that the paragraph should be revised on the following lines:

“A right may arise for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend to accord that right either (a) to the State in question or to a group of States to which it belongs and the
State expressly or impliedly assents thereto or (b) to States generally."

Paragraph 2 the United States Government considers to express a self-evident rule the inclusion of which is nevertheless highly desirable as a guide in the formulation of treaties and their application. At the same time, it feels that further consideration of the over-all effect of the article is required.

**Argentine delegation.** The Argentine delegation considers that two or more States can effectively and directly create a right in favour of another State by treaty if they so intended. Accordingly, it does not approve of the formulation of this article or of article 61.  

**Greek delegation.** The Greek delegation considers that articles 59 and 60 should be included in article 58 as a single but separate paragraph. It also considers that paragraph 2 of the present article adds nothing to the principles stated in paragraph 1. Furthermore, in its view, the inclusion of the provisions set out in the present article are only necessary if it is assumed that treaties create rights for third parties even without their consent, whereas the article has been drafted on the assumption that their consent is required. It appears to hold that in essence the third State becomes a party to the treaty. It observes that lawyers might consider that there is a collateral agreement between the parties and the third State; but that, collateral or not, that agreement is a treaty.

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur.**

1. Two Governments (Netherlands and Turkish) ask that the words “or impliedly” should be deleted from paragraph 1(b). They feel that a third State which merely gives an implied assent to the provision, e.g. by exercising the right, ought not to be recognized as having a vested right to enforce the provision against the parties to the treaty. Both Governments consider that this would put too large a burden on the parties to the treaty. The Netherlands Government sees particular objection to recognizing such a vested right in cases where a treaty accords rights to a large group of States or to the community of States in general, e.g., a treaty providing for freedom of shipping through an international waterway. Interpreting the article as giving “a voice in matters concerning the regulations operative for those waterways to a State which has not reacted in any formal fashion to the conclusion of the treaty and whose nationals have only occasionally availed themselves of the rights”, it expresses the opinion that this goes beyond what is compatible with reasonable practice. It also observes that the parties may have difficulty in tracing which States have given their “implied assent”.

2. The formulation of the rule stated in paragraph 1 of the present article, as explained in paragraphs (5) and (6) of the Commission’s commentary, gave rise to considerable discussion in 1964.  The Commission was evenly divided on the question whether “assent” is necessary in any form whatever in order for the provision to vest the right definitively in the third State. Approximately half the members were of the opinion that, when the parties to a treaty intend that a provision shall create an actual right in favour of a third State, there is nothing in international law to prevent that intention having effect; and that the right arises at once in virtue of the provision and exists in law unless and until disclaimed by the intended beneficiary State. According to these members, therefore, neither express nor implied assent is needed to establish the right; and this view is reflected also in the comments of the Argentine delegation in the Sixth Committee. The other members of the Commission, on the other hand, were of the opinion that some form of acceptance is in principle necessary, even if it may take the tacit form of a simple exercise of the right provided for in the treaty. The Commission, thinking that the two views would be likely to produce different results only in very exceptional circumstances, decided to frame the rule in a neutral form which would not prejudice its doctrinal basis and which would respect as far as possible the scruples felt by each group. The drafting of such a “neutral” rule was found to be a matter of considerable difficulty and paragraph 1(b), as adopted in 1964, is open to the interpretation put upon it by some Governments that some form of “assent” is necessary in order to vest the right definitively in the third State. The Commission intended to leave open the question whether the right is created by the treaty or by the beneficiary State’s act of acceptance, though the formulation which it adopted may not entirely succeed in doing so. Be that as it may, the inclusion of the words “or impliedly” in paragraph 1(b) was regarded by a large group of members as indispensable for their endorsement of the article. In short, those words were considered indispensable in 1964 if there was to be sufficient common ground to unite any substantial majority in the Commission in support of the article.

3. The Commission will, no doubt, give close attention to the comments of the Netherlands and Turkish Governments in re-examining the formulation of paragraph 1 at the forthcoming session. Meanwhile, having regard to the course of the discussion in the Commission in 1964, the Special Rapporteur feels that only in the event of a clear expression of opinion on the part of a number of Governments would it be advisable to propose the deletion of the words “or impliedly”, the omission of which would destroy the basis on which many members accepted the article in 1964. But the majority of Governments do not appear to have found any difficulty in these words. Indeed, the United States Government suggests an amendment which would dispense even with implied assent in the case of a dedication of a right to all States in general—the very class of case specially referred to by the Netherlands Government. Moreover, the principal preoccupation of the Netherlands and Turkish Governments appears to relate to the effect of the present article on the freedom of action of the parties subsequently to modify or terminate the treaty; and this is dealt with in article 61, where a number of Governments have called for a diminution of the position of the third State in this regard.

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54 Ibid., 846th meeting, para. 9.
55 Ibid., 845th meeting, para. 38.
4. The United States in effect proposes that the rule, as at present formulated in paragraph 1, should apply in all cases where the intention is to accord a right to a particular State or to any State in a particular group; but that no assent by a State in any shape or form should be necessary to vest the right in it when the intention of the parties was to dedicate a right to “States generally”. The Special Rapporteur belongs to the group of members who consider that, when the intention of the parties to create an actual right as distinct from a mere benefit is clearly expressed, the right already exists before any act of assent takes place. Accordingly, he would in any event find no difficulty in adopting the United States proposal. As Special Rapporteur, however, he approaches the proposal from the basis of the conclusion reached by the Commission in 1964. Even on that basis he feels that the United States proposal has much to recommend it, since the mere fact that the parties have expressed an intention to confer a right on “States generally” would seem to justify the conclusion that they fully intended to dispense with any expression of assent by individual States. Moreover, the special rule proposed by the United States for these cases appears better designed to serve the practical needs of the international community than leaving them to be governed by the general rule proposed by the Commission in paragraph 1. Having regard to the course of the discussion in 1964, the Special Rapporteur makes no formal proposal of his own on this point, but invites the attention of the Commission to the United States proposal to revise paragraph 1 so as to make it read as follows:

“A right may arise for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend to accord that right either (a) to the State in question or to a group of States to which it belongs and the State expressly or impliedly assents thereto or (b) to States generally.”

5. The Turkish Government objects to paragraph 2, as an undue restriction on the power of the parties to amend the rights recognized to third States. Its objection appears, however, to be based on an interpretation of the paragraph which is certainly not the one intended by the Commission, while the United States Government expresses the view that the paragraph states a “self-evident rule the inclusion of which is nevertheless highly desirable”. The question raised by the Turkish Government of restrictions on the power of the parties to modify the rights of the third State is the central issue of the following article, and it is that article to which its observations on this question appear primarily to have relevance. The present article, as its text and paragraph 7 make clear, concerns the obligation of the third State to comply with the conditions prescribed in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty. The words “or established in conformity with the treaty” were intended to cover conditions for the exercise of the right laid down in the treaty or in a related instrument concluded between the parties or established unilaterally by a party in whose territory the exercise of the right is to take place. The only question, it is thought, is whether the words “established in conformity with the treaty” might be held by implication to mean that the third State would be under no obligation to comply with conditions laid down in a subsequent treaty validly concluded between the parties to the treaty which created the right. Such an interpretation of paragraph 2 is believed to be inadmissible since, if under article 61 the subsequent treaty constitutes a valid modification of the right arising from the first treaty, the “treaty” for the purposes of paragraph 2 of the present article will automatically become the original treaty, as modified by the subsequent treaty.

Article 61.—Revocation or amendment of provisions regarding obligations or rights of third States

Comments of Governments

Hungary. The Hungarian Government notes that under article 59 express consent is needed to establish an obligation for a third State, while under article 60 express or implied consent suffices to establish a right; and it objects that the present article does not reflect this distinction. It points out that, according to the rules laid down in articles 59 and 60, express consent would logically be needed for the revocation or unfavourable amendment of a provision establishing a right, but that implied consent would be sufficient for the revocation or favourable amendment of a provision establishing a right. It suggests that article 61 should be brought into line with articles 59 and 60.

Israel. The Government of Israel considers that the provisions of this article should be more closely co-ordinated with the provisions of part II relating to the termination of treaties and those of part III relating to the modification of treaties. In its opinion, article 61 in its present form may be open to the interpretation that it gives to the third State more extensive rights—possibly even amounting to a veto—than the parties themselves would have as between themselves under the applicable provisions of the draft articles. It suggests that the position of the parties should be safeguarded by some reference to articles 38-47 and 49-51 as regards revocation and that the principles of articles 65-67 as regards modification should be made applicable as between the third State and the parties.

Netherlands. After mentioning the link between its comments on article 60 and the present article, the Netherlands Government states that it has considered whether its objective—the denial of rights to third States which have scarcely, if at all, reacted to the offer of a right—could be achieved by amending not article 60 but the present article. The amendment it has in mind is to add a proviso to the article on the following lines:

“and provided the State has actually exercised the right [and complied with the obligation]”.

However, although this solution might theoretically be more equitable, it feels that the amendment which it proposes for article 60 is preferable as being clearer; for, in its view, it would in practice be very difficult to produce evidence of “traditional rights”.

The Netherlands Government offers three further comments on the text of the article. First, it does not appreciate why the complete or partial withdrawal of an obligation imposed on a third State should require
its assent. While recognizing that assent might be required if a modification of the original obligation gives rise to a new or more onerous obligation, it thinks that article 59 suffices to cover such a case. Secondly, in its view, the modification of a right granted to a third State need not be mentioned separately in the article; for, if the modification amounts to a partial withdrawal of the right, it is governed by the rule regarding withdrawal and, if it involves the grant of a new or more comprehensive right, article 60 is applicable. Finally, it considers that the rule laid down in the article should protect the third State against withdrawal (or modification) of the right accorded, rather than of the treaty provision from which that right is derived. In the light of the foregoing observations, it would prefer to see the article read:

“...When under article 60 a right has arisen for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party, the right may be revoked only with the consent of that State, unless it appears from the treaty that the right was intended to be revocable.”

**Pakistan.** The Government of Pakistan considers that the article should be revised so as to require not the consent of the third State but a mere notification to it.

**Turkey.** The Turkish Government, as the Special Rapporteur understands its position, would find the present article unacceptable so long as implied consent is recognized under article 60 as sufficient to establish a right in favour of the third State. In its view, it would be indefensible that a State which has not expressly accepted the right should be in a position to obstruct an agreement between the parties to revoke or amend the treaty. Accordingly it is not prepared to accept article 61 unless the words “or impliedly” are deleted from article 60.

**United Kingdom.** The United Kingdom Government considers that the rule proposed might over-safeguard the position of the third State to the detriment of the parties. It suggests that the parties should be permitted to amend a provision affecting a third State unless it appears from the treaty or the surrounding circumstances that the provision was intended not to be revocable or unless the third State is entitled to invoke the rule of “estoppel” or preclusion against the amendment.

**United States.** The United States Government considers that the rule as at present formulated may give rise to more problems than it would resolve. In its view the rule may seriously hamper efforts of the original parties to revise or even terminate a treaty in its entirety; and changes in circumstances may result in the principal benefits flowing almost completely to the third State. It thinks that parties should not be impeded in their desire to reach a new agreement between themselves, especially if the third State has undertaken few, if any, reciprocal obligations under the treaty. Again, it asks what would be the situation in the event of a party’s having given notice of termination in accordance with a provision in the treaty, and whether the existence of that provision would be evidence of the revocability of the provision regarding an obligation or right for a State not a party. In general, it suggests that considerably more study of the rule in this article is necessary.

**Argentine delegation.** The Argentine delegation considers that two or more States can effectively and directly create a right in favour of another State by treaty, if they so intended. It does not approve of article 61 since, in its view, the right of the third State would be only too likely to be revoked afterwards.\(^{67}\)

**Greek delegation.** The Greek delegation, which considers that the right accruing to the third State under article 60 arises from a collateral treaty between the parties and that State, is of the opinion that the present article is superfluous.\(^{68}\)

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. The Argentine delegation, starting from the position that a treaty may of its own force create an actual right in the third State, does not think that the article goes far enough in protecting that right. The Greek delegation, starting from the opposite position that the right arises from what is legally a collateral agreement between the third State and the parties to the treaty, maintains that the article is superfluous; and by this it presumably means that the third State's consent would always be necessary for the revocation or modification of that agreement. The Netherlands Government also suggests that the article is largely superfluous because (a) it considers that no consent is needed for the complete or partial withdrawal of an obligation; and (b) cases of modification either of an obligation or of a right are already covered by articles 59 and 60. In addition, the majority of the Governments which have commented on the article, including the Netherlands Government, think that it goes too far in the protection which it gives to the right of the third State.

2. The Netherlands Government is, of course, correct in pointing out that in principle the situations covered in the present article are situations to which articles 59 and 60 themselves could be said to be at least partly applicable. Indeed, it would be possible to go further and say that, in principle, they should be completely applicable to those situations. When a third State has an "obligation" or a "right" arising from a treaty to which it is not a party, any modification increasing an obligation or diminishing a right could be said necessarily to fall under article 59, while any modification decreasing an obligation or increasing a right could be said necessarily to fall under article 60. But the obligations and rights vesting in third States under articles 59 and 60 arise in special circumstances and have a particular basis. The question posed in the present article is whether, by reason of their particular basis, their termination and modification should be governed by particular rules. If a single rule is to be formulated to cover both obligations and rights, then it is believed that it must be one along the lines of the text adopted in 1964 or one framed in the same way but, as suggested by the United Kingdom, reversing the presumption so as to make consent unnecessary unless it appears that the provision was intended to be irrevocable.

\(^{67}\) Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 846th meeting, para. 9.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 845th meeting, para. 38.
3. The alternative is to deal separately with the termination and modification, on the one hand, of obligations and, on the other, of rights; and this might make it easier to take account of the objection that the article at present over-protects the position of the third State. The Special Rapporteur himself feels that there is force in the view that, however necessary it may be to insist on the need for consent to any increase in an obligation or any change in the conditions for its performance, it is somewhat illogical to require it for the termination or reduction of an obligation. In those cases the position really is that the parties are renouncing in whole or in part their right to call upon the third State for the performance of its obligation; and it hardly seems consistent with principle to make their action subject to the consent of the State in whose favour the renunciation is made. Simple notice to the third State would appear to be fully sufficient. In the case of a right, the main question is whether the rule should be that the consent of the third State is presumed to be necessary unless it appears that the intention was to confer an irrevocable right, or vice versa, as a number of Governments would appear to prefer.

4. The Special Rapporteur has doubts as to the Government of Israel’s suggestions for safeguarding the position of the parties by a reference to the articles on modification, and for applying the principles of articles 65–67 on modification as between the parties and the third State. The relationship between the parties, on the one hand, and the third State, on the other, is a special one and there are two questions of termination or modification involved: (a) termination or modification of the treaty provision as between the parties themselves and (b) the termination or modification of the obligation or right as between the parties and the third State. Clearly, the ordinary rules regarding termination and modification of treaties apply as between the parties with respect to the termination or modification of the treaty provision giving rise to the third State’s obligation or right. But it is not so clear that the termination or modification of the obligation or right as between them and the third State is a simple question of the termination or modification of treaties. The Netherlands Government has, indeed, very pertinently raised the question whether it is correct in the present article to speak of the termination and amendment of the “provision” giving rise to the obligation or right, rather than of the actual “obligation” or “right” itself. As between the parties, it is the termination or amendment of the “provision” which is the focal point; as between the parties and the third State, the focal point, although the “provision” is again involved, is the obligation or right arising from it rather than the provision itself. The Special Rapporteur feels that the question of termination or amendment of the “provision” as such should be left to be governed by the general law laid down in the articles concerning termination and modification of treaties; and that the present article should confine itself to the relationship between the parties and the third State. In other words, he feels that it should deal with the obligation or right rather than the provision.

5. The other suggestion of the Netherlands Government for the addition of a proviso excluding, in the case of a right, the need for the third State’s consent unless it has actually exercised the right is already covered by what has been said in paragraph 2 of the Special Rapporteur’s observations on article 60. The Netherlands Government evidently itself feels that the point properly belongs to article 60; but for the reasons given in the Special Rapporteur’s observations on that article, the point does not seem to the Special Rapporteur to be consistent with the position taken up by the Commission in regard to treaties giving rise to a right in favour of a third State.

6. In general, the Special Rapporteur shares the view of the United States Government that “more study of the rule in this article is necessary”. Accordingly, in order to provide the Commission with a basis for discussion, he has drafted in the next paragraph a text which (a) separates cases of “obligation” from those of “right” and (b) reverses the presumption as to revocability in cases of “right”. The reversal of the presumption in cases of right under article 60 does not, it is believed, in any way affect the positions of principle taken up by different members in regard to the source of the right; for it only concerns the intention of the parties with respect to the revocable or irrevocable nature of the right which they are “conferring on”, or alternatively “offering to”, the third State, whichever be the theory held.

7. The text prepared by the Special Rapporteur for discussion reads:

1. When an obligation has arisen for a State not a party to a treaty under article 59, the parties afterwards may:
   (a) terminate the obligation in whole or in part on giving notice to such State;
   (b) modify the obligation in any other respect only with the consent of such State.

2. When a right has arisen for a State not a party to a treaty under article 60, the parties afterwards may:
   (a) terminate the right in whole or in part, after giving X months’ notice to such State, unless it appears that the right was intended to be irrevocable except with its consent;
   (b) modify the right in any other respect only under the rules laid down in articles 59 and 60.

Article 62.—Rules in a treaty becoming generally binding through international custom

Comments of Governments

Finland. In the opinion of the Finnish Government this article concerns the importance of custom as a source of international law and does not really belong to the law of treaties. In addition, as international custom and the law of treaties are equivalent sources of law, it considers the principle expressed in article 62 to be self-evident.

Israel. The Government of Israel suggests that the opening words should read: “Nothing in these articles precludes... etc.”

United States. The United States Government thinks the inclusion of the provision in the present article to be desirable and considers that the recognition of the extension of the rules contained in a treaty to non-parties through international custom does not in any way conflict with the concepts embodied in articles 58 to 60.
Greek delegation. The Greek delegation considers that the article, since it deals with the free creation of new rules of international law, may even be dangerous as well as unnecessary. It asks what would be the position if a number of States were to conclude a treaty which, being freely accepted by other States, became customary law for the latter and the parties terminated the treaty. Would the parties no longer be bound whereas the other States continued to be? The article, it complains, provides no solution to this problem. 59

Netherlands delegation. The Netherlands delegation notes that, whereas the title refers to rules "generally binding through international custom", the text speaks simply of "customary rules", which seem to include regional custom. It then suggests that there may be an inconsistency between the present article and article 59: rules in a regional treaty would, it suggests, become tacitly binding on all States of the region under the present article, whereas under article 59 obligations arising under a treaty intended to apply throughout a region could only become binding on non-parties by express agreement. Then, the decision to apply one rule or the other would depend on the conception held of customary law. In consequence, it asks whether the present article, which it considers to evoke certain doctrinaire problems, would not fit better in a code than in the convention on the law of treaties now envisaged. 60

Syrian delegation. The Syrian delegation, referring to the Commission's statement in paragraph (2) of its commentary regarding the recognition by non-parties of the rules set out in a treaty as binding customary law, suggests that the element of recognition should be expressly mentioned in the article in order to avoid any ambiguity. 61

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur
1. The Finnish Government considers that, as customary and treaties are "equivalent sources" of law, the principle expressed in the present article is self-evident; and that the article does not really belong to the law of treaties. The reason urged by this Government for omitting the article does not seem to the Special Rapporteur to carry conviction. The mere fact that custom and treaties may be independent and "equivalent" sources of law does not prevent their spheres of operation from intersecting and impinging on each other. Not infrequently the very object of a treaty is to establish a regime derogating in some respects from the general law. The purpose of the present article is to make it clear that the apparently general and all-embracing provisions of articles 58-60 do not preclude treaty provisions from having other effects vis-à-vis third States by becoming a generator of international custom.
2. The objection to the article raised by the Greek delegation does not appear to the Special Rapporteur to be any more convincing. The article does not establish any new rule. It merely states, for the purpose of avoiding any misconceptions as to the effects of articles 58-60, what is certainly the law: namely that, independently of the rules of the law of treaties regarding the effects of treaties on third States, principles contained in treaties may become binding on non-parties through being recognized as customary rules. Whatever may be the problems which may arise if the parties to a treaty, which has been the nucleus for the generation of customary law, should seek to terminate it, they will be inherent in the complex origins of the customary rule and their solution will depend on the particular circumstances in which the treaty is terminated, including the intentions of the parties in terminating it and the attitude of all the States concerned regarding the continuance of the custom. The present article does nothing to create these problems and nothing to prejudge their solution.

3. Similar considerations apply to the suggestion of the Netherlands delegation that there may be an inconsistency between the present article and article 59. If the present article is read according to its terms, there is not and cannot be any such inconsistency; for the article merely states that nothing in article 59 precludes rules set forth in a treaty from being binding upon States not parties to that treaty if they have become customary rules of international law. Nor does the article in any way prejudice the requirements for the establishment of a rule of customary law, whether general or regional. As already pointed out, it merely makes clear that, where the spheres of article 59 and of custom intersect, article 59 does not negative the normal operation of custom as a factor in the generation of rules of international law. Furthermore it is to be noted that in its written comments the Netherlands Government expressly states that it has no comment to make on the present article.

4. The Government of Israel suggests that the opening words of the article should read "Nothing in these articles precludes, etc.", instead of "Nothing in articles 58 to 60 precludes, etc.". Provided that the article retains its present place in the group of articles dealing with "third States", the Special Rapporteur sees no objection to the suggested modification, since it covers the point even more completely than the existing text.

5. The Syrian delegation suggests that the element of "recognition" should be expressly mentioned in the article to avoid ambiguity. Presumably, it has in mind modifying the phrase so as to make it read: "if they have become recognized as customary rules of international law." Although this modification would not meet with any difficulty from the Special Rapporteur, he does not think that the reason advanced for it is very cogent. He also believes that the Commission's choice of the quite neutral expression "if they have become customary rules of international law" was deliberate; and he therefore makes no new proposal in this connexion.

Article 63.—Application of treaties having incompatible provisions

Comments of Governments

· Cyprus. The Government of Cyprus attaches great importance to retaining in the draft the present wording expressing the over-riding character of Article 103 of the Charter. In its opinion, whenever circumstances warrant
it, the competent organs of the United Nations should be guided by and apply Article 103 unreservedly.

Israel. The Government of Israel expresses its concurrence with the view that cases of partial termination should be removed from article 41 and placed in the present article. It also thinks that the inter-relation between article 41 and the present article would be clearer if the element of “suspen-
sion” were removed from article 41 and dealt with either here or in a separate section collecting together all the various provisions relating to suspension of the operation of a treaty. It observes that, if article 41 is left to deal exclusively with “implied termination”, its place in the section dealing with termination will be logically correct and its provisions will be put in better focus.

The Government of Israel further suggests that, in paragraph 1, reference should be made to the rights as well as the obligations of States. In paragraph 2, it raises the question whether the treaty provision must always be taken at face value, as in its view the text implies, or whether it should not “be made open to the possibility of a material examination in order to establish whether in fact there is an inconsistency”.

In addition, it observes that obsolescence is an important cause of termination and yet is not covered in the draft articles. It expresses the view that the understanding of the present article would be facilitated and the scope of its application possibly reduced, if a place were found in the draft articles, or at least in the commentaries, for the problem of obsolescence.

Netherlands. Noting that article 67, paragraph 1(b) (ii), rightly takes account of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole, the Netherlands Government says that paragraph 4 of the present article, on the other hand, suggests that “every multilateral treaty can simply be divided up into a number of bilateral legal relationships leaving no remainder”. Again, while recognizing that paragraphs (14), (15) and (16) of the commentary show that the Commission has not lost sight of the question of the coherence of the various provisions of a treaty and of their relation to its object and purpose, it is of the opinion that paragraph 4 is “one-sided” and unsatisfactory. In its view, there may be some justification for concluding that customary law has not yet crystallized on the point and that the problem is not yet ripe for codification.

Yugoslavia. Commenting on articles 63, 66 and 67 together, the Yugoslav Government observes that they all have a bearing on the modification of multilateral treaties, with reference either to all the parties or to some of them only. It suggests that in the final draft of these articles a single, comprehensive and clearer draft should be aimed at. In particular, it feels that the consequence arising from the modification of a treaty under article 63, paragraph 5, and article 67, paragraph 1(a) and (b) should be put on the same footing.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government suggests that paragraph 2 should be so drafted as to avoid any appearance of referring to a specific earlier or later treaty; e.g. by making it read “any earlier or later treaty”. In its introductory observations, it mentions the test of “compatibility” in paragraph 3 as one of several provisions demonstrating the need of an independent adjudication of disputes regarding the operation of the draft articles.

United States. The United States Government observes that the article as a whole enunciates rules long and widely accepted and is a valuable classification. Paragraph 5 it mentions as especially important in calling attention to the fact that by entering into a later treaty a State cannot divest itself of treaty obligations under an earlier treaty with a State that does not become a party to the later treaty.

Argentine delegation. The Argentine delegation refers to the article as “wisely worded”. 76

Kenyan delegation. The Kenyan delegation, while commenting that the article seems quite adequate, expresses the view that the test of “incompatibility” is subjective and should be modified to make it “more judicial and objective”. 77

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. In paragraph 1, the Government of Israel’s suggestion that mention should be made of rights as well as of obligations appear to be well founded, even although the emphasis on the article may be primarily on obligations.

2. In paragraphs 2, the United Kingdom suggests that the references to “an earlier or a later treaty” should be changed to “any earlier or later treaty” in order not to appear to refer to a specific earlier or later treaty. This modification, although it does not seem to change the sense of the paragraph, is perhaps an improvement from a drafting point of view. The Government of Israel’s suggestion that the paragraph should admit the possibility of a “material examination” of the treaty provision in order to establish whether in fact there is an “inconsistency” does not seem apposite; for the paragraph concerns cases where the treaty by an express provision regulates its relation to other treaties.

3. In paragraph 3, the Government of Israel expresses the view that the interrelation of article 41 and of the present article would be clearer if (a) cases of “partial termination” were removed from article 41 and placed in the present article, and (b) if the element of “suspension” were removed from article 41 and dealt with either here or in a separate section covering all the various provisions relating to suspension of the operation of a treaty. The question of the co-ordination of the provisions of article 41 and 63 received the close attention of the Commission at its sixteenth session in 1964 when it drafted the present article and again at its recent session in Monaco when it revised article 41. 78 The new text of article 41 makes no express mention of “partial termination” of a treaty through the conclusion of a later—overlapping—treaty. On the other hand, the Commission

76 Ibid., 846th meeting, para. 9.
77 Ibid., 850th meeting, para. 38.
has retained in article 41 the provision in paragraph 2 dealing with cases of “implied suspension of the operation of a treaty” resulting from the conclusion of a later treaty whose provisions are incompatible with the earlier one. The distinction between cases of implied termination and implied suspension under article 41 is simply one of intention, and the Commission considered it logical and convenient to deal with both in the same article. Moreover, there are other cases, e.g. article 42 dealing with termination as a reaction to a breach, where it is almost essential to deal with both “termination” and “suspension” in the same article. Accordingly, it did not seem to the Commission that it would be a convenient course to place all the cases of suspension in a separate section. Only in dealing with the legal consequences of invalidity, termination and suspension, did the Commission find it possible to treat cases of suspension in a separate article.

4. The Special Rapporteur himself feels that, in order to complete the co-ordination of article 41 and the present article, it is desirable in the present article to revise paragraph 3 so as to make it read: “when all the parties to a treaty conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject matter, but the earlier treaty is not terminated or its operation suspended under article 41, etc.” Otherwise there will be a slight discrepancy between the two articles. Moreover, when the earlier treaty is wholly suspended, the case really falls outside the present article.

5. Paragraph 4 the Netherlands Government considers to be “one-sided and unsatisfactory” on the ground that it does not take sufficient account of the relation between the various provisions of a treaty and its “object and purpose”. On the other hand, it offers no alternative solution, simply observing that there may be some justification for concluding that customary law has not yet crystallized on the point and that the problem is not yet ripe for codification. The rules set out in paragraph 4 are founded upon fundamental principles of treaty law: the principle pacta sunt servanda and the principle that States in entering into a new agreement are presumed to intend that its provisions shall apply between them, rather than those of any earlier agreement between them regarding the same matter. The problem which appears to preoccupy the Netherlands Government is one to which the Commission itself gave the most anxious attention in 1964, namely, whether “obsolescence” and “desuetude” should be regarded merely as cases of implied agreement to terminate or its operation suspended under article 41, etc.” Otherwise there will be a slight discrepancy between the two articles. Moreover, when the earlier treaty is wholly suspended, the case really falls outside the present article.

6. The Yugoslav Government makes two points with respect to the article. First, it would prefer to see the provisions of the articles 63, 66 and 67, touching the modification of multilateral treaties, combined in a single, comprehensive and clear text. But the present article is not confined to the problem of incompatible treaty provisions arising out of treaties concluded for the purpose of “amending” a prior treaty; it seeks to deal with all cases of incompatibility and to cover some cases in the present article and others in an article on modification might perhaps lead to a greater, if different, complexity. Another difficulty is the inherent complexity of the matters covered by the three articles—which led the Commission in 1964 to prefer to deal with “amendments of multilateral treaties” and “inter se” agreements in separate articles. This Government’s second point is understood by the Special Rapporteur as being essentially a request that the Commission should try to ensure full co-ordination between the present article and article 67; and, as such, it seems to him to call for consideration primarily in connexion with article 67.

7. There remains the Government of Israel’s observation regarding “obsolescence” as an important cause of termination and suggestion that a place should be found for it in the draft articles. Clearly, the point is a general one and does not arise directly in connexion with the drafting of the present article. In fact, the point has been raised previously by the Special Rapporteur as to whether “obsolescence” or “desuetude” should be dealt with specifically as a ground of termination, and in order to dispose of the matter, the Commission may think it useful to ask the Drafting Committee to consider the point and report its conclusion. The problem is to determine whether “obsolescence” and “desuetude” should be regarded merely as cases of implied agreement to terminate founded on an interpretation of the intention of the parties in the light of the facts, or as examples of the application of article 44 (fundamental change of circumstances), or whether they should be regarded as distinct
legal causes of termination. At present, the Commission has before it (a) draft article 40—dealing generally with termination of treaties by agreement, the decision on which it postponed until the eighteenth session, and (b) article 41 dealing with termination implied from entering into a subsequent treaty. Agreement to terminate implied from other facts is not specifically dealt with, though it might be said to fall under article 40.

**Article 64.**—*The effect of severance of diplomatic relations on the application of treaties*

**Comments of Governments**

*Cambodia.* The Cambodian Government considers that paragraphs 2 and 3 are too vague in that they leave it to each party to appreciate to what extent the severance of diplomatic relations permits the continued application of the treaty. It fears that a State may resort to severance of diplomatic relations in order to evade its obligations under a treaty. In its view, the text opens the door to bad faith and involves a dangerous derogation from the rule *pacta sunt servanda*. It therefore considers the deletion of paragraphs 2 and 3 to be essential.

*Hungary.* Noting that this article deals with the effects of severance of diplomatic relations, the Hungarian Government raises the question of the severance of consular relations. It suggests that the effect of severance of consular relations on the application of treaties should be dealt with either in the present article or in a separate article. It points out that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations expressly contemplates the possibility of a severance of consular relations. In its view, the new provision should specify that paragraphs 1-3 of the present article apply equally to severance of consular relations.

*Israel.* The Government of Israel suggests that the present place is not the right one for the article. It also suggests that the last words of paragraph 2 should read: "disappearance of the means necessary for its operation." In addition, it observes that the severance of diplomatic relations ought not to be allowed to be an excuse even for the temporary suspension of the operation of a treaty when that is the very contingency for which the treaty was intended to provide; e.g. the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of victims of war. Paragraph (3) of the Commission’s commentary, it feels, may be too categorical on this point.

*Netherlands.* The Netherlands Government has no comment except that paragraph 3 can be dispensed with if the Netherlands proposal for the modification of article 46 (separability of treaty provisions) is adopted.

*United Kingdom.* The United Kingdom Government considers that, unless the exception in paragraph 2 is carefully and narrowly defined, the rule in paragraph 1 may be impaired. It observes that, in paragraphs (3) and (4) of the commentary, the Commission recognizes that cases of supervening impossibility of performance may occur in consequence of the severance of diplomatic relations, and that article 43 deals with supervening impossibility of performance only as regards the disappearance or destruction of the “subject matter of the rights and obligations contained in the treaty.” In its view, the severance of diplomatic relations affects not the subject matter of the rights and obligations, but rather “the means necessary for the application of the treaty.” Having regard to this difference, it suggests that the requirement of impossibility of performance, referred to in the commentary on the present article and set out in article 43, should be expressly included in the formulation of paragraph 2 of the present article. Lastly, it emphasizes that treaty obligations concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes ought not to be capable of being suspended by reason only of the severance of diplomatic relations.

*United States.* In general, the United States Government endorses the need for the article but observes that the rule in paragraph 2 requires careful study. In its view, although the normal means for the application of the treaty may be lacking in a case where diplomatic relations are severed, there may be other avenues for satisfying, in part at least, the requirements of the treaty. Paragraph (3) of the Commission's commentary uses the expression “supervening impossibility of performance”, but that concept does not seem to the United States Government to be clearly reflected in either paragraph 2 or 3 of the article itself. It suggests that the Commission’s intentions would be more fully reflected, and possible abuse of paragraphs 2 and 3 avoided, if a further paragraph were added as follows:

"4. The suspension may be invoked only for the period of time that application is impossible.”

Even so, however, it doubts whether this would suffice to avoid altogether the abuses that might occur under paragraphs 2 and 3. It therefore concludes that the better solution may be to retain paragraph 1 only and to leave the subject matter of the remaining paragraphs to be governed by other provisions of the draft articles such as article 43, paragraphs 2 and 3. In any event, it feels that further consideration of the over-all effect of the rules in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present article is required.

*Greek delegation.* The Greek delegation observes that it would be preferable for the Commission to consider the principle “*impossibilium nulla est obligatio*” in a more general way instead of including it in a provision concerning the severance of diplomatic relations (the delegation appears to have overlooked article 43 of part II). 67

*Thai delegation.* While agreeing with paragraph 1, the Thai delegation feels that paragraphs 2 and 3 provide an unnecessary and undesirable opportunity for a party to resort to severance of diplomatic relations as a political expedient to shirk treaty obligations. In its view, the word "disappearance of the means necessary for the application of the treaty" (paragraph 2) and “the disappearance of such means” (paragraph 3) are open to subjective interpretation. It considers that supervening impossibility of performance is already adequately covered in articles 43 and 54 and that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present article could be deleted altogether. Otherwise, it is of the opinion

that these paragraphs should be reformulated in a more precise and restrictive manner.  

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. The principal rule stated in paragraph 1, that the severance of diplomatic relations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations between them established by the treaty, appears to meet with the unanimous approval of Governments. The Government of Israel questions the placing of the article in its present position, without making any specific proposal of its own. The Special Rapporteur, in a tentative paper for the Drafting Committee, has suggested that this article should follow close after the *pacta sunt servanda* article. But as the whole matter of the final order of the articles is now before the Drafting Committee, the Commission will presumably prefer to await its report before considering the particular place of the present article.

2. On the other hand, almost all the Governments which have commented on the article take the view that paragraph 2 should be made more strict. A number of them, in effect, advocate either that paragraph 2 should be expressed in terms of temporary impossibility of performance or that the cases arising under this paragraph should be left to be covered by the provisions of article 43 regarding "supervening impossibility of performance". Article 43 underwent some revision at the recent session of the Commission in Monaco so that the comments of these Governments on the present article have to be appreciated in the light of the new text of article 43 which now reads:

"A party may invoke an impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty".

The new text formulates the criteria of impossibility of performance in terms of the permanent disappearance or destruction of "an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty" rather than of "the subject matter of the rights and obligations contained in the treaty". In the present context, on the other hand, as the United Kingdom Government emphasizes and as the article adopted in 1964 recognizes, it is "means" necessary for the application of the treaty which may be affected by the severance of diplomatic relations rather than an "object" indispensable for its execution.

3. The view expressed by Governments that paragraph 2 as at present drafted may appear to leave too much scope for invoking the severance of diplomatic relations as a pretext for suspending performance of a treaty is thought by the Special Rapporteur to be justified. The Commission itself, in paragraphs (3) and (4) of its commentary on the present article in 1964, envisaged paragraph 2 as covering cases of a temporary impossibility of performance resulting from the disappearance of the diplomatic channel. But the text of the paragraph falls short of stating the stringent criterion of "impossibility of performance", even although the words "if it results in the disappearance of the means necessary for the application of the treaty" may in some measure imply that criterion. The difficulty arises, it is thought, from the fact that the text speaks of a right to invoke, as a ground for suspension, the severance of diplomatic relations rather than of a right to invoke the disappearance of a means indispensable to the application of the treaty.

4. The solution which the Special Rapporteur is inclined to favour is that indicated by the United States and Thai Governments, namely, to retain the general rule stated in paragraph 1 and to leave the cases envisaged in paragraph 2 to be covered by article 43. The latter article would, of course, then have to be modified so as to include the disappearance of "a means" as well as the disappearance of "an object" indispensable for the execution of the treaty. In this case, it may still be desirable to touch on the question of "impossibility of performance" in paragraph 2 in the form of a provision making a cross-reference to article 43. In other words, paragraph 2 might be revised on the following lines:

If the severance of diplomatic relations should result in a temporary impossibility of performing the treaty in consequence of the disappearance of a means indispensable for its execution, articles 43 applies.

This solution would have the advantage of bringing the cases envisaged in paragraph 2 into the group of articles dealing with the termination and suspension of the operation of treaties to which they really seem to belong.

5. Paragraph 3 of the 1964 text, which deals with the questions of partial impossibility of performance and of the principle of the separability of treaty provisions, is no longer necessary since those points are now sufficiently covered in article 46 as revised at the recent session in Monaco. The suggestion of the Netherlands Government that this paragraph may be dispensed with is therefore clearly acceptable.

6. There remain for consideration a number of particular points made in the comments of Governments. First, the Government of Israel, citing the Geneva Conventions of 1949, stresses that the severance of diplomatic relations "ought not to be allowed to be an excuse for the temporary suspension of the operation of a treaty when that is the very contingency for which the treaty was intended to provide". The Special Rapporteur suggests that, if paragraph 2 is modified in the way proposed above so as to limit that paragraph explicitly to cases of "impossibility of performance", the preoccupation of that Government will automatically be met. Certainly, it would seem out of the question to invoke an impossibility of performance.


70 On re-examining article 43, the Special Rapporteur is inclined to think that the word "permanent" ought to be either deleted or placed in front of the word "impossibility" where it first occurs, i.e. "A party may invoke a permanent impossibility, etc.".

resulting from a severance of diplomatic relations when the treaty itself specifically provides for that contingency.

7. Secondly, there is the point made by the United Kingdom that treaty obligations concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes ought not to be capable of being suspended by reason only of the severance of diplomatic relations. This point, in the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, is in itself clearly valid. It is, indeed, unthinkable that the obligations in regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes, which are set out in Article 2, paragraph 3, and in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, should be capable of being suspended by the severance of diplomatic relations. The question is whether it is necessary to provide for the point specially, either in the present article or in article 43; in other words, whether the severance of diplomatic relations creates any such impossibility of performing obligations of peaceful settlement as would entitle a State to invoke article 43. Clearly, the ability of the States concerned to negotiate directly may be impaired. But, having regard to the other methods of negotiation open to them through the United Nations, through regional organizations or through the medium of friendly States, it may be doubted whether there could be said to be any "impossibility of performance". Practice, for example the Corfu Channel incident, seems to confirm that the absence of diplomatic relations does not create any legal impossibility of carrying out obligations of peaceful settlement or relieve the parties to a dispute in any way of their duty to perform those obligations. On the other hand, the performance in good faith of obligations undertaken with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes is of such outstanding importance that the Commission may wish to consider the possible addition to the present article of a provision on the following lines:

In no circumstances may the severance of diplomatic relations between parties to a treaty be considered as resulting in an impossibility of performing any obligation undertaken by them in the treaty with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes.

8. Thirdly, there is the suggestion of the United States Government that a new paragraph should be added to the existing text of the present article to the effect that any suspension of the operation of the treaty resulting from severance of diplomatic relations can be invoked "only for the period of time that the application of the treaty is impossible". This suggestion is made by the United States only in case the Commission does not adopt its more radical proposal to delete all but the first paragraph and leave the rest to be covered by article 43. Since the Special Rapporteur favours that more radical proposal, he does not see any need for the new paragraph to be added to the present article. On the other hand, the United States suggestion does perhaps provoke a question as to whether the second sentence of article 43, as adopted at the Monaco session, is drafted with quite sufficient precision in regard to the duration of the suspension. Is it desirable to underline that the "suspension" must be co-extensive with the "impossibility"?

In other words, ought the second sentence of article 43 to be revised so as to make it read:

If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty while the impossibility exists?

9. Finally, there is the suggestion of the Hungarian Government that the effect of the severance of consular relations should either be covered in the present article or be dealt with in a separate article, and that the same rules should be applied as in the case of severance of diplomatic relations. Logical though this suggestion may appear at first glance, the Special Rapporteur feels some hesitation in accepting the idea that the severance of diplomatic relations and the severance of consular relations should be placed on the same footing for the purpose of the present article. It is true that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in articles 2 and 27, envisages the possibility of the severance of consular relations as a measure independent of the severance of diplomatic relations. But the severance of consular relations does not seem to have the same general relevance in regard to the treaty relations of States as the severance of diplomatic relations. The maintenance of diplomatic relations is essential for the existence of normal international relations between States in a way that the maintenance of consular relations is not. Indeed, the only real need for the present article is firmly to negative the possible implication that, by severing diplomatic relations and thereby suspending normal international relations, a State equally suspends its treaty relations with the other State concerned. But the severance of consular relations does not by itself carry any such implication. On the other hand, what is said in paragraph 1 of the severance of diplomatic relations is, of course, largely true of the severance of consular relations: it does not normally affect the legal relations between the two States established by treaties. Again, it is possible to conceive of questions of "impossibility of performance" being raised—whether validly or not—as a result of a severance of consular relations; e.g. in regard to the machinery for the execution of established treaties. The Special Rapporteur feels, however, that delicate questions might arise as to the admissibility of the severance of consular relations under such treaties. Nor is it to be forgotten that there are large numbers of consular conventions in existence which must be taken into account in any formulation of a general rule regarding severance of consular relations. In short, for the reasons indicated, the Special Rapporteur feels some doubt on the question of making the rules of the present article apply also to severance of consular relations. If the Commission should favour introducing a provision on this question, the Special Rapporteur considers that it should be in the form of a separate paragraph which would at the same time take account of the problem of consular conventions.

Article 65.—Procedure for amending treaties

Comments of Governments

Israel. Observing that paragraph (7) of the commentary correctly recognizes the possibility of an oral agreement or tacit agreement to amend a treaty, the Government
of Israel suggests that the opening words of the article should be revised to read: "A treaty may be amended by agreement in writing between the parties and the rules in part I shall apply etc.". It also draws attention to the phrase "the established rules of an international organization", pointing to its remarks regarding this phrase in its comments on articles 66 and 67.

**Netherlands.** The Netherlands Government observes that the words "If it is in writing" imply recognition of the possibility of a written and ratified treaty being amended by a verbal agreement and that, although this occasionally occurs in practice, it is not to be recommended. Accordingly, it would prefer no mention to be made of it in the article. It adds that the deletion of those words would not rule out the possible significance of a verbal agreement in the context of the present article. Pointing out that a verbal agreement with "subsequent practice" is recognized in article 68(b), it expresses the opinion that a verbal agreement without "subsequent practice" would be of little or no importance. It proposes that the second sentence should read simply: "The rules laid down, etc.".

**United States.** The United States Government draws attention to the relation between the two exceptions mentioned at the end of the article, namely, cases where a treaty lays down particular rules for its own amendment and cases where "the established rules of an international organization" prescribe a particular procedure. It suggests that questions may arise as to which of those exceptions is to prevail when a treaty concluded under the auspices of an international organization contains express provisions regarding the manner of its amendment and the rules of the international organization subsequently provide for some other manner of amendment. At the same time, it seems to consider that those questions would be solved by the principle that the agreement of the parties should govern the procedure of amendment.

However, it foresees difficulty (a) in the case of treaties that have been concluded outside an international organization and are to be amended by agreements concluded under the auspices of an international organization, and (b) in the case of treaties which contain no provision for amendment and are concluded under the auspices of an international organization which subsequently develops rules that would permit amendment without agreement of all the parties. In those cases, it suggests, a question arises as to whether the provisions of article 65, with respect to international organizations, would prevail over the provisions of article 67, regarding agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only. In its view, it might be contended that, under article 65, an amendment of a treaty under the auspices of an international organization could deprive some of the parties to that treaty of rights under it and relieve States which become parties to the amendment from obligation to parties to the treaty which do not accept the amendment. The inclusion in the present article of the reference to international organizations seems to the United States Government to imply that a separate body of treaty law has been and can continue to be formulated by international organizations with respect to the amend-ment not only of treaties concluded under the auspices of such organizations but of other treaties as well. Accordingly, it reserves its position in regard to the second sentence in the present article.

**Greek delegation.** The Greek delegation observes that, since an agreement amending an agreement is itself a treaty, the present article may be superfluous. On the other hand, it feels that the draft should include a provision for taking account of any proposal to amend a treaty. In its view, there is, for example, a certain analogy to be drawn between a clause in an arbitration treaty providing for the possibility of negotiations before recourse to arbitration and proposals for amending a treaty.\(^73\)

**Romanian delegation.** The Romanian delegation considers that the second sentence of the present article, together with article 66, paragraphs 1 and 2 and article 72, paragraph 2(b), open the way to contradictions between the desires of States parties to treaties and the rules established by international organizations. It maintains that such provisions regarding the established rules of an international organization are incompatible with the fundamental principle that no treaty may be amended except with the participation and/or consent of the parties to it. In its view, the exceptions proposed in connexion with the established rules of international organizations are likely to create confusion in the interpretation of treaties and should be deleted.\(^74\)

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. Two Governments (Israel and the Netherlands) though recognizing that a treaty may sometimes be amended by an oral or tacit agreement, prefer that the possibility of such less formal modes of amendment should not be underlined in the present article. Both make proposals for revising the article so as to omit the opening words of the second sentence, "If it is in writing, the rules laid down in part I, etc.". Bearing in mind article 2(b), the Special Rapporteur feels that it would be appropriate to omit those words from the present article. Article 2(b), it will be recalled, provides that the fact that the draft articles do not relate to international agreements not in written form is not to affect their legal force or the application to them of any of the rules contained in the draft articles to which they would be subject independently of those articles. This provision would seem sufficient to safeguard oral or tacit agreements to amend a treaty; and tacit amendment by subsequent practice is dealt with specifically in article 68. The form of amendment proposed by the Netherlands Government appears to the Special Rapporteur to be preferable. He accordingly proposes that the words "If it is in writing" should simply be deleted from the second sentence which would then begin: "The rules laid down in part I...".

2. Three Governments (Israel, United States and Romania) take exception to the provision regarding "the established rules of an international organization". They

\(^73\) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 845th meeting, para. 40.*

\(^74\) *Ibid., 848th meeting, paras. 10 and 11.*
take the view that the second sentence of the article, as at present drafted, goes too far in appearing to give an overriding effect to the "established rules of an international organization" in the amendment of any treaty—even a treaty drawn up merely "under its auspices," i.e., merely using its facilities, and indeed, even a treaty drawn up altogether outside the organization. This was not contemplated by the Commission, which intended the words: "except in so far as the established rules of an international organization may otherwise provide" simply as a general reservation to safeguard special cases such as the international labour conventions, the amendment of which is controlled by the rules of the organization. However, as the reaction of the three Governments shows, such a reservation of "the established rules of an international organization" may give rise to equivocal interpretations which it is clearly necessary to avoid.

3. The Commission itself has narrowed its own approach to the relation of the rules of international organizations to treaty making procedures since it adopted the first draft of part I in 1962. In that draft it tended to deal with treaties concluded "under the auspices of an international organization" on the same footing as treaties concluded within an organization, and to allow the procedures for both categories to be affected by the "established rules of an international organization". Further consideration of the problem, however, led the Commission, in revising part I in 1965, to restrict the operation of "established rules of an international organization" to treaties which are constituent instruments of an organization or which have been drawn up within an organization, as in the case of international labour conventions. At the same time, the Commission decided to deal with this problem in a general provision which now appears as article 3(bis) and reads as follows:

"The application of the present articles to treaties which are constituent instruments of an international organization or have been drawn up within an international organization shall be subject to the rules of the organization in question."

Accordingly, quite apart from the comments of the three Governments, it would have been logical to delete from the present article the reservation regarding the rules of international organizations and to leave the question to be governed by article 3(bis), and this is, indeed, the proposal of the Special Rapporteur.

4. On the basis of the changes proposed in paragraphs 1 and 3 above, the revised text of the article would read:

A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in part I apply to such agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.

5. It is appreciated that the deletion of the reservation regarding the established rules of an international organization from the present article may not meet all the preoccupations expressed in the comments of Governments to the fullest extent. For example, it may not meet the United States' query regarding the case of a treaty concluded within an organization which subsequently introduces rules controlling amendments to treaties concluded within the organization. The Special Rapporteur doubts whether the Commission should attempt in the present articles to provide a general answer for such special cases, for they would seem to raise questions not only of inter-temporal law but also of the law of international organizations. A more general query raised by the Government of Israel may, however, require the attention of the Commission in connexion with its final consideration of the text of article 3(bis). This is the question whether the phrase "treaty which has been drawn up within an international organization" is restrictive enough. This Government suggests that the treaty ought not merely to have been drawn up within the organization, but to have a material link with the constitution of the organization, as in the case of labour conventions (see its comments on articles 66 and 67); and it states that many United Nations conventions have no such material link with the constitution of the Organization but merely make use of its conference machinery. When the wide "purposes" of the United Nations and the specific provisions of Chapters IX and X of the Charter are recalled, this statement may be disputable. Moreover, unless the "material link" is defined in terms of the objects and purposes of the organization, its definition may be difficult. However, since there is evidently some feeling among Governments that the reservation regarding "established rules of an international organization" should be of narrow scope, the Commission may wish to re-examine the problem before finally approving the text of article 3(bis).

Article 66.—Amendment of multilateral treaties

Comments of Governments

Hungary. The Hungarian Government considers that paragraph 1 should be completed by adding a special rule regarding general multilateral treaties. In its view every State, even those which are not parties to the original treaty, should be invited to take part in a conference dealing with the amendment of general multilateral treaties. At the same time it emphasizes that this addition to the present article presupposes the alteration of the text of article 8 so as to bring its provisions into accord with the definition of general multilateral treaties contained in article 1.

The Hungarian Government further questions the provision in paragraph 3 as being somewhat hypothetical. It doubts whether there is any need to create a new rule for a hypothetical case whose regulation hardly seems justified by practice. It also feels that the provision is open to question on the ground that it attaches a certain effect to the signature of a treaty and is moreover, in its view, out of place in the section dealing with modification of treaties.

Israel. The Government of Israel suggests that paragraph 1 should carefully distinguish between the "impersonal proposal to amend a multilateral treaty" and the right of a party to propose an amendment to a treaty which may be restricted by the terms of the treaty itself. In general, it considers that the obligations of the other parties should be determined in the first place by the
treaty (if it contains relevant provisions) and only in the second place by general rules. While accepting the distinction made in articles 66 and 67 between proposals for amendment in relation to all the parties and proposals initially for \textit{inter se} amendments, it suggests that there may be an intermediate case: a group of parties might initiate discussion of amendments without its being clear initially as to the kind of amendments that will finally emerge from the discussion. In its view, this kind of situation may be more prejudicial to the positions of the other parties than the situations in articles 66 and 67. As a remedy, it proposes that the question of notice of amendments should be dealt with in an independent article—article 65(bis) it would be—applicable to all proposed amendments. It feels that, under the present texts of articles 66 and 67, notification of the conclusion of an \textit{inter se} agreement, as provided in paragraph 2 of article 67, may come too late, particularly having regard to paragraph 1(b)(ii) of that article. It considers that the other parties ought to be given an early opportunity to determine whether the enjoyment of their rights or the performance of their obligations is likely to be adversely affected by a proposed modification of the treaty.

In addition, it queries whether the recipients of notifications of proposed amendments, whether general or \textit{inter se}, should be limited—at all events in an initial period—to the parties to the treaty. The Commission, in its view, does not take into account the possibility of cases where a multilateral treaty will not enter into force, for want of a sufficient number of ratifications, unless amendments, the necessity for which has been established only after the adoption of the text, are first made.

The Government of Israel also considers that the expression “established rules of an international organization” in paragraph 2 of the present article and in article 65 is highly ambiguous in the present context. It asks whether the expression refers to the rules of an international organization applying to the members of that organization as such, or to those rules which apply to treaties concluded or to treaties which have been drawn up within an international organization, the parties to which may not necessarily all be members. Recalling its proposal to generalize article 48, it raises the question of the adequacy of the criterion of a treaty’s having been drawn up within an international organization. It suggests that the real criterion has to be sought in the material connexion of the treaty with the organization within which it has been drawn up—its material link with the constitution of the organization; e.g. international labour conventions. Many treaties drawn up within the United Nations or at conferences convened by it have no such material connexion, or only a very tenuous one, with the Organization.

In paragraph 2(b) the Government of Israel suggests that it is not sufficient to refer to article 63, and that closer co-ordination is required between articles 59-61 and articles 65-67.

\textit{Netherlands.} The Netherlands Government considers that paragraph 3 in its present form could be taken to mean that, conversely, a State party which has \textit{not} signed the agreement (nor otherwise clearly intimated that it does not wish to oppose the amendment) is liable if there is a breach of the treaty. It observes that under paragraph 1 such a State would have taken part in the preliminary consultation on the desirability of an amendment and probably even in the drawing up of the amending agreement. It then expresses the view that liability for breach of the treaty will as a rule be out of place in this amendment procedure, and that this will be so even in the case of a party that has dissociated itself from the proposed amendment in the course of the procedure. In its view, paragraph 3 should be deleted.

\textit{United States.} The United States Government thinks that the article as a whole may serve as a useful guide. In paragraphs 1 and 2, however, it reserves its position in regard to the phrase “established rules of an international organization”, for the reasons given by it in its comments on article 65. It also suggests that the provision in paragraph 3, by which a State which signs an amendment is precluded from protesting against the application of the amendment, may be too severe. This provision, it says, goes further than the observation in paragraph (13) of the Commission’s commentary that the State signing but not ratifying an amendment is “precluded only from contesting the right of other parties to bring the amendment into force as between themselves”. The words “application of an amending agreement” in paragraph 3 would, in its view, cover the “giving of effect to provisions in the amending agreement that derogate from or are otherwise incompatible with the rights of parties under the earlier agreement”. In consequence, it believes that paragraph 3 may have the effect of discouraging States from signing an amendment if they are not certain that they can ratify it; and that States may sometimes consider it necessary to go through their whole treaty-making procedures, including legislative or parliamentary approval, before signing. Signature of an amendment would, under paragraph 3, constitute a waiver of treaty rights.

\textit{Yugoslavia.} Commenting in general terms on articles 63, 66 and 67, the Yugoslav Government observes that, in the final text of these articles bearing on the modification of multilateral treaties, whether in relation to all or only to some of the parties, it will be desirable to aim at a single, comprehensive and clearer solution.

\textit{Argentine delegation.} The Argentine delegation refers to the present article as one which has been “wisely worded”. \textsuperscript{78}

\textit{Romanian delegation.} The Romanian delegation's reservations regarding the use of the phrase “established rules of an international organization” in this article and in articles 65 and 72(b) have already been set out under article 65, to which members of the Commission are asked to refer. In brief, it maintains that the provisions regarding the established rules of an international organization in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article are incompatible with the principle that no treaty may be amended except with the participation and/or consent of the parties to it. \textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.}, 846th meeting, paras. 9.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ibid.}, 848th meeting, paras. 10 and 11.
**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. Three Governments (Israel, Romania, United States) have questioned the references to the “established rules of an international organization” found in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the article on the grounds that they may be open to large interpretations and go too far in subordinating the will of the parties to the rules of international organizations in the matter of the amendment of multilateral treaties. This point has already been discussed in paragraphs 2-5 of the Special Rapporteur’s observations on article 65, where it is recalled that in 1965 the Commission decided to deal with the relation of the rules of international organizations to the general law of treaties in a comprehensive provision which now appears as article 3(bis). In the present article, as in article 65, the logical consequence of that decision will be to delete the reservations in regard to the “established rules of an international organization”; and the Special Rapporteur so proposes in both paragraphs 1 and 2. The effect of adopting this proposal, as pointed out by the Special Rapporteur in his observations on article 65, will automatically be to narrow the scope of the reservation in the present article regarding the rules of international organizations. At the same time, when it has completed its re-examination of the draft articles, the Commission will doubtless review the wording of article 3(bis) in order to satisfy itself that the reservation is not too large in scope.

2. In paragraph 1 the Government of Israel asks that the text should distinguish between the “impersonal” proposal to amend a multilateral treaty and the right to propose an amendment which may be restricted by the terms of the treaty. The Special Rapporteur understands this request as suggesting that the paragraph should be formulated so as to express more comprehensively that it states only residuary rules applicable in the absence of specific provisions in the treaty. Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) are already stated as residuary rules, so that the point may primarily relate to the provision in the opening phrase: “every party has the right to have the proposal communicated to it”. This phrase was made subject to the qualifying words “subject to the provisions of the treaty” in the text submitted by the Special Rapporteur to the Commission at its 753rd meeting and it seems primarily to have been drafting considerations which led to its being made independent of those words. The Commission certainly attached great importance to the right of every party to be notified of any proposal to amend a multilateral treaty. But when the substantive rights to take part in the decision as to the resulting action (sub-paragraph (a)), and to take part in the conclusion of any amending agreement (sub-paragraph (b)), are made subject to the overriding effect of the provisions of the treaty, it seems logical that the right to notification should also be so subject.

3. The Government of Israel’s suggestion may perhaps have been intended to cover also the right of a party to put forward a proposal for amending a multilateral treaty; and it is, of course, true that a number of multilateral treaties contain clauses designed to restrict the making of proposals for amendment in some manner; for example, until after the elapse of a specified period of time. The Commission considered this aspect of the question in 1964. While recognizing that such clauses are not uncommon and that the influence which they may have on the reaction of the other parties to an amending proposal is not in conformity with a specific provision in the treaty, the Commission felt that such clauses do not and cannot deprive a party of the faculty of raising as a political matter the question of the amendment of a provision which it considers to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, it deliberately avoided formulating the present article in such a way as to appear to recognize that a treaty provision may place an absolute legal bar on a party’s faculty to make a political proposal for the amendment of a treaty. It preferred to speak in general terms of “Whenever it is proposed that a multilateral treaty should be amended, etc.” and to leave it to the other parties to invoke or not invoke any clause in the treaty restricting proposals for its amendment.

4. In the English text of paragraph 1, a small correction is necessary to take account of a decision of the Commission at its 764th meeting when it was expressly agreed to substitute the words “as between” for “in relation to”. This change seems to have escaped attention in the final revision of the 1964 report, and it may be that the Spanish text also requires to be modified so as to bring it into more exact correspondence with the French text.

5. The Government of Israel makes two points in regard to the notification of proposals of amendment, which apply both to the present article and to article 67. First, it suggests that there may be an intermediate class of case where a group of parties initiate discussions regarding amendments without its being clear as to the kind of amendments which will emerge—whether they will be inter se amendments or proposals for general amendments. It proposes that this type of case should be guarded against by dealing with the question of notice of amendments in an independent article which would follow article 65, but does not indicate what should be the rules stated in this independent article. In order to meet in this way the preoccupation of the Government of Israel in regard to this “intermediate” class, it would seem necessary to impose an obligation on every party to a multilateral treaty to notify all other parties of any proposals for amendment in some manner; and it might even prove a hindrance to the germination of desirable proposals for the amendment of the treaty. But such an obligation would hardly seem likely to be acceptable to States, and might even prove a hindrance to the possible amendment of the treaty. The Special Rapporteur accordingly doubts the advisability of the Commission’s trying to legislate directly for this so-called “intermediate” class of case. On the other hand, two other Governments in their comments on article 67 have indicated that they share the Government of Israel’s doubts whether the

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problem regarding general multilateral treaties, and in receiving close attention from the Special Rapporteur and treaty to additional participation (article 9) and termination, the Special Rapporteur does not feel that the provision would unduly complicate agreements). The Commission felt that the provision would unduly complicate matters in practice, the point would be likely to be easier to maintain the distinction between “amendment” and “inter se” modification of multilateral agreements on which the Commission so much insisted in 1964.

6. The second point is a query whether, at any rate during an initial period in the life of a multilateral treaty, States parties to the treaty should alone be entitled to be notified of proposals of amendment. This point relates to the rights or interests of States that took part in drawing up the treaty but have not yet become parties; and in certain other contexts—for example, opening a treaty to additional participation (article 9) and termination by agreement (article 40)—it is a point which has received close attention from the Special Rapporteur and the Commission. In both articles 9 and 40, the Commission, in 1962 and 1963 respectively, adopted texts which provided that, for a period of years, States which participated in the drawing up of the text of the treaty should have a voice in decisions regarding it. The Commission has not yet completed its revision of either of these articles; in the case of article 9 because of a special problem regarding general multilateral treaties, and in the case of article 40 because of the possible link between suspension of the operation of a treaty only between certain parties with article 67 (inter se agreements). The Commission has also left open the question of what it means by “contracting States”, a term used in a number of articles in part I to refer to States having rights as signatories, or endorsers of the text and, in particular, in article 29 setting out the functions of depositaries. On the other hand, in re-examining article 40 at the Monaco session the Commission showed no enthusiasm for retaining the provision protecting the right of States which have participated in drawing up a treaty to a voice in its termination; and the text proposed by the Drafting Committee omitted it. The Drafting Committee felt that the provision would unduly complicate the article and that it covered a somewhat unlikely contingency. Since on this point the situation in cases of amendment is analogous to that obtaining in cases of termination, the Special Rapporteur does not feel that he should introduce into the present article a provision of the kind suggested by the Government of Israel unless the Commission expresses itself in favour of such a provision. In practice, the point would be likely to be important only in the case of a treaty which comes into force after very few ratifications, acceptances, etc. Moreover, in such a case the “parties” would be unlikely to amend the text without consulting the other signatory States because to do so would be to risk the continued refusal of the latter to become parties and the restriction of the treaty to a narrow circle of States.

7. There is, however, another question which arises out of the Government of Israel’s point, namely, whether there is not a lacuna in the article in that it makes no provision for the amendment of the text before the treaty has come into force. Clearly, there is such a lacuna and, although proposals to amend the text of a multilateral treaty may not be frequent, they may be important in cases where, as the Government of Israel notes, the defects in the treaty are the very reason why the necessary ratifications, acceptances, etc., to bring it into force, have not been forthcoming. If the Commission decides that these cases should be covered in the article, two problems arise. The first is the definition of the States entitled to be notified and to take part in the decision. Presumably, these should in principle be any States which have “adopted” the text or otherwise endorsed it, e.g. by a subsequent signature, acceptance, etc.; but the matter is complicated by the practice of adopting the texts of multilateral treaties by resolution of an international organization when it is not necessarily possible to identify the States which have voted in favour of the text. The Commission has more than once discussed this question without resolving it; indeed, it is involved in the problem of the definition of “contracting States” mentioned above. The second problem is the effect of an amending agreement concluded before a treaty has come into force: does the original text continue in existence for those States which do not become parties to the amendment, or does the amendment substitute a new revised text for the original one? The Special Rapporteur believes that, in principle, the former is the case and that paragraph 2 of the article, as drafted in 1964, applies equally to an amending agreement concluded before a treaty has come into force. That an unratified text has a legal status of its own and that its signatories (to use a convenient if inexact expression) have certain rights in the text as such seems clear, whatever may be the true legal source of those rights. Accordingly, it would not seem possible for an amending agreement to deprive signatories of the original text, not parties to the amendment, of their rights under the original text, more especially under its final clauses.

8. The Hungarian Government suggests the addition of a special rule regarding general multilateral treaties under which every State, whether or not a party to the original treaty, should be invited to take part in a conference dealing with the amendment of general multilateral treaties; and it links this suggestion with its proposal for changing the text of article 8 (participation in a treaty). The text adopted for paragraph 1 of article 8 in 1962 reads: “In the case of a general multilateral treaty, every State may become a party to the treaty unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the treaty itself, etc.”. The Commission was divided in regard to the substance of the paragraph in 1962 and, when it re-examined the article in 1965, it failed to arrive at an agreement and postponed its decision upon the article. But in any event that article concerns the right to become a party to a general multilateral treaty, not the right to participate in the conference which draws it up; and in article 6, which does deal with the adoption of the texts of multi-
lateral treaties, the Commission did not prescribe any special rule regarding general multilateral treaties. In short, the Commission has treated the convening of States to a diplomatic conference for drawing up the text of any treaty as a political question, and this would seem to be equally the case with an amending agreement. In the present article, the Commission has not thought it appropriate to go beyond recognizing a right for parties to participate in the drawing up of amendments to multilateral treaties which are in force.

9. The Government of Israel's point that in paragraph 2(b) it is not sufficient to refer to article 63 and that closer co-ordination is required between articles 59-61 and articles 65-67 may be doubted. Article 63 already gives effect to the essential rule of article 59 that a later treaty cannot deprive "third States" of their rights under an earlier treaty or modify those rights without their consent. It would, it is thought, complicate the articles unduly and unnecessarily to try to spell out in articles 65-67 all the possible implications of articles 59-61. It seems sufficient to refer to article 63 and to leave the rest to the normal operation of articles 59-61 in any set of circumstances where any of those articles may be specially applicable.

10. Three Governments (Hungary, Netherlands, United States) express doubts concerning paragraph 3. The Netherlands Government proposes the deletion of the paragraph but does so on the basis of an interpretation which it does not seem to the Special Rapporteur to be possible to extract from the paragraph. At the same time it expresses the view that any question of liability for breach of the treaty arising out of the amendment procedure will normally be ruled out and that this will be so even in the case of a party which has dissociated itself from the proposal to amend the treaty. It may be that in practice amendments will not often be adopted the application of which might violate the existing rights of parties not accepting the amendments. But the possibility of such cases can hardly be excluded and it is noted that the United States Government criticizes the formulation of paragraph 3 from the opposite point of view—on the ground that the paragraph goes too far in precluding a State, which has signed but not become a party to the amending agreement, from complaining of a violation of its own rights.

11. The Hungarian Government, though on different grounds, also proposes the deletion of paragraph 3. In the first place, it regards the cases covered by the paragraph as somewhat hypothetical and doubts the need for the creation of a new rule. The Commission did not envisage the rule in paragraph 3 as a new rule but rather as an application of the principle of *nemo potest venire contra factum proprium* and as a recognition of what appears to be the common understanding of a situation which is met with quite often in practice. It is, indeed, even usual that an amending agreement signed by the great majority of the parties to the treaty does not come into force for all of them, owing to the failure of some to ratify the new agreement. It appears to be the generally accepted practice—reflected in paragraph 2 of the present article—that the States which do ratify the amendments may lawfully bring the amendments into force as between themselves (see paragraph (13) of the Commission's commentary). The Hungarian Government also queries paragraph 3 on the ground that it attaches a certain effect to the signature of a treaty, which it considers to be out of place in the section dealing with modification. However, just as article 17(b) deals with a special effect of signature in the case of treaties generally, so it would seem to be perfectly appropriate—if the point arises—to deal in the present article with a special effect of signature in the case of an amending agreement. The question, it is thought, is rather whether the signature of an amending agreement has special effects and, if so, how these should be formulated.

12. There is, as the Special Rapporteur has observed on a previous occasion, a certain link between paragraph 3 of the present article and article 17(b); for an amending agreement is a treaty and its signature automatically gives rise to the obligation stated in article 17(b). In other words, under article 17 a signatory, unless and until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the amending agreement, is bound to "refrain from acts calculated to frustrate its object". This would certainly seem normally to preclude a signatory from objecting to an amending agreement's being put into force *inter se* the States which become parties to it. Underlying article 17 is of course the principle *nemo potest venire contra factum proprium*, a principle of good faith, and this same principle underlies paragraph 3 of the present article. But in considering paragraph 3, it is necessary to keep in mind the specific provision already adopted regarding signature in article 17(b).

13. Paragraph 3, as at present drafted, may go somewhat beyond the principle in article 17, and the Special Rapporteur feels that the criticism of the paragraph by the United States Government that it is too strict may have substance. Paragraph (13) of the commentary, to which the United States Government refers, describes the object of the provision as being to protect the position of parties which in good faith ratify the amending agreement. It then adds:

"The provision does not in any other respect affect the rights of a State which does not accept the amendment. The treaty remains in force for it unamended in its relations with all the original parties, including those who have accepted the amendment. It may still invoke its rights under the earlier treaty. It is precluded only from contesting the right of the other parties to bring the amendment into force as between themselves".

The United States Government suggests, however, that the present text of paragraph 3 may be open to the interpretation that it precludes a State which has signed the amending agreement from objecting, even when its application derogates from the State's rights under the earlier treaty. Whether an application of the amending agreement which affected the enjoyment of their rights by the other parties to the treaty or the performance of their obligations could properly be said to be merely an application as between the parties to the amending agreement may be a question. But, in the view of the Special Rapporteur, it is desirable to formulate paragraph 3 in terms which plainly confine the scope of the
restriction to applications of the amending agreement inter se which do not affect the rights or obligations of other States. A State which signs or otherwise adopts the text of an amending agreement must be presumed to commit itself to allowing the agreement to come into force in conformity with its final clauses, by ratification or other prescribed procedures, as between the States which thus become parties to the agreement. But it does not commit itself to having the amending agreement applied to itself, even if it refrains from becoming a party to such agreement.

14. In the light of the foregoing observations, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the article should be revised on the following lines:

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, any proposal to amend a multilateral treaty as between all the parties must be notified to every other party which shall have the right to take part in:
   (a) The decision as to the action, if any, to be taken in regard to such proposal;
   (b) The conclusion of any agreement for the amendment of the treaty.

2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides:
   (a) An agreement amending a treaty does not bind any party to the treaty which does not become a party to such agreement;
   (b) The effect of the amending agreement is governed by article 63.

3. If the proposal relates to a multilateral treaty which has not yet entered into force, it must be notified to every State which by its signature or otherwise shall have adopted or endorsed the text. Mutatis mutandis, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall then apply with respect to each such State.

4. A party to the treaty, which by its signature or otherwise has adopted or endorsed the text of the amending agreement but without becoming a party thereto, may not object to the application of that agreement as between any States which have become parties to it.

Article 67.—Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only

Comments of Governments

Finland. The Finnish Government does not think the article to be in all respects satisfactory. In paragraph 1(b), it suggests that the third condition (i.e. not prohibited by the treaty) could be omitted, pointing out that the Commission concedes in paragraph (2) of its commentary that the second and third conditions may to some extent overlap. In paragraph 2, it considers that the States wishing to amend the treaty inter se should notify all the other parties, regardless of whether the treaty allows the possibility of inter se arrangements. It also feels that the notification should be made as soon as negotiations are under way. In any event, it considers paragraph 2 defective in that it does not specify that the notification should be made “at earliest convenience” or “as soon as possible” upon the conclusion of the inter se agreement.

Israel. In commenting upon article 66 and the present article the Government of Israel questions the adequacy of their provisions regarding notice of proposed amendments, and it suggests that the question of notice should form the subject of an independent article—article 65(bis) (see its comments under article 66). So far as the present article is concerned, it observes that notification of the conclusion of an inter se agreement as provided in paragraph 2 may come too late, especially having regard to paragraph 1(b) (i), which permits inter se agreements only if they do not affect the other parties’ enjoyment of their rights or the performance of their obligations. In its view, the other parties must be given an early opportunity to consider whether the enjoyment of their rights or the performance of their obligations is likely to be affected. In addition, it suggests that paragraph 1(a) should read “The possibility of such an agreement is provided etc.”

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government observes that, under paragraph 2, the notification may be post factum and that a considerable time may elapse between the conclusion of an inter se agreement and its being made known to the other parties. It considers that notification should be given in good time. It recognizes that in many instances it may be virtually impossible to notify the other States when the proposals for the inter se agreement are first tabled. But when the States concerned have reached an accord in substance on the proposals, and it is only a matter of making that accord definitive by concluding the agreement, it sees nothing to prevent the other parties from being informed at once. Accordingly, it suggests that paragraph 2 should be revised to read:

“Except in a case falling under paragraph 1(a), the intention to conclude any such agreement shall be notified to the other parties to the treaty.”

Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan, without giving reasons, expresses the view that the article should be deleted altogether.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government cites paragraphs 1(b) (i) and (ii) of the present article as examples of provisions demonstrating the need to provide for independent adjudication of disputes in the operation of the draft articles.

United States. The United States Government comments that the article serves the useful purpose of further developing the principle that two or more parties to a multilateral treaty cannot, by a separate treaty, derogate from their existing obligations to other parties to the multilateral treaty. It also comments that the article will provide guidance both to parties contemplating such a special treaty and to other parties interested in protecting their rights under a multilateral treaty.

Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government considers it desirable that, so far as possible, the consequences which may arise in connexion with the modification of treaties under article 63, paragraph 5, should be put on the same footing as those which may arise under article 67, paragraphs 1(a) and (b).

Argentine delegation. The Argentine delegation refers to this article as one which has been “wisely worded” 85

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Kenyan delegation. The Kenyan delegation considers the article to be very useful since it enables States interested in maintaining their rights under an existing treaty to protect them adequately, and also affords a useful mechanism for parties contemplating a special treaty.  

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. This article seems to have met with general approval except in regard to the requirement of notification dealt with in paragraph 2. The only substantive proposal made for amending paragraph 1 is that of the Finnish Government which proposes the deletion of the third condition from sub-paragraph (b), on the ground that it overlaps with the second condition and may be dispensed with. The Commission, as the Finnish Government notes, was aware of this overlap. But for reasons given in paragraph (2) of its commentary, the Commission considered it desirable to state both conditions. The Commission there said:

"The second and third conditions, it is true, overlap to some extent since an *inter se* agreement incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty may be said to be impliedly prohibited by the treaty. Nevertheless, the Commission thought it desirable for the condition contained in the second condition to be stated separately; and it is always possible that the parties themselves might explicitly forbid any *inter se* modifications, thus excluding even minor modifications not caught by the second condition".

However desirable brevity may be, these reasons seem to the Special Rapporteur to justify the very small addition to the text involved in the statement of both conditions. The Commission thought it essential that the limits within which *inter se* agreements are permissible should be formulated with all the necessary strictness and clarity. Furthermore, the third condition is really a separate case, since it leaves no room for the subjective questions of interpretation which may arise under the other two conditions.

2. In addition, a drafting suggestion is made by the Government of Israel under which the words "The possibility of such agreements, etc." in paragraph 1(a) would be changed to "The possibility of such an agreement, etc.". This change seems to the Special Rapporteur to be an improvement.

3. Three Governments (Finland, Israel and the Netherlands) question the adequacy of the provisions regarding notification of *inter se* agreements in paragraph 2. These Governments all consider that notification of the conclusion of an *inter se* agreement may come too late to enable the other parties to protect their interests, should the agreement not fulfil the conditions laid down in the article for an admissible *inter se* arrangement. In 1964, as paragraph (3) of the commentary records, some members of the Commission shared this view and would have preferred paragraph 2 to be so worded as to require notification of any proposal to conclude an *inter se* agreement. The Commission, however, then felt that timely notification of the conclusion of the agreement would be sufficient. In the light of the comments of the three Governments it will, no doubt, wish to re-examine the point. While it is desirable to avoid anything which might inhibit legitimate *inter se* arrangements, it is also desirable that the other parties should have a reasonable opportunity of reacting against an arrangement which may encroach upon their rights before it has crystallized into a treaty in force. The problem, as the Netherlands Government indicates and as the Special Rapporteur has noted in his observations on the previous article, is to draw the line between mere discussions and mature proposals. The suggestion of the Netherlands Government is that paragraph 2 should require the other parties to be notified of any intention to conclude an *inter se* agreement, except in cases where the treaty itself provides for the possibility of such agreements. This seems to the Special Rapporteur to meet the case, provided that the notification indicates the nature of the *inter se* agreement intended; and it may be desirable to specify that requirement. As to the Finnish Government's suggestion that the notification should be required even in the case of agreements contemplated by the treaty itself, this point merits consideration and was indeed considered in 1964. It is certainly true that even in such cases the proposed *inter se* agreement might be of a wider scope than that authorized by the treaty, and not fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 1(b). But the Commission felt in 1964 that, if the parties had themselves provided for the possibility of *inter se* agreement and had not at the same time laid down any conditions regarding notification, it might be going too far to add that condition by a provision in the present articles.

4. The Special Rapporteur accordingly suggests that paragraph 2 should be revised so as to read as follows:

Except in a case falling under paragraph 1(a), the parties concerned shall notify the other parties of their intention to conclude any such agreement and of the nature of its provisions.

Article 68.—Modification of a treaty by a subsequent treaty, by subsequent practice or by customary law

Comments of Governments

Israel. The Government of Israel finds the word "also" in the opening phrase not to be clear and asks whether it is intended to refer only to articles 65 and 66 or in addition to include article 67. Paragraphs (a) and (b) it considers to be redundant. Paragraph (a) is, in its view, probably covered by articles 41 and 63, especially the latter; and paragraph (b) it feels to be indistinguishable in its practical effect from article 69, paragraph 3(b) (interpretation by reference to subsequent practice).

The substance of sub-paragraph (c), on the other hand, it thinks should find an appropriate place in the draft articles. Recalling Judge Huber's award in the Island of Palmas case, 87 it observes that sub-paragraph (c) represents the "second leg" of the inter-temporal law as enunciated by Judge Huber. Noting that the "first leg"

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86 Ibid., 850th meeting, para. 38.

appears in article 69, paragraph 1(b), it comments that the Commission has not explained why it has reversed the order of postulating the two branches of the inter-temporal law; and it questions this reversal of the order, more especially when the normal order was maintained in the original proposals of the Special Rapporteur. Saying that it appreciates that “the distinction between the interpretation of a treaty as a step logically prior to its application, and the modification of a treaty as a consequence of its re-interpretation through its application, does exist from a theoretical point of view”, it expresses the view that the practical consequences of the distinction are so fine that the Commission’s treatment of it is open to question. It suggests that paragraph (c) of the present article should be brought into closer association with the “first leg” of the inter-temporal law in article 69, paragraph 1(b) and at the same time be given a place subsequent to it.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government states that it has no comment to make upon the present article.

Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan, without stating reasons, comments that paragraph (c) of the article should be deleted.

Turkey. The Turkish Government notes that in the commentary on paragraph (c) the Commission appears to envisage a new general rule of international law but that this is not fully reflected in the text. Pointing out that the expression “general international law” is used in article 69, paragraph 1(b), it suggests that the difference in terminology may lead to a different meaning’s being given to paragraph (c) of the present article. In consequence, it proposes that the word “general” should be inserted in paragraph (c)—presumably in between the words “new” and “rule” (the text of the Turkish comment says “immediately after the word ‘international’”, but this word does not appear in the present article).

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government does not consider that the operation of paragraph (c) would be satisfactory. The exact point of time at which a new rule of customary law can be said to have emerged is an exceedingly difficult question; and, in its view, treaties ought not to be modified without the consent of the parties. Accordingly, it proposes the deletion of paragraph (c).

United States. Paragraphs (a) and (b) the United States Government considers to reflect long-standing and widely accepted practice. Paragraph (c) also it concedes to be “literally accurate” and “in keeping with the long-recognized principle that treaties are to be applied in the context of international law and in accordance with its evolution”. But at the same time it feels that paragraph (c) may lead to serious differences of opinion because of differing views as to what constitutes customary law, and accordingly thinks that it should be omitted, leaving the principle to be applied “under the norms of international law in general” rather than as a specific provision in a convention on treaty law.

Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government observes that it is necessary to harmonize the English and French texts of paragraph (c) with respect to the expressions used for customary international law.

Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur

1. This article, although not many Governments have commented upon it, is one which requires close examination by the Commission as to its substance and as to its relation to other articles, particularly to articles 63 (application of treaties having incompatible provisions), 65-67 (modification of a treaty by another treaty) and 69 (general rule of interpretation). Its genesis is traceable to a draft article in the Special Rapporteur’s third report which set out the three matters mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the present article as developments subsequent to the conclusion of a treaty which might influence its interpretation. That article (73 of the Special Rapporteur’s draft) had itself been preceded by a proposal in the same report (article 56 of that report) for the inclusion of an article setting out the implications of the two branches of the inter-temporal law for the interpretation and application of treaties. The article in the inter-temporal law would have provided that: (1) a treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the law in force at the time when the treaty was concluded; and (2) subject to the rule in (1), the application of a treaty is to be governed by the rules of international law in force at the time when the treaty is applied. However, when the article was discussed at the 728th and 729th meetings, the Commission decided to reconsider the problems involved in the inter-temporal law when it examined the rules on interpretation of treaties. Taking account of the discussion at the 728th and 729th meetings, the Special Rapporteur submitted a new article—the above-mentioned article 73—as one of a series of four general articles on interpretation of treaties. As a result of the discussion at the 765th, 766th and 767th meetings, these articles underwent considerable rearrangement and amendment. At the same time, it was noted that the three matters in question—a subsequent treaty, a subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the treaty and the subsequent emergence of a new rule of customary law—may have effects either as elements of interpretation or as elements modifying the operation of a treaty.

2. The outcome was that subsequent agreement and subsequent practice as elements of interpretation were covered in article 69, paragraphs 3(a) and (b), while subsequent agreement, subsequent practice and the subsequent emergence of a new rule of customary law as elements modifying the operation of a treaty were dealt with in the present article. The problem of the subsequent emergence of a new rule of customary law as an element of interpretation, to which the Special Rapporteur had drawn attention, was not covered in either article. These are cases where the parties have used legal terms, for example “bay” or “territorial waters”, and the question is whether they intended it to have a meaning fixed by the law in force when the treaty was concluded or a meaning which would follow the evolution of the law.

Article 69, paragraph 1(b), provides merely that the terms of a treaty are to be interpreted in the light of the general rules of international law in force at the time of its conclusion.

3. In addition to the genesis of the present article, the Special Rapporteur thinks that the Commission should have in mind the order in which it is likely ultimately to arrange the articles on "modification" and "interpretation" of treaties. He has previously suggested to the Commission that the provisions on "interpretation" should be introduced much earlier in the draft articles and understands that view to be widely shared. This is not the place at which to debate that question, which is already before the Drafting Committee. But the Special Rapporteur believes it to be highly probable that, in the final arrangement of the articles, the provisions on interpretation will precede those on both the "application" and "modification" of treaties; and thinks that it may be helpful to make this assumption in revising the present article.

4. The Government of Israel queries the word "also" in the opening phrase, asking whether it is intended to refer only to articles 65 and 66 or to include article 67. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, the objection to the word "also" which is implicit in this query is justified, though in fact the word is thought to have been intended to relate to article 67 more than to the two previous articles. Articles 65 and 66 deal with the amendment of the treaty as such, while article 67 deals with the modification of its operation as between certain parties; and it is the "modification" motif which is echoed in the word "also". But the real explanation of the word is thought to be simply a hesitation as to precisely how to fit in article 68 into the scheme of the articles and a desire to indicate a link with articles 65-67. In any event, the word is thought to be infelicitous. If the matters covered by the article really belong to "modification" of treaties, they need no connecting link; it should suffice to state the rules.

5. The Government of Israel, in effect, also suggests that the present article should disappear, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) being regarded as covered by other articles and sub-paragraph (c) being transferred to article 69. While the Special Rapporteur feels that the Commission should re-examine the question whether article 69 justifies itself as an article to be included in the section on "Modification of treaties", he will reserve his observations on this question until after he has considered the comments of Governments on the three rules stated in the article.

6. Sub-paragraph (a) is endorsed by the United States Government as reflecting long-standing and widely accepted practice, and no Government criticizes its content. The Government of Israel, however, considers it redundant, taking the view that it is "probably covered by articles 41 and 63, especially the latter". The sub-paragraph appears to the Special Rapporteur to reflect the Commission's uncertainty in 1964 as to the exact function of the present article; for it does little more than reserve the possibility that the operation of a treaty may be modified by a subsequent treaty, and does not state the conditions under which this will occur. These conditions, as the Government of Israel indicates, are formulated in article 63. The present sub-paragraph is incomplete since it takes no account of Article 103 of the Charter, or of other cases where the relation between two treaties is determined by a special provision in one of them, or of cases of implied termination. Being incomplete, it is unsatisfactory even if viewed as a general reservation of the possibility that the operation of a treaty may be modified by a subsequent treaty concluded between the same parties and relating to the same subject matter. No doubt this defect could be removed by rewording the text—perhaps with a cross reference to article 63. But the Special Rapporteur shares the doubts of the Government of Israel as to whether there is need to retain sub-paragraph (c), if the rules regarding the effect of a subsequent treaty are satisfactorily formulated in article 63.

7. Sub-paragraph (b) also is endorsed by the United States Government as reflecting long-standing and widely accepted practice, and again no Government has questioned its correctness. The Government of Israel, however, thinks it to be indistinguishable in its practical effect from the provision in article 69, paragraph 3(b), and for that reason redundant. This provision requires that, in interpreting a treaty, there must be taken into account "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which clearly establishes the understanding of all the parties regarding its interpretation". The Commission, in paragraph (2) of its commentary on the present article, recognized that "the line may sometimes be blurred between interpretation and amendment of a treaty through subsequent practice". But it concluded that legally the processes are quite distinct and should be dealt with separately.

8. In the case of bilateral treaties, it may be that the effect of subsequent practice as evidence of a new agreement modifying a treaty may be indistinguishable for practical purposes from subsequent practice as evidence of an agreement giving an authentic interpretation of the treaty. Thus, in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, the International Court, although there was a manifest divergence of the boundary line accepted by the parties in their subsequent practice from the criterion for determining the boundary laid down in the treaty, regarded the subsequent practice primarily as evidence of an authentic interpretation of the treaty settlement by the parties which must prevail over the relevant treaty clause. If this reasoning may seem somewhat artificial when the treaty clause continued to be applicable according to its ordinary meaning in other sections of the boundary, the case does perhaps show that for practical purposes it may not be of much moment whether in bilateral treaties subsequent practice is regarded as having its effect in the context of an interpretation or of a modification of the treaty. Even so, it may be going a little far to classify all subsequent practice, however much at variance with the plain meaning of the text, as constituting an authentic interpretation rather than a modification of a bilateral treaty. In the other precedent mentioned in paragraph (2) of the commentary—the

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89 I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 33 and 34.
facto constitute a violation of the treaty.

9. In any event, there remains the problem of multilateral treaties and of inter se applications of such treaties by two parties or by a group. Under article 69, paragraph 3(b), it is only subsequent practice which clearly establishes the understanding of all the parties regarding the meaning of the treaty which is recognized as equivalent to an interpretative agreement and the reason is, of course, that two parties or even a group of parties cannot, by their interpretation of the treaty, bind the other parties as to its correct interpretation. Sub-paragraph (b) of the present article, on the other hand, does not speak of the agreement of “all the parties” but simply of “the parties”. Many multilateral treaties operate in practice bilaterally in the relations between each party and each other party; and it may happen that different parties apply the treaty in somewhat different ways; or that some parties apply the treaty in a way which the others do not accept as a correct interpretation of it. Clearly, on the plane of interpretation, the treaty has only one correct interpretation. But in practice it may have applications between particular parties which diverge from the interpretation and application of it by the general body of the parties. It hardly seems possible to classify such cases under the head of “interpretation by subsequent practice” without seeming to throw overboard the essential concept of the integrity of the text of a multilateral treaty. If this concept may suffer some qualification through the practice of reservations, it remains of the highest importance. Accordingly, it is thought that the Commission was right in 1964 to distinguish between the “interpretation” and the “modification” of a treaty by subsequent practice.

10. In the case of multilateral treaties, the question would seem to arise whether it is necessary to distinguish between a subsequent practice having the effect of “amending” the treaty generally between the parties, and one “modifying” the operation of the treaty only between certain of its parties; in other words, whether the distinction made in articles 66 and 67 between “amending” and inter se agreements has also to be made in the present article. If it may be inadvisable to try to carry the parallelism between express agreement and agreement evidenced by subsequent conduct too far, it seems desirable for the Commission to consider how far the conditions set out in article 67 may be applicable also to inter se modification by subsequent practice. In some multilateral treaties, for example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, an application of the treaty which differentiates between one party and another may ipso facto constitute a violation of the treaty.

11. Sub-paragraph (c) has attracted a number of criticisms and its simple deletion is proposed by three Governments. The Government of Pakistan does not indicate the grounds on which it finds difficulty in the proposition that the operation of a treaty may be modified by the emergence of a new rule of customary law relating to matters dealt with in the treaty and binding upon all parties. The United Kingdom mentions two grounds on which it objects to the inclusion of the sub-paragraph: first, the exact point of time at which a new rule of customary law can be said to have emerged is an exceedingly difficult question; and secondly, it does not think that treaties should be modified without the consent of the parties. The first of these appears also to be the reason behind the proposal of the United States Government for omitting the sub-paragraph; for it also says that paragraph (c) may lead to serious differences of opinion because of differing views as to what constitutes customary law. But uncertainty as to the rules of customary law does not seem a very cogent objection to the formulation of the rule in sub-paragraph (c) because, whatever its uncertainties, customary law is a phenomenon which looms large in international law, and the problem of how it may affect the application of treaties at any given time unquestionably exists.

12. The United States Government seems to regard sub-paragraph (c) essentially as an aspect of the inter-temporal law; for it observes that the sub-paragraph is in keeping with “the long-recognized principle that treaties are to be applied in the context of international law and in accordance with its evolution”. The solution which it proposes is to omit the sub-paragraph and to leave the principle underlying it to be applied “under the norms of international law in general” rather than as a provision of the draft articles. The Government of Israel also treats the sub-paragraph as concerned with one aspect of the inter-temporal law. Unlike the United States Government, it advocates the retention of the substance of the sub-paragraph in the draft articles but in the context of interpretation; and it suggests that the sub-paragraph should be transferred to article 69 and follow closely after paragraph 1(b) of that article. The second objection mentioned by the United Kingdom Government, on the other hand, suggests that its understanding of sub-paragraph (c) is different from that of the United States and Israel Governments; for it seems to regard the sub-paragraph as dealing rather with the relative priority of treaty and customary norms of international law. It objects to the idea that a new customary norm should necessarily over-ride a treaty provision regardless of the will of the parties.

13. Sub-paragraph (c), in the view of the Special Rapporteur, is ambivalent, reflecting a certain hesitation in the Commission in 1964 as to the precise motif of the sub-paragraph, namely, as to whether it should deal with the inter-temporal law or with the relative priority of treaty and customary norms. If it deals with the inter-temporal law, the Special Rapporteur agrees with the Government of Israel that the question of the effect of the evolution of the law on the meaning of a term of a treaty falls under article 69. If, on the other hand, it deals with the relation between treaty and customary norms, the objection of the United Kingdom Government that it disregards the will of the parties is considered by the Special Rapporteur to be well-founded. The very object of a bilateral treaty or of a treaty between a small group

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of States is not infrequently to set up a special legal regime between the States concerned and sometimes a régime which derogates from the existing customary law. Accordingly, to say that the emergence of a new rule of customary law, binding on the parties as a general rule, is necessarily to modify the particular relations which they have set up between them may defeat their intention. Here the Commission is confronted with a problem of the priority of legal norms, similar to that dealt with in article 63 in regard to successive treaties covering the same subject matter, but in the different context of the relation between a treaty and a customary norm. If the problem is to be dealt with at all in the draft articles, the Special Rapporteur feels that the rules may have to be more closely worked out than they are in sub-paragraph (c) and transferred to the section on the application of treaties. At the very least, it would be necessary to make the end of the sub-paragraph read: "and binding upon all the parties in their mutual relations".

14. In any event, the Special Rapporteur feels that article 68, as at present constructed, is out of place in the section on "modification" of treaties. Articles 65-67 concern the alteration of the operation of treaties by acts of the parties done in relation to the treaty. Those articles may therefore properly be regarded as relating to the modification of treaties. The same is true of sub-paragraph (b) of the present article, since it concerns the subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the treaty. But sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) concern the impact on a treaty of acts done outside and not in relation to it.

15. In the light of the foregoing observations, the Special Rapporteur thinks that the Commission should reconsider the whole article; and pending that reconsideration his own suggestions are necessarily of a very tentative character. A possible solution, he feels, may be: (1) to remove sub-paragraph (a) and regard it as covered by article 63; (2) to omit sub-paragraph (c) and re-examine how the question of the inter-temporal law should be dealt with in article 69, paragraph 1; and (3) to retain only sub-paragraph (b) in the present article. In that case, it may perhaps be desirable to expand the rule regarding subsequent practice slightly in order to take account of the problem of "inter se" modification of multilateral treaties, so that the article might read on the following lines:

Modification of a treaty by subsequent practice

The operation of a treaty may be modified by subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the treaty establishing their agreement to an alteration or extension of its provisions. In the case of a multilateral treaty, the rules set out in article 67, paragraph 1, apply to an alteration or extension of its provisions as between certain of the parties alone.

Article 69.—General rule of interpretation
Article 70.—Further means of interpretation
Article 71.—Terms having a special meaning

Comments of Governments

Cyprus. While reserving the right to make detailed comments later, the Government of Cyprus expresses the view that it might have been preferable to attach more weight to the principle contained in the maxim *ut res magis valeat quam pereat* by its express mention.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government considers that the principle that the text must be the starting point of interpretation should receive express mention in the text; and it therefore proposes that article 69, paragraph 1, should be revised so as to read as follows:

"A treaty, whose text is presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties, shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to each term."

Finland. The Government of Finland considers the rules concerning the interpretation of treaties to be both useful and appropriate.

Hungary. Noting that the commentary to article 69 explains the textual approach adopted by the Commission, the Hungarian Government observes that the text does not even mention the intention of the contracting parties. In its view, it is desirable to draft the article more flexibly and to give expression in it to the notion that it is the intention of the parties which is sought and that their intention is presumed to be that which appears from the text.

Mentioning that article 70 refers to preparatory work merely as a further means of interpretation, the Hungarian Government expresses the view that this is out of harmony with article 69, paragraph 3, under which "subsequent practice" is stated to be a primary means of interpretation. In its view preparatory work done prior to the conclusion of a treaty is of the same importance as subsequent practice for determining the intention.

Israel. While reserving its freedom of decision when the question comes before political organs, the Government of Israel expresses the view that the draft articles should contain provisions concerning interpretation on the lines of those formulated by the Commission. It also feels that those provisions should appear early in the draft articles. On the substance, it endorses the general philosophy of the Commission's treatment of the subject as expressed in paragraph (9) of the commentary; i.e., the textual approach to interpretation.

Paragraph 2 of article 69 it considers not to be part of any general rule of interpretation but in reality a definition which, in some respects, completes that of a "treaty" in article 1 and is applicable throughout the draft articles. In its view, the removal of paragraph 2 from article 69 would make the general rule of interpretation clearer; and it suggests the transfer of the definition in that paragraph to article 1. At the same time, it suggests that the expression "drawn up" in paragraph 2 may be ambiguous since it is capable of meaning a draft instrument, whereas the intention is clearly to refer to the final text.

If paragraph 2 is removed from article 69 in the manner already indicated, the Government of Israel suggests that the elements comprised in paragraph 3 could be moved into paragraph 1 to form sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of that paragraph. In this connexion it states that the word "also" in paragraph 3 may cause confusion. Noting that paragraph (13) of the commentary refers to
paragraph 3 as specifying “further authentic elements of interpretation”, while article 70 is entitled “further means of interpretation”, it expresses the opinion that the appropriate point of departure for the process of interpretation is to be found in each one of the four elements of paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 69. All these, it suggests, stand on an equal footing.

The Government of Israel thinks that the expression “ordinary meaning to be given to each term” in paragraph 1 of article 69 may become a source of confusion to the extent that it seems to leave open the question of changes in linguistic usage subsequent to the establishment of the treaty text. It cites in this connexion a dictum of the International Court on the United States Nationals in Morocco case interpreting the word “dispute” by reference to the linguistic usage at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.  

In addition, it warns against formulating the rule as a whole in such a way as would lead to “excessive molecularization of the treaty”. Here it refers to a dictum of the International Court in the Maritime Safety Committee case regarding the meaning of the word “elected”, in which it emphasized that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation by reference to its usual or common meaning and that a word “obtains its meaning from the context in which it is used”.  

It suggests that, leaving aside the question of the time factor previously mentioned, this point could be met by revising the opening words of article 69 so as to make them read:

“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the language used in its context.”

In that event, the reference to the “context of the treaty” in sub-paragraph (a) would be deleted. At the same time it suggests that the order of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) should be reversed.

In sub-paragraph (b) the Government of Israel suggests that the text needs adjustment so as to make it clear that the rules of general international law there referred to are the substantive rules of international law, including the rules of interpretation, and not the rules of interpretation alone.

In addition, the Government of Israel considers that, in view of the proliferation of multilingual versions of treaties, comparison between two or more authentic versions ought to be mentioned in article 69, since in its view, such comparison is normal practice in interpretation. It observes that article 73 deals only with the specific problem of what happens when the comparison discloses a difference; but that comparison is of a greater importance, for it frequently assists in determining the meaning of the text and the intention of the parties to the treaty. To that extent, in its opinion, comparison forms part of any general rule of interpretation in the case of multilingual treaties.

The Government of Israel further states that if article 69 is reconstructed on the lines which it proposes, including the transfer of paragraph 2 to article 1, it may be unnecessary and, indeed, confusing to refer specifically to the preparatory work of the treaty in article 70.

Finally, it suggests that article 71 should either be combined with article 69 or placed immediately after it.

Netherlands. The Netherlands Government comments that, where a treaty refers or appears to refer to concepts of international law, observance of the rule in paragraph 1(b) of article 69 would mean that efforts must be made to discover the intention of the parties by considering the meaning of these concepts elsewhere in international law and independently of the treaty to be interpreted. In its view, it is essential that the intention of the parties should be ascertained from the treaty itself under paragraph 1(a), and any attempt to discover that intention from international law in general is of secondary importance. It thinks the rules in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) not to be of equal value and that sub-paragraph (b) should not be applied until sub-paragraph (c) has proved ineffective. Nor does it agree with the reference in sub-paragraph (b) to “law in force at the time of the conclusion of the treaty”. Although this may be the correct criterion in some cases, it is of the opinion that in others legal terms will have to be interpreted according to the law in force either at the time the dispute arises or at the time of interpretation. For example, in interpreting the terms “territorial sea” or “open sea”, regard must, it considers, be had to changing legal views. The Netherlands Government favours the total deletion of sub-paragraph 1(b), rather than merely the words “in force at the time of its conclusion”. It would be quite enough, it considers, to leave the question of the time element to be determined on the basis of “good faith”. It proposes that paragraph 1 should be revised so as to make it read:

“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to each term in the context of the treaty and in the light of its objects and purposes”.

The Netherlands Government also considers that paragraph 3(b) of article 69, by requiring the “understanding of all the parties”, may rule out or greatly restrict the possible influence of what is conventional within an international organization. Even if the word “all” is deleted, the clause would still, it thinks, place an undesirable curb on the interpretation procedure and make it unnecessarily rigid. It suggests that all the words from “which clearly” to “its interpretation” should be deleted from paragraph 3(b). It proposes that the sub-paragraph should read simply as follows:

“Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty...”.

Turkey. The Turkish Government approves of the effort of the Commission to codify the rules for the interpretation of treaties, and is in general accord with the principles adopted by the Commission as the basis of the rules formulated in the articles.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government supports the Commission’s view that the text of a treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties. It further expresses its support for the Commission’s proposal in paragraph 1(b). It
also considers the concept of the “context” of a treaty to be a useful one, not only with regard to interpretation but also with regard to such expressions as “unless the treaty otherwise provides” and “unless it appears from the treaty”, found in other articles. At the same time it suggests that in paragraph 2 of article 69 the words “including its preamble and annexes” should be omitted from the definition of the “context of the treaty”.

**United States.** While expressing the view that articles 69-71 appear to serve a useful purpose, the United States Government suggests that there may be a question whether their provisions should be stated as guidelines rather than as rules; and also a question whether additional means of interpretation should be enumerated. It further assumes that the order in which the means of interpretation are given has no significance in determining the relative weight to be given to them. At the same time, it questions the apparent primacy given to the ordinary meaning even when an agreement between the parties requires that some terms be given a special or technical meaning. It suggests that this possible conflict could be avoided by listing in paragraph 1 six rules of interpretation *seriatim*: (a) ordinary meaning; (b) context; (c) objects and purposes; (d) rules of international law; (e) agreement regarding interpretation; (f) subsequent practice in interpretation. Paragraph 3 of article 69 would then be eliminated. As to paragraph 2, it feels that if “context” is to be defined, the definition should be improved; for example, by clarifying whether it includes (a) a unilateral document and (b) a document on which several but not all of the parties to a multilateral instrument have agreed.

The United States Government considers that, *mutatis mutandis*, the Commission’s formulation of the six rules is, in general, satisfactory. It feels, however, that in paragraph 1(b) of article 69, the reference to “general international law” may add an element of confusion and that the word “general” should be deleted. Again, in paragraph 3(b), it suggests that the reference to “the understanding of all the parties” may be open to the construction that some affirmative action is required of each and every party. In its view, a course of action by one party not objected to by others may be a substantial guide to interpretation.

Article 70 it thinks may be unduly restrictive with respect to recourse to preparatory work and other means of interpretation. It observes that, if a provision seems clear on its face but a dispute has arisen with respect to its meaning, recourse to other means of interpretation should not be dependent on the conditions specified in (a) and (b) of the article. It suggests that recourse to further means of interpretation should be permissible if the rules set forth in article 69 are not sufficient to establish the correct interpretation.

In article 71 it suggests that the word “conclusively” is unnecessary and may be a source of confusion.

Finally, the United States Government remarks that further study should be given to the relationship of the articles on interpretation with other articles which have “interpretive overtones”, e.g. articles 43 (supervening impossibility of performance), 44 (fundamental change of circumstances) and 68 (modification by a subsequent treaty, subsequent practice or customary law).

**Yugoslavia.** The Yugoslav Government considers that the articles on interpretation require to be made more complete. First, it suggests the desirability of a special provision for the purpose of excluding the possibility of depriving a treaty of its true force and effect by means of a procedure of interpretation. Secondly, it remarks that States acceding to a multilateral treaty ordinarily have in view only the text itself and not its *travaux préparatoires*; and that this point ought also to be covered. It endorses the Commission’s proposal that recourse may be had to the *travaux préparatoires* only in the circumstances envisaged in article 70. Indeed, it thinks that the point might be formulated in sharper form, namely, that when the text of a treaty is clear and unambiguous it is inadmissible to refer to the provisional understandings arrived at in the course of the negotiations. In these cases, it considers that the parties are entitled in good faith to refer only to the agreement definitively adopted.

In addition, the Yugoslav Government considers it necessary to envisage the case of an international instrument produced by several States having different legal systems and concepts in which the interpretation of the agreement must conform to the legal concepts of all the contracting parties.

**Greek delegation.** The Greek delegation does not accept that priorities should be established among the various means of interpreting a treaty. In its view, since a treaty is an expression of the common intention of the parties the only basic rule of interpretation is to ascertain that intention by every possible means in every possible way. It remarks that the Permanent Court in its Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Convention concerning Employment of Women during the Night, although it relied upon “the natural meaning of the words”, discovered that meaning by studying the *travaux préparatoires* of the convention. In article 69 it would prefer to see the expression “word” used rather than “term”. Even so, it does not think that “words” always have an ordinary meaning and the intention of the parties is the only thing that matters. Paragraph 1(b), by referring to the rules of general international law in force at the time of a treaty’s conclusion, has the effect, it emphasizes, of excluding so-called evolutionary interpretation. By way of example, it instances the term “exchange control” in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.

**Kenyan delegation.** The Kenyan delegation considers that articles 69-71 represent a reasonable compromise of conflicting views. At the same time, it underlines that, as the essence of any treaty is the intention of the parties, the goal of any method of interpretation must be to use all intrinsic and external aids to find out what that intention really was.
**Syrian delegation.** The Syrian delegation says of article 69, paragraph 1(b) that it stipulates advisedly that a treaty is to be interpreted "in the light of the general rules of international law in force at the time of its conclusion"; and it adds that it is only in that context that the wish of the parties can be validly interpreted. 87

**Thai delegation.** The Thai delegation considers that in article 69 the first rule of interpretation should be that the terms of the treaty, if clear and precise, are the only guide to the intention of the parties. Citing Vattel, it says that the text should be subject to interpretation only if it is ambiguous. As to paragraph 3(b), it is of the opinion that, although subsequent practice may provide evidence of facts, it is not conclusive, and cannot be automatically applied but must be invoked by a party. The probative value of subsequent practice, it maintains, depends on all the surrounding circumstances and must be weighed with all other relevant evidence. In its view, subsequent practice may afford aid in the interpretation of ambiguous provisions, but may not be used to frustrate the natural meaning of the words or to extend the scope of the original terms. 88

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. It appears from the comments of Governments that in principle they endorse the attempt of the Commission to isolate and codify the general principles which constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties. The United States Government, it is true, while it considers articles 69-71 to serve a useful purpose, and makes suggestions for their improvement, raises a query as to whether their provisions should be stated as "guidelines" rather than as rules. The Special Rapporteur understands this query primarily as a caveat against formulating the general principles for the interpretation of treaties in such a manner as to give them a rigidity which might deprive the process of interpretation of the degree of flexibility necessary to it. The Commission was fully conscious in 1964 of the undesirability—if not impossibility—of confining the process of interpretation within rigid rules, and the provisions of articles 69-71 when read together, as they must be, do not appear to constitute a code of rules incompatible with the required degree of flexibility. No doubt the formulation of those provisions and their interrelation with each other can and will be improved by the Commission in the light of the comments of Governments. But if satisfactory texts can be found, it seems desirable than any "principles" found by the Commission to be "rules" should, so far as seems advisable, be formulated as such. In a sense, all "rules" of interpretation have the character of "guidelines" since their application in a particular case depends so much on the appreciation of the context and the circumstances of the point to be interpreted. But in the international community, where the role of treaty interpretation is so important and where recourse to adjudication depends on the will of the parties, there may be particular value in codifying as rules such basic principles of interpretation as are found to be generally accepted as law.

2. Governments appear also to endorse, in general, the Commission's view that the elucidation of the meaning of the text should be the starting point of interpretation rather than an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties. One Government (Czechoslovakia) has indeed suggested that this concept should receive express mention in article 69 in the form of a presumption: "A treaty, whose text is presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties, shall be interpreted, etc." On the other hand, another Government (Hungary) would prefer expression to be given to the notion that it is the intention of the parties which is sought in interpretation and that "their intention is presumed to be that which appears from the text". Whichever way the presumption is framed, its introduction into the article would seem to have disadvantages. The presumption suggested by the Czechoslovak Government is closely in line with the concept of interpretation expressed in the article. But the statement of the presumption may tend to raise the question how far the presumption is rebuttable and what precisely is the relation between the presumption and other elements of interpretation mentioned in articles 69-71. In other words, it may slightly tend to increase the rigidity of the rule formulated in the articles. The presumption suggested by the Hungarian Government, while open to the same objection, tends to present the intention of the parties rather than the text as the starting point of interpretation and thus to diverge somewhat from the Commission's approach to the rules of interpretation. (See also this Government's suggestion that preparatory work should be given the same importance as subsequent practice for determining the intention of the parties.)

3. Two Governments (United States and Israel) make proposals for the rearrangement of the provisions of articles 69 and 71 which, if their explanations of the proposals are different, would give a somewhat similar result. The United States Government first expresses the opinion that the order in which the means of interpretation are stated ought not to have any significance in determining their relative weight. It then queries what it calls the "apparent primacy given to the ordinary meaning even when an agreement between the parties requires that some terms be given a special or technical meaning". The validity of this objection may be open to doubt since, if the intention of the parties to give a special or technical meaning to terms is clear, that intention will certainly prevail under the combined effect of the rules stated in article 69, paragraphs 1 and 3(a), and article 71. But if that intention is not clear, the onus put by article 71 upon the State alleging the special or technical meaning to establish the intention to set aside the ordinary meaning would seem to be justified, whether the intention is said to be expressed in the treaty itself or in "an agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty". Nevertheless, the general point made regarding the relation between the various rules set out in article 69 remains. This point, the United States Government suggests, should be met by listing seriatim in article 69, paragraph 1, the following six rules of interpretation: (a) ordinary meaning; (b) context; (c) objects and purposes; (d) rules of international law;

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87 Ibid., 845th meeting, para. 9.
88 Ibid., 850th meeting, para. 17.
(e) agreement regarding interpretation; and (f) subsequent practice in interpretation. Paragraph 3 would then, as a separate paragraph, disappear. Under the United States scheme, article 71, dealing with terms intended to have a special meaning, would, it seems, remain where it is as a distinct article.

The Government of Israel, also proposes that the two matters covered in paragraph 3 of article 69—agreement regarding interpretation and subsequent practice—should be moved up into paragraph 1. At the same time it underlines that, in its view, “the appropriate point of departure for the process of interpretation is to be found in each one of the four elements of paragraphs 1 and 3”; and it considers each of these elements to stand on an equal footing. If “ordinary meaning” is added from the opening phrase of article 69 and the elements of “context” and “objects and purposes” combined in paragraph 1(a) are separated, the four elements of the Israel proposal become the six elements of the United States proposal. The two proposals differ, however, in that the United States Government suggests that “ordinary meaning” should be removed from its governing position in the opening phrase and placed alongside the other elements, whereas the Government of Israel assumes that the “ordinary meaning” will retain its position in the opening phrase. The United States Government does not indicate very clearly how it relates the “ordinary meaning” to the “context”, to “objects and purposes” or to “rules of international law”.

The Government of Israel it should be added, proposes that article 71 (intention to give a special meaning) should either be moved up into article 69 or placed immediately after it.

4. Leaving aside the question of the “ordinary meaning”, the Commission did not, it is believed, intend in 1964 to establish any positive hierarchy for the application of the means of interpretation mentioned in the four sub-paragraphs of paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 69. It headed the article “General rule of interpretation”, in the singular, and it regarded the application of the means of interpretation set out in the article as a combined operation. All the various elements, so far as they are present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible and their interaction would then give the legally relevant interpretation. The problem is perhaps reminiscent of the so-called sources of international law listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court. In the nature of things the various elements have to be arranged in some order, and considerations of logic lead the mind to find one arrangement more satisfying than another. Then, no matter how general or neutral the formulation, alert minds may see in the arrangement chosen a basis for deducing a hierarchical order for the application of the norms. Although he doubts whether the change affects the legal position very much, the Special Rapporteur suggests that it may be advisable to move the contents of paragraph 3 up into paragraph 1 in order to emphasize the unity of the process of interpretation under the “general rule” laid down in article 69 and to minimize the significance of the order in which the various elements make their appearance in the article. Paragraph 2, if retained, can then readily enough follow the enlarged paragraph 1.

5. The United States proposal to detach the “ordinary meaning” rule from the opening phrase and make it the first of six rules involves a point of presentation which may also be one of substance. In 1964 the Commission took the view that the “ordinary meaning” of terms cannot properly be determined without reference to their context and to the objects and purposes of the treaty and to any relevant rules of international law. Indeed, some members even thought article 71 to be unnecessary on the ground that, in its context, the technical or special meaning of terms will appear as their ordinary meaning. But, if paragraph 1 of article 69 is revised, as the United States Government suggests, so as to read:

“The terms of a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith:
(a) in accordance with their ordinary meaning;
(b) in the context of the treaty;
(c) in the light of the objects and purposes of the treaty etc.”

the article will seem to recognize that terms have an ordinary meaning which is independent of their context and of the objects and purposes of the treaty. This may be true as a matter of pure linguistics but it may be doubted whether it is true as a matter of interpretation. As the precedents cited in paragraph (10) of the commentary illustrate, the “ordinary meaning of terms” is always in international jurisprudence associated with the “context”.

6. At the same time, it is necessary to consider the United States observation that, in the present text of article 69, there may be a certain appearance of conflict between the primacy given to the ordinary meaning and the rule in paragraph 3(a) concerning “an agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty”. This observation does not perhaps give full weight to the opening phrase of paragraph 3: “There shall also be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any agreement between the parties etc.” These words were intended by the Commission to put such interpretative agreements on the same level as the “context” and to indicate that an interpretative agreement is to be taken into account as if it were part of the treaty. It seems that the force of these words may have been obscured by the intervention of the definition of “context” between paragraphs 1 and 3; but this would be remedied if the contents of paragraph 3 are moved up into paragraph 1.

7. The Government of Israel makes two criticisms of the expression “ordinary meaning to be given to each term”, found at the beginning of article 69. First, it suggests that the expression may become a source of confusion by leaving open the question of changes in linguistic usage subsequent to the establishment of the treaty text; and it refers in this connexion to a dictum in the United States Nationals in Morocco case regarding the need to interpret the word “dispute” by reference to the meaning which it had at the time of the conclusion
of the treaty. 99 Attention was drawn to this point by Sir G. Fitzmaurice in an article where he referred to it as the “principle of contemporaneity” and by the Special Rapporteur in his third report. 100 The Commission regarded the point as simply an aspect of the inter-temporal law and did not seek to spell out a separate rule of “inter-temporal linguistics”. This view is believed by the Special Rapporteur to be correct; and he shares the view of the Netherlands Government that at root the application of the inter-temporal law to interpretation is a matter of good faith. He also feels that the requirement that a treaty should be interpreted by reference to the linguistic usage current at the time of its conclusion is really one both of common sense and good faith, and is also implicit in the rule that the meaning of terms is to be determined by reference to the context of the treaty and to its objects and purposes. This is not to belittle the practical importance of the inter-temporal law, but it may unduly complicate matters to introduce as a separate principle in the present article the concept of “inter-temporal” linguistics. Moreover, as the Special Rapporteur pointed out in his third report 101 the rule cannot be formulated in the simple form in which it is stated by Sir G. Fitzmaurice and by the Court in the United States Nationals in Morocco case; for the content of a word, e.g. “bay” or “territorial waters”, may change with the evolution of the law if the parties used it in the treaty as a general concept and not as a word of fixed content. Indeed, one Government questioned the advisability even of dealing with the inter-temporal law in the present article (see paragraph 11 below).

8. The second criticism is that the words as formulated—“ordinary meaning to be given to each term”—may lead to “excessive molecularization of the treaty”; and in this connexion the Government of Israel refers to a dictum of the International Court that a “word obtains its meaning from the context in which it is used”. 102 It proposes that the opening phrase of article 69 should be revised to read: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the language used in its context” and that the word “context” should then be deleted from sub-paragraph (a). The Special Rapporteur doubts the force of this criticism, even although he may still prefer his original formulation “ordinary meaning to be given to each term in its context in the treaty and in the context of the treaty as a whole”. The existing text relates the meaning of each term to “the context of the treaty” and to “its objects and purposes”, which seems sufficient to discourage “excessive molecularization” of the treaty. And a simpler expedient to meet the point would seem to be to change “each term” to “its terms”. Nor does the phrase “language used in its context” seem felicitous. Terms—“termes” in French—is the word whose use is hallowed in this connexion and it seems natural to employ it in article 69. True, it has the disadvantage of having two senses: “term” in the linguistic sense and “term” in the legal sense of “provision”. But the two senses are concordant and the rule is meaningful and valid for both. Otherwise, it would seem preferable to adopt the Greek Government’s suggestion and to speak of the “words” of the treaty.

9. Paragraph 1(b) has attracted comments from a number of governments. The United Kingdom and Syrian Governments express their support of the rule formulated in this sub-paragraph. The United States Government also supports the rule, merely suggesting that the word “general” should be deleted from the phrase “general international law”, as it feels that this word may add an element of confusion. The Netherlands Government, on the other hand, takes exception to the sub-paragraph and advocates its total deletion. In its view, the sub-paragraph would require that, wherever a treaty appears to refer to a concept of international law, an effort should be made to determine the intention of the parties by considering the meaning of those concepts elsewhere in international law and independently of the treaty. It considers that the principle regarding context and objects and purposes in sub-paragraph (a) does not possess the same value as the principle regarding rules of international law in sub-paragraph (b); and that recourse should only be had to the latter when the application of sub-paragraph (a) has proved ineffective. The Government of Israel, on the other hand, suggests that sub-paragraph (b) should be placed before sub-paragraph (a) (which, in its view, should contain a reference to “objects and purposes”). This Government at the same time suggests that sub-paragraph (b) should be revised so as to make it clear that the expression “rules of general international law” denotes the substantive rules of international law, including rules of interpretation, and not the rules of interpretation alone. The Special Rapporteur thinks that it may be convenient if he examines the foregoing comments on paragraph 1(b) before turning to the other comments dealing with the question of the inter-temporal law.

10. The objection taken by the Netherlands Government to sub-paragraph (b) does not seem to the Special Rapporteur to carry conviction; for it involves interpreting the sub-paragraph in a manner which could hardly be justified as an interpretation in good faith. Certainly, it is a manner of interpreting the reference to rules of international law which has not occurred to any other Government and which did not occur to members of the Commission in 1964 or to members of the Institute of International Law in 1956 when they adopted the resolution on the interpretation of treaties mentioned in the Special Rapporteur’s third report. 103 Paragraph 1 has to be read as a whole and, when this is done, it does little more than say that the terms of a treaty have to be interpreted in the light of the fact that it is an instrument concluded under the international legal order existing at the time of its conclusion.

Indeed, the Government of Israel’s proposal for the reversal of the order of the sub-paragraphs goes in the...
opposite direction from that of the Netherlands Government, since it would, if anything, give more prominence to the rules of international law. No reason is given for this proposal, and the advantage of it is not apparent to the Special Rapporteur. On the contrary, he sees every reason for not separating the "context of the treaty" from the "objects and purposes" of the treaty, in the formulation of article 69. In his view, both are aspects of the "context of the treaty" and although, as already stated, he himself might have preferred a slightly different formulation of the element of "context", he does not favour this proposal of the Government of Israel. Nor does he find convincing its other suggestion that the text needs revision so as to make it clear that "the general rules of international law" cover the substantive rules of international law. Unless the Commission can rely on words being interpreted in good faith according to their ordinary meaning in their context, its drafts may have to become much more complicated than they now are. There remains the United States proposal for the deletion of the word "general". Its comment that this word may introduce an element of confusion is considered to be justified. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur doubts whether the Commission ever decided to include the word in the text. At its 770th meeting he introduced a final draft which spoke only of "the rules of international law". A proposal was made by one member of the Commission to introduce the word "general" into the text; and a discussion then ensued as to whether the phrase should be "rules" or "principles" of international law. But the record does not indicate that any vote was taken on the proposal to include the word "general"; while the trend of the discussion was against it.

11. Three Governments question the adequacy of paragraph 1(b) in regard to the inter-temporal element. The Government of Israel, in its comments on article 68, sub-paragraph (c) (Modification of a treaty by the emergence of a new rule of customary law), proposes the transfer of the contents of that sub-paragraph to article 69. It considers that the question raised by the emergence of a new customary rule is primarily the impact of the new rule on the interpretation of the treaty under the second branch of the inter-temporal law mentioned by Judge Huber in the *Island of Palmas* case. The Netherlands Government, for its part, questions the words "in force at the time of the conclusion of the treaty" in paragraph 1(b) of article 69, observing that in some cases legal terms may have to be interpreted according to the law in force at the time of their interpretation. It suggests that the time element in interpretation should be left to "good faith". The Greek Government also questions the words "in force at the time of the conclusion of the treaty" as having the effect of excluding "evolutionary interpretation" of treaties.

12. The Special Rapporteur, in his comments on article 68, has suggested that the rule regarding the emergence of a new rule of customary law should be removed from article 68, since it does not seem to be a case of "modification of treaties" in the same sense as the cases dealt with in articles 65-67. He has also pointed out that the emergence of a new rule of customary law has two aspects: (1) its impact on the interpretation of terms and (2) its possible impact on the application of the treaty by setting up a customary legal norm, i.e. by raising a question of the relative priority of the treaty and the customary norm. The present arrangement under which the "interpretative" aspect is half dealt with in article 69 and the "application" aspect is incompletely covered in article 68 under the head of "modification", does not seem justifiable. The Commission, it is thought, has to decide, first, whether it is going to cover the inter-temporal element at all in the draft article and, secondly, if it is to do so, how the rules regarding its two aspects can be formulated in a manner to render them complete or at any rate not misleading.

13. Paragraph 1(b), as at present drafted, is incomplete in that it may be open to the interpretation that it negates the possibility that a term may ever change its content with the evolution of international law. The choice before the Commission, it is thought, is either to spell out in article 69 the second branch of the inter-temporal law which recognizes that such a change may occur in certain cases, or else to adopt the point of view of the Netherlands Government that the temporal element in interpretation is implicit in interpretation in good faith. The second branch of the inter-temporal law, as the Special Rapporteur pointed out in his third report, cannot be altogether divorced from the intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. Thus, in the *North Atlantic Coast Fisheries* arbitration it was held that the word "bay" in the Treaty of Ghent of 1818 had been intended to denote a bay in the popular rather than legal sense. Even when a term, e.g. "bay", "territorial waters", "continental shelf", is used in its legal sense, a question may arise whether the parties had a particular concept of the term in mind and intended to fix their rights definitively in the treaty by reference to that concept, or whether they intended the term to be given whatever meaning it might from time to time possess under international law. Accordingly, if the second branch is incorporated in article 69, its formulation will require close attention. In 1964, the Commission did not show itself very receptive to the idea of dealing with both branches of the inter-temporal law in article 69. If the Commission remains of this mind, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the words "in force at the time of its conclusion" should be deleted, and that sub-paragraph (b) should refer simply to "the rules of international law", or to the principles of international law) leaving the application of the inter-temporal law to be implied.

14. Paragraph 2 of article 69 is commented on by three Governments. The United Kingdom Government considers the concept of the "context" of a treaty to be a useful one, both with regard to interpretation and to such expressions as "unless it appears from the treaty". It merely suggests that the words "including its preamble and annexes" should be omitted from the definition. The United States Government, on the other hand, perhaps

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indicates a doubt as to the value of the concept when it suggests that if “context” is to be defined, it should be improved by clarifying whether it includes (1) a unilateral document and (2) a document on which several but not all of the parties to a multilateral instrument have agreed. The Government of Israel considers paragraph 2 not to be part of any general rule of interpretation but a definition which, in some respects, completes that of a “treaty” in article 1 and is applicable throughout the draft articles. Accordingly, it suggests the transfer of the definition to article 1. It also questions the expression “drawn up” as being open to the interpretation that it refers to a draft instrument.

15. The definition of what is comprised in the “context of the treaty”, as the Commission pointed out in paragraph (12) of its commentary, is important not only for the general application of the rules of interpretation but also for indicating the scope of such expressions as “unless the treaty otherwise provides”, “unless it appears from the treaty”, etc. These expressions occur at various places throughout the draft articles, including articles on the conclusion of treaties which in any arrangement of the articles will precede those on interpretation. That being so, the Government of Israel’s suggestion that the definition should be transferred to article 1 has a certain attraction. But the Government of Israel does not make clear whether it has in mind “context of the treaty” as the term to be defined in article 1, or a further clause “completing” the definition of what the term “treaty” means in the draft articles. In any case, neither of those solutions seem viable. Probably, only a further clause completing the definition of “treaty” by adding to it the elements in paragraph 2 of article 69 would be very helpful in article 1 in connexion with the later interpretation of expressions like “appears from the treaty”. But to expand the definition of “treaty” in that way, generally and not thereby for purposes of interpretation, might have unexpected consequences in the sections on “invalidity” and “termination” of treaties. On the other hand, to define “context of the treaty” in article 1 independently of the provisions of article 69 might not be very meaningful. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur feels that the better course is to retain the definition of “context” in article 69, but, as already indicated above, to place it at the end of the article and move the contents of paragraph 3 into paragraph 1.

16. As to the substance of paragraph 2, the Special Rapporteur sees no objection to the proposal to delete the words “including the preamble and annexes” which were inserted in 1964 only ex abundante cautela. The suggestion of the United States Government that it should be made clear whether the “context” includes (1) a unilateral document and (2) a document on which several but not all of the parties to a multilateral instrument have agreed raises problems both of substance and of drafting which the Commission was aware of in 1964 but did not find it easy to solve at the sixteenth session. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case¹⁰⁷ the International Court upheld the relevance of a purely unilateral declaration for the interpretation of a unilateral instrument. But it would seem clear on principle that a unilateral document cannot be regarded as part of the “context” for the purpose of interpreting a treaty, unless its relevance for the interpretation of the treaty or for determining the conditions of the particular State’s acceptance of the treaty is acquiesced in by the other parties. Similarly, in the case of a document emanating from a group of the parties to a multilateral treaty, principle would seem to indicate that the relevance of the document in connexion with the treaty must be acquiesced in by the other parties. Whether a “unilateral” or a “group” document forms part of the context depends on the particular circumstances of each case, and the Special Rapporteur does not think it advisable that the Commission should try to do more than state the essential point of the principle—the need for express or implied assent. The Government of Israel’s point regarding the expression “drawn up” will no doubt be borne in mind by the Drafting Committee, which in 1964 did not find it easy to arrive at a combination of words in paragraph 2 that would be satisfactory from every point of view.

17. Paragraph 3(b) (subsequent practice) is commented on by three Governments. The Netherlands Government considers that to require the “understanding of all the parties” may restrict unduly the influence of what is “conventional” (customary usage?) within an international organization. But even the deletion of the word “all” would, in its view, still be too restrictive; and it proposes that the sub-paragraph should read: “Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty”. The United States Government, though from a somewhat different point of view, also thinks that the word “all” is too strong, as being open to the construction that some affirmative action is required by each and every party. In its view, a course of action even by one party not objected to by others may be a substantial guide to interpretation. The Government of Thailand, on the other hand, questions the inclusion of “subsequent practice” in this paragraph. In its view, although evidence of intention, subsequent practice is never conclusive, has to be weighed against all other relevant evidence, and may afford aid only in the interpretation of ambiguous provisions.

18. The original proposals of the Special Rapporteur in his third report¹⁰⁸ mentioned subsequent practice among the “other evidence and indications of the intentions of the parties” additional to the context. But the Commission decided to differentiate subsequent practice establishing the common understanding of all the parties and to classify this as an authentic interpretation comparable to an interpretative agreement. At the same time, it said in paragraph (13) of the commentary that the practice of individual States in the application of a treaty may be taken into account under article 70 as one of the further means of interpretation there mentioned. But it did not refer to subsequent practice eo nomine in that article. The comments of the Netherlands Government suggest that this omission may have led it to read paragraph 3(b) as covering every application of subsequent

practice. Clearly, to amount to an "authentic interpretation", the practice must be such as to indicate that the interpretation has received the tacit assent of the parties generally. As to the United States objection that the word "all" may be construed as requiring some affirmative action from each and every party, it is doubted whether the objection is wholly valid. The word "understanding" was chosen by the Commission instead of "agreement" expressly in order to indicate that the assent of a party to the interpretation may be inferred from its reaction or absence of reaction to the practice. But although the existing text of paragraph 3(b) may not be inexact, the Special Rapporteur feels that the rigorous terms in which the rule is formulated—"clearly establishes", "all the parties"—may perhaps go a little beyond the way in which its operation is viewed in practice. He suggests that the word "clearly", which is unnecessary, should be omitted and that the paragraph might be reworded on the following lines:

any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the common understanding of the meaning of the terms as between the parties generally.

19. In article 70, the chief point which has attracted attention is the Commission's treatment of the question of "preparatory work" and, having regard to the controversial character of this question, the number of Governments which have made comments on it is comparatively small. The views of three Governments appear to diverge substantially from that of the Commission in regard to the place to be accorded to travaux préparatoires in the process of interpretation. The Hungarian Government considers that preparatory work ought to be given the same importance as subsequent practice, that is, should be classed as a primary means of interpretation. The United States Government, while not going quite as far as this, considers that article 70, as at present drafted, may be unduly restrictive with respect to recourse to preparatory work and other means of interpretation. Its view appears to be that, whenever a dispute has arisen regarding the meaning of a treaty, recourse to further means of interpretation should be admissible independently of whether the conditions specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) are fulfilled; and that the only requirement to be met should be that application of the rules in article 69 have failed to establish the correct interpretation. The Greek Government, considering that the only basis of rule of interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties by every possible means in every possible way, appears to take the position that recourse to preparatory work should in every case be automatically admissible in order to determine that intention. A fourth Government (Kenya), while stating that articles 69-71 represent a reasonable compromise of conflicting views, underlines that the goal of any method of interpretation must be to use all intrinsic and external aids to ascertain the intention of the parties. The Yugoslav Government, on the other hand, would prefer to see the conditions for recourse to travaux préparatoires stated in even stricter form, namely, that when the text is clear and unambiguous, recourse to them is inadmissible.

The Government of Israel, without taking a position on the question of substance, in effect proposes the deletion of the specific reference to preparatory work. It argues that, if the definition of "context" is transferred to article 1 (as it recommends) it may become "unnecessary and indeed confusing" to refer specifically to preparatory work in article 70.

20. The particular reason given by the Government of Israel for omitting any reference to preparatory work does not seem convincing. The "context of the treaty", as defined by the Commission, comprises not "drafts" and other preparatory material but separate operative documents formally related to the treaty. The Commission's definition of "context"—whether or not this may need amendment—does not dispose of the problem of travaux préparatoires: moreover, the formulation of such a definition seems to make it more, rather than less, necessary to refer specifically to travaux préparatoires in order to avoid any risk of its being supposed that the rule regarding the "context of the treaty" covers all aspects of travaux préparatoires. The expression "further means of interpretation" is, of course, wide enough to cover travaux préparatoires, but in 1964 the Commission considered it desirable on general grounds to indicate specifically the rule laid down for travaux préparatoires in the draft articles.

So far as concerns the substance of the question and the formulation of the rule in article 70, the Special Rapporteur does not feel that he should make any new proposal in the present report on the basis of the above-mentioned comments of Governments. The content and drafting of article 70 received close consideration in the Commission in 1964, when some differences of opinion appeared among members regarding the precise way in which recourse to travaux préparatoires should be related to the textual approach to interpretation. Some members felt that in practice travaux préparatoires play a somewhat more significant role in interpretation than might perhaps appear from a strict reading of certain pronouncements of the International Court. The Commission itself said in paragraph (15) of its commentary that "it would be unrealistic and inappropriate to lay down in the draft articles that no recourse whatever may be had to extensive means of interpretation, such as travaux préparatoires, until after the application of the rules contained in article 69 has disclosed no clear or reasonable meaning". Accordingly, the rule which it formulated was carefully balanced so as to allow recourse to travaux préparatoires in order to "verify or confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 69", but only to allow it for the purpose of determining the meaning in cases where interpretation according to article 69 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or gives a meaning which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. This formulation seemed to the Commission to be about as near as it is possible to get to reconciling the principle of the primacy of the text, frequently laid down by the Court and adopted by the Commission, with the frequent and quite normal recourse to travaux préparatoires without any too nice regard for the question whether the text itself is clear. Moreover, the rule formulated in article 70 is inherently
flexible, since the question whether the text can be said to be "clear" is in some degree subjective. But this does not detract from the importance of stating the rule in order to furnish the necessary directive for interpretation in good faith on the basis of the text and the travaux préparatoires; and without such a rule, the cardinal principle of the primacy of the text might be undermined.

The Commission will wish to re-examine its position in regard to the whole problem of travaux préparatoires at its eighteenth session and in doing so will certainly give every attention to the comments of Governments. But the Special Rapporteur, as already stated, does not think that these comments should lead him to propose changes in the text to the Commission. He does not, for example, feel that the modification suggested by the United States—

that recourse to preparatory work for the purpose of determining the meaning should be admitted whenever application of article 69 has failed to establish the correct interpretation—would be an improvement on the rule proposed by the Commission. To make recourse to travaux préparatoires dependent on a determination whether the rules in article 69 have given a "correct interpretation" seems to the Special Rapporteur rather to beg the question to be solved.

21. The special question of recourse to travaux préparatoires in the case of multilateral treaties is raised by the Yugoslav Government. In its opinion, States acceding to a multilateral treaty ordinarily have in view only the text itself and not the travaux préparatoires; and it proposes that the point should be covered in the article. The Commission examined this question in 1964 and decided that it should not include any special provision regarding the use of travaux préparatoires in the case of multilateral treaties. The considerations on which this decision was based are set out in paragraph (17) of its commentary and need not be repeated here. In view of the Commission's previous examination of the point, the Special Rapporteur does not feel that he should do more than draw its attention to the proposal of the Yugoslav Government.

22. Article 71 has been the subject of two comments. The United States Government proposes the deletion of the word "conclusively", which it considers to be unnecessary and a possible source of confusion. The Special Rapporteur feels that this comment is well-founded and that the word should be omitted.

The Government of Israel suggests that the article should either be combined with article 69, or placed immediately after it. The rule regarding terms used with a special meaning contained in article 71 at present seems somewhat detached from the "general rule"; and its relation to the various elements in article 69 and to "further means of interpretation" (article 70) is left somewhat in the air. If it is not easy to indicate very precisely the relation between article 71 and articles 69 and 70, the Special Rapporteur believes that it will be an improvement if the rule in article 71 is moved up into article 69 as a new paragraph 2. The establishment of a "special meaning" is not one of the purposes for which article 70 admits recourse to travaux préparatoires; and unless the "special meaning" rule is made part of article 69, means of interpretation necessary to establish a special meaning may appear to be excluded.

23. The Government of Israel further proposes that, having regard to the proliferation of multilingual versions of treaties, comparison between two or more versions ought to be included in article 69 as an additional principal means of interpretation; for such comparison is, in its view, normal practice in interpretation. However plausible this proposal may be when stated in these simple terms, it is not one which the Special Rapporteur feels that the Commission should adopt without very careful consideration of its implications. The legal relation between authentic texts (versions) of a treaty in different languages is a question of some delicacy, as appears from the Commission's examination of the matter in paragraphs (5) to (9) of its commentary on articles 72 and 73. The Special Rapporteur fears that the insertion of "comparison of authentic versions" among the general elements of interpretation contained in article 69, so far from being a simple recognition of something done in practice, might have far-reaching implications by undermining the security of the individual texts. Each language has its own genius, and it is not always possible to express the same idea in identical phraseology or syntax in different languages. It is one thing to admit interaction between two versions when each has been interpreted in accordance with its own genius and a divergence has appeared between them or an ambiguity in one of them. But it is another thing to attribute legal value to a comparison for the purpose of determining the ordinary meaning of the terms in the context of the treaty; for this may encourage attempts to transplant concepts of one language into the interpretation of a text in another language with a resultant distortion of the meaning. Nor is it to be forgotten that today many important treaties have five authentic versions, or that plurilingual treaties not infrequently have provisions giving one version a certain measure of priority over the other. The Commission will, no doubt, wish to examine the Government of Israel's proposal in this connexion; pending that examination, the Special Rapporteur confines himself to the above preliminary observations.

24. Finally, the Special Rapporteur does not overlook the suggestion of the United States Government that further study should be given to the relationship of the articles on interpretation to other articles which have "interpretive overtones", e.g. articles 43, 44 and 68. Numerous articles, in fact, have such interpretative overtones. But, as the bearing of the articles concerning interpretation on those other articles is already very much in the mind of the Commission and of the Drafting Committee, it suffices for the Special Rapporteur to make this suggestion.

25. In the light of the foregoing observations and in order that the Commission may have before it a text showing the broad result of accepting certain of the suggestions of Governments for the reformulation of the three articles, the Special Rapporteur has prepared the following draft illustrating the effect of incorporating the contents of paragraph 3 of article 69 and of article 71 in paragraph 1 of article 69:
**Article 69**

*General rule of interpretation*

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in the light of:
   (a) The context of the treaty and its objects and purposes;
   (b) The rules of international law;
   (c) Any agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty;
   (d) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the common understanding of the meaning of the terms as between the parties generally.

2. Nevertheless, a meaning other than its ordinary meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties intended the term to have that special meaning.

3. The context of the treaty, for the purposes of its interpretation, shall be understood as comprising in addition to the treaty any agreement or instrument related to the treaty which has either been made by the parties or has been made by some of them and assented to by the others as an instrument related to the treaty.

**Article 70**

*Further means of interpretation*

Recourse may be had to further means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to verify or confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 69, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 69:

(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable in the light of the objects and purposes of the treaty.

**Article 71** (deleted and contents transferred to article 69 as new paragraph 2).

**Article 72.**—*Treaties drawn up in two or more languages*

**Article 73.**—*Interpretation of treaties having two or more texts*

**Comments of Governments**

*Finland.* The Government of Finland considers the rules in these articles to be both useful and appropriate.

*Israel.* The Government of Israel defers its general comments on these articles until the Secretariat’s information regarding practice in the drafting of multilingual instruments is available. Meanwhile, it suggests that the word “versions” should be substituted for “texts” throughout article 73, in order to make it more consistent with article 72.

*Netherlands.* The Netherlands Government states that it has no comment to make on these articles.

*United States.* In article 72, the United States Government considers paragraph 1 to state a widely accepted rule. Paragraph 2(b), on the other hand, it feels to be of questionable utility. In its view, when negotiators have an opportunity to examine and react to a version which they personally authenticate, there is a basis for considering that they have accepted it as accurate. A provision that a version drawn up separately, and with respect to which the negotiators have no opportunity to make suggestions, shall also be authoritative, would introduce a new factor that should not, it maintains, be crystallized as a part of the law of treaties. If any such non-authenticated version is to have authenticity, it considers that it should be effected by the treaty to which that version applies or else by a supplementary agreement between the parties. In consequence, it proposes that sub-paragraph (b) regarding the established rules of an international organization should be deleted.

In article 73, the United States Government questions the use of the word “texts”, while recognizing that the usage is becoming more frequent. It says that a treaty is more properly conceived of as a unit, consisting of one text; and that when the text is expressed in two or more different languages, the several versions are an integral part of and constitute a single text. The use of the word “texts” seems, in its view, to derogate from the unity of the treaty as a single document. It accordingly suggests that the title to article 73 should read:

“Interpretation of treaties drawn up in two or more languages”.

It further suggests that paragraph 1 should be revised to read as follows:

“This formulation, it says, avoids the use of the word “different” when the emphasis should be upon similarity and equality. And for similar reasons it suggests that paragraph 2 should be reworded to read as follows:

“2. The terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each of the languages in which the text is authenticated. Except in the case referred to in paragraph 1, when a comparison between two or more language versions discloses a difference in the expressions of a term or concept and any resulting ambiguity or obscurity is not removed by the application of articles 69-72, a meaning which so far as possible reconciles the two or more language versions shall be adopted.””

*Kenyan delegation.* In the view of the Kenyan delegation, paragraph 2(b) of article 72 is unnecessary and should be deleted. 109

*Romanian delegation.* In comments covering articles 65, 66 and 72, the Romanian delegation also takes exception to paragraph 2(b) of article 72. 110

**Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur**

1. At its sixteenth session, the Commission requested the Secretariat to furnish further information on the practice of the United Nations in drawing up the texts of multilingual instruments. This information is contained in the Secretariat memorandum “Preparation of Multilingual Treaties” which is printed in this volume of the Yearbook. The memorandum confirms the information already available to the Commission in the Secretariat memorandum “The Summary of the Practice of the Secre-

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109 *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 850th meeting, para. 41.*

110 *Ibid.,* 842nd meeting, para. 16.
in the preparation of multilingual instruments, including "texts" throughout article 73 in order to make article 73 inconsistent with article 72, paragraph 2 of which differentiates between a mere version and a "text". Nor would it be in accord with the linguistic usage found in practice to speak of "versions" rather than "texts" in articles 72 and 73, as is explained in the next paragraph.

3. The use of the word "texts" in article 73 is also questioned by the United States Government, which at the same time concedes that the "usage is becoming more frequent". It maintains that a treaty is more properly conceived of as a unit, consisting of one text; and that the several language versions are an integral part of and constitute a single text. In its view, the use of the word "texts" tends to "derogate from the unity of the treaty as a single document". The statement that the use of the word "texts" is "becoming more frequent" is, however, a serious underestimate of the treaty practice in the matter. The general practice has always been and most certainly is today to speak of authentic "texts" and not authentic "versions" of a treaty. All the precedents mentioned in the "Handbook of Final Clauses" (pages 164-168 and footnotes 69 and 70 containing long lists of treaties having similar clauses) speak of "texts" not "versions". This usage is also reflected in "The Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Agreements" (pages 7 and 8) and in the "Preparation of Multilingual Treaties". It is, of course, perfectly correct and normal to speak in general terms of different language "versions" of a treaty but, whenever the question of "different language versions" is provided for in a treaty, the practice is almost invariably to refer to "texts", not "versions". Such is the practice found in the Charter itself (Article 111) and in the treaties drawn up within or under the auspices of the United Nations. (See paragraphs 18, 21, 25 and 31 of "Preparation of Multilingual Treaties".) These treaties include all the codifying conventions—and their accompanying protocols—which have resulted from the work of the Commission and the relevant final clauses of which are all on the following model:

"The original of the present Convention [Protocol], of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, etc."

Again, the "model final clauses" used for treaties concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe refer to the treaty's being "done in French and English, both texts being equally authoritative". The modern practice of the Organization of American States is similar, as is also that of the States of the Warsaw Treaty.

4. The doctrinal basis of the United States Government's objection to the word "texts" also appears to the Special Rapporteur to be open to question. The concept of the treaty as a unity, in however many languages its terms are expressed, is certainly of the highest importance and is, indeed, the basis of the rules laid down in paragraph 2 of article 73. But it may be doubted whether the principle of the unity of the treaty is derogated from by speaking of "texts" any more than by speaking of "versions". It does not seem to improve matters to speak of the text having more than one "version" instead of the treaty having more than one "text". If recourse is had to the fiction that the treaty has only one text, the "text" becomes only another name for the treaty and if the text is to be regarded as having more than one "version", precisely the same element of multiplicity is present as when the treaty is regarded as having more than one text. Moreover, so far as the English language is concerned, the word "version" is more indicative of difference than the word "text", and it may be doubted whether any advantage would be gained by introducing the fiction that a plurilingual treaty has only one text of which there may be different "versions". That this concept is a pure fiction seems to the Special Rapporteur to be self-evident; and it is a fiction to which, as already indicated, treaty practice gives no support.

5. A further consideration is that it is desirable to distinguish sharply between language "versions" of a treaty which have the status of an authentic text and those which do not, even although they may possess a certain "official" character. For example, the European Convention of Human Rights is authentic in two languages, English and French, but governs the enjoyment of human rights in countries whose languages may be German, Greek, Italian, Turkish or a Scandinavian language. In some of these countries it is applicable as law, and for internal purposes an official translation in the local language has been drawn up. The word "version", being a word of entirely general meaning and not a term of art, clearly covers according to its ordinary meaning any such renderings of the treaty in other languages. It is for this reason that the Commission was careful in paragraph 2 of article 72 to distinguish between "versions" which have expressly been given the status of "authentic texts", and those which have not and therefore remain mere translations of the treaty into other languages. The existing State practice of referring to authentic "texts" rather than to language versions makes it easier to keep this important distinction clear and sharp.

6. The above observations are not meant to suggest that the formulation of article 73 is in all respects satisfactory; only that the transfer of the emphasis from

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“texts” to “versions” may not be the appropriate remedy. Before re-examining the drafting of article 73, however, it is necessary to consider the comments of Governments on article 72.

7. In article 72 three Governments take objection to paragraph 2(b), which makes an exception in the case of “the established rules of an international organization”. The Government of Kenya proposes its deletion, merely observing that the sub-paragraph is unnecessary. The Romanian delegation, which also proposes its deletion, considers that, as in the case of the similar provisions in articles 65 and 66, the sub-paragraph “opens the way to contradictions between the desires of States parties to treaties and the rules established by international organizations”. The third Government, that of the United States, observes that when negotiators have an opportunity to examine and react to a version which they personally authenticate, there is a basis for considering that they have accepted it as accurate; but that a provision that a version drawn up separately, and with respect to which the negotiators have no opportunity to make suggestions shall also be authoritative, would introduce a new factor that ought not to be crystallized as a part of the law of treaties. It considers that if such a version is to have authenticity, authentication should be effected by the treaty or by a supplementary agreement between the parties—in other words, under paragraph 2(a).

8. The objection taken by these Governments to paragraph 2(b) is primarily due, it is thought, to the too-general nature of the exception regarding the rules of international organizations which the sub-paragraph would create. The point is the same as that which arises under a number of other articles and which has been discussed by the Special Rapporteur in paragraphs 2 and 3 of his observations on article 65. As there noted, the Commission has decided to deal with the problem of the rules of international organizations in a general article, which now appears as article 3(bis). Accordingly, quite apart from the comments of the three Governments, the Commission’s decision to cover the matter in article 3(bis) would have called for the deletion of this sub-paragraph from article 72.

9. A minor point of drafting arises under paragraph 2(a). As the above-mentioned comment of the United States Government indicates, the status of an authentic text may be accorded to a “version” either by a provision in the treaty or by agreement of the parties. In other articles, the Commission has used a formula spelling out both these possibilities. In order to be consistent, it would therefore seem desirable to revise paragraph 2(a) to read: “if the treaty so provides or it is so agreed”.

10. In article 73 the United States Government, in addition to querying the use of the word “texts”, suggests that the use of the word “different” in paragraph 1 is undesirable when the emphasis should be upon similarity and equality. The word “different” was not intended by the Commission to mean more than “several” and the United States Government is clearly correct in saying that it is not well chosen. If the paragraph is slightly modified on the lines indicated in paragraph 11 below, this point will be met because no adjective at all will be necessary. In paragraph 2, where the existing text speaks of a “difference in the expression of a term” the United States Government, in its revised draft, puts “a difference in the expression of a term or concept”. The Special Rapporteur is inclined to suggest that the appropriate course may be simply to refer to “a difference in the expression of the treaty”. The phrase “different texts” appears also in this paragraph, but again the word “different” can be easily eliminated by a slight modification of the drafting.

11. The Special Rapporteur suggests that articles 72 and 73 should be amalgamated into a single article of four paragraphs. His reasons are, first, that the rule in paragraph 1 of article 73 is at least as closely connected with the rules in article 72 as it is with the rule in paragraph 2 of its own article; and, secondly, that the presentation of the rules in a single article may help to avoid any appearance of over-emphasizing the significance of the multilingual character of a treaty as an element in treaty interpretation. Certain minor drafting amendments also appear to be desirable and the Special Rapporteur suggests that the whole matter of multilingual treaties might be dealt with in a new article 72 formulated on the following lines:

**Article 72**

*Interpretation of treaties drawn up in two or more languages*

1. When the text of a treaty has been authenticated in accordance with the provisions of article 7 in two or more languages, the text is authoritative in each language, unless the treaty otherwise provides.

2. A version of the treaty drawn up in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall also be considered as an authentic text and authoritative if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.

3. Authentic texts are equally authoritative in each language unless the treaty provides that, in the event of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.

4. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the texts discloses a difference in the expression of the treaty and any resulting ambiguity or obscurity is not removed by the application of article 69-70, a meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted.

112 The reference here to articles 69 and 70 assumes that article 71 will become amalgamated with article 69.
 introduction

1. The International Law Commission, while examining at its sixteenth session articles 74 and 75 of the Special Rapporteur’s third report on the Law of Treaties, adopted as articles 72 and 73 of the draft articles on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/L.107), requested the Secretariat to furnish further information on the practice of the United Nations in drawing up the texts of multilingual instruments. In compliance with that request, the Secretariat has prepared this non-exhaustive memorandum in which the language practices of several typical conferences and meetings convened for the express purpose of drawing up multilateral treaties are described. Having regard to article 3(bis) (Treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations or which have been drawn up within international organizations) adopted by the Commission at the first part of its seventeenth session, this memorandum is limited to the United Nations, and more particularly to the General Assembly and conferences convened by the General Assembly. At the same time brief descriptions of the language rules and practices of the San Francisco Conference and of the International Law Commission itself have been included.

2. Accordingly, the language rules and practices adopted by the following conferences, organs and treaties are considered:

(a) The United Nations Conference on International Organization (the San Francisco Conference);
(b) The General Assembly;
(c) The International Law Commission;
(d) Conventions drawn up within the General Assembly itself:
   (ii) The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, of 1962;

(e) Conventions drawn up in certain conferences convened by the General Assembly:
   (ii) The Vienna Conference of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities and the Vienna Conference of 1963 on Consular Relations.

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The San Francisco Conference

3. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which formed the basis for the work of the San Francisco Conference, were drawn up in English only. English, Russian, Chinese, French and Spanish were adopted as the official languages of the San Francisco Conference, and English and French as its working languages. The basic distinction between the two categories of language was that whereas interpretation was provided, and translations made, into the other working language of all statements and documents originating in one of the working languages, and into both working languages in the case of statements and documents originating in one of the official languages only, as far as the official languages were concerned it was provided that only certain categories of documents would be published in these languages upon request. Those categories of documents included all proposals presented to the conference or its subordinate bodies, all decisions of plenary sessions, commissions or committees, and summaries or records of meetings of the committees or sub-committees. The official documentation of the conference has been published on behalf of the United Nations in the two working languages only.

4. For the text of the Charter itself (including, as an integral part of it, the Statute of the International Court of Justice), Article 111 provides that "the Chinese, French, Russian, English and Spanish texts are equally authentic". In the course of the conference it was contemplated that the text of the Charter would be prepared for signature in each of the five official languages, but that if time did not permit the completion of the texts in each of those languages before the closing of the conference, the texts which had not then been completed would be opened for signature at a later date. However, at the same time there was established, under the Executive Committee, an Advisory Committee on Languages which was to carry out its duties under the direction of the Co-ordination Committee. Later, in connexion with the final arrangements for the drawing up of the Charter and the Statute and the approval of the text in all five languages, the following procedures were approved by the Co-ordination Committee on 11 June 1945:

"2. The function of the Advisory Committee on Languages should be to review approved texts from the point of view of language only, in order to assure accuracy and uniformity in all languages.

"3. Since the text of the Charter is being drafted in English and French as working languages, the main task of the Advisory Committee on Languages would be to assure the accuracy of the Chinese, Russian and Spanish texts. For this purpose a panel should be formed for each of these three languages."

On the same occasion, the following decisions were reached for the procedure for review and approval of the final text in each of the five languages:

"1. When Charter provisions have been approved in English and French texts by the Co-ordination Committee and the Advisory Committee of Jurists, the three panels of the Advisory Committee on Languages should then review the Secretariat translations of the texts in the three respective languages. The Advisory Committee on Languages should consult the Advisory Committee of Jurists as occasion requires. Any proposed changes in the English and French texts should be submitted to the Co-ordination Committee for approval. The texts as reviewed should be distributed to all delegations as rapidly as possible.

"2. When the Commissions have approved Charter provisions in the two working languages of the Conference, any changes made should be incorporated in the so-called "Spanish" and "Russian" texts and be approved by the competent panels of the Advisory Committee on Languages.

"3. The texts in all five languages would be submitted to the Steering Committee prior to submission to the Plenary Session.

"4. After review by the Steering Committee the printed texts in all five languages should be submitted for final review by the Advisory Committee on Languages, with all panels meeting together. At this meeting the texts should be read in English and each language group would check the accuracy of its text. After a last correction of the proofs by members of the Advisory Committee on Languages the final texts in all languages will be approved by the Advisory Committee on Languages for submission to the Plenary Session for signature.

"Under the above procedure all delegations would have an opportunity to review and approve the texts in all languages. They would be able to rely on the Advisory Committee on Languages to assure that the documents as prepared for signature are accurate and uniform in all languages as approved.""

5. In conformity with this procedure, the conference Advisory Committee of Jurists worked on the English and French texts of the Charter and Statute, though the Co-ordination Committee agreed to accept responsibility for their concordance. On the procedure for the signing, "in response to a question raised as to the method by which a state might indicate that it was not yet prepared to accept one of the five texts, the [Co-ordination] Committee expressed the strong view that such exceptions should not be possible. It felt that the Charter must be signed as an entity, including all five texts, and pointed to the fact that Article 83 [now Article 111] makes each text an integral part of the Charter". Although it had been envisaged that any delegation could refrain from signing one or other of the authentic texts at the formal ceremony of signature on condition that it appended its signature thereto subsequently, in fact no delegation availed itself of that facility, but each of the signatories signed the Charter "as an entity".

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6 Ibid., vol. II, p. 593.
6. The pattern created at San Francisco, with its distinction between the working languages and official languages, has continued to guide the United Nations in its language practices. However, each organ, principal and subsidiary, has established detailed rules of procedure or practices suited to its special needs. These substantive requirements, varying from organ to organ, are in turn reflected in the organization of the translation and interpretation services of the Secretariat.

The General Assembly

7. The Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission, in its report to the Preparatory Commission, summarizing its proposals regarding the provisions on languages included in the provisional rules of procedure for the General Assembly, stated:

"...The proposed text on languages follows closely the language rules of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. An effort has been made to provide for more extended use of all five official languages. It is proposed that Resolutions and other important documents of the General Assembly shall be published in all five official languages; and that any additional document shall be reproduced upon request by any Delegation in any or all of the five languages. At the same time certain practical necessities involved in the use of the working languages have been kept in view." 10

Rules 57 to 66 of the provisional rules of procedure of the General Assembly, prepared by the Executive Committee, spelled this policy out in detail. However, the Preparatory Commission itself, after discussion in the twelfth meeting of the Technical Committee on the General Assembly, adopted a simpler formulation that:

"The rules adopted at the San Francisco Conference regarding languages shall prevail until otherwise decided." 11

8. The procedure of the first part of the first session of the General Assembly was accordingly regulated by the provisional rules of procedure adopted by the Preparatory Commission. However, the General Assembly decided, at its sixteenth plenary meeting, that the question of languages needed further study. It therefore referred that part of the Preparatory Commission's report to the First Committee which, at its third meeting, established a Sub-Committee for that purpose. The Sub-Committee held two meetings (A/C.1/10) and submitted a report (A/C.1/8) which recommended the adoption of rules of procedure based on the proposals of the Executive Committee, but slightly modified so as to be applicable to all the organs of the United Nations except the International Court of Justice, the language practices of which are governed by Article 39 of the Statute. At its fifth meeting, the First Committee approved these arrangements 12 which were adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2(I) at its twenty-first plenary meeting on 1 February 1946. These rules maintained the distinction, which originated at San Francisco, between the working languages (English and French) and the official languages (Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) of the United Nations and adapted them to the requirements of the United Nations. At its second session, the General Assembly, in resolution 173 (II) of 17 November 1947, adopted permanent rules of procedure. Section VIII of those rules, headed "Languages", closely followed those adopted in 1946. The principal difference was that, instead of purporting to apply to all the organs of the United Nations (except the International Court of Justice), they were limited to the General Assembly, 13 it being left to each organ to decide its own procedure.

9. The second session also had before it a proposal for the adoption of Spanish as one of the working languages of the General Assembly, and by resolution 154 (II) of 15 November 1947, adopted on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, it requested the Secretary-General to study all aspects of the proposal and to report to the third session; the Secretary-General presented his report (A/624) on 27 August 1948. This proposal itself (A/742) was adopted in resolution 247 (III) of 7 December 1948 over the opposition of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/657) and of the Fifth Committee (A/704), the question of the formal amendment of the rules of procedure then being referred to the Sixth Committee, which reported on 11 December 1948 (A/799). The necessary amendments are contained in resolution 262 (III) of 11 December 1948. 14

10. The language rules of the General Assembly have remained unchanged since then. In their current form they appear as rules 51 to 59 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly (A/520/Rev.8), and read as follows:

VIII. LANGUAGES

Official and working languages

Rule 51

Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the General Assembly, its committees and sub-committees. English, French and Spanish shall be the working languages.

Interpretation from a working language

Rule 52

Speeches made in any of the working languages shall be interpreted into the other two working languages.

10 Report by the Executive Committee to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. PC/EX/113/Rev.1, p. 38, para. 54.
14 Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. II, annex 4, p. 1455; report of the Sixth Committee, ibid., annex 4b, p. 1485, and discussion at the 118th plenary meeting on 17 November 1947, ibid., p. 1098. These rules were established by the Sixth Committee which, on the question of languages, sought the recommendations of the Fifth Committee. The Fifth Committee had no comment to make on those provisions. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Sixth Committee, annex 4i, p. 272 and annex 4h, p. 275.
Interpretation from official languages

Rule 53

Speeches made in either of the other two official languages shall be interpreted into the three working languages.

Interpretation from other languages

Rule 54

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the official languages. In this case, he shall himself provide for interpretation into one of the working languages. Interpretation into the other working languages by the interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first working language.

Language of verbatim records

Rule 55

Verbatim records shall be drawn up in the working languages. A translation of the whole or part of any verbatim record into either of the other two official languages shall be furnished if requested by any delegation.

Language of summary records

Rule 56

Summary records shall be drawn up as soon as possible in the official languages.

Language of Journal

Rule 57

The Journal of the General Assembly shall be issued in the working languages.

Language of resolutions and important documents

Rule 58

All resolutions and other important documents shall be made available in the official languages. Upon the request of any representative, any other document shall be made available in any or all of the official languages.

Publications in languages other than the official languages

Rule 59

Documents of the General Assembly, its committees and subcommittees shall, if the General Assembly so decides, be published in any languages other than the official languages.

Other organs of the United Nations

11. In the Security Council, English and French are the working languages, the language rules being otherwise similar to those of the General Assembly (provisional rules of procedure, rules 41 to 47, S/94/Rev.4), except that in practice both simultaneous and consecutive interpretation are provided at all meetings of the Council. For the Economic and Social Council (rules 35 to 40, E/3063) and its functional commissions (rules 29 to 34, E/2425), the language rules are similar to those of the General Assembly. For the Trusteeship Council, English and French only are the working languages (rules 28 to 35, T/1/Rev.1).

12. In order to enable the Secretariat to discharge the functions which these various rules impose upon it, the Language and Meetings Service has been established within the Office of Conference Services, under the responsibility of the Under-Secretary for Conference Services. Amongst the general functions of this Office are the translation of official records, documents, publications and correspondence, the compilation of the final texts of United Nations official records, etc. The Language and Meetings Service contains sections for editing, for verbatim reporting, and for translation (Arabic [cf. General Assembly resolution 878 (IX) of 4 December 1954], Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish). The principal duties of the translation sections are to translate into the language of the section documents, official records and official correspondence transmitted to them by Documents Control or the Office of the Chief of Meetings Service. The Office of Legal Affairs has no direct responsibility as such for the preparation of the different language versions of documents, official records and official correspondence, except to the extent that any matter comes within the general advisory functions which the Office of Legal Affairs performs on behalf of the Secretariat.

13. The Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Agreements (ST/LEG/7/paras. 2-3) contains the following description of the preparation of the different language versions of multilingual treaties by the Secretariat (subject to the terms of the treaty):

"2. Once the treaty has been concluded [in the current terminology of the draft articles as adopted by the Commission at the first part of its seventeenth session, this expression may be taken to mean "authenticated in the working languages of the organ or conference concerned" (Secretariat)] the preparation for signature of authentic texts in the specified languages is generally the depositary's responsibility. These texts are prepared in either typewritten or printed form, the different versions being presented consecutively when more than two languages are involved; where only two versions are adopted, side-by-side presentation in columns is sometimes used. The pages reserved for the signatures of the plenipotentiaries, on which the names of the States concerned appear in the English alphabetical order, always follow the text of the treaty. The names of the States appear in all the official languages. These names, which determine their position in the alphabetical order, are based on official communications from the Governments concerned."

"3. A comparison of the authentic texts precedes the physical work of collating the articles, arranging their layout and checking the texts before they are submitted for signature. In the case of agreements concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, the number of authentic texts varies with the body adopting them. In most cases, agreements approved by the General Assembly provide in their final clauses that the texts in the five official languages: Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, are authentic. If the agreement contains no provisions on the subject and if the resolution approving the agreement is also silent on the point (see, for example, the Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, concluded..."
at Lake Success, New York, on 21 March 1950 (General Assembly resolution 317 (IV)) the practice followed by the Secretary-General has been to consider the texts in the five official languages listed above as being authentic. However, this practice has not been followed uniformly (see Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1, p. 15).

"In the case of agreements adopted by the regional commissions, the authentic texts are generally in the languages used by the commission concerned. Finally, there are agreements adopted by conferences convened under the auspices of the United Nations. These agreements are more diverse and the decision as to which text is to be authentic is made in each case by the participating States. Furthermore, the Secretary-General is sometimes requested to prepare ‘authoritative’ translations which are added to the ‘authentic’ texts in the certified copies."  

The International Law Commission

14. At its first meeting on 12 April 1949, the International Law Commission, recognizing that it was a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, decided that, in accordance with rule 150 [now rule 162] of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the rules relating to the procedure of committees of the General Assembly should apply to the procedure of the Commission.  

15. A change was introduced in 1964 when the Commission formally decided to request its Drafting Committee to assume responsibility for the preparation of the Spanish texts of the draft articles, in addition to the English and French texts. In consequence, the Drafting Committee is so constituted as to ensure adequate representation of the three working languages, and appropriate Secretariat services, both substantive and administrative, are provided. This practice has been followed since, the Secretariat remaining responsible for the preparation of the translations of the report as a whole, including the commentaries. The preparation of the Chinese and Russian official versions of the articles for inclusion in the Official Records of the General Assembly is undertaken by the Secretariat.

Conventions drawn up within the General Assembly

16. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly contain no provisions applicable especially to the drawing up of international conventions, and the normal language rules (see para. 10 above) are therefore applied. The Official Records of the General Assembly are published in each of the official languages. Documents for current use are distributed initially in the working languages, and upon request in either or both of the other official languages. Subject to any special directions that may be given by the delegation or organ with which the document originates, the preparation of the translations is undertaken by the Secretariat, and an indication of the original language appears on each document, immediately beneath its symbol.


17. The Secretariat prepared the basic text of this instrument in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 47 (IV) of 28 March 1947, itself adopted after General Assembly resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946. The original of that draft convention (E/447) was French. Article XV, on the authentic texts, left open at that stage the question of the languages in which the convention would be drawn up. This question was discussed at the twenty-third meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Genocide. Some representatives held the view that the convention should be drafted in the five official languages, others that it should be drafted in the two working languages only. One representative, while not objecting to the convention being drafted in the five official languages, wished to point out the danger inherent in the existence of five equally valid texts. The Ad hoc Committee then decided unanimously that the convention should be drafted in the five official languages, the five texts being equally "valid" (E/AC.25/SR.23, pp. 10-11). In its observations on article XI, in its report to the Economic and Social Council, the Ad hoc Committee stated: "The drafting of the convention in the five official languages of the United Nations conforms to the practice followed up to the present [May 1948] by the United Nations in most cases."

18. At the third session of the General Assembly, the draft was referred to the Sixth Committee which, at its 104th meeting, after completing its first reading of the text of the substantive articles submitted by the Ad hoc

19. cf. Handbook of Final Clauses (ST/LEG/6), Chapter XII, section B.


20. On the basis of Economic and Social Council resolution 722 B (XXVIII) of 14 July 1959, the Secretary-General prepared a draft convention on this topic and submitted it to the fourteenth session of the Commission on the Status of Women—one of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council. The original version of the Secretary-General's draft (E/ACN.6/353) was English. This was discussed by that Commission at its fourteenth 26 and fifteenth sessions, 28 when a draft convention was completed and referred through the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly for adoption. The Economic and Social Council made the necessary recommendation in its resolution 821 III A (XXXII) of 19 July 1961.

21. At the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, this item of the agenda was allocated to the Third Committee, which first held a general discussion, in the course of which various amendments were submitted, and then proceeded to vote on the preamble and articles 1 to 3, the substantive articles. It subsequently decided to recommend postponement of the remainder of the discussion until the seventeenth session, a recommendation in which the General Assembly concurred in resolution 1680 (XVI) of 18 December 1961. During this stage of the discussion, some linguistic difficulties were encountered, and at one point the Chairman of the Third Committee suggested (A/C/3/L.915) that the French version of one controversial passage be adopted, and that the English and Spanish texts be adjusted to conform with it. The discussion was accordingly resumed at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, when the item was again allocated to the Third Committee, which limited itself to the final clauses which had been prepared by the Secretariat. No drafting committee was set up by the Third Committee on either occasion. In resolution 1763 (XVII) of 7 November 1962, the General Assembly adopted the draft convention as proposed by the Third Committee and opened it for signature on 10 December. Article 10 provides that the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts "shall be equally authentic" ("feront également foi"). The original version of the report of the Third Committee, 28 to which the text of the convention was annexed, was French. It had been distributed in English, French, Russian and Spanish prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly, and in Chinese on 9 November. The preparation of the Chinese and Russian texts had been undertaken by the Secretariat in co-operation with interested delegations, in accordance with the usual practice. The Secretariat then made the document ready for signature, in accordance with the practice outlined in paragraph 13 above.

(iii) The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)

22. The initiative for this convention was taken by the General Assembly which, in its resolution 1780 (XVII) of 7 December 1962, requested the Economic and Social Council to ask the Commission on Human Rights—one of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council—inter alia to prepare a draft convention. The General Assembly repeated this request in resolution 1906 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, after it had proclaimed the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in resolution 1904 (XVIII) of the same date. In the preparation of the draft convention, the Commission on Human Rights was to bear in mind the views of the Sub-Commis-

26 Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Sixth Committee, annexes, p. 43. The original text of this report is English/French.

27 For its distribution, see Journal of the General Assembly, Third Session, No. 65, p. 9, and No. 66, p. 8.


29 Commission on the Status of Women, report of the fourteenth session, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 7, paras. 44-70. The draft of this report was prepared partly in English and partly in English/French original, the above paragraphs being in English.

28 Commission on the Status of Women, report of the fifteenth session, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 7, paras. 48-73, The original of the draft of this report was in English.
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (a subsidiary body of the Commission on Human Rights, to which it reports), the debates at the seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the General Assembly, any proposals on this matter that might be submitted by Governments, and any international instruments already adopted in this field.

23. At its sixteenth session, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities therefore considered this item, having before it certain preparatory documentation submitted by the Secretariat. It also had before it three draft conventions, two submitted by individual members and the third submitted by two members jointly. After a brief debate on these three texts, the Sub-Commission decided to take one of them, which had been drafted in English, as its basis. After detailed examination, the Sub-Commission adopted the preamble and 10 substantive articles. It also adopted a preliminary draft of seventeen articles on additional measures of implementation (E/CN.4/873; E/CN.4/Sub.2/241). These were duly transmitted to the Commission on Human Rights.

24. The Commission on Human Rights, at its twentieth session, accordingly proceeded to an examination of the draft articles, which it amended. It adopted a draft convention consisting of seven substantive articles. It reached no decision on one proposal for an additional article submitted by one Government in the course of its discussion, nor on one of the articles submitted by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, nor on the preliminary draft submitted by that Sub-Commission on additional measures of implementation, nor on the final clauses. In the course of this discussion, several amendments were put forward for the express purpose of securing greater concordance between the different language versions. The Economic and Social Council, in resolution 1015 B (XXXVII) of 30 July 1964, submitted to the General Assembly the substantive articles prepared by the Commission on Human Rights and all the other texts on which the Commission had not voted.

25. Since the General Assembly did not consider this item at its nineteenth session, it was placed on the agenda for the twentieth session, and allocated to the Third Committee. The Third Committee, after prolonged discussion, recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of the text of the complete convention, consisting of a preamble and 25 articles. No drafting committee was set up by the Third Committee. It was provided that the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts should be equally authentic. Several of the amendments submitted in the course of the debate in the Third Committee were designed to secure greater concordance between the versions drawn up in the working languages. In the General Assembly, an amendment (A/L.479) to add a new article to the convention was adopted, and the convention as a whole was adopted by resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, the President of the General Assembly intimating that the signature would take place at a date to be notified subsequently. Later, this date was fixed by the Secretary-General at 7 March 1966. When resolution 2106 (XX) was adopted, the General Assembly had before it the report of the Third Committee and the amendment, the originals of both of which were English, in English, French, Russian and Spanish. The Chinese text of the report was issued on 7 February 1966, and of the amendment on 23 December 1965. After the adoption of the resolution, the Secretariat made the document ready for signature in accordance with the practice outlined in paragraph 13 above.

Conventions drawn up in certain conferences convened by the General Assembly


26. The original text of the articles on the law of the sea (A/CN.4/L.68/Add.2 and 3) was prepared by the International Law Commission, in accordance with the practice then in force, described in paragraph 14 above, in French. The report of the Commission on the work of its eighth session (A/CN.4/104) was issued originally in English and French, although when republished in the Official Records of the General Assembly, it appeared in each of the five official languages, following the normal practice. The basis for the work of the conference was thus a text which existed in five language versions as part of the Official Records of the General Assembly, although the organ which had prepared that text had itself produced only two language versions, the others having been prepared by the Secretariat.

27. Already in the earliest stages of the conference, the Secretary-General urged the early appointment of a drafting committee which would have responsibility inter alia for ensuring consistency within one and the same instrument, and co-ordination between the different instruments to be adopted by the conference. Referring more particularly to the question of language, he suggested that, although it was "desirable that the various languages and legal systems should be adequately represented [on the drafting committee] the main qualification for appointment should be experience in legal draftsmanship." Accordingly the rules of procedure of

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29 The original is in English. It was distributed in English, French, Russian and Spanish.
the Conference provided, in rule 49, for the establishment of a Drafting Committee, to be entrusted with the final drafting and co-ordination of the instruments approved by the committees of the conference. As for the languages themselves, by rule 54, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish were designated the official languages of the conference, and English, French and Spanish the working languages. Rules 55 to 57, dealing with the interpretation of speeches, corresponded to rules 52 to 54 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, but rule 59, by providing that documents and summary records should be made available in the working languages, departed from the corresponding rule 58 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. The official records of the Conference have been published in English, French and Spanish (no budgetary provision was made for their production in other languages).

28. In fact, the conference operated in a somewhat different manner than may have been envisaged in the preparatory stages. The establishment by the conference itself of its drafting committee, as required by rule 49 of the rules of procedure, did not prevent the main committees from appointing drafting committees if they so desired. Thus, the First Committee, at its forty-second meeting, established its own drafting committee charged with the task of reviewing, as to matters of form, all articles before the First Committee, and of making recommendations for the textual co-ordination of proposals expressly referred to it. The report of this drafting committee was prepared by the Secretariat and is included in the official records of the Conference. However, recommendations which referred to one language version only are excluded from the printed version of the report published in other languages. The report contained a number of suggestions regarding the adjustments to be made, either to one or other, or to all, of the three language versions in which the articles were being drawn up. The First Committee’s decisions on these recommendations were incorporated in its report to the Conference. In addition to the First Committee, the Second Committee at its thirty-fourth meeting, and the Fourth Committee at its thirty-sixth meeting, each established a drafting committee, the functions of which were in fact similar to those of the drafting committee of the First Committee, although they were not formally defined, and the reports of these two drafting committees are not included in the official records of the Conference, remaining in mimeographed form only. On the other hand, no drafting committees were set up by the Third and Fifth Committees.

29. All the main committees submitted the results of their work to the Conference in formal reports, to which the text of the articles adopted was annexed. These reports are included in the official records of the Conference. No indication appears there of the original language version of the report of the First Committee: the original language of the reports of the Second and Third Committees was English, of the Fourth Committee, Spanish and of the Fifth Committee, French. The official records contain no separate indication of the original language versions of the articles themselves.

30. In accordance with the rules of procedure, the Conference drafting committee scrutinized all the articles submitted to the Conference by the main committees, and reported thereon separately to the conference. It was also responsible for the co-ordination of the English, French and Spanish texts of the articles, and the Conference took its final decisions on the basis of the reports both of the respective main committees and of the Conference drafting committee. These reports are included in the official records, except that where they refer to one language only, the references are excluded from other language versions of the official records.

31. The Final Act of the Conference, as well as each of the four Conventions there adopted, states that the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are “equally authentic”, and the signatures of the representative of States which signed the conventions, or the Final Act, appear in each case at the end of a bound volume which contains the text of the convention in question, or the Final Act, in each of its authentic versions. However, the official records do not disclose any direct interest by the Conference as a whole in the Chinese and Russian language versions, the preparation of which was in fact the responsibility of the Secretariat, with the assistance of interested delegations and representatives.

(ii) The Vienna Conference of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities and the Vienna Conference of 1963 on Consular Relations

32. The procedure at the two Vienna Conferences was similar. The original text of the articles on diplomatic intercourse and immunities (A/CN.4/L.70/Add.1), and of most of the articles on consular relations (A/CN.4/L.90), had been prepared by the International Law Commission in English and French, but Chapter III of the latter (A/CN.4/L.90/Add.1), on honorary consuls, is expressed to be in French original only. The rules of procedure of these two Conferences were, mutatis mutandis, similar as regards languages to those of the Geneva Conference of 1958. The Committee of the Whole at the 1961 Conference, and the First and Second Committees at the 1963 conference, each established a drafting committee. On each occasion also, the conference established a drafting committee in accordance with the rules of procedure, and that drafting committee reported on the drafts before the final decisions were taken by the conference. As in 1958, the Final Act of each Conference, and the two Conventions themselves, were drawn up in five equally authentic versions, the preparation of the Chinese and Russian texts being again entrusted to the Secretariat. The official records of these two Conferences have been published in English, French and Spanish.

34 Ibid., vol. II, p. xxxv.
36 Ibid., vol. II, p. 115. The report of the First Committee omits to mention the establishment of the drafting committee.
37 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 102.
38 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 106.
# Document A/CN.4/L.117 and Add.1

## Revised Draft Articles

**[Original text: English]**

**[13 and 14 July 1966]**

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NOTE: The present document contains the text of the draft articles as revised by the Commission up to and including 12 July 1966, together with certain additional changes proposed by the Drafting Committee.

Part I. Introduction

Article 0.—The scope of the present articles

The present articles relate to treaties concluded between States.

Article 1.—Use of terms

1. For the purposes of the present articles:
   (a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.
   (b) [Deleted by the Commission]
   (c) [Deleted by the Commission]
   (d) "Ratification", "Accession", "Acceptance" and "Approval" mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty.
   (e) "Full powers" means a document emanating from the competent authority of a State designating a person to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty.¹
   (f) "Reservation" means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to vary the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.
   (f)(bis) "Negotiating State" means a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty.

¹ The addition of the final phrase, "or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty." is proposed by the Drafting Committee.

(f)(ter) "Contracting State" means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force.

(f)(quater) "Party" means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force.

(f)(quinquies) "Third State" means a State not a party to the treaty.

(f)(sexies) "International organization" means an inter-governmental organization.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present articles are without prejudice to the use of those terms or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of any State.

Article 2.—Treaties and other international agreements not within the scope of the present articles

The fact that the present articles do not relate:
   (a) To treaties concluded between States and other subjects of international law or between such other subjects of international law; or
   (b) To international agreements not in written form shall not affect the legal force of such treaties or agreements or the application to them of any of the rules set forth in the present articles to which they would be subject independently of these articles.

Article 3(bis).—Treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations or are adopted within international organizations

The application of the present articles to treaties which are constituent instruments of an international organization or are adopted within an international organization shall be subject to any relevant rules of the organization.

Part II. Conclusion and entry into force of treaties

Section 1: Conclusion of treaties

Article 3.—Capacity of States to conclude treaties

1. Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.

2. States members of a federal union may possess a capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted
by the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down.

Article 4.—Full powers to represent the State in the conclusion of treaties

1. Except as provided in paragraph 2, a person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty only if:
   (a) He produces an appropriate instrument of full powers; or
   (b) It appears from the circumstances that the intention of the States concerned was to dispense with full powers.

2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce an instrument of full powers, the following are considered as representing their State:
   (a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty;
   (b) Heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting State and the State to which they are accredited;
   (c) Representatives accredited by States to an international conference or to an organ of an international organization, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty.

Article 4(bis).—Subsequent confirmation of an act performed without authority

An act relating to the conclusion of a treaty performed by a person who cannot be considered under article 4 as representing his State for that purpose is without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by the competent authority of the State.

Article 5.—Negotiation and drawing up of a treaty [Deleted by the Commission]

Article 6.—Adoption of the text

1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the unanimous agreement of the States participating in its drawing up except as provided in paragraph 2.

2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the States participating in the conference, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a different rule.

Article 7.—Authentication of the text

The text of a treaty is established as authentic and definitive:
   (a) By such procedure as may be provided for in the text or agreed upon by the States participating in its drawing up; or
   (b) Failing such procedure, by the signature, signature ad referendum or initialling by the representatives of those States of the text of the treaty or of the Final Act of a conference incorporating the text.

Article 8.—Participation in a treaty [Deleted by the Commission]

Article 9.—The opening of a treaty to the participation of additional States [Deleted by the Commission]

Article 10.—Initialling and signature ad referendum as forms of signature [Deleted by the Commission and substance incorporated in article 11]

Article 11.—Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by signature

1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its representative when:
   (a) The treaty provides that signature shall have that effect;
   (b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that signature should have that effect;
   (c) The intention of the State in question to give that effect to the signature appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
   (a) The initialling of a text constitutes a signature of the treaty when it is established that the negotiating States so agreed;
   (b) The signature ad referendum of a treaty by a representative, if confirmed by his State, constitutes a full signature of the treaty.

Article 12.—Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or approval

1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when:
   (a) The treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification;
   (b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification should be required;
   (c) The representative of the State in question has signed the treaty subject to ratification; or
   (d) The intention of the State in question to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.

3 See section headed “Question of participation in a treaty”, in the commentary to article 12, p. 200.

4 The wording “It is otherwise established” in paragraph 1(b) and “is established” in paragraph 2(a) is proposed by the Drafting Committee.

5 The wording “It is otherwise established” is proposed by the Drafting Committee.
2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or approval under conditions similar to those which apply to ratification.

Article 13.—Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession

The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when:

(a) The treaty or an amendment to the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession;
(b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; or
(c) All the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession.

Article 14.—Acceptance or approval

[Deleted by the Commission and substance incorporated in article 12.]

Article 15.—Exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, accession, acceptance or approval

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, accession, acceptance or approval establish the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty upon:

(a) Their exchange between the contracting States;
(b) Their deposit with the depositary; or
(c) Their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary, if so agreed.

Article 16.—Consent relating to a part of a treaty and choice of differing provisions

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 18 to 22, the consent of a State to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty so permits or the other contracting States so agree.

2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty which permits a choice between differing provisions is effective only if it is made plain to which of the provisions the consent relates.

Article 17.—Obligation of a State not to frustrate the object of a treaty prior to its entry into force

A State is obliged to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the object of a proposed treaty when:

(a) It has agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty, while these negotiations are in progress;
(b) It has signed the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty;
(c) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.

Section 2: Reservations to multilateral treaties

Article 18.—Formulation of reservations

A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:

(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) The treaty authorizes specified reservations which do not include the reservation in question; or
(c) In cases where the treaty contains no provisions regarding reservations, the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Article 19.—Acceptance of and objection to reservations

1. A reservation expressly or impliedly authorized by the treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.

2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of the treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.

3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization, the reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization, unless the treaty otherwise provides.

4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs of this article:

(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of the reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that State if or when the treaty is in force;
(b) An objection by another contracting State to a reservation precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is expressed by the objecting State;
(c) An act expressing the State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation.

5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.

Article 20.—Procedure regarding reservations

1. A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation, and an objection to a reservation must be formulated in

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6 The wording "It is otherwise established" is proposed by the Drafting Committee.

7 The deletion of the words "and the circumstances of its conclusion" is proposed by the Drafting Committee.
writing and communicated to the other States entitled to become parties to the treaty.

2. If formulated on the occasion of the adoption of the text or upon signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation.

3. An objection to the reservation made previously to its confirmation does not itself require confirmation. 8

**Article 21.—Legal effects of reservations**

1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 18, 19 and 20:
   (a) Modifies for the reserving State the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and
   (b) Modifies those provisions to the same extent for such other party in its relations with the reserving State.

2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty inter se.

3. When a State objecting to a reservation agrees to consider the treaty in force between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.

**Article 22.—Withdrawal of reservations**

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for its withdrawal.

2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal becomes operative only when notice of it has been received by the other contracting States.

**SECTION 3: ENTRY INTO FORCE**

**Article 23.—Entry into force of a treaty**

1. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the negotiating States may agree.

2. Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States.

3. When the consent of a State to be bound is established after a treaty has come into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on the date when its consent was established unless the treaty otherwise provides.

**Article 24.—Entry into force of a treaty provisionally**

1. A treaty may enter into force provisionally if:
   (a) The treaty itself prescribes that it shall enter into force provisionally pending ratification, accession, acceptance or approval by the contracting States; or
   (b) The negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed.

2. The same rule applies to the entry into force provisionally of part of a treaty.

**Part III. Observance, application and interpretation of treaties**

**SECTION 1: OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES**

**Article 55.—Pacta sunt servanda**

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

**SECTION 2: APPLICATION OF TREATIES**

**Article 56.—Non-retroactivity of treaties**

Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, 10 its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.

**Article 57.—Application of treaties to territory**

Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, 10 the application of a treaty extends to the entire territory of each party.

**Article 63.—Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter**

1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.

2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as inconsistent with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.

3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 41, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.

4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
   (a) As between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
   (b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party only to the earlier treaty, the earlier treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations;

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8 The transfer of the last sentence of paragraph 2 to become a new paragraph 3 is proposed by the Drafting Committee.

9 The insertion of the word "only" is proposed by the Drafting Committee.

10 The wording "Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established" is proposed by the Drafting Committee.

(c) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party only to the later treaty, the later treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations.

5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 67, or to any question of the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 42 or to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty.

SECTION 3: INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

Article 69.—General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of another State under another treaty.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty;

(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the understanding of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Article 70.—Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 69, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 69:

(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

Article 72.—Interpretation of treaties expressed in two or more languages

1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.

2. A version of the treaty expressed in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.

3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 69 and 70 does not remove, a meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted.

SECTION 4: TREATIES AND THIRD STATES

Article 58.—General rule regarding third States

A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.

Article 59.—Treaties providing for obligations for third States

An obligation arises for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend the provision to be a means of establishing the obligation and the third State has expressly accepted that obligation.

Article 60.—Treaties providing for rights for third States

1. A right arises for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend the right to accord that right either to the State in question, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated.

2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty.

Article 61.—Revocation or modification of obligations or rights of third States

1. When an obligation has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 59, the obligation may be revoked or modified only with the mutual consent of the parties to the treaty and of the third State, unless it is established that they had otherwise agreed.

2. When a right has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 60, the right may not be revoked or modified by the parties if it is established that the right was intended not to be revocable or subject to modification without the consent of the third State.

Article 62.—Rules in a treaty becoming binding through international custom

Nothing in articles 58 to 61 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law.
Law of Treaties

Part IV. Amendment and modification of treaties

Article 65.—General rule regarding the amendment of treaties

A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in Part I apply to such agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.

Article 66.—Amendment of multilateral treaties

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, the amendment of multilateral treaties shall be governed by the following paragraphs.

2. Any proposal to amend a multilateral treaty as between all the parties must be notified to every party each one of which shall have the right to take part in:
   (a) The decision as to the action to be taken in regard to such proposal;
   (b) The negotiation and conclusion of any agreement for the amendment of the treaty.

3. Every State entitled to become a party to the treaty shall also be entitled to become a party to the treaty as amended.

4. The amending agreement does not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement; and article 63, paragraph 4(b) applies in relation to such State.

5. Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after failing an expression of a different intention by that State:
   (a) Be considered as a party to the treaty as amended; and
   (b) Be considered as a party to the unamended treaty in relation to any party to the treaty not bound by the amending agreement.

Article 67.—Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only

1. Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if:
   (a) The possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; or
   (b) The modification in question:
      (i) Does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations;
      (ii) Does not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the objects and purposes of the treaty as a whole; and
      (iii) Is not prohibited by the treaty.

2. Unless in a case falling under paragraph 1(a) the treaty otherwise provides, the parties in question shall notify the other parties of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modifications to the treaty for which it provides.

Part V. Invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties

SECTION 1: General provisions

Article 30.—Validity and continuance in force of treaties

1. The validity of a treaty may be impeached only through the application of the present articles. A treaty the invalidity of which is established under the present articles is void.

2. A treaty may be terminated or denounced or withdrawn from by a party only as a result of the application of the terms of the treaty or of the present articles. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.

Article 30(bis).—Obligations under other rules of international law

The invalidity, termination or denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the suspension of its operation, as a result of the application of the present articles or of the terms of the treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it is subject under any other rule of international law.

Article 46.—Separability of treaty provisions

1. A right of a party provided for in a treaty to denounce, withdraw from or suspend the operation of the treaty may only be exercised with respect to the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.

2. A ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty recognized in the present articles may only be invoked with respect to the whole treaty except as provided in the following paragraphs or in article 42.

3. If the ground relates to particular clauses alone, it may only be invoked with respect to those clauses where:
   (a) The said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application; and
   (b) Acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to the treaty as a whole.

4. In cases falling under articles 33 and 34(bis) the State entitled to invoke the fraud or corruption may do so with respect either to the whole treaty or to the particular clauses alone.

5. In cases falling under articles 35, 36 and 37, no separation of the provisions of the treaty is permitted.
Article 47.—Loss of a right to invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty

A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 31 to 34(bis) inclusive or articles 42 to 44 inclusive if, after becoming aware of the facts:

(a) It shall have expressly agreed that the treaty, as the case may be, is valid or remains in force or continues in operation; or
(b) It must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced, as the case may be, in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or in operation.

SECTION 2: INVALIDITY OF TREATIES

Article 31.—Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude a treaty

A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation of its internal law was manifest.

Article 32.—Specific restrictions on authority to express the consent of the State

If the authority of a representative to express the consent of his State to be bound by a particular treaty has been made subject to a specific restriction, his omission to observe that restriction may not be invoked as invalidating a consent expressed by him unless the restriction was brought to the knowledge of the other negotiating States prior to his expressing such consent.

Article 34.—Error

1. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error, or if the circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error.

3. An error relating only to the wording of the text of a treaty does not affect its validity; article 26 then applies.

Article 33.—Fraud

A State which has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

\[\text{The substitution of the word “notice” by the word “knowledge” is proposed by the Drafting Committee.}\]

Article 34(bis).—Corruption of a representative of the State

If the expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured through the corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

Article 35.—Coercion of a representative of the State

The expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him personally shall be without any legal effect.

Article 36.—Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force

A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 37.—Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)

A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

SECTION 3: TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

Article 38.—Termination of or withdrawal from a treaty by consent of the parties

A treaty may be terminated or a party may withdraw from a treaty:

(a) In conformity with a provision of the treaty allowing such termination or withdrawal; or
(b) At any time by consent of all the parties.

Article 39(bis).—Reduction of the parties to a multilateral treaty below the number necessary for its entry into force

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a multilateral treaty does not terminate by reason only of the fact that the number of the parties falls below the number specified in the treaty as necessary for its entry into force.

Article 39.—Denunciation of a treaty containing no provision regarding termination

1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal.

\[\text{The addition of the words “Unless the treaty otherwise provides”, is proposed by the Drafting Committee.}\]

\[\text{The wording “unless it is established” is proposed by the Drafting Committee.}\]
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 40.—Suspension of the operation of a treaty by consent of the parties

The operation of a treaty in regard to all the parties or to a particular party may be suspended:

(a) In conformity with a provision of the treaty allowing such suspension;

(b) At any time by consent of all the parties.

Article 40(bis).—Temporary suspension of the operation of a multilateral treaty by consent between certain of the parties only

When a multilateral treaty contains no provision regarding the suspension of its operation, two or more parties may conclude an agreement to suspend the operation of provisions of the treaty temporarily and as between themselves alone if such suspension:

(a) Does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; and

(b) Is not incompatible with the effective execution as between the parties as a whole of the objects and purposes of the treaty.

Article 41.—Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied from entering into a subsequent treaty

1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a further treaty relating to the same subject-matter and:

(a) It appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should thenceforth be governed by the later treaty, or

(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time.

2. The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that such was the intention of the parties when concluding the later treaty.

Article 42.—Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach

1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.

2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:

(a) The other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty or to terminate it either (i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State or (ii) as between all the parties;

(b) A party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;

(c) Any other party to suspend the operation of the treaty with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty.

3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of the present article, consists in:

(a) A repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present articles; or

(b) The violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of any of the objects or purposes of the treaty.

4. The foregoing paragraphs are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty applicable in the event of a breach.

Article 43.—Supervening impossibility of performance

A party may invoke an impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

Article 44.—Fundamental change of circumstances

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:

(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and

(b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the scope of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked:

(a) As a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty establishing a boundary;

(b) If the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of the treaty or of a different international obligation owed to the other parties to the treaty.

Article 64.—Severance of diplomatic relations

The severance of diplomatic relations between parties to a treaty does not in itself affect the legal relations established between them by the treaty.
**Article 45.—Establishment of a new peremptory norm of general international law**

If a new peremptory norm of general international law of the kind referred to in article 37 is established, any existing treaty which is incompatible with that norm becomes void and terminates.

**SECTION 4: PROCEDURE**

**Article 51.—Procedure to be followed in cases of invalidity, termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty**

1. A party which claims that a treaty is invalid or which alleges a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under the provisions of the present articles must notify the other parties of its claim. The notification shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken with respect to the treaty and the grounds therefore.

2. If, after the expiry of a period which shall not be less than three months except in cases of special urgency, no party has raised any objection, the party making the notification may carry out in the manner provided in article 50 the measure which it has proposed.

3. If, however, objection has been raised by any other party, the parties shall seek a solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations of the parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes.

5. Without prejudice to article 47, the fact that a State has not previously made the notification prescribed in paragraph 1 shall not prevent it from making such notification in answer to another party claiming performance of the treaty or alleging its violation.

**Article 50.—Instruments for declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty**

1. Any act declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty pursuant to the provisions of the treaty or of paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 51 shall be carried out through an instrument communicated to the other parties.

2. If the instrument is not signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs, the representative of the State communicating it may be called upon to produce full powers.

**Article 50(bis).—Revocation of notifications and instruments provided for in articles 51 and 50**

A notification or instrument provided for in articles 51 and 50 may be revoked at any time before it takes effect.

**SECTION 5: CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY, TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF A TREATY**

**Article 52.—Consequences of the invalidity of a treaty**

1. The provisions of a void treaty have no legal force.

2. If acts have nevertheless been performed in reliance on such a treaty:
   
   (a) Each party may require any other party to establish as far as possible in their mutual relations the position that would have existed if the acts had not been performed;
   
   (b) Acts performed in good faith before the nullity was invoked are not rendered unlawful by reason only of the nullity of the treaty.

3. In cases falling under articles 33, 35 or 36, paragraph 2 does not apply with respect to the party to which the fraud, coercion or corrupt act is imputable.

4. In the case of the invalidity of a particular State’s consent to be bound by a multilateral treaty, the foregoing rules apply in the relations between that State and the parties to the treaty.

**Article 53.—Consequences of the termination of a treaty**

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present articles:
   
   (a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;
   
   (b) Does not affect any rights or obligations of the parties or any legal situation created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.

2. If a State denounces or withdraws from a multilateral treaty, paragraph 1 applies in the relations between that State and each of the other parties to the treaty from the date when such denunciation or withdrawal takes effect.

**Article 53(bis).—Consequences of the nullity or termination of a treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law**

1. In the case of a treaty void under article 37 the parties shall:
   
   (a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act done in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and
   
   (b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

2. In the case of a treaty which becomes void and terminates under article 45, the termination of the treaty:
   
   (a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;
   
   (b) Does not affect any rights or obligations of the parties or any legal situation created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination; provided that those rights, obligations or situations may thereafter be maintained only to the extent that
their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the
new peremptory norm of general international law.

Article 54.—Consequences of the suspension of the operation of a treaty

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the suspension of the operation of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present articles:
   (a) Relieves the parties between which the operation of the treaty is suspended from the obligation to perform the treaty in their mutual relations during the period of suspension;
   (b) Does not otherwise affect the legal relations established by the treaty.

2. During the period of the suspension the parties shall refrain from acts calculated to render the resumption of the operation of the treaty impossible.

Part VI. Case of an aggressor state

Article 29(bis).—Notifications and communications

Except as the treaty or the present articles otherwise provide, any notification or communication to be made by any State under the present articles shall:
   (a) If there is no depositary, be transmitted directly to the States for which it is intended; or if there is a depositary, to the latter;
   (b) Be considered as having been made by the State in question only upon its receipt by the State to which it was transmitted or, as the case may be, upon its receipt by the depositary;
   (c) If transmitted to a depositary, be considered as received by the State for which it was intended only upon the latter State’s having been informed by the depositary in accordance with article 29, paragraph 1(e).

Article 26.—Correction of errors in texts or in certified copies of treaties

1. Where, after the authentication of the text of a treaty, the negotiating States are agreed that it contains an error, the error shall, unless they otherwise decide, be corrected:
   (a) By having the appropriate correction made in the text and causing the correction to be initialled by duly authorized representatives;
   (b) By executing or exchanging a separate instrument or instruments setting out the correction which it has been agreed to make; or
   (c) By executing a corrected text of the whole treaty by the same procedure as in the case of the original text.

2. Where the treaty is one for which there is a depositary, the latter:
   (a) Shall notify the negotiating States of the error and of the proposal to correct it if no objection is raised within a specified time-limit;
   (b) If on the expiry of the time-limit no objection has been raised, shall make and initial the correction in the text and shall execute a procès-verbal of the rectification of the text, and communicate a copy of it to the contracting States;
   (c) If an objection has been raised to the proposed correction, shall communicate the objection to the other negotiating States.
3. The rules in paragraphs 1 and 2 apply also where the text has been authenticated in two or more languages and it appears that there is a lack of concordance which it is agreed should be corrected.

4. (a) The corrected text replaces the defective text ab initio, unless the negotiating States otherwise decide. 

   (b) The correction of the text of a treaty that has been registered shall be notified to the Secretariat of the United Nations.

5. Where an error is discovered in a certified copy of a treaty, the depositary shall execute a procès-verbal specifying the rectification and communicate a copy to the negotiating States.

Article 27.—The correction of errors in the texts of treaties for which there is a depositary

[Deleted by the Commission and substance incorporated in article 26]

Article 25.—Registration and publication of treaties

Treaties entered into by parties to the present articles shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Their registration and publication shall be governed by the regulations adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The following article was adopted by the Commission on 14 July 1966.

“Article Y.—Cases of State succession and State responsibility

“The provisions of the present articles are without prejudice to any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States or from the international responsibility of States.”

The above article is to be inserted in Part VI, before article Z. The title of Part VI should accordingly be changed to “Miscellaneous Provisions”, and the title of article Z to “Case of an aggressor State”. 
SPECIAL MISSIONS

[Item 2 of the agenda]

DOCUMENT A/CN.4/189 and Add.1 and 2

Third Report on Special Missions, by Mr. Milan Bartos, Special Rapporteur

[Original text: French]
[13 June, 17 June and 11 July 1966]

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Introduction

1. At its seventeenth session (1965), the International Law Commission decided that it would review the articles on special missions provisionally adopted during its sixteenth and seventeenth sessions, after receiving the observations and comments of governments.\(^1\)

2. Some delegations commented during the discussion of the Commission's report by the General Assembly. Their comments were made at the 839th-852nd meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, held between 29 September and 14 October 1965. During these discussions, certain delegations requested that their oral remarks should be considered as the comments of their respective countries on the Commission's draft, since the time available for formulating written comments was very short and their chancelleries were busy with other United Nations work. Although this is not the best way of formulating comments, the Special Rapporteur has taken their remarks into account.

3. On the other hand, few States sent in their comments on the draft in writing. This prevented the Special Rapporteur from submitting his third report on special missions in good time, as he was expecting a greater number of observations from which he could draw wider experience and more useful suggestions. Up to 15 May 1966, the United Nations Secretariat had, indeed, received written comments from the following States only: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Israel, Sweden, Upper Volta and Yugoslavia.\(^2\) The Governments of Malawi and Nigeria have also considered the draft, but without making any concrete observations. The fact that only a small number of Governments have stated their views on the draft is rather discouraging, but in any case this cannot be taken to mean that the other Governments have no comments to make on the subject or on the solutions proposed in the draft.

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\(^2\) Later, the Secretariat also forwarded to the Special Rapporteur the observations of certain other Governments. They have not been included in this part of the report, but are dealt with in addendum 2.
4. In this report the Special Rapporteur has drawn attention to the opinions expressed during the discussion in the General Assembly, and to the comments by Governments which the United Nations Secretariat has made available to him.

5. In addition, the Commission asked the Special Rapporteur to draft and submit to it an introductory article on the use of terms in the draft, so as to make it possible to simplify and condense the text. The Special Rapporteur submits the article in this report, provisionally numbered article 0. In dealing with particular articles, he also makes drafting suggestions concerning the use of this introductory article, with a view to simplifying the text of the other articles. The Special Rapporteur considers, however, that this is a task for the Drafting Committee, rather than the plenary Commission. In his opinion, however, the Commission should take a decision in plenary on the introductory article as a synthesis of juridical concepts.

6. The Special Rapporteur has devoted a separate section of this report to the question whether special rules of law should or should not be drafted for so-called "high-level" special missions, whose heads hold high office in their States. The Commission stated that it would appreciate the opinion of Governments on this matter and hoped that their suggestions would be as specific as possible.\footnote{Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1963, vol. II, document A/6009, para. 48.}

7. Similarly, in this report the Special Rapporteur has not overlooked the fact that the Commission "thought that the time was not yet ripe for deciding whether the draft articles on special missions should be in the form of an additional protocol to the Vienna Convention, 1961, or should be embodied in a separate convention or in any other appropriate form, and that the Commission should await the Special Rapporteur's recommendations on that subject".\footnote{Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1963, vol. II, p. 225, para. 64.} Several Governments have expressed their views on this question and the Special Rapporteur has devoted a special section to it.

8. Lastly, the Special Rapporteur reminds the Commission that the delegations and Governments of various States have also propounded some other questions of principle relating to the draft articles, to which he has devoted special attention in his report.

CHAPTER I


9. At its tenth session, in 1958, the International Law Commission adopted a set of draft articles on diplomatic intercourse and immunities. The Commission observed, however, that the draft "deals only with permanent diplomatic missions. Diplomatic relations between States also assume other forms that might be placed under the heading of 'ad hoc diplomacy', covering itinerant envoys, diplomatic conferences and special missions sent to a State for limited purposes. The Commission considered that these forms of diplomacy should also be studied, in order to bring out the rules of law governing them, and requested the Special Rapporteur to make a study of the question and to submit his report at a future session".\footnote{Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, vol. II, p. 89, para. 51.}

10. Mr. A. E. F. Sandström was appointed Special Rapporteur. He submitted his report\footnote{Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1959, vol. II, p. 122, para. 43.} to the twelfth session, and on the basis of this report the Commission took decisions and drew up recommendations for the rules concerning special missions. The Commission's draft was very brief. It was based on the idea that the rules on diplomatic intercourse and immunities in general prepared by the Commission should on the whole be applied to special missions by analogy. The Commission expressed the opinion that this brief draft should be referred to the Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities convened at Vienna in the spring of 1961. But the Commission stressed the fact that it had not been able to give this subject the thorough study it would normally have done. For that reason, the Commission regarded its draft as only a preliminary survey, carried out in order to put forward certain ideas and suggestions which should be taken into account at the Vienna Conference.\footnote{Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1963, vol. II, document A/CN.4/129, paras. 37 and 39.}

11. At its 943rd plenary meeting on 12 December 1960, the United Nations General Assembly decided,\footnote{Resolution 1504 (XV).} on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, that these draft articles should be referred to the Vienna Conference with the recommendation that the Conference should consider them with the draft articles on diplomatic intercourse and immunities. The Vienna Conference placed this question on its agenda and appointed a special Sub-Committee.\footnote{The Sub-Committee was composed of the representatives of Ecuador, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Senegal, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1963, vol. II, p. 157, para. 44.}

12. The Sub-Committee noted that these draft articles did little more than indicate which of the rules on permanent missions applied to special missions and which did not. The Sub-Committee took the view that the draft articles were unsuitable for inclusion in the final convention without long and detailed study which could take place only after a set of rules on permanent missions had been finally adopted.\footnote{United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Official Records, vol. II, document A/CONF.20/C.1/L.315, p. 45.} For this reason the Sub-Committee...
recommended that the Conference should refer this question back to the General Assembly so that the Assembly could recommend to the International Law Commission further study of the topic, i.e. that it continue to study the topic in the light of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Relations which was then drawn up. At a plenary meeting of the Vienna Conference on 10 April 1961, the Sub-Committee’s recommendation was adopted. 13

13. The matter was again submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. On 18 December 1961, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, adopted resolution 1687 (XVI) in which the International Law Commission was requested to study the subject further and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

14. Pursuant to this decision, the question was referred back to the International Law Commission, which, at its 669th meeting on 27 June 1962, decided to place it on its agenda. 14 The Commission requested the United Nations Secretariat to prepare a working paper which would serve as a basis for the discussions on this topic at its 1963 session. The Commission then placed this question on the agenda for its fifteenth session (1963).

15. During its fifteenth session, at the 712th meeting, the Commission appointed Mr. Milan Bartoš as Special Rapporteur for the topic of special missions. 16

16. In that connexion, the Commission took the following decision:

“With regard to the approach to the codification of the topic, the Commission decided that the Special Rapporteur should prepare a draft of articles. These articles should be based on the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, but the Special Rapporteur should keep in mind that special missions are, both by virtue of their functions and by their nature, an institution distinct from permanent missions. In addition, the Commission thought that the time was not yet ripe for deciding whether the draft articles on special missions should be in the form of an additional protocol to the Vienna Convention, 1961, or should be embodied in a separate convention or in any other appropriate form, and that the Commission should await the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations on that subject.” 17

17. In addition, the Commission considered again whether the topic of special missions should also cover the status of government delegates to congresses and conferences. On this point, the Commission, at its fifteenth session, inserted the following paragraph in its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly:

“With regard to the scope of the topic, the members agreed that the topic of special missions should also cover itinerant envoys, in accordance with its decision at its 1960 session. 18 At that session the Commission had also decided not to deal with the privileges and immunities of delegates to congresses and conferences as part of the study of special missions, because the topic of diplomatic conferences was connected with that of relations between States and inter-governmental organizations. At the present session, the question was raised again, with particular reference to conferences convened by States. Most of the members expressed the opinion, however, that for the time being the terms of reference of the Special Rapporteur should not cover the question of delegates to congresses and conferences.” 19

18. The Special Rapporteur submitted his report, 20 which was placed on the agenda for the Commission’s sixteenth session.

19. The Commission considered the report twice. First, at the 723rd, 724th and 725th meetings, it engaged in a general discussion and gave the Special Rapporteur general instructions on continuing his study and submitting the rest of his report at the following session. Secondly, at the 757th, 758th, 760th and 768th-770th meetings, it examined a number of draft articles and adopted sixteen articles, 21 to be supplemented, if necessary, during its seventeenth session. These articles were submitted to the General Assembly and to the Governments of Member States for information.

20. Owing to the circumstances prevailing at the time of its regular session in 1964, the General Assembly did not discuss the report and consequently did not express its opinion to the Commission. Accordingly, the Commission had to resume its work on the topic at the point it had reached at its sixteenth session in 1964. The Special Rapporteur hoped that the reports submitted at the 1964 and 1965 sessions would be consolidated in a single report.

21. The topic of special missions was placed on the agenda for the Commission’s seventeenth session, at which the Special Rapporteur submitted his second report on the subject. 22 The Commission considered that report at its 804th-809th, 817th, 819th and 820th meetings.

22. The Commission considered all the articles proposed in the Special Rapporteur’s second report. It adopted twenty-eight articles of the draft, 23 which follow on from the sixteen articles adopted at the sixteenth session. The Commission requested that the General Assembly should consider all the articles adopted at the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions as a single draft.

13 Ibid., document A/CONF.20/10/Add.1, resolution I, pp. 89-90.
17 Ibid., para. 64.
23. In preparing the draft articles, the Commission sought to codify the modern rules of international law concerning special missions, and the articles formulated by the Commission contain elements of progressive development as well as of codification of the law.

24. In conformity with articles 16 and 21 of its Statute, the Commission decided to communicate its draft articles on special missions to Governments through the Secretary-General, inviting their comments. Governments were asked to submit their comments by 1 May 1966. This short time-limit was regarded as essential if the Commission was to finish its preparation of the final draft on special missions with its present membership.

25. The Commission decided to submit to the General Assembly and to the Governments of Member States, in addition to the draft articles in chapter II, section B of its report, certain other decisions, suggestions and observations set out in section C, on which the Commission requested any comments likely to facilitate its subsequent work.

26. The General Assembly discussed the draft and referred it to the Governments of Member States, inviting them to communicate their comments and suggestions. However, only a small number of States had sent in their comments by the opening of the eighteenth session of the International Law Commission.

Chapter II

General

1. Nature of the provisions relating to special missions

27. In the International Law Commission, the question was raised whether the provisions relating to special missions should be considered as mandatory rules of law or as residuary rules. The Commission took the view that there were, in fact, few rules on the subject which had the character of *jus cogens*, and tried to bring out in the wording of the articles that they were residuary rules which would apply unless the parties agreed otherwise.

28. The Swedish Government particularly stressed that point in its comments. It expressed its opinion on the question in the following terms:

"The question to what extent the articles of the draft should be peremptory or *jus cogens* was also discussed by the Swedish delegate on the occasion referred to above. He said in that respect:

‘My next point on the draft on special missions derives not from the report of the Commission, but from the second report by Professor Bartos, from which—on page 9—it appears that States would be free to derogate from such articles only as expressly allow it. The others would be peremptory, *jus cogens*. In the draft articles submitted to us, some are found, indeed, which expressly allow States to derogate, e.g. article 3. However, article 15, which provides that a special mission shall have the right to display its flag and emblem on its premises, on the residence of its head of mission, and on its means of transport, contains no clause expressly allowing two States to derogate from it by agreement in the case of some particular mission. Yet, it would be hard to see why they should be precluded from so doing. The same argument could be adduced with respect to several other articles. Indeed, I wonder if it would not be wiser to accept as basic presumption that States are free to derogate from the rules, by express agreement between themselves, unless the contrary appears.'

29. The Special Rapporteur considers that this is a fundamental question on which the Commission must take a decision, since the final form of the whole draft will depend on how it is answered. He himself does not advocate the solution proposed by the Swedish Government, which is to adopt a general provision stipulating that all the rules relating to special missions are residuary rules. On the contrary, he is convinced that even at the present time there are binding custom rules of international law on the subject, and that it is for the Commission to specify the cases in which the provisions of the articles should be considered as residuary rules, from which the States concerned may derogate unless they have agreed otherwise.

2. Distinction between the different kinds of special missions

30. During the debates in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the representatives of various States referred to the question of the different kinds of special missions. For example:

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24 This statement was made at the 844th meeting of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the records of which are published in summary form.
The representative of Brazil said that:

"The Commission had already rejected the idea that a distinction must be made between missions of a political nature and technical missions. Political missions could have important technical aspects, just as technical missions could have a significant political character." 26

The representative of Czechoslovakia expressed the following opinion on the subject:

"In view of the constantly increasing number of special missions entrusted with tasks ranging from the highly political to the purely technical, it might be advisable to draw a clearer line between the kind of missions that fell within the draft articles and those that did not." 26

31. As the Special Rapporteur was not in a position to draw any reliable conclusion from that statement, he hoped to find one in the written comments submitted by the Czechoslovak Government. These comments contain the following passage:

"The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shares the views expressed by a number of members of the International Law Commission and likewise contained in the report of the Special Rapporteur, namely that the term special missions covers a great number of State organs for international relations which are entrusted with tasks of the most diverse character. It also shares the view that the tasks and legal status of special missions (except delegations to international conferences and congresses as well as delegations and representatives of international organizations) should be regulated within the general codification of diplomatic law by one convention. At the same time, however, it is of the opinion that in view of the fundamental difference in the character of the individual special missions it would be necessary to differentiate their legal status according to the functions assumed by them with the agreement of the participating States. (To characterize the individual categories of special missions would be undoubtedly very difficult and moreover they might be outdated by the relatively rapid development.) Proceeding from this fact the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is inclined to believe that in the case of special missions of a predominantly technical and administrative character privileges and immunities of more limited character emanating from the theory of functional necessity would correspond better to the state of international law and to the needs of States. Therefore, it suggests that it might be purposeful that the Commission when definitively formulating the draft convention should proceed e.g. from a division of special missions into at least two categories. The first category might include special missions of political character and the second one special missions of predominantly technical and administrative character. The formulation of provisions concerning special missions of political character should proceed from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. However, special missions of a predominantly technical and administrative character should be granted only such privileges and immunities as are necessary for expeditious and efficient performance of their tasks."

32. From that explanation the Special Rapporteur deduced that the Government of Czechoslovakia took the view that the differences in the character of special missions, according to their task, would justify different measures in regard to the granting of privileges and immunities, according to the theory of functional necessity.

33. The delegation of Mali also took the position that the nature of the special mission itself should be taken into account. On this point its representative said:

"...given the large number of missions and their varied nature, it would be wise to limit the application of the relevant rules to a clearly defined category of missions." 27

34. The delegation of Finland also expressed an opinion on this question. It criticized the Commission, on the ground that:

"...the Commission had failed to recognize that most special missions were purely technical and that such drastic exemptions were therefore unnecessary. It should seek to limit the scope of application of those articles, or, failing that, it should at least establish a clear distinction between different groups of special missions, and condense the articles as much as possible." 28

35. The Special Rapporteur feels bound to point out, with regard to this comment by the Finnish delegation, that the Commission was not unaware of the fact that most special missions are of a technical character, but that it nevertheless recognized that they also have a functional and a representative aspect, and that the facilities, privileges and immunities provided for in the draft articles should be accorded to them for the performance of their functions, having regard to their nature and task (draft article 17).

36. In order to allay the anxieties of certain Governments, however, the Special Rapporteur proposes that the Commission should insert in article 17 a paragraph 2, reading as follows:

2. The facilities, privileges and immunities provided for in Part II of these articles shall be granted to the extent required by these articles, unless the receiving State and the sending State agree otherwise.

3. Question of introducing into the draft articles a provision prohibiting discrimination

37. In his second report on special missions, 29 submitted to the International Law Commission at its seventeenth session, the Special Rapporteur included an article 39, entitled "Non-discrimination". His intention in doing so was to include in the draft articles on special missions

27 Ibid., 843rd meeting, para. 17.
28 Ibid., 845th meeting, para. 21.
29 Ibid., 850th meeting, para. 3.
a provision corresponding to article 47 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and article 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In paragraph 49 of its report on the work of its seventeenth session (1965) the Commission recorded its decision not to accept that suggestion "on the ground that the nature and tasks of special missions are so diverse that in practice such missions have inevitably to be differentiated inter se".

38. The Governments of various States reacted to this passage in the Commission’s report in different ways:

(a) In its comments, the Government of Yugoslavia stated that it "considers as justified the proposal for he inclusion of a provision forbidding discrimination, as in article 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and article 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations."

(b) The Belgian Government stated that it "agrees with the Commission that no provision on non-discrimination should be included in the draft, as special missions are so diverse."

(c) The Swedish Government also dealt with the question in its written comments, and stated that "The Swedish Government agrees with the stand taken by the Commission that a provision on non-discrimination would be out of place with respect to special missions."

39. As can be seen from the foregoing summary, no Government of any Member State except Yugoslavia expressed itself in favour of inserting a provision of this nature.

4. Reciprocity in the application of the draft

40. Although the Belgian Government stated that no provision on discrimination as between States in the application of the draft articles should be included in the draft, it none the less expressed the view in its written comments that "there should be a provision on reciprocity in the application of this draft."

41. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that all provisions of conventions should be applied on the assumption that there is reciprocity, and that no special provisions requiring reciprocity should be included in the draft articles.

5. Relationship with other international agreements

42. In the second report on special missions which he submitted to the Commission, the Special Rapporteur proposed an article 40, containing a provision on the relationship between the articles on special missions and other international agreements; this article corresponds to article 73 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963). At its seventeenth session in 1965, the Commission decided not to accept this proposal by the Special Rapporteur for the time being, and noted its decision in paragraph 50 of its report.

43. In its written comments, the Belgian Government stated its views on this question in the following terms: "As to the question whether the draft should contain a provision on the relationship between it and other international agreements, two points should be singled out:

(a) if the status of special missions to conferences and congresses convened both by States and by international organizations is eventually covered by this draft convention, the convention should stipulate that it does not prejudice agreements relating to international organizations in so far as they regulate the problems contemplated in the draft;

(b) more generally, the Belgian Government has no objection to the inclusion in the draft of an article similar to article 73 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations."

44. The Government of Israel, in its comments, emphasized the importance of the matter, saying that: "The question of the relationship between the articles on special missions and other international agreements is undoubtedly of great importance, and it is hoped that it will be given further consideration by the Commission in due course."

45. In its written comments, the Swedish Government expressed the following opinion:

"The question whether the draft ‘should contain a provision on the relationship between the articles on special missions and other international agreements’ is closely connected with the problem whether the articles should have a subsidiary dispositive character or whether some of them should be jus cogens. Whatever course the Commission decides to follow in this respect, the character of the articles should be clearly defined in the draft."

46. Although only three Governments have stated their views on this question, it is incumbent on the Commission to revert to it and take a final decision.

6. Form of the instrument relating to special missions

47. During its fifteenth session, at the 712th meeting, the International Law Commission expressed the opinion that the time was not yet ripe for deciding whether the draft articles on special missions should be in the form of an additional protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, or should be embodied in a separate convention or put in any other appropriate form. The Commission decided to await the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations on that subject.

48. In the course of the discussion by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the reports of the International Law Commission on its sixteenth and seventeenth sessions, several delegations stated their views on this question. The representative of Brazil took the view that:

"...there was buttress hope that a text on special missions might be added by an international conference to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
49. The Special Rapporteur considers that this statement supports the drafting of a separate convention on special missions which would be organically linked with the two Vienna Conventions.

50. The Czechoslovak representative said that “the draft articles should be embodied in an international treaty”. 38

51. The Swedish representative pointed out that “a convention on special missions had been deemed necessary to complement the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”. 39

52. The Greek representative said that the law on special missions should be codified in order to supplement the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations 40 (i.e. both Conventions, not merely that on Diplomatic Relations).

53. The Romanian representative expressed himself firmly on the question, as follows:

“His delegation accepted the view widely held that special missions were distinct from permanent diplomatic missions and considered that the rules regarding the former should be set out in a single separate convention to be drafted at a special conference of plenipotentiaries.” 41

54. The French representative expressed the opinion that:

“...the draft convention on special missions would certainly be useful, especially if it employed the same terminology as the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations while remaining independent of that Convention.” 42

55. The representative of Iraq took the view that:

“It would be preferable for them [the draft articles] to constitute a separate convention instead of forming an additional protocol to the 1961 Vienna Convention”. 43

The same representative thought that “the draft articles would seem in their general lines already to constitute the foundations for a convention”.

56. Only the representative of the Netherlands advocated codification in the form of “one unified statute book”. 44

57. The Government of Israel, in its written comments, expressed itself as follows:

“The question of the final form in which the draft articles are to be couched will undoubtedly require careful consideration. An international convention on the lines of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations would be an achievement well worth striving for, yet it is felt that it may eventually prove difficult to achieve the codification of this topic by means of a convention drawn up in a conference of plenipotentiaries. It would therefore appear desirable for the Commission to explore any other possibilities that may suggest themselves.

“It is hoped that it may be found possible to bring the draft articles, dealing as they do with a closely related subject, even more closely into line with the 1961 Vienna Convention (and, where appropriate, with the 1963 Vienna Convention) both with regard to the language used and to the arrangement of the articles.”

58. The Yugoslav Government also expressed its opinion on this question in its written comments. It considers:

“That the rules on special missions should be embodied in a separate international convention in the same manner as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963.”

59. Taking into account all these statements by Member States, the Special Rapporteur reiterates the opinion he expressed in paragraph 28 of his first report on special missions, submitted to the Commission at its sixteenth session. 45 This opinion was summed up as follows: “The Special Rapporteur believes that it would be wrong to append the draft articles on special missions to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as a mere additional protocol; for he cannot lose sight of the basic idea of the decision taken by the Commission, namely, that the Special Rapporteur ‘should keep in mind that special missions are, both by virtue of their functions and by their nature, an institution distinct from permanent missions’.”

60. The Special Rapporteur is more than ever convinced that the draft articles on special missions should be a separate diplomatic instrument, but that their terms should take account of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

7. Body which should adopt the instrument relating to special missions

61. Although the Commission did not ask Member States what body should, in their opinion, adopt the text of the instrument relating to special missions, several States expressed their views on this question, either in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during the discussion of the reports of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixteenth and seventeenth sessions, or in their written comments.

62. The representative of Israel said he was not convinced at present that the draft articles on special missions should be put before a diplomatic conference. 46

64. Ibid., 843rd meeting, para. 17.
65. Ibid., 844th meeting, para. 9.
66. Ibid., 845th meeting, para. 45.
67. Ibid., 848th meeting, para. 12.
68. Ibid., 849th meeting, para. 20.
69. Ibid., para. 34.
70. Ibid., 847th meeting, para. 7.

Ibid., p. 74.
Special Missions

Government of Israel reiterated this opinion in its written comments, inviting the Commission to consider whether there was not perhaps some other possible way of bringing this convention into being.

63. The Brazilian representative hoped that the text on special missions would be adopted by an international conference. 41

64. The Romanian representative considered that there should be a “single separate convention to be drafted at a special conference of plenipotentiaries”. 42

65. The Yugoslav Government gave its views on this question in its written comments. Its opinion is as follows:

“The convention should be adopted at a special meeting of State plenipotentiaries which might be held at the time of a session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The convention could thus be adopted either before or after the session.”

66. The Special Rapporteur considers it his duty to inform the Commission of the above opinions and to recommend that it should deal with this question in its final report, suggesting that the instrument be adopted by a special conference of plenipotentiaries of States.

8. Preamble

67. Although it is not current practice for the Commission to prepare preambles to the drafts which it submits to the General Assembly, the Yugoslav Government, in its written comments, stated that it

“...considers that the preamble to the convention should give a definition of a special mission and emphasize the differences between special missions and permanent diplomatic missions.”

68. The Special Rapporteur considers it his duty to bring this statement to the attention of the Commission, but does not think the Commission should take any further action on this desideratum of the Yugoslav Government.

9. Arrangement of the articles

69. The Commission itself, as well as certain delegations, including those of Israel, Belgium and Finland, made suggestions to the effect that when the text was finally adopted, the general arrangement of the articles in the draft should be revised. The Belgian Government went very far in this direction, proposing that the articles should be rearranged as follows:

“The Belgian Government is of the opinion that it would be more practical to regroup these articles in accordance with the following arrangement:

First would come the articles on the sending of a mission: article 5 would become article 2; article 5(bis) [Belgian proposal] would become article 3; article 16 would become article 4.

Then the task of a special mission: article 2 would become article 5.

Next would come the provisions dealing with the composition of the mission: article 6 would keep its number; article 3 (Appointment), would become article 7; article 8 (Notification) would retain its number; article 4 (Persons declared non grata) would become article 9, article 7 (Official communications) would become article 10.

In the case of two articles relating to precedence, article 9 would become article 11 and article 10 would become article 12. Article 11 (Commencement of the functions of a special mission) would become article 13, and article 12 (End of the functions) would become article 14; article 13 (Seat of the special mission) would become article 15; article 14 (Nationality of the members of the special mission) would become article 16.

Lastly, article 15 on the right to use the emblem of the sending State would become article 17.”

70. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the arrangement of the articles cannot be decided until they have been put into final form and that it would be premature to settle the question at the present stage.

Chapter III

Draft articles on special missions 43

Part I. General Rules

Article I.—The sending of special missions

71. The Swedish Government devoted special attention in its comments to the question of the use of special missions between States or Governments which did not recognize each other, and in relations with insurgents. The Swedish Government commented in the following terms:

“In its commentary to article 1 the Commission says:

‘The question whether special missions can be used between States or Governments which do not recognize each other was also raised. The Commission considered that, even in those cases, special missions could be helpful in improving relations between States, but it did not consider it necessary to add a clause to that effect to article 1.’

“The Commission’s view that special missions can be helpful in improving relations between States or Governments which do not recognize each other is certainly correct. Special missions are sometimes used to remove obstacles to recognition. It is, however, obvious that special missions can be used for these purposes only if it is clear that the mere sending of a special mission does not imply recognition. If it could be successfully argued that a State by sending to or receiving from a State or Government a special mission had recognized that State or Government, a special

41 Ibid., para. 14.
42 Ibid., 848th meeting, para. 12.
mission would no longer be a useful instrument for preparing the way to recognition. It might be useful further to investigate this problem and, if it is found warranted, include in article 1 a clause stating that sending or receiving a special mission does not in itself imply recognition.

“The Commission also states in its commentary to article 1:

‘In the case of insurrection or civil war, however, any such movements which have been recognized as belligerents and have become subjects of international law have the capacity to send and receive special missions. The same concept will be found in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (article 3, paragraph 1(a)).’

“First, if also belligerents have the capacity to send and receive special missions, the term “States” in the text of article 1 is hardly adequate. Secondly, the meaning of the reference to article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is not apparent. Thirdly, supposing that States A and B are both parties to the future instrument on special missions, supposing further that there is an insurrection in State A, that State B recognizes the insurgents as belligerents, and that State A protests against that recognition as an intervention in its internal affairs, supposing finally that State B sends a special mission to the insurgents, would State A be obliged to consider the mission as a special mission under the instrument? If so, is State A to be considered as a third State in relation to the special mission? How in that case would article 16 be applied? If the insurgents were defeated and the mission captured by State A on its territory, what is the mission’s status? The questions could be multiplied; it therefore seems that, if insurgents recognized as belligerents are to be covered by article 1, the matter should be further explored and that more precise provisions thereon should be drafted. The short reference in the commentary is not sufficient to clarify and settle the question.”

72. The Special Rapporteur considers these comments by the Swedish Government to be useful and well-founded, but in his opinion they are not such as to necessitate amendment of the actual text of the article. Nevertheless, they should be included in the commentary.

73. The Belgian Government takes the view that, in article 1, paragraph 1

“the words ‘for the performance of specific tasks’ and ‘temporary’ should be deleted, because they denote characteristics of a special mission which should be stated in the definitions”.

74. The Special Rapporteur considers that this comment by the Belgian Government does not lack justification from a structural point of view, but that the characteristics involved are so essential to the concept of a special mission that there would be a risk of mutilating the whole draft if these words were omitted from the text of the provisions themselves. Lastly, it should not be overlooked that the purpose of this provision is to show what the Governments of States must agree on if a special mission is to exist.

75. The Belgian Government then raises an objection to the use of the term “consent”. In its opinion this word “does not seem to correspond with the facts of international life. It connotes tolerance rather than approval, whereas what often happens in practice is that a proposal is made which is followed by an invitation”.

76. The Special Rapporteur considers that this comment goes beyond the Commission’s intention. The Commission has taken the position that what is referred to is consent in the true sense of the term, which is the real expression of the will of the State and does not necessarily imply an invitation, strict formality not being required. The Special Rapporteur accordingly proposes to disregard this objection.

77. Another comment by the Belgian Government relates to the meaning of the provision in article 1, paragraph 2. It is worded as follows:

“Belgium endorses the Commission’s opinion that special missions may be sent between States or Governments which do not recognize each other, but wishes to make it clear that this in no way prejudices subsequent recognition.”

78. The Special Rapporteur considers that, in this case, paragraph (3) of the Commission’s commentary on article 1 should be amplified by incorporating the sense of the Belgian comment “that this in no way prejudices subsequent recognition.”

79. During the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the representative of Ceylon expressed his delegation’s opinion on this question. He proposed that the application of the rules concerning special missions should be confined to States which had diplomatic relations with each other. The Special Rapporteur is unable to accept that proposal, and points out that, according to the International Law Commission, special missions are very often used in practice—to the great advantage of international relations—precisely in cases where no diplomatic relations exist (see paragraph (2) of the commentary to article 1 in the Special Rapporteur’s first report).

80. The delegation of Ceylon further considered that the articles on special missions should include provisions governing the legal status of delegations to international conferences. The Special Rapporteur is unable to accept that view, because the Commission has considered the question in principle and has recognized that, although there are many similarities between special missions in direct relations between States and special missions which represent States at international conferences, the rules governing the last-named missions should not be

46 Ibid., p. 89.
included in the present draft. The Special Rapporteur stresses that it will be necessary for the Commission to revert to this question, which will be studied jointly by two special rapporteurs (the Special Rapporteur on special missions and the Special Rapporteur on relations between States and inter-governmental organizations).

**Article 2.—The task of a special mission**

81. The Belgian Government submitted an observation on paragraph (5) of the commentary to article 2. The opinion it expressed was as follows:

“Belgium does not believe that the division of competence between a special mission and a permanent diplomatic mission is likely to give rise to difficulties, at any rate for the receiving State, for it is for the sending State to determine the methods of contact among its various missions and to intervene should there be any overlapping of authority. Moreover, it will frequently be the case that a member of the diplomatic mission will be attached to a special mission; he may even lead it as its *ad hoc* head.”

82. The Special Rapporteur draws attention to the fact that the Commission did not endeavour to settle this point in the text of article 2, but “decided to draw the attention of Governments to this point and to ask them to decide whether or not a rule on the matter should be included in the final text of the articles, and if so to what effect.”

83. The Government of the Republic of the Upper Volta also referred to this paragraph of the commentary. It expressed itself in the following terms:

“The problem here concerns the parallel existence of permanent and special missions and their respective areas of competence, and, in this context, the question of the validity of acts performed by special missions is raised.

“Special missions differ by nature from permanent missions, as is made clear, incidentally, in article 1 and its commentary.

“In the first place, States send special missions for specific tasks: their tasks are not of a general nature like those of a permanent mission; special missions are of a temporary nature. We mention these few facts concerning the nature of special missions in order to stress the difference, which we consider to be fundamental, between them and permanent missions; it is these individual features of special missions that determine the position of the Upper Volta Government with regard to the respective areas of competence of special missions and permanent missions. The Government of the Upper Volta therefore considers that since a special mission is established for a specific task and since it is temporary, it should be able to act independently of the permanent mission, and the tasks entrusted to it by the States concerned ought to be regarded as being outside the competence of the permanent diplomatic mission.”

84. The replies from the Belgian and Upper Volta Governments to the question raised are similar to that submitted by the Yugoslav Government. In that Government’s opinion:

“It should be stated, in article 2 of the convention, as an addition to the text already adopted, that a special mission cannot accomplish the task entrusted to it, nor can it exceed its powers, except by prior agreement with the receiving State. This would avoid any overlapping of the competence of special missions with that of permanent diplomatic missions.

“The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that some wording should be added to the commentary on that article, stating that the task of a special mission should not be specified in those cases where the special mission’s field of activity is known, and this should be considered as a definition of its task. An example of that would be the sending and receiving of experts in hydro-technology who are sent and received when two neighbouring countries are threatened by floods in areas liable to flooding.”

85. The comments of all these three Governments show that there is no need whatever to change the text of article 2, but that the Special Rapporteur will be compelled to change paragraph (5) of the commentary to that article when he puts it into final form.

**Article 3.—Appointment of the head and members of the special mission or of members of its staff**

86. The only comment on article 3 in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly seems to have been that of the Hungarian representative, who stated “In draft articles 3, 4 and 6 on special missions, the latter comprised only the head of the mission and other principal delegates”. The Hungarian representative regarded failure to mention the staff of the mission as a defect in those articles. The Special Rapporteur believes there must be some misunderstanding, for the text of article 3 as proposed by the Commission expressly states “as well as its staff”. He therefore considers that this comment should be disregarded.

87. In its written comments on article 3 the Swedish Government has the following to say:

“Should the principle be accepted that all the rules concerning the status of the special mission would be applicable unless the parties agree otherwise, the phrase ‘except as otherwise agreed’ in this and corresponding phrases in some other articles would have to be replaced by a more general provision. The second phrase of the article seems to be superfluous.”

88. With regard to this comment by the Swedish Government, the Special Rapporteur wishes to point out that the aim of the draft is to lay down certain general rules and at the same time to draw attention to those which are of a residual nature. The expression “except as otherwise agreed” indicates a residual rule. In his opinion, this expression cannot be omitted in all cases.

47 *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 843rd meeting, para. 37.*
because that would suggest that all the provisions without distinction were of a residual nature.

**Article 4.—Persons declared non grata or not acceptable**

89. The Belgian Government comments as follows on article 4, paragraph 2:

“To make the alternative stated at the end of the first sentence clearer, it would be advisable to add the words ‘as appropriate’, as in article 9, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.”

90. The Government of Israel expresses the same view and also proposes the insertion of the expression “as appropriate”. The Special Rapporteur finds these proposals acceptable.

91. In its comments on article 4, the Yugoslav Government expressed the view that

“Consideration should be given to the possibility of adding to article 4 a provision stating that the receiving State may not declare a person persona non grata if that State, by prior agreement with the sending State, had already signified its acceptance of that person as head of the mission, assuming that States agree, at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, to send and receive missions and that, between the agreement and the appointment of the special mission, no change of Ministers took place”.

92. The Special Rapporteur is unable to support this proposal, for he too has abandoned his previous opinion that the receiving State would have to renounce its right to have recourse to the persona non grata procedure if that State, by prior agreement with the sending State, had already signified its acceptance of the person as head of the mission, assuming that States agree, at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, to send and receive missions and that, between the agreement and the appointment of the special mission, no change of Ministers took place.

93. The Hungarian delegation also commented on this article in connexion with the membership of the mission and in particular of its staff. The Special Rapporteur considers that this comment has already been replied to in principle in connexion with the discussion on article 3.

94. The Turkish representative pointed out that draft articles 4, 21 and 42, on the membership of the mission, were based on the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and his delegation found it difficult to accept them in the case of special missions. The Special Rapporteur does not see how this difficulty arises in connexion with article 4, since experience shows that, even in the case of special missions, individual States may find themselves unable to work with the head of the special mission or a member of its staff and that it is therefore in the interest of good relations and of the successful accomplishment of the task of the special mission that the right to declare a person persona non grata or not acceptable should also be available in the case of special missions. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur believes there is no need to introduce any changes in the idea conveyed in draft article 4.

**Article 5.—Sending the same special mission to more than one State**

95. The Belgian Government accepts the text of the article but has the following comment to make:

“This article is unilateral; the converse situation is also conceivable, i.e. the sending of the same mission by two or more States. Belgium therefore proposes the addition of a new article, which might be drafted as follows:

‘Article 5(bis). A special mission may be sent by two or more States. In that case, the sending States shall give the receiving State prior notice of the sending of that mission. Any State may refuse to receive such a mission’.”

96. From the point of view of doctrine, the Special Rapporteur sees no objection to this proposal of the Belgian Government in support of which the same arguments can be adduced as those which led the 1961 Vienna Conference to adopt article 6 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There is, however, an all-important difference between the text of the Vienna Convention and the Belgian Government’s proposal. The Vienna Convention deals with the case where the same person is accredited by several States (a subjective consideration) whereas the Belgian proposal refers to the sending of the same mission (an objective consideration). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency to emphasize the undesirability of joint missions, because of the predominance of the strongest State in such a partnership, leading to inequality of rights, unequal protection of interests, conflict of interests between the sending States, and so forth. The Special Rapporteur is, however, prepared to admit that special missions of this kind are sent by States belonging to a community or union. After studying the problem, the Special Rapporteur, though grateful to the Belgian Government for having drawn attention to it, does not advise the Commission to adopt the Belgian proposal.

97. The Swedish Government comments that article 5 seems to it to be superfluous. It says:

“The article seems to be superfluous as article 1, paragraph 1, sufficiently covers the case. If State A wants to send a special mission to State B whose relations with State C are difficult, State A would certainly in some way or other consult authorities in State B before sending the mission on to State C. A special rule to that effect is unnecessary and could in any case be easily evaded, e.g., if State A so wished, it could postpone telling State B about its intention to send the mission to State C until the mission had accomplished its task in State B.”

98. The Special Rapporteur does not consider that there are good grounds for these comments by the Swedish Government, since the sending of the same special mission to two or more States would give rise to disputes of a special kind.
Article 6.—Composition of the special mission

99. The Belgian Government made certain comments on the terminology used in paragraph 1 of article 6. The text of its comments is as follows:

"In order to prevent any confusion with diplomatic terminology, the word ‘delegate’ should be substituted for the word ‘representative’. What should be made quite explicit in the definition of a special mission is its official character, i.e. the fact that it is composed of persons designated by a State to negotiate on its behalf. Consequently, it seems excessive to confer on them automatically a representative character, as that term is construed in diplomacy and politics.

"The expression ‘other members’ causes many ambiguities in the articles of the present draft. In the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the term ‘members of the mission’ is entirely general and means the head of the mission and the members of the staff, the latter being subdivided into members of the diplomatic staff, members of the administrative and technical staff, and members of the service staff.

"The introduction into the present draft of a new specific concept without giving it a specific name considerably impairs the intelligibility of the text."

100. The Commission is not unfamiliar with the problem of terminology raised by the Belgian Government. In his first draft, the Special Rapporteur also used the term “delegate”, but some members of the Commission rightly observed that in practice all the members of a special mission who have full powers are regarded as delegates. For this reason, the Commission took the position that where a special mission included only one representative with full powers he should be called "a single representative", in contrast to the situation where there is "a delegation composed of a head and other members".

101. The Special Rapporteur does not share the view expressed by the Belgian Government that the term “representative" is essentially incorrect because it implies a representative character, which the Belgian Government considers excessive. His understanding is that the Commission has recognized that special missions also have a representative character, even when their task is not purely diplomatic or political. This argument of the Belgian Government would therefore call for a departure from the attitude hitherto adopted by the Commission.

102. As to the expression "other members”, it might, as the Belgian Government has rightly observed, give rise to confusion between a member of the mission in the strict sense of the word and a member in the wider sense, meaning a member of the mission’s staff. The Commission has therefore distinguished between these two meanings and made this distinction in the introductory article containing the definitions. Hence it is not considered necessary to revert to this question.

103. The Belgian Government also commented on paragraph 2 of this article. It considers that

"A similar confusion is caused by the use of the term ‘diplomatic staff’. If these words applied to

advisers and experts, as stated in paragraph (5) of the commentary on the article, there is no reason for not saying so explicitly. Besides, it is to be presumed that the ‘other members’ also enjoy diplomatic status".

104. The Special Rapporteur does not think he should recommend that the text of the convention should specify the functions which the diplomatic staff of the special mission are entitled to perform. Even in the commentary referred to by the Belgian Government it is not stated that the diplomatic staff is composed of advisers and experts; they are merely mentioned by way of example. In practice, the diplomatic staff of special missions is designated by a wide variety of titles, such as assistant delegate, secretary of mission, military adviser, etc. For this reason, the Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that, even in the case of special missions, the Commission should keep to the general term “diplomatic staff”, as was done in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

105. The comments of the Government of Israel also deal with article 6. They concern paragraph 3 of the article and are as follows:

"Article 6 distinguishes between ‘a delegation’ and ‘the staff’ (see, for example, paragraph (5) of the commentary to that article). Paragraph 3 of the article provides for the limiting of the size of the staff, but keeps silent about the size of the delegation. Article 11 of the 1961 Vienna Convention provides for the possibility of limiting the size of the ‘mission’, which in the present article would mean ‘the delegation’, and it would appear that a similar provision would be desirable in the present article. Article 6, paragraph 3, would then read:

"In the absence of an express agreement as to the size of a special mission and its staff, the receiving State may require that the size of the special mission and its staff be kept within limits...’."

106. The Special Rapporteur considers that this proposal by the Government of Israel is justified and recommends the Commission to adopt it.

107. In the Sixth Committee, the Hungarian delegation made the same comment on article 6, concerning the composition of special missions, as it had made on article 3. The Special Rapporteur believes that the view hitherto expressed by the Commission is correct, namely, that the provisions on the composition of special missions should be similar to those of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. He does not really see in what respect the present text of article 6 of the draft should be changed; he thinks that something must have been omitted from the official records of the Sixth Committee.

Article 7.—Authority to act on behalf of the special mission

108. In its comments the Yugoslav Government says it considers that

60 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 843rd meeting, para. 37.
“In view of the fact that there is some inconsistency between the provisions of article 7 and the commentary on that article, the words ‘and a member of his diplomatic staff’ should be inserted after the word ‘mission’ at the beginning of article 7, paragraph 2”.

109. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that, in accordance with the intention of the Commission, only the head of a special mission is normally authorized, by virtue of his function, to act on behalf of the special mission, whereas paragraph 2 of the text provides for the possibility of authorizing some other person as well. After considering the Yugoslav comments, the Special Rapporteur does not see why one of the members of the staff could not be authorized to perform certain acts on behalf of the mission; but he does not think that members of the staff can be authorized to replace the head of the mission. Consequently, the Special Rapporteur recommends that the Commission should adopt only part of the Yugoslav Government’s proposal and should insert in the text of article 7 a new, additional paragraph 3, reading as follows:

A member of the staff of the special mission may be authorized to perform particular acts on behalf of the mission.

110. In its comments, the Belgian Government expresses the opinion that in order to make the article correspond with the idea expressed in paragraph (2) of the commentary, it would be better to say “unless otherwise agreed” and to delete the word “normally”. The Special Rapporteur cannot agree to this proposal; the word “normally” was used deliberately, because there may be cases which are not provided for in the agreement concluded between the parties, but which justify a derogation from the normal rule. For example, the head of a special mission might fall ill and he could then be replaced by his deputy or even by the charge d'affaires ad interim of the special mission as stated in paragraphs (7), (8), (9) and (10) of the commentary to article 7. The Special Rapporteur therefore recommends that the proposal made in the Belgian Government’s comments should be disregarded.

111. The Swedish Government also made some comments on article 7, which read as follows:

“The phrase ‘normally’ is a descriptive term and hardly appropriate here. The text should be rephrased. How, would depend upon whether the principle of the subsidiary character of the rules is accepted or not.”

112. The Special Rapporteur thinks that the reply given above to the Belgian Government’s comments also applies to this observation by the Government of Sweden. He reiterates that the word “normally” is an essential term and not a descriptive one, as stated above.

113. The Government of Israel suggested in its comments that the text of article 41 of the draft articles on special missions should be incorporated in the text of article 7. The Special Rapporteur does not share this view, because article 7 deals with authority to act on behalf of the special mission, whereas article 41 concerns the establishment of rules for designating the organ of the receiving State with which official business is conducted.

114. In its comments on article 8 the Government of Israel says:

“With regard to the expression ‘any person’ used in article 8, paragraph 1(c), it may perhaps be desirable to include an explanation in the commentary to that article, such as that given by the Special Rapporteur in paragraph 14 of the summary record of the 762nd meeting of the International Law Commission.”

115. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, this comment should be taken into consideration; he will bear it in mind when drafting the commentaries.

116. The Government of Yugoslavia comments on this article as follows:

“...the commentary on article 8 should be made consistent with the provisions of that article. Whereas article 8, paragraph 1(d), provides for the receiving State to be notified of the members of the mission, the private servants of the head or of a member of the mission or of a member of the mission’s staff who are recruited from among the nationals of that State or from among aliens domiciled in its territory, it is stated in paragraph (7) of the commentary that such recruitment is in practice limited to auxiliary staff without diplomatic rank. Since some States allow the recruitment of staff with diplomatic rank, the Government considers that the following words should be inserted in paragraph (7) of the commentary: ‘In some countries such recruitment is in practice limited to auxiliary staff without diplomatic rank’.”

117. Having considered this comment by the Yugoslav Government, the Special Rapporteur takes the view that the text of article 8, paragraph 1(d) is correctly formulated, because it covers all recruitment of persons “residing in the receiving State as members of the mission or as private servants...”, but that the observation on paragraph (7) of the commentary is justified. He is therefore of the opinion that the Yugoslav Government’s proposal should be adopted in so far as it supplements the commentary.

118. The Belgian Government’s comments also contain a passage concerning article 8. First of all, it is said that:

“As to the substance, it should be specified that there must be prior notification, which would avoid having to resort where necessary to the non grata procedure, which is always unpleasant for all parties concerned. The text of this paragraph should therefore read as follows:

‘The sending State shall notify the receiving State in advance...’.”

119. The Special Rapporteur is not able to recommend the Commission to adopt this suggestion by the Belgian Government. He is convinced that it is impossible in practice to give prior notification always, and in all circumstances, of all the facts listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d). This could not be done even in the case of regular

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diplomatic missions, and that is why the matter was regulated as follows in article 10, paragraph 2, of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: "Where possible, prior notification of arrival and final departure shall also be given". If this cannot constitute a general rule, even for these two isolated events, in the case of permanent diplomatic missions, there is clearly no need to amend the text of the article. However, it might perhaps be useful to include the essence of the Belgian Government's observation in the commentary.

120. The Belgian Government's comments contain another passage referring to article 8, paragraph 2, of the draft and reading as follows:

"In this context, the notifications to be made when the special mission has already commenced its functions would concern only persons subsequently called upon to participate in the special mission's work, which would be more in line with the usual practice."

121. The Special Rapporteur, knowing the practice of special missions, considers that the Commission was right in laying down the rule for all cases arising after the commencement of the special mission's functions and in including persons who have been the subject of notification by other organs of the sending State, and that this rule should not be limited to the notification of facts concerning persons forming part of the mission or arriving after it has commenced its functions. Until the time when the special mission commences its functions, the notification is made by other organs, because the special mission does not yet exist de facto; and once it has really begun to function there is no need to resort to notification by other organs.

Article 9.—General rules concerning precedence

122. The Belgian Government makes the following comment on article 9, paragraph 1:

"Belgium is of the opinion that the choice of the language determining the alphabetical order should be made in accordance with the rules of protocol of the receiving State. The end of the paragraph should therefore read

"...in conformity with the protocol in force in the receiving State."

123. The Special Rapporteur considers this to be an apposite comment which is in conformity with the idea expressed by the Commission in paragraph (20) of the commentary on article 9. He is willing to make the change proposed.

124. The Belgian Government proposes in its comments that the text of article 9 should be expanded by the addition of a new paragraph. This proposal is worded as follows:

"It is considered that it would be useful to lead up to the exception which is stated in the following article; there should accordingly be a new paragraph 3 stipulating that 'the present article shall not affect the provisions of article 10 relating to special ceremonial and formal missions'."

125. The Special Rapporteur is not convinced of the need for this new paragraph, because article 10 immediately follows article 9.

126. The comments of the Government of Israel include a proposal that articles 9 and 10 should be combined into a single article. The text of the proposal is as follows:

"There would seem to be no necessity for applying different criteria in article 9, paragraph 1 and article 10, and it is therefore suggested that they be combined as follows: 'Except as otherwise agreed, where two or more special missions meet in order to carry out a common task, or on a ceremonial or formal occasion, precedence among their respective members and staff shall be determined by the alphabetical order of the names of the States concerned'."

127. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that modern special missions having a substantive task should not be associated with the traditional institution of special ceremonial and formal missions.

128. In its comments on article 9 the Yugoslav Government says that:

"As regards precedence and the alphabetical order to be applied under draft article 9, it is considered that the alphabetical order to be adopted should be the one in use in the receiving State, or, in the absence thereof, the method used by the United Nations."

129. With regard to this comment, the Special Rapporteur takes the same position as he does on the Belgian Government's proposal referred to above. He considers it his duty to point out that the Yugoslav proposal is more complete, because it provides for an alternative solution by suggesting two alphabetical orders—that of the receiving State, and that used by the United Nations. It might, perhaps, even be better to adopt this proposal as an addition to paragraph 1 of article 9.

130. The Government of Israel suggests, in its comments, that the commentary on article 9 should be shortened, as it is too long. The Special Rapporteur will take this suggestion into consideration and will be very grateful to Mr. Rosenne, the member of the Commission who is probably familiar with the intentions underlying this comment, if he will indicate the passages which he thinks should be shortened.

Article 10.—Precedence among special ceremonial and formal missions

131. The Belgian Government formulated comments and proposals concerning article 10, in the following terms:

"This article is ambiguous. It refers to special missions which meet on a ceremonial occasion; but, taken literally, it seems to refer to special missions of all kinds. It would be both clearer and simpler to state that 'precedence among special ceremonial and formal missions shall be governed by the protocol in force in the receiving State.' In that case, Belgium would not wish this article to be regulated by a detailed text such as that proposed in paragraph (4) of the commentary."
132. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, the text proposed by the Belgian Government is identical in substance with the text of article 10 of the Commission’s draft, but is perhaps more suitable because briefer.

133. We recall that the Belgian Government has proposed an additional paragraph to article 9 containing a reference to article 10. The Special Rapporteur has given his opinion on this matter in the section relating to article 9.

134. The Government of Israel proposes that article 9, paragraph 1, and article 10 should be combined as a single provision, which would entail the deletion of article 10. The Special Rapporteur has already expressed his view on this proposal in connexion with article 9.

135. In the remarks by the Government of Israel on the commentary to article 10 there is also a suggestion that that commentary should be shortened. The Special Rapporteur’s opinion on this proposal has been given in the section relating to article 9.

Article 11.—Commencement of the functions of a special mission

136. The Government of the Upper Volta proposes in its comments that the actual text of article 11 should include the idea of non-discrimination in the reception of special missions and the way in which they are permitted to begin to function, especially among special missions of the same character—the idea set forth in paragraph (12) of the commentary to article 11 of the draft. This proposal is worded as follows:

“The problem raised in paragraph (12) of the commentary on article 11—that of the discrimination to which some special missions may be subjected in practice in comparison with others—is of great importance at the present time. Such discrimination is contrary to the sovereign equality of States and to the principles which should guide States in their daily relations with each other; the differences in treatment in the reception of special missions and the way in which they are permitted to begin to function may prejudice the chances of success of the mission itself, which should be able to develop in an atmosphere of calm and confidence.

“The Government of the Upper Volta considers that a provision on non-discrimination should be included in this article.”

137. The Special Rapporteur views this proposal with especial sympathy; he regards it as justified in law and founded on the principle of the equality of States. This idea also underlay the formulation of article 13, paragraph 2, of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

138. The Belgian Government uses as a starting point for its comments a concept of the commencement of the special mission’s functions differing from that adopted by the vast body of international practice and by the Commission. The purpose of article 11 of the draft is to link the commencement of the special mission’s functions to the time of effective contact between the special mission and the appropriate organs of the receiving State. The Belgian Government, however, has submitted a proposal which might lead to a different interpretation in the over-all solution of the problem. First, the commencement of the special mission’s privileges and immunities should not be confused with the commencement of its functioning. In the Special Rapporteur’s opinion, these are two different juridical institutions, although they occasionally coincide. For this reason, the Commission should take up a definite position on the Belgian proposal, which is worded as follows:

“The usefulness of the first sentence of the article is open to question, as the commencement of privileges and immunities is governed by article 37. Furthermore, the present wording may lead to confusion in connexion with protocol, which is precisely where letters of credence may be required.

“Lastly, a diplomatic mission should not be qualified as regular, but as permanent. The article might therefore be drafted as follows: ‘Where no other provision is made by the protocol in force in the receiving State for special ceremonial and formal missions, the exercise of the function of a special mission shall not depend upon presentation of the special mission by the permanent diplomatic mission or upon the submission of letters of credence or full powers’.”

Article 12.—End of the functions of a special mission

139. The Belgian Government proposes, in its comments, that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), both dealing with causes of the cessation of the special mission’s functions, should be combined in a single paragraph. Sub-paragraph (a) relates to “The expiry of the duration assigned for the special mission”, while sub-paragraph (b) relates to “The completion of the task of the special mission”. The Commission took the view that these two causes of the cessation of the special mission’s functions should be separated, so as to emphasize that they were independent of each other. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the wording adopted by the Commission should be left as it stands.

140. The Belgian Government further proposes that in the French text the word “rappel” should be used rather than the word “révocation” (of the special mission), which it finds too strong. The Special Rapporteur points out that both of these terms are used in practice, and that as this is a question of drafting it should be settled by the Drafting Committee.

141. The Belgian Government considers that the provision in article 44, paragraph 2, of the Commission’s draft should also be included in article 12. This provision reads as follows: “The severance of diplomatic relations between the sending State and the receiving State shall not automatically have the effect of terminating special missions existing at the time of the severance of relations, but each of the two States may terminate the special mission”. In this case the Commission was not referring to the mandatory termination of the special mission, so that adoption of the Belgian Government’s proposal would upset the system which the Commission had in mind.
142. The Government of the Upper Volta comments on article 12 as follows:

"The Government of the Upper Volta would like to support the proposal, mentioned in the commentary to this article, which was submitted in 1960 by the Commission's Special Rapporteur, Mr. Sandström.

"It is desirable to consider that when negotiations between the special mission and the local authorities are interrupted, the mission loses its purpose, and that consequently the interruption of negotiations marks the end of the functions of a special mission."

143. The Special Rapporteur is not sure of the purpose of this comment by the Government of the Upper Volta; that is to say, whether it is a proposal to transfer one of the ideas in the commentary to the actual text of the draft or whether it is an expression of support by the Government of a Member State for this idea, which is still an integral part of the commentary. If the Government of the Upper Volta considers that this idea should be transferred to the text of the article, the Special Rapporteur's view is that the position taken by the Commission on this question should be adhered to, and that no change should be made in the text of the draft. If what is intended is an expression of agreement with the opinion of the previous Special Rapporteur, Mr. Sandström, which should remain in the commentary, the Special Rapporteur sees no need for a further discussion of this question in the Commission.

144. The Government of Israel suggests, in its comments, that article 12 should be transferred to the end of the draft and placed after articles 43 and 44. The Special Rapporteur considers that article 12 is appropriately placed and should stay where it is.

Article 13.—Seat of the special mission

145. Commenting on article 13, paragraph 1, the Belgian Government says:

"The need for the proviso ‘in the absence of prior agreement’ is not readily apparent; for in any case the procedure contemplated consists of a proposal followed by its approval. It should also be noted that in practice the seat of a special mission is always determined by mutual consent."

146. The Special Rapporteur shares, in principle, the Belgian Government’s view that mutual consent is always involved; but that consent may either be reached in advance—which is the situation referred to in the phrase “in the absence of prior agreement” —or be reached later. The Special Rapporteur therefore considers that the text formulated by the Commission is correct, for it makes provision for both solutions.

147. The comments by the Government of Israel also include one relating to the expression “in the absence of prior agreement”; it reads as follows:

"The phrase ‘in the absence of prior agreement’ is used in article 13, preceding the residual rule, whereas the expression ‘except as otherwise agreed’ is used in article 9, and the expression ‘unless otherwise agreed’ in articles 21 and 26. It is suggested that the same terminology be employed to express the residual rule throughout the draft."

148. The Special Rapporteur proposes that this point, being a matter of drafting, should be considered by the Drafting Committee, although in his view the expression “in the absence of prior agreement” is here correctly used.

149. In paragraph (4) of the commentary on article 13, the Commission suggested a compromise in cases where the seat of the special mission was not established in advance by agreement, namely, that the receiving State should have the right to propose the locality, but that, in order to become effective, that choice should be accepted by the sending State. However, the Commission left this question open. Only the Government of the Upper Volta gave attention to this solution, expressing the following opinion in its written comments:

"The Upper Volta considers that the compromise suggested by the Commission, namely that the sending State should have a part in choosing the seat of the special mission, might impair the sovereign authority of the receiving State over its own territory. The Government of the Upper Volta is of the opinion that the receiving State is competent to choose the seat of the mission, without the participation of the sending State, provided that the locality chosen by the receiving State is suitable in the light of all the circumstances which might affect the special mission’s efficient functioning."

150. The Special Rapporteur considers that the Commission should take note of the opinion expressed by the Government of the Upper Volta, but that it is not such as to affect the actual text of the proposed article.

Article 14.—Nationality of the head and members of the special mission and of members of its staff

151. The comments by the Swedish Government include two proposals for the amendment of article 14. The first of these proposals is as follows:

"The term ‘should in principle’ is too vague. Paragraph 1 of the article could well be omitted."

152. In the Special Rapporteur’s opinion, the Commission was right to include in article 14, paragraph 1 of the draft on special missions, a provision corresponding to article 8, paragraph 1, of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It was right, as regards substance, too, since both these provisions express a general rule, subject to the exceptions referred to in the subsequent paragraphs, that members of a mission should in principle be of the nationality of the sending State. Consequently, the Special Rapporteur does not consider this comment justified.

153. The Swedish Government’s second proposal is that:

"If the articles of the draft are given only a subsidiary character, paragraph 3 could also be omitted."

154. The Special Rapporteur considers that the Commission was right to introduce this paragraph from article 8, paragraph 3, of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. The question often arises, even as regards its substance. At the Vienna Conference, however, the Scandinavian States opposed this provision, although it proved generally acceptable.

Article 15.—Right of special missions to use the flag and emblem of the sending State

155. In its comments the Belgian Government expressed the opinion “that the solution adopted in article 20 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations should prevail and that the emblem should be used only on the means of transport of the head of the mission”.

156. The Special Rapporteur’s view is that there are practical reasons, such as travel in the territory concerned, which make it necessary, in the interests of both States and for the information of the general public, for special missions to make wider use of the emblem of the sending State. This does not apply to permanent diplomatic missions, for which the privilege can be confined to heads of mission.

157. During the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the Hungarian representative expressed the view that there was no need to retain draft article 15, which should be regarded as an instance of the rule that special missions are required to comply with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.62

158. The Special Rapporteur considers that the right of special missions to use the flag and emblem of the sending State is a specific right which should be guaranteed to special missions and that, accordingly, regulation of the exercise of that right cannot be left entirely to the receiving State. In paragraph (2) of its commentary on article 15, the Commission stressed that it “reserves the right to decide at a later stage whether article 15 should be placed in the section of the draft dealing with general matters or in the special section concerning facilities, privileges and immunities”. The Special Rapporteur’s view is that it would be preferable to leave article 15 in part I of the convention, but he could agree to its being transferred to part II, where it would precede the present article 18.

Article 16.—Activities of special missions in the territory of a third State

159. The Government of Israel comments as follows: “Although the right of the ‘third State’ concerned to withdraw its consent appears to be implied in the wording of article 16, paragraph 1, it may be preferable to accord such an important eventuality a separate paragraph (on the lines of paragraph (8) of the commentary to that article), which could at the same time provide for an express agreement to the contrary:

1. The third State may impose conditions which must be observed by the sending States.
2. The third State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, withdraw its consent’.”

160. The Special Rapporteur reminds the Commission that he put forward the same idea in his second report63 and proposed that it be incorporated in the text of the article. He accordingly supports the proposal.

161. The Government of Israel also proposes that certain changes should be made in article 16, paragraph 2. Its proposal is as follows:

“With regard to article 16, paragraph 2, it is suggested to use the expression ‘the sending States’, as obviously there must be more than one ‘sending State’.”

162. The Special Rapporteur accepts this proposal, as it would bring the English text into line with the French, which is his original text.

163. The Belgian Government made a separate comment on this article and proposes a new draft. Its comment reads:

“From the point of view of substance, a fundamental question arises, namely, whether the convention will apply in this case or whether on the contrary this article forms a separate entity. In other words, is the situation with which it deals regulated solely by the terms of the conditions imposed by the host State or is the host State bound by the fact of its consent to apply the articles of the convention, and in particular those which concern privileges and immunities? In the latter case, to what extent can the conditions imposed by the third State derogate from the provisions of the convention?

“From the point of view of drafting, it would be desirable to specify that the consent must be prior and may be withdrawn at any time. The text might therefore be amended to read as follows:

1. Special missions may not perform their functions on the territory of a third State without its prior consent.
2. The third State may impose conditions which must be observed by the sending States.
3. The third State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, withdraw its consent’.”

164. The Special Rapporteur’s view is that the draft proposed by the Belgian Government is an over-simplification. He prefers the wording proposed by the Government of Israel and reproduced above.

165. In his statement to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the Hungarian representative made suggestions similar to those of the Governments of Israel and Belgium, namely that the substance of paragraph (3) of the commentary on article 16 should be incorporated


in the text of the article itself. As he has already explained when discussing these proposals, the Special Rapporteur is in favour of this idea.

**PART II. FACILITIES, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES**

*Article 17.—General facilities*

166. During the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the Indian representative took his stand on the principle that the privileges and immunities of officials of special missions should be based not on formal criteria, but on "functional necessity". He expressed the fear that undue expansion of the categories of functionaries of special missions on whom diplomatic immunity and privileges were conferred might put them on an equal footing with permanent diplomatic missions and thus lead to many irritating situations and problems. In his opinion, that could be avoided without adversely affecting the functioning of special missions.

167. The representative of Nigeria also pointed out that privileges and immunities should be granted to members of special missions on the basis of their functions and not of their personal status.

168. The Special Rapporteur takes these two comments as evidence of a trend against granting officials of special missions the same legal status as members of permanent diplomatic missions, and points out that in the introduction to his first report he himself, unlike the majority of the Commission, was inclined to give precedence to the functional character of special missions rather than the representative character. As other States have not opposed the view of the majority, the Special Rapporteur does not consider it possible to abandon the system adopted by the Commission. Nevertheless, he feels bound to stress that these comments are such as to require the Commission to take a position on the matter: if the Commission changes its former opinion, it will be necessary to revise a whole series of provisions.

169. The Swedish Government devoted special attention to this question in its comments. Its main point is that the number of persons who will enjoy privileges and immunities in their capacity as members of special missions should be taken into account. The Swedish delegation advanced this opinion during the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, and maintained it as a general remark in its written comments. This remark reads as follows:

"During the discussion of the Commission's report in the Sixth Committee, at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the Swedish delegate, in a speech on 8 October 1965, drew attention to the problem of granting immunities and privileges to a great number of people. He pointed out that this problem arises in connexion with special missions, and he continued:

While the great quantity of these missions makes a codification desirable, it also makes it difficult, for immunities and privileges granted to a few may not meet insurmountable obstacles, but the same immunities and privileges given to many may cause a real problem.

'Now, as Professor Bartos demonstrated in his first report on the subject, a great many kinds of special missions would come under the new régime: political, military, police, transport, water supply, economic, veterinary, humanitarian, labour-recruiting and others. Consequently, a great many persons would be immune from jurisdiction, would enjoy exemption from Customs control and duties, etc. This group of persons would be further widened at a later stage, when rules in the same vein were introduced for delegates to conferences convened by governments or international organizations. Yet, we know that in many countries the public and parliament already complain of the present extent of immunity and privileges. A wide extension would surely meet some resistance. Of course, to the extent that such widening is functionally indispensable, we must try to achieve its acceptance and persuade the opponents it will meet. However, it would seem highly desirable that the Commission should seek some means of reducing the circle of missions which would fall under the special régime or else of limiting the privileges and immunities granted. It is appreciated that there are great difficulties in distinguishing between missions. Diplomatic or non-diplomatic status cannot alone be decisive; a mission consisting of a minister of defence and generals sent to negotiate military co-operation may have as great a functional need to be under the special régime as a diplomatic delegation sent to negotiate a new trade agreement. Yet it may possibly be said that special missions, which by definition are temporary, generally have a somewhat more limited need, at least for privileges, than do permanent missions. In a great many cases the express agreement to send and receive a special mission may also be a guarantee that the receiving State will in all ways spontaneously facilitate the task of the mission, a guarantee that does not necessarily exist for permanent missions.'"

170. The Swedish Government is of the opinion that great care should be taken to limit privileges and immunities as much as possible, both with respect to their extent and with respect to the categories of persons who would enjoy them. This is regarded as particularly important if it is the intention that a considerable part of the provisions regarding privileges and immunities shall be peremptory.

**Extent of the privileges and immunities of special missions as compared with permanent diplomatic missions**

171. The Commission started from the principle that special missions should enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of their tasks. On the other hand, the Commission drafted the provisions of the articles on special missions in conformity with the rules of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplo-

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54 **Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 843rd meeting, para. 40.**

55 **Ibid., 846th meeting, para. 5.**

56 **Ibid., 847th meeting, para. 17.**

57 This statement was made at the 844th meeting of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the records of which are published in summary form.
matic Relations, as it considered that special missions cannot enjoy wider privileges and immunities than are granted to permanent diplomatic missions. However, the absence from this body of rules of any express provision on the subject prompted the Belgian Government to make the following point in its written comments:

"... it is hard to conceive that a special mission should receive better treatment than the permanent diplomatic mission of the same nationality established in the receiving State. Privileges and immunities should be granted to a special mission only to the extent to which they are applied in favour of the permanent diplomatic mission of the same nationality, unless otherwise mutually agreed between the States concerned."

172. The Special Rapporteur thinks it necessary to include a special provision which, as an operative rule, will settle this question, and to insert an explanation of the Commission's view in the commentary on article 17. (For the text of the new paragraph 2 of article 17, see above, paragraph 36.)

Article 18.—Accommodation of the special mission and its members

173. No reference was made to this article either during the discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly or in the written comments by Governments.

Article 19.—Inviolability of the premises

174. In its comments, the Government of Israel proposes an addition to article 19, paragraph 1. The proposal reads as follows:

"With regard to article 19, paragraph 1, it would appear desirable, from a practical point of view, to add to it a provision similar to the last sentence of article 31, paragraph 2 of the 1963 Vienna Convention: 'The consent...may, however, be assumed in case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action'."

175. The Special Rapporteur points out that in his second report he considered the possibility of introducing, in the text itself, a provision similar to that of article 31, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, concerning the right of the receiving State to assume the consent of the head of a consular post in case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action. The Commission studied this question very carefully and decided that it should not adopt the relevant provision of the Convention on Consular Relations, but should take the same position in the draft articles on special missions as had been taken in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 58

176. The Government of Israel also makes the following suggestion concerning article 19:

"Consideration may, perhaps, be given to drawing a distinction between the case of a special mission residing in a town where the sending State has a permanent mission and that of a special mission in a town where there is no such permanent mission, and allowing the aforesaid proposition only in the former case."

177. The Special Rapporteur is not convinced that this is a useful proposal, because the respective powers of the head of the special mission and the head of the permanent diplomatic mission remain the same in both cases.

178. The Belgian Government, in its comments, proposes an amendment to article 19, paragraph 3. Its proposal is as follows:

"The words 'by the organs of the receiving State' might be deleted; they do not appear either in article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or in article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Furthermore, the term used should be 'measure of execution'."

179. The Special Rapporteur points out that although, when the articles on special missions were being drafted, there was a tendency to model the text as closely as possible on the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations and on Consular Relations, certain special conditions and circumstances in which the tasks of special missions are performed were nevertheless taken into account. That was why the Special Rapporteur and the Commission thought it necessary to make the text clearer by introducing the words whose deletion is suggested by the Belgian Government solely on the ground that they do not appear in the texts of the two Vienna Conventions.

Article 20.—Inviolability of archives and documents

180. No observations were made on this article, either in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly or in the comments by Governments.

Article 21.—Freedom of movement

181. In the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the Turkish representative expressed the opinion that the International Law Commission had gone too far by granting all members of special missions, in principle, freedom of movement throughout the territory of the receiving State. He doubted whether it was necessary to retain that provision and thus place the special mission, in that respect, on an absolutely equal footing with the staff of permanent diplomatic missions. 59 The Special Rapporteur points out that in his first and second reports he informed the Commission that in practice it was possible to lay down rules placing some restriction on the freedom of movement of the members and staff of a special mission in the territory of the receiving State. The Commission considered that it should start from the principle of full freedom of movement to the extent provided for in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). It decided, however, not to make the

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rule stated in article 21 of the draft an absolute rule. It regarded this provision as a residuary rule from which States might derogate in their mutual relations, making restrictions by agreement. The words “unless otherwise agreed” were accordingly added at the end of article 21. The Special Rapporteur proposes that the Commission should reconsider the principle as he himself attaches some weight to the comment made by the Turkish delegation.

182. The Swedish Government also commented on this article, as follows:

“Should the principle of the subsidiary character of the articles be accepted, the phrase ‘unless otherwise agreed’ can be omitted. If, on the other hand, the articles are in principle to constitute jus cogens the text should at least be reworded along these lines:

‘In the absence of an agreement on the matter between the sending and the receiving State, the receiving State shall, subject to its laws, etc. ensure, etc.’

“As now phrased the text seems to assume that the parties might agree not to accord such freedom of movement to the mission as is necessary for the performance of its functions.”

183. The Special Rapporteur does not consider the phrase “unless otherwise agreed” superfluous. It is, in fact, necessary, in order to show what is held to be the general rule on the subject; but this general rule, being of a residuary character, will not be applied if the States concerned agree otherwise. The Special Rapporteur does not see the advantage of the new wording proposed by the Swedish Government.

Article 22.—Freedom of communication

184. The Yugoslav Government suggests that paragraph 6 of article 22 should be amended. It comments as follows:

“...consideration should be given to the possibility of guaranteeing, in article 22, the immunity of couriers ad hoc during their return journey also, if it immediately follows the delivery of the bag to the special mission.”

185. The Special Rapporteur fully appreciates the reasons which led the Yugoslav Government to make this suggestion; he considers it very logical, but, in his opinion, it would be difficult to provide, for the couriers ad hoc of special missions, greater guarantees and more extensive rights than those enjoyed by the same category of couriers of regular and permanent diplomatic missions and consular posts. For this reason, he does not recommend the adoption of this suggestion by the Yugoslav Government. In the two Vienna Conventions, immunity was not conferred on this category of couriers as a personal safeguard, but as protection of the bag they carry.

186. In its comments, the Belgian Government deals with several aspects of the text of article 22. In the first place, it emphasizes in the following terms the inadequacy of the protection provided for the telegraphic communications of special missions, if they are not transmitted as communications of diplomatic or consular missions:

“With regard to wireless communications, the article provides that the special mission shall be entitled to send messages in code or cipher. But article 18 of the Telegraph Regulations annexed to the 1959 Geneva International Telecommunication Convention states:

‘The sender of a telegram in secret language must produce the code from which the text or part of the text or the signature of the telegram is compiled if the office of origin or the Administration to which this office belongs asks him for it. This provision shall not apply to Government telegrams’. 60

“The only way to reconcile the provisions of this paragraph relating to secret messages with the provisions of the international Conventions relating to the telegraph service would be for special missions to transmit such messages as Government telegrams.

“However, annex 3 of the Geneva International Telecommunication Convention gives a complete list of the persons authorized to send Government telegrams and it refers only to diplomatic or consular agents. 61

“In short, in the present state of international conventional law, special missions would have to be authorized by their diplomatic or consular posts to hand in Government telegrams bearing the seal or stamp of the authority sending them.

“If there is no such post the problem remains unsolved. This question might well be raised when the time comes to revise the International Telecommunication Convention.”

187. The Special Rapporteur considers it his duty to thank the Belgian Government for having drawn attention to the provisions of the Geneva International Telecommunication Convention, but he adds that the International Law Commission had this provision in mind when drafting article 22, paragraph 1 and decided to recognize the right of special missions to use messages in code or cipher and to use them directly, without using the permanent diplomatic or consular mission of the sending State as an intermediary. The Belgian Government is of the opinion that the convention under study cannot amend the Geneva International Telecommunication Convention, whereas in the International Law Commission the prevailing opinion was that the future convention on special missions, as a subsequent instrument, would be directly applicable. Nevertheless, it is the Special Rapporteur’s duty to draw the Commission’s attention to this comment by the Belgian Government.

188. In its comments, the Belgian Government also refers to the last sentence of paragraph 1 of article 22, as follows:

“With regard to wireless transmitters, it would be desirable to amend the last sentence of the present paragraph to read as follows:


189. The Special Rapporteur points out that the sentence in the text of the draft article referred to by the Belgian Government in the above comment, is copied from the last sentence of article 27, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the last sentence of article 35, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Belgian Government's proposal is more complete from the technical point of view and the Special Rapporteur has no objection to its adoption. If adopted, the Belgian text would replace the last sentence of paragraph 1 of article 22 of the Commission's draft.

190. The Belgian Government also makes some comments on the provisions of article 22 relating to diplomatic bags. On this subject it says:

"With regard to the postal service, it should be borne in mind that the Universal Postal Convention does not make provision for any special treatment of diplomatic bags from the point of view of rates. Some postal unions covering a limited area consent to carry such bags post-free, but this is solely because special reciprocal arrangements have been made; all proposals so far submitted for including a provision for their carriage post-free in the Universal Convention have been rejected.

"As Belgium does not participate in an arrangement for the post-free carriage of diplomatic bags, this mail is subject to the ordinary postal rates."

191. After studying this comment by the Belgian Government, the Special Rapporteur feels bound to point out that what was intended by the Commission in paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 22 was solely the protection under substantive law of the inviolability of the contents and secrecy of the bag, and not any special treatment of diplomatic bags in respect of postal rates. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the Commission should not discuss the question of privileged rates, which is not referred to in the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963; the diplomatic bag should be uniformly protected regardless of the means used for its transport and there is no need to draw special attention to the situation of diplomatic bags sent by post.

Articles 23 to 32.—Questions of terminology

192. In connexion with these articles, the Government of Israel raises the question of terminology. Its comment is as follows:

"The following observation is made in respect of articles 23 to 32 inclusive: these articles, which deal mainly with questions of exemptions and immunities, mention alternately the 'staff' of the special missions in some places, and the 'diplomatic staff' in others, without this distinction being always really justified, especially in view of the provisions of article 32. It is therefore suggested to use the term 'staff' throughout the aforesaid articles and to adjust article 32 accordingly."

193. The Special Rapporteur thanks the Government of Israel for having raised this question, but he considers that in principle the comment is not pertinent. In his first draft, the Special Rapporteur proceeded on the assumption that all staff members of special missions should be accorded the same privileges and immunities. The Commission, however, did not adopt this view, but distinguished, in each article, between the different categories of staff of special missions, and tried not to grant them greater privileges and immunities than those granted to the corresponding categories of staff under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This is why articles 23 to 32 refer in some places to the 'staff' of special missions and in others to the "diplomatic staff". The Special Rapporteur will try to take this comment by the Government of Israel into consideration with respect to each of these articles and to verify once again that the distinction between "staff" and "diplomatic staff" is justified.

Article 23.—Exemption of the mission from taxation

194. With regard to article 23 of the draft, the Belgian Government comments as follows:

"The Belgian view is that which it upheld in connexion with article 23 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, namely that the head of the mission is exempt from dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission only if he has acquired them in his capacity as head of the special mission and with a view to the performance of the functions of the mission. Accordingly, the words 'in his capacity as such' should be inserted after 'head of the special mission'."

195. The Special Rapporteur considers this suggestion useful, as it removes all doubt about the meaning of the text.

196. Although the proposal of the Government of Israel concerning questions of terminology includes article 23, we do not think it applies to this article, the text of which contains none of the terms whose standardization is aimed at in the above-mentioned proposal.

Article 24.—Personal inviolability

197. The Belgian Government comments as follows:

"The Belgian Government is of the opinion that members of missions should be granted only a personal inviolability limited to the performance of their functions."

198. The Special Rapporteur points out that the Commission limited this guarantee to "the person of the head and members of the special mission and of the members of its diplomatic staff". The Commission recognized that..."
these persons should be placed on an equal footing with the diplomatic agents referred to in article 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This question is directly dependent on the answer to the general question whether the extent of the privileges and immunities to be granted to special missions should depend on the functions they have to perform. The point is dealt with in article 17, and the decision concerning the Belgian Government's comments will depend on the attitude taken with regard to this article. The Special Rapporteur nevertheless considers that personal inviolability is a fundamental guarantee which should, in any case, be granted to the persons mentioned above.

199. In connexion with this article, the question also arises whether, in keeping with the spirit of the general comment by the Government of Israel, the Commission should aim at simplifying the term staff and apply it, without restriction, to the category of diplomatic staff. The Special Rapporteur reminds the Commission that it rejected his original idea that personal inviolability should be guaranteed to all categories of staff of the special mission. It kept to the analogy with article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and considered it advisable to extend that privilege to other categories of staff.

Article 25.—Inviolability of the private accommodation

200. In its comments, the Belgian Government makes the following proposal regarding article 25, paragraph 2:

"It would be as well to introduce, as in article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a proviso regarding measures of execution on property in cases where immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction does not apply, and accordingly to begin the paragraph with the words: 'Except as provided in article 26, paragraph 4...'"

201. The Special Rapporteur considers that this proposal by the Belgian Government is in conformity with the Commission's concern not to grant the staff of special missions more rights than are granted to diplomatic agents under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; consequently, he is of the opinion that this proposal can be adopted.

202. In examining this article, account should also be taken of the comment by the Government of Israel concerning terminology. The Special Rapporteur points out that the Commission also wished to restrict this right exclusively to the diplomatic staff of special missions, in order not to grant other members of the staff more privileges and immunities than are enjoyed by the other categories of staff of diplomatic missions. He therefore believes that the expression "members of its diplomatic staff" was not used without good reason.

Article 26.—Immunity from jurisdiction

203. Applicable to this article is the comment by the Government of Israel that the terminology should be revised and consideration given to the question whether the text should refer solely to members of the diplomatic staff of the special mission or to all categories of staff.

The Special Rapporteur considers it his duty to mention that the Commission, following article 31 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, deliberately restricted the text to diplomatic staff only.

Article 27.—Waiver of immunity

204. Taking into account the comment by the Government of Israel concerning terminology, the Special Rapporteur thinks that the expression "members of its staff" is correctly used in this article also, for the Commission took the view that this provision should apply to waiver of immunity for all persons, not only members of the diplomatic staff.

Article 28.—Exemption from social security legislation

205. Here, too, the Special Rapporteur has examined the applicability of the general comment on terminology made by the Government of Israel with regard to articles 23 to 32; he finds that the expression "member of its staff" is correctly used, and that it is unnecessary to specify the different categories of staff in greater detail in this article.

Article 29.—Exemption from dues and taxes

206. In considering this article, the Special Rapporteur kept in mind the general comment on terminology made by the Government of Israel with regard to articles 23 to 32 and he considers it necessary to confine the article to the members of the diplomatic staff of the special mission, without mentioning the other categories of staff of the special mission; these other categories come under the provisions of article 32.

Article 30.—Exemption from personal services and contributions

207. This article is restricted to members of the diplomatic staff, the privileges of the other categories of staff of the special mission being regulated by article 32. The Special Rapporteur points out that it was impossible to apply to article 30 the simplified formula proposed by the Government of Israel in its general comment on the terminology of articles 23 to 32.

Article 31.—Exemption from Customs duties and inspection

208. The Belgian Government has a comment to make on article 31, paragraph 1 and proposes that the range of articles to which Customs privileges extend should be restricted. The proposal is worded as follows:

"With regard to sub-paragraph (b), the word 'articles' is too vague and is inadequate. The Belgian Government is prepared to grant exemption from Customs duties solely in the case of personal effects and baggage."

209. The Special Rapporteur believes it to be necessary to grant to the members of special missions mentioned in article 31, paragraph 1, a fairly wide degree of Customs exemption, not confined to personal effects and baggage in the strict sense, yet narrower than that granted under...
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to diplomatic agents, who are granted this privilege in connexion with the entry of articles intended for their establishment. He considers that the provision laid down by the Commission is a just one and that it should not be restricted.

210. The Belgian Government further considers that the privileges granted to the members of the families of the head and of members of a special mission and of its diplomatic staff should not be expressly mentioned, because this matter is explicitly regulated by article 35, paragraph 1. The Special Rapporteur considers that the Belgian Government’s comment is well-founded and that that part of the provision relating to members of families could be omitted.

211. In connexion with article 31, the Government of Israel, in its general comment on terminology, raises the question whether the restrictive expression “diplomatic staff” (of the special mission) or the general term “staff” should be used. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, the specific term “members of its diplomatic staff” should be used here, because the position in the case of other types of staff is governed by a special provision in article 32.

212. The Swedish Government also has a comment to make on article 31 in its written remarks. It says:

“In view of the fact that there is a special article (article 35) dealing with the families, should not, in paragraph 1(b), the words ‘or of the members of their family who accompany them’ be omitted?” (Cf. commentary (2)(a) to article 32). There also seems to be a discrepancy between the expression ‘who accompany them’ in article 31, paragraph 1, and the expression ‘who are authorized by the receiving State to accompany them’ in article 35, paragraph 1.”

213. The Special Rapporteur regards this comment by the Swedish Government as essentially the same as that by the Belgian Government referred to above, which he considered well-founded.

**Article 32.—Administrative and technical staff**

214. In its written comments, the Belgian Government expresses the view that the reference to nationality or permanent residence in article 32 should be omitted, on the ground that the matter is regulated by article 36. The Special Rapporteur’s view is that, although this comment by the Belgian Government may strictly speaking be correct, the omission of these references from article 32 would make it necessary to insert a reference to article 36. The question is whether it is better to have a direct reservation, or an indirect reservation which would be less clear because it would merely take the form of a reference to another article.

215. The Israel Government’s general comment on terminology also refers to this article. The Special Rapporteur does not think that the abbreviated expression “the staff” can be used, because the Commission’s idea, based on the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, is that the privileges and immunities of the administrative and technical staff should not be the same as those of the diplomatic staff.

216. The Swedish Government’s comment on article 31 (see above, paragraph 212) also refers to this article. The Special Rapporteur has already accepted this comment in connexion with article 31.

**Article 33.—Members of the service staff**

217. In its written comments, the Belgian Government proposes an addition to article 33. This proposal is worded as follows:

“No reference is made to article 28 concerning social security. The following should therefore be added: ‘as well as the provisions of article 28 on social security’.”

218. The Special Rapporteur thanks the Belgian Government for this reminder, for article 28 (Exemption from social security legislation) refers to the staff of the special mission in general and consequently also to members of the service staff. The reference to article 28 proposed by the Belgian Government will therefore have to be inserted in article 33.

219. The Belgian Government proposes in its comments that the reference to nationality or permanent residence of members of the service staff should be omitted from article 33, as the matter is regulated by article 36, paragraph 2. The Special Rapporteur considers this observation to be well-founded.

**Article 34.—Private staff**

220. The Belgian Government takes the view that reference to nationality or permanent residence should be omitted from this article, on the ground that the position of private staff where nationality or permanent residence in the territory of the receiving State is concerned is regulated by article 36. The Belgian Government’s observation is correct.

**Article 35.—Members of the family**

221. The Belgian Government has the following comment to make on article 35, paragraph 1:

“The paragraph refers to articles 24 to 31, including article 29; but it is hard to see how a member of the family can enjoy tax exemption on income attaching to functions with the special mission.”

222. Although in principle it is difficult to see how members of the families of members of the special mission and of its staff can have “income attaching to their functions with the special mission”, the fact remains that in practice special missions entrust certain minor matters to members of the families of members of the special mission rather than to persons not connected with the mission. For this reason, the Special Rapporteur considers that the reference to article 29 should not be deleted from the text of article 35, paragraph 1.

223. The Belgian Government also has some comments to make on article 35, paragraph 2. It says:
“This paragraph refers to article 32, which itself refers back to the same articles; the comment on paragraph 1 therefore applies equally to this paragraph.

“The drafting of this paragraph does not seem adequate; it would be clearer to word it: ‘Members of the families of the administrative and technical staff of the special mission who are authorized to accompany it shall enjoy the privileges and immunities referred to in article 32 except when they are nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State.’

“An anomaly, which in fact exists in article 37, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, but was corrected in article 71, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, should be pointed out. If a member of the mission is a national or permanent resident of the receiving State, he loses his immunities; taking the text literally, the members of his family who are not either nationals or permanent residents would enjoy the immunities.”

224. The Special Rapporteur, while thanking the Belgian Government for its comment, does not accept this literal interpretation of the text. In his view, members of the family cannot possess privileges and immunities greater than those enjoyed by the member of the mission or the member of the staff from whom their privileged position is derived. Consequently, the Special Rapporteur sees no reason for changing the Commission’s text.

225. The Swedish Government’s comment on article 31 (see above, paragraph 212) also refers to this article. The Special Rapporteur has already answered this comment by the Swedish Government in the section dealing with article 31.

**Article 36.—Nationals of the receiving State and persons permanently resident in the territory of the receiving State**

226. In its written comments, the Belgian Government states that the text of this article contains a drafting error. This comment is worded as follows:

“The word ‘que’ in the seventh line of the French text should be placed before the words ‘de l’immunité’. This drafting error, which appeared in article 38, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, was in fact corrected in article 71, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.”

227. The Special Rapporteur considers this comment to be a drafting nature, but he is not sure whether it is a question of a “drafting error” or of two expressions that were used deliberately. The Drafting Committee will no doubt take the comment into consideration.

228. The Swedish Government has the following to say about the commentary to article 36:

“The commentary should be revised. As it now stands, it is confusing, in particular because the phrase ‘This idea is set forth in article 14’; etc., is not exact. As appears from paragraph (3), only part of the idea was incorporated in article 14.”

229. Since this comment by the Swedish Government relates only to the commentary, and since it is in large measure justified, the Special Rapporteur will endeavour to redraft the commentary on this article.

**Article 37.—Duration of privileges and immunities**

230. In its written comments, the Belgian Government raises the following objection of a terminological character to the drafting of article 37, paragraph 1:

“The word ‘organ’ in the seventh line should be replaced by some more neutral word such as ‘authority’.”

231. The Special Rapporteur’s view is that the issue is not merely one of terminology but also of modern concepts of comparative constitutional law. To the contemporary way of thinking, every official is not at the same time an authority, but he is certainly an organ.

232. The Belgian Government also makes the following drafting comment on the French text of article 37, paragraph 2:

“In the fifth line of the French text ‘qu’il’ should read ‘qui lui’.”

233. The Special Rapporteur leaves the decision on this point to the Drafting Committee.

**Article 38.—Case of death**

234. This article was not referred to either in the discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly or in the written comments of Governments.

**Article 39.—Transit through the territory of a third State**

235. In its written comments, the Government of Israel proposes a change in the adjective applied to the third State. Its proposal is as follows:

“With regard to article 39, paragraph 1, attention is drawn to the use therein of the expression ‘in a foreign State’, and it is suggested that it may perhaps be preferable in the context to say ‘in another State’, in view of the fact that except for a person’s ‘own country’ (which expression is also used in that paragraph) every other country is a foreign State, including the ‘third State’ (likewise mentioned in that paragraph).”

236. The Special Rapporteur considers that this comment is justified and that the Drafting Committee should take it into account.

237. The Government of Israel also has the following suggestion to make with regard to article 39, paragraph 4:

“In respect of article 39, paragraph 4, it is suggested to delete the phrase ‘either in the visa application or by notification’ and to substitute the word ‘notified’ for the word ‘informed’, in the third line of that paragraph.”

238. The Special Rapporteur wishes to draw the Commission’s attention to the fact that the phrase which the Government of Israel suggests should be deleted conveys a definite opinion on the part of the Commission, which held that the sending State was not always bound
to notify the proposed transit by a formal note and that the visa application relating to the transit would suffice. The Special Rapporteur considers that failure to mention in the text the form which the notification should take might lead to misunderstandings in practice and, in consequence, he is not disposed to recommend the Commission to adopt this suggestion by the Government of Israel.

239. The Belgian Government also proposes a change in article 39, paragraph 4, as follows:

“It would be better to say ‘soit dans la demande de visa’, as that wording would bring out better the obligation to inform at the time that the visa application is made.”

240. The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that the intention of the Belgian proposal is to replace the word “par” by the word “dans”, but the proposal is also useful from the point of view of substance, as it clearly brings out the idea that it is not sufficient merely to apply for a visa; the visa application concerned must be an application arising out of the need for transit by the special mission itself. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur is in favour of adopting the Belgian proposal.

Article 40.—Obligation to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State

241. This article was the subject of an observation made in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly by the Hungarian delegation. That delegation expressed the opinion that article 15 of the draft concerning the use of the flag and emblem of the sending State was superfluous, since that question was covered by article 40 of the draft. The Special Rapporteur has dealt with this question in his observations on article 15.

Article 41.—Organ of the receiving State with which official business is conducted

242. In its observations, the Belgian Government expresses the opinion that the words “or such other organ, delegation or representative...” which appear at the end of article 41 of the draft should be changed. It says:

“At the end, it would be advisable to use a broader and less controversial listing, for example ‘such body or person as may be agreed’.”

243. The Special Rapporteur does not feel able to approve the expressions proposed by the Belgian Government, for in his opinion they are not in conformity with modern ideas as to who may negotiate on behalf of a Government with respect to article 37 of the draft. It is not merely a question of terminology but also of conceptions of comparative constitutional law which does not regard the notions of organ and authority as equivalent.

Article 42.—Professional activity

244. The Special Rapporteur recalls that he has already stated his views on a similar proposal by the Belgian Government with respect to article 37 of the draft. It is not merely a question of terminology but also of conceptions of comparative constitutional law which does not regard the notions of organ and authority as equivalent.

245. The Special Rapporteur recalls that he has already stated his views on a similar proposal by the Belgian Government with respect to article 37 of the draft. It is not merely a question of terminology but also of conceptions of comparative constitutional law which does not regard the notions of organ and authority as equivalent.

246. The Belgian Government has stated its views on the question whether members of special missions and their diplomatic staff should be forbidden to practise a professional or commercial activity by a provision on the lines of article 42 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, or by one on the lines of article 57 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In this connexion, it states:

“The prohibition against practising any professional or commercial activity would be better rendered by the expression ‘shall not carry on’, as in article 57 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963.”

247. The Special Rapporteur reminds the Commission of the discussion held by it on the question whether the professional activity of the members of special missions should be regulated by a provision on the lines of one or other of those two Conventions. At the close of the discussion, the prevailing view was that the provisions of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations should be followed.

248. In line with the attitude set forth above, the Belgian Government also made the following proposal:

“In addition, the article should be supplemented by provisions similar to those in paragraph 2 of the aforesaid article 57.”

249. The Special Rapporteur considers that the explanation given by him with respect to the preceding proposal is also an adequate reply to this second proposal by the Belgian Government.

250. The Government of Israel thinks that it might perhaps be better for the Commission to reconsider the essence of article 42. Its proposal reads as follows:

“It is submitted that the wording of the second paragraph of the commentary to article 42 is not very clear. As to the substance of that article, it is suggested that the Commission may wish to reconsider the proposal to include a provision enabling members of a special mission, in particular instances, to engage in some professional or other activity whilst in the receiving State, e.g., by substituting a comma for the full-stop at the end of that article and adding thereto: ‘without the express prior permission of that State’.

251. In connexion with this proposal by the Government of Israel, which is contrary to the line taken by the Belgian Government, the Special Rapporteur expresses the opinion that this question is a very delicate one and

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83 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 843rd meeting, para. 38.

that a number of different attitudes can be taken towards it. He personally considers that the text adopted should be adhered to, but at the same time he recalls that this text was not adopted unanimously at the first part of the Commission's seventeenth session, in 1965, and that consequently any doubts regarding it should be taken into consideration. He hopes that certain members of the Commission will give a more detailed explanation of the attitude taken by the Government of Israel.

252. During the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the Turkish representative stated that he hesitated to express an opinion concerning the advisability of adopting mutatis mutandis, in article 42 on special missions, the rules of article 42 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. From the official record in question the Special Rapporteur has been unable to form a clear idea of the meaning of the observation of the Turkish representative, whom he has asked for a more detailed explanation of his ideas. At the time of writing he has received no reply to his letter.

Article 43.—Right to leave the territory of the receiving State

253. The Government of Israel considers that the terminology used in article 43 ought to be re-examined. It has drawn up two proposals on this subject.

254. According to the first proposal of the Government of Israel:

“Article 43 speaks of ‘persons enjoying privileges and immunities’ and ‘members of the families of such persons’, instead of referring to ‘members of the special mission, its staff, families, etc.’, which would seem to be more in keeping with the language employed elsewhere in the draft articles.”

255. The Special Rapporteur observes that the terminology criticized by the Government of Israel was borrowed from article 44 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and that the Commission was not inclined to depart from that terminology unless obliged to do so. In this case, he does not see any need to depart from the wording of the Vienna Convention.

256. The second proposal of the Government of Israel reads as follows:

“Article 43 requires the receiving State to place at the disposal of the persons mentioned therein means of transport ‘for themselves and their property’. Article 44, however, which deals with a very similar situation, likewise necessitating the withdrawal of the special mission and all that goes with it, speaks of ‘its property and archives’, but makes no effective provision for the removal of such ‘property and archives’ from the territory of the receiving State.”

257. The Special Rapporteur thinks that the purpose of article 43, which refers to the right of persons to leave the territory of the receiving State, and that of article 44, which concerns the situation in case of the cessation of the special mission's functions, cannot be considered as identical. In his opinion, the correct solution is that which provides for the possibility of removing the archives only in the second case, for the archives in question are not those of persons who enjoy privileges and immunities but archives of special missions. The question raised, however, is an interesting one and deserves the Commission's attention.

Article 44.—Cessation of the functions of the special mission

258. In its observations the Belgian Government also touched on the substance of article 44 and particularly on its paragraph 2. This observation reads as follows:

“This article deals only with the action to be taken when a special mission ceases to function. Accordingly, paragraph 2 would be better placed in article 12. In addition, the word ‘automatically’ in that paragraph should be replaced by ‘ipso facto’. Lastly, the words ‘but each of two States may terminate the special mission’ would become superfluous.”

259. The Special Rapporteur considers its duty to point out that the Belgian Government, in formulating this amendment, looked at the matter from a purely juridico-technical point of view, whereas the Commission envisaged other aspects, namely that the severance of diplomatic relations is not the same thing as the termination of the special mission, although each of the States concerned has the right to terminate it if it wishes. For this reason, the Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the Belgian proposal should not be adopted.

260. The Special Rapporteur considers, however, that the Drafting Committee should take a decision concerning the Belgian Government's proposal that the word “automatically”, which appears in the present text of article 44, paragraph 2, should be replaced by the expression “ipso facto”, although he prefers the term “automatically”, since it is a question of the effective consequence of a fact rather than of a juridical effect.

261. The Government of Israel also makes some observations concerning the text of article 44. These observations are as follows:

“Article 44, paragraph 1, provides for the permanent diplomatic mission or a consular post of the sending State to ‘take possession’ of the ‘property and archives’, but there may not exist any such diplomatic mission or consular post of the sending State in the territory of the receiving State.”

“Article 44, paragraph 3(b), would also not meet the case, as there may not be any mission of a third State in the territory of the receiving State prepared to accept the custody of the ‘property and archives’ of the stranded mission of the sending State.”

“It would, therefore, appear to be necessary to make express provision for the removal of the aforesaid archives from the territory of the receiving State in the cases envisaged in articles 43 and 44.”

262. The Special Rapporteur thanks the Government of Israel for having drawn attention to the special

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situations connected with the severance of diplomatic or consular relations, since the draft has not taken such situations sufficiently into account, but he is not sure whether it is necessary to go into details on the subject. Perhaps the proper place for dealing with these situations would be the commentary on article 44.

**CHAPTER IV**

**Introductory article**

263. In paragraph 46 of its report on the work of the first part of its seventeenth session (1965), the Commission "instructed the Special Rapporteur to prepare and submit to the Commission an introductory article on the use of terms in the draft, in order that the text may be simplified and condensed." 66

264. This idea met with general approval, both in the discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and in the written comments by Governments.

265. During the discussions in the Sixth Committee, the representatives of Hungary, 69 Turkey 70 and Ceylon 71 spoke in favour of an introductory article comprising definitions. The representatives of Israel 72 and Finland 73 considered that such an article would make it possible to condense the text of the draft. They also referred to the need to keep the terminology of the articles on special missions as close as possible to that of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963. The representatives of Hungary, 74 Sweden 75 and France 76 also expressed this view, whereas the representative of Jordan 77 said that only the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations should be taken into consideration.

266. It is interesting to note that the delegation of Afghanistan had a different opinion on terminology: it proposed that the term "special mission" should be rejected in favour of "temporary mission" and that "a standard terminology of international law" should be adopted in formulating the rules. 78

267. The Government of Israel devoted particular attention to this point in its comments, where it says:

"With this object in mind, it would be most helpful if an article containing definitions of terms frequently used could be drawn up and embodied in the draft, giving those terms the same meanings as in the 1961 Vienna Convention, and, whenever possible, making use of cross-references to the said Convention. The definitions would probably include such terms as: special missions, head of special mission, members of special mission, staff (diplomatic, administrative and technical, service, personal), premises, etc.

"It is believed that the draft articles would gain by being shortened, and that this could be achieved by such cross-references and by combining some articles."

268. The Yugoslav Government also dealt with this matter in its comments. It states that it "agrees with the International Law Commission's proposal that an article defining the terms used in the convention should be inserted as article 1 of the future convention".

269. In accordance with the Commission's decision and with the opinions expressed by delegations and Governments, the Special Rapporteur proposes the introductory article, set out below, which contains definitions of the expressions used in several articles of the draft. If the Commission adopts this article, the texts of a number of articles can be shortened, since the repetition of descriptive definitions can be avoided.

270. The text of the introductory article proposed by the Special Rapporteur is as follows:

**Article 0 (provisional number).—Expressions used**

For the purposes of the present articles

(a) A "special mission" is a temporary special mission which a State proposes to send to another State, with the consent of that State, for the performance of a specific task;

(b) A "permanent diplomatic mission" is a diplomatic mission sent in accordance with the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

(c) A "consular post" is a consular post established under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;

(d) The "head of a special mission" is the person charged by the sending State with the duty of acting in that capacity;

(e) A "representative" is a person charged by the sending State with the duty of acting alone as a special mission;

(f) A "delegation" is a special mission consisting of a head, and other members;

(g) The "members of a special mission" are the head of the special mission and the members authorized by the sending State to represent it as plenipotentiaries;

(h) The "members and staff of the special mission" are the head and members of the special mission and the members of the staff of the special mission;

(i) The "members of the staff of the special mission" are the members of the staff of the special mission to whom the sending State has given diplomatic rank;

(j) The "members of the diplomatic staff" are the members of the staff of the special mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the special mission;

(k) The "members of the administrative and technical staff" are the members of the staff of the special mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the special mission;

(l) The "members of the service staff" are the members of the staff of the special mission employed in unskilled and domestic service within the special mission;

(m) The "private staff" are persons employed in the private service of the members and staff of the special mission;
particular special missions led by Heads of States, Heads of Governments, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Cabinet Ministers.

271. At its sixteenth session the International Law Commission decided to ask its Special Rapporteur to submit at its succeeding session articles dealing with the legal status of so-called high-level special missions, in particular special missions led by Heads of States, Heads of Governments, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Cabinet Ministers.

272. Despite all his efforts to establish what are the rules specially applicable to missions of this kind, the Special Rapporteur has not succeeded in discovering them either in the practice or in the literature. The only rules he has found are those relating to the treatment of these distinguished persons in their own State, not only as regards the courtesy accorded to them, but also as regards the scope of the privileges and immunities.

273. In his second report (A/CN.4/179), submitted to the Commission at its seventeenth session, the Special Rapporteur accordingly included draft provisions concerning so-called high-level missions.

274. The Commission did not discuss this draft at its seventeenth session, but it considered whether special rules of law should or should not be drafted for so-called “high-level” special missions, whose heads held high office in their States. It stated that it would appreciate the opinion of Governments on this matter and hoped that their suggestions would be as specific as possible. 76 The Special Rapporteur prepared a draft on high-level missions.

275. The Commission reproduced this draft as an annex to the report on the work of its seventeenth session, submitted to the General Assembly at its twentieth session. The draft reads as follows:

Rule 1

A special mission which is led by a Head of State shall be governed by the provisions of the said articles, subject to the following exceptions:

(a) In giving its approval to the special mission being led by the Head of State, the receiving State admits in advance that such a mission may perform the tasks to be agreed upon by the two States concerned in the course of their contacts (exception to article 2 as adopted);

(b) The Head of State, as head of the special mission, cannot be declared persona non grata or not acceptable (exception to article 4);

(c) The members of the staff of a special mission which is led by a Head of State may also be members of his personal suite. Such persons shall be treated as diplomatic staff (supplement to article 6);

(d) In the case of the simultaneous presence of several special missions, Heads of State who lead special missions shall have precedence over the other heads of special missions who are not Heads of State. Nevertheless, in the case of the simultaneous presence of several special missions led by Heads of State, precedence shall be determined according to the alphabetical order of the names of the States (supplement to article 9);

(e) In cases where a Head of State acts as head of a special mission, the function of the mission is deemed to commence at the time when he arrives in the territory of the receiving State (special rule replacing article 11);

(f) The function of a special mission which is led by a Head of State comes to an end at the time when he leaves the territory of the receiving State, but the special mission may, if the sending State and the receiving State so agree, continue in being after his departure; in this case, however, the level of the special mission changes, and its level shall be determined according to the rank of the person who becomes head of the special mission (supplement to article 12);

(g) A special mission which is led by a Head of State shall have the right to display, in addition to the flag and emblem of the sending State, the flag and emblem peculiar to the Head of State under the law of the sending State (supplement to article 15);

(h) The receiving State has the duty to provide a Head of State who leads a special mission with accommodation that is suitable and worthy of him;

(i) The freedom of movement of a Head of State who leads a special mission is limited in the territory of the receiving State in that an agreement on this matter is necessary with the receiving State (guarantee of the personal safety of the Head of State);

(j) A Head of State who leads a special mission enjoys complete inviolability as to his person, property and residence and full immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving State;

(k) A Head of State who leads a special mission enjoys full Customs exemption and exemption from Customs inspection by an agency of the receiving State;

(l) A Head of State who leads a special mission has the right to bring with him members of his family and persons attached to his personal service, who shall, for so long as they form part of his suite, be entitled to the same immunities as the Head of State;

(m) On his arrival in the territory of the receiving State and on his departure, a Head of State who leads a special mission shall receive all the honours due to him as Head of State according to the rules of international law;

(n) If a Head of State who leads a special mission should die in the territory of the receiving State, then the receiving State has the duty to make arrangements in conformity with the rules

of protocol for the transport of the body or for burial in its territory.

Rule 3

A special mission which is led by a Head of Government shall be governed by the provisions of the said articles, subject to the following exceptions:

(a) In giving its approval to the special mission being led by the Head of Government, the receiving State admits in advance that such a mission may perform the tasks to be agreed upon by the two States concerned in the course of their contacts (exception to article 2 as adopted);

(b) The Head of Government, as head of the special mission, cannot be declared persona non grata or not acceptable (exception to article 4);

(c) In cases where a Head of Government acts as head of a special mission, the function of the mission is deemed to commence at the time when he arrives in the territory of the receiving State (special rule replacing article 11);

(d) The function of a special mission which is led by a Head of Government comes to an end at the time when he leaves the territory of the receiving State, but the mission may, if the sending State and the receiving State so agree, continue in being after his departure; in this case, however, the level of the special mission changes, and its level shall be determined according to the rank of the person who becomes head of the special mission (supplement to article 12);

(e) A Head of Government who leads a special mission enjoys complete inviolability as to his person, property and residence and full immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving State;

(f) A Head of Government who leads a special mission enjoys full Customs exemption and exemption from Customs inspection by an agency of the receiving State;

(g) A Head of Government who leads a special mission has the right to bring with him members of his family and persons attached to his personal service, who shall, for so long as they form part of his suite, be entitled to the same immunities as the Head of Government.

Rule 4

A special mission which is led by a Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be governed by the provisions of the said articles, subject to the following exceptions:

(a) In giving its approval to the special mission being led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the receiving State admits in advance that such a mission may perform the tasks to be agreed upon by the two States concerned in the course of their contacts (exception to article 2 as adopted);

(b) The Minister for Foreign Affairs, as head of the special mission, cannot be declared persona non grata or not acceptable (exception to article 4);

(c) The members of the staff of a special mission which is led by a Minister for Foreign Affairs may also be members of his personal suite. Such persons shall be treated as diplomatic staff (supplement to article 6);

(d) In cases where a Minister for Foreign Affairs acts as head of a special mission, the function of the mission is deemed to commence at the time when he arrives in the territory of the receiving State (special rule replacing article 11);

(e) The function of a special mission which is led by a Minister for Foreign Affairs comes to an end at the time when he leaves the territory of the receiving State;

(f) A Minister for Foreign Affairs who leads a special mission enjoys complete inviolability as to his person, property and residence and full immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving State;

(g) A Minister for Foreign Affairs who leads a special mission enjoys full Customs exemption and exemption from Customs inspection by an agency of the receiving State;

(h) A Minister for Foreign Affairs who leads a special mission has the right to bring with him members of his family and persons attached to his personal service, who shall, for so long as they form part of his suite, be entitled to the same immunities as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rule 5

A special mission which is led by a Cabinet Minister other than the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be governed by the provisions of the said articles, subject to the following exceptions:

(a) The members of the staff of a special mission which is led by a Cabinet Minister may also be members of his personal suite. Such persons shall be treated as diplomatic staff (supplement to article 6);

(b) In cases where a Cabinet Minister acts as head of a special mission, the function of the mission is deemed to commence at the time when he arrives in the territory of the receiving State (special rule replacing article 11);

(c) The function of a special mission which is led by a Cabinet Minister comes to an end at the time when he leaves the territory of the receiving State, but the special mission may, if the sending State and the receiving State so agree, continue in being after his departure; in this case, however, the level of the special mission changes, and its level shall be determined according to the rank of the person who becomes head of the special mission (supplement to article 12);

(d) A Cabinet Minister who leads a special mission enjoys complete inviolability as to his person, property and residence and full immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving State;

(e) A Cabinet Minister who leads a special mission has the right to bring with him members of his family and persons attached to his personal service, who shall, for so long as they form part of his suite, be entitled to the same immunities as the Cabinet Minister.

Rule 6

The sending State and the receiving State may, by mutual agreement, determine more particularly the status of the special missions referred to in rule 1 and, especially, may make provision for more favourable treatment for special missions at this level.

The Special Rapporteur is putting forward the foregoing rules as a suggestion only, in order that the Commission may express its opinion on the exceptions enumerated above. In the light of the Commission's decision he will submit a final proposal; he thinks he will be able to do so during the Commission's seventeenth session.

276. Only a few Member States expressed an opinion on the question raised by the Commission.

277. The Belgian Government commented as follows:

"In the case of so-called high-level missions, the question arises whether an attempt to define their limits in an instrument may not lead to serious omissions.

"In practice, moreover, the rules to be applied to such missions are always established by agreement and
in respect of the particular case. That being so, it may be asked whether the rules of protocol in force in each State do not amply suffice."

278. In its comments on this question, the Government of Israel said:

"Whilst expressing full appreciation of the work done by the Special Rapporteur in preparing the draft provisions 'concerning so-called high-level special missions', it is felt that there is no particular necessity to include this subject in the articles on special missions."

279. The Government of the Upper Volta expressed the following opinion:

"On the question whether special rules of law should or should not be drafted for so-called 'high-level' special missions, whose heads hold high office in their States:

"It is true that in practice no distinction is made, with respect to legal status, between special missions led by a high official of the sending State and other special missions. The draft provisions concerning these so-called high level special missions, which have been submitted to Governments for their comments, are therefore likely to draw the attention of Governments to this state of affairs in relations between States.

"(A) Special mission which is led by a Head of State:

"In rule 2, paragraph (i), concerning the end of the functions of a special mission which is led by a Head of State, the interruption of the negotiations which are the purpose of the special mission should also be considered as bringing the mission's functions to an end. The views expressed above concerning paragraph (4) of the commentary on article 12 of the Commission's draft articles on special missions also apply in this case.

"Rule 2, paragraph (i), relating to the freedom of movement of a Head of State: for reasons of security, it is indeed necessary that there should be an agreement between the sending State and the receiving State limiting the freedom of movement of the Head of State.

"In practice, however, the situation is often different. Many Heads of State, for personal reasons, like to have great freedom of movement in order to be in touch with the mass of the people. Others even like to refuse all protection in certain situations. These are cases which bring up the problem of the security of special missions led by a Head of State. The Government of the Upper Volta would like to see specific provisions on this subject included in the draft."

280. The Yugoslav Government made the following comment:

"The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also considers that there should be special provisions applicable to special missions led by Heads of State or Heads of Government but not to those led by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Cabinet Ministers. The Yugoslav Government takes the view, however, that such provisions should be included in the body of the convention and not in an annex and should therefore be drafted more concisely."

281. The Government of Czechoslovakia, in its comments, expressed the following opinion:

"The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic agrees that the status of special missions at the so-called high level should be regulated in harmony with the prevailing customs and usages. In view of the fact that the proposed regulation is almost identical for all the four categories of special missions of this kind, it seems useful to embody the identical provisions contained in draft rules 2-5 in a general rule covering all the four categories and to stipulate exceptions for the individual categories in a special rule, whereby the draft would be substantially shorter. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic holds that the draft rules should be further elaborated."

282. The Swedish Government made the following comment:

"The Commission would like to know the opinion of Governments on the question whether 'special rules of law should or should not be drafted for so-called high-level special missions whose heads hold high office in their States'. In the opinion of the Swedish Government such special rules should not be included in the draft on special missions. If the head of a 'high-level' mission is entitled to a special status, that would not be because he is the head of a special mission but because of his position as Head of State, Head of Government, Member of Government, etc. The rules envisaged, therefore, do not really pertain to the matter of special missions but to the question of the international status of Heads of State, etc."

283. In the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the Brazilian representative also referred to this question, pointing out that the sending of high-level special missions was common practice. The Brazilian representative concluded by saying that: "There might be a special chapter to give high-level missions separate treatment." 77

284. The Turkish delegation adopted a more definite attitude in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, where the Turkish representative said that:

"The preparation of draft provisions concerning so-called high-level special missions would seem to serve a useful purpose. A point to be considered, however, was the existence of a category of persons—for example, vice-presidents, deputy prime ministers and ministers of State—who were generally higher in rank than ministers for foreign affairs and were being more and more frequently entrusted with special missions." 78

77 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Sixth Committee, 840th meeting, para. 15.
78 Ibid., 847th meeting, para. 24.
285. During the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the delegation of Israel opposed the inclusion of rules concerning high-level special missions in the draft articles on special missions; this attitude is similar to the opinion expressed in the written comments by the Government of Israel quoted in paragraph 278 above.

286. In the light of the facts and opinions reported above, the Special Rapporteur considers that States have given the Commission no encouragement to introduce rules concerning so-called high-level special missions into its draft articles.

Written comments by Governments received subsequently, with the Special Rapporteur's observations thereon (A/CN.4/189/Add.2)

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PRELIMINARY NOTE

1. This addendum deals with the written comments by Governments which did not reach the Secretariat within the prescribed time-limit. Its structure is the same as that of the earlier part of the report, and the headings of the chapters and sections correspond.

2. This addendum includes comments by the Governments of Austria, Malta, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, together with the Special Rapporteur's opinions on those comments.

Ad Chapter II—General

2. Distinction between the different kinds of special missions

3. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government expresses concern at the liberality of the draft articles with regard to the granting of privileges and immunities which, in that Government's opinion, go beyond the requirements of functional necessity. These comments are as follows:

"While expressing their general agreement with the principles and rules embodied in the draft articles, and with the desirability of codifying international law and practice on this aspect of diplomacy, the United Kingdom Government feel bound to record their opposition to the undue extension of privileges and immunities which certain articles appear to confer. In their view the granting of such privileges and immunities should be strictly controlled by considerations of functional necessity and should be limited to the minimum required to ensure the efficient discharge of the duties entrusted to special missions. The draft articles follow closely the corresponding provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and it is the view of the United Kingdom Government that such extensive privileges in the case of special missions cannot be justified on functional grounds."

4. The Special Rapporteur regards these comments by the United Kingdom Government as a confirmation of his conclusion, recorded in chapter II, section 2 of this report (see above, paragraph 36), in which he proposed an addition to article 17 of the draft. That addition would meet the wishes of the United Kingdom Government.

5. The Austrian Government, in its written comments, also supports the contention that the privileges and immunities of special missions, and more particularly of the non-diplomatic officials of such missions, should be restricted in accordance with the functional theory. The Austrian comment is given below:

"However, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, the privileges and immunities of such non-diplomatic officials should be codified in such a way that the rights of these officials do not go beyond what is unavoidably necessary for the functioning of special missions, since, even in the case of diplomats and consuls, the principle holds that they enjoy privileges not in their personal interest, but only to facilitate their work."

6. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the reply to the United Kingdom Government's comment given above applies equally to the Austrian Government's comments.

3. Question of introducing into the draft articles a provision prohibiting discrimination

7. In addition to the opinions of three Governments on this question, reproduced earlier in this report (see above, paragraph 38), it should be noted that the United Kingdom Government also expressed its views in its written comments. That Government's opinion is as follows:

"Paragraph 49. It is agreed that there would be no point in including non-discrimination provisions in draft articles of this character."
8. The Special Rapporteur does not consider that the insertion of this opinion in any way changes the situation described in the report.

... 

5. **Relationship with other international agreements**

9. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government touches on the question of the relationship of the draft articles on special missions with other international agreements, with special reference to paragraph 50 of the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its seventeenth session (1965). The United Kingdom Government’s opinion is as follows:

"Paragraph 50. The United Kingdom Government believe that there would be advantage in adding to the draft articles a provision dealing with their relationship to other international agreements."

10. This being the fourth Government that has expressed an opinion on this subject, the Special Rapporteur recommends that the Commission should decide what provision should be included in the final text of the draft articles.

... 

*Ad Chapter III—Draft articles on special missions*

**Part I. General rules**

**Article 1.—The sending of special missions**

11. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government puts forward a proposal concerning article 1, paragraph 1 of the draft. The proposal is as follows:

"Article 1. In paragraph 1 the word ‘express’ should be inserted before ‘consent’ in order to eliminate reliance upon alleged tacit or informal consent as a basis for invoking the special treatment provided for in the draft articles."

12. The Special Rapporteur is not in favour of taking up the United Kingdom proposal, since the Commission, in requiring the consent of the receiving State, deliberately avoided qualifying that consent in any way, so as to make the provision as flexible and informal as possible. Contrary to the opinion of the Belgian Government, that the word “consent” connotes tolerance, the United Kingdom Government proposes that express consent should be required. Although the Commission is of the opinion that consent should be consent in the proper sense of the term, a genuine expression of the will of the receiving State, it takes into consideration the fact that consent is often given informally or even tacitly. The Special Rapporteur accordingly considers that if the United Kingdom proposal was adopted, it would call in question the whole system on which the draft articles are based.

13. In the United Kingdom Government’s written comments concerning the relationship between the concept of special missions and the concept of permanent specialized missions, it is suggested that the latter should also be brought within the scope of the draft articles on special missions, although the application of the articles might be made subject in each specific case to the conditions to be determined by the express consent of the receiving State. The United Kingdom Government’s proposal reads as follows:

“In paragraph 2(d) of the commentary the question of permanent specialized missions is discussed. It is made clear that the special missions to be covered by the draft articles are temporary in character. Although permanent specialized missions may in some cases be staffed by members of the staff of the diplomatic mission of the country concerned and occupy ‘premises of the mission’ in a manner bringing them within the scope of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, there will be other cases to which that Convention will not be applicable since the purposes of the permanent specialized mission will not be ‘purposes of the mission’. In some cases a permanent mission is accredited to an international organization and its status is regulated by an international agreement governing the privileges and immunities of the organization. The United Kingdom Government believe that permanent missions which do not fall into either of these categories should be brought within the scope of the present draft articles. It appears desirable to regulate their status by international agreement and there seems no reason to do this by a separate code of rules. It is further suggested that the application of the rules laid down in these draft articles to permanent specialized missions might be made subject in each case to the express consent of the receiving State.”

14. Although that proposal was made in connexion with the text of the Commission’s commentary on article 1, it actually bears no relation to the commentary; it is rather a suggestion for an amendment to the text of the article itself, and should be considered as such. The question accordingly arises as to whether the scope of the draft articles should be extended to cover categories other than special missions. The Special Rapporteur does not consider that it should; otherwise the draft articles would have to deal with all kinds of related institutions. He does not think that the Commission would be prepared to follow up this idea, and does not therefore recommend the adoption of the United Kingdom proposal.

15. The United Kingdom comments include a suggestion referring to the matter dealt with in paragraph (7) of the commentary on article 1. In discussing the commentary, the United Kingdom Government again suggests a change in the text of the draft article itself. This is what it says on the subject:

“With regard to paragraph (7) of the commentary, the United Kingdom Government suggest that a provision should be added to the article to make clear that where members of the regular permanent diplomatic mission act also in connexion with a special mission, their position as members of the permanent mission should determine their status.”

16. The Special Rapporteur does not agree with the United Kingdom Government. Admittedly, members of a regular permanent diplomatic mission should retain their diplomatic status even when they are members of a special mission, if the permanent mission is accredited to the same receiving State as the special mission. But
the Special Rapporteur thinks that in such a case a career diplomat is entitled to make use of the privileges he enjoys in his capacity as head or member of a special mission, and that it is his duty, in performing the tasks of the special mission, to discharge the obligations arising from the rules on special missions. Hence, he has a dual status. For these reasons the Special Rapporteur considers that the attitude adopted by the Commission, i.e., that the question should be mentioned only in the commentary on article 1, and that there should be no reference to the substance in the article itself, is correct.

17. In its written comments, the Government of the USSR concentrates on the question whether the existence of diplomatic or consular relations, or recognition between the sending and receiving States, are necessary for the sending or reception of special missions. The USSR Government considers that the text of the draft articles should be made quite clear on this point, and proposes that article 1, paragraph 2 of the draft should be worded as follows:

“Neither diplomatic and consular relations nor recognition are necessary for the sending and reception of special missions.”

18. As several Governments and several delegations to the General Assembly touched on this question, the Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the USSR proposal should be adopted, since it has the advantage of also covering the question of recognition between States sending or receiving special missions.

**Article 2. The task of a special mission**

19. The United Kingdom Government is not satisfied with the Commission’s proposal concerning the determination of the task of a special mission. In its opinion, it would be desirable, when determining the mission’s task, not to apply the rules on special missions on every occasion and for all kinds of missions coming from another State on official or quasi-official business. It is afraid that the existing text of the draft may create an obligation for the receiving State to accord privileges and immunities to every “mission” of this kind. The United Kingdom Government expresses this concern in its written comments, as follows:

“Article 2. It appears desirable to limit in some way the purposes for which a special mission qualifying for the treatment contemplated in the draft articles may be constituted—otherwise there is a danger that the provisions of an eventual convention could be invoked in any case of a visit to one State by a person or group of persons from another on official or quasi-official business, whatever its nature. There may be cases in which the receiving State wishes to permit a mission to come without necessarily according it the full privileges and immunities laid down in the draft articles but as the articles are at present drafted this might be very difficult.”

20. The Special Rapporteur understands the United Kingdom Government’s concern, but he thinks that the meaning of the draft articles on special missions submitted by the Commission had not been fully grasped. In the first place, no State is obliged to receive a special mission from another State without its consent. Secondly, in the Commission’s draft, the task of a special mission is determined by mutual consent of the sending State and of the receiving State; on receiving a visiting foreign mission, the receiving State is entitled to make it clear that it is not considered as a special mission; and finally, the existence and extent of privileges and immunities can also be determined by mutual consent of the States concerned. It is very difficult to make reservations in the text of the article with regard to certain categories of special mission. For that reason, the Commission left it to States themselves to determine what they would regard as a special mission.

21. In connexion with paragraph (5) of the commentary on article 2, the United Kingdom Government also referred to the extremely difficult question of the relationship between special missions and permanent diplomatic missions as regards their respective competence. In reply to the last proposition set forth in the commentary, the United Kingdom Government expressed its opinion on this question; it was thus one of the few Governments that were kind enough to reply to the question put by the Commission in that proposition. In its reply, the United Kingdom Government states that it sees no need to include a rule on this subject in article 2, but the reply in itself is typical of the underlying legal concept. It reads as follows:

“With reference to paragraph (5) of the commentary, the United Kingdom Government see no need for a rule of the exclusion of the tasks or functions of a special mission from the competence of the permanent diplomatic mission. The matter seems to be entirely one between the sending State and its two missions and the receiving State should be entitled to presume that either the permanent or the special mission (within the scope of its task) has authority to perform any acts which it purports to perform. If difficulties are likely to arise, they can be dealt with by an *ad hoc* arrangement on the subject.”

22. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that this reply from the United Kingdom Government is worthy of mention in the commentary, and will try to reproduce it fully when drafting the final text. He himself considers that from the point of view of law, the solution proposed is likely to increase the stability of legal relations between States.

23. The Government of Malta dealt with this question in its written comments. Its opinion on the matter is as follows:

“Article 2. The question of overlapping authority resulting from the parallel existence of permanent diplomatic missions and special missions, is of considerable importance and it is felt that a rule on the matter should be included in the final text of the articles. The absence of any such rule could leave open to question the validity of acts performed by the special mission and this is most undesirable. The competence or authority of a mission is a fundamental issue which
unless regulated could undermine the essential quality of a mission, namely its authority to function.

"As to the nature of the rule that ought to be included in the final text, it is agreed that certain powers are retained by the permanent mission notwithstanding that a special mission is functioning. These functions, however, relate to matters touching the special mission itself: its powers, including their limits and their revocation, certain changes in the composition of the mission, particularly those affecting the head of mission, and the recalling of the special mission. On the other hand, once the sending State has deemed it necessary or expedient to send a special mission, it is to be presumed, in the absence of an express statement to the contrary, that the task of that mission is temporarily excluded from the competence of the permanent diplomatic mission."

24. The Special Rapporteur is grateful to the Government of Malta for having responded to the Commission’s appeal and given its opinion on this difficult question. Having regard to the opinions expressed in the comments of Malta and the United Kingdom, the Special Rapporteur believes it would be useful for the comments of the Government of Malta also to be reproduced in full in the final text of the Commission’s commentary.

25. In its written comments, the Government of Austria deals with the question of overlapping and possible conflicts of competence between the special mission and the regular permanent diplomatic missions of the sending State. It expresses the following view on the subject:

"Moreover, in the further elaboration of the draft articles, care should be taken that their provisions impair the position of traditional diplomacy as little as possible.

"Accordingly, it is essential that the relationship between permanent representative authorities (diplomatic missions and consulates) and special missions should be expressly regulated, so as to avoid overlapping and conflicts in the matter of privileges. This would appear to be especially necessary in dealing with the immunities granted under articles 26 et seq."

26. The Special Rapporteur takes this opportunity to thank the Austrian Government for its comments, but his opinion on the subject remains as stated in paragraph 24 above.

27. In this connexion, the Special Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to the remark made by the Austrian Government in its comments on article 19, paragraph 1, which refers to the question of allowing agents of the receiving State access to the premises of a special mission. The text of the Austrian comment is reproduced in this addendum in the section devoted to article 19.

28. The Special Rapporteur does not regard this as a case of overlapping between the functions of a special mission and those of a regular diplomatic mission, as the only actual conflict of competence the Commission had in mind concerns the representation of the State in respect of the specific task assigned to a special mission, and not the legal protection of the mission’s status, the subject dealt with in article 19 of the draft.

Article 5.—Sending the same special mission to more than one State

29. With regard to article 5 of the draft, the Government of the USSR makes the same comment as the Government of Sweden. Its written comments contain the following passage:

"In view of the tasks which are usually given to special missions, it is unnecessary to include in the draft provisions relating to the possibility of sending the same special mission to more than one State (article 5) and to the size of the staff of a special mission (article 6, paragraph 3). These provisions should therefore be deleted from the draft."

30. The Special Rapporteur expressed his views on the substance of this idea in his comments on the Swedish Government’s observation and the same arguments apply to the comments of the USSR.

Article 6.—Composition of the special mission

31. In its written comments, the Government of the USSR suggests that paragraph 3 of article 6 (possible limitation of the size of the staff of a special mission) might be deleted (for this proposal, see article 5, paragraph 29 above).

32. In submitting this proposal by the Government of the USSR, the Special Rapporteur draws attention to the fact that the problem of limiting the size of the special mission has already been dealt with in paragraphs (6) and (7) of the commentary on article 6, in which it is pointed out that article 6, paragraph 3 of the draft is based on article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Special Rapporteur recalls that the Commission discussed the question fully at its seventeenth session, and he does not think that any new problems have arisen in this connexion.

Article 9.—General rules concerning precedence

33. In its written comments, the Austrian Government refers to the question of the more precise determination of the alphabetical order of the names of States as a basis for settling the problem of the precedence of special missions. Its observations on this subject are as follows:

"Article 9, paragraph 1:

"It would seem desirable to render the provision more precise by showing in what language the alphabetical order is to be determined, especially as no unambiguous conclusions on this point can be drawn from the commentary."

34. In principle, the Special Rapporteur endorses the Austrian proposal, and suggests to the Commission that it should be co-ordinated with the proposals of the Belgian and Yugoslav Governments, set forth in the relevant paragraphs of the section dealing with article 9.  

1 See above, document A/CN. 4/189 and Add. 1, paras. 97 and 98.
2 See above, document A/CN. 4/189 and Add. 1, paras. 122, 123, 128 and 129.
35. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government refers to paragraph (12) of the commentary on article 11, in which the Commission raises the question of the need to include in the article a rule on non-discrimination among the various sending States with regard to the commencement of the functions of their special missions. The Commission has made it clear that, in its view, discrimination is not permissible in practice. The United Kingdom Government’s comment, which is contrary to that made by the Government of Upper Volta, is as follows:

“Article 11. The United Kingdom Government consider, with reference to paragraph (12) of the commentary on this article, that it would not be necessary or appropriate to add to this article a reference to the principle of non-discrimination. They support fully the views of the Commission on this question.”

36. The Government of Malta also deals with this question in its written comments, in which it expresses the following view:

“Article 11. The question as to whether an appropriate rule should be included to deal with non-discrimination between special missions by the receiving State appears to be limited in this article to discrimination ‘in the reception of special missions and the way they are permitted to begin to function even among special missions of the same character’, while the broader question of non-discrimination is referred to in paragraph 49 of the report.

“It is felt that a special provision in article 11 to deal with non-discrimination is not appropriate, since the scope of any such provision would be either too limited or, if extended to cover non-discrimination in general, out of place. On the other hand, it is felt that a new article corresponding to article 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and article 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations should be included in the final text. The fact that the nature and tasks of special missions are so diverse should not justify discrimination as between States in the application of the rules contained in the articles.”

37. The Special Rapporteur notes that the Governments of both the United Kingdom and Malta consider it unnecessary to include in article 11 a rule on non-discrimination in respect of the commencement of the functions of a special mission. The Special Rapporteur thinks that a summary of these two opinions and of the opinion expressed by the Government of Upper Volta should be included in the final text of the commentary.

Part II. Facilities, privileges and immunities

Article 17.—General facilities

38. On the subject of article 17, the United Kingdom Government raises a question which was not discussed in the Commission and is not even referred to in the literature on special missions. This is the question of the possibility of the sending State believing that all expenses of the special mission should be defrayed by the receiving State. The written comments by the United Kingdom Government contain the following reference to this problem:

“Article 17. This article suggests that, for instance, the sending State may have all expenses of its special mission defrayed by the receiving State, which is not the case, unless by virtue of a special agreement. Some clarification appears to be desirable.”

39. This is a point which the Special Rapporteur has not hitherto considered, but he would have no objection to the Commission stating in the commentary its belief that, unless otherwise agreed, all expenses of the special mission should be defrayed by the sending State. It was, in fact, on this understanding that the Special Rapporteur in his first report raised the question of possible over-charging for accommodation occupied by the special mission.4

Article 19.—Inviolability of the premises

40. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government also refers to the text of article 19 of the Commission’s draft. It states:

“Article 19. The United Kingdom Government observes that this article accords the property of special missions a wider protection than is given to diplomatic missions by the Vienna Convention in that property not on the premises of the mission other than means of transport is covered by the article. The United Kingdom Government doubts whether this distinction is justifiable on functional grounds.”

41. The Special Rapporteur wishes to point out that the question raised in this comment was discussed in the Commission; it was noted that, in view of the nature of the special mission, the property of special missions was not always located on the premises of the special mission proper and that, precisely on functional grounds, it was necessary to provide constant protection for such property, contrary to the opinion expressed by the United Kingdom Government. The Special Rapporteur accordingly proposes that this comment should be disregarded.

42. In its written comments, the Austrian Government expresses the view that article 19, paragraph 1, of the draft implies a conflict of competence between the head of the special mission and the head of the regular permanent diplomatic mission. It is not opposed to such a solution for the purpose of allowing agents of the receiving State access to the premises of the special mission, but believes that the case in question calls for some modification of the commentary on article 2 of the draft. This opinion of the Austrian Government is expressed as follows:

“Article 19, paragraph 1:

“This paragraph states that the agents of the receiving State may be allowed access to the premises (including

See above, document A/CN. 4/189 and Add 1, para. 136.
Article 23.—Exemption of the mission from taxation

46. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government expresses the view that some addition should be made to the text of article 23 of the Commission's draft, and it makes the following proposal in this connexion:

"Article 23. The expression 'taxes in respect of the premises of the special mission' in paragraph 1 does not clearly cover capital gains tax on the disposal of the premises. The United Kingdom authorities would not seek to tax a gain accruing to the sending State under these circumstances and they accordingly suggest the addition of the words 'including taxes on capital gains arising on disposal' after the words 'premises of the special mission'."

47. The Special Rapporteur wishes to point out that, in drawing up article 23 of the draft, the Commission took the text of article 23 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as a basis; it did not go into details, its aim being rather to produce a general text. Obviously, therefore, there are a considerable number of cases which would have to be inserted in the text of this article in order to make it comprehensive. The Special Rapporteur does not object in principle to the United Kingdom Government's proposal, but fears that the introduction of this detailed point might guarantee special missions an exemption from taxation to an extent which is not explicitly guaranteed to permanent diplomatic missions.

Articles 24, 25 and 26.—General remarks on these three articles

48. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government expresses its concern that, if the rules of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations are applied to special missions, as provided for in the above-mentioned articles of the Commission's draft, immunities and privileges may be extended to a very large number of individuals.

49. The Special Rapporteur believes that this remark by the United Kingdom Government is similar in substance to the comments made earlier, in chapter II, section 2, "Distinction between the different kinds of special missions", and in chapter III, part II, section on article 17.

50. The United Kingdom Government's comments on these three articles are as follows:

"Articles 24-25-26. The scale of immunity and inviolability prescribed in these articles, based on the corresponding provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, appears excessive, and inappropriate to the character and functions of special missions. While noting the Commission's basic hypothesis that special missions should be equated, so far as practicable, with permanent missions, the United Kingdom Government would prefer a restriction of

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6 Ibid., paras. 166-170.
immunity and inviolability to official documents and official acts."

51. The Special Rapporteur believes that this question has been answered in chapter II, but he will take these remarks into consideration in dealing with each of the three articles individually.

**Article 24.** — *[Personal inviolability]*

52. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government—as stated above in the section headed "General remarks on these three articles" (articles 24, 25 and 26)—says that it would prefer a restriction of immunity and inviolability to official documents and official acts.

53. The Special Rapporteur recalls that the Commission has already discussed this possibility, and has come to the conclusion that members of the special mission could not perform their functions with complete freedom if they could be arrested, detained or brought before a court at any time by the authorities of the receiving State on the pretext of their responsibility for acts other than those performed in their official capacity. The Commission took the view that a guarantee of this kind would not be adequate for special missions, and had accordingly decided to adopt the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and not those of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

54. Bound as he is by the Commission's decision, the Special Rapporteur cannot recommend the adoption of the United Kingdom Government's proposal.

**Article 25.** — *[Inviolability of the private accommodation]*

55. This article is also referred to in the United Kingdom Government's written comments, as already indicated in the section headed "General remarks on these three articles".

56. The Special Rapporteur cannot see how the inviolability of the private accommodation of members of special missions could be restricted to official documents and official acts, particularly as members of the special mission move around the territory of the receiving State, their stay is only temporary, and their accommodation is such that it would be difficult to differentiate between objects relating to official acts and other objects in that accommodation. He is, therefore, unable to recommend that the Commission should adopt this proposal.

**Article 26.** — *[Immunity from jurisdiction]*

57. This article also is referred to in the general remarks on articles 24, 25 and 26 in the written comments of the United Kingdom Government. The United Kingdom Government bases its arguments on the assumption that special missions should be accorded only what is known as minor or functional immunity. The Commission, on the other hand, strongly believes that members of the special mission should enjoy complete immunity from criminal jurisdiction, as a protection against the receiving State. This point has already been mentioned in the section on article 24, and the Special Rapporteur does not think that there is any reason for reverting to it here.

58. The above-mentioned general remarks also relate to immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State. The United Kingdom Government believes that these forms of immunity should be restricted exclusively to official documents and official acts. The Commission's attitude, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that members of the special mission must enjoy complete immunity in this respect also, subject to two limitations. The first results from the proviso "unless otherwise agreed" in the text of article 26, and the second from the exceptions provided for in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

59. The Special Rapporteur believes that the Commission should reconsider the question of the immunity of members of special missions in regard to the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State; and he would point out that in his first and second reports he himself supported the idea of functional immunity. 7

60. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government questions whether the text of article 26, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c), is wide enough to protect the receiving State against all abuses of immunity. Its remarks on this subject are as follows:

"**Article 26.** There seems to be room for doubt whether the expression 'professional or commercial activity' in paragraph 2(c) is wide enough to cover, for instance, disputes about the ownership of, or liability for calls etc. on, shares in a company registered in the receiving State. The expression has in the case of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations given rise to difficulty and its scope should be made more clear."

61. The Special Rapporteur draws the Commission's attention to the fact that the question of the ownership of shares was discussed at the Vienna Conferences and referred to by the Special Rapporteur himself in his second report. The Commission, however, took the view that it was only one of many points of detail all of which could not be included in the text of the Convention. The Special Rapporteur leaves it to the Commission to decide whether this matter should be included in the text or perhaps mentioned in the commentary, so as to make the Commission's intentions clearer.

62. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government also suggests that some attention should be given to paragraph (3) of the commentary on article 26. Its remarks are worded as follows:

"The commentary on this article implies that the phrase 'unless otherwise agreed' in paragraph 2 does not contemplate the possibility of excluding all immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction but only of limiting immunity to official acts. This should be made clear in the text." 7

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63. The Special Rapporteur believes that this observation by the United Kingdom Government is in line with the attitude of that Government, as described in paragraph 58 above. The amendment of the text of the commentary will, therefore, depend on whether the Commission adheres to its existing position or adopts the idea of “minor” or so-called functional immunity.

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Article 28.—Exemption from social security legislation

64. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government expresses the view that it is unnecessary to refer in article 28 of the draft to the exemption of persons who are nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State, as the status of these persons is defined in article 36 of the draft.

65. The Special Rapporteur believes that, despite the existence of a general provision concerning this category of persons in article 36 of the draft, it would nevertheless be more satisfactory for their position in regard to the social security legislation of the receiving State to be clearly and explicitly dealt with in article 28 of the draft. It would otherwise be uncertain whether the privileges referred to in article 36 apply to these persons, since social security is connected with the performance of official functions in the special mission.

Article 29.—Exemption from dues and taxes

66. The United Kingdom Government has made a detailed comment on this article, in which it tries to show that the abridged text of article 29 of the draft, based on the provisions of article 34 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, is not altogether felicitous, as the curtailment of the text has left certain situations unsolved. The United Kingdom Government’s remarks are as follows:

“Article 29. The article as it stands does not fully carry out the intention of the Commission expressed in paragraph (2) of the commentary to accord a narrower scale of exemption than is accorded to permanent missions by article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Omission of the exceptions has had in some respects the contrary effect—for example, relief appears due from taxes normally included in the price of goods or services.

“Moreover, unlike article 34 of the Vienna Convention on which it is said to be based, the article might be construed as exempting from stamp duty cheques, receipts, etc., given by the head, members and diplomatic staff of a special mission in the course of their duties. It will not be construed in the United Kingdom as having any effect in relation to duties chargeable under the Stamp Act 1891, as amended, on cheques and other instruments issued by the head, members or diplomatic staff of a special mission.

“In the matter of income tax, because of the exclusion under article 36 of United Kingdom citizens and permanent residents in the United Kingdom from any exemption from United Kingdom tax under this article, it is only in exceptional cases that United Kingdom law would impose any liability to income tax. In such exceptional cases, the expression ‘income attaching to their functions with the special mission’ is too wide. There is no objection to the exemption of emoluments or fees paid by the sending State or, so long as the mission is for the governmental purposes of the sending State, of emoluments or fees paid by other sources in the sending State. Article 42, however, does not appear to exclude the possibility of members of a special mission deriving income from the sale of goods in the receiving State, or the provision of services, or any other activity of a profit-making nature, if the activity attaches to their functions with the mission. A mission sent to promote the export trade of the sending State or to organize a fair or exhibition on behalf of the sending State might claim that the sale of large quantities of goods was within its functions. Income derived from such activities should not be exempt from tax in the receiving State.”

67. The Special Rapporteur recognizes that all the arguments put forward in the United Kingdom comment are technically sound; but he wonders whether the Commission, in a draft on special missions, considers it advisable to go into the details of fiscal legislation. He fears that this might cause it to become too deeply involved in the subject, particularly in view of the fact that no other State has made any comments on this article.

68. In its written comments on article 32 of the draft, the United Kingdom Government expresses the view that it is not necessary to include in article 32 the clause referring to nationals of, and permanent residents in, the receiving State, since article 36 of the draft contains a general provision relating to this category of persons on the staff of the special mission.

69. The Special Rapporteur agrees in substance with this remark by the United Kingdom Government, but ventures to point out that, in drafting article 29, the Commission decided not to insert a clause relating to nationals and permanent residents precisely because there is a general provision relating to this subject in article 36 of the draft.

70. On the subject of article 38 the United Kingdom Government, in its written comments (see the text of the comments in the section on article 38), expresses the fear that the Commission’s commentary on article 29 might be taken to mean that the possibility of profit-making special missions has not been excluded.

71. Although this is a comment on the commentary, the Special Rapporteur does not think that it requires any attention from the Commission since, when drafting article 29 of the draft, the Commission intended that exemption from dues and taxes should apply only to income which can be considered as attaching to functions with the special mission and he believes that the matter should be left there.

Article 30.—Exemption from personal services and contributions

72. In its comments on article 32 of the draft, the United Kingdom Government states that it seems unnecessary to include in article 30 a clause relating to nationals of,
and permanent residents in, the receiving State, as there is a general provision relating to these categories of persons in article 36 of the draft.

73. The Special Rapporteur points out that the Commission was of the same opinion, and did not insert in article 30 of the draft a clause relating to nationals of, and permanent residents in, the receiving State.

Article 31.—Exemption from Customs duties and inspection

74. In its written comments the United Kingdom Government expresses the view that exemption from Customs duties and inspection should not be accorded to members of special missions. It believes that this would be going too far, and that the granting of such facilities should be optional. The United Kingdom Government's view is as follows:

"Article 31. The United Kingdom Government would be reluctant to extend full diplomatic Customs privilege to members of special missions: it appears that they would not be alone in disallowing relief from Customs duty on articles for the personal use of members of a special mission and they consider that the personal relief provision in the article should be made optional. This would conform more closely with international usage."

75. The Special Rapporteur draws the Commission's attention to the fact that the exemptions granted to members of special missions in article 31 of the draft are narrower than those provided for in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. He does not think, however, that it would be advisable to grant more exemptions than those listed in article 31 of the draft. The rather severe character of the United Kingdom proposal stems from the basic attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards the restriction of the immunities and privileges of members of special missions. The proposal is based, in short, on a concept which the Commission has not adopted.

76. In the written comments of the United Kingdom Government we also find the following remark on paragraph (2) of the commentary on article 31:

"Paragraph (2) of the commentary is difficult to understand: it appears to be at variance with the terms of the article."

77. The Special Rapporteur is grateful to the United Kingdom Government for drawing his attention to this fact but, even after a very careful examination, he has been unable to discover any inconsistency between the operative text and the commentary.

78. The United Kingdom Government, in its written comments on article 35 of the draft, states that its comment on article 31 applies equally to families.

79. The Special Rapporteur thanks the United Kingdom Government for this remark, and points out that the whole question will have to be reconsidered in the light of the remarks made by the Swedish and Belgian Governments, on which he has expressed his views in the section on article 31, since the United Kingdom comment is closely linked with those of the other two Governments.

Articles 31 and 32.—Exemption of administrative and technical staff from Customs duties and inspection

80. The Austrian Government points out in its written comments that there is a certain inconsistency between the wording of articles 31 and 32 of the draft regarding exemption of administrative and technical staff from Customs duties. The Austrian Government states in this connexion:

"Article 37, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations contains a limitation in time of the Customs exemptions granted to members of the administrative and technical staff. The omission of this limitation in the present draft articles would place the administrative and technical staff of a special mission in a substantially more favourable position than the corresponding staff members of a permanent mission.

"In article 32, moreover, instead of referring to article 31 as a whole, reference should be made to article 31, paragraph 1(b), since it can hardly be intended to grant to administrative and technical staff the same rights as are granted to diplomats in article 31, paragraph 2, which would be going beyond the corresponding provision in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Accordingly, in article 32 of the draft either the same time-limitation to 'articles imported at the time of first installation' should be inserted and, in addition, the reference limited to article 31, paragraph 1(b), or the reference to article 31 should be omitted altogether."

81. As this remark by the Austrian Government is almost identical in substance with the written comment of the United Kingdom Government, on which the Special Rapporteur states his views in paragraph 84 of this addendum in the section on article 32, he does not think that there is any need to express a further opinion on the subject.

82. The above-mentioned remark by the Austrian Government relates also to the Austrian comment cited in the section in this addendum on article 35.

Article 32.—Administrative and technical staff

83. In its written comments the United Kingdom Government expresses the fear that the wording of article 32 may be too wide, in that it confers "first installation" Customs privilege on administrative and technical staff. Its remarks are as follows:

"Article 32. According to paragraph 2(b) of the commentary, the Commission did not intend the grant of 'first installation' Customs privilege to administrative and technical staffs, but the article as it stands confers on these staffs full diplomatic Customs privilege, contrary to intention."

84. The Special Rapporteur thanks the United Kingdom Government for this warning, but believes that the

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* See above, document A/CN. 4/189 and Add 1, paras. 210, 212 and 213.
reference in the commentary is not to article 31 of the draft but to article 37 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and that accordingly this staff does not enjoy “first installation” Customs privilege, which is not mentioned in article 31 of the draft, though there is a reference to it in article 37 of the above-mentioned Vienna Convention.

85. In its written comments the United Kingdom Government, like the Belgian Government, expresses the view that it is unnecessary to insert here a clause relating to nationals of, and permanent residents in, the receiving State, since the relevant sedes materiae provision is to be found in article 36 of the draft.

86. In the section on article 32, the Special Rapporteur recognizes the soundness of this observation; and he himself considers that the clause in question should be retained in article 36 only, as suggested in the United Kingdom remark, which reads as follows:

“Since nationals of, and permanent residents in, the receiving State are excluded from privileges and immunities by article 36, the repetition of the exclusion in this article seems unnecessary and, as it is not repeated in articles 28, 29 and 30, confusing.”

87. On the subject of article 35, the United Kingdom Government, in its written comments, expresses the fear that the commentary on article 32 may give the impression that the draft accords full diplomatic Customs privilege to families of administrative and technical staff.

88. The Special Rapporteur wishes to confine himself for the moment to article 32 of the draft, and to point out that this article does not relate directly to members of families.

Article 33.—Members of the service staff

89. In its remarks on article 33 of the draft, the United Kingdom Government refers to paragraphs (3) and (4) of the Commission’s commentary on the article and, in its written comments, it states:

“Article 33. The formulation of the Commission is preferred to the suggestion of the Rapporteur that service staffs of special missions should be accorded a level of immunity higher than that given in the case of permanent diplomatic missions.”

90. As the United Kingdom Government’s remarks amount merely to acceptance of the Commission’s view, as opposed to the separate opinion expressed by the Special Rapporteur, the latter believes that they do not require any comment.

Article 34.—Private staff

91. In its written comments, the United Kingdom Government suggests that some restrictions should be introduced, and some amendments made, in the text of draft article 34 as drawn up by the Commission. While the Commission takes the view that “Private staff... shall...be exempt from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their employment”, the United Kingdom Government takes the opposite view. Its objection is worded as follows:

“Article 34. The United Kingdom Government oppose the exemption of private servants from income tax on their emoluments.

“A private servant who is not himself permanently resident in the United Kingdom would be liable to United Kingdom tax on his emoluments for his services in the United Kingdom if he were in the United Kingdom for six months or more in any one income tax year. In such circumstances it is unlikely that the private servant would be liable to taxation on his emoluments in the sending State: if the receiving State were required to exempt him, he would be free of all taxation. By contrast, the staff of the special mission will normally be taxed by the sending State. If, exceptionally, the sending State should tax the private servant’s emoluments, he would qualify for double taxation relief in the United Kingdom.”

92. The Special Rapporteur feels obliged to point out that the exemption of private staff from taxes is also in accordance with the provision contained in article 37, paragraph 4, of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, that it is frequently applied in practice and that it is not merely a privilege accorded to private staff but also a concession granted to the members of the special mission themselves, so that they do not have to waste time, during their brief sojourn in the receiving State, in studying its taxation system and procedure.

Article 35.—Members of the family

93. On the subject of this article, the United Kingdom Government expresses the view that the Commission’s commentary on articles 31 and 32 should be more specific. In that Government’s opinion the consequence of these two articles, taken in conjunction with the text of article 35, would be that members of the family of administrative and technical staff would enjoy excessive Customs privileges, which the United Kingdom Government is not prepared to accept. The text of the comment by the United Kingdom Government is as follows:

“Article 35. The comment on article 31 above applies equally to families. The provision which appears to accord full diplomatic Customs privilege to families of administrative and technical staff is presumably an error consequent upon that apparently existing in article 32, to which attention has already been drawn.”

94. The Special Rapporteur believes that there are no grounds for the concern expressed by the United Kingdom Government, and that the latter’s comments apply to the commentary rather than to the operative text. He will, nevertheless, take these comments into account in preparing the final text of the commentary.

95. The Austrian Government considers that the wording of paragraph 2 of article 35 is incomplete and inconsistent with the text of article 31, and suggests that the two texts should be brought into line with each other. Its remarks are worded as follows:

“This paragraph should, in the manner already explained in connexion with article 32, and in the light

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9 See above, document A/CN. 4/189 and Add 1, para. 214.
of the wording ultimately adopted for that article, be limited to the privilege set forth in article 31, paragraph 1(b) and to articles imported at the time of first installation, unless this paragraph is omitted altogether.”

96. The Special Rapporteur thanks the Austrian Government for drawing his attention to this question and points out that he has already expressed his views on it in paragraph 94 above, in reply to a similar remark by the United Kingdom Government.

Article 36.—Nationals of the receiving State and persons permanently resident in the territory of the receiving State

97. In its written comments on article 32, the United Kingdom Government draws attention to the nature of the principle underlying article 36, and expresses the view that the article is sufficient in itself and that the clause relating to nationals of, and permanent residents in, the receiving State need not be repeated in the other articles of the draft.

98. The Special Rapporteur agrees with this comment by the United Kingdom Government.

Article 38.—Case of death

99. In the section on this article (paragraph 234), we stated that article 38 of the Commission’s draft had not been referred to either in the discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly or in the written comments of Governments. But the United Kingdom Government has now referred to the text of this article in its written comments, and has made the following proposal:

“Article 38. If the possibility of profit-making special missions is to remain (see comment on article 29) the United Kingdom Government would prefer not to give exemption from estate duty to the personnel of such a mission.”

100. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the text of article 38 relates only to the movable property of members of special missions, and that the Commission was thinking only of movable property which such persons had brought in as luggage or acquired by legal means during their stay in the territory of the receiving State. He realizes that the extent of this movable property may not coincide with what the Commission had in mind; but, as the article deals with the case of death in the territory of the receiving State, he believes that the Commission might in some future revision of the draft consider the possibility that estate duty should be levied only on movable property which cannot be regarded as the luggage or personal effects of the deceased.

Article 39.—Transit through the territory of a third State

101. The United Kingdom Government in its written comments calls in question the whole principle of the obligation of States which accede to the convention on special missions to comply with the stipulation that third States shall accord immunities where they permit transit. The observations of the United Kingdom Government are as follows:

“Article 39. As drafted this article obliges the third State to grant immunities where it permits transit. The United Kingdom Government would prefer that third States should instead be entitled to permit transit without also granting immunities to a special mission.”

102. The Special Rapporteur is convinced that adoption of the United Kingdom proposal would undermine the whole institution of special missions. He does believe, however, that this is a question of exceptional importance and that the Commission should consider it in greater detail.

... Article 44.—Cessation of the functions of the special mission...
'members of its staff', 'permanently resident in the receiving State' and 'premises of the special mission', in particular, are among those used in the draft articles which should be precisely defined. It seems, for example, unclear whether 'members [of the special mission]' as used in article 6 (1) does or does not include some or all of the staffs referred to in article 6 (2). A definition of the term 'premises of the special mission' should exclude living accommodation of all staff.'

106. The Special Rapporteur believes that, in substance, he has already complied with the wishes of the United Kingdom Government in submitting the draft introductory article contained in this report. There are, however, two points on which he is unable to reach a conclusion without guidance from the Commission. These are:

(a) the exclusion of living accommodation of members of the special mission from the concept of "premises of the mission", since, as a general rule, the special mission has no premises in the proper sense of the term and its business premises are considered as identical with the premises used for accommodation; and

(b) the definition of the concept of "resident", as this concept varies from one State to another.

107. In its written comments the Austrian Government also expresses itself in favour of an introductory article containing definitions. Its statement reads as follows:

"A noticeable feature in the Commission’s draft is that, unlike the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, it contains no definitions of the various categories of members of special missions; in addition, it would seem necessary to define the possible tasks and functions of special missions more specifically than has so far been done in the introduction to the draft articles."

108. The Special Rapporteur considers that he has complied with this proposal in submitting the draft introductory article contained in this report.

Ad CHAPTER V—DRAFT PROVISIONS CONCERNING SO-CALLED HIGH-LEVEL SPECIAL MISSIONS

109. Contrary to what was stated earlier by the Special Rapporteur in Chapter V, paragraph 286, the Commission has now received a comment from the Government of Malta encouraging the elaboration of rules on so-called high-level special missions. In this comment, the Government of Malta makes some detailed suggestions for amending the draft provisions which the Special Rapporteur submitted to the Commission at its seventeenth session (1965). The text of the comment is as follows:

"It is not understood why paragraph (c) of rule 2, which is extended to a special mission led by a Minister for Foreign Affairs (paragraph (c) of rule 4) or by a Cabinet Minister (paragraph (a) of rule 5) is not also extended to the case of a special mission led by a Head of Government.

"If it is accepted that a special mission led by any of the distinguished persons mentioned in the draft provisions in question is a high-level special mission (and the inclusion of special rules to govern these missions implies such an acceptance), then paragraph (d) of rule 2 should, mutatis mutandis, be applied to the other high-level special missions. This is further justified by the rule, which has been proposed in respect of all such missions, that the level of the mission changes as soon as the head of mission leaves the territory of the receiving State."

110. The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the encouragement given by the Governments of Malta and Yugoslavia does not, in the light of the opposite views expressed, justify the elaboration of rules of this kind.

10 See above, document A/CN.4/189 and Add. 1, para. 270.

A. Introduction

1. The International Law Commission, established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947 and in accordance with its Statute annexed thereto, as subsequently amended, held the second part of its seventeenth session at the Palais des Congrès, Principality of Monaco, from 3 to 28 January 1966.

2. At its sixteenth session, in 1964, and at the first part of its seventeenth session, in 1965, the Commission declared that it was essential to hold a four-week series of meetings at the beginning of 1966, in order to finish in the course of that year its draft articles on the law of treaties and on special missions before the end of the term of office of its present members. The General Assembly, by resolution 2045 (XX) of 8 December 1965, approved the Commission’s proposal to meet from 3 to 28 January 1966.

3. The Government of the Principality of Monaco invited the Commission to hold its meetings of January 1966 in Monaco, and undertook to defray the additional costs involved, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1202 (XII) of 13 December 1957. The Commission decided, in pursuance of article 12 of its Statute and after consultation with the Secretary-General, to accept the invitation. The second part of the seventeenth session of the Commission was therefore held in Monaco.

B. Membership and attendance

4. The Commission consists of the following members:

   Mr. Roberto AGO (Italy)
   Mr. Gilberto AMADO (Brazil)
   Mr. Milan BARTOŠ (Yugoslavia)
   Mr. Mohammed BEDJAOUI (Algeria)
   Mr. Herbert W. BRIGGS (United States of America)
   Mr. Marcel CADIEUX (Canada)
   Mr. Erik CASTREN (Finland)
   Mr. Abdullah EL-ERIAN (United Arab Republic)
   Mr. Taslim O. ELIAS (Nigeria)
   Mr. Eduardo JIMÉNEZ DE ARECHAGA (Uruguay)
   Mr. Manfred LACHS (Poland)
   Mr. Liu Chieh (China)
   Mr. Antonio DE LUNA (Spain)
   Mr. Radhabinod PAL (India)
   Mr. Angel M. PAREDES (Ecuador)
   Mr. Obed PEŠOU (Senegal)
   Mr. Paul REUTER (France)
   Mr. Shabtai ROSENNE (Israel)
   Mr. José María RUDA (Argentina)
   Mr. Abdul Hakim TABIBI (Afghanistan)
   Mr. Senjin TSURUOKA (Japan)
   Mr. Grigory I. TUNKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Alfred VERDROSS (Austria)
Sir Humphrey WALDOCK (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Mr. Mustafa Kamil YASSEEN (Iraq)

5. Except for Mr. Abdullah El-Erian, Mr. Liu Chieh, Mr. Radhabinod Pal, Mr. Angel M. Paredes and Mr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi, who were unable to be present, all the members attended.

C. Officers

6. The officers elected during the first part of the session, at the 775th meeting held on 3 May 1965, remained in office during the second part. They were the following:

Chairman: Mr. Milan Bartoš
First Vice-Chairman: Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga
Second Vice-Chairman: Mr. Paul Reuter
Rapporteur: Mr. Taslim O. Elias

7. The Drafting Committee appointed at the first part of the session likewise remained in office. It was composed of the following:

Chairman: Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga
Members: Mr. Roberto Ago; Mr. Herbert W. Briggs; Mr. Taslim O. Elias; Mr. Manfred Lachs; Mr. Paul Reuter; Mr. Shabtai Rosenne; Mr. José María Ruda; Mr. Grigory I. Tunkin; Sir Humphrey Waldock; and Mr. Mustafa Kamil Yasseen. In addition the Commission requested Mr. Marcel Cadieux and Mr. Antonio de Luna to serve temporarily as members of the Committee.

8. Mr. Constantin A. Baguinian, Director of the Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs, represented the Secretary-General and acted as Secretary to the Commission.

D. Agenda and meetings

9. The agenda for the seventeenth session was adopted during the first part of the session, at the 775th meeting on 3 May 1965. In accordance with the Commission’s decision taken in 1965, the second part of the session was mainly devoted to the law of treaties. Consideration was also given to the organization and duration of the eighteenth session in 1966, to cooperation with other bodies, and to other business.

10. In the course of the second part of the seventeenth session the Commission held twenty-two public meetings. In addition, the Drafting Committee held eight meetings.

E. Law of treaties

11. During its meetings in Monaco the Commission had before it, in connexion with the law of treaties, a portion of the fourth report (A/CN.4/177/Add.2) of Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, which had not previously been examined; the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/183 and Add.1-4); part II of the draft articles on the law of treaties, adopted by the Commission at its fifteenth session in 1963; and the comments of Governments on those draft articles (A/CN.4/175 and Add.1-4).

12. The Commission re-examined in the light of the comments of Governments articles 30-50 of the draft articles. It decided to defer a decision on article 40 until the eighteenth session, and at that session the Drafting Committee will report on articles 49 and 50, on which it was unable to complete its study in Monaco. The Commission, in all, adopted revised texts of nineteen articles. As explained in its last report, these texts must still be treated as subject to review at the eighteenth session of the Commission, when its work on the draft articles on the law of treaties will be completed. As also explained in that report, the Commission preferred to postpone its consideration of all the commentaries until its eighteenth session when it would have before it the final text of all the articles to be included in the draft. The texts of articles 30-50 as finally adopted by the Commission, together with commentaries thereto, will be published as part of the complete draft on the law of treaties in the report of the Commission on the work of its eighteenth session.

F. Resolution of thanks to the Government of Monaco

13. At its 843rd meeting, on 27 January 1966, the Commission unanimously adopted the following resolution:

“The International Law Commission,
“Having met from 3 to 28 January 1966 in order to continue the work of its seventeenth session,
“Expresses its profound gratitude to the Government of H.S.H. Prince Rainier III and to the Principality of Monaco for having made it possible to hold the second part of the Commission’s seventeenth session at Monaco, for their generous hospitality and for their contribution to the completion of its work.”

G. Organization and duration of the eighteenth session

14. At its 843rd meeting, on 28 January 1966, the Commission decided that its eighteenth session would be mainly devoted to the law of treaties and to special missions, and that the law of treaties would be taken up at the beginning of the session. The Commission would also discuss at that session the organization of future work on the other topics on its agenda.

15. The Commission, during its meetings in 1965, desired to reserve the possibility of a two-week extension of its eighteenth session in summer 1966, the question of the extension to be decided in January 1966 in the light of the progress made up to that time. The General Assembly, by resolution 2045 (XX) of 8 December 1965,
H. Co-operation with other bodies

European Committee on Legal Co-operation

16. At its 827th meeting, on 10 January 1966, the Commission considered a letter of 16 December 1965 from the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who had transmitted it to the Commission. The letter stated that the Council of Europe in 1963 had set up a special body, the European Committee on Legal Co-operation, for the purpose of dealing with co-operation of its member States in the legal field. The Committee, which was composed of delegations of eighteen States and of three delegates of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, had under consideration various items (including immunity of States, consular functions, and reservations to international treaties) which appeared to be connected with the work of the International Law Commission. It was proposed to establish a co-operative relationship of the Commission with the European Committee like those existing with the juridical bodies of the Organization of American States and with the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee. The Commission decided at its 827th meeting to establish a relationship under article 26 of its Statute with the European Committee on Legal Co-operation.

17. The European Committee was represented at the Commission's meeting by Mr. H. Golsong, Director of Legal Affairs, Council of Europe, who addressed the Commission at its 830th meeting, on 13 January 1966, on the work of the Committee.

Inter-American Council of Jurists

18. The Inter-American Juridical Committee, the standing organ of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, was represented by Mr. José Joaquín Caicedo Castilla, who addressed the Commission at its 830th meeting, on 13 January 1966, on the legal work of the Organization of American States. He referred in particular to the meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists in San Salvador, a meeting of the Inter-American Juridical Committee in Rio de Janeiro in July, August and September 1965, and an extraordinary Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in November 1965. The Juridical Committee had completed work on drafts concerning the breadth of the territorial sea, international responsibility of the State, industrial and agricultural utilization of international rivers and lakes, and differences between intervention and collective action. The Extraordinary Conference had, among other things, examined the opinion of the Juridical Committee on the last-mentioned subject.

I. Seminar on International Law

19. At its 831st meeting, on 14 January 1966, the Commission took note of the final preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2045 (XX) of 8 December 1965, by which the General Assembly noted with satisfaction that the Office of the United Nations at Geneva had organized, during the first part of the seventeenth session of the Commission, a seminar on international law, and expressed the wish that during future sessions other seminars would be held, with the participation of a reasonable number of nationals of the developing countries. At that meeting, explanations concerning the seminar to be held during the eighteenth session of the Commission were given on behalf of the United Nations Office at Geneva by Mr. Pierre Raton, the officer in charge of the organization of the seminar. It was explained that practical reasons made it necessary to hold the seminar to begin not later than the second or third week of the session. The second seminar would be of slightly longer duration than the first, in order to give the participants an opportunity to do research in the library of the Palais des Nations. The number of participants would be increased to a maximum of twenty or twenty-one, in order to help secure a better geographical distribution; but a further increase would risk impairing the possibilities for the participants to play an active part and to have personal contacts with members of the Commission. It was hoped that other Governments would follow the examples of the Governments of Israel and Sweden, which had generously agreed to provide one fellowship each to enable a national of a developing country to attend the seminar.

20. In the course of the discussion certain members of the Commission made observations about the seminar. One member suggested that a further attempt should be made to explore the possibilities of obtaining fellowships from Governments and private sources. Another suggested that it might be desirable for other members of the Commission in addition to the lecturer to attend the lectures, so that the debate could be broadened; that the maximum number of participants could be enlarged to thirty; and that one method of ensuring that the best candidates were chosen for fellowships would be to have them chosen by the universities in their countries of origin. The Commission decided to bring these comments to the attention of the Office of the United Nations at Geneva, for its consideration.

## Part II

Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth session

*Geneva, 4 May - 19 July 1966*

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CHAPTER I

Organization of the session

1. The International Law Commission, established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947 and in accordance with its Statute annexed thereto, as subsequently amended, held its eighteenth session at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 4 May to 19 July 1966. The Commission thus availed itself of the possibility of extending its session which was granted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session in the interest of allowing the Commission to complete as much work as possible during the term of office of the present members. The work of the Commission during this session is described in this report. Chapter II of the report, on the law of treaties, contains a description of the Commission's work on that topic, together with seventy-five draft articles and commentaries thereto, as finally approved by the Commission. Chapter III, relating to special missions, contains a description of the Commission's work on that topic. Chapter IV relates to the programme of work and organization of future sessions of the Commission, and to a number of administrative and other questions.

A. MEMBERSHIP AND ATTENDANCE

2. The Commission consists of the following members:
   - Mr. Roberto Ago (Italy)
   - Mr. Gilberto Amado (Brazil)
   - Mr. Milan Bartoš (Yougoslaavia)
   - Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algeria)
   - Mr. Herbert W. Briggs (United States of America)
   - Mr. Marcel Cadieux (Canada)
   - Mr. Erik Castrén (Finland)
   - Mr. Abdullah El-Erian (United Arab Republic)
   - Mr. Taslim O. Elias (Nigeria)
   - Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga (Uruguay)
   - Mr. Manfred Lachs (Poland)
   - Mr. Liu Chieh (China)
   - Mr. Antonio de Luna (Spain)
   - Mr. Radhabinod Pal (India)
   - Mr. Angel M. Pareš (Ecuador)
   - Mr. Obed Pessou (Togo)
   - Mr. Paul Reuter (France)
   - Mr. Shabtai Rosenne (Israel)
   - Mr. José María Ruda (Argentina)
   - Mr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi (Afghanistan)
   - Mr. Senjin Tsuruoka (Japan)
   - Mr. Grigory I. Tunkin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
   - Mr. Alfred Verdross (Austria)
   - Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
   - Mr. Mustafa Kamil Yasseen (Iraq)

3. Except for Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Mr. Taslim O. Elias, Mr. Liu Chieh and Mr. Radhabinod Pal, who were unable to be present, all the members attended.

4. At its 844th meeting, held on 4 May 1966, the Commission elected the following officers:
   - **Chairman:** Mr. Mustafa Kamil Yasseen
   - **First Vice-Chairman:** Mr. Herbert W. Briggs
   - **Second Vice-Chairman:** Mr. Manfred Lachs
   - **Rapporteur:** Mr. Antonio de Luna

5. At its 845th meeting, held on 5 May 1966, the Commission appointed a Drafting Committee composed as follows:
   - **Chairman:** Mr. Herbert W. Briggs
   - **Members:** Mr. Roberto Ago; Mr. Erik Castrén; Mr. Abdullah El-Erian; Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga; Mr. Manfred Lachs; Mr. Antonio de Luna; Mr. Paul Reuter; Mr. Shabtai Rosenne; Mr. Grigory I. Tunkin; Sir Humphrey Waldock.

6. Mr. Constantin A. Stavropoulos, Legal Counsel, attended the 878th, 879th and 880th meetings, held on 27, 28 and 29 June 1966 respectively, and represented the Secretary-General at those meetings. Mr. Constantin A. Baguinian, Director of the Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs, represented the Secretary-General at the other meetings of the session, and acted as Secretary to the Commission.

C. AGENDA

7. The Commission adopted an agenda for the eighteenth session, consisting of the following items:
   1. Law of treaties
   2. Special missions
   3. Organization of future work
   4. Date and place of the nineteenth session
   5. Co-operation with other bodies
   6. Other business.

8. In the course of the session, the Commission held fifty-one public meetings. In addition, the Drafting Committee held twenty-three meetings. The Commission considered all the items on its agenda. At the invitation of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations and in accordance with suggestions made in the Sixth Committee at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the Commission discussed the procedural and organizational problems involved in a possible diplomatic conference on the law of treaties, and also the question of the responsibilities of United Nations organs in furthering co-operation in the development of the law of international trade and in promoting its progressive unification and harmonization.

CHAPTER II

Law of treaties

A. INTRODUCTION

9. At its first session in 1949, the International Law Commission at its sixth and seventh meetings placed the law of treaties amongst the topics listed in its report.  

for that year as being suitable for codification, and at its 33rd meeting appointed Mr. J. L. Brierly as Special Rapporteur for the subject.

10. At its second session in 1950, the Commission devoted its 49th to 53rd and 78th meetings to a preliminary discussion of Mr. Brierly's first report, which like his other reports envisaged that the Commission's work on the law of treaties would take the form of a draft convention. The Commission also had before it replies of Governments to a questionnaire addressed to them under article 19, paragraph 2, of its Statute. 3

11. At its third session, in 1951, the Commission had before it two reports from Mr. Brierly, one relating to the continuation of the Commission's general work on the law of treaties, and the other relating to reservations to multilateral conventions, a topic referred to the Commission by the General Assembly in its resolution 478 (V) of 16 November 1950, by which the Assembly also requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the particular problem of reservations to the Genocide Convention. The Commission considered the first report at its 84th to 88th, 98th to 100th, and 134th meetings, and the second report at its 100th to 106th, 125th to 129th, and 133rd meetings. The conclusions of the Commission regarding reservations to multilateral conventions were given in chapter II of its report. 6

12. At its fourth session, in 1952, the Commission had before it a third report on the law of treaties prepared by Mr. Brierly, but as Mr. Brierly had meanwhile resigned his membership of the Commission, the Commission did not think it advisable to discuss that report in the absence of the author, and after a discussion at its 178th and 179th meetings, appointed Mr. (later Sir Hersch) Lauterpacht as Special Rapporteur. In 1952 the Secretariat published a volume in the United Nations Legislative Series entitled "Laws and Practices concerning the Conclusion of Treaties".

13. At the fifth session, in 1953, and the sixth session, in 1954, the Commission received two reports by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, but was unable to discuss them. Since meanwhile Sir Hersch Lauterpacht had resigned from the Commission upon his election as a judge of the International Court of Justice, the Commission at its seventh session, in 1955 (296th meeting), appointed Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice as Special Rapporteur in his place.

14. At the next five sessions of the Commission, from 1956 to 1960, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice presented five successive reports covering respectively: (a) the framing, conclusion and entry into force of treaties, (b) the termination of treaties, (c) essential and substantial validity of treaties, (d) effects of treaties as between the parties (operation, execution and enforcement), and (e) treaties and third States. Although taking full account of the reports of his predecessors, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice prepared his drafts de novo and framed them in the form of an expository code rather than of a convention. During this period the Commission's time was largely taken up with other topics so that apart from a brief discussion of certain general questions of treaty law at the 368th-370th meetings of the eighth session, in 1956, it was able to concentrate upon the law of treaties only at its eleventh session, in 1959. At that session it devoted twenty-six meetings (480th-496th, 500th-504th and 519th-522nd meetings) to a discussion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's first report, and provisionally adopted the texts of fourteen articles, together with their commentaries. However, the time available was not sufficient to enable the Commission to complete its series of draft articles on that part of the law of treaties. In its report for 1959 11 the Commission, in addition to setting out the text of those articles, explained the reasons why, without prejudice to any eventual decision it might take, it had been envisaging its work on the law of treaties as taking the form of "a code of a general character", rather than of one or more international conventions. This question is discussed in the next section below.

15. The twelfth session, in 1960, was entirely taken up with drafts on other topics, so that no further progress was made with the law of treaties at that session. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice then resigned from the Commission after his election as a judge of the International Court of Justice, and at the thirteenth session, in 1961, the Commission appointed Sir Humphrey Waldock to succeed him as Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties. At the same session the Commission decided, after discussion at the 620th and 621st meetings, that its aim would be to prepare draft articles on the law of treaties intended to serve as the basis for a convention (see the next section below). The General Assembly, in its resolution 1686 (XVI) of 18 December 1961, taking note of the Commission's decision, recommended that the Commission continue its work on the law of treaties.

16. At its fourteenth session, in 1962, the Commission, at its 637th-670th and 672nd meetings, considered the

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3 Ibid., p. 196.
5 J.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15.
8 ST/LEG/SER.B/3 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 1952. V. 4).
first report of Sir Humphrey Waldock, adopted a provisional draft of twenty-nine articles on the conclusion, entry into force and registration of treaties, and decided to transmit its draft, through the Secretary-General, to Governments for their comments. The General Assembly, in its resolution 1765 (XVII) of 20 November 1962, recommended that the Commission continue the work of codification and progressive development of the law of treaties, taking into account the views expressed in the Assembly and the comments submitted by Governments.

17. At its fifteenth session, in 1963, the Commission, at its 673rd-685th, 687th-711th, 714th, 716th-721st meetings, considered the second report of Sir Humphrey Waldock, adopted a provisional draft of twenty-four further articles on the invalidity, termination and suspension of treaties, and likewise decided to transmit them to Governments for their comments. At the same session, the Commission studied the question of extended participation in general multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, which had been referred to it by General Assembly resolution 1766 (XVII) of 20 November 1962. On this question the Commission, at its 712th and 713th meetings, considered a special report by Sir Humphrey Waldock, and submitted its conclusions in its report to the General Assembly. The General Assembly, in resolution 1902 (XVIII) of 18 November 1963, made a recommendation concerning the Commission’s work on the law of treaties which was similar to that in resolution 1765 (XVII), referred to in the preceding paragraph.

18. At its sixteenth session, in 1964, the Commission, at its 726th-755th, 759th-760th, 764th-767th, 769th and 770th-774th meetings, considered the third report of Sir Humphrey Waldock, and adopted a provisional draft of nineteen further articles on the application, effects, revision and interpretation of treaties, thus completing a provisional draft on the topic. The third part of the draft articles was also transmitted to Governments for their comments.

19. The comments of Governments on the provisional draft were published for the use of the Commission in documents A/CN.4/175 and Add.1-5 and A/CN.4/182 and Add.1-3. Part II of each of those documents reproduced article by article extracts from the summary records of the Sixth Committee containing the views expressed on the articles in that Committee. The comments submitted in writing by Governments, which were published in part I of those documents, are also published in the annex to the present report.

20. At the first part of its seventeenth session, from May to July 1965, the Commission, at its 776th-803rd, 810th-816th, 819th and 820th meetings, began the revision of the draft articles in the light of the comments of Governments. It had before it the fourth report of Sir Humphrey Waldock, which summarized the written comments of Governments and also those made orally by delegations in the General Assembly, and made proposals for the revision of the articles. The Commission also had before it a report (A/5687) on “Depositary Practice in Relation to Reservations”, submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly in accordance with resolution 1452 B (XIV), and certain further information on depositary practice and reservations submitted by the Secretary-General at the request of the Commission. The Commission in 1965 re-examined the first twenty-nine articles of the draft, but, as the draft articles were still considered as subject to review, the Commission did not consider that it would be useful to adopt commentaries on those articles. The General Assembly, in resolution 2045 (XX) of 8 December 1965, again made a recommendation concerning the Commission’s work on the law of treaties which was like those in resolutions 1765 (XVII) and 1902 (XVIII), referred to above.

21. For the purpose of finishing the draft articles before the end of the term of office of its present members, the Commission proposed to hold the second part of its seventeenth session for four weeks in January 1966, and the General Assembly, by resolution 2045 (XX), approved that proposal. Those four weeks of meetings, consisting of the 822nd-843rd meetings, were held in Monaco by invitation of the Government of the Principality, and the law of treaties was discussed at all of them. The Commission had before it the fifth report of Sir Humphrey Waldock, and re-examined twenty-one further articles, but again did not adopt commentaries on those articles.

22. At the eighteenth session the Commission has had before it the sixth report of Sir Humphrey Waldock, and also a memorandum by the Secretariat entitled “Preparation of Multilingual Treaties” (A/CN.4/187). At its 845th-876th, 879th-880th and 883rd-894th meetings, the Commission re-examined the remainder of the draft articles, revised certain earlier articles, decided upon the order of all the articles, dealt with some general questions of terminology, adopted the commentaries to all articles, and also, in accordance with suggestions made by representatives in the Sixth Committee at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, considered the procedural and organizational problems involved in a possible conference on the law of treaties. The Commission has adopted the final text of its draft articles on the law of treaties.
treaties in English, French and Spanish, and, in accordance with its Statute, submits them herewith to the General Assembly, together with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 36 and 37 below.

2. Form of the draft articles

23. The first two Special Rapporteurs of the Commission on the law of treaties envisaged that the Commission's work on the topic would take the form of a draft convention. The third Special Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, however, drafted his reports in the form of an expository code. At its thirteenth session, in 1961, the Commission, in appointing Sir Humphrey Waldock as its fourth Special Rapporteur on the topic, decided "that its aim would be to prepare draft articles on the law of treaties intended to serve as the basis for a convention". Thus the Commission changed the scheme of its work from a mere expository statement of the law to the preparation of draft articles capable of serving as a basis for an instrument intended to become legally binding.

24. This decision was explained as follows by the Commission in its report on its fourteenth session in 1962:

"First, an expository code, however well formulated, cannot in the nature of things be so effective as a convention for consolidating the law; and the consolidation of the law of treaties is of particular importance at the present time when so many new States have recently become members of the international community. Secondly, the codification of the law of treaties through a multilateral convention would give all the new States the opportunity to participate directly in the formulation of the law if they so wished; and their participation in the work of codification appears to the Commission to be extremely desirable in order that the law of treaties may be placed upon the widest and most secure foundations."

25. At the first part of its seventeenth session, in 1965, the Commission re-examined the question in the light of the comments of certain Governments on the question of the form ultimately to be given to the draft articles, and of the view of two Governments that the form should be that of a code rather than a convention. The Commission adhered to the views it had expressed in 1961 and 1962 in favour of a convention, and gave the same explanation as has been quoted in the preceding paragraph. The Commission also:

"...recalled that at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly the Sixth Committee had stated in its report that the great majority of representatives had approved the Commission's decision to give the codification of the law of treaties the form of a convention. The Commission, moreover, felt it to be its duty to aim at achieving the maximum results from the prolonged work done by it on the codification of the law of treaties. Accordingly, it reaffirmed its decision of 1961 to prepare draft articles 'intended to serve as the basis for a convention'.”

26. In submitting the final text of the draft articles on the law of treaties in the present report, the Commission maintains the view which it accepted at the outset of its work on the topic and which it has expressed in its reports since 1961. A corresponding recommendation is made in paragraph 36 below.

27. The Commission also maintains the view that the draft articles should be cast in the form of a single draft convention rather than that of a series of related conventions. As stated in its report for 1965:

"...the Commission concluded that the legal rules set out in the different parts are so far interrelated that it is desirable that they should be codified in a single convention. It considered that, while certain topics on the law of treaties may be susceptible of being dealt with separately, the proper co-ordination of the rules governing the several topics is likely to be achieved only by incorporating them in a single, closely integrated set of articles. Accordingly, it decided that in the course of their revision the draft articles should be rearranged in the form of a single convention.”

3. Scope of the draft articles

28. During the course of the preparation of its draft articles on the law of treaties, the Commission frequently had occasion to consider the scope of application of those articles. It decided to limit that scope to treaties concluded between States, to the exclusion of treaties between States and other subjects of international law and treaties between such other subjects of international law, and it also decided not to deal with international agreements not in written form. These decisions are explained in the commentaries to articles 1, 2 and 3 below. Apart from these matters, however, there are certain others which require explanation in this section.

29. At its fifteenth session, in 1963, the Commission concluded that the draft articles should not contain any provisions concerning the effect of the outbreak of hostilities upon treaties, although this topic might raise problems both of the termination of treaties and of the suspension of their operation. It was explained in the report for 1963 that:

"The Commission considered that the study of this topic would inevitably involve a consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Charter concerning the threat or use of force upon the legality of the recourse to the particular hostilities in question; and it did not feel that this question could conveniently be dealt with in the context of its present work upon the law of treaties.”


30. Similarly, the draft articles do not contain provisions concerning either the succession of States in respect of treaties, which the Commission considers can be more appropriately dealt with under the item of its agenda relating to succession of States and Governments, or the effect of the extinction of the international personality of a State upon the termination of treaties. In regard to the latter question, as is further explained in paragraph (6) of its commentary to article 58 and in its 1963 report,\textsuperscript{20} the Commission

"...did not think that any useful provisions could be formulated on this question without taking into account the problem of the succession of States to treaty rights and obligations."

31. The draft articles do not contain provisions concerning the question of the international responsibility of a State with respect to a failure to perform a treaty obligation. This question, the Commission noted in its 1964 report,\textsuperscript{30} would involve not only the general principles governing the reparation to be made for a breach of a treaty, but also the grounds which may be invoked in justification for the non-performance of a treaty. As these matters form part of the general topic of international responsibility of States, which is to be the subject of separate examination by the Commission, it decided to exclude them from its codification of the law of treaties and to take them up in connexion with its study of the international responsibility of States.

32. Moreover, the Commission, as explained in its 1964 report,\textsuperscript{31} did not think it advisable to deal with the so-called "most-favoured-nation clause" in the present codification of the general law of treaties, although it felt that such clauses might at some future time appropriately form the subject of a special study. Likewise the Commission, while recognizing the importance of not prejudicing in any way the operation of most-favoured-nation clauses, found it unnecessary to make a specific exception regarding such clauses in articles 30-33 of the present draft, since it did not consider that these clauses were in any way touched by these articles.

33. Again, no provision regarding the application of treaties providing for obligations or rights to be performed or enjoyed by individuals has been included in the draft. It was stated in the 1964 report\textsuperscript{32} that

"Some members of the Commission desired to see a provision on that question included in the present group of draft articles. But other members considered that such a provision would go beyond the present scope of the law of treaties, and in view of the division of opinion the Special Rapporteur withdrew the proposal."

34. The Commission did not consider that it should cover the whole question of the relationship between treaty law and customary law, although aspects of that question are touched in certain articles. That question, it felt, would lead it far outside the scope of the law of treaties proper and would more appropriately be the subject of an independent study.

35. The Commission's work on the law of treaties constitutes both codification and progressive development of international law in the sense in which those concepts are defined in article 15 of the Commission's Statute, and, as was the case with several previous drafts,\textsuperscript{33} it is not practicable to determine into which category each provision falls. Some of the commentaries, however, indicate that certain new rules are being proposed for the consideration of the General Assembly and of Governments.

B. RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

36. At its 892nd meeting, on 18 July 1966, the Commission decided, in conformity with Article 23, paragraph 1(d), of its Statute, to recommend that the General Assembly should convene an international conference of plenipotentiaries to study the Commission's draft articles on the law of treaties and to conclude a convention on the subject.

37. The Commission wishes to refer to the titles given to parts, sections and articles of its draft, which it considers helpful for an understanding of the structure of the draft and for promoting ease of reference. It expresses the hope, as it did in regard to its draft articles on consular relations,\textsuperscript{34} that these titles, subject to any appropriate changes, will be retained in any convention which may be concluded in the future on the basis of the Commission's draft articles.

C. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION

38. The Commission, at its 893rd meeting on 18 July 1966, after adopting the text of the articles on the law of treaties, unanimously adopted the following resolution:

"The International Law Commission,

"Having adopted the draft articles on the law of treaties,

"Desires to express to the Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, its deep appreciation of the invaluable contribution he has made to the preparation of the draft throughout these past years by his tireless devotion and incessant labour, which have enabled the Commission to bring this important task to a successful conclusion."

Draft articles on the law of treaties
Part I.—Introduction

Article 1. The scope of the present articles

The present articles relate to treaties concluded between States.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., para. 22.


\textsuperscript{34} Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1961, vol. II, p. 92, para. 35.
Article 2. Use of terms

1. For the purposes of the present articles:
   (a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.
   (b) "Ratification", "Acceptance", "Approval", and "Accession" mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty.
   (c) "Full powers" means a document emanating from the competent authority of a State designating a person to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty.
   (d) "Reservation" means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to vary the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.
   (e) "Negotiating State" means a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty.
   (f) "Contracting State" means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force.
   (g) "Party" means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force.
   (h) "Third State" means a State not a party to the treaty.
   (i) "International organization" means an intergovernmental organization.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present articles are without prejudice to the use of those terms or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of any State.

Article 3. International agreements not within the scope of the present articles

The fact that the present articles do not relate:
   (a) To international agreements concluded between States and other subjects of international law or between such other subjects of international law; or
   (b) To international agreements not in written form shall not affect the legal force of such agreements or the application to them of any of the rules set forth in the present articles to which they would be subject independently of these articles.

Article 4. Treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations or are adopted within international organizations

The application of the present articles to treaties which are constituent instruments of an international organization or are adopted within an international organization shall be subject to any relevant rules of the organization.

Part II.—Conclusion and entry into force of treaties

Section 1: Conclusion of treaties

Article 5. Capacity of States to conclude treaties

1. Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.

2. States members of a federal union may possess a capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down.

Article 6. Full powers to represent the State in the conclusion of treaties

1. Except as provided in paragraph 2, a person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty only if:
   (a) He produces appropriate full powers; or
   (b) It appears from the circumstances that the intention of the States concerned was to dispense with full powers.

2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their State:
   (a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty;
   (b) Heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting State and the State to which they are accredited;
   (c) Representatives accredited by States to an international conference or to an organ of an international organization, for the purpose of the adoption of the text of a treaty in that conference or organ.

Article 7. Subsequent confirmation of an act performed without authority

An act relating to the conclusion of a treaty performed by a person who cannot be considered under article 6 as representing his State for that purpose is without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by the competent authority of the State.

Article 8. Adoption of the text

1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the unanimous consent of the States participating in its drawing up except as provided in paragraph 2.

2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the States participating in the conference, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a different rule.

Article 9. Authentication of the text

The text of a treaty is established as authentic and definitive:
   (a) By such procedure as may be provided for in the text or agreed upon by the States participating in its drawing up; or
(b) Failing such procedure, by the signature, signature ad referendum or initialling by the representatives of those States of the text of the treaty or of the Final Act of a conference incorporating the text.

Article 10. Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by signature
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its representative when:
   (a) The treaty provides that signature shall have that effect;
   (b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that signature should have that effect;
   (c) The intention of the State in question to give that effect to the signature appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
   (a) The initialling of a text constitutes a signature of the treaty when it is established that the negotiating States so agreed;
   (b) The signature ad referendum of a treaty by a representative, if confirmed by his State, constitutes a full signature of the treaty.

Article 11. Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or approval
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when:
   (a) The treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification;
   (b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification should be required;
   (c) The representative of the State in question has signed the treaty subject to ratification; or
   (d) The intention of the State in question to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.
2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or approval under conditions similar to those which apply to ratification.

Article 12. Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when:
   (a) The treaty or an amendment to the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession;
   (b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; or
   (c) All the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession.

Article 13. Exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
Unless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession establish the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty upon:
   (a) Their exchange between the contracting States;
   (b) Their deposit with the depositary; or
   (c) Their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary, if so agreed.

Article 14. Consent relating to a part of a treaty and choice of differing provisions
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 16 to 20, the consent of a State to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty so permits or the other contracting States so agree.
2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty which permits a choice between differing provisions is effective only if it is made plain to which of the provisions the consent relates.

Article 15. Obligation of a State not to frustrate the object of a treaty prior to its entry into force
A State is obliged to refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of a proposed treaty when:
   (a) It has agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty, while these negotiations are in progress;
   (b) It has signed the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty;
   (c) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.

Section 2: Reservations to multilateral treaties

Article 16. Formulation of reservations
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
   (a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
   (b) The treaty authorizes specified reservations which do not include the reservation in question; or
   (c) In cases where the treaty contains no provisions regarding reservations, the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Article 17. Acceptance of and objection to reservations
1. A reservation expressly or impliedly authorized by the treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of the treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization, the reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization, unless the treaty otherwise provides.

4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs of this article:
   (a) Acceptance by another contracting State of the reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that State if or when the treaty is in force;
   (b) An objection by another contracting State to a reservation precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is expressed by the objecting State;
   (c) An act expressing the State’s consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation.

5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.

Article 18. Procedure regarding reservations
1. A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation, and an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing and communicated to the other States entitled to become parties to the treaty.

2. If formulated on the occasion of the adoption of the text or upon signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation.

3. An objection to the reservation made previously to its confirmation does not itself require confirmation.

Article 19. Legal effects of reservations
1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 16, 17 and 18:
   (a) Modifies for the reserving State the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and
   (b) Modifies those provisions to the same extent for such other party in its relations with the reserving State.

2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty inter se.

3. When a State objecting to a reservation agrees to consider the treaty as in force between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.

Article 20. Withdrawal of reservations
1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for its withdrawal.

2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal becomes operative only when notice of it has been received by the other contracting States.

Section 3: Entry into force of treaties

Article 21. Entry into force
1. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the negotiating States may agree.

2. Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States.

3. When the consent of a State to be bound is established after a treaty has come into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on the date when its consent was established unless the treaty otherwise provides.

Article 22. Entry into force provisionally
1. A treaty may enter into force provisionally if:
   (a) The treaty itself prescribes that it shall enter into force provisionally pending ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by the contracting States; or
   (b) The negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed.

2. The same rule applies to the entry into force provisionally of part of a treaty.

Part III.—Observance, application and interpretation of treaties

Section 1: Observance of treaties

Article 23. Pacta sunt servanda
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

Section 2: Application of treaties

Article 24. Non-retroactivity of treaties
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.

Article 25. Application of treaties to territory
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, the application of a treaty extends to the entire territory of each party.

Article 26. Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
Section 3: Interpretation of treaties

Article 27. General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
   (a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
   (b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
   (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty;
   (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the understanding of the parties regarding its interpretation;
   (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Article 28. Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 27, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 27:
   (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
   (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

Article 29. Interpretation of treaties in two or more languages

1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.

2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.

3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 27 and 28 does not remove, a meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted.

Section 4: Treaties and third States

Article 30. General rule regarding third States

A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.

Article 31. Treaties providing for obligations for third States

An obligation arises for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend the provision to be a means of establishing the obligation and the third State has expressly accepted that obligation.

Article 32. Treaties providing for rights for third States

1. A right arises for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend the provision to accord that right either to the State in question, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated.

2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty.

Article 33. Revocation or modification of obligations or rights of third States

1. When an obligation has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 31, the obligation may be revoked or modified only with the mutual consent of the parties to the treaty and of the third State, unless it is established that they had otherwise agreed.

2. When a right has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 32, the right may not be revoked or modified.
by the parties if it is established that the right was intended not to be revocable or subject to modification without the consent of the third State.

Article 34. Rules in a treaty becoming binding through international custom

Nothing in articles 30 to 33 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law.

Part IV.—Amendment and modification of treaties

Article 35. General rule regarding the amendment of treaties

A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in part II apply to such agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.

Article 36. Amendment of multilateral treaties

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, the amendment of multilateral treaties shall be governed by the following paragraphs.

2. Any proposal to amend a multilateral treaty as between all the parties must be notified to every party, each one of which shall have the right to take part in:

(a) The decision as to the action to be taken in regard to such proposal;

(b) The negotiation and conclusion of any agreement for the amendment of the treaty.

3. Every State entitled to become a party to the treaty shall also be entitled to become a party to the treaty as amended.

4. The amending agreement does not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement; and article 26, paragraph 4(b) applies in relation to such State.

5. Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after the entry into force of the amending agreement shall, failing an expression of a different intention by that State:

(a) Be considered as a party to the treaty as amended; and

(b) Be considered as a party to the unamended treaty in relation to any party to the treaty not bound by the amending agreement.

Article 37. Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only

1. Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if:

(a) The possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; or

(b) The modification in question:

(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations;

(ii) does not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole; and

(iii) is not prohibited by the treaty.

2. Unless in a case falling under paragraph 1(a) the treaty otherwise provides, the parties in question shall notify the other parties of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification to the treaty for which it provides.

Article 38. Modification of treaties by subsequent practice

A treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions.

Part V.—Invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties

Section 1: General provisions

Article 39. Validity and continuance in force of treaties

1. The validity of a treaty may be impeached only through the application of the present articles. A treaty the invalidity of which is established under the present articles is void.

2. A treaty may be terminated or denounced or withdrawn from by a party only as a result of the application of the terms of the treaty or of the present articles. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.

Article 40. Obligations under other rules of international law

The invalidity, termination or denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the suspension of its operation, as a result of the application of the present articles or of the terms of the treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it is subject under any other rule of international law.

Article 41. Separability of treaty provisions

1. A right of a party provided for in a treaty to denounce, withdraw from or suspend the operation of the treaty may only be exercised with respect to the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.

2. A ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty recognized in the present articles may only be invoked with respect to the whole treaty except as provided in the following paragraphs or in article 57.

3. If the ground relates to particular clauses alone, it may only be invoked with respect to those clauses where:

(a) The said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application; and

(b) Acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to the treaty as a whole.
4. Subject to paragraph 3, in cases falling under articles 46 and 47 the State entitled to invoke the fraud or corruption may do so with respect either to the whole treaty or to the particular clauses alone.

5. In cases falling under articles 48, 49 and 50, no separation of the provisions of the treaty is permitted.

Article 42. Loss of a right to invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty

A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 43 to 47 inclusive or articles 57 to 59 inclusive if, after becoming aware of the facts:

(a) It shall have expressly agreed that the treaty, as the case may be, is valid or remains in force or continues in operation; or

(b) It must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced, as the case may be, in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or in operation.

Section 2: Invalidity of treaties

Article 43. Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude a treaty

A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation of its internal law was manifest.

Article 44. Specific restrictions on authority to express the consent of the State

If the authority of a representative to express the consent of his State to be bound by a particular treaty has been made subject to a specific restriction, his omission to observe that restriction may not be invoked as invalidating a consent expressed by him unless the restriction was brought to the knowledge of the other negotiating States prior to his expressing such consent.

Article 45. Error

1. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error, or if the circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error.

3. An error relating only to the wording of the text of a treaty does not affect its validity; article 74 then applies.

Article 46. Fraud

A State which has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

Article 47. Corruption of a representative of the State

If the expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured through the corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

Article 48. Coercion of a representative of the State

The expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him personally shall be without any legal effect.

Article 49. Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force

A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 50. Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law

(jus cogens)

A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Section 3: Termination and suspension of the operation of treaties

Article 51. Termination of or withdrawal from a treaty by consent of the parties

A treaty may be terminated or a party may withdraw from a treaty:

(a) In conformity with a provision of the treaty allowing such termination or withdrawal; or

(b) At any time by consent of all the parties.

Article 52. Reduction of the parties to a multilateral treaty below the number necessary for its entry into force

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a multilateral treaty does not terminate by reason only of the fact that the number of the parties falls below the number specified in the treaty as necessary for its entry into force.

Article 53. Denunciation of a treaty containing no provision regarding termination

1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal.

2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1 of this article.
Article 54. Suspension of the operation of a treaty by consent of the parties

The operation of a treaty in regard to all the parties or to a particular party may be suspended:

(a) In conformity with a provision of the treaty allowing such suspension;

(b) At any time by consent of all the parties.

Article 55. Temporary suspension of the operation of a multilateral treaty by consent between certain of the parties only

When a multilateral treaty contains no provision regarding the suspension of its operation, two or more parties may conclude an agreement to suspend the operation of provisions of the treaty temporarily and as between themselves alone if such suspension:

(a) Does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; and

(b) Is not incompatible with the effective execution as between the parties as a whole of the object and purpose of the treaty.

Article 56. Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied from entering into a subsequent treaty

1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a further treaty relating to the same subject-matter and:

(a) It appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should thenceforth be governed by the later treaty; or

(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time.

2. The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that such was the intention of the parties when concluding the later treaty.

Article 57. Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach

1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.

2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:

(a) The other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty or to terminate it either:

(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State, or

(ii) as between all the parties;

(b) A party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;

(c) Any other party to suspend the operation of the treaty with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty.

3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of the present article, consists in:

(a) A repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present articles; or

(b) The violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.

4. The foregoing paragraphs are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty applicable in the event of a breach.

Article 58. Supervening impossibility of performance

A party may invoke an impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

Article 59. Fundamental change of circumstances

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:

(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and

(b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the scope of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked:

(a) As a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty establishing a boundary;

(b) If the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of the treaty or of a different international obligation owed to the other parties to the treaty.

Article 60. Severance of diplomatic relations

The severance of diplomatic relations between parties to a treaty does not in itself affect the legal relations established between them by the treaty.

Article 61. Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law

If a new peremptory norm of general international law of the kind referred to in article 50 is established, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.
Section 4: Procedure

Article 62. Procedure to be followed in cases of invalidity, termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty

1. A party which claims that a treaty is invalid or which alleges a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under the provisions of the present articles must notify the other parties of its claim. The notification shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken with respect to the treaty and the grounds therefor.

2. If, after the expiry of a period which, except in cases of special urgency, shall not be less than three months after the receipt of the notification, no party has raised any objection, the party making the notification may carry out in the manner provided in article 63 the measure which it has proposed.

3. If, however, objection has been raised by any other party, the parties shall seek a solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations of the parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes.

5. Without prejudice to article 42, the fact that a State has not previously made the notification prescribed in paragraph 1 shall not prevent it from making such notification in answer to another party claiming performance of the treaty or alleging its violation.

Article 63. Instruments for declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty

1. Any act declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty pursuant to the provisions of the treaty or of paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 62 shall be carried out through an instrument communicated to the other parties.

2. If the instrument is not signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs, the representative of the State communicating it may be called upon to produce full powers.

Article 64. Revocation of notifications and instruments provided for in articles 62 and 63

A notification or instrument provided for in articles 62 and 63 may be revoked at any time before it takes effect.

Section 5: Consequences of the invalidity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty

Article 65. Consequences of the invalidity of a treaty

1. The provisions of a void treaty have no legal force.

2. If acts have nevertheless been performed in reliance on such a treaty:

(a) Each party may require any other party to establish as far as possible in their mutual relations the position that would have existed if the acts had not been performed;

(b) Acts performed in good faith before the nullity was invoked are not rendered unlawful by reason only of the nullity of the treaty.

3. In cases falling under articles 46, 47, 48 or 49, paragraph 2 does not apply with respect to the party to which the fraud, coercion or corrupt act is imputable.

4. In the case of the invalidity of a particular State's consent to be bound by a multilateral treaty, the foregoing rules apply in the relations between that State and the parties to the treaty.

Article 66. Consequences of the termination of a treaty

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present articles:

(a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;

(b) Does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.

2. If a State denounces or withdraws from a multilateral treaty, paragraph 1 applies in the relations between that State and each of the other parties to the treaty from the date when such denunciation or withdrawal takes effect.

Article 67. Consequences of the nullity or termination of a treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law

1. In the case of a treaty void under article 50 the parties shall:

(a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act done in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and

(b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

2. In the case of a treaty which becomes void and terminates under article 61, the termination of the treaty:

(a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;

(b) Does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination; provided that those rights, obligations or situations may thereafter be maintained only to the extent that their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new peremptory norm of general international law.

Article 68. Consequences of the suspension of the operation of a treaty

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the suspension of the operation of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present articles:

(a) Relieves the parties between which the operation of the treaty is suspended from the obligation to perform the treaty in their mutual relations during the period of suspension;
(b) Does not otherwise affect the legal relations between the parties established by the treaty.

2. During the period of the suspension the parties shall refrain from acts tending to render the resumption of the operation of the treaty impossible.

Part VI.—Miscellaneous provisions

Article 69. Cases of State succession and State responsibility

The provisions of the present articles are without prejudice to any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States or from the international responsibility of a State.

Article 70. Case of an aggressor State

The present articles are without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations with reference to that State's aggression.

Part VII.—Depositaries, notifications, corrections and registration

Article 71. Depositaries of treaties

1. The depositary of a treaty, which may be a State or an international organization, shall be designated by the negotiating States in the treaty or in some other manner.

2. The functions of a depositary of a treaty are international in character and the depositary is under an obligation to act impartially in their performance.

Article 72. Functions of depositaries

1. The functions of a depositary, unless the treaty otherwise provides, comprise in particular:

   (a) Keeping the custody of the original text of the treaty, if entrusted to it;

   (b) Preparing certified copies of the original text and any further text in such additional languages as may be required by the treaty and transmitting them to the States entitled to become parties to the treaty;

   (c) Receiving any signatures to the treaty and any instruments and notifications relating to it;

   (d) Examining whether a signature, an instrument or a reservation is in conformity with the provisions of the treaty and of the present articles and, if need be, bringing the matter to the attention of the State in question;

   (e) Informing the States entitled to become parties to the treaty of acts, communications and notifications relating to the treaty;

   (f) Informing the States entitled to become parties to the treaty when the number of signatures or of instruments of ratification, accession, acceptance or approval required for the entry into force of the treaty has been received or deposited;

   (g) Performing the functions specified in other provisions of the present articles.

2. In the event of any difference appearing between a State and the depositary as to the performance of the latter's functions, the depositary shall bring the question to the attention of the other States entitled to become parties to the treaty or, where appropriate, of the competent organ of the organization concerned.

Article 73. Notifications and communications

Except as the treaty or the present articles otherwise provide, any notification or communication to be made by any State under the present articles shall:

(a) If there is no depositary, be transmitted directly to the States for which it is intended, or if there is a depositary, to the latter;

(b) Be considered as having been made by the State in question only upon its receipt by the State to which it was transmitted or, as the case may be, upon its receipt by the depositary;

(c) If transmitted to a depositary, be considered as received by the State for which it was intended only upon the latter State's having been informed by the depositary in accordance with article 72, paragraph 1(e).

Article 74. Correction of errors in texts or in certified copies of treaties

1. Where, after the authentication of the text of a treaty, the contracting States are agreed that it contains an error, the error shall, unless they otherwise decide, be corrected:

   (a) By having the appropriate correction made in the text and causing the correction to be initialled by duly authorized representatives;

   (b) By executing or exchanging a separate instrument or instruments setting out the correction which it has been agreed to make; or

   (c) By executing a corrected text of the whole treaty by the same procedure as in the case of the original text.

2. Where the treaty is one for which there is a depositary, the latter:

   (a) Shall notify the contracting States of the error and of the proposal to correct it if no objection is raised within a specified time-limit;

   (b) If on the expiry of the time-limit no objection has been raised, shall make and initial the correction in the text and shall execute a procès-verbal of the rectification of the text, and communicate a copy of it to the contracting States;

   (c) If an objection has been raised to the proposed correction, shall communicate the objection to the other contracting States.

3. The rules in paragraphs 1 and 2 apply also where the text has been authenticated in two or more languages and it appears that there is a lack of concordance which the contracting States agree should be corrected.

4. (a) The corrected text replaces the defective text ab initio, unless the contracting States otherwise decide.

   (b) The correction of the text of a treaty that has been registered shall be notified to the Secretariat of the United Nations.
5. Where an error is discovered in a certified copy of a treaty, the depository shall execute a proces-verbal specifying the rectification and communicate a copy to the contracting States.

Article 75. Registration and publication of treaties

Treaties entered into by parties to the present articles shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Their registration and publication shall be governed by the regulations adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries

Part I.—Introduction

Article 1. The scope of the present articles

The present articles relate to treaties concluded between States.

Commentary

(1) This provision defining the scope of the present articles as relating to “treaties concluded between States” has to be read in close conjunction not only with article 2(1)(a), which states the meaning with which the term “treaty” is used in the articles, but also with article 3, which contains a general reservation regarding certain other categories of international agreements. The sole but important purpose of this provision is to underline at the outset that all the articles which follow have been formulated with particular reference to treaties concluded between States and are designed for application only to such treaties.

(2) Article 1 gives effect to and is the logical consequence of the Commission’s decision at its fourteenth session not to include any special provisions dealing with the treaties of international organizations and to confine the draft articles to treaties concluded between States. Treaties concluded by international organizations have many special characteristics; and the Commission considered that it would both unduly complicate and delay the drafting of the present articles if it were to attempt to include in them satisfactory provisions concerning treaties of international organizations. It is true that in the draft provisionally adopted in 1962, article 1 defined the term treaty “for the purpose of the present articles” as covering treaties “concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law”. It is also true that article 3 of that draft contained a very general reference to the capacity of “other subjects of international law” to conclude treaties and a very general rule concerning the capacity of international organizations in particular. But no other article of that draft or of those provisionally adopted in 1963 and 1964 made any specific reference to the treaties of international organizations or of any other “subject of international law”.

(3) The Commission, since the draft articles were being prepared as a basis for a possible convention, considered it essential, first, to remove from former articles 1 and 3 (articles 2 and 5 of the present draft) the provisions relating to treaties not specifically the subject of the present articles and, secondly, to indicate clearly the restriction of the present articles to treaties concluded between States. Accordingly, it decided to make the appropriate adjustments in articles 1 and 5 and to insert article 1 restricting the scope of the draft articles to treaties concluded between States. The Commission examined whether the object could be more appropriately achieved by merely amending the definition of treaty in article 2. But considerations of emphasis and of drafting convenience led it to conclude that the definition of the scope of the draft articles in the first article is desirable.

(4) The Commission considered it no less essential to prevent any misconception from arising from the express restriction of the draft articles to treaties concluded between States or from the elimination of the references to treaties of “other subjects of international law” and of “international organizations”. It accordingly decided to underline in the present commentary that the elimination of those references is not to be understood as implying any change of opinion on the part of the Commission as to the legal nature of those forms of international agreements. It further decided to add to article 3 (former article 2) a specific reservation with respect to their legal force and the rules applicable to them.

Article 2. Use of terms

1. For the purposes of the present articles:

(a) “Treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

(b) “Ratification”, “Acceptance”, “Approval”, and “Accession” mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty.

(c) “Full powers” means a document emanating from the competent authority of a State designating a person to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty.

(d) “Reservation” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to vary the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.

(e) “Negotiating State” means a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty.

(f) “Contracting State” means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force.

(g) “Party” means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force.

— 1965 draft, article 0.

— 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 1.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present articles are without prejudice to the treaty.

(ii) "Third State" means a State not a party to the treaty.

(iii) "International organization" means an intergovernmental organization.

Commentary

(1) This article, as its title and the introductory words of paragraph 1 indicate, is intended only to state the meanings with which terms are used in the draft articles.

(2) "Treaty". The term "treaty" is used throughout the draft articles as a generic term covering all forms of international agreement in writing concluded between States. Although the term "treaty" in one sense connotes only the single formal instrument, there also exist international agreements, such as exchanges of notes, which are not a single formal instrument, and yet are certainly agreements to which the law of treaties applies. Similarly, very many single instruments in daily use, such as an "agreed minute" or a "memorandum of understanding", could not appropriately be called formal instruments, but they are undoubtedly international agreements subject to the law of treaties. A general convention on the law of treaties must cover all such agreements, and the question whether, for the purpose of describing them, the expression "treaties" should be employed rather than "international agreements" is a question of terminology rather than of substance. In the opinion of the Commission a number of considerations point strongly in favour of using the term "treaty" for this purpose.

(3) First, the treaty in simplified form, far from being at all exceptional, is very common, and its use is steadily increasing. Secondly, the juridical differences, in so far as they really exist at all, between formal treaties and treaties in simplified form lie almost exclusively in the method of conclusion and entry into force. The law relating to such matters as validity, operation and effect, execution and enforcement, interpretation, and termination, applies to all classes of international agreements. In relation to these matters, there are admittedly some important differences of a juridical character between certain classes or categories of international agreements. But these differences spring neither from the form, the appellation, nor any other outward characteristic of the instrument in which they are embodied: they spring exclusively from the content of the agreement, whatever its form. It would therefore be inadmissible to exclude certain forms of international agreements from the general scope of a convention on the law of treaties merely because, in regard to the method of conclusion and entry into force, there may be certain differences between such agreements and formal agreements. Thirdly, even in the case of single formal agreements an extraordinarily varied nomenclature has developed which serves to confuse the question of classifying international agreements. Thus, in addition to "treaty", "convention" and "protocol", one not infrequently finds titles such as "declaration", "charter", "covenant", "pact", "act", "statute", "agreement", "concordat", whilst names like "declaration" "agreement" and "modus vivendi" may well be found given both to formal and less formal types of agreements. As to the latter, their nomenclature is almost illimitable, even if some names such as "agreement", "exchange of notes", "exchange of letters", "memorandum of agreement", or "agreed minute" may be more common than others. It is true that some types of instruments are used more frequently for some purposes rather than others; it is also true that some titles are more frequently attached to some types of transactions rather than to others. But there is no exclusive or systematic use of nomenclature for particular types of transactions. Fourthly, the use of the term "treaty" as a generic term embracing all kinds of international agreements in written form is accepted by the majority of jurists.

(4) Even more important, the generic use of the term "treaty" is supported by two provisions of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In Article 36, paragraph 2, amongst the matters in respect of which States parties to the Statute can accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, there is listed "a. the interpretation of a treaty". But clearly, this cannot be intended to mean that States cannot accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for purposes of the interpretation of international agreements not actually called treaties, or embodied in instruments having another designation. Again, in Article 38, paragraph 1, the Court is directed to apply in reaching its decisions, "a. international conventions". But, equally, this cannot be intended to mean that the Court is precluded from applying other kinds of instruments embodying international agreements, but not styled "conventions". On the contrary, the Court must and does apply them. The fact that in one of these two provisions dealing with the whole range of international agreements the term employed is "treaty" and in the other the even more formal term "convention" is used serves to confirm that the use of the term "treaty" generically in the present articles to embrace all international agreements is perfectly legitimate. Moreover, the only real alternative would be to use for the generic term the phrase "international agreement", which would not only make the drafting more cumbrous but would sound strangely today, when the "law of treaties" is the term almost universally employed to describe this branch of international law.

(5) The term "treaty", as used in the draft articles, covers only international agreements made between "two or more States". The fact that the term is so defined here and


so used throughout the articles is not, as already underlined in the commentary to the previous article, in any way intended to deny that other subjects of international law, such as international organizations and insurgent communities, may conclude treaties. On the contrary, the reservation in article 3 regarding the legal force of and the legal principles applicable to their treaties was inserted by the Commission expressly for the purpose of refuting any such interpretation of its decision to confine the draft articles to treaties concluded between States.

(6) The phrase "governed by international law" serves to distinguish between international agreements regulated by public international law and those which, although concluded between States, are regulated by the national law of one of the parties (or by some other national law system chosen by the parties). The Commission examined the question whether the element of "intention to create obligations under international law" should be added to the definition. Some members considered this to be actually undesirable since it might imply that States always had the option to choose between international and municipal law as the law to govern the treaty, whereas this was often not open to them. Others considered that the very nature of the contracting parties necessarily made an inter-State agreement subject to international law, at any rate in the first instance. The Commission concluded that, in so far as it may be relevant, the element of intention is embraced in the phrase "governed by international law", and it decided not to make any mention of the element of intention in the definition.

(7) The restriction of the use of the term "treaty" in the draft articles to international agreements expressed in writing is not intended to deny the legal force of oral agreements under international law or to imply that some of the principles contained in later parts of the Commission's draft articles on the law of treaties may not have relevance in regard to oral agreements. But the term "treaty" is commonly used as denoting an agreement in written form, and in any case the Commission considered that, in the interests of clarity and simplicity, its draft articles on the law of treaties must be confined to agreements in written form. On the other hand, although the classical form of treaty was a single formal instrument, in modern practice international agreements are frequently concluded not only by less formal instruments but also by means of two or more instruments. The definition, by the phrase "whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments", brings all these forms of international agreement within the term "treaty".

(8) The text provisionally adopted in 1962 also contained definitions of two separate categories of treaty: (a) a "treaty in simplified form" and (b) a "general multilateral treaty". The former term was employed in articles 4 and 12 of the 1962 draft in connexion with the rules governing respectively "full powers" and "ratification". The definition, to which the Commission did not find it easy to give sufficient precision, was employed in those articles as a criterion for the application of certain rules. On re-examining the two articles at its seventeenth session, the Commission revised the formulation of their provisions considerably and in the process found it possible to eliminate the distinctions made in them between "treaties in simplified form" and other treaties which had necessitated the definition of the term. In consequence, it no longer appears in the present article. The second term "general multilateral treaty" was employed in article 8 of the 1962 draft as a criterion for the application of the rules then included in the draft regarding "participation in treaties". The article, for reasons which are explained in a discussion of the question of participation in treaties appended to the commentary to article 12, has been omitted from the draft articles, which do not now contain any rules dealing specifically with participation in treaties. Accordingly this definition also ceases to be necessary for the purposes of the draft articles and no longer appears among the terms defined in the present article.

(9) "Ratification", "Acceptance", "Approval" and "Accession". The purpose of this definition is to underline that these terms, as used throughout the draft articles, relate exclusively to the international act by which the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is established on the international plane. The constitutions of many States contain specific requirements of internal law regarding the submission of treaties to the "ratification" or the "approval" of a particular organ or organs of the State. These procedures of "ratification" and "approval" have their effects in internal law as requirements to be fulfilled before the competent organs of the State may proceed to the international act which will establish the State's consent to be bound. The international act establishing that consent, on the other hand, is the exchange, deposit or notification internationally of the instrument specified in the treaty as the means by which States may become parties to it. Nor is there any exact or necessary correspondence between the use of the terms in internal law and international law, or between one system of internal law and another. Since it is clear that there is some tendency for the international and internal procedures to be confused and since it is only the international procedures which are relevant in the international law of treaties, the Commission thought it desirable in the definition to lay heavy emphasis on the fact that it is purely the international act to which the terms ratification, acceptance, approval and accession relate in the present articles.

(10) "Full powers". The definition of this term does not appear to require any comment except to indicate the significance of the final phrase "or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty". Although "full powers" normally come into consideration with respect to conclusion of treaties (see articles 6, 10 and 11), it is possible that they may be called for in connexion with other acts such as the termination or denunciation of a treaty (see article 63, paragraph 2).

(11) "Reservation". The need for this definition arises from the fact that States, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty, not infrequently make declarations as to their understanding of some matter or as to their interpretation of a particular pro-
vision. Such a declaration may be a mere clarification of the State’s position or it may amount to a reservation, according as it does or does not vary or exclude the application of the terms of the treaty as adopted.

(12) “Negotiating State”, “Contracting State”, “Party”. In formulating the articles the Commission decided that it was necessary to distinguish between four separate categories of State according as the particular context required, and that it was necessary to identify them clearly by using a uniform terminology. One category, “States entitled to become parties to the treaty”, did not appear to require definition. The other three are those defined in sub-paragraphs 1(e), 1(f) and 1(g). “Negotiating States” require to be distinguished from both “contracting States” and “parties” in certain contexts, notably whenever an article speaks of the intention underlying the treaty. “States entitled to become parties” is the appropriate term in certain paragraphs of article 72. “Contracting States” require to be distinguished both from “negotiating States” and “parties” in certain contexts where the relevant point is the State’s expression of consent to be bound independently of whether the treaty has yet come into force. As to “party”, the Commission decided that, in principle, this term should be confined to States for which the treaty is in force. At the same time, the Commission considered it justifiable to use the term “party” in certain articles which deal with cases where, as in article 65, a treaty having purportedly come into force, its validity is challenged, or where a treaty that was in force has been terminated.

(13) “Third State”. This term is in common use to denote a State which is not a party to the treaty and the Commission, for drafting reasons, considered it convenient to use the term in that sense in section 4 of part III.

(14) “International organization”. Although the draft articles do not relate to the treaties of international organizations, their application to certain classes of treaties concluded between States may be affected by the rules of an international organization (see article 4). The term “international organization” is here defined as an intergovernmental organization in order to make it clear that the rules of non-governmental organizations are excluded.

(15) Paragraph 2 is designed to safeguard the position of States in regard to their internal law and usages, and more especially in connexion with the ratification of treaties. In many countries, the constitution requires that international agreements in a form considered under the internal law or usage of the State to be a “treaty” must be endorsed by the legislature or have their ratification authorized by it, perhaps by a specific majority; whereas other forms of international agreement are not subject to this requirement. Accordingly, it is essential that the definition given to the term “treaty” in the present articles should do nothing to disturb or affect in any way the existing domestic rules or usages which govern the classification of international agreements under national law.

Article 3. 40 International agreements not within the scope of the present articles

The fact that the present articles do not relate:

(a) To international agreements concluded between States and other subjects of international law or between such other subjects of international law; or

(b) To international agreements not in written form shall not affect the legal force of such agreements or the application to them of any of the rules set forth in the present articles to which they would be subject independently of these articles.

Commentary

(1) The text of this article, as provisionally adopted in 1962, contained only the reservation in paragraph (b) regarding the force of international agreements not in written form.

(2) The first reservation in sub-paragraph (a) regarding treaties concluded between States and other subjects of international law or between such other subjects of international law was added at the seventeenth session as a result of the Commission’s decision to limit the draft articles strictly to treaties concluded between States and of the consequential restriction of the definition of “treaty” in article 2 to “an international agreement concluded between States”. This narrow definition of “treaty”, although expressly limited to the purposes of the present articles, might by itself give the impression that international agreements between a State and an international organization or other subject of international law, or between two international organizations, or between any other two non-State subjects of international law, are outside the purview of the law of treaties. As such international agreements are now frequent—especially between States and international organizations and between two organizations—the Commission considered it desirable to make an express reservation in the present article regarding their legal force and the possible relevance to them of certain of the rules expressed in the present articles.

(3) The need for the second reservation in sub-paragraph (b) arises from the definition of “treaty” in article 2 as an international agreement concluded “in written form”, which by itself might equally give the impression that oral or tacit agreements are not to be regarded as having any legal force or as governed by any of the rules forming the law of treaties. While the Commission considered that in the interests of clarity and simplicity the present articles on the general law of treaties must be confined to agreements in written form, it recognized that oral international agreements may possess legal force and that certain of the substantive rules set out in the draft articles may have relevance also in regard to such agreements.

(4) The article accordingly specifies that the fact that the present articles do not relate to either of those categories of international agreements is not to affect their legal force or the “application to them of any of the rules set

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40 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 2.
forth in the present articles to which they would be subject independently of these articles”.

**Article 4.** Treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations or which are adopted within international organizations  

The application of the present articles to treaties which are constituent instruments of an international organization or are adopted within an international organization shall be subject to any relevant rules of the organization.

**Commentary**

(1) The draft articles, as provisionally adopted at the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions, contained a number of specific reservations with regard to the application of the established rules of an international organization. In addition, in what was then part II of the draft articles and which dealt with the invalidity and termination of treaties, the Commission had inserted an article (article 48 of that draft) making a broad reservation in the same sense with regard to all the articles on termination of treaties. On beginning its re-examination of the draft articles at its seventeenth session, the Commission concluded that the article in question should be transferred to its present place in the introduction and should be reformulated as a general reservation covering the draft articles as a whole. It considered that this would enable it to simplify the drafting of the articles containing specific reservations. It also considered that such a general reservation was desirable in case the possible impact of rules of international organizations in any particular context of the law of treaties should have been inadvertently overlooked.

(2) The Commission at the same time decided that the categories of treaties which should be regarded as subject to the impact of the rules of an international organization and to that extent excepted from the application of this or that provision of the law of treaties ought to be narrowed. Some reservations regarding the rules of international organizations inserted in articles of the 1962 draft concerning the conclusion of treaties had embraced not only constituent instruments and treaties drawn up within an organization but also treaties drawn up “under its auspices”. In reconsidering the matter in 1963 in the context of termination and suspension of the operation of treaties, the Commission decided that only constituent instruments and treaties actually drawn up within an organization should be regarded as covered by the reservation. The general reservation regarding the rules of international organizations inserted in the text of the present article at the seventeenth session was accordingly formulated in those terms.

(3) Certain Governments, in their comments upon what was then part III of the draft articles (application, effects, modification and interpretation), expressed the view that care must be taken to avoid allowing the rules of international organizations to restrict the freedom of negotiating States unless the conclusion of the treaty was part of the work of the organization, and not merely when the treaty was drawn up within it because of the convenience of using its conference facilities. Noting these comments, the Commission revised the formulation of the reservation at its present session so as to make it cover only “constituent instruments” and treaties which are “adopted within an international organization”. This phrase is intended to exclude treaties merely drawn up under the auspices of an organization or through use of its facilities and to confine the reservation to treaties the text of which is drawn up and adopted within an organ of the organization.

**Part II.—Conclusion and entry into force of treaties**

**Section 1: Conclusion of treaties**

**Article 5.** Capacity of States to conclude treaties

1. Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.

2. States members of a federal union may possess a capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down.

**Commentary**

(1) Some members of the Commission considered that there was no need for an article on capacity in international law to conclude treaties. They pointed out that capacity to enter into diplomatic relations had not been dealt with in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and suggested that, if it were to be dealt with in the law of treaties, the Commission might find itself codifying the whole law concerning the “subjects” of international law. Other members felt that the question of capacity was more prominent in the law of treaties than in the law of diplomatic intercourse and immunities and that the draft articles should contain at least some general provisions concerning capacity to conclude treaties.

(2) In 1962 the Commission, while holding that it would not be appropriate to enter into all the detailed problems of capacity which might arise, decided to include in the present article three broad provisions concerning the capacity to conclude treaties of (i) States and other subjects of international law, (ii) Member States of a federal union and (iii) international organizations. The third of these provisions—capacity of international organizations to conclude treaties—was an echo from a period when the Commission contemplated including a separate part dealing with the treaties of international organizations. Although at its session in 1962 the Commission had decided to confine the draft articles to treaties concluded between States, it retained this provision in the present article dealing with capacity to conclude treaties. On re-examining the article, however, at its seventeenth session the Commission concluded that the logic of its decision that the draft articles should deal only with the treaties concluded between States necessitated the omission from the first paragraph of the

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41 1963 draft, article 48; 1965 draft, article 3(bis).

42 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 3.
reference to the capacity of “other subjects of international law”, and also required the deletion of the entire third paragraph dealing specifically with the treaty-making capacity of international organizations.

(3) Some members of the Commission were of the opinion that the two provisions which remained did not justify the retention of the article. They considered that to proclaim that States possess capacity to conclude treaties would be a pleonasm since the proposition was already implicit in the definition of the scope of the draft articles in article 1. They also expressed doubts about the adequacy of and need for the provision in paragraph 2 regarding the capacity of member States of a federal union; in particular, they considered that the role of international law in regard to this question should have been included in the paragraph. The Commission, however, decided to retain the two provisions, subject to minor drafting changes. It considered that it was desirable to underline the capacity possessed by every State to conclude treaties; and that, having regard to the examples which occur in practice of treaties concluded by member States of certain federal unions with foreign States in virtue of powers given to them by the constitution of the particular federal union, a general provision covering such cases should be included.

(4) Paragraph 1 proclaims the general principle that every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties. The term “State” is used in this paragraph with the same meaning as in the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the Court, the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; i.e. it means a State for the purposes of international law.

(5) Paragraph 2, as already mentioned, deals with the case of federal States whose constitutions, in some instances, allow to their member States a measure of treaty-making capacity. It does not cover treaties made between two units of a federation. Agreements between two member states of a federal State have a certain similarity to international treaties and in some instances certain principles of treaty law have been applied to them in internal law by analogy. However, those agreements operate within the legal régime of the constitution of the federal State, and to bring them within the terms of the present articles would be to overstep the line between international and domestic law. Paragraph 2, therefore, is concerned only with treaties made by a unit of the federation with an outside State. More frequently, the treaty-making capacity is vested exclusively in the federal government, but there is no rule of international law which precludes the component States from being invested with the power to conclude treaties with third States. Questions may arise in some cases as to whether the component State concludes the treaty as an organ of the federal State or in its own right. But on this point also the solution must be sought in the provisions of the federal constitution.

Article 6. \(^\text{43}\) Full powers to represent the State in the conclusion of treaties

1. Except as provided in paragraph 2, a person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty only if:

(a) He produces appropriate full powers; or
(b) It appears from the circumstances that the intention of the States concerned was to dispense with full powers.

2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their State:

(a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty;
(b) Heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting State and the State to which they are accredited;
(c) Representatives accredited by States to an international conference or to an organ of an international organization, for the purpose of the adoption of the text of a treaty in that conference or organ.

\(\text{Commentary}\)

(1) The rules contained in the text of the article provisionally adopted in 1962 have been rearranged and shortened. At the same time, in the light of the comments of Governments, the emphasis in the statement of the rules has been changed. The 1962 text set out the law from the point of view of the authority of the different categories of representatives to perform the various acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty. The text finally adopted by the Commission approaches the matter rather from the point of view of stating the cases in which another negotiating State may call for the production of full powers and the cases in which it may safely proceed without doing so. In consequence, the motif of the formulation of the rules is a statement of the conditions under which a person is considered in international law as representing his State for the purpose of performing acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty.

(2) The article must necessarily be read in conjunction with the definition of “full powers” in article 2(l)(c), under which they are expressed to mean: “a document emanating from the competent authority of a State designating a person to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty”. The 1962 text of the present article dealt with certain special aspects of “full powers” such as the use of a letter or telegram as provisional evidence of a grant of full powers. On re-examining the matter the Commission concluded that it would be better to leave such details to practice and to the decision of those concerned rather than to try to cover them by a general

\(^{43}\) 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 4.
rule. Those provisions of the 1962 text have therefore been dropped from the article.

(3) **Paragraph 1** lays down the general rule for all cases except those specifically listed in the second paragraph. It provides that a person is considered as representing his State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound only if he produces an appropriate instrument of full powers or it appears from the circumstances that the intention of the States concerned was to dispense with them. The rule makes it clear that the production of full powers is the fundamental safeguard for the representatives of the States concerned of each other’s qualifications to represent their State for the purpose of performing the particular act in question; and that it is for the States to decide whether they may safely dispense with the production of full powers. In earlier times the production of full powers was almost invariably requested; and it is still common in the conclusion of more formal types of treaty. But a considerable proportion of modern treaties are concluded in simplified form, when more often than not the production of full powers is not required.

(4) Paragraph 2 sets out three categories of case in which a person is considered in international law as representing his State without having to produce an instrument of full powers. In these cases, therefore, the other representatives are entitled to rely on the qualification of the person concerned to represent his State without calling for evidence of it. The first of these categories covers Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who are considered as representing their State for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty. In the case of Foreign Ministers, their special position as representatives of their State for the purpose of entering into international engagements was expressly recognized by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the **Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case** in connexion with the “Ihlen declaration”.

(5) The second special category of cases is heads of diplomatic missions, who are considered as representing their State for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting State and the State to which they are accredited. Article 3, paragraph (c) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that the “functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in...negotiating with the government of the receiving State”. However, the qualification of heads of diplomatic missions to represent their States is not considered in practice to extend, without production of full powers, to expressing the consent of their State to be bound by the treaty. Accordingly, sub-paragraph (b) limits their automatic qualification to represent their State up to the point of “adoption” of the text.

(6) The third special category is representatives of States accredited to an international conference or to an organ of an international organization, for which the same

rule is laid down as for the head of a diplomatic mission: namely, automatic qualification to represent their States for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty but no more. This category replaces paragraph 2(b) of the 1962 text, which treated heads of permanent missions to international organizations on a similar basis to heads of diplomatic missions, so that they would automatically have been considered as representing their States in regard to treaties drawn up under the auspices of the organization and also in regard to treaties between their State and the organization. In the light of the comments of Governments and on further re-examination of the practice, the Commission concluded that it was not justified in attributing to heads of permanent missions such a general qualification to represent the State in the conclusion of treaties. At the same time, it concluded that the 1962 rule was too narrow in referring only to heads of permanent missions since other persons may be accredited to an organ of an international organization in connexion with the drawing up of the text of the treaty, or to an international conference.

Article 7. Subsequent confirmation of an act performed without authority

An act relating to the conclusion of a treaty performed by a person who cannot be considered under article 6 as representing his State for that purpose is without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by the competent authority of the State.

**Commentary**

(1) This article contains the substance of what appeared in the draft provisionally adopted in 1963 as paragraph 1 of article 32, dealing with lack of authority to bind the State as a ground of invalidity. That article then contained two paragraphs dealing respectively with acts purporting to express a State’s consent to be bound (i) performed by a person lacking any authority from the State to represent it for that purpose; and (ii) performed by a person who had authority to do so subject to certain restrictions but failed to observe those restrictions. In re-examining article 32 at the second part of its seventeenth session, however, the Commission concluded that only the second of these cases could properly be regarded as one of invalidity of consent. It considered that in the first case, where a person lacking any authority to represent the State in this connexion purported to express its consent to be bound by a treaty, the true legal position was that his act was not attributable to the State and that, in consequence, there was no question of any consent having been expressed by it. Accordingly, the Commission decided that the first case should be dealt with in the present part in the context of representation of a State in the conclusion of treaties; and that the rule stated in the article should be that the unauthorized act of the representative is without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by the State.

(2) Article 6 deals with the question of full powers to represent the State in the conclusion of treaties. The
present article therefore provides that “An act relating to the conclusion of a treaty performed by a person who cannot be considered under article 6 as representing his State for that purpose is without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by the competent authority of the State”. Such cases are not, of course, likely to happen frequently, but instances have occurred in practice. In 1908, for example, the United States Minister to Romania signed two conventions without having any authority to do so.\(^\text{46}\) With regard to one of these conventions his Government had given him no authority at all, while he had obtained full powers for the other by leading his Government to understand that he was to sign a quite different treaty. Again, in 1951 a convention concerning the naming of cheeses concluded at Stresa was signed by a delegate on behalf of both Norway and Sweden, whereas it appears that he had authority to do so only from the former country. In both these instances the treaty was subject to ratification and was in fact ratified. A further case, in which the same question may arise, and one more likely to occur in practice, is where an agent has authority to enter into a particular treaty, but goes beyond his full powers by accepting unauthorized extensions or modifications of it. An instance of such a case was Persia’s attempt, in discussions in the Council of the League, to disavow the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 on the ground that the Persian representative had gone beyond his authority in accepting a certain explanatory note when exchanging ratifications.

(3) Where there is no authority to enter into a treaty, it seems clear, on principle, that the State must be entitled to disavow the act of its representative, and the article so provides. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that, notwithstanding the representative’s original lack of authority, the State may afterwards endorse his act and thereby establish its consent to be bound by the treaty. It will also be held to have done so by implication if it invokes the provisions of the treaty or otherwise acts in such a way as to appear to treat the act of its representative as effective.

Article 8.\(^\text{47}\) Adoption of the text

1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the unanimous consent of the States participating in its drawing up except as provided in paragraph 2.

2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the States participating in the conference, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a different rule.

Commentary

(1) This article deals with the voting rule by which the text of the treaty is “adopted”, i.e. the voting rule by which the form and content of the proposed treaty are settled. At this stage, the negotiating States are concerned only with drawing up the text of the treaty as a document setting out the provisions of the proposed treaty and their votes, even when cast at the end of the negotiations in favour of adopting the text as a whole, relate solely to this process. A vote cast at this stage, therefore, is not in any sense an expression of the State’s agreement to be bound by the provisions of the text, which can only become binding upon it by a further expression of its consent (signature, ratification, accession or acceptance).

(2) In former times the adoption of the text of a treaty almost always took place by the agreement of all the States participating in the negotiations and unanimity could be said to be the general rule. The growth of the practice of drawing up treaties in large international conferences or within international organizations has, however, led to so normal a use of the procedure of majority vote that, in the opinion of the Commission, it would be unrealistic to lay down unanimity as the general rule for the adoption of the texts of treaties drawn up at conferences or within organizations. Unanimity remains the general rule for bilateral treaties and for treaties drawn up between few States. But for other multilateral treaties a different general rule must be specified, although, of course, it will always be open to the States concerned to apply the rule of unanimity in a particular case if they should so decide.

(3) Paragraph 1 states the classical principle of unanimity as the applicable rule for the adoption of the text except in the case of a text adopted at an international conference. This rule, as already indicated, will primarily apply to bilateral treaties and to treaties drawn up between only a few States. Of course, under paragraph 2, the States participating in a conference may decide beforehand or at the Conference to apply the unanimity principle. But in the absence of such a decision, the unanimity principle applies under the present article to the adoption of the texts of treaties other than those drawn up at an international conference.

(4) Paragraph 2 concerns treaties the texts of which are adopted at an international conference, and the Commission considered whether a distinction should be made between conferences convened by the State concerned and those convened by an international organization. The question at issue was whether in the latter case the voting rule of the organization should automatically apply. When the General Assembly convenes a conference, the practice of the Secretariat of the United Nations is, after consultation with the States mainly concerned, to prepare provisional or draft rules of procedure for the conference, including a suggested voting rule, for adoption by the conference itself. But it is left to the conference to decide whether to adopt the suggested rule or replace it by another. The Commission therefore concluded that both in the case of a conference convened by the States themselves and of one convened by an organization, the voting rule for adopting the text is a matter for the States at the conference.

(5) The general rule proposed in paragraph 2 is that a two-thirds majority should be necessary for the adoption of a text at any international conference unless the States at the conference should by the same majority decide to apply a different voting rule. While the States at the conference must retain the ultimate power to decide the

\(^{46}\) Hackworth's *Digest of International Law*, vol. IV, p. 467.

\(^{47}\) 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 6.
voting rule by which they will adopt the text of the treaty, it appeared to the Commission to be desirable to fix in the present articles the procedure by which a conference is to arrive at its decision concerning that voting rule. Otherwise there is some risk of the work of the conference being delayed by long procedural debates concerning the preliminary voting rule by which it is to decide upon its substantive voting rule for adopting the text of the treaty. Some members of the Commission considered that the procedural vote should be taken by simple majority. Others felt that such a rule might not afford sufficient protection to minority groups at the conference, for the other States would be able in every case to decide by a simple majority to adopt the text of the treaty by the vote of a simple majority and in that way override the views of what might be quite a substantial minority group of States at the conference. The rule in paragraph 2 takes account of the interests of minorities to the extent of requiring at least two-thirds of the States to be in favour of proceeding by simple majorities before recourse can be had to simple majority votes for adopting the text of a treaty. It leaves the ultimate decision in the hands of the conference but at the same time establishes a basis upon which the procedural questions can be speedily and fairly resolved. The Commission felt all the more justified in proposing this rule, seeing that the use of a two-thirds majority for adopting the text of multilateral treaties is now so frequent.

(6) The Commission considered the further case of treaties like the Genocide Convention or the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, which are actually drawn up within an international organization. Here, the voting rule for adopting the text of the treaty must clearly be the voting rule applicable in the particular organ in which the treaty is adopted. This case is, however, covered by the general provision in article 4 regarding the application of the rules of an international organization, and need not receive mention in the present article.

Article 9.48 Authentication of the text

The text of a treaty is established as authentic and definitive:

(a) By such procedure as may be provided for in the text or agreed upon by the States participating in its drawing up; or

(b) Failing such procedure, by the signature, signature ad referendum or initialling by the representatives of those States of the text of the treaty or of the Final Act of a conference incorporating the text.

Commentary

(1) Authentication of the text of a treaty is necessary in order that the negotiating States, before they are called upon to decide whether they will become parties to the treaty, may know finally and definitively what is the content of the treaty to which they will be subscribing. There must come a point, therefore, at which the draft which the parties have agreed upon is established as being the text of the proposed treaty and not susceptible of alteration. Authentication is the process by which this definitive text is established, and it consists in some act or procedure which certifies the text as the correct and authentic text.

(2) In the past jurists have not usually spoken of authentication as a distinct part of the treaty-making process. The reason appears to be that until comparatively recently signature was the general method of authenticating a text and signature has another function as a first step towards ratification, acceptance or approval of the treaty or an expression of the State's consent to be bound by it. The authenticating function of signature is thus merged in its other function.49 In recent years, however, other methods of authenticating texts of treaties on behalf of all or most of the negotiating States have been devised. Examples are the incorporation of unsigned texts of projected treaties in Final Acts of diplomatic conferences, the procedure of international organizations under which the signatures of the President or other competent authority of the organization authenticate the texts of conventions, and treaties whose texts are authenticated by being incorporated in a resolution of an international organization. It is these developments in treaty-making practice which emphasize the need to deal separately with authentication as a distinct procedural step in the conclusion of a treaty. Another consideration is that the text of a treaty may be "adopted" in one language but "authenticated" in two or more languages.

(3) The procedure of authentication will often be fixed either in the text itself or by agreement of the negotiating States. Failing any such prescribed or agreed procedure and except in the cases covered by the next paragraph authentication takes place by the signature, signature ad referendum or initialling of the text by the negotiating States, or alternatively of the Final Act of a conference incorporating the text.

(4) As already indicated, authentication today not infrequently takes the form of a resolution of an organ of an international organization or of an act of authentication performed by a competent authority of an organization. These, however, are cases in which the text of the treaty has been adopted within an international organization and which are therefore covered by the general provision in article 4 regarding the established rules of international organizations. Accordingly, they do not require specific mention here.

(5) The present article, therefore, simply provides for the procedures mentioned in paragraph (3) above and leaves the procedures applicable within international organizations to the operation of article 4.

Article 10.50 Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by signature

1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its representative when:

49 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 7.
50 1962 draft, articles 10 and 11, and 1965 draft, article 11.
(a) The treaty provides that signature shall have that

effect;

(b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States

were agreed that signature should have that effect;

(c) The intention of the State in question to give that

effect to the signature appears from the full powers of its

representative or was expressed during the negotiation.

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:

(a) The initialling of a text constitutes a signature of

the treaty when it is established that the negotiating States

so agreed;

(b) The signature ad referendum of a treaty by a represen-
tative, if confirmed by his State, constitutes a full

signature of the treaty.

Commentary

(1) The draft provisionally adopted in 1962 dealt with

various aspects of “signature” in three separate articles:

article 7, which covered the authenticating effect of signa-
ture, initialling and signature ad referendum; article 10,

which covered certain procedural aspects of the three

forms of signatures; and article 11, which covered their

legal effects. This treatment of the matter involved some

repetition of certain points and tended to introduce some

complication into the rules. At the same time, certain

provisions were expository in character rather than

formulated as legal rules. Accordingly, in re-examining

articles 10 and 11 at its seventeenth session, the Com-
mision decided to deal with the authenticating effects

of signature exclusively in the present article 9, to delete

article 10 of the previous draft, to incorporate such of

its remaining elements as required retention in what is

now the present article, and to confine the article to

operative legal rules.

(2) The present article, as its title indicates, deals with

the institution of signature only as a means by which

the definitive consent of a State to be bound by a treaty

is expressed. It does not deal with signature subject to

“ratification” or subject to “acceptance” or “approval”,
as had been the case in paragraph 2 of the 1962 text of

article 11. The Commission noted that one of the points

covered in that paragraph went without saying and that

the other was no more than a cross-reference to former

article 17 (now article 15). It also noted that the other

principal effect of signature subject to ratification, etc.—

authentication—was already covered in the present

article 9. In addition, it noted that this institution received

further mention in article 11. Accordingly, while not in

any way underestimating the significance or usefulness

of the institution of signature subject to ratification,

acceptance or approval, the Commission concluded

that it was unnecessary to give it particular treatment in

a special article or provision.

(3) Paragraph 1 of the article admits the signature of a

treaty by a representative as an expression of his State’s

consent to be bound by the treaty in three cases. The

first is when the treaty itself provides that such is to be

the effect of signature as is common in the case of many

types of bilateral treaties. The second is when it is other-

wise established that the negotiating States were agreed

that signature should have that effect. In this case it is

simply a question of demonstrating the intention from the

evidence. The third case, which the Commission included

in the light of the comments of Governments, is when the

intention of an individual State to give its signature that

effect appears from the full powers issued to its representa-

tive or was expressed during the negotiation. It is not

uncommon in practice that even when ratification is

regarded as essential by some States from the point of

view of their own requirements, another State is ready
to express its consent to be bound definitively by its

signature. In such a case, when the intention to be bound

by signature alone is made clear, it is superfluous to insist

upon ratification; and under paragraph 1(c) signature

will have that effect for the particular State in question.

(4) Paragraph 2 covers two small but not unimportant

subsidary points. Paragraph 2(a) concerns the question

whether initialling of a text may constitute a signature

expressing the State’s consent to be bound by the treaty.

In the 1962 draft it was very strict, initialling being treated as carrying

only an authenticating effect and as needing in all cases to be followed by a further act of signature. In short it

was put on a basis similar to that of signature ad referendum. Certain Governments pointed out, however, that

in practice initialling, especially by a Head of State, Prime Minister or Foreign Minister, is not infrequently

intended as the equivalent of full signature. The Com-
mision recognized that this was so, but at the same time

felt that it was important that the use of initials as a full

signature should be understood and accepted by the other

States. It also felt that it would make the rule unduly

complicated to draw a distinction between initialling by

a high minister of State and by other representatives, and

considered that the question whether initialling amounts

to an expression of consent to be bound by the treaty

should be regarded simply as a question of the intentions

of the negotiating States. Paragraph 2(a) therefore pro-

vides that initialling is the equivalent of a signature

expressing such consent when it is established that the

negotiating States so agreed.

(5) Paragraph 2(b) concerns signature ad referendum

which, as its name implies, is given provisionally and sub-

ject to confirmation. When confirmed, it constitutes a

full signature and will operate as one for the purpose of the

rules in the present article concerning the expression

of the State’s consent to be bound by a treaty. Unlike

“ratification”, the “confirmation” of a signature ad referen-
dum is not a confirmation of the treaty but simply

of the signature; and in principle therefore the confirma-

tion renders the State a signatory as of the original date

of signature. The 1962 text of the then article 10 stated

this specifically and as an absolute rule. A suggestion

was made in the comments of Governments that the rule

should be qualified by the words “unless the State con-

cerned specifies a later date when it confirms its signature”. As this would enable a State to choose unilaterally, in

the light of what had happened in the interval, whether to be considered a party from the earlier or later date, the

Commission felt that to add such an express qualifi-

61 Article 10, para. 3 of that draft.
treaty-making power of the executive to parliamentary
century. Earlier, ratification had been an essentially
to ratify his representative's full powers, if these had
confirmed, constitutes a full signature for the purposes
of the rules regarding the expression of a State's consent
to be bound by a treaty.

Article 11. Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed
by ratification, acceptance or approval

1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is
expressed by ratification when:
   (a) The treaty provides for such consent to be expressed
       by means of ratification;
   (b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States
       were agreed that ratification should be required;
   (c) The representative of the State in question has
       signed the treaty subject to ratification; or
   (d) The intention of the State in question to sign the
       treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers
       of its representative or was expressed during the negoti-
       ation.

2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is
expressed by acceptance or approval under conditions
similar to those which apply to ratification.

Commentary

(1) This article sets out the rules determining the cases
in which ratification is necessary in addition to signature
in order to establish the State's consent to be bound by
the treaty. The word "ratification", as the definition in
article 2 indicates, is used here and throughout these draft
articles exclusively in the sense of ratification on the
international plane. Parliamentary "ratification" or "approval"
of a treaty under municipal law is not, of course, un-
connected with "ratification" on the international plane,
since without it the necessary constitutional authority to
perform the international act of ratification may be
lacking. But it remains true that the international and
constitutional ratifications of a treaty are entirely separate
procedural acts carried out on two different planes.

(2) The modern institution of ratification in interna-
tional law developed in the course of the nineteenth
century. Earlier, ratification had been an essentially
formal and limited act by which, after a treaty had been
drawn up, a sovereign confirmed, or finally verified,
the full powers previously issued to his representative
to negotiate the treaty. It was then not an approval of
the treaty itself but a confirmation that the representative
had been invested with authority to negotiate it and,
that being so, there was an obligation upon the sovereign
to ratify his representative's full powers, if these had
been in order. Ratification came, however, to be used in
the majority of cases as the means of submitting the
treaty-making power of the executive to parliamentary
control, and ultimately the doctrine of ratification under-
went a fundamental change. It was established that
the treaty itself was subject to subsequent ratification
by the State before it became binding. Furthermore,
this development took place at a time when the great
majority of international agreements were formal treaties.
Not unnaturally, therefore, it came to be the opinion that
the general rule is that ratification is necessary to render
a treaty binding.

(3) Meanwhile, however, the expansion of intercourse
between States, especially in economic and technical
fields, led to an ever-increasing use of less formal types
of international agreements, amongst which were exchan-
ges of notes, and these agreements are usually intended
by the parties to become binding by signature alone.
On the other hand, an exchange of notes or other informal
agreement, though employed for its ease and convenience,
has sometimes expressly been made subject to ratification
because of constitutional requirements in one or the
other of the contracting States.

(4) The general result of these developments has been
to complicate the law concerning the conditions under
which treaties need ratification in order to make them
binding. The controversy which surrounds the subject
is, however, largely theoretical. The more formal
types of instrument include, almost without exception,
express provisions on the subject of ratification, and
occasionally this is so even in the case of exchanges
of notes or other instruments in simplified form. More-
over, whether they are of a formal or informal type,
treaties normally either provide that the instrument shall
be ratified or, by laying down that the treaty shall enter
into force upon signature or upon a specified date or
event, dispense with ratification. Total silence on the
subject is exceptional, and the number of cases that
remain to be covered by a general rule is very small.
But, if the general rule is taken to be that ratification
is necessary unless it is expressly or impliedly excluded,
large exceptions qualifying the rule have to be inserted
in order to bring it into accord with modern practice,
with the result that the number of cases calling for the
operation of the general rule is small. Indeed, the practical
effect of choosing either that version of the general
rule, or the opposite rule that ratification is unnecessary
unless expressly agreed upon by the parties, is not very
substantial.

(5) The text provisionally adopted in 1962 began by
declaring in its first paragraph that treaties in principle
required to be ratified except as provided in the second
paragraph. The second paragraph then excluded from the
principle four categories of case in which the intention
to dispense with ratification was either expressed, estab-
lished or to be presumed; and one of those categories
was treaties "in simplified form". A third paragraph then
qualified the second by listing three contrary categories
of case where the intention to require ratification was
expressed or established. The operation of paragraph 2

62 See the reports of Sir H. Lauterpacht, Yearbook of the Inter-
national Law Commission, 1953, vol. II, p. 112; and ibid., 1954,
vol. II, p. 127; and the first report of Sir G. Fitzmaurice, Yearbook
of the article was dependent to an important extent on its being possible to identify easily a “treaty in simplified form”. But although the general concept is well enough understood, the Commission found it difficult to formulate a practical definition of such treaties. And article 1(b) of the 1962 text was a description rather than a definition of a treaty in simplified form.

(6) Certain Governments in their comments suggested that the basic rule in paragraph 1 of the 1962 text should be reversed so as to dispense with the need for ratification unless a contrary intention was expressed or established, or that the law should be stated in purely pragmatic terms; while others appeared to accept the basic rule. At the same time criticism was directed at the elaborate form of the rules in paragraphs 2 and 3 and at their tendency to cancel each other out.

(7) The Commission recognized that the 1962 text, which had been the outcome of an attempt to reconcile two opposing points of view amongst States on this question, might give rise to difficulty in its application and especially in regard to the presumption in the case of treaties in simplified form. It re-examined the matter de novo and, in the light of the positions taken by Governments and of the very large proportion of treaties concluded to-day without being ratified, it decided that its proper course was simply to set out the conditions under which the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification in modern international law. This would have the advantage, in its view, of enabling it to state the substance of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 1962 text in much simpler form, to dispense with the distinction between treaties in simplified form and other treaties, and to leave the question of ratification as a matter of the intention of the negotiating States without recourse to a statement of a controversial residuary rule.

(8) The present article accordingly provides in paragraph 1 that the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification in four cases: (i) when there is an express provision to that effect in the treaty; (ii) when it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed ratification should be required; (iii) when the representative of an individual State has expressly signed “subject to ratification”; and (iv) when the intention of an individual State to sign “subject to ratification” appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiations. The Commission considered that these rules give every legitimate protection to any negotiating State in regard to its constitutional requirements; for under the rules it may provide for ratification by agreement with the other negotiating States either in the treaty itself or in a collateral agreement, or it may do so unilaterally by the form of its signature, the form of the full powers of its representative or by making its intention clear to the other negotiating States during the negotiations. At the same time, the position of the other negotiating States is safeguarded, since in each case the intention to express consent by ratification must either be subject to their agreement or brought to their notice.

(9) Paragraph 2 provides simply that the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or approval under conditions similar to those which apply to ratification. In the 1962 draft “acceptance” and “approval” were dealt with in a separate article. As explained in the paragraphs which follow, each of them is used in two ways: either as an expression of consent to be bound without a prior signature, or as a ratification after a non-binding prior signature. Nevertheless the Commission considered that their use also is essentially a matter of intention, and that the same rules should be applicable as in the case of ratification.

(10) Acceptance has become established in treaty practice during the past twenty years as a new procedure for becoming a party to treaties. But it would probably be more correct to say that “acceptance” has become established as a name given to two new procedures, one analogous to ratification and the other to accession.

For, on the international plane, “acceptance” is an innovation which is more one of terminology than of method. If a treaty provides that it shall be open to signature “subject to acceptance”, the process on the international plane is like “signature subject to ratification”. Similarly, if a treaty is made open to “acceptance” without prior signature, the process is like accession. In either case the question whether the instrument is framed in the terms of “acceptance”, on the one hand, or of ratification or acceptance, on the other, simply depends on the phraseology used in the treaty. Accordingly the same name is found in connexion with two different procedures; but there can be no doubt that to-day “acceptance” takes two forms, the one an act establishing the State’s consent to be bound after a prior signature and the other without any prior signature.

(11) “Signature subject to acceptance” was introduced into treaty practice principally in order to provide a simplified form of “ratification” which would allow the government a further opportunity to examine the treaty when it is not necessarily obliged to submit it to the State’s constitutional procedure for obtaining ratification. Accordingly, the procedure of “signature subject to acceptance” is employed more particularly in the case of treaties whose form or subject matter is not such as would normally bring them under the constitutional requirements of parliamentary “ratification” in force in many States. In some cases, in order to make it as easy as possible for States with their varying constitutional requirements to enter into the treaty, its terms provide for either ratification or acceptance. Nevertheless, it remains broadly true that “acceptance” is generally used as a simplified procedure of “ratification”.

(12) The observations in the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis to “approval”, whose introduction into the terminology of treaty-making is even more recent than that of “acceptance”. “Approval”, perhaps, appears more often in the form of “signature subject to approval” than in the form of a treaty which is simply made open to “approval” without signature. But it appears in

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For examples, see Handbook of Final Clauses (ST/LEG/6), pp. 6-17.

The Handbook of Final Clauses (ST/LEG/6), p. 18, even gives an example of the formula “signature subject to approval followed by acceptance”.

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both forms. Its introduction into treaty-making practice seems, in fact, to have been inspired by the constitutional procedures or practices of approving treaties which exist in some countries.

Article 12.  Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession

The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when:

(a) The treaty or an amendment to the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession;

(b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; or

(c) All the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession.

Commentary

(1) Accession is the traditional method by which a State, in certain circumstances, becomes a party to a treaty of which it is not a signatory. One type of accession is when the treaty expressly provides that certain States or categories of States may accede to it. Another type is when a State which was not entitled to become a party to a treaty under its terms is subsequently invited to become a party.

(2) Divergent opinions have been expressed in the past as to whether it is legally possible to accede to a treaty which is not yet in force and there is some support for the view that it is not possible.  However, an examination of the most recent treaty practice shows that in practically all modern treaties which contain accession clauses the right to accede is made independent of the entry into force of the treaty, either expressly by allowing accession to take place before the date fixed for the entry into force of the treaty, or impliedly by making the entry into force of the treaty conditional on the deposit, inter alia, of instruments of accession. The modern practice has gone so far in this direction that the Commission does not consider it appropriate to give any currency, even in the form of a residuary rule, to the doctrine that treaties are not open to accession until they are in force. In this connexion it recalls the following observation of a previous Special Rapporteur: 58

"Important considerations connected with the effectiveness of the procedure of conclusion of treaties seem to call for a contrary rule. Many treaties might never enter into force but for accession. Where the entire tendency in the field of conclusion of treaties is in the direction of elasticity and elimination of restrictive rules it seems undesirable to burden the subject of accession with a presumption which practice has shown to be in the nature of an exception rather than the rule."

Accordingly, in the present article accession is not made dependent upon the treaty having entered into force.

(3) Occasionally, a purported instrument of accession is expressed to be "subject to ratification", and the Commission considered whether anything should be said on the point either in the present article or in article 13 dealing with instruments of accession. The question arises whether it should be indicated in the present article that the deposit of an instrument of accession in this form is ineffective as an accession. The question was considered by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, which, however, contented itself with emphasizing that an instrument of accession would be taken to be final unless the contrary were expressly stated. At the same time it said that the procedure was one which "the League should neither discourage or encourage". 59

As to the actual practice to-day, the Secretary-General has stated that he takes a position similar to that taken by the League of Nations Secretariat. He considers such an instrument "simply as a notification of the government's intention to become a party", and he does not notify the other States of its receipt. Furthermore, he draws the attention of the government to the fact that the instrument does not entitle it to become a party and underlines that "it is only when an instrument containing no reference to subsequent ratification is deposited that the State will be included among the parties to the agreement and the other governments concerned notified to that effect". 60 The attitude adopted by the Secretary-General towards an instrument of accession expressed to be "subject to ratification" is considered by the Commission to be entirely correct. The procedure of accession subject to ratification is somewhat anomalous, but it is infrequent and does not appear to cause difficulty in practice. The Commission has not, therefore, thought it necessary to deal with it specifically in these articles.

(4) If developments in treaty-making procedures tend even to blur the use of accession in some cases, it remains true that accession is normally the act of a State which was not a negotiating State. It is a procedure normally indicated for States which did not take part in the drawing up of the treaty but for the participation of which the treaty makes provision, or alternatively to which the treaty is subsequently made open either by a formal amendment to the treaty or by the agreement of the parties. The rule laid down for accession has therefore to be a little different from that set out in the previous article for ratification, acceptance and approval. The present article provides that consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession in three cases: (i) when a treaty or an amendment to the treaty provides for its accession; (ii) when it is otherwise established that the negotiating States intended to admit its accession; and (iii) when all the parties have subsequently agreed to admit its accession.


59 See Sir H. Lauterpacht, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, vol. II, p. 120.


61 Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Agreements (ST/LEG/7), para. 48.
The third case is, of course, also a case of “amendment” of the treaty. But, as the procedures of formal amendment by the conclusion of an amending agreement under article 36 and of informal agreement to invite a State to accede are somewhat different, the Commission thought that they should be distinguished in separate sub-paragraphs. A recent example of the use of the procedure of informal agreement to open treaties to accession was the question of extended participation in general multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, which formed the subject of General Assembly resolution 1903 (XVIII) and on which the Commission submitted its views in chapter III of its report on the work of its fourteenth session. 61

**Question of participation in a treaty**

(1) Article 8 of the 1962 draft contained two provisions, the first relating to general multilateral treaties and the second to all other treaties. The second provision gave rise to no particular difficulty, but the Commission was divided with respect to the rule to be proposed for general multilateral treaties. Some members considered that these treaties should be regarded as open to participation by “every State” regardless of any provision in the treaty specifying the categories of States entitled to become parties. Some members, on the other hand, while not in favour of setting aside so completely the principle of the freedom of States to determine by the clauses of the treaty itself the States with which they would enter into treaty relations, considered it justifiable and desirable to specify as a residual rule that, in the absence of a contrary provision in the treaty, general multilateral treaties should be open to “every State”. Other members, while sharing the view that these treaties should in principle be open to all States, did not think that a residuary rule in this form would be justified, having regard to the existing practice of inserting in a general multilateral treaty a formula opening it to all Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies, all parties to the Statute of the International Court and to any other State invited by the General Assembly. By a majority the Commission adopted a text stating that unless otherwise provided by the treaty or by the established rules of an international organization, a general multilateral treaty should be open to participation by “every State”. In short, the 1962 text recognized the freedom of negotiating States to fix by the provisions of the treaty the categories of States to which the treaty may be open; but in the absence of any such provision, recognized the right of “every State” to participate.

(2) The 1962 draft also included in article 1 a definition of “general multilateral treaty”. This definition, for which the Commission did not find it easy to devise an altogether satisfactory formula, read as follows: “a multilateral treaty which concerns general norms of international law or deals with matters of general interest to States as a whole”. (3) A number of Governments in their comments on article 8 of the 1962 draft expressed themselves in favour of opening general multilateral treaties to all States, and at the same time proposed that this principle should be recognized also in article 9 so as automatically to open to all States general multilateral treaties having provisions limiting participation to specified categories of States. Certain other Governments objected to the 1962 text from the opposite point of view, contending that no presumption of universal participation should be laid down, even as a residuary rule, for cases when the treaty is silent on the question. A few Governments in their comments on article 8 acknowledged the freedom of States to determine by the clauses of the treaty the right of “every State” to participate.

(4) At its seventeenth session, in addition to the comments of Governments, the Commission had before it further information concerning recent practice in regard to participation clauses in general multilateral treaties and in regard to the implications of an “every State” formula for depositaries of multilateral treaties. It re-examined the problem of participation in general multilateral treaties de novo at its 791st to 795th meetings, at the conclusion of which a number of proposals were put to the vote but none was adopted. In consequence, the Commission requested its Special Rapporteur, with the assistance of the Drafting Committee, to try to submit a proposal for subsequent discussion. At its present session, it concluded that in the light of the division of opinion it would not be possible to formulate any general provision concerning the right of States to participate in treaties. It therefore decided to confine itself to setting out pragmatically the cases in which a State expresses its consent to be bound by signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Accordingly, the Commission decided that the question, which has more than once been debated in the General Assembly, and recently in the Special Committees on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations among States, should be left aside from the draft articles. In communicating this decision to the General Assembly, the Commission decided to draw the General Assembly’s attention to the records of its 791st-795th meetings at which the question of participation in treaties was discussed at its seventeenth session, and to its commentary on articles 8 and 9 of the draft articles in its report for its fourteenth session, which contains a summary of the points of view expressed by members in the earlier discussion of the question at that session.

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Article 13. Exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession establish the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty upon:

(a) Their exchange between the contracting States;
(b) Their deposit with the depositary; or
(c) Their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary, if so agreed.

Commentary

(1) The draft provisionally adopted in 1962 contained two articles (articles 15 and 16), covering respectively the procedure and legal effects of ratification, accession, acceptance and approval. On re-examining these articles at its seventeenth session the Commission concluded that certain elements which were essentially descriptive should be eliminated; that two substantive points regarding “consent to a part of a treaty” and “choice of differing provisions” should be detached and made the subject of a separate article; and that the present article should be confined to the international acts—exchange, deposit, or notification of the instrument—by which ratification, acceptance, approval and accession are accomplished and the consent of the State to be bound by the treaty is established.

(2) The present article thus provides that instruments of ratification, etc. establish the consent of a State upon either their exchange between the contracting States, their deposit with the depositary or their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary. These are the acts usually specified in a treaty, but if the treaty should lay down a special procedure, it will, of course, prevail, and the article so provides.

(3) The point of importance is the moment at which the consent to be bound is established and in operation with respect to other contracting States. In the case of exchange of instruments there is no problem; it is the moment of exchange. In the case of the deposit of an instrument with a depositary, the problem arises whether the deposit by itself establishes the legal nexus between the depositing State and other contracting States or whether the legal nexus arises only upon their being informed by the depositary. The Commission considered that the existing general rule clearly is that the act of deposit by itself establishes the legal nexus. Some treaties, e.g. the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, specifically provide that the treaty is not to enter into force with respect to the depositing State until after the expiry of a short interval of time. But, even in these cases the legal nexus is established by the act of deposit alone. The reason is that the negotiating States, for reasons of practical convenience, have chosen to specify this act as the means by which participation in the treaty is to be established. This may involve a certain time-lag before each of the other contracting States is aware that the depositing State has established its consent to be bound by the treaty. But, the parties having prescribed that deposit of the instrument shall establish consent, the deposit by itself establishes the legal nexus at once with other contracting States, unless the treaty otherwise provides. This was the view taken by the International Court in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (preliminary objections) case in the analogous situation of the deposit of instruments of acceptance of the optional clause under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Court. If this case indicates the possibility that difficult problems may arise under the rule in special circumstances, the existing rule appears to be well-settled. Having regard to the existing practice and the great variety of the objects and purposes of treaties, the Commission did not consider that it should propose a different rule, but that it should be left to the negotiating States to modify it if they should think this necessary in the light of the provisions of the particular treaty.

(4) The procedure of notifying instruments to the contracting States or to the depositary mentioned in subparagraph (c), if less frequent, is sometimes used to-day as the equivalent, in the one case, of a simplified form of exchange of instruments and in the other, of a simplified form of deposit of the instrument. If the procedure agreed upon is notification to the depositing States, article 73 will apply and the consent of the notifying State to be bound by the treaty vis-à-vis another contracting State will be established only upon its receipt by the latter. On the other hand, if the procedure agreed upon is notification to the depositary, the same considerations apply as in the case of the deposit of an instrument; in other words, the consent will be established on receipt of the notification by the depositary.

Article 14. Consent relating to a part of a treaty and choice of differing provisions

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 16 to 20, the consent of a State to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty so permits or the other contracting States so agree.

2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty which permits a choice between differing provisions is effective only if it is made plain to which of the provisions the consent relates.

Commentary

(1) The two paragraphs of this article contain the provisions of what were paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of article 15 of the draft provisionally adopted in 1962. At the same time, they frame those provisions as substantive legal rules rather than as descriptive statements of procedure.

(2) Some treaties expressly authorize States to consent to a part or parts only of the treaty or to exclude certain parts, and then, of course, partial ratification, acceptance, approval or accession is admissible. But in the absence of such a provision, the established rule is that the...
ratification, accession etc. must relate to the treaty as a whole. Although it may be admissible to formulate reservations to selected provisions of the treaty under the rules stated in article 16, it is inadmissible to subscribe only to selected parts of the treaty. Accordingly, paragraph 1 of the article lays down that without prejudice to the provisions of articles 16 to 20 regarding reservations to multilateral treaties, an expression of consent by a State to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty or the other contracting States authorize such a partial consent.

(3) Paragraph 2 takes account of a practice which is not very common but which is sometimes found, for example, in the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and in some international labour conventions. The treaty offers to each State a choice between differing provisions of the treaty. The paragraph states that in such a case an expression of consent is effective only if it is made plain to which of the provisions the consent relates.

Article 15. 69 Obligation of a State not to frustrate the object of a treaty prior to its entry into force

A State is obliged to refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of a proposed treaty when:

(a) It has agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty, while these negotiations are in progress;

(b) It has signed the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty;

(c) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.

Commentary

(1) That an obligation of good faith to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the object of the treaty attaches to a State which has signed a treaty subject to ratification appears to be generally accepted. Certainly, in the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, 70 the Permanent Court of International Justice appears to have recognized that, if ratification takes place, a signatory State's misuse of its rights in the interval preceding ratification may amount to a violation of its obligations in respect of the treaty. The Commission considered that this obligation begins at an earlier stage when a State agrees to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty. A fortiori, it attaches also to a State which actually ratifies, accedes to, accepts or approves a treaty if there is an interval before the treaty actually comes into force.

(2) Paragraph (a) of the article covers the stage when a State has merely agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a proposed treaty; and then the obligation to refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of the treaty lasts only so long as the negotiations continue in progress.

(3) Paragraph (b) covers the case in which a State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, and provides that such a State is to be subject to the obligation provided for in the article until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party.

(4) The obligation of a State which has committed itself to be bound by the treaty to refrain from such acts is obviously of particular cogency and importance. As, however, treaties, and especially multilateral treaties, sometimes take a very long time to come into force or never come into force at all, it is necessary to place some limit of time upon the obligation. Paragraph (c) therefore states that the obligation attaches "pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed."

Section 2: Reservations to multilateral treaties

Article 16. 71 Formulation of reservations

A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:

(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;

(b) The treaty authorizes specified reservations which do not include the reservation in question; or

(c) In cases where the treaty contains no provisions regarding reservations, the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Article 17. 72 Acceptance of and objection to reservations

1. A reservation expressly or impliedly authorized by the treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.

2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of the treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.

3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization, the reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization, unless the treaty otherwise provides.

4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs of this article:

(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of the reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that State if or when the treaty is in force;

(b) An objection by another contracting State to a reservation precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is expressed by the objecting State;

(c) An act expressing the State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as

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69 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 17.
71 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 18.
72 1962 draft, articles 19 and 20, and 1965 draft, article 19.
soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation.

5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.

Commentary

Introduction

(1) Articles 16 and 17 have to be read together because the legal effect of a reservation, when formulated, is dependent on its acceptance or rejection by the other States concerned. A reservation to a bilateral treaty presents no problem, because it amounts to a new proposal reopening the negotiations between the two States concerning the terms of the treaty. If they arrive at an agreement—either adopting or rejecting the reservation—the treaty will be concluded; if not, it will fall to the ground. But as soon as more than two States are involved problems arise, since one State may be disposed to accept the reservation while another objects to it, and, when large multilateral treaties are in question, these problems become decidedly complex.

(2) The subject of reservations to multilateral treaties has been much discussed in recent years and has been considered by the General Assembly itself on more than one occasion, as well as by the International Court of Justice in its opinion concerning the Genocide Convention and by the Commission. Divergent views have been expressed in the Court, the Commission and the General Assembly on the fundamental question of the extent to which the consent of other interested States is necessary to the effectiveness of a reservation to this type of treaty.

(3) In 1951, the doctrine under which a reservation, in order to be valid, must have the assent of all the other interested States was not accepted by the majority of the Court in its opinion concerning the Genocide Convention; moreover, while they considered the "traditional" doctrine to be of "undisputed value", they did not consider it to have been "transformed into a rule of law". Four judges, on the other hand, dissented from this view and set out their reasons for holding that the traditional doctrine must be regarded as a generally accepted rule of customary law. The Court's reply to the question put to it by the General Assembly was as follows:

"On Question I:

"That a State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention."

(4) Although limiting its replies to the case of the Genocide Convention itself, the Court emphasized that they were strictly limited to the Genocide Convention; and said that, in determining what kind of reservations might be made to the Genocide Convention and what kind of objections might be taken to such reservations, the solution must be found in the special characteristics of that Convention. Amongst these special characteristics it mentioned: (a) the fact that the principles underlying the Convention—the condemnation and punishment of genocide—are principles recognized by civilized nations as binding upon governments even without a convention, (b) the consequently universal character of the Convention, and (c) its purely humanitarian and civilized purpose without individual advantages or disadvantages for the contracting States.

(5) For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.

(6) That if, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is a party to the Convention.

(7) That an objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not yet ratified the Convention can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question I only upon ratification. Until that moment it merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual attitude of the signatory State.

(8) That an objection to a reservation made by a State which is entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so, is without legal effect."}

In giving these replies to the General Assembly's questions the Court emphasized that they were strictly limited to the Genocide Convention; and said that, in determining what kind of reservations might be made to the Genocide Convention and what kind of objections might be taken to such reservations, the solution must be found in the special characteristics of that Convention. Amongst these special characteristics it mentioned: (a) the fact that the principles underlying the Convention—the condemnation and punishment of genocide—are principles recognized by civilized nations as binding upon governments even without a convention, (b) the consequently universal character of the Convention, and (c) its purely humanitarian and civilized purpose without individual advantages or disadvantages for the contracting States.

"On Question II:

"(a) That if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is not a party to the Convention;

"(b) That if, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is a party to the Convention.

"On Question III:

"(a) That an objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not yet ratified the Convention can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question I only upon ratification. Until that moment it merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual attitude of the signatory State;

"(b) That an objection to a reservation made by a State which is entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so, is without legal effect."}
allowance made for tacit assent to reservations and the existence of practices which, despite the fact that a reservation has been rejected by certain States, go so far as to admit the reserving State as a party to the Convention vis-à-vis those States which have accepted it.

(d) In the present state of international practice it cannot be inferred from the mere absence of any article providing for reservations in a multilateral convention that the contracting States are prohibited from making certain reservations. The character of a multilateral convention, its purpose, provisions, mode of preparation and adoption, are factors which must be considered in determining, in the absence of any express provision on the subject, the possibility of making reservations, as well as their validity and effect.

(e) The principle of the integrity of the convention, which subjects the admissibility of a reservation to the express or tacit assent of all the contracting parties, does not appear to have been transformed into a rule of law.

5 Later in 1951, as had been requested by the General Assembly, the Commission presented a general report on reservations to multilateral conventions. It expressed the view that the Court's criterion—"compatibility with the object and purpose of the convention"—was open to objection as a criterion of general application, because it considered the question of "compatibility with the object and purpose of the convention" to be too subjective for application to multilateral conventions generally. Noting that the Court's opinion was specifically confined to the Genocide Convention and recognizing that no single rule uniformly applied could be wholly satisfactory to cover all cases, the Commission recommended the adoption of the doctrine requiring unanimous consent for the admission of a State as a party to a treaty subject to a reservation. At the same time, it proposed certain minor modifications in the application of the rule.

6 The Court's opinion and the Commission's report were considered together at the sixth session of the General Assembly, which adopted resolution 598 (VI) dealing with the particular question of reservations to the Genocide Convention separately from that of reservations to other multilateral conventions. With regard to the Genocide Convention it requested the Secretary-General to conform his practice to the Court's Advisory Opinion and recommended to States that they should be guided by it. With regard to all other future multilateral conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations of which he is the depository, it requested the Secretary-General:

(i) to continue to act as depository in connexion with the deposit of documents containing reservations or objections, without passing upon the legal effect of such documents; and

(ii) to communicate the text of such documents relating to reservations or objections to all States concerned, leaving it to each State to draw legal consequences from such communications.

The resolution, being confined to future conventions, was limited to conventions concluded after 12 January 1952, the date of the adoption of the resolution, so that the former practice still applied to conventions concluded before that date. As to future conventions, the General Assembly did not endorse the Commission's proposal to retain the former practice subject to minor modifications. Instead, it directed the Secretary-General, in effect, to act simply as a channel for receiving and circulating instruments containing reservations or objections to reservations, without drawing any legal consequences from them.

7 In the General Assembly, as already mentioned, opinion was divided in the debates on this question in 1951. One group of States favoured the unanimity doctrine, though there was some support in this group for replacing the need for unanimous consent by one of acceptance by a two-thirds majority of the States concerned. Another group of States, however, was definitely opposed to the unanimity doctrine and favoured a flexible system making the acceptance and rejection of reservations a matter for each State individually. They argued that such a system would safeguard the position of outvoted minorities and make possible a wider acceptance of conventions. The opposing group maintained, on the other hand, that a flexible system of this kind, although it might be suitable for a homogeneous community like the Pan-American Union, was not suitable for universal application. Opinion being divided in the United Nations, the only concrete result was the directives given to the Secretary-General for the performance of his depository functions with respect to reservations.

8 The situation with regard to this whole question has changed in certain respects since 1951. First, the international community has undergone rapid expansion since 1951, so that the very number of potential participants in multilateral treaties now seems to make the unanimity principle less appropriate and less practicable. Secondly, since 12 January 1952, i.e. during the past fourteen years, the system which has been in operation de facto for all new multilateral treaties of which the Secretary-General is the depository has approximated to the "flexible" system. For the Secretariat's practice with regard to all treaties concluded after the General Assembly's resolution of 12 January 1952 has been officially stated to be as follows:

"In the absence of any clause on reservations in agreements concluded after the General Assembly resolution on reservations to multilateral conventions, the Secretary-General adheres to the provisions of that resolution and communicates to the States concerned the text of the reservation accompanying an instrument of ratification or accession without passing on the legal effect of such documents, and 'leaving it to each State to draw legal consequences from such communications'. He transmits the observations received on reservations to the States concerned, also without comment. A general table is kept up to date for each convention, showing the reservations made and the observations transmitted thereon by the States concerned. A State which has deposited an
instrument accompanied by reservations is counted among the parties required for the entry into force of the agreement.” 78

It is true that the Secretary-General, in compliance with the General Assembly’s resolution, does not “pass upon” the legal effect either of reservations or of objections to reservations, and each State is free to draw its own conclusions regarding their legal effects. But, having regard to the opposition of many States to the unanimity principle and to the Court’s refusal to consider that principle as having been “transformed into a rule of law”, a State making a reservation is now in practice considered a party to the convention by the majority of those States which do not give notice of their objection to the reservation.

(9) A further point is that in 1959 the question of reservations to multilateral conventions again came before the General Assembly in the particular context of a convention which was the constituent instrument of an international organization—namely the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. The actual issue raised by India’s declaration in accepting that Convention was remitted to IMCO and settled without the legal questions having been resolved. But the General Assembly reaffirmed its previous directive to the Secretary-General concerning his depositary functions and extended it to cover all conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations (unless they contain contrary provisions), not merely those concluded after 12 January 1952.

(10) At its session in 1962, the Commission was agreed that, where the treaty itself deals with the question of reservations, the matter is concluded by the terms of the treaty. Reservations expressly or impliedly prohibited by the terms of the treaty are excluded, while those expressly or impliedly authorized are ipso facto effective. The problem concerns only the cases where the treaty is silent in regard to reservations, and here the Commission was agreed that the Court’s principle of “compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty” is one suitable for adoption as a general criterion of the legitimacy of reservations to multilateral treaties and of objection to them. The difficulty lies in the process by which that principle is to be applied, and especially where there is no tribunal or other organ invested with standing competence to interpret the treaty. The Commission was agreed that where the treaty is one concluded between a small group of States, unanimous agreement to the acceptance of a reservation must be presumed to be necessary in the absence of any contrary indication, and that the problem essentially concerned multilateral treaties which contain no provisions in regard to reservations. On this problem, opinion in the Commission, as in the Court and the General Assembly, was divided.

(11) Some members of the Commission considered it essential that the effectiveness of a reservation to a multilateral treaty should be dependent on at least some measure of common acceptance of it by the other States concerned. They thought it inadmissible that a State, having formulated a reservation incompatible with the objects of a multilateral treaty, should be entitled to regard itself as a party to the treaty, on the basis of the acceptance of the reservation by a single State or by very few States. They instanced a reservation which undermined the basis of the reservation by a single State or by very few States. They instanced a reservation which undermined the basis of the treaty by a reservation, plays a large role in the practice concerning multilateral treaties and is provided for in the draft articles, such a rule would mean in practice that a reserving State, however objectionable its reservation, could always be sure of being able to consider itself a party to the treaty vis-à-vis a certain number of States. Accordingly these members advocated a rule under which, if more than a certain proportion of the interested States (for example, one third) objected to a reservation, the reserving State would be barred altogether from considering itself a party to the treaty unless it withdrew the reservation.

(12) The Commission, while giving full weight to the arguments in favour of maintaining the integrity of the Convention as adopted to the greatest extent possible, felt that the detrimental effect of reservations upon the integrity of the treaty should not be overestimated. The treaty itself remains the sole authentic statement of the common agreement between the participating States. The majority of reservations relate to a particular point which a particular State for one reason or another finds difficult to accept, and the effect of the reservation on the general integrity of the treaty is often minimal; and the same is true even if the reservation in question relates to a comparatively important provision of the treaty, so long as the reservation is not made by more than a few States. In short, the integrity of the treaty would only be materially affected if a reservation of a somewhat substantial kind were to be formulated by a number of States. This might, no doubt, happen; but even then the treaty itself would remain the master agreement between the other participating States. What is essential to ensure both the effectiveness and the integrity of the treaty is that a sufficient number of States should become parties to it, accepting the great bulk of its provisions. The Commission in 1951 said that the history of the conventions adopted by the Conference of American States had failed to convince it “that an approach to universality is necessarily assured or promoted by permitting a State which offers a reservation to which objection is taken to become a party vis-à-vis non-objecting States”. 79 Nevertheless, a power to formulate reservations must in the nature of things tend to make it easier for some States to execute the act necessary to bind themselves finally to participating in the treaty and therefore tend to promote a greater measure of universality in the application of the treaty. Moreover, in the case of general multilateral treaties, it appears that not infrequently a number of States have, to all appearances, only found it possible to participate in the treaty subject to one or more reservations. Whether these States, if objection had been taken to their reservations,

78 Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General as Depository of Multilateral Agreements (ST/LEG/7), para. 80.

would have preferred to remain outside the treaty rather than to withdraw their reservation is a matter which is not known. But when to-day the number of the negotiating States may be upwards of one hundred States with very diverse cultural, economic and political conditions, it seems necessary to assume that the power to make reservations without the risk of being totally excluded by the objection of one or even of a few States may be a factor in promoting a more general acceptance of multilateral treaties. Moreover, the failure of negotiating States to take the necessary steps to become parties to multilateral treaties appears a greater obstacle to the development of international law through the medium of treaties than the possibility that the integrity of such treaties may be unduly weakened by the liberal admission of reserving States as parties to them. The Commission also considered that, in the present era of change and of challenge to traditional concepts, the rule calculated to promote the widest possible acceptance of whatever measure of common agreement can be achieved and expressed in a multilateral treaty may be the one most suited to the immediate needs of the international community.

(13) Another consideration which influenced the Commission was that, in any event the essential interests of individual States are in large measure safeguarded by the two well-established rules:

(a) That a State which within a reasonable time signifies its objection to a reservation is entitled to regard the treaty as not in force between itself and the reserving State;

(b) That a State which asents to another State’s reservation is nevertheless entitled to object to any attempt by the reserving State to invoke against it the obligations of the treaty from which the reserving State has exempted itself by its reservation.

It has, it is true, been suggested that the equality between a reserving and non-reserving State, which is the aim of the above-mentioned rules, may in practice be less than complete. For a non-reserving State, by reason of its obligations towards other non-reserving States, may feel bound to comply with the whole of the treaty, including the provisions from which the reserving State has exempted itself by its reservation. Accordingly, the reserving State may be in the position of being exempt itself from certain of the provisions of the treaty, while having the assurance that the non-reserving States will observe those provisions. Normally however a State wishing to make a reservation would equally have the assurance that the non-reserving State would be obliged to comply with the provisions of the treaty by reason of its obligations to other States, even if the reserving State remained completely outside the treaty. By entering into the treaty subject to its reservation, the reserving State at least submits itself in some measure to the régime of the treaty. The position of the non-reserving State is not therefore made more onerous if the reserving State becomes a party to the treaty on a limited basis by reason of its reservation. Even in those cases where there is such a close connexion between the provisions to which the reservation relates and other parts of the treaty that the non-reserving State is not prepared to become a party to the treaty at all vis-à-vis the reserving State on the limited basis which the latter proposes, the non-reserving State can prevent the treaty coming into force between itself and the reserving State by objecting to the reservation. Thus, the point only appears to have significance in cases where the non-reserving State would never itself have consented to become a party to the treaty, if it had known that the other State would do so subject to the reservation in question. And it may not be unreasonable to suggest that, if a State attaches so much importance to maintaining the absolute integrity of particular provisions, its appropriate course is to protect itself during the drafting of the treaty by obtaining the insertion of an express clause prohibiting the making of the reservations which it considers to be so objectionable.

(14) The Commission accordingly concluded in 1962 that, in the case of general multilateral treaties, the considerations in favour of a flexible system, under which it is for each State individually to decide whether to accept a reservation and to regard the reserving State as a party to the treaty for the purpose of the relations between the two States, outweigh the arguments advanced in favour of retaining a “collegiate” system under which the reserving State would only become a party if the reservation were accepted by a given proportion of the other States concerned. Having arrived at this decision, the Commission also decided that there were insufficient reasons for making a distinction between different kinds of multilateral treaties other than to exempt from the general rule those concluded between a small number of States for which the unanimity rule is retained.

(15) Governments, while criticizing one or another point in the articles proposed by the Commission, appeared in their comments to endorse its decision to try to work out a solution of the question of reservations to multilateral treaties on the basis of the flexible system embodied in the 1962 draft. Accordingly, at its seventeenth session the Commission confined itself to revising the articles provisionally adopted in 1962 in the light of the detailed points made by Governments. 79a

(16) The 1962 draft contained five articles dealing with reservations to multilateral treaties covering: “Formulation of reservations” (article 18), “Acceptance of and objections to reservations” (article 19), “Effect of reservations” (article 20), “Application of reservations” (article 21) and “Withdrawal of reservations” (article 22). The two last-mentioned articles, subject to drafting changes, remain much as they were in the 1962 draft (present articles 19 and 20). The other three have undergone considerable rearrangement and revision. The procedural aspects of formulating, accepting and objecting to reservations have been detached from the former articles 18 and 19 and placed together in present article 18. Article 16 now deals only with the substantive rules regarding the formulation of reservations, while the substantive provisions of the former articles 19 and 20 regarding

79a The Commission also had before it a report from the Secretary-General on Depositary Practice in Relation to Reservations (A/5687).
acceptance of and objection to reservations have been brought together in present article 17. The final draft therefore sets out the topic of reservations also in five articles, but with the differences mentioned. The main foundations of the régime for reservations to multilateral treaties proposed by the Commission are laid down in articles 16 and 17, to which the remainder of this commentary is therefore devoted.

Commentary to article 16

(17) This article states the general principle that the formulation of reservations is permitted except in three cases. The first two are cases in which the reservation is expressly or impliedly prohibited by the treaty itself. The third case is where the treaty is silent in regard to reservation but the particular reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The article, in short, adopts the Court's criterion as a general rule governing the formulation of reservations not provided for in the treaty. The legal position when a reservation is one expressly or impliedly prohibited in unambiguous terms under paragraphs (a) or (b) of the article is clear. The admissibility or otherwise of a reservation under paragraph (c), on the other hand, is in every case of very much a matter of the appreciation of the acceptability of the reservation by the other contracting States; and this paragraph has, therefore, to be read in close conjunction with the provisions of article 17 regarding acceptance of and objection to reservations.

Commentary to article 17

(18) Paragraph 1 of this article covers cases where a reservation is expressly or impliedly authorized by the treaty; in other words, where the consent of the other contracting States has been given in the treaty. No further acceptance of the reservation by them is therefore required.

(19) Paragraph 2, as foreshadowed in paragraph (14) of this commentary, makes a certain distinction between treaties concluded between a large group of States and treaties concluded between a limited number for the purpose of the application of the "flexible" system of reservations to multilateral treaties. The 1962 text simply excepted from that system "a treaty which has been concluded between a small group of States". Governments in their comments questioned whether the expression "a small group of States" was precise enough to furnish by itself a sufficient criterion of the cases excepted from the general rules of the flexible system. The Commission therefore re-examined the point and concluded that, while the limited number of the negotiating States is an important element in the criterion, the decisive point is their intention that the treaty should be applied in its entirety between all the parties. Accordingly, the rule now proposed by the Commission provides that acceptance of a reservation by all the parties is necessary "when it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of the treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty".

(20) Paragraph 3 lays down a special rule also in the case of a treaty which is a constituent instrument of an international organization and states that the reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of the organization unless the treaty otherwise provides. The question has arisen a number of times, and the Secretary-General's report in 1959 in regard to his handling of an alleged "reservation" to the IMCO Convention stated that it had "invariably been treated as one for reference to the body having authority to interpret the Convention in question".80 The Commission considers that in the case of instruments which form the constitutions of international organizations, the integrity of the instrument is a consideration which outweighs other considerations and that it must be for the members of the organization, acting through its competent organ, to determine how far any relaxation of the integrity of the instrument is acceptable. The Commission noted that the question would be partially covered by the general provision now included in article 4 regarding the rules of international organizations. But it considered the retention of the present paragraph to be desirable to provide a rule in cases where the rules of the international organization contain no provision touching the question.

(21) Paragraph 4 contains the three basic rules of the "flexible" system which are to govern the position of the contracting States in regard to reservations to any multilateral treaties not covered by the preceding paragraphs. Sub-paragraph (a) provides that acceptance of a reservation by another contracting State constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that State if or when the treaty is in force. Sub-paragraph (b), on the other hand, states that a contracting State's objection precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States, unless a contrary intention is expressed by the objecting State. Although an objection to a reservation normally indicates a refusal to enter into treaty relations on the basis of the reservation, objections are sometimes made to reservations for reasons of principle or policy without the intention of precluding the entry into force of the treaty between the objecting and reserving States. Sub-paragraph (c) then provides that an act expressing the consent of a State to be bound and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation. This provision is important since it determines the moment at which a reserving State may be considered as a State which has ratified, accepted or otherwise become bound by the treaty.

(22) The rules in paragraph 4 establish a relative system of participation in a treaty, which envisages the possibility of every party to a multilateral treaty not being bound by the treaty vis-à-vis every other party. They have the result that a reserving State may be a party to the treaty vis-à-vis State X, but not vis-à-vis State Y, although States X and Y are themselves mutually bound. But in the case of a treaty drawn up between a large number

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of States, the Commission considered this to be preferable to allowing State Y by its objection to prevent the treaty from coming into force between the reserving State and State X which accepted the reservation.

(23) Paragraph 5 completes the rules regarding acceptance of and objection to reservations by proposing that for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 (i.e. for cases where the reservation is not expressly or impliedly authorized and is not a reservation to a constituent instrument of an international organization), absence of objection should under certain conditions be considered as constituting a tacit acceptance of it. The paragraph lays down that a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date in which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later. That the principle of implying consent to a reservation from absence of objection has been admitted into State practice cannot be doubted; for the Court itself in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case spoke of “very great allowance” being made in international practice for “tacit assent to reservations”. Moreover, a rule specifically stating that consent will be presumed after a period of three, or in some cases six, months is to be found in some modern conventions; 81 while other conventions achieve the same result by limiting the right of objection to a period of three months. 82 Again, in 1959, the Inter-American Council of Jurists 83 recommended that, if no reply had been received from a State to which a reservation had been communicated, it should be presumed after one year that the State concerned had no objection to the reservation.

Article 18. 84 Procedure regarding reservations

1. A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation, and an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing and communicated to the other States entitled to become parties to the treaty.

2. If formulated on the occasion of the adoption of the text or upon signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation.

3. An objection to the reservation made previously to its confirmation does not itself require confirmation.

Commentary

1. This article reproduces, in a considerably revised and shortened form, procedural provisions regarding formulating, accepting and objecting to reservations which were formerly included in articles 18 and 19 of the 1962 draft.

2. Paragraph 1 merely provides that a reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation and an objection to a reservation must be in writing and communicated to the other States entitled to become parties. In the case of acceptance the rule is limited to express acceptance, because tacit consent to a reservation plays a large role in the acceptance of reservations, as is specifically recognized in paragraph 5 of the previous article.

3. Statements of reservations are made in practice at various stages in the conclusion of a treaty. Thus, a reservation is not infrequently expressed during the negotiations and recorded in the minutes. Such embryo reservations have sometimes been relied upon afterwards as amounting to formal reservations. The Commission, however, considered it essential that the State concerned should formally reiterate the statement when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty in order that it should make its intention to formulate the reservation clear and definitive. Accordingly, a statement during the negotiations expressing a reservation is not, as such, recognized in article 16 as a method of formulating a reservation and equally receives no mention in the present article.

4. Paragraph 2 concerns reservations made at a later stage: on the occasion of the adoption of the text or upon signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Here again the Commission considered it essential that, when definitely committing itself to be bound, the State should leave no doubt as to its final standpoint in regard to the reservation. The paragraph accordingly requires the State formally to confirm the reservation if it desires to maintain it. At the same time, it provides that in these cases the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation, a point which is of importance for the operation of paragraph 5 of article 17.

5. On the other hand, the Commission did not consider that an objection to a reservation made previously to the latter’s confirmation would need to be reiterated after that event; and paragraph 3 therefore makes it clear that the objection need not be confirmed in such a case.

Article 19. 85 Legal effects of reservations

1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 16, 17 and 18:

(a) Modifies for the reserving State the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and

(b) Modifies those provisions to the same extent for such other party in its relations with the reserving State.

81 E.g., International Convention to Facilitate the Importation of Commercial Samples and Advertising Material, 1952 (90 days); and International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, 1929 (6 months).
82 E.g., Conventions on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons, 1950, and on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957 (both 90 days).
84 1962 draft, articles 18 and 19, and 1965 draft, article 20.
85 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 21.
2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty \textit{inter se}.

3. When a State objecting to a reservation agrees to consider the treaty as in force between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article set out the rules concerning the legal effects of a reservation which has been established under the provisions of articles 16, 17 and 18, assuming that the treaty is in force. These rules, which appear not to be questioned, follow directly from the consensual basis of the relations between parties to a treaty. A reservation operates reciprocally between the reserving State and any other party, so that it modifies the treaty for both of them in their mutual relations to the extent of the reserved provisions. But it does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties, \textit{inter se}, since they have not accepted it as a term of the treaty in their mutual relations.

(2) Paragraph 3 of the article covers the special case, contemplated in article 17, paragraph 4(b), where a State in objecting to a reservation nevertheless states that it agrees to the treaty’s coming into force between it and the reserving State. The Commission concurred with the view expressed in the comments of certain Governments that it is desirable, for the sake of completeness, to cover this possibility and that in such cases the provisions to which the reservation relates should not apply in the relations between the two States to the extent of the reservation. Such is the rule prescribed in the paragraph.

\textbf{Article 20.} 86 Withdrawal of reservations

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for its withdrawal.

2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal becomes operative only when notice of it has been received by the other contracting States.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) It has sometimes been maintained that when a reservation has been accepted by another State it may not be withdrawn without the latter’s consent, as the acceptance of the reservation establishes a relation between the two States which cannot be changed without the agreement of both. The Commission, however, considered that the preferable rule is that unless the treaty otherwise provides, the reserving State should always be free to bring its position into full conformity with the provisions of the treaty as adopted by withdrawing its reservation. The parties to a treaty, in its view, ought to be presumed to wish a reserving State to abandon its reservation, unless a restriction on the withdrawal of reservations has been inserted in the treaty. Paragraph 1 of the article accordingly so states the general rule.

(2) Since a reservation is a derogation from the provisions of the treaty made at the instance of the reserving State, the Commission considered that the onus should lie upon that State to bring the withdrawal to the notice of the other States; and that the latter could not be responsible for any breach of a term of the treaty, to which the reservation relates, committed in ignorance of the withdrawal of the reservation. Paragraph 2 therefore provides that unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, a withdrawal of a reservation becomes operative only when notice of it has been received by the other contracting States. The Commission appreciated that, even when the other States had received notice of the withdrawal of the reservation, they might in certain types of treaty require a short period of time within which to adapt their internal law to the new situation resulting from it. It concluded, however, that it would be going too far to formulate this requirement as a general rule. since in many cases it would be desirable that the withdrawal of a reservation should operate at once. It felt that the matter should be left to be regulated by a specific provision in the treaty. It also considered that, even in the absence of such a provision, if a State required a short interval of time in which to bring its internal law into conformity with the situation resulting from the withdrawal of the reservation, good faith would debar the reserving State from complaining of the difficulty which its own reservation had occasioned.

\textbf{Section 3: Entry into force of treaties}

\textbf{Article 21.} 87 Entry into force

1. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the negotiating States may agree.

2. Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States.

3. When the consent of a State to be bound is established after a treaty has come into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on the date when its consent was established unless the treaty otherwise provides.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) The text of this article, as provisionally adopted in 1962, was a little more elaborate since it recognized that, where a treaty fixed a date by which instruments of ratification, acceptance, etc. were to be exchanged or deposited, or signatures were to take place, there would be a certain presumption that this was intended to be the date of the entry into force of the treaty. Thus if the treaty failed to specify the time of its entry into force, paragraph 2 of the 1962 text would have made the date fixed for ratifications, acceptances, approvals

86 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 22.

87 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 23.
or signatures become the date of entry into force, subject to any requirement in the treaty as to the number of such ratifications, etc. necessary to bring it into force. Although this paragraph did not meet with objection from Governments, the Commission decided at its seventeenth session that it should be omitted. It doubted whether the negotiating States would necessarily have intended in all cases that the date fixed for deposit of instruments of ratification, etc. or for attaching signatures should be the date of entry into force. Accordingly, it concluded that it might be going too far to convert the indication given by the fixing of such dates into a definite legal presumption.

(2) Paragraph 1 of the article specifies the basic rule that a treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the negotiating States may agree. The Commission noted that, if in a particular case the fixing of a date for the exchange or deposit of instruments or for signatures were to constitute a clear indication of the intended date of entry into force, the case would fall within the words "in such manner or upon such date as it may provide".

(3) Paragraph 2 states that failing any specific provision in the treaty or other agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as all the negotiating States have consented to be bound by the treaty. This was the only general presumption which the Commission considered justified by existing practice and should be stated in the article.

(4) Paragraph 3 lays down what is believed to be an undisputed rule, namely, that after a treaty has come into force, it enters into force for each new party on the date when its consent to be bound is established, unless the treaty otherwise provides. The phrase "enters into force for that State" is the one normally employed in this connexion in practice, and simply denotes the commencement of the participation of the State in the treaty which is already in force.

(5) In re-examining this article in conjunction with article 73 regarding notifications and communications the Commission noted that there is an increasing tendency, more especially in the case of multilateral treaties, to provide for a time-lag between the establishment of consent to be bound and the entry into force of the treaty. The Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, for example, provide for a thirty-day interval between these two stages of participation in a treaty. Having regard, however, to the great variety of treaties and of the circumstances in which they are concluded, the Commission concluded that it would be inappropriate to introduce de lege ferenda the concept of such a time-lag into the article as a general rule, and that it should be left to the negotiating States to insert it in the treaty as and when they deemed it necessary. The existing general rule, in its opinion, is undoubtedly that entry into force takes place at once upon the relevant consents having been established, unless the treaty otherwise provides.

**Commentary**

(1) This article recognizes a practice which occurs with some frequency to-day and requires notice in the draft articles. Owing to the urgency of the matters dealt with in the treaty or for other reasons the States concerned may specify in a treaty, which it is necessary for them to bring before their constitutional authorities for ratification or approval, that it shall come into force provisionally. Whether in these cases the treaty is to be considered as entering into force in virtue of the treaty or of a subsidiary agreement concluded between the States concerned in adopting the text may be a question. But there can be no doubt that such clauses have legal effect and bring the treaty into force on a provisional basis.

(2) An alternative procedure having the same effect is for the States concerned, without inserting such a clause in the treaty, to enter into an agreement in a separate protocol or exchange of letters, or in some other manner, to bring the treaty into force provisionally. Paragraph 1 of the article provides for these two contingencies.

(3) No less frequent to-day is the practice of bringing into force provisionally only a certain part of a treaty in order to meet the immediate needs of the situation or to prepare the way for the entry into force of the whole treaty a little later. What has been said above of the entry into force of the whole treaty also holds good in these cases. Accordingly, paragraph 2 of the article simply applies the same rule to the entry into force provisionally of part of a treaty.

(4) The text of the article, as provisionally adopted in 1962, contained a provision regarding the termination of the application of a treaty which has been brought into force provisionally. On re-examining the article and in the light of the comments of Governments, however, the Commission decided to dispense with the provision and to leave the point to be determined by the agreement of the parties and the operation of the rules regarding termination of treaties.

**Part III.—Observance, application and interpretation of treaties**

**Section 1: Observance of treaties**

**Article 23.** *Pacta sunt servanda*

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

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88 E.g., in the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.

89 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 24.

90 1964 draft, article 55.
Commentary

(1) *Pacta sunt servanda*—the rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in good faith—is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties. Its importance is underlined by the fact that it is enshrined in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. As to the Charter itself, paragraph 2 of Article 2 expressly provides that Members are to “fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter”.

(2) There is much authority in the jurisprudence of international tribunals for the proposition that in the present context the principle of good faith is a legal principle which forms an integral part of the rule *pacta sunt servanda*. Thus, speaking of certain valuations to be made under articles 95 and 96 of the Act of Algeciras, the Court said in the *Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco* (Judgment of 27 August 1954)3:

> “The power of making the valuation rests with the Customs authorities, but it is a power which must be exercised reasonably and in good faith”. Similarly, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in applying treaty clauses prohibiting discrimination against minorities, insisted in a number of cases,92 that the clauses must be so applied as to ensure the absence of discrimination in fact as well as in law; in other words, the obligation must not be evaded by a merely literal application of the clauses. Numerous precedents could also be found in the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals. To give only one example, in the *North Atlantic Coast Fisheries* arbitration the Tribunal dealing with Great Britain’s right to regulate fisheries in Canadian waters in which she had granted certain fishing rights to United States nationals by the Treaty of Ghent, said:93

> “...from the Treaty results an obligatory relation whereby the right of Great Britain to exercise its right of sovereignty by making regulations is limited to such regulations as are made in good faith, and are not in violation of the Treaty”.

(3) Accordingly, the article provides that “A treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”. Some members hesitated to include the words “in force” as possibly lending themselves to interpretations which might weaken the clear statement of the rule. Other members, however, considered that the words give expression to an element which forms part of the rule and that, having regard to other provisions of the draft articles, it was necessary on logical grounds to include them. The Commission had adopted a number of articles which dealt with the entry into force of treaties, with cases of provisional entry into force of treaties, with certain obligations resting upon the contracting States prior to entry into force,

with the nullity of treaties and with their termination. Consequently, from a drafting point of view, it seemed necessary to specify that it is treaties in force in accordance with the provisions of the present articles to which the *pacta sunt servanda* rule applies. The words “in force” of course cover treaties in force provisionally under article 22 as well as treaties which enter into force definitively under article 21.

(4) Some members felt that there would be advantage in also stating that a party must abstain from acts calculated to frustrate the object and purpose of the treaty. The Commission, however, considered that this was clearly implicit in the obligation to perform the treaty in good faith and preferred to state the *pacta sunt servanda* rule in as simple a form as possible.

(5) The Commission considered whether this article containing the *pacta sunt servanda* rule should be placed in its present position in the draft articles or given special prominence by being inserted towards the beginning of the articles. Having regard to the introductory character of the provisions in part I and on logical grounds, it did not feel that the placing of the article towards the beginning would be appropriate. On the other hand, it was strongly of the opinion that a means should be found in the ultimate text of any convention on the law of treaties that may result from its work to emphasize the fundamental nature of the obligation to perform treaties *in good faith*. The motif of good faith, it is true, applies throughout international relations; but it has a particular importance in the law of treaties and is indeed reiterated in article 27 in the context of the interpretation of treaties. The Commission desired to suggest that the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* might suitably be given stress in the preamble to the convention just as it is already stressed in the Preamble to the Charter.

Section 2: Application of treaties

**Article 24.** Non-retroactivity of treaties

Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.

Commentary

(1) There is nothing to prevent the parties from giving a treaty, or some of its provisions, retroactive effects if they think fit. It is essentially a question of their intention. The general rule, however, is that a treaty is not to be regarded as intended to have retroactive effects unless such an intention is expressed in the treaty or is clearly to be implied from its terms. This rule was endorsed and acted upon by the International Court of Justice in the *Ambartsumian* case (Preliminary Objection),95 where the Greek Government contended that under a treaty of 1926 it was entitled to present a claim based on acts which had taken place in 1922 and 1923.

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4 *E.g.* *Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory*, P.C.I.J. (1932), Series A/B, No. 44, p. 28; *Minority Schools in Albania*, P.C.I.J. (1935), Series A/B, No. 64, pp. 19 and 20.

5 (1910) *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*, vol. XI, p. 188. The Tribunal also referred expressly to “the principle of international law that treaty obligations are to be executed in perfect good faith”.

Recognizing that its argument ran counter to the general principle that a treaty does not have retroactive effects, that Government sought to justify its contention as a special case by arguing that during the years 1922 and 1923 an earlier treaty of 1886 had been in force between the parties containing provisions similar to those of the 1926 treaty. This argument was rejected by the Court, which said:

"To accept this theory would mean giving retroactive effect to Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926, whereas Article 32 of this Treaty states that the Treaty, which must mean all the provisions of the Treaty, shall come into force immediately upon ratification. Such a conclusion might have been rebutted if there had been any special clause or any special object necessitating retroactive interpretation. There is no such clause or object in the present case. It is therefore impossible to hold that any of its provisions must be deemed to have been in force earlier".

A good example of a treaty having such a "special clause" or "special object" necessitating retroactive interpretation is to be found in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case. The United Kingdom contested the Court’s jurisdiction on the ground, inter alia, that the acts complained of had taken place before Protocol XII to the Treaty of Lausanne had come into force, but the Court said:

"Protocol XII was drawn up in order to fix the conditions governing the recognition and treatment by the contracting Parties of certain concessions granted by the Ottoman authorities before the conclusion of the Protocol. An essential characteristic therefore of Protocol XII is that its effects extend to legal situations dating from a time previous to its own existence. If provision were not made in the clauses of the Protocol for the protection of the rights recognized therein as against infringements before the coming into force of that instrument, the Protocol would be ineffective as regards the very period at which the rights in question are most in need of protection. The Court therefore considers that the Protocol guarantees the rights recognized in it against any violation regardless of the date at which it may have taken place."

(2) The question has come under consideration in international tribunals in connexion with jurisdictional clauses providing for the submission to an international tribunal of "disputes", or specified categories of "disputes", between the parties. The Permanent Court said in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case:

"The Court is of opinion that, in cases of doubt, jurisdiction based on an international agreement embraces all disputes referred to it after its establishment.... The reservation made in many arbitration treaties regarding disputes arising out of events previous to the conclusion of the treaty seems to prove the necessity for an explicit limitation of jurisdiction and, consequently, the correctness of the rule of interpretation enunciated above." 97

This is not to give retroactive effect to the agreement because, by using the word "disputes" without any qualification, the parties are to be understood as accepting jurisdiction with respect to all disputes existing after the entry into force of the agreement. On the other hand, when a jurisdictional clause is attached to the substantive clauses of a treaty as a means of securing their due application, the non-retroactivity principle may operate to limit ratione temporis the application of the jurisdictional clause. Thus in numerous cases under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Commission of Human Rights has held that it is incompetent to entertain complaints regarding alleged violations of human rights said to have occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention with respect to the State in question. 88

(3) If, however, an act or fact or situation which took place or arose prior to the entry into force of a treaty continues to occur or exist after the treaty has come into force, it will be caught by the provisions of the treaty. The non-retroactivity principle cannot be infringed by applying a treaty to matters that occur or exist when the treaty is in force, even if they first began at an earlier date. Thus, while the European Commission of Human Rights has not considered itself competent to inquire into the propriety of legislative, administrative or judicial acts completed and made final before the entry into force of the European Convention, it has assumed jurisdiction where there were fresh proceedings or recurring applications of those acts after the Convention was in force. 89

(4) The article accordingly states that unless it otherwise appears from the treaty, its provisions do not apply to a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party. In other words, the treaty will not apply to acts or facts which are completed or to situations which have ceased to exist before the treaty comes into force. The general phrase "unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established" is used in preference to "unless the treaty otherwise provides" in order to allow for cases where the very nature of the

97 P.C.J. (1924) Series A, No. 2, p. 34.
treaty rather than its specific provisions indicates that it is intended to have certain retroactive effects.

(5) The Commission re-examined the question whether it was necessary to state any rule concerning the application of a treaty with respect to acts, facts or situations which take place or exist after the treaty has ceased to be in force. Clearly, the treaty continues to have certain effects for the purpose of determining the legal position in regard to any act or fact which took place or any situation which was created in application of the treaty while it was in force. The Commission, however, concluded that this question really belonged to and was covered by the provisions of articles 66 and 67, paragraph 2, dealing with the consequences of the termination of a treaty. Accordingly, it decided to confine the present article to the principle of the non-retroactivity of treaties.

Article 25. Application of treaties to territory

Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, the application of a treaty extends to the entire territory of each party.

Commentary

(1) Certain types of treaty, by reason of their subject-matter, are hardly susceptible of territorial application in the ordinary sense. Most treaties, however, have application to territory and a question may arise as to what is their precise scope territorially. In some cases the provisions of the treaty expressly relate to a particular territory or area, for example the Treaty of 21 October 1920 recognizing the sovereignty of Norway over Spitzbergen and the Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959. In other cases, the terms of the treaty indicate that it relates to particular areas. Certain United Kingdom treaties dealing with domestic matters are expressly limited to Great Britain and Northern Ireland and do not relate to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. Again, States whose territory includes a free zone may find it necessary to except this zone from the scope of a commercial treaty. Another example is a boundary treaty which applies to particular areas and regulates problems arising from mixed populations, such as the languages used for official purposes. On the other hand, many treaties which are applicable territorially contain no indication of any restriction of their territorial scope, for example treaties of extradition or for the execution of judgments.

(2) The Commission considered that the territorial scope of a treaty depends on the intention of the parties and that it is only necessary in the present article to formulate the general rule which should apply in the absence of any specific provision or indication in the treaty as to its territorial application. State practice, the jurisprudence of international tribunals and the writings of jurists appear to support the view that a treaty is to be presumed to apply to all the territory of each party unless it otherwise appears from the treaty. Accordingly, it is this rule which is formulated in the present article.

(3) The term "the entire territory of each party" is a comprehensive term designed to embrace all the land and appurtenant territorial waters and air space which constitute the territory of the State. The Commission preferred this term to the term "all the territory or territories for which the parties are internationally responsible", which is found in some recent multilateral conventions. It desired to avoid the association of the latter term with the so-called "colonial clause". It held that its task in codifying the modern law of treaties should be confined to formulating the general rule regarding the application of a treaty to territory.

(4) One Government proposed that a second paragraph should be added to the article providing specifically that a State, which is composed of distinct autonomous parts, should have the right to declare to which of the constituent parts of the State a treaty is to apply. Under this proposal the declaration was not to be considered a reservation but a limitation of the consent to certain parts only of the State. The Commission was of the opinion that such a provision, however formulated, might raise as many problems as it would solve. It further considered that the words "unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established" in the text now proposed give the necessary flexibility to the rule to cover all legitimate requirements in regard to the application of treaties to territory.

(5) Certain Governments in their comments expressed the view that the article was defective in that it might be understood to mean that the application of a treaty is necessarily confined to the territory of the parties. They proposed that the article should be revised so as to make it deal also with the extra-territorial application of treaties. The Commission recognized that the title of the article, as provisionally adopted in 1964, might create the impression that the article was intended to cover the whole topic of the application of treaties from the point of view of space; and that the limited provision which it in fact contained might in consequence give rise to misunderstandings of the kind indicated by these Governments. On the other hand, it considered that the proposal to include a provision regarding the extra-territorial application of treaties would at once raise difficult problems in regard to the extra-territorial competence of States; and that the drafts suggested in the comments of Governments were unsatisfactory in this respect. The article was intended by the Commission to deal only
with the limited topic of the application of a treaty to the territory of the respective parties; and the Commission concluded that the preferable solution was to modify the title and the text of the article so as to make precise the limited nature of the rule. In its view, the law regarding the extra-territorial application of treaties could not be stated simply in terms of the intention of the parties or of a presumption as to their intention; and it considered that to attempt to deal with all the delicate problems of extra-territorial competence in the present article would be inappropriate and inadvisable.

(6) The point was raised in the Commission whether the territorial scope of a treaty may be affected by questions of State succession. The Commission, however, decided not to deal with this question and, as explained in paragraph (5) of the commentary to article 39, decided to reserve it in a general provision (article 69).

Article 26. Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter

1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.

2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as inconsistent with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.

3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 56, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.

4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:

(a) As between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;

(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party only to the earlier treaty, the earlier treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations;

(c) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party only to the later treaty, the later treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations.

5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 37, or to any question of the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 57 or to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty.

Commentary

(1) The rules set out in the text of this article provisionally adopted in 1964 were formulated in terms of the priority of application of treaties having incompatible provisions. On re-examining the article at the present session the Commission felt that, although the rules may have particular importance in cases of incompatibility, they should be stated more generally in terms of the application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter. One advantage of this formulation of the rules, it thought, would be that it would avoid any risk of paragraph 4(c) being interpreted as sanctioning the conclusion of a treaty incompatible with obligations undertaken towards another State under another treaty. Consequently, while the substance of the article remains the same as in the 1964 text, its wording has been revised in the manner indicated.

(2) Treaties not infrequently contain a clause intended to regulate the relation between the provisions of the treaty and those of another treaty or of any other treaty relating to the matters with which the treaty deals. Sometimes the clause concerns the relation of the treaty to a prior treaty, sometimes its relation to a future treaty and sometimes to any treaty past or future. Whatever the nature of the provision, the clause has necessarily to be taken into account in appreciating the priority of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter.

(3) Pre-eminent among such clauses is Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations which provides: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail". The precise effect of the provision in the relations between Members of the United Nations and non-member States may not be entirely clear. But the position of the Charter of the United Nations in modern international law is of such importance, and the States Members of the United Nations constitute so large a part of the international community, that it appeared to the Commission to be essential to give Article 103 of the Charter special mention and a special place in the present article. Therefore, without prejudging in any way the interpretation of Article 103 or its application by the competent organs of the United Nations, it decided to recognize the overriding character of Article 103 of the Charter with respect to any treaty obligations of Members. Paragraph 1 accordingly provides that the rules laid down in the present article for regulating the obligations of parties to successive treaties are subject to Article 103 of the Charter.

(4) Paragraph 2 concerns clauses inserted in other treaties for the purpose of determining the relation of their provisions to those of other treaties entered into by the contracting States. Some of these clauses do no more than confirm the general rules of priority contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article. Others, like paragraph 2 of article 73 of the Vienna Convention of 1963 on Consular Relations, 106 which recognizes the right to supplement its provisions by bilateral agreements, merely confirm the legitimacy of bilateral agreements which do not derogate from the obligations of the general Convention. Certain types of clause may, however, influence

the operation of the general rules, and therefore require special consideration. For example, a number of treaties contain a clause in which the parties declare either that the treaty is not incompatible with, or that it is not to affect, their obligations under another designated treaty. Many older treaties\textsuperscript{107} provided that nothing contained in them was to be regarded as imposing upon the parties obligations inconsistent with their obligations under the Covenant of the League; and to-day a similar clause giving pre-eminence to the Charter is found in certain treaties.\textsuperscript{108} Other examples are: article XVII of the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952,\textsuperscript{109} which disavows any intention to affect the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; article 30 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the High Seas and article 73 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, all of which disavow any intention of overriding existing treaties. Such clauses, in so far as they relate to existing treaties concluded by the contracting States with third States, merely confirm the general rule \textit{pacta tertii non nocent}. But they may go beyond that rule because in some cases not only do they affect the priority of the respective treaties as between States parties to both treaties, but they may also concern future treaties concluded by a contracting State with a third State. They appear in any case of incompatibility to give pre-eminence to the other treaty. Paragraph 2 accordingly lays down that, whenever a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or is not to be considered as inconsistent with, an earlier or a later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty should prevail.

(5) On the other hand, Article 103 apart, clauses in treaties which purport to give the treaty priority over another treaty, whether earlier or later in date, do not by themselves appear to alter the operation of the general rules of priority set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the article.

(6) One form of such clause looks only to the past, providing for the priority of the treaty over earlier treaties relating to the same subject-matter. This form of clause presents no difficulty when all the parties to the earlier treaty are also parties to the treaty which seeks to override it. As is pointed out in the commentary to article 56, the parties to the earlier treaty are always competent to abrogate it, whether in whole or in part, by concluding another treaty with that object. That being so, when they conclude a second treaty incompatible with the first, they are to be presumed to have intended to terminate the first treaty or to modify it to the extent of the incompatibility, unless there is evidence of a contrary intention. Accordingly, in these cases the inclusion of a clause in the second treaty expressly pro-

\textsuperscript{107} See e.g. article 16 of the Statute of 1921 on the Régime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern (League of Nations, \textit{Treaty Series}, vol. VII, p. 61); and article 4 of the Pan-American Treaty of 1936 on Good Offices and Mediation (League of Nations, \textit{Treaty Series}, vol. CLXXXVIII, p. 82).


\textsuperscript{111} \textit{American Journal of International Law}, vol. 57 (1963), p. 275.


(7) Another form of clause looks only to the future, and specifically requires the parties not to enter into any future agreement which would be inconsistent with its obligations under the treaty. Some treaties, like the Statute on the Régime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern\textsuperscript{111} contain both forms of clause; a few like the League Covenant (Article 20) and the United Nations Charter (Article 103), contain single clauses which look both to the past and the future. In these cases, the...
clause can be of no significance if all the parties to the earlier treaty are also parties to the later one, because when concluding the later treaty they are fully competent to abrogate or modify the earlier treaty which they themselves drew up. More difficult, however, and more important, is the effect of such a clause in cases where the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one. The clause in the earlier treaty may be so framed as to prohibit the parties from concluding with any State whatever a treaty conflicting with the earlier treaty; e.g. article 2 of the Nine-Power Pact of 1922 with respect to China. Or it may refer only to agreements with third States, as in the case of article 18 of the Statute on the Régime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern:

"Each of the contracting States undertakes not to grant, either by agreement or in any other way, to a non-contracting State treatment with regard to navigation over a navigable waterway of international concern which, as between Contracting States, would be contrary to the provisions of this Statute." 113

Or, again, the aim of the clause may be to prohibit the contracting States from entering into agreement *inter se* which would derogate from their general obligations under a convention. 114 These clauses do not appear to modify the application of the normal rules for resolving conflicts between incompatible treaties. Some obligations contained in treaties are in the nature of things intended to apply generally to all the parties all the time. An obvious example is the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and a subsequent agreement entered into by any individual party contracting out of its obligations under that Treaty would manifestly be incompatible with the Treaty. Other obligations may be of a purely reciprocal kind, so that a bilateral treaty modifying the application of the convention *inter se* the contracting States is compatible with its provisions. Even then the parties may in particular cases decide to establish a single compulsive regime for matters susceptible of being dealt with on a reciprocal basis, e.g. copyright or the protection of industrial property. The chief legal relevance of a clause asserting the priority of a particular treaty over other treaties requires to be dealt with specially in the article except Article 103 of the Charter. It considered that the real issue, which does not depend on the presence or absence of such a clause, is whether the conclusion of a treaty providing for obligations of an "interdependent" or "integral" character 117 affects the actual capacity of each party unilaterally to enter into a later treaty derogating from those obligations or leaves the matter as one of international responsibility for breach of the treaty. This issue arises in connexion with the rule in paragraph 4(c) of the article and is dealt with in paragraphs (12) and (13) below.

(9) Paragraph 3 states the general rule for cases where all the parties to a treaty (whether without or with additional States) conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter. The paragraph has to be read in conjunction with article 56 which provides that in such cases the earlier treaty is to be considered as terminated if (a) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should thenceforth be governed by the later treaty, or (b) the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time. The second paragraph of that article provides, however, that the treaty is only to be considered as suspended if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that such was the intention. The present article applies only when both treaties are in force and in operation; in other words, when the termination or suspension of the operation of the treaty has not occurred under article 56. Paragraph 3, in conformity with the general rule that a later expression of intention is to be presumed to prevail over an earlier one, then states that "the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty".

(10) Paragraph 4 deals with the more complex problem of the cases where some, but not all, of the parties to the earlier treaty are parties to a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter. In such cases the rule in article 30 precludes the parties to the later treaty from depriving the other parties to the earlier treaty of their rights under that treaty without their consent. Accordingly, apart from

114 League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXXVIII, p. 281: "The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers which would infringe or impair the principles stated in article 1."


117 A treaty containing "interdependent type" obligations as defined by a previous Special Rapporteur (Sir G. Fitzmaurice, third report in the *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1958, vol. II, article 19 and commentary) is one where the obligations of each party are only meaningful in the context of the corresponding obligations of every other party, so that the violation of its obligations by one party prejudices the treaty regime applicable between them all and not merely the relations between the defaulting State and the other parties. Examples given by him were treaties of disarmament, treaties prohibiting the use of particular weapons, treaties requiring abstention from fishing in certain areas or during certain seasons, etc. A treaty containing "integral type" obligations was defined by the same Special Rapporteur as one where "the force of the obligation is self-existent, absolute and inherent for each party and not dependent on a corresponding performance by the others". The examples given by him were the Genocide Convention, Human Rights Conventions, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on prisoners of war, etc., International Labour Conventions and treaties imposing an obligation to maintain a certain régime or system in a given area, such as the régime of the Sounds and the Belts at the entrance to the Baltic Sea.
the question whether the case of an earlier treaty containing obligations of an “interdependent” or “integral” character should be subject to a special rule, the rules generally applicable in such cases appeared to the Commission to work out automatically as follows:

(a) As between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;

(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party only to the earlier treaty, the earlier treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations;

(c) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party only to the later treaty, the later treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations.

The rules contained in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) are, again, no more than an application of the general principle that a later expression of intention is to be presumed to prevail over an earlier one; and sub-paragraph (b) is no more than a particular application of the rule in article 30. These rules, the Commission noted, are the rules applied in cases of amendment of a multilateral treaty, as in the case of the United Nations protocols for amending League of Nations treaties, when not all the parties to the treaty become parties to the amending agreement.

(11) The rules in paragraph 4 determine the mutual rights and obligations of the particular parties in each situation merely as between themselves. They do not relieve any party to a treaty of any international responsibilities it may incur by concluding or by applying a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty. If the conclusion or application of the treaty constitutes an infringement of the rights of parties to another treaty, all the normal consequences of the breach of a treaty follow with respect to that other treaty. The injured party may invoke its right to terminate or suspend the operation of the treaty under article 57 and it may equally invoke the international responsibility of the party which has infringed its rights. Paragraph 5 accordingly makes an express reservation with respect to both these matters. At the same time, it makes a reservation with respect to the provisions of article 37 concerning inter se modification of multilateral treaties. Those provisions lay down the conditions under which an agreement may be made to modify the operation of a multilateral treaty as between some of its parties only, and nothing in paragraph 4 of the present article is to be understood as setting aside those provisions.

(12) The Commission re-examined, in the light of the comments of Governments, the problem whether an earlier treaty which contains obligations of an “interdependent” or “integral” type should constitute a special case in which a later treaty incompatible with it should be considered as void, at any rate if all the parties to the later treaty were aware that they were infringing the rights of other States under the earlier treaty. An analogous aspect of this problem was submitted to the Commission by the Special Rapporteur in his second report, the relevant passages from which were reproduced, for purposes of information, in paragraph (14) of the Commission’s commentary to the present article contained in its report on the work of its sixteenth session. Without adopting any position on the detailed considerations advanced by the Special Rapporteur, the Commission desired in the present commentary to draw attention to his analysis of certain aspects of the problem.

(13) Certain members of the Commission were inclined to favour the idea of a special rule in the case of an earlier treaty containing obligations of an “interdependent” or “integral” character, at any rate if the parties to the later treaty were all aware of its incompatibility with the earlier one. The Commission, however, noted that under the existing law the question appeared to be left as a matter of international responsibility if a party to a treaty of such a type afterwards concluded another treaty derogating from it. The Commission also noted that obligations of an “interdependent” or “integral” character may vary widely in importance. Some, although important in their own spheres, may deal with essentially technical matters; others may deal with vital matters, such as the maintenance of peace, nuclear tests or human rights. It pointed out that in some cases the obligations, by reason of their subject-matter, might be of a jus cogens character and the case fall within the provisions of articles 50 and 61. But the Commission felt that it should in other cases leave the question as one of international responsibility. At the same time, as previously mentioned, in order to remove any impression that paragraph 4(c) justifies the conclusion of the later treaty, the Commission decided to reorient the formulation of the article so as to make it refer to the priority of successive treaties dealing with the same subject-matter rather than of treaties having incompatible provisions. The conclusion of the later treaty may, of course, be perfectly legitimate if it is only a development of or addition to the earlier treaty.

Section 3: Interpretation of treaties

Article 27. General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.


121 1964 draft, article 69.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
   (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty;
   (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the understanding of the parties regarding its interpretation;
   (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 128

Article 28. 123 Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 27, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 27:
   (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
   (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

Commentary

Introduction

(1) The utility and even the existence of rules of international law governing the interpretation of treaties are sometimes questioned. The first two of the Commission’s Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties in their private writings also expressed doubts as to the existence in international law of any general rules for the interpretation of treaties. Other jurists, although they express reservations as to the obligatory character of certain of the so-called canons of interpretation, show less hesitance in recognizing the existence of some general rules for the interpretation of treaties. Sir G. Fitzmaurice, the previous Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, in his private writings deduced six principles from the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court and the International Court which he regarded as the major principles of interpretation. In 1956, the Institute of International Law 124 adopted a resolution in which it formulated, if in somewhat cautious language, two articles containing a small number of basic principles of interpretation.

(2) Jurists also differ to some extent in their basic approach to the interpretation of treaties according to the relative weight which they give to:
   (a) The text of the treaty as the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties;
   (b) The intentions of the parties as a subjective element distinct from the text; and
   (c) The declared or apparent objects and purposes of the treaty.

Some place the main emphasis on the intentions of the parties and in consequence admit a liberal recourse to the travaux préparatoires and to other evidence of the intentions of the contracting States as means of interpretation. Some give great weight to the object and purpose of the treaty and are in consequence more ready, especially in the case of general multilateral treaties, to admit teleological interpretations of the text which go beyond, or even diverge from, the original intentions of the parties as expressed in the text. The majority, however, emphasizes the primacy of the text as the basis for the interpretation of a treaty, while at the same time giving a certain place to extrinsic evidence of the intentions of the parties and of the objects and purposes of the treaty as means of interpretation. It is this view which is reflected in the 1956 resolution of the Institute of International Law mentioned in the previous paragraph.

(3) Most cases submitted to international adjudication involve the interpretation of treaties, and the jurisprudence of international tribunals is rich in reference to principles and maxims of interpretation. In fact, statements can be found in the decisions of international tribunals to support the use of almost every principle or maxim of which use is made in national systems of law in the interpretation of statutes and contracts. Treaty interpretation is, of course, equally part of the everyday work of Foreign Ministries.

(4) Thus, it would be possible to find sufficient evidence of recourse to principles and maxims in international practice to justify their inclusion in a codification of the law of treaties, if the question were simply one of their relevance on the international plane. But the question raised by jurists is rather as to the non-obligatory character of many of these principles and maxims. They are, for the most part, principles of logic and good sense valuable only as guides to assist in appreciating the meaning which the parties may have intended to attach to the expressions that they employed in a document. Their suitability for use in any given case hinges on a variety of considerations which have first to be appreciated by the interpreter of the document; the particular arrangement of the words and sentences, their relation to each other and to other parts of the document, the general nature and subject-matter of the document, the circumstances in which it was drawn up, etc. Even when a possible occasion for their application may appear to exist, their application is not automatic but depends on the conviction of the interpreter that it is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words, recourse to many of these principles is discretionary rather than obligatory and the interpretation of documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science.

(5) Any attempt to codify the conditions of the application of those principles of interpretation whose appropriateness in any given case depends on the particular context and on a subjective appreciation of varying circumstances would clearly be inadvisable. Accordingly the Commission confined itself to trying to isolate and codify the comparatively few general principles which appear to constitute general rules for the inter-
pretation of treaties. Admittedly, the task of formulating even these rules is not easy, but the Commission considered that there were cogent reasons why it should be attempted. First, the interpretation of treaties in good faith and according to law is essential if the *paeta sunt servanda* rule is to have any real meaning. Secondly, having regard to the divergent opinions concerning methods of interpretation, it seemed desirable that the Commission should take a clear position in regard to the role of the text in treaty interpretation. Thirdly, a number of articles adopted by the Commission contain clauses which distinguish between matters expressly provided in the treaty and matters to be implied in it by reference to the intention of the parties; and clearly, the operation of such clauses can be fully appreciated and determined only in the light of the means of interpretation admissible for ascertaining the intention of the parties. In addition the establishment of some measure of agreement in regard to the basic rules of interpretation is important not only for the application but also for the drafting of treaties.

(6) Some jurists in their exposition of the principles of treaty interpretation distinguish between law-making and other treaties, and it is true that the character of a treaty may affect the question whether the application of a particular principle, maxim or method of interpretation is suitable in a particular case (e.g. the *contra proferentem* principle or the use of *travaux préparatoires*). But for the purpose of formulating the general rules of interpretation the Commission did not consider it necessary to make such a distinction. Nor did it consider that the principle expressed in the maxim *ut res magis valeat quam pereat* should not be included as one of the general rules. It recognized that in certain circumstances recourse to the principle may be appropriate and that it has sometimes been invoked by the International Court. In the *Corfu Channel* case, it considered that the principle expressed in the maxim *ut res magis valeat quam pereat* should not be included as one of the general rules. It recognized that in certain circumstances recourse to the principle may be appropriate and that it has sometimes been invoked by the International Court. In the *Corfu Channel* case, for example, in interpreting a Special Agreement the Court said:

"It would indeed be incompatible with the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring in a Special Agreement should be devoid of purport or effect."

And it referred to a previous decision of the Permanent Court to the same effect in the *Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex* case. The Commission, however, took the view that, in so far as the maxim *ut res magis valeat quam pereat* reflects a true general rule of interpretation, it is embodied in article 27, paragraph 1, which requires that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose. When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted. Properly limited and applied, the maxim does not call for an "extensive" or "liberal" interpretation in the sense of an interpretation going beyond what is expressed or necessarily to be implied in the terms of the treaty. Accordingly, it did not seem to the Commission that there was any need to include a separate provision on this point. Moreover, to do so might encourage attempts to extend the meaning of treaties illegitimately on the basis of the so-called principle of "effective interpretation". The Court, which has by no means adopted a narrow view of the extent to which it is proper to imply terms in treaties, has nevertheless insisted that there are definite limits to the use which may be made of the principle *ut res magis valeat* for this purpose. In the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* Advisory Opinion it said:

"The principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*, often referred to as the rule of effectiveness, cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions for the settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which... would be contrary to their letter and spirit."

And it emphasized that to adopt an interpretation which ran counter to the clear meaning of the terms would not be to interpret but to revise the treaty.

(7) At its session in 1964 the Commission provisionally adopted three articles (69-71) dealing generally with the interpretation of treaties, and two articles dealing with treaties having plurilingual texts. The Commission's attempt to isolate and codify the basic rules of interpretation was generally approved by Governments in their comments and the rules contained in its draft appeared largely to be endorsed by them. However, in the light of the comments of Governments and as part of its normal process of tightening and streamlining the draft, the Commission has reduced these five articles to three by incorporating the then article 71 (terms having a special meaning) in the then article 69 (general rule of interpretation), and by amalgamating the then articles 72 and 73 (plurilingual treaties) into a single article. Apart from these changes the rules now proposed by the Commission do not differ materially in their general structure and substance from those transmitted to Governments in 1964.

(8) Having regard to certain observations in the comments of Governments the Commission considered it desirable to underline its concept of the relation between the various elements of interpretation in article 27 and the relation between these elements and those in article 28. Those observations appeared to indicate a possible fear that the successive paragraphs of article 27 might be taken as laying down a hierarchical order for the application of the various elements of interpretation in the article. The Commission, by headning the article "General rule of interpretation" in the singular and by underlining the connexion between paragraphs 1 and 2 and again between paragraph 3 and the two previous paragraphs, intended to indicate that the application of the means of interpretation in the article would be a single combined operation. All the various elements, as they were present

in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation. Thus, article 27 is entitled "General rule of interpretation" in the singular, not "General rules" in the plural, because the Commission desired to emphasize that the process of interpretation is a unity and that the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule. In the same way the word "context" in the opening phrase of paragraph 2 is designed to link all the elements of interpretation mentioned in this paragraph to the word "context" in the first paragraph and thereby incorporate them in the provision contained in that paragraph. Equally, the opening phrase of paragraph 3 "There shall be taken into account together with the context" is designed to incorporate in paragraph 1 the elements of interpretation set out in paragraph 3. If the provision in paragraph 4 (article 71 of the 1964 draft) is of a different character, the word “special” serves to indicate its relation to the rule in paragraph 1.

(9) The Commission re-examined the structure of article 27 in the light of the comments of Governments and considered other possible alternatives. It concluded, however, that subject to transferring the provision regarding rules of international law from paragraph 1 to paragraph 3 and adding the former article 71 as paragraph 4, the general structure of the article, as provisionally adopted in 1964, should be retained. It considered that the article, when read as a whole, cannot properly be regarded as laying down a legal hierarchy of norms for the interpretation of treaties. The elements of interpretation in the article have in the nature of things to be arranged in some order. But it was considerations of logic, not any obligatory legal hierarchy, which guided the Commission in arriving at the arrangement proposed in the article. Once it is established—and on this point the Commission was unanimous—that the starting point of interpretation is the meaning of the text, logic indicates that "the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose" should be the first element to be mentioned. Similarly, logic suggests that the elements comprised in the "context" should be the next to be mentioned since they form part of or are intimately related to the text. Again, it is only logic which suggests that the elements in paragraph 3—a subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation, subsequent practice establishing the understanding of the parties regarding the interpretation and relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties—should follow and not precede the elements in the previous paragraphs. The logical consideration which suggests this is that these elements are extrinsic to the text. But these three elements are all of an obligatory character and by their very nature could not be considered to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to those which precede them.

(10) The Commission also re-examined in the light of the comments of Governments the relation between the further (supplementary) means of interpretation mentioned in former article 70 and those contained in former article 69, giving special attention to the role of preparatory work as an element of interpretation. Although a few Governments indicated a preference for allowing a larger role to preparatory work and even for including it in the present article, the majority appeared to be in agreement with the Commission's treatment of the matter. Certain members of the Commission also favored a system which would give a more automatic role to preparatory work and other supplementary means in the process of interpretation. But the Commission considered that the relationship established between the "supplementary" elements of interpretation in present article 28 and those in present article 27—which accords with the jurisprudence of the International Court on the matter—should be retained. The elements of interpretation in article 27 all relate to the agreement between the parties at the time when or after it received authentic expression in the text. Ex hypothesi this is not the case with preparatory work which does not, in consequence, have the same authentic character as an element of interpretation, however valuable it may sometimes be in throwing light on the expression of the agreement in the text. Moreover, it is beyond question that the records of treaty negotiations are in many cases incomplete or misleading, so that considerable discretion has to be exercised in determining their value as an element of interpretation. Accordingly, the Commission was of the opinion that the distinction made in articles 27 and 28 between authentic and supplementary means of interpretation is both justified and desirable. At the same time, it pointed out that the provisions of article 28 by no means have the effect of drawing a rigid line between the "supplementary" means of interpretation and the means included in article 27. The fact that article 28 admits recourse to the supplementary means for the purpose of "confirming" the meaning resulting from the application of article 27 establishes a general link between the two articles and maintains the unity of the process of interpretation.

Commentary to article 27

(11) The article as already indicated is based on the view that the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and that, in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties. The Institute of International Law adopted this—the textual—approach to treaty interpretation. The objections to giving too large a place to the intentions of the parties as an independent basis of interpretation find expression in the proceedings of the Institute. The textual approach, on the other hand, commends itself by the fact that, as one authority has put it, "le texte signé est, sauf de rares exceptions, la seule et la plus récente expression de la volonté commune des parties". Moreover, the jurisprudence of the International Court contains many pronouncements from which it is permissible to conclude that the textual approach to treaty interpretation is regarded by it as established law. In particular, the Court has more than once stressed that it is not the function of inter-

interpretation to revise treaties or to read into them what they do not, expressly or by implication, contain.\textsuperscript{120}

(12) Paragraph 1 contains three separate principles. The first—interpretation in good faith—flows directly from the rule \textit{pacta sunt servanda}. The second principle is the very essence of the textual approach: the parties are to be presumed to have that intention which appears from the ordinary meaning of the terms used by them. The third principle is one both of common sense and good faith; the ordinary meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract but in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose. These principles have repeatedly been affirmed by the Court. The present Court in its Advisory Opinion on the \textit{Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations} said:\textsuperscript{120}

\begin{quote}
"The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter."
\end{quote}

And the Permanent Court in an early Advisory Opinion\textsuperscript{131} stressed that the context is not merely the article or section of the treaty in which the term occurs, but the treaty as a whole:

\begin{quote}
"In considering the question before the Court upon the language of the Treaty, it is obvious that the Treaty must be read as a whole, and that its meaning is not to be determined merely upon particular phrases which, if detached from the context, may be interpreted in more than one sense."
\end{quote}

Again the Court has more than once had recourse to the statement of the object and purpose of the treaty in the preamble in order to interpret a particular provision.\textsuperscript{132}

(13) Paragraph 2 seeks to define what is comprised in the "context" for the purposes of the interpretation of the treaty. That the preamble forms part of a treaty for purposes of interpretation is too well settled to require comment, as is also the case with documents which are specifically made annexes to the treaty. The question is how far other documents connected with the treaty are to be regarded as forming part of the "context" for the purposes of interpretation. Paragraph 2 proposes that two classes of documents should be so regarded: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; and (b) any instrument which was made in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. The principle on which this provision is based is that a unilateral document cannot be regarded as forming part of the "context" within the meaning of article 27 unless not only was it made in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty but its relation to the treaty was accepted in the same manner by the other parties. On the other hand, the fact that these two classes of documents are recognized in paragraph 2 as forming part of the "context" does not mean that they are necessarily to be considered as an integral part of the treaty. Whether they are an actual part of the treaty depends on the intention of the parties in each case.\textsuperscript{133} What is proposed in paragraph 2 is that, for purposes of interpreting the treaty, these categories of documents should not be treated as mere evidence to which recourse may be had for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity or obscurity, but as part of the context for the purpose of arriving at the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty.

(14) Paragraph 3(a) specifies as a further authentic element of interpretation to be taken into account together with the context any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty. A question of fact may sometimes arise as to whether an understanding reached during the negotiations concerning the meaning of a provision was or was not intended to constitute an agreed basis for its interpretation.\textsuperscript{134} But it is well settled that when an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision is established as having been reached before or at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, it is to be regarded as forming part of the treaty. Thus, in the \textit{Ambatielos} case\textsuperscript{135} the Court said: "...the provisions of the Declaration are in the nature of an interpretation clause, and, as such, should be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty...". Similarly, an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of the treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties which must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation.

(15) Paragraph 3(b) then similarly specifies as an element to be taken into account together with the context: "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the understanding of the parties regarding its interpretation". The importance of such subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, as an element of interpretation, is obvious; for it constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty.\textsuperscript{136} Recourse to it as a means of

\textsuperscript{120} Cf. the \textit{Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter)} case, \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1948, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1952, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1950, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1950, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1952, pp. 196 and 199.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1952, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{136} Cf. the \textit{Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter)} case, \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1948, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1952, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{138} In the \textit{Russian Indemnity} case the Permanent Court of Arbitration said: "...l'exécution des engagements est, entre États, comme entre particuliers, le plus sûr commentaire du sens de ces engagements". \textit{Reports of International Abitral Awards}, vol. XI, p. 433. ("...the fulfilment of engagements between States, as between individuals, is the surest commentary on the effectiveness of those engagements". English translation from J. B. Scott, \textit{The Hague Court} Reports (1916), p. 302.)
interpretation is well-established in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. In its opinion on the Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour, the Permanent Court said:

“If there were any ambiguity, the Court might, for the purpose of arriving at the true meaning, consider the action which has been taken under the Treaty.”

At the same time, the Court referred to subsequent practice in confirmation of the meaning which it had deduced from the text and which it considered to be unambiguous. Similarly in the Corfu Channel case, the International Court said:

“The subsequent attitude of the Parties shows it has not been their intention, by entering into the Special Agreement, to preclude the Court from fixing the amount of the compensation.”

The value of subsequent practice varies according as it shows the common understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the terms. The Commission considered that subsequent practice establishing the understanding of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty should be included in paragraph 3 as an authentic means of interpretation alongside interpretative agreements. The text provisionally adopted in 1964 spoke of a practice which “establishes the understanding of all the parties”. By omitting the word “all” the Commission did not intend to change the rule. It considered that the phrase “the understanding of the parties” necessarily means “the parties as a whole”. It omitted the word “all” merely to avoid any possible misconception that every party must individually have engaged in the practice where it suffices that it should have accepted the practice.

(16) Paragraph 3(c) adds as a third element to be taken into account together with the context: “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. This element, as previously indicated, appeared in paragraph 1 of the text provisionally adopted in 1964, which stated that, inter alia, the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty is to be determined “in the light of the general rules of international law in force at the time of its conclusion”. The words in italics were a reflection of the general principle that a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it. When this provision was discussed at the sixteenth session, some members suggested that it failed to deal with the problem of the effect of an evolution of the law on the interpretation of legal terms in a treaty and was therefore inadequate. Some Governments in their comments endorsed the provision, others criticized it from varying points of view. On re-examining the provision, the Commission considered that the formula used in the 1964 text was unsatisfactory, since it covered only partially the question of the so-called intertemporal law in its application to the interpretation of treaties and might, in consequence, lead to misunderstanding. It also considered that, in any event, the relevance of rules of international law for the interpretation of treaties in any given case was dependent on the intentions of the parties, and that to attempt to formulate a rule covering comprehensively the temporal element would present difficulties. It further considered that correct application of the temporal element would normally be indicated by interpretation of the term in good faith. The Commission therefore concluded that it should omit the temporal element and revise the reference to international law so as to make it read “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. At the same time, it decided to transfer this element of interpretation to paragraph 3 as being an element which is extrinsic both to the text and to the “context” as defined in paragraph 2.

(17) Paragraph 4 incorporates in article 27 the substance of what was article 71 of the 1964 text. It provides for the somewhat exceptional case where, notwithstanding the apparent meaning of a term in its context, it is established that the parties intended it to have a special meaning. Some members doubted the need to include a special provision on this point, although they recognized that parties to a treaty not infrequently employ a term with a technical or other special meaning. They pointed out that technical or special use of the term normally appears from the context and the technical or special meaning becomes, as it were, the ordinary meaning in the particular context. Other members, while not disputing that the technical or special meaning of the term may often appear from the context, considered that there was a certain utility in laying down a specific rule on the point, if only to emphasize that the burden of proof lies on the party invoking the special meaning of the term. They pointed out that the exception had been referred to more than once by the Court. In the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, for example, the Permanent Court had said:

“The geographical meaning of the word ‘Greenland’, i.e. the name which is habitually used in the maps to denominate the whole island, must be regarded as the ordinary meaning of the word. If it is alleged by one of the Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to be attributed to it, it lies on that Party to establish its contention.”

Commentary to article 28

(18) There are many dicta in the jurisprudence of international tribunals stating that where the ordinary meaning of the words is clear and makes sense in the context, there is no occasion to have recourse to other means of interpretation. Many of these statements relate to the use of travaux préparatoires. The passage from the Court’s Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations cited in paragraph (12) above is one example,

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137 P.C.I.J. (1922), Series B, No. 2, p. 39; see also Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, P.C.I.J. (1925), Series B, No. 12, p. 24; the Brazilian Loans case, P.C.I.J. (1929), Series A, No. 21, p. 119.
138 Ibid., pp. 40 and 41.
139 I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 25.
141 P.C.I.J. (1933), Series A/B, No. 53, p. 49.
and another is its earlier Opinion on Admission of a State to the United Nations: 144

“The Court considers that the text is sufficiently clear; consequently it does not feel that it should deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself.”

As already indicated, the Commission’s approach to treaty interpretation was on the basis that the text of the treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties, and that the elucidation of the meaning of the text rather than an investigation ab initio of the supposed intentions of the parties constitutes the object of interpretation. It formulated article 28 on that basis, making the ordinary meaning of the terms, the context of the treaty, its object and purpose, and the general rules of international law, together with authentic interpretations by the parties, the primary criteria for interpreting a treaty. Nevertheless, it felt that it would be unrealistic and inappropriate to lay down in the draft articles that no recourse whatever may be had to extrinsic means of interpretation, such as travaux préparatoires, until after the application of the rules contained in article 27 has disclosed no clear or reasonable meaning. In practice, international tribunals, as well as States and international organizations, have recourse to subsidiary means of interpretation, more especially travaux préparatoires, for the purpose of confirming the meaning that appears to result from an interpretation of the treaty in accordance with article 27. The Court itself has on numerous occasions referred to the travaux préparatoires for the purpose of confirming its conclusions as to the “ordinary” meaning of the text. For example, in its opinion on the Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 concerning Employment of Women during the Night 145 the Permanent Court said:

“The preparatory work thus confirms the conclusion reached on a study of the text of the Convention that there is no good reason for interpreting Article 3 otherwise than in accordance with the natural meaning of the words.”

(19) Accordingly, the Commission decided to specify in article 28 that recourse to further means of interpretation, including preparatory work, is permissible for the purpose of confirming the meaning resulting from the application of article 27 and for the purpose of determining the meaning when the interpretation according to article 27:

(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

The word “supplementary” emphasizes that article 28 does not provide for alternative, autonomous, means of interpretation but only for means to aid an interpretation governed by the principles contained in article 27. Sub-paragraph (a) admits the use of these means for the purpose of deciding the meaning in cases where there is no clear meaning. Sub-paragraph (b) does the same in cases where interpretation according to article 27 gives a meaning which is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable”. The Court has recognized 146 this exception to the rule that the ordinary meaning of the terms must prevail.

On the other hand, the comparative rarity of the cases in which it has done so suggest that it regards this exception as limited to cases where the absurd or unreasonable character of the “ordinary” meaning is manifest. The Commission considered that the exception must be strictly limited, if it is not to weaken unduly the authority of the ordinary meaning of the terms. Sub-paragraph (b) is accordingly confined to cases where interpretation under article 27 gives a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

(20) The Commission did not think that anything would be gained by trying to define travaux préparatoires; indeed, to do so might only lead to the possible exclusion of relevant evidence. It also considered whether, in regard to multilateral treaties, the article should authorize the use of travaux préparatoires only as between States which took part in the negotiations or, alternatively, only if they have been published. In the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder case 147 the Permanent Court excluded from its consideration the travaux préparatoires of certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles on the ground that three of the States before the Court had not participated in the conference which prepared the Treaty of Versailles; and in making this ruling it expressly refused to differentiate between published and unpublished documents. The Commission doubted, however, whether this ruling reflects the actual practice regarding the use of travaux préparatoires in the case of multilateral treaties that are open to accession by States which did not attend the conference at which they were drawn up. Moreover, the principle behind the ruling did not seem to be so compelling as might appear from the language of the Court in that case. A State acceding to a treaty in the drafting of which it did not participate is perfectly entitled to request to see the travaux préparatoires, if it wishes, before acceding. Nor did the rule seem likely to be practically convenient, having regard to the many important multilateral treaties open generally to accession. These considerations apply to unpublished, but accessible, travaux préparatoires as well as to published ones; and in the case of bilateral treaties or “closed” treaties between small groups of States, unpublished travaux préparatoires will usually be in the hands of all the parties. Accordingly, the Commission decided that it should not include any special provision in the article regarding the use of travaux préparatoires in the case of multilateral treaties.


145 P.C.I.J. (1929), Series A, No. 23.
Article 29. Interpretation of treaties in two or more languages

1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.

2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.

3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 27 and 28 does not remove, a meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted.

Commentary

(1) The phenomenon of treaties drawn up in two or more languages has become extremely common and, with the advent of the United Nations, general multilateral treaties drawn up, or finally expressed, in five different languages have become quite numerous. When a treaty is plurilingual, there may or may not be a difference in the status of the different language versions for the purpose of interpretation. Each of the versions may have the status of an authentic text of the treaty; or one or more of them may be merely an "official text", that is a text which has been signed by the negotiating States but not accepted as authoritative; or one or more of them may be merely an "official translation", that is a translation prepared by the parties or an individual Government or by an organ of an international organization.

(2) To-day the majority of more formal treaties contain an express provision determining the status of the different language versions. If there is no such provision, it seems to be generally accepted that each of the versions in which the text of the treaty was "drawn up" is to be considered authentic, and therefore authoritative for purposes of interpretation. In other words, the general rule is the equality of the languages and the equal authenticity of the texts in the absence of any provision to the contrary. In formulating this general rule paragraph 1 refers to languages in which the text of the treaty has been "authenticated" rather than "drawn up" or "adopted". This is to take account of article 9 of the present articles in which the Commission recognized "authentication of the text" as a distinct procedural step in the conclusion of a treaty.

(3) The proviso in paragraph 1 is necessary for two reasons. First, treaties sometimes provide expressly that only certain texts are to be authoritative, as in the case of the Peace Treaties concluded after the Second World War which make the French, English and Russian texts authentic while leaving the Italian, Bulgarian, Hungarian etc. texts merely "official". Indeed, cases have been known where one text has been made authentic between some parties and a different text between others. Secondly, a plurilingual treaty may provide that in the event of divergence between the texts a specified text is to prevail. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a treaty between two States, because the language of one is not well understood by the other or because neither State wishes to recognize the supremacy of the other's language, to agree upon a text in a third language and designate it as the authoritative text in case of divergence. An example is the Treaty of Friendship concluded between Japan and Ethiopia in 1957 in Japanese, Amharic and French, article 6 of which makes the French text authentic "en cas de divergence d'interprétation". A somewhat special case was the Peace Treaties of St. Germain, Neuilly and Trianon, which were drawn up in French, English and Italian, and which provided that in case of divergence the French text should prevail, except with regard to parts I and XII, containing respectively the Covenant of the League of Nations and the articles concerning the International Labour Organisation.

(4) The application of provisions giving priority to a particular text in case of divergence may raise a difficult problem as to the exact point in the interpretation at which the provision should be put into operation. Should the "master" text be applied automatically as soon as the slightest difference appears in the wording of the texts? Or should recourse first be had to all, or at any rate some, of the normal means of interpretation in an attempt to reconcile the texts before concluding that there is a case of "divergence"? The jurisprudence of international tribunals throws an uncertain light on the solution of this problem. Sometimes the tribunal has simply applied the "master" text at once without going into the question whether there was an actual divergence between the authentic texts, as indeed the Permanent Court appears to have done in the case concerning the interpretation of the Treaty of Neuilly. Sometimes the tribunal has made some comparison at least of the different texts in an attempt to ascertain the intention of the parties. This was also the method adopted by the Supreme Court of Poland in the case of the Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v. The Polish State Treasury. The question is essentially one of the intention of the parties in inserting the provision in the treaty, and the Commission doubted whether it would be appropriate for the Commission to try to resolve the problem in a formulation of the general rules of interpretation. Accordingly, it seemed to the Commission sufficient in paragraph 1 to make a general reservation of cases where the treaty contains this type of provision.

146 See the Peace Treaties with Italy (article 90), Bulgaria (article 38), Hungary (article 42), Romania (article 40) and Finland (article 36).
147 E.g., the Italian text of the Treaty of Peace with Italy is "official", but not "authentic", since article 90 designates only the French, English and Russian texts as authentic.
148 Indeed, cases have been known where one text has been made authentic between some parties and a different text between others. Secondly, a plurilingual treaty may provide that in the event of divergence between the texts a specified text is to prevail. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a treaty between two States, because the language of one is not well understood by the other or because neither State wishes to recognize the supremacy of the other's language, to agree upon a text in a third language and designate it as the authoritative text in case of divergence. An example is the Treaty of Friendship concluded between Japan and Ethiopia in 1957 in Japanese, Amharic and French, article 6 of which makes the French text authentic "en cas de divergence d'interprétation". A somewhat special case was the Peace Treaties of St. Germain, Neuilly and Trianon, which were drawn up in French, English and Italian, and which provided that in case of divergence the French text should prevail, except with regard to parts I and XII, containing respectively the Covenant of the League of Nations and the articles concerning the International Labour Organisation.
149 E.g., Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1918 (article 10).
151 P.C.I.J. (1924), Series A, No. 3.
152 E.g., De Paoli v. Bulgarian State, Tribunaux arbitraux mixtes, Recueil des décisions, vol. 6, p. 456.
153 Annual Digest of International Law Cases, 1929-1930, case No. 235.
(5) Paragraph 2 provides for the case of a version of the treaty which is not “authenticated” as a text in the sense of article 9, but which is nevertheless prescribed by the treaty or accepted by the parties as authentic for purposes of interpretation. For example, a boundary treaty of 1897 between Great Britain and Ethiopia was drawn up in English and Amharic and it was stated that both texts were to be considered authentic, but a French translation was annexed to the treaty which was to be authoritative in the event of a dispute.

(6) The plurality of the authentic texts of a treaty is always a material factor in its interpretation, since both or all the texts authoritatively state the terms of the agreement between the parties. But it needs to be stressed that in law there is only one treaty—one set of terms accepted by the parties and one common intention with respect to those terms—even when two authentic texts appear to diverge. In practice, the existence of authentic texts in two or more languages sometimes complicates and sometimes facilitates the interpretation of a treaty. Few plurilingual treaties containing more than one or two articles are without some discrepancy between the texts. The different genius of the languages, the absence of a complete consensus ad idem, or lack of sufficient time to co-ordinate the texts may result in minor or even major discrepancies in the meaning of the texts. In that event the plurality of the texts may be a serious additional source of ambiguity or obscurity in the terms of the treaty. On the other hand, when the meaning of terms is ambiguous or obscure in one language but it is clear and convincing as to the intentions of the parties in another, the plurilingual character of the treaty facilitates interpretation of the text the meaning of which is doubtful.

(7) The existence of more than one authentic text clearly introduces a new element—comparison of the texts—into the interpretation of the treaty. But it does not involve a different system of interpretation. Plurilingual in expression, the treaty remains a single treaty with a single set of terms the interpretation of which is governed by the rules set out in articles 27 and 28. The unity of the treaty and of each of its terms is of fundamental importance in the interpretation of plurilingual treaties and it is safeguarded by combining with the principle of the equal authority of authentic texts the presumption that the terms are intended to have the same meaning in each text. This presumption requires that every effort should be made to find a common meaning for the texts before preferring one to another. A term of the treaty may be ambiguous or obscure because it is so in all the authentic texts, or because it is so in one text only but it is not certain whether there is a difference between the texts, or because on their face the authentic texts seem not to have exactly the same meaning. But whether the ambiguity or obscurity is found in all the texts or arises from the plurilingual form of the treaty, the first rule for the interpreter is to look for the meaning intended by the parties to be attached to the term by applying the standard rules for the interpretation of treaties. The plurilingual form of the treaty does not justify the interpreter in simply preferring one text to another and discarding the normal means of resolving an ambiguity or obscurity on the basis of the objects and purposes of the treaty, travaux préparatoires, the surrounding circumstances, subsequent practice, etc. On the contrary, the equality of the texts means that every reasonable effort should first be made to reconcile the texts and to ascertain the intention of the parties by recourse to the normal means of interpretation.

(8) Paragraph 3 therefore provides, first, that the terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. Then it adds that—apart from cases where the parties have agreed upon the priority of a particular text—in the event of a divergence between authentic texts a meaning which so far as possible reconciles the different texts shall be adopted. These provisions give effect to the principle of the equality of texts. In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent Court was thought by some jurists to lay down a general rule of restrictive interpretation in cases of divergence between authentic texts when it said:

"...where two versions possessing equal authority exist one of which appears to have a wider bearing than the other, it [the Court] is bound to adopt the more limited interpretation which can be made to harmonize with both versions and which, as far as it goes, is doubtless in accordance with the common intention of the Parties. In the present case this conclusion is indicated with especial force because the question concerns an instrument laying down the obligations of Great Britain in her capacity as Mandatory for Palestine and because the original draft of this instrument was probably made in English". But the Court does not appear necessarily to have intended by the first sentence of this passage to lay down as a general rule that the more limited interpretation which can be made to harmonize with both texts is the one which must always be adopted. Restrictive interpretation was appropriate in that case. But the question whether in case of ambiguity a restrictive interpretation ought to be adopted is a more general one the answer to which hinges on the nature of the treaty and the particular context in which the ambiguous term occurs. The mere fact that the ambiguity arises from a difference of expression in a plurilingual treaty does not alter the principles by which the presumption should or should not be made in favour of a restrictive interpretation. Accordingly, while the Mavrommatis case gives strong support to the principle of conciliating—i.e. harmonizing—the texts, it is not thought to call for a general rule laying down a presumption in favour of restrictive inter-


pretation in the case of an ambiguity in plurilingual texts.

(9) The Commission considered whether there were any further principles which it might be appropriate to codify as general rules for the interpretation of plurilingual treaties. For example, it examined whether it should be specified that there is a legal presumption in favour of the text with a clear meaning or of the language version in which the treaty was drafted. It felt, however, that this might be going too far, since much might depend on the circumstances of each case and the evidence of the intention of the parties. Nor did it think that it would be appropriate to formulate any general rule regarding recourse to non-authentic versions, though these are sometimes referred to for such light as they may throw on the matter.

Section 4: Treaties and third States

Article 30. General rule regarding third States

A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.

Commentary

(1) A third State, as defined in article 2(1)(h), is any State not a party to the treaty, and there appears to be almost universal agreement that in principle a treaty creates neither obligations nor rights for third States without their consent. The rule underlying the present article appears originally to have been derived from Roman law in the form of the well-known maxim *pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt*—agreements neither impose obligations nor confer rights upon third parties. In international law, however, the justification for the rule does not rest simply on this general concept of the law of contract but on the sovereignty and independence of States. There is abundant evidence of the recognition of the rule in State practice and in the decisions of international tribunals, as well as in the writings of jurists.

(2) Obligations. International tribunals have been firm in laying down in principle treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, neither impose any obligation on States which are not parties to them nor modify in any way their legal rights without their consent. In the *Island of Palmas* case, for example, dealing with a supposed recognition of Spain's title to the island in treaties concluded by that country with other States, Judge Huber said: "It appears further to be evident that Treaties concluded by Spain with third Powers recognizing her sovereignty over the 'Philippines' could not be binding upon the Netherlands...". In another passage he said: "...whatever may be the right construction of a treaty, it cannot be interpreted as disposing of the rights of independent third Powers"; and in a third passage he emphasized that "...the inchoate title of the Nether-

167 1964 draft, article 58.
169 Ibid., p. 850.
160 Ibid., p. 842.
161 Ibid., p. 870.
non-party unless and until it is accepted by the non-party. This matter is discussed more fully in the commentary to article 32.

(5) The title of the article, as provisionally adopted in 1964, was "General rule limiting the effects of treaties to the parties". As this title gave rise to a misconception on the part of at least one Government that the article purports to deal generally with the question of the "effects of treaties on third States", the Commission decided to change it to "General rule regarding third States". For the same reason and in order not to appear to prejudice in any way the question of the application of treaties with respect to individuals, it deleted the first limb of the article "A treaty applies only between the parties and" etc. It thus confined the article to the short and simple statement: "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent". The formulation of both the title and the text were designed to be as neutral as possible so as to maintain a certain equilibrium between the respective doctrinal points of view of members of the Commission.

Article 31. Treaties providing for obligations for third States

An obligation arises for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend the provision to be a means of establishing the obligation and the third State has expressly accepted that obligation.

Commentary

(1) The primary rule, formulated in the previous article, is that the parties to a treaty cannot impose an obligation on a third State without its consent. That rule is one of the bulwarks of the independence and equality of States. The present article also underlines that the consent of a State is always necessary if it is to be bound by a provision contained in a treaty to which it is not a party. Under it two conditions have to be fulfilled before a non-party can become bound: first, the parties to the treaty must have intended the provision in question to be a means of establishing an obligation for the State not a party to the treaty; and secondly, the third State must have expressly agreed to be bound by the obligation. The Commission appreciated that when these conditions are fulfilled there is, in effect, a second collateral agreement between the parties to the treaty, on the one hand, and the third State on the other: and that the juridical basis of the latter's obligation is not the treaty itself but the collateral agreement. However, even if the matter is viewed in this way, the case remains one where a provision of a treaty concluded between certain States becomes directly binding upon another State which is not and does not become a party to the treaty.

(2) The operation of the rule in this article is illustrated by the Permanent Court's approach to article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles in the Free Zones case. Switzerland was not a party to the Treaty of Versailles, but the text of the article had been referred to her prior to the conclusion of the treaty. The Swiss Federal Council had further addressed a note to the French Government informing it that Switzerland found it possible to "acquiesce" in article 435, but only on certain conditions. One of those conditions was that the Federal Council made the most express reservations as to the statement that the provisions of the old treaties, conventions, etc., were no longer consistent with present conditions, and said that it would not wish its acceptance of the article to lead to the conclusion that it would agree to the suppression of the régime of the free zones. France contended before the Court that the provisions of the old treaties, conventions, etc., concerning the free zones had been abrogated by article 435. In rejecting this contention, the Court pointed out that Switzerland had not accepted that part of article 435 which asserted the obsolescence and abrogation of the free zones:

"Whereas, in any event, Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles is not binding on Switzerland, which is not a Party to this Treaty, except to the extent to which that country has itself accepted it; as this extent is determined by the note of the Swiss Federal Council of May 5th, 1919, an extract from which constitutes Annex I to this article; as it is by this action and by this action alone that the Swiss Government has 'acquiesced' in the 'provisions of Article 435', namely 'under the conditions and reservations' which are set out in the said note."

(3) Some Governments in their comments referred to treaty provisions imposed upon an aggressor State and raised the question of the application of the present article to such provisions. The Commission recognized that such cases would fall outside the principle laid down in this article, provided that the action taken was in conformity with the Charter. At the same time, it noted that article 49, which provides for the nullity of any treaty procured by the threat or use of force, is confined to cases where the threat or use of force is "in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations". A treaty provision imposed upon an aggressor State in conformity with the Charter would not run counter to the principle in article 49 of the present articles. The Commission decided by a majority vote to include in the draft a separate article containing a general reservation in regard to any obligation in relation to a treaty which arises for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter. The text of this reservation is in article 70.

Article 32. Treaties providing for rights for third States

1. A right arises for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend the provision to accord that right either to the State in question, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and

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168 1964 draft, article 59.
170 The text of the relevant part of this note was annexed to article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles.
171 1964 draft, article 60.
the State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated.

2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty.

Commentary

(1) This article deals with the conditions under which a State may be entitled to invoke a right under a treaty to which it is not a party. The case of rights is more controversial than that of obligations, because the question of the need for the consent of the third State presents itself in a somewhat different light. The parties to a treaty cannot, in the nature of things, effectively impose a right on a third State because a right may always be disclaimed or waived. Consequently, under the present article the question is simply whether the third State's "acceptance" of the provision is or is not legally necessary for the creation of the right, or whether the treaty of its own force creates the right.

(2) The Commission noted that treaty practice shows a not inconsiderable number of treaties containing stipulations in favour of third States. In some instances, the stipulation is in favour of individual States as, for example, provisions in the Treaty of Versailles in favour of Denmark and Switzerland. In some instances, it is in favour of a group of States, as in the case of the provisions in the Peace Treaties after the two world wars which stipulated that the defeated States should waive any claims arising out of the war in favour of certain States not parties to the treaties. A further case is Article 35 of the Charter, which stipulates that non-members have a right to bring disputes before the Security Council or General Assembly. Again, the Mandate and Trusteeship Agreements contain provisions stipulating for certain rights in favour respectively of members of the League and of the United Nations, though in these cases the stipulations are of a special character as being by one member of an international organization in favour of the rest. In other instances, the stipulation is in favour of States generally, as in the case of provisions concerning freedom of navigation in certain international rivers, and through certain maritime canals and straits.

(3) Some jurists maintain that, while a treaty may certainly confer, either by design or by its incidental effects, a benefit on a third State, the latter can only acquire an actual right through some form of collateral agreement between it and the parties to the treaty. In other words, as with the case of an obligation they hold that a right will be created only when the treaty provision is intended to constitute an offer of a right to the third State which the latter has accepted. They take the position that neither State practice nor the pronounce-

ments of the Permanent Court in the Free Zones case furnish any clear evidence of the recognition of the institution of stipulation pour autrui in international law.

(4) Other jurists, who include all the four Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties, take a different position. Broadly, their view is that there is nothing in international law to prevent two or more States from effectively creating a right in favour of another State by treaty, if they so intend; and that it is always a question of the intention of the parties in concluding the particular treaty. According to them, a distinction has to be drawn between a treaty in which the intention of the parties is merely to confer a benefit on the other State and one in which their intention is to invest it with an actual right. In the latter case they hold that the other State acquires a legal right to invoke directly and on its own account the provision conferring the benefit, and does not need to enlist the aid of one of the parties to the treaty in order to obtain the execution of the provision. This right is not, in their opinion, conditional upon any specific act of acceptance by the other State or any collateral agreement between it and the parties to the treaty. These writers maintain that State practice confirms this view and that authority for it is also to be found in the report of the Committee of Jurists to the Council of the League on the Aaland Islands question, and more especially in the judgment of the Permanent Court in 1932 in the Free Zones case where it said:

"It cannot be lightly presumed that stipulations favourable to a third State have been adopted with the object of creating an actual right in its favour. There is however nothing to prevent the will of sovereign States from having this object and this effect. The question of the existence of a right acquired under an instrument drawn between other States is therefore one to be decided in each particular case: it must be ascertained whether the States which have stipulated in favour of a third State meant to create for that State an actual right which the latter has accepted as such." 178

(5) In 1964, some members of the Commission shared the view of the first group of jurists set out in paragraph (3) above, while other members in general shared the view of the second group set out in paragraph (4). The Commission, however, concluded that this division of opinion amongst its members was primarily of a doctrinal character and that the two opposing doctrines did not differ very substantially in their practical effects. Both groups considered that a treaty provision may be a means of establishing a right in favour of a third State, and that the third State is free to accept or reject the right as it

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172 Article 109 of the Treaty of Versailles.
173 Articles 358 and 374 of the Treaty of Versailles.
174 See the South-West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 329-331 and p. 410; the Northern Cameroons case, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 29.
175 P.C.I.J. (1932), Series A/B, No. 46, p. 147.
178 P.C.I.J. (1932), Series A/B, No. 46, pp. 147 and 148; in the course of that case, however, three judges expressly dissented from the view that a stipulation in favour of a State not a party to the treaty may of itself confer an actual right upon that State.
the provision to accord the right either to the particular State in question, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to States generally. The intention to accord the right is of cardinal importance, since it is only when the parties have such an intention that a legal right, as distinct from a mere benefit, may arise from the provision. Examples of stipulations in favour of individual States, groups of States or States generally have already been mentioned in paragraph (2). The second condition is the assent of the beneficiary State. The formulation of this condition in the present tense “and the State assents thereto” leaves open the question whether juridically the right is created by the treaty or by the beneficiary State’s act of acceptance. In one view, as already explained, the assent of the intended beneficiary, even although it may merely be implied from the exercise of the right, constitutes an “acceptance” of an offer made by the parties; in the other view the assent is only significant as an indication that the right is not disclaimed by the beneficiary. The second sentence of the paragraph then provides that the assent of the State is to be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated. This provision the Commission considered desirable in order to give the necessary flexibility to the operation of the rule in cases where the right is expressed to be in favour of States generally or of a large group of States. The provision, as previously mentioned, also has the effect of further narrowing the gap between the two theories as to the source of the right arising from the treaty.

(8) Paragraph 2 specifies that in exercising the right a beneficiary State must comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty. The words “or established in conformity with the treaty” take account of the fact that not infrequently conditions for the exercise of the right may be laid down in a supplementary instrument or in some cases unilaterally by one of the parties. For example, in the case of a provision allowing freedom of navigation in an international river or maritime waterway, the territorial State has the right in virtue of its sovereignty to lay down relevant conditions for the exercise of the right provided, of course, that they are in conformity with its obligations under the treaty. One Government expressed the fear that this paragraph might be open to the interpretation that it restricts the power of the parties to the treaty to amend the right conferred on third States. In the Commission’s opinion, such an interpretation would be wholly inadmissible since the paragraph manifestly deals only with the obligation of the third State to comply with the conditions applicable to the exercise of the right. The question of the power of the parties to modify the right is certainly an important one, but it arises under article 33, not under paragraph 2 of the present article.

Article 33. Revocation or modification of obligations or rights of third States
1. When an obligation has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 31, the obligation may be revoked or modified only with the mutual consent of the parties

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179 For example, in the controversy between the United States Treasury and the State Department as to whether the Finnish Peace Treaty had actually vested a right in the United States to avail itself or not to avail itself of a waiver of Finland’s claims.

180 1964 draft, article 61.
to the treaty and of the third State, unless it is established that they had otherwise agreed.

2. When a right has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 32, the right may not be revoked or modified by the parties if it is established that the right was intended not to be revocable or subject to modification without the consent of the third State.

Commentary

(1) Article 33 deals with the position of the parties to a treaty in regard to the revocation or modification of an obligation or of a right which has arisen for a third State under article 31 or 32. The text of the article, as provisionally adopted in 1964, contained a single rule covering both obligations and rights and laying down that neither could be revoked or modified by the parties without the consent of the third State unless it appeared from the treaty that the provision giving rise to them was intended to be revocable. The formulation of this rule was criticized in some respects by certain Governments in their comments, and certain others expressed the view that the article went too far in protecting the right of the third State. The Commission, while not fully in accord with the particular criticisms, agreed that the rule proposed in 1964 was not altogether satisfactory and that the article needed to be reformulated in a slightly different way.

(2) The Commission considered that, although analogous, the considerations affecting revocation or modification of an obligation are not identical with those applicable in the case of a right. Indeed, the respective positions of the parties and of the third State are reversed in the two cases. It also considered that regard must be had to the possibility that the initiative for revoking or modifying an obligation might well come from the third State rather than from the parties; and that in such a case the third State, having accepted the obligation, could not revoke or modify it without the consent of the parties unless they had otherwise agreed. Accordingly, it decided to reformulate the article in two paragraphs, one covering the case of an obligation and the other the case of a right. The Commission also decided that the article should refer to the revocation or modification of the third State's obligation or right rather than of the provision of the treaty giving rise to the obligation or right; for the revocation or modification of the provision as such is a matter which concerns the parties alone and it is the mutual relations between the parties and the third State which are in question in the present article.

(3) Paragraph 1 lays down that the obligation of a third State may be revoked or modified only with the mutual consent of the parties and of the third State, unless it is established that they had otherwise agreed. As noted in the previous paragraph, this rule is clearly correct if it is the third State which seeks to revoke or modify the obligation. When it is the parties who seek the revocation or modification, the position is less simple. In a case where the parties were simply renouncing their right to call for the performance of the obligation, it might be urged that the consent of the third State would be superfluous; and in such a case it is certainly very improbable that any difficulty would arise. But the Commission felt that in international relations such simple cases are likely to be rare, and that in most cases a third State's obligation is likely to involve a more complex relation which would make it desirable that any change in the obligation should be a matter of mutual consent. Accordingly it concluded that the general rule stated in the paragraph should require the mutual consent of the parties and of the third State, unless it was established that they had otherwise agreed.

(4) Paragraph 2, for the reason indicated above, deals only with the revocation or modification of a third State's right by the parties to the treaty. The Commission took note of the view of some Governments that the 1964 text went too far in restricting the power of the parties to revoke or modify a stipulation in favour of the third State and in giving the latter a veto over any modification of the treaty provision. It considered, however, that there are conflicting considerations to be taken into account. No doubt, it was desirable that States should not be discouraged from creating rights in favour of third States, especially in such matters as navigation in international waterways, by the fear that they might be hampering their freedom of action in the future. But it was no less important that such rights should have a measure of solidity and firmness. Furthermore, there was force in the argument that, if the parties wished the third State's rights to be revocable, they could so specify in the treaty or in negotiations with the third State. Taking account of these conflicting considerations and of the above-mentioned view expressed by certain Governments, the Commission reformulated the rule in paragraph 2 so as to provide that a third State's right may not be revoked if it is established that the right was intended not to be revocable or subject to modification without the consent of the third State. The irrevocable character of the right would normally be established either from the terms or nature of the treaty provision giving rise to the right or from an agreement or understanding arrived at between the parties and the third State.

Article 34.  

Rules in a treaty becoming binding through international custom

Nothing in articles 30 to 33 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law.

Commentary

(1) The role played by custom in sometimes extending the application of rules contained in a treaty beyond the contracting States is well recognized. A treaty concluded between certain States may formulate a rule, or establish a territorial, fluvial or maritime régime, which afterwards comes to be generally accepted by other States and becomes binding upon other States by way of custom,
as for example the Hague Conventions regarding the rules of land warfare,\textsuperscript{182} the agreements for the neutralization of Switzerland, and various treaties regarding international riverways and maritime waterways. So too a codifying convention purporting to state existing rules of customary law may come to be regarded as the generally accepted formulation of the customary rules in question even by States not parties to the convention.

(2) In none of these cases, however, can it properly be said that the treaty itself has legal effects for third States. They are cases where, without establishing any treaty relation between themselves and the parties to the treaty, other States recognize rules formulated in a treaty as binding customary law. In short, for these States the source of the binding force of the rules is custom, not the treaty. For this reason the Commission did not think that this process should be included in the draft articles as a case of a treaty having legal effects for third States. It did not, therefore, formulate any specific provisions concerning the operation of custom in extending the application of treaty rules beyond the contracting States. On the other hand, having regard to the importance of the process and to the nature of the provisions in articles 30 to 33, it decided to include in the present article a general reservation stating that nothing in those articles precludes treaty rules from becoming binding on non-parties as customary rules of international law.

(3) The Commission desired to emphasize that the provision in the present article is purely and simply a reservation designed to negative any possible implication from articles 30 to 33 that the draft articles reject the legitimacy of the above-mentioned process. In order to make it absolutely plain that this is the sole purpose of the present article, the Commission slightly modified the wording of the text provisionally adopted in 1964.

(4) The Commission considered whether treaties creating so-called “objective régimes”, that is, obligations and rights valid \textit{erga omnes}, should be dealt with separately as a special case.\textsuperscript{183} Some members of the Commission favoured this course, expressing the view that the concept of treaties creating objective régimes existed in international law and merited special treatment in the draft articles. In their view, treaties which fall within this concept are treaties for the neutralization or demilitarization of particular territories or areas, and treaties providing for freedom of navigation in international rivers or maritime waterways; and they cited the Antarctic Treaty as a recent example of such a treaty. Other members, however, while recognizing that in certain cases treaty rights and obligations may come to be valid \textit{erga omnes}, did not regard these cases as resulting from any special concept or institution of the law of treaties. They considered that these cases resulted either from the application of the principle in article 32 or from the grafting of an international custom upon a treaty under the process which is the subject of the reservation in the present article. Since to lay down a rule recognizing the possibility of the creation of objective régimes directly by treaty might be unlikely to meet with general acceptance, the Commission decided to leave this question aside in drafting the present articles on the law of treaties. It considered that the provision in article 32, regarding treaties intended to create rights in favour of States generally, together with the process mentioned in the present article, furnish a legal basis for the establishment of treaty obligations and rights valid \textit{erga omnes}, which goes as far as is at present possible. Accordingly, it decided not to propose any special provision on treaties creating so-called objective régimes.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Part IV.—Amendment and modification of treaties}
\end{center}

\textbf{Article 35.} \textsuperscript{184} General rule regarding the amendment of treaties

A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in part II apply to such agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.

\textbf{Article 36.} \textsuperscript{185} Amendment of multilateral treaties

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, the amendment of multilateral treaties shall be governed by the following paragraphs.

2. Any proposal to amend a multilateral treaty as between all the parties must be notified to every party, each one of which shall have the right to take part in:

(a) The decision as to the action to be taken in regard to such proposal;

(b) The negotiation and conclusion of any agreement for the amendment of the treaty.

3. Every State entitled to become a party to the treaty shall also be entitled to become a party to the treaty as amended.

4. The amending agreement does not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement; and article 26, paragraph 4(b) applies in relation to such State.

5. Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after the entry into force of the amending agreement shall, falling an expression of a different intention by that State:

(a) Be considered as a party to the treaty as amended; and

(b) Be considered as a party to the unamended treaty in relation to any party to the treaty not bound by the amending agreement.

\textbf{Commentary}

\textbf{Introduction}

(1) The development of international organization and the tremendous increase in multilateral treaty-making

\textsuperscript{182} Held by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to enunciate rules which had become generally binding rules of customary law.


\textsuperscript{184} 1964 draft, article 65.

\textsuperscript{185} 1964 draft, article 66.
have made a considerable impact on the process of amending treaties. In the first place, the amendment of many multilateral treaties is now a matter which concerns an international organization. This is clearly the case where the treaty is the constituent instrument of an organization or where the treaty, like international labour conventions, is drawn up within an organization. But it is also to some extent the case where the treaty is concluded under the auspices of an organization and the Secretariat of the organization is made the depositary for executing its procedural provisions. In all these cases the drawing up of an amending instrument is caught up in the machinery of the organization or in the functions of the depositary. As a result, the right of each party to be consulted with regard to the amendment or revision of the treaty is largely safeguarded. In the second place, the proliferation of multilateral treaties has led to an increased awareness of the importance of making provision in advance, in the treaty itself, for the possibility of its future amendment. In the third place, the growth of multilateral treaties having a very large number of parties has made it virtually impossible to limit the amending process to amendments brought into force by an agreement entered into by all the parties to the original treaty; and has led to an increasing practice of bringing amending agreements into force as between those States willing to accept the amendment, while at the same time leaving the existing treaty in force with respect to the other parties to the earlier treaty. Thus, in 1906 the Geneva Convention of 1864 for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded in Armies in the Field was revised by a new Convention which expressly provided that, when duly ratified, it should supersede the 1864 Convention in the relations between the contracting States, but that the 1864 Convention should remain in force in the relations of parties to that Convention who did not ratify the new Convention. A similar provision was inserted in the Hague Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which revised the earlier Convention of 1899. There are numerous later examples of the same technique, notably the United Nations protocols revising certain League of Nations conventions.

(2) Amendment clauses found in multilateral treaties take a great variety of forms, as appears from the examples given in the Handbook of Final Clauses.\(^\text{186}\) Despite their variety, many amendment clauses are far from dealing comprehensively with the legal aspects of amendment. Some, for example, merely specify the conditions under which a proposal for amendment may be put forward, without providing for the procedure for considering it. Others, while also specifying the procedure for considering a proposal, do not deal with the conditions under which an amendment may be adopted and come into force, or do not define the exact effect on the parties to the existing treaty. As to clauses regarding the adoption and entry into force of an amendment, some require its acceptance by all the parties to the treaty, but many admit some form of qualified majority as sufficient. In general, the variety of the clauses makes it difficult to deduce from the treaty practice the development of detailed customary rules regarding the amendment of multilateral treaties; and the Commission did not therefore think that it would be appropriate for it to try to frame a comprehensive code of rules regarding the amendment of treaties. On the other hand, it seemed to the Commission desirable that the draft articles should include a formulation of the basic rules concerning the process of amendment.

(3) Some treaties use the term "amendment" in relation to individual provisions of the treaty and the term "revision" for a general review of the whole treaty.\(^\text{187}\) If this phraseology has a certain convenience, it is not one which is found uniformly in State practice, and there does not appear to be any difference in the legal process. The Commission therefore considered it sufficient in the present articles to speak of "amendment" as being a term which covers both the amendment of particular provisions and a general review of the whole treaty.\(^\text{188}\) As to the term "revision", the Commission recognized that it is frequently found in State practice and that it is also used in some treaties. Nevertheless, having regard to the nuances that became attached to the phrase "revision of treaties" in the period preceding the Second World War, the Commission preferred the term "amendment". This term is here used to denote a formal amendment of a treaty intended to alter its provisions with respect to all the parties. The more general term "modification" is used in article 37 in connexion with an inter se agreement concluded between certain of the parties only, and intended to vary provisions of the treaty between themselves alone, and also in connexion with a variation of the provisions of a treaty resulting from the practice of the parties in applying it.

**Commentary to article 35**

(4) Article 35 provides that a treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties, and that the rules laid down in part II apply to it except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide. Having regard to the modern practice of amending multilateral treaties by another multilateral treaty which comes into force only for those States which become bound by it, the Commission did not specify that the agreement must be that of all the parties, as in the case of termination of a treaty under article 51. It felt that the procedure for the adoption of the text and the entry into force of the amending agreement should simply be governed by articles 8, 21 and 22 of part II. On the other hand, it sought in article 36 to lay down strict rules guaranteeing the right of each party to participate in the process of amendment. The amendment of a treaty is normally effected through the conclusion of another treaty in written form and this is reflected in the provision that the rules of part II are to apply to the amending agreement. However, as explained in paragraph (3) of its commentary to article 51, the Commission did not consider that the theory of the "acte contraire" has any place in international law. An amend-

\(^{186}\) ST/LEG/6, pp. 130-152.

\(^{187}\) Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter; see also Handbook of Final Clauses (ST/LEG/6), pp. 130 and 150.

\(^{188}\) Thus, while Chapter XVIII of the Charter is entitled "Amendments", Article 109 speaks of "reviewing" the Charter.
ing agreement may take whatever form the parties to the original treaty may choose. Indeed, the Commission recognized that a treaty may sometimes be modified even by an oral agreement or by a tacit agreement evidenced by the conduct of the parties in the application of the treaty. Accordingly, in stating that the rules of part II regarding the conclusion and entry into force of treaties apply to amending agreements, the Commission did not mean to imply that the modification of a treaty by an oral or tacit agreement is inadmissible. On the contrary, it noted that the legal force of an oral agreement modifying a treaty would be preserved by the provision in article 3, sub-paragraph (b), and it made express provision in article 38 for the modification of a treaty by the subsequent practice of the parties in its application.

**Commentary to article 36**

(5) This article deals with the complex process of the amendment of multilateral treaties. The Commission considered whether to formulate any rule specifically for bilateral treaties, but concluded that it would not serve any useful purpose. Where only two parties are involved, the question is essentially one of negotiation and agreement between them, and the rules contained in part II suffice to regulate the procedure and to protect the positions of the individual parties. Moreover, although the Commission was of the opinion that a party is under a certain obligation of good faith to give due consideration to a proposal from the other party for the amendment of a treaty, it felt that such a principle would be difficult to formulate as a legal rule without opening the door to arbitrary denunciations of treaties on the pretended ground that the other party had not given serious attention to a proposal for amendment.

(6) Article 36 is concerned only with the amendment *stricto sensu* of a multilateral treaty, that is, where the intention is to draw up a formal agreement between the parties generally for modifying the treaty between them all, and not to draw up an agreement between certain parties only for the purpose of modifying the treaty between themselves alone. The Commission recognized that an amending agreement drawn up between the parties generally may not infrequently come into force only with respect to some of them owing to the failure of the others to proceed to ratification, acceptance or approval of the agreement. Nevertheless, it considered that there is an essential difference between amending agreements designed to amend a treaty between the parties generally and agreements designed *ab initio* to modify the operation of the treaty as between certain of the parties only. Although an amending instrument may equally turn out to operate only between certain of the parties, the Commission considered that a clear-cut distinction must be made between the amendment process *stricto sensu* and *inter se* agreements modifying the operation of the treaty between a restricted circle of the parties. For this reason, *inter se* agreements are dealt with separately in article 37 while the opening phrase of paragraph 2 of the present article underlines that it is concerned only with proposals to amend the treaty as between all the parties.

(7) Paragraph 1 merely emphasizes that the rules stated in the article are residuary rules in the sense that they apply only in the absence of a specific provision in the treaty laying down a different rule. Modern multilateral treaties, as indicated in paragraph (3) of this commentary, not infrequently contain some provisions regarding their amendment and the rules contained in the present articles must clearly be subject to any such specific provisions in the treaty.

(8) Paragraph 2 provides that any proposal to amend a multilateral treaty as between all the parties must be notified to every party and that each party has the right to take part in the decision as to the action, if any, to be taken in regard to the proposal and to take part in the negotiation and conclusion of any agreement designed to amend the treaty. Treaties have often in the past been amended or revised by certain of the parties without consultation with the others. This has led some jurists to conclude that there is no general rule entitling every party to a multilateral treaty to take part in any negotiations for the amendment of the treaty and that, correspondingly, parties to a multilateral treaty are under no legal obligation to invite all the original parties to participate in such negotiations. Although recognizing that instances have been common enough in which individual parties to a treaty have not been consulted in regard to its revision, the Commission does not think that State practice leads to that conclusion or that such a view should be the one adopted by the Commission.

(9) If a group of parties has sometimes succeeded in effecting an amendment of a treaty régime without consulting the other parties, equally States left out of such a transaction have from time to time reacted against the failure to bring them into consultation as a violation of their rights as parties. Moreover, there are also numerous cases where the parties have, as a matter of course, all been consulted. The Commission, however, considers that the very nature of the legal relation established by a treaty requires that every party should be consulted in regard to any amendment or revision of the treaty. The fact that this has not always happened in the past is not a sufficient reason for setting aside a principle which seems to flow directly from the obligation assumed by the parties to perform the treaty in good faith. There may be special circumstances when it is justifiable not to bring a particular party into consultation, as in the case of an aggressor. But the general rule is believed to be that every party is entitled to be brought into consultation with regard to an amendment of the treaty; and paragraph 2 of article 36 so states the law.

(10) Paragraph 3, which was added to the article at the present session, provides that every State entitled to become a party to the treaty shall also be entitled to become a party to the treaty as amended. This rule recognizes that States entitled to become parties to a treaty, and notably those which took part in its drawing up but have not yet established their consent to be bound by it, have a definite interest in the amendment of the treaty. The Commission considered whether this interest should be expressed in the form of an actual right to take part in the negotiation and conclusion of
the amending agreement, or whether it should be limited to a right to become a party to the amending agreement. The problem, in its view, was to strike a balance between the right of the parties to adopt the treaty to meet requirements which experience of the working of the treaty had revealed, and the right of the States which had participated in drawing up the text to become parties to the treaty which they had helped to fashion. The Commission appreciated that in practice the parties would very often think it desirable to associate States entitled to become parties with the negotiation and conclusion of an amending agreement in order to encourage the widest possible participation in the treaty as amended. But it concluded that the right of those which had committed themselves to be bound by the treaty to proceed alone, if they thought fit, to embody desired improvements in an amending agreement should be recognized. It therefore decided that paragraph 3 should not go beyond conferring on the States entitled to become parties to the treaty a right to become parties to it as modified by the amending agreement; in other words, the paragraph should give them a right to become parties simultaneously to the treaty and to the amending agreement.

(11) Paragraph 4 provides that an amending agreement does not bind a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement. And, by its reference to article 26, paragraph 4(b), it further provides that as between such a party to the treaty and one which has become bound by the amending agreement, it is the unamended treaty which governs their mutual rights and obligations. This paragraph is, of course, no more than an application, in the case of amending agreements, of the general rule in article 30 that a treaty does not impose any obligation upon a State not a party to it. Nevertheless, without this paragraph the question might be thought to be left open whether by its very nature an instrument amending a prior treaty necessarily has legal effects for parties to the treaty. In some modern treaties the general rule in this paragraph is indeed displaced by a different provision laid down in the original treaty or by a contrary rule applied to treaties concluded within a particular international organization. Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on Road Traffic (1949), for example, provides that any amendment adopted by a two-thirds majority of a conference shall come into force for all parties except those which make a declaration that they do not adopt the amendment. Article 16 of the International Convention to Facilitate the Crossing of Frontiers for Goods Carried by Rail provides for amendments to come into force for all parties unless it is objected to by at least one-third.

(12) Paragraph 5, which has also been added at the present session, deals with the rather more complex case of a State which becomes a party to the treaty after the amending agreement has come into force between at least some of the parties to the treaty. As previously indicated, it is in practice very common that an amending agreement is ratified only by some of the parties to the original treaty. As a result two categories of parties to the treaty come into being: (a) those States which are parties only to the unamended treaty, and (b) those which are parties both to the treaty and to the amending agreement. Yet all are, in a general sense, parties to the treaty and have mutual relations under the treaty. Any State party only to the unamended treaty is bound by the treaty alone in its relations both with any other such State and with any State which is a party both to the treaty and to the amending agreement; for that is the effect of the rule in paragraph 4. On the other hand, as between any two States which are parties both to the treaty and the amending agreement it is the treaty as amended which applies. The problem then is what is to be the position of a State which only becomes a party to the original treaty after the amending agreement is already in force. This problem raises two basic questions. (1) Must the new party become or, in the absence of a contrary expression of intention, be presumed to become, a party both to the treaty and the amending agreement? (2) Must the new party become or, in the absence of a contrary expression of intention, be presumed to become a party to the unamended treaty vis-à-vis any State party to the treaty but not party to the amending agreement? These questions are far from being theoretical since they are apt to arise in practice whenever a general multilateral treaty is amended. Moreover, the Commission was informed by the Secretariat that it is by no means uncommon for a State to ratify or otherwise establish its consent to the treaty without giving any indication as to its intentions regarding the amending agreement; and that in these cases the instrument of ratification, acceptance, etc. is presumed by the Secretary-General in his capacity as a depository to cover the treaty with its amendments.

(13) Some modern treaties foresee and determine the matter by a specific provision but the majority of treaties do not. The Commission accordingly thought it necessary that the present article should lay down a general rule to apply in the absence of any expression of intention in the treaty or by the State concerned. It considered that this rule should be based on two principles: (a) the right of the State, on becoming a party to the treaty, to decide whether to become a party to the treaty alone, to the treaty plus the amending agreement or to the amended treaty alone; (b) in the absence of any indication by the State, it is desirable to adopt a solution which will bring the maximum number of States into mutual relations under the treaty. Paragraph 5 therefore provides that, failing an expression of a different intention, a State which becomes a party after the amending agreement has come into force is to be considered as: (a) a party to the treaty as amended, and (b) a party also to the unamended treaty in its relations with any party to the treaty which is not bound by the amending agreement.

(14) The text of the article provisionally adopted by the Commission in 1964 contained a provision (paragraph 3 of the 1964 text) applying the principle nemo potest venire contra factum proprium to States which participate in the drawing up of an amending agreement but after—

189 See the Handbook of Final Clauses (ST/LEG/6) pp. 135-148.
wards fail to become parties to it. The effect of the provision was to preclude them from objecting to the amending agreement’s being brought into force between those States which did become parties to it. On re-examining this provision in the light of the comments of Governments the Commission concluded that it should be dispensed with. While recognizing that it would be very unusual for States which participate in the drawing up of an amending agreement to complain of the putting into force of the agreement as a breach of their rights under the original treaty, the Commission felt that it might be going too far to lay down an absolute rule in the sense of paragraph 3 of the 1964 text, applicable for every case.

Article 37,\(^\text{100}\) Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only

1. Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if:

(a) The possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; or

(b) The modification in question:

(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their obligations;

(ii) does not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole; and

(iii) is not prohibited by the treaty.

2. Unless in a case falling under paragraph 1(a) the treaty otherwise provides, the parties in question shall notify the other parties of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modifications to the treaty for which it provides.

Commentary

(1) This article, as already explained in the commentary to articles 35 and 36, deals not with “amendment” of a treaty but with an “inter se agreement” for its “modification”; that is, with an agreement entered into by some of the parties to a multilateral treaty and intended to modify it between themselves alone. Clearly, a transaction in which two or a small group of parties set out to modify the treaty between themselves alone without giving the other parties the option of participating in it is on a different footing from an amending agreement drawn up between the parties generally, even if ultimately they do not all ratify it. For an inter se agreement is more likely to have an aim and effect incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. History furnishes a number of instances of inter se agreements which substantially changed the régime of the treaty and which overrode the objections of interested States. Nor can there be any doubt that the application, and even the conclusion, of an inter se agreement incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty may raise a question of State responsibility. Under the present article, therefore, the main issue is the conditions under which inter se agreements may be regarded as permissible.

(2) Paragraph 1(a) necessarily recognizes that an inter se agreement is permissible if the possibility of such an agreement was provided for in the treaty; in other words, if “contracting out” was contemplated in the treaty. Paragraph 1(b) states that inter se agreements are to be permissible in other cases only if three conditions are fulfilled. First, the modification must not affect the enjoyment of the rights or the performance of the obligations of the other parties; that is, it must not prejudice their rights or add to their burdens. Secondly, it must not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty; for example, an inter se agreement modifying substantive provisions of a disarmament or neutralization treaty would be incompatible with its object and purpose and not permissible under the present article. Thirdly, the modification must not be one prohibited by the treaty, as for example the prohibition on contracting out contained in article 20 of the Berlin Convention of 1908 for the Protection of Literary Property. These conditions are not alternative, but cumulative. The second and third conditions, it is true, overlap to some extent since an inter se agreement incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty may be said to be impliedly prohibited by the treaty. Nevertheless, the Commission thought it desirable for the principle contained in the second condition to be stated separately; and it is always possible that the parties might explicitly forbid any inter se modifications, thus excluding even minor modifications not caught by the second condition.

(3) Paragraph 2 seeks to add a further protection to the parties against illegitimate modifications of the treaty by some of the parties through an inter se agreement by requiring them to notify the other parties in advance of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modifications for which it provides. The text of this paragraph, as provisionally adopted in 1964, would have required them to notify the other parties only of the actual conclusion of the inter se agreement. On re-examining the paragraph in the light of the comments of Governments, however, the Commission concluded at the present session that the rule should require the notice to be given in advance of the conclusion of the agreement. The Commission considered that it is unnecessary and even inadvisable to require notice to be given while a proposal is merely germinating and still at an exploratory stage. It therefore expressed the requirement in terms of notifying their “intention to conclude the agreement and... the modifications to the treaty for which it provides” in order to indicate that it is only when a negotiation of an inter se agreement has reached a mature stage that notification need be given to the other parties. The Commission also concluded at the present session that, when a treaty contemplates the possibility of inter se agreements, it is desirable that the intention to conclude one should be notified to the other parties, unless the treaty itself dispenses with the need for notification. Even in such cases, it thought, the other parties ought

\(^{100}\) 1964 draft, article 67.
to have a reasonable opportunity of satisfying themselves that the inter se agreement does not exceed what is contemplated by the treaty.

Article 38. Modification of treaties by subsequent practice

A treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions.

Commentary

(1) This article covers cases where the parties by common consent in fact apply the treaty in a manner which its provisions do not envisage. Subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, as stated in article 27, paragraph 3(b), is authoritative evidence as to its interpretation when the practice is consistent, and establishes their understanding regarding the meaning of the provisions of the treaty. Equally, a consistent practice, establishing the common consent of the parties to the application of the treaty in a manner different from that laid down in certain of its provisions, may have the effect of modifying the treaty. In a recent arbitration between France and the United States regarding the interpretation of a bilateral air transport services agreement the tribunal, speaking of the subsequent practice of the parties, said:

"This course of conduct may, in fact, be taken into account not merely as a means useful for interpreting the Agreement, but also as something more: that is, as a possible source of a subsequent modification, arising out of certain actions or certain attitudes, having a bearing on the juridical situation of the parties and on the rights that each of them could properly claim." 192

And the tribunal in fact found that the agreement had been modified in a certain respect by the subsequent practice. Although the line may sometimes be blurred between interpretation and amendment of a treaty through subsequent practice, legally the processes are distinct. Accordingly, the effect of subsequent practice in amending a treaty is dealt with in the present article as a case of modification of treaties.

(2) The article thus provides that a treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions. In formulating the rule in this way the Commission intended to indicate that the subsequent practice, even if every party might not itself have actively participated in the practice, must be such as to establish the agreement of the parties as a whole to the modification in question.

(3) The text of the article, as provisionally adopted in 1964, contained two other paragraphs recognizing that a treaty may be modified:

(i) by a subsequent treaty between the parties relating to the same subject-matter, to the extent that their provisions are incompatible; and

(ii) by the subsequent emergence of a new rule of customary law relating to matters dealt with in the treaty and binding upon all the parties.

However, after re-examining these paragraphs in the light of the comments of Governments, the Commission decided to dispense with them. It considered that the case of a modification effected through the conclusion of a subsequent treaty relating to the same subject-matter is sufficiently covered by the provisions of article 26, paragraphs 3 and 4. As to the case of modification through the emergence of a new rule of customary law, it concluded that the question would in any given case depend to a large extent on the particular circumstances and on the intentions of the parties to the treaty. It further considered that the question formed part of the general topic of the relation between customary norms and treaty norms which is too complex for it to be safe to deal only with one aspect of it in the present article.

Part V.—Invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties

Section 1: General provisions

Article 39. Validity and continuance in force of treaties

1. The validity of a treaty may be impeached only through the application of the present articles. A treaty the invalidity of which is established under the present articles is void.

2. A treaty may be terminated or denounced or withdrawn from by a party only as a result of the application of the terms of the treaty or of the present articles. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.

Commentary

(1) The substantive provisions of the present part of the draft articles concern a series of grounds upon which the question of the invalidity or termination of a treaty or of the withdrawal of a party from a treaty or the suspension of its operation may be raised. The Commission accordingly considered it desirable, as a safeguard for the stability of treaties, to underline in a general provision at the beginning of this part that the validity and continuance in force of a treaty is the normal state of things which may be set aside only on the grounds and under the conditions provided for in the present articles.

(2) Paragraph 1 thus provides that the validity of a treaty may be impeached only through the application of the present articles.

(3) Paragraph 2 is necessarily a little different in its wording since a treaty not infrequently contains specific provisions regarding its termination or denunciation, the withdrawal of parties or the suspension of the opera-

191 1964 draft, article 68.
192 Decided at Geneva on 22 December 1963, the arbitrators being R. Ago (President), P. Reuter and H. P. de Vries. (Mimeographed text of decision of the Tribunal, pp. 104 and 105.)
193 1963 draft, article 30.
tion of its provisions. This paragraph consequently provides that a treaty may be terminated or denounced or withdrawn from or its operation suspended only as a result of the application of the terms of the treaty or of the present articles.

(4) The phrase “application of the present articles” used in both paragraphs refers, it needs to be stressed, to the draft articles as a whole and not merely to the particular article dealing with the particular ground of invalidity or termination in question in any given case. In other words, it refers not merely to the article dealing with the ground of invalidity or termination relevant in the case but also to other articles governing the conditions for putting that article into effect; for example, article 4 (treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations), article 41 (separability of treaty provisions), article 42 (loss of a right to invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, etc.) and, notably, articles 62 (procedure to be followed) and 63 (instruments to be used).

(5) The words “only through the application of the present articles” and “only as a result of the application of the present articles” used respectively in the two paragraphs are also intended to indicate that the grounds of invalidity, termination, denunciation, withdrawal and suspension provided for in the draft articles are exhaustive of all such grounds, apart from any special cases expressly provided for in the treaty itself. In this connexion, the Commission considered whether “obsolescence” or “desuetude” should be recognized as a distinct ground of termination of treaties. But it concluded that, while “obsolescence” or “desuetude” may be a factual cause of the termination of a treaty, the legal basis of such termination, when it occurs, is the consent of the parties to abandon the treaty, which is to be implied from their conduct in relation to the treaty. In the Commission’s view, therefore, cases of “obsolescence” or “desuetude” may be considered as covered by article 51, paragraph (b), under which a treaty may be terminated “at any time by consent of all the parties”. Again, although a change in the legal personality of a party resulting in its disappearance as a separate international person may be a factual cause of the termination of a bilateral treaty, this does not appear to be a distinct legal ground for terminating a treaty requiring to be covered in the present articles. A bilateral treaty, lacking two parties, may simply cease any longer to exist, while a multilateral treaty in such circumstances may simply lose a party. The Commission also considered the questions whether account should be taken of the possible implications of a succession of States or of the international responsibility of a State in regard to the termination of treaties. However, without adopting any position on the substance of these questions, the Commission decided that cases of a succession of States and of the international responsibility of a State, both of which topics it has under separate study, should be left aside from the present articles on the law of treaties. Since these cases may possibly have implications in other parts of the law of treaties, the Commission further decided to make in article 69 a general reservation regarding them covering the draft articles as a whole.

Article 40.\(^{194}\) Obligations under other rules of international law

The invalidity, termination or denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the suspension of its operation, as a result of the application of the present articles or of the terms of the treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it is subject under any other rule of international law.

Commentary

(1) This article did not appear, in its present general form, among the articles of part II transmitted to Governments in 1963. A similar provision was included in paragraph 4 of article 53 but was there confined to cases of “termination”. In that context the Commission considered that although the point might be regarded as axiomatic, it was desirable to underline that the termination of a treaty would not release the parties from obligations embodied in the treaty to which they were also subject under any other rule of international law. In re-examining the articles on invalidity and suspension of operation of treaties at the second part of its seventeenth session\(^{195}\) the Commission concluded that it was no less desirable to underline the point in these contexts. Accordingly, it decided to delete paragraph 4 from article 53 of the 1963 draft and to replace it with a general article at the beginning of this part applying the rule in every case where a treaty is invalidated, terminated or denounced or its operation suspended.

Article 41.\(^{196}\) Separability of treaty provisions

1. A right of a party provided for in a treaty to denounce, withdraw from or suspend the operation of the treaty may only be exercised with respect to the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.

2. A ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty recognized in the present articles may only be invoked with respect to the whole treaty except as provided in the following paragraphs or in article 57.

3. If the ground relates to particular clauses alone, it may only be invoked with respect to those clauses where:

(a) The said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application; and

(b) Acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to the treaty as a whole.

4. Subject to paragraph 3, in cases falling under articles 46 and 47 the State entitled to invoke the fraud or corruption may do so with respect either to the whole treaty or to the particular clauses alone.

\(^{194}\) New article. A similar provision was included in article 53, paragraph 4, of the 1963 draft, but was there confined to cases of termination.

\(^{195}\) See 842nd meeting.

\(^{196}\) 1963 draft, article 46.
5. In cases falling under articles 48, 49 and 50, no separation of the provisions of the treaty is permitted.

Commentary

(1) The separability of treaty provisions was until comparatively recently considered almost exclusively in connexion with the right to terminate a treaty on the ground of a breach of the other party. Certain modern authorities, however, have advocated recognition of the principle of separability in cases of invalidity and in determining the effect of war upon treaties. They have urged that in some cases one provision of a treaty may be struck out or suspended without necessarily disturbing the balance of the rights and obligations established by the other provisions of the treaty. These authorities cite in support of their contentions certain pronouncements of the Permanent Court of International Justice in regard to the interpretation of self-contained parts of treaties.\(^{197}\) The question of the separability of treaty provisions for the purposes of interpretation raises quite different issues from the application of the principle of separability to the invalidity or termination of treaties. However, if the jurisprudence of the two Courts does not throw much light on these latter questions, it is clear that certain judges in separate opinions in the Norwegian Loans\(^{198}\) and Interhandel\(^{199}\) cases accepted the applicability of the principle of separating treaty provisions in the case of the alleged nullity of a unilateral declaration under the Optional Clause, by reason of a reservation the validity of which was contested.

(2) In these circumstances, the Commission decided that it should examine de novo the appropriateness and utility of recognizing the principle of separability of treaty provisions in the context of the invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties. It further decided that in order to determine the appropriateness of applying the principle in these contexts each article should be examined in turn, since different considerations might well apply in the various articles. The Commission concluded that, subject to certain exceptions, it was desirable to admit the relevance of the principle of separability in the application of grounds of invalidity, termination and suspension. In general, it seemed to the Commission inappropriate that treaties between sovereign States should be capable of being invalidated, terminated or suspended in operation in their entirety even in cases where the ground of invalidity, termination or suspension may relate to quite secondary provisions in the treaty. It also seemed to the Commission that it would sometimes be possible in such cases to eliminate those provisions without materially upsetting the balance of the interests of the parties under the treaty. On the other hand, the Commission recognized that the consensual character of all treaties, whether contractual or law-making, requires that the principle of separability should not be applied in such a way as materially to alter the basis of obligation upon which the consents to the treaty were given. Accordingly, it sought to find a solution which would respect the original basis of the treaty and which would also prevent the treaty from being brought to nothing on grounds relating to provisions which were not an essential basis of the consent.

(3) The Commission did not consider that the principle of separability should be made applicable to a right of denunciation, termination, etc., provided for in the treaty. In the case of a right provided for in the treaty, it is for the parties to lay down the conditions for the exercise of the right; and, if they have not specifically contemplated a right to denounce, terminate, etc., parts only of the treaty, the presumption is that they intended the right to relate to the whole treaty. Paragraph 1 of the article accordingly provides that a right provided for in the treaty is exercisable only with respect to the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.

(4) The Commission, while favouring the recognition of the principle of separability in connexion with the application of grounds of invalidity, termination, etc., considered it desirable to underline that the integrity of the provisions of the treaty is the primary rule. Accordingly, paragraph 2 of the article lays down that a ground of invalidity, termination, etc., may be invoked only with respect to the whole treaty except in the cases provided for in the later paragraphs and in cases of breach of the treaty.

(5) Paragraph 3 then lays down that, if a ground relates to particular clauses alone which are clearly separable from the remainder of the treaty in regard to their application and the acceptance of which was not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to the treaty as a whole, the ground may only be invoked with respect to those clauses. Thus, if these conditions are satisfied, the paragraph requires the separation of the invalid, terminated, denounced or suspended clauses from the remainder of the treaty and the maintenance of the remainder in force. The question whether the condition in sub-paragraph (b)—whether acceptance of the clause was not an essential basis of the consent to the treaty as a whole—was met would necessarily be a matter to be established by reference to the subject-matter of the clauses, their relation to the other clauses, to the travaux préparatoires and to the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty.

(6) Paragraph 4, while still making the question of the separability of the clauses subject to the conditions contained in paragraph 3, lays down a different rule for cases of fraud (article 46) and corruption (article 47). In these cases the ground of invalidity may, of course, be invoked only by the State which was the victim of the fraud or corruption, and the Commission considered that it should have the option either to invalidate the whole treaty or the particular clauses to which the fraud or corruption related.

(7) Paragraph 5 excepts altogether from the principle of separability cases of coercion of a representative (article 48) and coercion of a State (article 49). The Com-

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\(^{197}\) E.g. the Free Zones case, Series A/B, No. 46, p. 140; the s.s. Wimbledon case, Series A, No. 1, p. 24.

\(^{198}\) I.C.J. Reports 1937, pp. 55-59.

\(^{199}\) I.C.J. Reports 1939, pp. 57, 77, 78, 116 and 117.
mission considered that where a treaty has been procured by the coercion either of the State or of its representative, there were imperative reasons for regarding it as absolutely void in all its parts. Only thus, in the opinion of the Commission, would it be possible to ensure that the coerced State, when deciding upon its future treaty relations with the State which had coerced it, would be able to do so in a position of full freedom from the coercion.

(8) Paragraph 5 also excepts altogether from the principle of separability the case of a treaty which, when concluded, conflicts with a rule of jus cogens (article 50). Some members were of the opinion that it was undestable to prescribe that the whole treaty should be brought to the ground in cases where only one part—and that a small part—of the treaty was in conflict with a rule of jus cogens. The Commission, however, took the view that rules of jus cogens are of so fundamental a character that, when parties conclude a treaty which conflicts in any of its clauses with an already existing rule of jus cogens, the treaty must be considered totally invalid. In such a case it was open to the parties themselves to revise the treaty so as to bring it into conformity with the law; and if they did not do so, the law must attach the sanction of nullity to the whole transaction.

Article 42. 200 Loss of a right to invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty

A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 43 to 47 inclusive or articles 57 to 59 inclusive if, after becoming aware of the facts:

(a) It shall have expressly agreed that the treaty, as the case may be, is valid or remains in force or continues in operation; or

(b) It must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced, as the case may be, in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or in operation.

Commentary

(1) The foundation of the principle that a party is not permitted to benefit from its own inconsistencies is essentially good faith and fair dealing (allegans contraria non audiendus est). The relevance of this principle in international law is generally admitted and has been expressly recognized by the International Court of Justice itself in two recent cases. 201

(2) The principle 202 has a particular importance in the law of treaties. As already mentioned in previous commentaries, the grounds upon which treaties may be invalidated, terminated or suspended in operation involve certain risks of abuse. Another risk is that a State, after becoming aware of an essential error in the conclusion of the treaty, an excess of authority committed by its representative, a breach by the other party, etc., may continue with the treaty as if nothing had happened, and only raise the matter at a much later date when it desires for quite other reasons to put an end to its obligations under the treaty. The principle now under consideration places a limit upon the cases in which such claims can be asserted with any appearance of legitimacy. Such was the role played by the principle in the Temple case and in the case of the Arbitral Award of the King of Spain. Accordingly, while recognizing the general character of the principle, the Commission considered that its importance in the sphere of the invalidity and termination of treaties called for its particular mention in this part of the law of treaties.

(3) The most obvious instance is where after becoming aware of a possible ground of invalidity, termination, withdrawal or suspension the party concerned has expressly agreed that the treaty is, as the case may be, valid, in force or in operation. Clearly, in those circumstances the State must be considered to have given up once and for all its right to invoke the particular ground of invalidity, termination, withdrawal or suspension in question; and sub-paragraph (a) of the article so provides.

(4) Sub-paragraph (b) provides that a right to invoke a ground of invalidity, termination, etc. shall also be no longer exercisable if after becoming aware of the facts a State’s conduct has been such that it must be considered as having acquiesced, as the case may be, in the validity of the treaty or its maintenance in force or in operation. In such a case the State is not permitted to take up a legal position which is in contradiction with the position which its own previous conduct must have led the other parties to suppose that it had taken up with respect to the validity, maintenance in force or maintenance in operation of the treaty. The Commission noted that in municipal systems of law this principle has its particular manifestations reflecting technical features of the particular system. It felt that these technical features of the principle in municipal law might not necessarily be appropriate for the application of the principle in international law. For this reason, it preferred to avoid the use of such municipal law terms as “estoppel”.

(5) The Commission considered that the application of the rule in any given case would necessarily turn upon the facts and that the governing consideration would be that of good faith. This being so, the principle would not operate if the State in question had not been aware of the facts giving rise to the right or had not been in a position freely to exercise its right to invoke the nullity of the treaty. For the latter reason the Commission did not think that the principle should be applicable at all in cases of coercion of a representative under article 48 or coercion of the State itself under article 49. The effects and the implications of coercion in international relations are of such gravity that the Commission felt that a consent so obtained must be treated as absolutely void in order to ensure that the victim of the coercion should afterwards be in a position freely to determine its future relations with the State which coerced it. To admit the
application of the present article in cases of coercion might, in its view, weaken the protection given by articles 48 and 49 to the victims of coercion. The Commission also considered it inappropriate that the principle should be admitted in cases of *jus cogens* or of supervening *jus cogens*; and, clearly, it would not be applicable to termination under a right conferred by the treaty or to termination by agreement. Consequently, it confined the operation of the rule to articles 43-47 and 57-59.

Section 2: Invalidity of treaties

Article 43. Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude a treaty

A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation of its internal law was manifest.

Commentary

(1) Constitutional limitations affecting the exercise of the treaty-making power take various forms. Some constitutions seek to preclude the executive from entering into treaties, or particular kinds of treaties, except with the previous consent of a legislative organ; some provide that treaties shall not be effective as law within the State unless “approved” or confirmed in some manner by a legislative organ; others contain fundamental laws which are not susceptible of alteration except by a special procedure of constitutional amendment and which in that way indirectly impose restrictions upon the power of the executive to conclude treaties. Legally, a distinction can be drawn under internal law between those types of provision which place constitutional limits upon the power of a government to enter into treaties and those which merely limit the power of a government to enforce a treaty within the State’s internal law without some form of endorsement of the treaty by the legislature. The former can be said to affect the actual power of the executive to conclude a treaty, the latter merely the power to implement a treaty when concluded. The question which arises under this article is how far any of these constitutional limitations may affect the validity under international law of a consent to a treaty given by a State agent ostensibly authorized to declare that consent; and on this question opinion has been divided.

(2) Some jurists maintain that international law leaves it to the internal law of each State to determine the organs and procedures by which the will of a State to be bound by a treaty shall be formed and expressed; and that constitutional laws governing the formation and expression of a State’s consent to a treaty have always to be taken into account in considering whether an international act of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession is effective to bind the State. On this view, internal laws limiting the power of State organs to enter into treaties are to be considered part of international law so as to avoid, or at least render voidable, any consent to a treaty given on the international plane in disregard of a constitutional limitation; the agent purporting to bind the State in breach of the constitution is totally incompetent in international as well as national law to express its consent to the treaty. If this view were to be accepted, it would follow that other States would not be entitled to rely on the authority to commit the State ostensibly possessed by a Head of State, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, etc., under article 6; they would have to satisfy themselves in each case that the provisions of the State’s constitution are not infringed or take the risk of subsequently finding the treaty void.

(3) In 1951 the Commission itself adopted an article based upon this view. Some members, however, were strongly critical of the thesis that constitutional limitations are incorporated into international law, while the Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs expressed misgivings as to the difficulties with which it might confront depositaries. During the discussion at that session it was said that the Commission’s decision had been based less on legal principles than on a belief that States would not accept any other rule.

(4) Other jurists, while basing themselves on the incorporation of constitutional limitations into international law, recognize that some qualification of that doctrine is essential if it is not to undermine the security of treaties. According to them, good faith requires that only notorious constitutional limitations with which other States can reasonably be expected to acquaint themselves should be taken into account. On this view, a State contesting the validity of a treaty on constitutional grounds may invoke only those provisions of the constitution which are notorious. A compromise solution based upon the initial hypothesis of the invalidity in international law of an unconstitutional signature, ratification, etc., of a treaty presents certain difficulties. If a limitation laid down in the internal law of a State is to be regarded as effective in international law to curtail the authority of a Head of State or other State agent to declare the State’s consent to a treaty, it is not clear upon what principle a “notorious” limitation is effective for that purpose but a “non-notorious” one is not. Under the State’s internal law both kinds of limitation are legally effective to curtail the agent’s authority to enter into the treaty. The practical difficulties are even greater, because in many cases it is quite impossible to make a clear-cut distinction between notorious and non-notorious limitations. Some constitutional provisions are capable of subjective interpretation, such as a requirement that “political” treaties or treaties of “special importance” should be submitted to the legislature; some laws do not make it clear on their face whether the limitation refers to the power to conclude the treaty or to its effectiveness within domestic law. But even when the provisions are

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203 Article 2: “A treaty becomes binding in relation to a State by signature, ratification, accession or any other means of expressing the will of the State, in accordance with its constitutional law and practice through an organ competent for that purpose.” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1931, vol. II, p. 73.)

204 See United Nations Legislative Series, Laws and Practices concerning the Conclusions of Treaties (ST/LEG/SER.B/3).

205 1963 draft, article 31.
apparently uncomplicated and precise, the superficial clarity and notoriety of the limitations may be quite deceptive. Where the constitution itself contains apparently strict and precise limitations it has usually been found necessary to admit a wide freedom for the executive to conclude treaties in simplified form without following the strict procedures prescribed in internal law; and this use of the treaty-making power is reconciled with the letter of the law either by a process of interpretation or by the development of political understandings. Furthermore, the constitutional practice in regard to treaties in simplified form tends to be somewhat flexible; and the question whether or not to deal with a particular treaty under the procedures laid down in the constitution then becomes to some extent a matter of the political judgment of the executive, whose decision may afterwards be challenged in the legislature or in the courts. Accordingly, in many cases it may be difficult to say with any certainty whether, if contested, a given treaty would be held under national law to fall within an internal limitation, or whether an international tribunal would hold the internal provision to be one that is "notorious" and "clear" for the purposes of international law.

(5) A third group of jurists considers that international law leaves to each State the determination of the organs and procedures by which its will to conclude treaties is formed, and is itself concerned exclusively with the external manifestations of this will on the international plane. According to this view, international law determines the procedures and conditions under which States express their consent to treaties on the international plane; and it also regulates the conditions under which the various categories of State organs and agents will be recognized as competent to carry out such procedures on behalf of their State. In consequence, if an agent, competent under international law to commit the State, expresses the consent of the State to a treaty through one of the established procedures, the State is held bound by the treaty in international law. Under this view, failure to comply with internal requirements may entail the invalidity of the treaty as domestic law, and may also render the agent liable to legal consequences under domestic law; but it does not affect the validity of the treaty in international law so long as the agent acted within the scope of his authority under international law. Some of these writers modify the stringency of the rule in cases where the other State is actually aware of the failure to comply with internal law or where the lack of constitutional authority is so manifest that the other State must be deemed to have been aware of it. As the basic principle, according to the third group, is that a State is entitled to assume the regularity of what is done within the authority possessed by an agent under international law, it is logical enough that the State should not be able to do so when it knows, or must in law be assumed to know, that in the particular case the authority does not exist.

(6) The decisions of international tribunals and State practice, if they are not conclusive, appear to support a solution based upon the position taken by the third group. The international jurisprudence is admittedly not very extensive. The Cleveland award (1888) and the George Pinson case (1928), although not involving actual decisions on the point, contain observations favouring the relevance of constitutional provisions to the international validity of treaties. On the other hand, the Franco-Swiss Custom case (1912) and the Rio Martin case (1924) contain definite decisions by arbitrators declining to take account of alleged breaches of constitutional limitations when upholding the validity respectively of a protocol and an exchange of notes, while the Metzger case contains an observation in the same sense. Furthermore, pronouncements in the Eastern Greenland and Free Zones cases, while not directly in point, seem to indicate that international tribunals will not readily go behind the ostensible authority under international law of a State agent—a Foreign Minister and an Agent in international proceedings in the cases mentioned—to commit his State.

(7) State practice furnishes examples of claims that treaties were invalid on constitutional grounds, but in none of them was that claim admitted by the other party to the dispute. Moreover, in three instances—the admission of Luxembourg to the League, the Politis incident and the membership of Argentina—the League of Nations seems to have acted upon the principle that a consent given on the international plane by an ostensibly competent State agent is not invalidated by the subsequent disclosure that the agent lacked constitutional authority to commit his State. Again, in one case a depositary, the United States Government, seems to have assumed that an ostensibly regular notice of adherence to an agreement could not be withdrawn on a plea of lack of constitutional authority except with the consent of the other parties. Nor is it the practice of State agents, when concluding treaties, to cross-examine each other as to their constitutional authority to affix their signatures to a treaty or to deposit an instrument of ratification, acceptance, etc.

(8) The view that a failure to comply with constitutional provisions should not normally be regarded as vitiating a consent given in due form by an organ or agent ostensibly competent to give it, appears to derive support from two further considerations. The first is that international law has devised a number of treaty-making procedures—ratification, acceptance, approval and accession—specifically for the purpose of enabling Governments to reflect fully upon the treaty before deciding whether or not the State should become a party to it, and also of enabling them to take account of any domestic constitutional requirements. When a treaty has been made subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, the negotiating States would seem to have done all that

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211 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, p. 262.

can reasonably be demanded of them in the way of taking account of each other's constitutional requirements. It would scarcely be reasonable to expect each Government subsequently to follow the internal handling of the treaty by each of the other Governments, while any questioning on constitutional grounds of the internal handling of the treaty by another Government would certainly be regarded as an inadmissible interference in its affairs. The same considerations apply in cases of accession where the Government has the fullest opportunity to study the treaty and give effect to constitutional requirements before taking any action on the international plane to declare the State's accession to the treaty. Again, in the case of a treaty binding upon signature it is the Government which authorizes the use of this procedure; the Government is aware of the object of the treaty before the negotiations begin and, with modern methods of communication, it normally has knowledge of the exact contents of the treaty before its representative proceeds to the act of signature; moreover, if necessary, its representative can be instructed to sign ad referendum. Admittedly, in the case of treaties binding upon signature, and more especially those in simplified form, there may be a slightly greater risk of a constitutional provision being overlooked. But even in those cases the Government had the necessary means of controlling the acts of its representative and of giving effect to any constitutional requirements. In other words, in every case any failure to comply with constitutional provisions in entering into a treaty will be the clear responsibility of the Government of the State concerned.

(9) The second consideration is that the majority of the diplomatic incidents in which States have invoked their constitutional requirements as a ground of invalidity have been cases in which for quite other reasons they have desired to escape from their obligations under the treaty. Where a Government has genuinely found itself in constitutional difficulties after concluding a treaty and has raised the matter promptly, it appears normally to be able to get the constitutional obstacle removed by internal action and to obtain any necessary indulgence in the meanwhile from the other parties. Confronted with a challenge under national law of the constitutional validity of a treaty, a Government will normally seek to regularize its position under the treaty by taking appropriate action in the domestic or international sphere.

(10) At the fifteenth session some members of the Commission expressed the opinion that international law has to take account of internal law to the extent of recognizing that internal law determines the organ or organs competent in the State to exercise the treaty-making power. On this view, any treaty concluded by an organ or representative not competent to do so under internal law would be invalid by reason of the lack of authority under internal law to give the State's consent to the treaty. The majority, however, considered that the complexity and uncertainty of proceedings of internal law regarding the conclusion of treaties creates too large a risk to the security of treaties. They considered that the basic principle of the present article should be that non-observance of a provision of internal law regarding competence to enter into treaties does not affect the validity of a consent given in due form by a State organ or agent competent under international law to give that consent. Some members, in fact, took the view that it was undesirable to weaken this basic principle in any way by admitting any exception to it. Other members, however, considered that it would be admissible to allow an exception in cases where the violation of the internal law regarding competence to enter into treaties was absolutely manifest. They had in mind cases, such as have occurred in the past, where a Head of State enters into a treaty on his own responsibility in contravention of an unequivocal provision of the constitution. They did not feel that to allow this exception would compromise the basic principle, since the other State could not legitimately claim to have relied upon a consent given in such circumstances. This view prevailed in the Commission.

(11) The great majority of the Governments which have commented on this article have indicated their approval of the position taken up by the Commission on this problem: namely, that a violation of a provision of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties may not be invoked as invalidating consent unless that violation was manifest. Some Governments suggested that the text should indicate, on the other hand, to whom the violation must be "manifest" for the purpose of bringing the exception into play and, on the other, what constitutes a "manifest violation". The Commission considered, however, that it is unnecessary to specify further to whom the violation must be manifest. The rule embodied in the article is that, when the violation of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties would be objectively evident to any State dealing with the matter normally and in good faith, the consent to the treaty purported to be given on behalf of the State may be repudiated. In the Commission's view, the word "manifest" according to its ordinary meaning is sufficient to indicate the objective character of the criterion to be applied. It was also of the opinion that it would be impracticable and inadvisable to try to specify in advance the cases in which a violation of internal law may be held to be "manifest", since the question must depend on the large extent on the particular circumstances of each case.

(12) In order to emphasize the exceptional character of the cases in which this ground of invalidity may be invoked, the Commission decided that the rule should be stated in negative form. The article thus provides that "A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation of its internal law was manifest".

Article 44. 214 Specific restrictions on authority to express the consent of the State

If the authority of a representative to express the consent of his State to be bound by a particular treaty has been made subject to a specific restriction, his omission to observe that restriction may not be invoked as invalidating a

214 1963 draft, article 32, para. 2.
consent expressed by him unless the restriction was brought to the knowledge of the other negotiating States prior to his expressing such consent.

Commentary

(1) This article covers cases where a representative has purported to execute an act binding his State but in fact lacked authority to do so, because in the particular case his authority was made subject to specific restrictions which he omitted to observe.

(2) Where a treaty is not to become binding without subsequent ratification, acceptance or approval, any excess of authority committed by a representative in establishing the text of the treaty will automatically be dealt with at the subsequent stage of ratification, acceptance or approval. The State in question will then have the clear choice either of repudiating the text established by its representative or of ratifying, accepting or approving the treaty; and if it does the latter, it will necessarily be held to have endorsed the unauthorized act of its representative and, by doing so, to have cured the original defect of authority. Accordingly, the article is confined to cases in which the defect of authority relates to the execution of an act by which a representative purports finally to establish his State’s consent to be bound. In other words, it is confined to cases where a representative authorized, subject to specific conditions, reservations or limitations, to express the consent of his State to be bound by a particular treaty exceeds his authority by omitting to observe those restrictions upon it.

(3) The Commission considered that in order to safeguard the security of international transactions, the rule must be that specific instructions given by a State to its representative are only effective to limit his authority to cases where a representative authorized, subject to specific conditions, reservations or limitations, to express the consent of his State to be bound by a particular treaty exceeds his authority by omitting to observe those restrictions upon it.

Article 45. 215 Error

1. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error, or if the circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error.

3. An error relating only to the wording of the text of a treaty does not affect its validity; article 74 then applies.

Commentary

(1) In municipal law error occupies a comparatively large place as a factor which vitiates consent to a contract. Some types of error found in municipal law are, however, unlikely to arise in international law. Moreover, treaty-making processes are such as to reduce to a minimum the risk of errors on material points of substance. In consequence, the instances in which errors of substance have been invoked as affecting the essential validity of a treaty have not been frequent. Almost all the recorded instances concern geographical errors, and most of them concern errors in maps. In some instances, the difficulty was disposed of by a further treaty; in others the error was treated more as affecting the application of the treaty than its validity and the point was settled by arbitration.

(2) The effect of error was discussed in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case before the Permanent Court of International Justice, and again in the Temple of Preah Vihear case before the present Court. In the former case 216 the Court contented itself with saying that the Norwegian Foreign Minister’s reply had been definitive and unconditional and appears not to have considered that there was any relevant error in the case. Judge Anzilotti, while also considering that there was no error, said: “But even accepting, for a moment, the supposition that M. Ihlen was mistaken as to the results which might ensue from an extension of Danish sovereignty, it must be admitted that this mistake was not such as to entail the nullity of the agreement. If a mistake is pleaded it must be of an excusable character; and one can scarcely believe that a Government could be ignorant of the legitimate consequences following upon an extension of sovereignty...” 217

(3) In the first stage of the Temple case 218 the Court said: “Any error of this kind would evidently have been an error of law, but in any event the Court does not consider that the issue in the present case is really one of error. Furthermore, the principal juridical relevance of error, where it exists, is that it may affect the reality of the consent supposed to have been given.” A plea of error was also raised in the second stage of the case on the merits; and the error, which was geographical, arose in somewhat special circumstances. There was no error in the conclusion of the original treaty, in which the parties were agreed that the boundary in a particular area should be the line of a certain watershed; the error concerned the subsequent acceptance of the delimitation of the boundary on a map. As to this error, the Court said: “It is an established rule of law that the plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent, if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error, or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible error.” 219

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215 1963 draft, article 34.
216 P.C.I.J. (1933), Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 71 and 91.
217 Ibid., p. 92.
219 I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 26. See also the individual opinion of Sir G. Fitzmaurice (Ibid., p. 57).
(4) The *Eastern Greenland* and *Temple* cases throw light on the conditions under which error will *not* vitiate consent rather than on those under which it will do so. However, in the *Readaptation of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions* case, 220 which concerned a concession not a treaty, the Court held that an error in regard to a matter not constituting a *condition* of the agreement would not suffice to invalidate the consent; and it seems to be generally agreed that, to vitiate the consent of a State to a treaty, an error must relate to a matter constituting an essential basis of its consent to the treaty.

(5) The Commission recognized that some systems of law distinguish between mutual and unilateral error; but it did not consider that it would be appropriate to make this distinction in international law. Accordingly, the present article applies to an error made by only one party no less than to a mutual error made by both or all the parties.

(6) Paragraph 1 formulates the general rule that an error in a treaty may be invoked by a party as vitiating its consent where the error related to a fact or situation assumed by that party to exist at the time that the treaty was concluded and constituting an essential basis of its consent to the treaty. The Commission appreciated that an error in a treaty may sometimes involve mixed questions of fact and of law and that the line between an error of fact and of law may not always be an easy one to draw. Nevertheless, it considered that to introduce into the article a provision appearing to admit an error of law as in itself a ground for invalidating consent would dangerously weaken the stability of treaties. Accordingly, the paragraph speaks only of errors relating to a "fact" or "situation".

(7) Under paragraph 1 error affects consent only if it was an essential error in the sense of an error as to a matter which formed an essential basis of the consent given to the treaty. Furthermore, such an error does not make the treaty automatically void, but gives a right to the party whose consent to the treaty was caused by the error to invoke the error as invalidating its consent. On the other hand, if the invalidity of the treaty is established in accordance with the present articles, the effect will be to make the treaty void *ab initio*.

(8) Paragraph 2 excepts from the rule cases where the mistaken party in some degree brought the error upon itself. The terms in which the exception is formulated are drawn from those used by the Court in the sentence from its judgment in the *Temple* case which is cited at the end of paragraph (3) above. The Commission felt, however, that there is substance in the view that the Court's formulation of the exception "if the party contributed by its own conduct to the error, or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible error" is so wide as to leave little room for the operation of the rule. This applies particularly to the words "or could have avoided it". Accordingly, without questioning the Court's formulation of the exception in the context of the particular case, the Commission concluded that, in codifying the general rule regarding the effect of error in the law of treaties, those words should be omitted.

(9) Paragraph 3, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, distinguishes errors in the *wording* of the text from errors in the treaty. The paragraph merely underlines that such an error does not affect the validity of the consent and falls under the provisions of article 74 relating to the correction of errors in the texts of treaties.

**Article 46.** 221 Fraud

A State which has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

**Commentary**

(1) Clearly, cases in which Governments resort to deliberate fraud in order to procure the conclusion of a treaty are likely to be rare, while any fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact inducing an essential error would be caught by the provisions of the preceding article dealing with error; the question therefore arises whether it is necessary to have a separate article dealing specifically with fraud. On balance the Commission considered that it was advisable to keep fraud and error distinct in separate articles. Fraud, when it occurs, strikes at the root of an agreement in a somewhat different way from innocent misrepresentation and error. It does not merely affect the consent of the other party to the terms of the agreement; it destroys the whole basis of mutual confidence between the parties.

(2) Fraud is a concept found in most systems of law, but the scope of the concept is not the same in all systems. In international law, the paucity of precedents means that there is little guidance to be found either in practice or in the jurisprudence of international tribunals as to the scope to be given to the concept. In these circumstances, the Commission considered whether it should attempt to define fraud in the law of treaties. The Commission concluded, however, that it would suffice to formulate the general concept of fraud applicable in the law of treaties and to leave its precise scope to be worked out in practice and in the decisions of international tribunals.

(3) The article uses the English word "fraud", the French word "dol" and the Spanish word "dolo" as the nearest terms available in those languages for identifying the concept with which the article is concerned. These words are not intended to convey that all the detailed connotations given to them in internal law are necessarily applicable in international law. It is the broad concept comprised in each of these words, rather than its detailed applications in internal law, that is dealt with in the present article. The word used in each of the three texts is accordingly intended to have the same meaning and...
Corruption of a representative of the State

If the expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured through the corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

Commentary

(1) The draft articles on the invalidity of treaties provisionally adopted by the Commission in 1963 and transmitted to Governments for their observations did not contain any provision dealing specifically with the corruption of a State’s representative by another negotiating State. The only provision of the 1963 text under which the corruption of a representative might be subsumed was article 33 dealing with fraud. At the second part of the seventeenth session, however, in connexion with its re-examination of article 35 (personal coercion of a representative)—now article 48—some members of the Commission expressed doubts as to whether corruption of a representative can properly be regarded as a case of fraud. The Commission therefore decided to reconsider the question at the present session with a view to the possible addition of a specific provision concerning corruption in either former article 33 or 35.

(2) At the present session certain members of the Commission were opposed to the inclusion in the draft articles of any specific provision regarding “corruption”. These members considered such a provision to be unnecessary especially since the use of corruption, if it occurred, would in their view fall under the present article 46 as a case of fraud. Corruption, they maintained, is not an independent cause of defective consent but merely one of the possible means of securing consent through “fraud” or “dol”. It would thus be covered by the expression “fraudulent conduct” (conduite frauduleuse, conducta fraudulenta) in article 46.

(3) The majority of the Commission, however, considered that the corruption of a representative by another negotiating State undermines the consent which the representative purports to express on behalf of his State in a quite special manner which differentiates the case from one of fraud. Again, although the corruption of a representative may in some degree be analogous to his coercion by acts directed against him personally, the Commission considered that cases of threat or use of force against a representative are of such particular gravity as to make it desirable to treat the two grounds of invalidity in separate articles. Nor did it think that “corruption” could be left aside altogether from the draft articles. It felt that in practice attempts to corrupt are more likely than attempts to coerce a representative; and that, having regard to the great volume of treaties concluded to-day and the great variety of the methods of concluding them, a specific provision on the subject is desirable. Accordingly, it decided to cover “corruption” in a new article inserted between the article dealing with “fraud” and that dealing with “coercion of a representative of a State”.

(4) The strong term “corruption” is used in the article expressly in order to indicate that only acts calculated to exercise a substantial influence on the disposition of the representative to conclude the treaty may be invoked as invalidating the expression of consent which he has purported to give on behalf of his State. The Commission did not mean to imply that under the present article a small courtesy or favour shown to a representative in connexion with the conclusion of a treaty may be invoked as a pretext for invalidating the treaty.

(5) Similarly, the phrase “directly or indirectly by another negotiating State” is used in the article in order to make it plain that the mere fact of the representative’s having been corrupted is not enough. The Commission appreciated that corruption by another negotiating State, if it occurs, is unlikely to be overt. But it considered that, in order to be a ground for invalidating the treaty, the corrupt acts must be shown to be directly or indirectly imputable to the other negotiating State.

(6) The Commission was further of the opinion that in regard to its legal incidents “corruption” should be assimilated to “fraud” rather than to “coercion of a representative”. Accordingly, for the purposes of article 41, paragraph 4, concerning the separability of treaty provisions, article 42, concerning loss of a right to invoke a ground of invalidity, and article 65, paragraph 3, concerning the consequences of the invalidity of a treaty, cases of corruption are placed on the same footing as cases of fraud.

Corruption of a representative of the State

The expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him personally shall be without any legal effect.

Commentary

(1) There is general agreement that acts of coercion or threats applied to individuals with respect to their own persons or in their personal capacity in order to procure the signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of a
treaty will unquestionably invalidate the consent so procured. History provides a number of instances of the employment of coercion against not only negotiators but also members of legislatures in order to procure the signature or ratification of a treaty. It is true that in some instances it may not be possible to distinguish completely between coercion of a Head of State or Minister as a means of coercing the State itself and coercion of them in their personal capacities. For example, something like third-degree methods of pressure were employed in 1939 for the purpose of extracting the signatures of President Hacha and the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia to a treaty creating a German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, as well as the gravest threats against their State. Nevertheless, the two forms of coercion, although they may sometimes be combined, are, from a legal point of view, somewhat different; the Commission has accordingly placed them in separate articles.

(2) The present article deals with the coercion of the individual representatives “through acts or threats directed against him personally”. This phrase is intended to cover any form of constraint or threat against a representative affecting him as an individual and not as an organ of his State. It would therefore include not only a threat to his person, but a threat to ruin his career by exposing a private indiscretion, as also a threat to injure a member of the representative’s family with a view to coercing the representative.

(3) The Commission gave consideration to the question whether coercion of a representative, as distinct from coercion of the State, should render the treaty ipso facto void or whether it should merely entitle it to invoke the coercion of its representative as invalidating its consent to the treaty. It concluded that the use of coercion against the representative of a State for the purpose of procuring the conclusion of a treaty would be a matter of such gravity that the article should provide for the absolute nullity of a consent to a treaty so obtained.

Article 49.284 Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force

A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Commentary

(1) The traditional doctrine prior to the Covenant of the League of Nations was that the validity of a treaty was not affected by the fact that it had been brought about by the threat or use of force. However, this doctrine was simply a reflection of the general attitude of international law during that era towards the legality of the use of force for the settlement of international disputes. With the Covenant and the Pact of Paris there began to develop a strong body of opinion which held that such treaties should no longer be recognized as legally valid. The endorsement of the criminality of aggressive war in the Charters of the Allied Military Tribunals for the trial of the Axis war criminals, the clear-cut prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, together with the practice of the United Nations itself, have reinforced and consolidated this development in the law. The Commission considers that these developments justify the conclusion that the invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or use of force is a principle which is lex lata in the international law of to-day.

(2) Some jurists, it is true, while not disputing the moral value of the principle, have hesitated to accept it as a legal rule. They fear that to recognize the principle as a legal rule may open the door to the evasion of treaties by encouraging unfounded assertions of coercion, and that the rule will be ineffective because the same threat or compulsion that procured the conclusion of the treaty will also procure its execution, whether the law regards it as valid or invalid. These objections do not appear to the Commission to be of such a kind as to call for the omission from the present articles of a ground of invalidity springing from the most fundamental provisions of the Charter, the relevance of which in the law of treaties as in other branches of international law cannot to-day be regarded as open to question.

(3) If the notion of coercion is confined, as the Commission thinks it must be, to a threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter, this ground of invalidity would not appear to be any more open to the possibility of illegitimate attempts to evade treaty obligations than other grounds. Some members of the Commission expressed the view that any other forms of pressure, such as a threat to strangle the economy of a country, ought to be stated in the article as falling within the concept of coercion. The Commission, however, decided to define coercion in terms of a “threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter”, and considered that the precise scope of the acts covered by this definition should be left to be determined in practice by interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter.

(4) Again, even if sometimes a State should initially be successful in achieving its objects by a threat or use of force, it cannot be assumed in the circumstances of to-day that a rule nullifying a treaty procured by such unlawful means would not prove meaningful and effective. The existence, universal character and effective functioning of the United Nations in themselves provide for the necessary framework for the operation of the rule formulated in the present article.

(5) The Commission considered that the rule should be stated in as simple and categorical terms as possible. The article therefore provides that “A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. The principles regarding the threat or use of force laid down in the Charter are, in the opinion of the Commission, rules of general international law which are to-day of universal application. It accordingly appears to be both legitimate and appropriate to frame

284 1963 draft, article 36.
the article in terms of the principles of the Charter. At the same time, the phrase “violation of the principles of the Charter” has been chosen rather than “violation of the Charter”, in order that the article should not appear to be confined in its application to Members of the United Nations. Clearly the same rule would apply in the event of an individual State’s being coerced into expressing its consent to be bound by a multilateral treaty. The Commission discussed whether it should add a second paragraph to the article specifically applying the rule to such a case, but concluded that this was unnecessary, since the nullity of the consent so procured is beyond question implicit in the general rule stated in the article.

(6) The Commission further considered that a treaty procured by a threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter must be characterized as void, rather than as voidable at the instance of the injured party. The prohibitions on the threat or use of force contained in the Charter are rules of international law the observance of which is legally a matter of concern to every State. Even if it were conceivable that after being liberated from the influence of a threat or of a use of force a State might wish to allow a treaty procured from it by such means, the Commission considered it essential that the treaty should be regarded in law as void ab initio. This would enable the State concerned to take its decision in regard to the maintenance of the treaty in a position of full legal equality with the other State. If, therefore, the treaty were maintained in force, it would in effect be by the conclusion of a new treaty and not by the recognition of the validity of a treaty procured by means contrary to the most fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

(7) The question of the time element in the application of the article was raised in the comments of Governments from two points of view: (a) the undesirability of allowing the rule contained in the article to operate retroactively upon treaties concluded prior to the establishment of the modern law regarding recourse to the threat or use of force; and (b) the date from which that law should be considered as having been in operation. The Commission considered that there is no question of the article having retroactive effects on the validity of treaties concluded prior to the establishment of the modern law.225 “A juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it.”226 The present article concerns the conditions for the valid conclusion of a treaty—the conditions, that is, for the creation of a legal relation by treaty. An evolution of the law governing the conditions for the carrying out of a legal act does not operate to deprive of validity a legal act already accomplished in conformity with the law previously in force. The rule codified in the present article cannot therefore be properly understood as depriving of validity ab initio a peace treaty or other treaty procured by coercion prior to the establishment of the modern law regarding the threat or use of force.

(8) As to the date from which the modern law should be considered as in force for the purposes of the present article, the Commission considered that it would be illogical and unacceptable to formulate the rule as one applicable only from the date of the conclusion of a convention on the law of treaties. As pointed out in paragraph (1) above, the invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or use of force is a principle which is lex lata. Moreover, whatever differences of opinion there may be about the state of the law prior to the establishment of the United Nations, the great majority of international lawyers to-day unhesitatingly hold that Article 2, paragraph 4, together with other provisions of the Charter, authoritatively declares the modern customary law regarding the threat or use of force. The present article, by its formulation, recognizes by implication that the rule which it lays down is applicable at any rate to all treaties concluded since the entry into force of the Charter. On the other hand, the Commission did not think that it was part of its function, in codifying the modern law of treaties, to specify on what precise date in the past an existing general rule in another branch of international law came to be established as such. Accordingly, it did not feel that it should go beyond the temporal indication given by the reference in the article to “the principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.

Article 50.227 Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)

A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Commentary

(1) The view that in the last analysis there is no rule of international law from which States cannot at their own free will contract out has become increasingly difficult to sustain, although some jurists deny the existence of any rules of jus cogens in international law, since in their view even the most general rules still fall short of being universal. The Commission pointed out that the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens. Moreover, if some Governments in their comments have expressed doubts as to the advisability of this article unless it is accompanied by provision for independent adjudication, only one questioned the existence of rules of jus cogens in the international law of to-day. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that in codifying the law of treaties it must start from the basis that to-day there are certain rules from which States are not competent to derogate at all by a treaty arrangement, and which may be changed only by another rule of the same character.

(2) The formulation of the article is not free from difficulty, since there is no simple criterion by which to

225 See also paragraph (6) of the commentary on article 50.
227 1963 draft, article 37.
identify a general rule of international law as having the character of *jus cogens*. Moreover, the majority of the general rules of international law do not have that character, and States may contract out of them by treaty. It would therefore be going much too far to state that a treaty is void if its provisions conflict with a rule of general international law. Nor would it be correct to say that a provision in a treaty possesses the character of *jus cogens* merely because the parties have stipulated that no derogation from that provision is to be permitted, so that another treaty which conflicted with that provision would be void. Such a stipulation may be inserted in any treaty with respect to any subject-matter for any reasons which may seem good to the parties. The conclusion by a party of a later treaty derogating from such a stipulation may, of course, engage its responsibility for a breach of the earlier treaty. But the breach of the stipulation does not, simply as such, render the treaty void (see article 26).

It is not the form of a general rule of international law but the particular nature of the subject-matter with which it deals that may, in the opinion of the Commission, give it the character of *jus cogens*.

(3) The emergence of rules having the character of *jus cogens* is comparatively recent, while international law is in process of rapid development. The Commission considered the right course to be to provide in general terms that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a rule of *jus cogens* and to leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. Some members of the Commission felt that there might be advantage in specifying, by way of illustration, some of the most obvious and best settled rules of *jus cogens* in order to indicate by these examples the general nature and scope of the rule contained in the article. Examples suggested included (a) a treaty contemplating an unlawful use of force contrary to the principles of the Charter, (b) a treaty contemplating the performance of any other act criminal under international law, and (c) a treaty contemplating or conniving at the commission of acts, such as trade in slaves, piracy or genocide, in the suppression of which every State is called upon to co-operate. Other members expressed the view that, if examples were given, it would be undesirable to appear to limit the scope of the article to cases involving acts which constitute crimes under international law; treaties violating human rights, the equality of States or the principle of self-determination were mentioned as other possible examples. The Commission decided against including any examples of rules of *jus cogens* in the article for two reasons. First, the mention of some cases of treaties void for conflict with a rule of *jus cogens* might, even with the most careful drafting, lead to misunderstanding as to the position concerning other cases not mentioned in the article. Secondly, if the Commission were to attempt to draw up, even on a selective basis, a list of the rules of international law which are to be regarded as having the character of *jus cogens*, it might find itself engaged in a prolonged study of matters which fall outside the scope of the present articles.

(4) Accordingly, the article simply provides that a treaty is void "if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character". This provision makes it plain that nullity attaches to a treaty under the article only if the rule with which it conflicts is a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted, even by agreement between particular States. On the other hand, it would clearly be wrong to regard even rules of *jus cogens* as immutable and incapable of modification in the light of future developments. As a modification of a rule of *jus cogens* would to-day most probably be effected through a general multilateral treaty, the Commission thought it desirable to indicate that such a treaty would fall outside the scope of the article. The article, therefore, defines rules of *jus cogens* as peremptory norms of general international law from which no derogation is permitted "and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character".

(5) The Commission thinks it desirable to state its point of view with regard to two matters raised in the comments of Governments. The first, already mentioned above, concerns the difficulty of applying the article in a satisfactory manner unless it is accompanied by a system of independent adjudication or by some provision for an authoritative determination of the rules which are rules of *jus cogens*. The Commission considered that the question of the means of resolving a dispute regarding the invalidity of a treaty, if it may have particular importance in connexion with the present article, is a general one affecting the application of all the articles on the invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties. It has sought, so far as is practicable in the present state of international opinion regarding acceptance of compulsory means of pacific settlement, to cover the question by the procedural safeguards laid down in article 62. This article is designed to exclude the arbitrary determination of the invalidity, termination or suspension of a treaty by an individual State such as has happened not infrequently in the past and to ensure that recourse shall be had to the means of peaceful settlement indicated in Article 33 of the Charter. In the Commission's view, the position is essentially the same in the cases of an alleged conflict with a rule of *jus cogens* as in the case of other grounds of invalidity alleged by a State.

(6) The second matter is the non-retroactive character of the rule in the present article. The article has to be read in conjunction with article 61 (Emergence of a new rule of *jus cogens*), and in the view of the Commission, there is no question of the present article having retroactive effects. It concerns cases where a treaty is void at the time of its conclusion by reason of the fact that its provisions are in conflict with an already existing rule of *jus cogens*. The treaty is wholly void because its actual conclusion conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no States may derogate even by mutual consent. Article 61, on the other hand, concerns cases where a treaty, valid when concluded, becomes void and terminates by reason of the subsequent establishment of a new rule of *jus cogens* with which its provisions are in conflict. The words "becomes void and termi-
nates" make it quite clear, the Commission considered, that the emergence of a new rule of jus cogens is not to have retroactive effects on the validity of a treaty. The invalidity is to attach only as from the time of the establishment of the new rule of jus cogens. The non-retroactive character of the rules in articles 50 and 61 is further underlined in article 67, paragraph 2 of which provides in the most express manner that the termination of a treaty as a result of the emergence of a new rule of jus cogens is not to have retroactive effects.

Section 3: Termination and suspension of the operation of treaties

Article 51. Termination of or withdrawal from a treaty by consent of the parties

A treaty may be terminated or a party may withdraw from a treaty:

(a) In conformity with a provision of the treaty allowing such termination or withdrawal; or
(b) At any time by consent of all the parties.

Commentary

(1) The majority of modern treaties contain clauses fixing their duration or the date of their termination or a condition or event which is to bring about their termination, or providing for a right to denounce or withdraw from the treaty. In these cases the termination of the treaty is brought about by the provisions of the treaty itself, and how and when this is to happen is essentially a question of interpreting and applying the treaty. The present article sets out the basic rules governing the termination of a treaty through the application of its own provisions.

(2) The treaty clauses are very varied. Many treaties provide that they are to remain in force for a specified period of years or until a particular date or event; others provide for the termination of the treaty through the operation of a resolutory condition. Specific periods fixed by individual treaties may be of very different lengths, periods between one and twelve years being usual but longer periods up to twenty, fifty and even ninety-nine years being sometimes found. More common in modern practice are treaties which fix a comparatively short initial period for their duration, such as five or ten years, but at the same time provide for their continuance in force after the expiry of the period subject to a right of denunciation or withdrawal. These provisions normally take the form either of an indefinite continuance in force of the treaty subject to a right of denunciation on six or twelve months' notice, or of a renewal of the treaty for successive periods of years subject to a right of denunciation or withdrawal on giving notice to that effect six months before the expiry of each period. Some treaties fix no period for their duration and simply provide for a right to denounce or withdraw from the treaty, either with or without a period of notice. Occasionally, a treaty which fixes a single specific period, such as five or ten years, for its duration allows a right of denunciation or withdrawal even during the currency of the period.

(3) The Commission considered that, whatever may be the provisions of a treaty regarding its own termination, it is always possible for all the parties to agree together to put an end to the treaty. It also considered that the particular form which such an agreement may take is a matter for the parties themselves to decide in each case. The theory has sometimes been advanced that an agreement terminating a treaty must be cast in the same form as the treaty which is to be terminated or at least constitute a treaty form of equal weight. The Commission, however, concluded that this theory reflects the constitutional practice of particular States and not a rule of international law. In its opinion, international law does not accept the theory of the "acte contraire". The States concerned are always free to choose the form in which they arrive at their agreement to terminate the treaty. In doing so, they will doubtless take into account their own constitutional requirements, but international law requires no more than that they should consent to the treaty's termination. At the same time, the Commission considered it important to underline that, when a treaty is terminated otherwise than under its provisions, the consent of all the parties is necessary. The termination, unlike the amendment, of a treaty necessarily deprives all the parties of all their rights and, in consequence, the consent of all of them is necessary.

(4) The Commission gave careful consideration to the question whether, at any rate for a certain period of time after the adoption of the text of a treaty, the consent even of all the parties should not be regarded as sufficient for its termination. It appreciated that the other States still entitled to become parties to the treaty have a certain interest in the matter; and it examined the possibility of providing that until the expiry of a specified period of years the consent of not less than two-thirds of all the States which adopted the text should be necessary. Such a provison might, it was suggested, be particularly needed in the case of treaties brought into force on the deposit only of very few instruments of ratification, etc. Although the comments of some Governments appeared not to be unfavourable to the inclusion of such a provision, the Commission concluded that it might introduce an undesirable complication into the operation of the rule regarding termination by consent of the parties. Nor did it understand this question ever to have given rise to difficulties in practice. Accordingly, it decided not to insert any provision on the point in the article.

(5) The article is thus confined to two clear and simple rules. A treaty may be terminated or a party may terminate its own participation in a treaty by agreement in two ways: (a) in conformity with the treaty, and (b) at any time by consent of all the parties.

228 See an observation of the United States representative at the 49th meeting of the Social Committee of the Economic and Social Council (E/AC.7/SR.49, p. 8) to which Sir G. Fitzmaurice drew attention.

229 See Handbook of Final Clauses (ST/LEG/6), pp. 54-73.
Article 52. Reduction of the number of parties to a multilateral treaty below the number necessary for its entry into force

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a multilateral treaty does not terminate by reason only of the fact that the number of the parties falls below the number specified in the treaty as necessary for its entry into force.

Commentary

(1) A multilateral treaty which is subject to denunciation or withdrawal sometimes provides for termination of the treaty itself, if denunciations or withdrawals should reduce the number of parties to less than six becomes effective". In some cases the minimum number of surviving parties required to keep the treaty alive is even smaller, e.g. five in the case of the Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Commercial Road Vehicles and three in the case of the Convention Regarding the Measurement and Registration of Vessels Employed in Inland Navigation. In other cases a larger number of parties is required. Clearly, provisions of this kind establish a resolutory condition and the termination of the treaty, should it occur, falls under article 51, sub-paragraph (a).

(2) A further point arises, however, as to whether a multilateral treaty, the entry into force of which was made dependent upon its ratification, acceptance, etc. by a given minimum number of States, automatically ceases to be in force, should the parties afterwards fall below that number as a result of denunciations or withdrawals. The Commission considers that this is not a necessary effect of a drop in the number of the parties below that fixed for the treaty's entry into force. The treaty provisions in question relate exclusively to the conditions for the entry into force of the treaty and, if the negotiating States had intended the minimum number of parties fixed for that purpose to be a continuing condition for the maintenance in force of the treaty, it would have been both easy and natural for them so to provide. In some cases, it is true, a treaty which fixes a low minimum number of parties for entry into force prescribes the same number for the cessation of the treaty. But there is no general practice to that effect, and the fact that this has not been a regular practice in cases where a larger minimum number, such as ten or twenty, has been fixed for entry into force seems significant. At any rate, when the number for entry into force is of that order of magnitude, it does not seem desirable that the application of the treaty should be dependent on the number of parties not falling below that number. The remaining parties, if unwilling to continue to operate the treaty with the reduced number, may themselves either join together to terminate it or separately exercise their own right of denunciation or withdrawal.

(3) More often than not multilateral treaties fail to cover the point mentioned in the previous paragraph, thereby leaving the question of the continuance of the treaty in doubt. The Commission accordingly considered it desirable that the draft articles should contain a general provision on the point. The present article, for the reasons given above, lays down as the general rule that unless the treaty otherwise provides, a multilateral treaty does not terminate by reason only of the fact that the number of the parties falls below the number specified in the treaty as necessary for its entry into force.

Article 53. Denunciation of a treaty containing no provision regarding termination

1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal.

2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1 of this article.

Commentary

(1) Article 53 covers the termination of treaties which neither contain any provision regarding their duration or termination nor mention any right for the parties to denounce or withdraw from them. Such treaties are not uncommon, recent examples being the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The question is whether they are to be regarded as terminable only by unanimous agreement or whether individual parties are under any conditions to be considered as having an implied right to withdraw from the treaty upon giving reasonable notice to that effect.

(2) In principle, the answer to the question must depend on the intention of the parties in each case, and the very character of some treaties excludes the possibility that the contracting States intended them to be open to unilateral denunciation or withdrawal at the will of an individual party. Treaties of peace and treaties fixing a territorial boundary are examples of such treaties. Many treaties, however, are not of a kind with regard to which it can be said that to allow a unilateral right of denunciation or withdrawal would be inconsistent with the character of the treaty. No doubt, one possible point of view might be that, since the parties in many cases do provide expressly for a unilateral right of denunciation or withdrawal, their silence on the point in other cases must be interpreted as excluding such a right. Some jurists, basing themselves on the Declaration of London of 1871 and certain State practice, take the position that an individual party may denounce or withdraw from a treaty only when such denunciation or withdrawal is
provided for in the treaty or consented to by all the other parties. A number of other jurists, however, take the position that a right of denunciation or withdrawal may properly be implied under certain conditions in some types of treaties.

(3) The difficulty of the problem is well illustrated by the discussions which took place at the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea concerning the insertion of denunciation clauses in the four conventions drawn up at that conference. None of the conventions contains a denunciation clause. They provide only that after five years from the date of their entry into force any party may at any time request the revision of the Convention, and that it will be for the General Assembly to decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of the request. The Drafting Committee, in putting forward this revision clause, observed that its inclusion “made unnecessary any clause on denunciation”. Proposals had previously been made for the inclusion of a denunciation clause and these were renewed in the plenary meeting, notwithstanding the view of the Drafting Committee. Some delegates thought it wholly inconsistent with the nature of codifying conventions to allow denunciation; some thought that a right of denunciation existed anyhow under customary law; others considered it desirable to provide expressly for denunciation in order to take account of possible changes of circumstances. The proposal to include the clause in the “codifying” conventions was rejected by 32 votes to 12, with 23 abstentions. A similar proposal was also made with reference to the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which formulated entirely new law. Here, opponents of the clause argued that a right of denunciation would be out of place in a convention which created new law and was the result of negotiation. Advocates of the clause, on the other hand, regarded the very fact that the convention created new law as justifying and indeed requiring the inclusion of a right of denunciation. Again, the proposal was rejected, by 25 votes to 6, with no less than 35 abstentions. As already mentioned, no clause of denunciation or withdrawal was inserted in these conventions and at the subsequent Vienna Conferences on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, the omission of the clause from the conventions on those subjects was accepted without discussion. However, any temptation to generalize from these Conferences as to the intentions of the parties in regard to the denunciation of “law-making” treaties is discouraged by the fact that other conventions, such as the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, expressly provide for a right of denunciation.

(4) Some members of the Commission considered that in certain types of treaty, such as treaties of alliance, a right of denunciation or withdrawal after reasonable notice should be implied in the treaty unless there are indications of a contrary intention. Other members took the view that, while the omission of any provision for it in the treaty does not exclude the possibility of implying a right of denunciation or withdrawal, the existence of such a right is not to be implied from the character of the treaty alone. According to these members, the intention of the parties is essentially a question of fact to be determined not merely by reference to the character of the treaty but by reference to all the circumstances of the case. This view prevailed in the Commission.

(5) The article states that a treaty not making any provision for its termination or for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless “it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal”. Under this rule, the character of the treaty is only one of the elements to be taken into account, and a right of denunciation or withdrawal will not be implied unless it appears from the general circumstances of the case that the parties intended to allow the possibility of unilateral denunciation or withdrawal.

(6) The Commission considered it essential that any implied right to denounce or withdraw from a treaty should be subject to the giving of a reasonable period of notice. A period of six months’ notice is sometimes found in termination clauses, but this is usually where the treaty is of the renewable type and is open to denunciation by a notice given before or at the time of renewal. Where the treaty is to continue indefinitely subject to a right of denunciation, the period of notice is more usually twelve months, though admittedly in some cases no period of notice is required. In formulating a general rule, the Commission considered it to be desirable to lay down a longer rather than a shorter period in order to give adequate protection to the interests of the other parties to the treaty. Accordingly, it preferred in paragraph 2 to specify that not less than twelve months’ notice must be given of an intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under the present article.

Article 54. Suspension of the operation of a treaty by consent of the parties

The operation of a treaty in regard to all the parties or to a particular party may be suspended:

(a) In conformity with a provision of the treaty allowing such suspension;

(b) At any time by consent of all the parties.

Commentary

(1) This article parallels for the suspension of the operation of a treaty the provisions of article 51 relating to the termination of a treaty. Treaties sometimes specify that in certain circumstances or under certain conditions the operation of a treaty or of some of its provisions may be suspended. Whether or not a treaty contains such a clause, it is clear that the operation of the treaty or of some of its provisions may be suspended at any time by

238 1963 draft, article 40.
Article 55. Temporary suspension of the operation of a multilateral treaty by consent between certain of the parties only

When a multilateral treaty contains no provision regarding the suspension of its operation, two or more parties may conclude an agreement to suspend the operation of provisions of the treaty temporarily and as between themselves alone if such suspension:

(a) Does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; and

(b) Is not incompatible with the effective execution as between the parties as a whole of the object and purpose of the treaty.

Commentary

(1) In re-examining article 40 of the 1963 draft at the second part of its seventeenth session in January 1966, the Commission concluded that, whereas the *termination* of a treaty must, on principle, require the consent of all the parties, this might not necessarily be so in the case of the suspension of a treaty's operation. Since many multilateral treaties function primarily in the bilateral relations of the parties, it seemed to the Commission that the possibility of *inter se* suspension of the operation of a multilateral treaty in certain cases called for further investigation. At the present session the Commission considered that the question is analogous to that raised by the *inter se* modification of multilateral treaties but that, as the situation is not identical in the two cases, the *inter se* suspension of the operation of a treaty could not be completely equated with its *inter se* modification. The Commission decided that it was desirable to deal with it in the present article and to attach to it the safeguards necessary to protect the position of other parties.

(2) The present article accordingly provides that, in the absence of any specific provision in the treaty on the subject, two or more parties may agree to suspend the operation of provisions of the treaty temporarily and as between themselves alone under two conditions. The first is that the suspension does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations. The second is that the suspension is not incompatible with the effective execution as between the parties as a whole of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 37, dealing with the modification of a treaty as between certain parties only, prescribes a third condition, namely, that formal notice of the intended modification should be given in advance. Although the Commission did not think that this requirement should be made a specific condition for a temporary suspension of the operation of a treaty, its omission from the present article is not to be understood as implying that the parties in question may not have a certain general obligation to inform the other parties of their *inter se* suspension of the operation of the treaty.

Article 56. Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied from entering into a subsequent treaty

1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a further treaty relating to the same subject-matter and:

(a) It appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should thenceforth be governed by the later treaty, or

(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time.

2. The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that such was the intention of the parties when concluding the later treaty.

Commentary

(1) The present article deals with cases where the parties, without expressly terminating or modifying the first treaty, enter into another treaty which is so far incompatible with the earlier one that they must be considered to have intended to abrogate it. Where the parties to the two treaties are identical, there can be no doubt that, in concluding the second treaty, they are competent to abrogate the earlier one; for that is the very core of the rule contained in article 51. Even where the parties to the two treaties are not identical, the position is clearly the same if the parties to the later treaty include all the parties to the earlier one; for what the parties to the earlier treaty are competent to do together, they are competent to do in conjunction with other States. The sole question therefore is whether and under what conditions the conclusion of the further incompatible treaty must be held by implication to have terminated the earlier one. This question is essentially one of the construction of the two treaties in order to determine
the intentions of the parties with respect to the maintenance in force of the earlier one.

(2) Paragraph 1 therefore seeks to formulate the conditions under which the parties to a treaty are to be understood as having intended to terminate it by concluding a later treaty conflicting with it. The wording of the two clauses in paragraph 1 is based upon the language used by Judge Anzilotti in his separate opinion in the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case,\(^\text{243}\) where he said:

“There was no express abrogation. But it is generally agreed that, beside express abrogation, there is also tacit abrogation resulting from the fact that the new provisions are incompatible with the previous provisions, or that the whole matter which formed the subject of these latter is henceforward governed by the new provisions.”

That case, it is true, concerned a possible conflict between unilateral declarations under the Optional Clause and a treaty, and the Court itself did not accept Judge Anzilotti’s view that there was any incompatibility between the two instruments. Nevertheless, the two tests put forward by Judge Anzilotti for determining whether a tacit abrogation had taken place appeared to the majority of the Commission to contain the essence of the matter.

(3) Paragraph 2 provides that the earlier treaty shall not be considered to have been terminated where it appears from the circumstances that a later treaty was intended only to suspend the operation of the earlier one. Judge Anzilotti, it is true, in the above-mentioned opinion considered that the declarations under the Optional Clause, although in his view incompatible with the earlier treaty, had not abrogated it because of the fact that the treaty was of indefinite duration whereas the declarations were for limited terms. But it could not be said to be a general principle that a later treaty for a fixed term does not abrogate an earlier treaty expressed to have a longer or indefinite duration. It would depend entirely upon the intention of the States in concluding the second treaty, and in most cases it is probable that their intention would have been to cancel rather than suspend the earlier treaty.

(4) Article 26 also concerns the relation between successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter, paragraphs 3 and 4(a) of that article stating that the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. The practical effect of those paragraphs, no doubt, is temporarily to negative and in that way suspend the operation of the incompatible provisions of the earlier treaty so long as the later treaty is in force. But article 26 deals only with the priority of inconsistent obligations of treaties both of which are to be considered as in force and in operation. That article does not apply to cases where it is clear that the parties intended the earlier treaty to be abrogated or its operation to be wholly suspended by the conclusion of the later treaty; for then there are not two sets of incompatible treaty provisions in force and in operation, but only those of the later treaty. In other words, article 26 comes into play only after it has been determined under the present article that the parties did not intend to abrogate, or wholly to suspend the operation of, the earlier treaty. The present article, for its part, is not concerned with the priority of treaty provisions which are incompatible, but with cases where it clearly appears that the intention of the parties in concluding the later treaty was either definitively or temporarily to supersede the régime of the earlier treaty by that of the later one. In these cases the present article terminates or suspends the operation of the earlier treaty altogether, so that it is either no longer in force or no longer in operation. In short, the present article is confined to cases of termination or of the suspension of the operation of a treaty implied from entering into a subsequent treaty.

Article 57.\(^\text{244}\) Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach

1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.

2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
   (a) The other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty or to terminate it either:
      (i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State, or
      (ii) as between all the parties;
   (b) A party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;
   (c) Any other party to suspend the operation of the treaty with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty.

3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of the present article, consists in:
   (a) A repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present articles; or
   (b) The violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.

4. The foregoing paragraphs are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty applicable in the event of a breach.

Commentary

(i) The great majority of jurists recognize that a violation of a treaty by one party may give rise to a right in the other party to abrogate the treaty or to suspend the performance of its own obligations under the treaty. A violation of a treaty obligation, as of any other obligation,
may give rise to a right in the other party to take non-forcible reprisals, and these reprisals may properly relate to the defaulting party's rights under the treaty. Opinion differs, however, as to the extent of the right to abrogate the treaty and the conditions under which it may be exercised. Some jurists, in the absence of effective international machinery for securing the observance of treaties, are more impressed with the innocent party's need to have this right as a sanction for the violation of the treaty. They tend to formulate the right in unqualified terms, giving the innocent party a general right to abrogate the treaty in the event of a breach. Other jurists are more impressed with the risk that a State may allege a trivial or even fictitious breach simply to furnish a pretext for denouncing a treaty which it now finds embarrassing. These jurists tend to restrict the right of denunciation to "material" or "fundamental" breaches and also to subject the exercise of the right to procedural conditions.

(2) State practice does not give great assistance in determining the true extent of this right or the proper conditions for its exercise. In many cases, the denouncing State has decided for quite other reasons to put an end to the treaty and, having alleged the violation primarily to provide a pretext for its action, has not been prepared to enter into a serious discussion of the legal principles involved. The other party has usually contested the denunciation primarily on the basis of the facts; and, if it has sometimes used language appearing to deny that unilateral denunciation is ever justified, this has usually appeared rather to be a protest against the one-sided and arbitrary pronounce of the denouncing State than a rejection of the right to denounce when serious violations are established.

(3) Municipal courts have not infrequently made pronouncements recognizing the principle that the violation of a treaty may entitle the innocent party to denounce it. But they have nearly always done so in cases where their Government had not in fact elected to denounce the treaty, and they have not found it necessary to examine the conditions for the application of the principle at all closely.

(4) In the case of the Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Belgium contended that, by constructing certain works contrary to the terms of the Treaty of 1863, Holland had forfeited the right to invoke the treaty against it. Belgium did not claim to denounce the treaty, but it did assert a right, as a defence to Holland's claim, to suspend the operation of one of the provisions of the treaty on the basis of Holland's alleged breach of that provision, although it pleaded its claim rather as an application of the principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum. The Court, having found that Holland had not violated the treaty, did not pronounce upon the Belgian contention. In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Anzilotti expressed the view that the principle underlying the Belgian contention is "so just, so equitable, so universally recognized that it must be applied in international relations also". The only other case that seems to be of much significance is the Tacna-Arica arbitration.

There Peru contended that by preventing the performance of article 3 of the Treaty of Ancon, which provided for the holding of a plebiscite under certain conditions in the disputed area, Chile had discharged Peru from her obligations under that article. The Arbitrator, after examining the evidence, rejected the Peruvian contention, saying:

"It is manifest that if abuses of administration could have the effect of terminating such an agreement, it would be necessary to establish such serious conditions as the consequence of administrative wrongs as would operate to frustrate the purpose of the agreement, and, in the opinion of the Arbitrator, a situation of such gravity has not been shown."

This pronouncement seems to assume that only a "fundamental" breach of article 3 by Chile could have justified Peru in claiming to be released from its provisions.

(5) The Commission was agreed that a breach of a treaty, however serious, does not ipso facto put an end to the treaty, and also that it is not open to a State simply to allege a violation of the treaty and pronounce the treaty at an end. On the other hand, it considered that within certain limits and subject to certain safeguards the right of a party to invoke the breach of a treaty as a ground for terminating it or suspending its operation must be recognized. Some members considered that it would be dangerous for the Commission to endorse such a right, unless its exercise were to be subject to control by compulsory reference to the International Court of Justice. The Commission, while recognizing the importance of providing proper safeguards against arbitrary denunciation of a treaty on the ground of an alleged breach, concluded that the question of providing safeguards against arbitrary action was a general one which affected several articles. It, therefore, decided to formulate in the present article the substantive conditions under which a treaty may be terminated or its operation suspended in consequence of a breach, and to deal with the question of the procedural safeguards in article 62.

(6) Paragraph 1 provides that a "material" breach of a bilateral treaty by one party entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part. The formula "invoke as a ground" is intended to underline that the right arising under the article is not a right arbitrarily to pronounce the treaty terminated. If the other party contests the breach or its character as a "material" breach, there will be a "difference" between the parties with regard to which the normal obligations incumbent upon the parties under the Charter and under general international law to seek a solution of the question


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through pacific means will apply. The Commission considered that the action open to the other party in the case of a material breach is to invoke either the termination or the suspension of the operation of the treaty, in whole or in part. The right to take this action arises under the law of treaties independently of any right of reprisal, the principle being that a party cannot be called upon to fulfill its obligations under a treaty when the other party fails to fulfill those which it undertook under the same treaty. This right would, of course, be without prejudice to the injured party's right to present an international claim for reparation on the basis of the other party's responsibility with respect to the breach.

(7) Paragraph 2 deals with a material breach of a multilateral treaty, and the Commission considered it necessary to distinguish between the right of the other parties to react jointly to the breach and the right of an individual party specially affected by the breach to react alone. Sub-paragraph (a) provides that the other parties may, by a unanimous agreement, suspend the operation of the treaty or terminate it, and may do so either only in their relations with the defaulting State or altogether as between all the parties. When an individual party reacts alone, the Commission considered that its position is similar to that in the case of a bilateral treaty, but that its right should be limited to suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part as between itself and the defaulting State. In the case of a multilateral treaty the interests of the other parties have to be taken into account and a right of suspension normally provides adequate protection to the State specially affected by the breach. Moreover, the limitation of the right of the individual party to a right of suspension seemed to the Commission to be particularly necessary in the case of general multilateral treaties of a law-making character. Indeed, a question was raised as to whether even suspension would be admissible in the case of law-making treaties. The Commission felt, however, that it would be inequitable to allow a defaulting State to continue to enforce the treaty against the injured party, whilst itself violating its obligations towards that State under the treaty. Moreover, even such treaties as the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war, sick and wounded allowed an express right of denunciation independently of any breach of the convention. The Commission concluded that general law-making treaties should not, simply as such, be dealt with differently from other multilateral treaties in the present connexion. Accordingly, sub-paragraph (b) lays down that on a material breach of a multilateral treaty, any party specially affected by the breach may invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State.

(8) Paragraph 2(c) is designed to deal with the problem raised in the comments of Governments of special types of treaty, e.g. disarmament treaties, where a breach by one party tends to undermine the whole régime of the treaty as between all the parties. In the case of a material breach of such a treaty the interests of an individual party may not be adequately protected by the rules contained in paragraphs 2(a) and (b). It could not suspend the performance of its own obligations under the treaty vis-à-vis the defaulting State without at the same time violating its obligations to the other parties. Yet, unless it does so, it may be unable to protect itself against the threat resulting from the arming of the defaulting State. In these cases, where a material breach of the treaty by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations, the Commission considered that any party must be permitted without first obtaining the agreement of the other parties to suspend the operation of the treaty with respect to itself generally in its relations with all the other parties. Paragraph 2(c) accordingly so provides.

(9) Paragraph 3 defines the kind of breach which may give rise to a right to terminate or suspend the treaty. Some authorities have in the past seemed to assume that any breach of any provision would suffice to justify the denunciation of the treaty. The Commission, however, was unanimous that the right to terminate or suspend must be limited to cases where the breach is of a serious character. It preferred the term "material" to "fundamental" to express the kind of breach which is required. The word "fundamental" might be understood as meaning that only the violation of a provision directly touching the central purposes of the treaty can ever justify the other party in terminating the treaty. But other provisions considered by a party to be essential to the effective execution of the treaty may have been very material in inducing it to enter into the treaty at all, even although these provisions may be of an ancillary character. Clearly, an unjustified repudiation of the treaty—a repudiation not sanctioned by any of the provisions of the present articles—would automatically constitute a material breach of the treaty; and this is provided for in sub-paragraph (a) of the definition. The other and more general form of material breach is that in sub-paragraph (b), and is there defined as a violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of any object or purpose of the treaty.

(10) Paragraph 4 merely reserves the rights of the parties under any specific provisions of the treaty applicable in the event of a breach.

Article 58. Supervening impossibility of performance

A party may invoke an impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

Commentary

(1) The present article concerns the termination of a treaty or the suspension of its operation in consequence of the permanent or temporary total disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for its execution. The next article concerns the termination of a treaty in

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250 1963 draft, article 43.
consequence of a fundamental change in the circumstances existing at the time when it was entered into. Cases of supervening impossibility of performance are ex hypothesi cases where there has been a fundamental change in the circumstances existing at the time when the treaty was entered into. Some members of the Commission felt that it was not easy to draw a clear distinction between the types of cases dealt with in the two articles and were in favour of amalgamating them. The Commission, however, considered that juridically “impossibility of performance” and “fundamental change of circumstances” are distinct grounds for regarding a treaty as having been terminated, and should be kept separate. Although there might be borderline cases in which the two articles tended to overlap, the criteria to be employed in applying the articles were not the same, and to combine them might lead to misunderstanding.

(2) The article provides that the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty may be invoked as a ground for putting an end to the treaty. State practice furnishes few examples of the termination of a treaty on this ground. But the type of cases envisaged by the article is the submergence of an island, the drying up of a river or the destruction of a dam or hydro-electric installation indispensable for the execution of a treaty.

(3) The article further provides that, if the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty. The Commission appreciated that such cases might be regarded simply as cases where force majeure could be pleaded as a defence exonerating a party from liability for non-performance of the treaty. But it considered that, when there is a continuing impossibility of performing recurring obligations of a treaty, it is desirable to recognize, as part of the law of treaties, that the operation of a treaty may be suspended temporarily.

(4) The fact that the article deals first with cases of termination is not meant to imply that termination is to be regarded as the normal result in such cases or that there is any presumption that the disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable to the execution of the treaty will be permanent. On the contrary, the Commission considered it essential to underline that, unless it is clear that the impossibility will be permanent, the right of the party must be limited to invoking it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty. In other words, it regarded “suspension of the operation of the treaty” rather than “termination” as the desirable course of action, not vice versa.

(5) The Commission appreciated that in cases under this article, unlike cases of breach, the ground of termination, when established, might be said to have automatic effects on the validity of the treaty. But it felt bound to state the rule in the form not of a provision automatically terminating the treaty but one entitling the parties to invoke the impossibility of performance as a ground for terminating the treaty. The point is that disputes may arise as to whether a total disappearance or destruction of the subject-matter of the treaty has in fact occurred, and in the absence of compulsory adjudication it would be inadvisable to adopt, without any qualification, a rule bringing about the automatic abrogation of the treaty by operation of law. Otherwise, there would be a risk of arbitrary assertions of a supposed impossibility of performance as a mere pretext for repudiating a treaty. For this reason, the Commission formulated the article in terms of a right to invoke the impossibility of performance as a ground for terminating the treaty and made this right subject to the procedural requirements of article 62.

(6) The Commission appreciated that the total extinction of the international personality of one of the parties to a bilateral treaty is often cited as an instance of impossibility of performance, but decided against including it in the present article for two reasons. First, it would be misleading to formulate a provision concerning the extinction of the international personality of a party without at the same time dealing with, or at least reserving, the question of the succession of States to treaty rights and obligations. The subject of succession is a complex one which is already under separate study in the Commission and it would be undesirable to prejudge the outcome of that study. Accordingly, the Commission did not think that it should deal with this subject in the present article, and, as already mentioned in paragraph (5) of the commentary to article 39, it decided to reserve the question in a general provision in article 69.

(7) Certain Governments in their comments raised the question whether, in connexion with both the present article and article 59 (fundamental change of circumstances), special provision should be made for cases where the treaty has been partly performed and benefits obtained by one party before the cause of termination supervenes. The Commission, while recognizing that problems of equitable adjustment may arise in such cases, doubted the advisability of trying to regulate them by a general provision in articles 58 and 59. It did not seem to the Commission possible to go beyond the provisions of article 66 and 67, paragraph 2, dealing with the consequences of the termination of a treaty.

Article 59. 251 Fundamental change of circumstances

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:

(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and

(b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the scope of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked:

(a) As a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty establishing a boundary;

251 1963 draft, article 44.
(b) If the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of the treaty or of a different international obligation owed to the other parties to the treaty.

Commentary

(1) Almost all modern jurists, however reluctantly, admit the existence in international law of the principle with which this article is concerned and which is commonly spoken of as the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Just as many systems of municipal law recognize that, quite apart from any actual impossibility of performance, contracts may become inapplicable through a fundamental change of circumstances, so also treaties may become inapplicable for the same reason. Most jurists, however, at the same time enter a strong caveat as to the need to confine the scope of the doctrine within narrow limits and to regulate strictly the conditions under which it may be invoked; for the risks to the security of treaties which this doctrine presents in the absence of any general system of compulsory jurisdiction are obvious. The circumstances of international life are always changing and it is easy to allege that the changes render the treaty inapplicable.

(2) The evidence of the principle in customary law is considerable, but the International Court has not yet committed itself on the point. In the Free Zones case, having held that the facts did not in any event justify the application of the principle, the Permanent Court expressly reserved its position. It observed that it became unnecessary for it to consider "any of the questions of principle which arise in connexion with the theory of the lapse of treaties by reason of change of circumstances, such as the extent to which the theory can be regarded as constituting a rule of international law, the occasions on which and the methods by which effect can be given to the theory, if recognized, and the question whether it would apply to treaties establishing rights such as that which Switzerland derived from the treaties of 1815 and 1816".

(3) Municipal courts, on the other hand, have not infrequently recognized the relevance of the principle in international law, though for one reason or another they have always ended by rejecting the application of it in the particular circumstances of the case before them. These cases contain the propositions that the principle is limited to changes in circumstances the continuance of which, having regard to the evident intention of the parties at the time, was regarded as a tacit condition of the agreement, that the treaty is not dissolved automatically by law upon the occurrence of the change but only if the doctrine is invoked by one of the parties, and that the doctrine must be invoked within a reasonable time after the change in the circumstances was first perceived. Moreover, in Bremen v. Prussia the German Reichsgericht, while not disputing the general relevance of the doctrine, considered it altogether inapplicable to a case where one party was seeking to release itself not from the whole treaty but only from certain restrictive clauses which had formed an essential part of an agreement for an exchange of territory.

(4) The principle of rebus sic stantibus has not infrequently been invoked in State practice either eo nomine or in the form of a reference to a general principle claimed to justify the termination or modification of treaty obligations by reason of changed circumstances. Detailed examination of this State practice is not possible in the present report. Broadly speaking, it shows a wide acceptance of the view that a fundamental change of circumstances may justify a demand for the termination or revision of a treaty, but also shows a strong disposition to question the right of a party to denounce a treaty unilaterally on this ground. The most illuminating indications as to the attitude of States regarding the principle are perhaps statements submitted to the Court in the cases where the doctrine has been invoked. In the Nationality Decrees case the French Government contended that "perpetual" treaties are always subject to termination in virtue of the rebus sic stantibus clause and claimed that the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco had for that reason had the effect of extinguishing certain Anglo-French treaties. The British Government, while contesting the French Government's view of the facts, observed that the most forceful argument advanced by France was that of rebus sic stantibus. In the case concerning The Denunciation of the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865, China invoked, in general terms, changes of circumstances as a justification of her denunciation of a sixty-year-old treaty, and supported her contention with a reference to Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The article, however, provided that the Assembly of the League should "from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable", and the Belgian Government replied that neither Article 19 nor the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus contemplated the unilateral denunciation of treaties. It further maintained that there could be no question of China's denouncing the treaty because of a change of circumstances unless she had at least tried to obtain its revision through Article 19; that where both parties were subject to the Court's jurisdiction, the natural course for China, in case of dispute, was to obtain a ruling.
from the Court; and that if she did not, she could not
denounce the treaty without Belgium's consent.\footnote{261 Ibid., pp. 22-23; the case was ultimately settled by the conclusion of a new treaty.} In the Free Zones case\footnote{262 Ibid., Series A/B, No. 46.} the French Government, the
Government invoking the \textit{rebus sic stantibus} principle,
*itself* emphasized that the principle does not allow uni-
lateral denunciation of a treaty claimed to be out of date. It
argued that the doctrine would cause a treaty to lapse only
"lorsque le changement de circonstances aura été
reconnu par un acte faisant droit entre les deux Etats
intéressés"; and it further said: "cet acte faisant droit
entre les deux Etats intéressés peut être soit un accord,
lequel accord sera une reconnaissance du changement
des circonstances et de son effet sur le traité, soit une
sentence du juge international compétent s'il y en a un".\footnote{263 Ibid., Series C, No. 58, pp. 578-579, 109-146, and 405-415; see also Series C, No. 17, I, pp. 89, 250, 256, 283-284.} Switzerland,
emphasizing the differences of opinion amongst jurists in regard to the principle, disputed the existence in international law of any such right
to the termination of a treaty because of changed cir-
cumstances enforceable through the decision of a competent
tribunal. But she rested her case primarily on three
contentions: (a) the circumstances alleged to have changed
were not circumstances on the basis of whose continuance
the parties could be said to have entered into the treaty;
(b) in any event, the doctrine does not apply to treaties
creating territorial rights; and (c) France had delayed
unreasonably long after the alleged changes of circumstances
had manifested themselves.\footnote{264 Ibid., Series A/B, No. 46.} France does not
appear to have disputed that the doctrine is inapplicable
to territorial rights; instead, she drew a distinction
between territorial rights and "personal" rights created
on the occasion of a territorial settlement.\footnote{265 Ibid.} The Court
upheld the Swiss Government's contentions on points (a) and (c),
did not pronounce on the application of the
\textit{rebus sic stantibus} principle to treaties creating territorial
rights.

(5) The principle has also been invoked in debates in
political organs of the United Nations, either expressly
or by implication. In these debates, the existence of the
principle has not usually been disputed, though emphasis
has been placed on the conditions restricting its application.
The Secretary-General also, in a study of the validity
of the minorities treaties concluded during the League
of Nations era, while fully accepting the existence of the
principle in international law, emphasized the exceptional
and limited character of its application.\footnote{266 Ibid., Series C, No. 58, pp. 463-476.} In their com-
ments some Governments expressed doubts as to how far
the principle could be regarded as an already accepted
rule of international law; and others emphasized the
dangers which the principle involved for the security of treaties unless the conditions for its application were
closely defined and adequate safeguards were provided
against its arbitrary application.

(6) The Commission concluded that the principle, if
its application were carefully delimited and regulated,
should find a place in the modern law of treaties. A
treaty may remain in force for a long time and its stipula-
tions come to place an undue burden on one of the
parties as a result of a fundamental change of circum-
stances. Then, if the other party were obdurate in oppos-
ing any change, the fact that international law recognized
no legal means of terminating or modifying the treaty
otherwise than through a further agreement between the
same parties might impose a serious strain on the rela-
tions between the States concerned; and the dissatisfied
State might ultimately be driven to take action outside
the law. The number of cases calling for the application
of the rule is likely to be comparatively small. As pointed
out in the commentary to article 51, the majority
of modern treaties are expressed to be of short duration,
or are entered into for recurrent terms of years with a
right to denounce the treaty at the end of each term, or
are expressly or implicitly terminable upon notice. In
all these cases either the treaty expires automatically
or each party, having the power to terminate the treaty,
has the power also to apply pressure upon the other party
to revise its provisions. Nevertheless, there may remain
a residue of cases in which, failing any agreement, one
party may be left powerless under the treaty to obtain
any legal relief from outmoded and burdensome provi-
sions. It is in these cases that the \textit{rebus sic stantibus}
doctrine could serve a purpose as a lever to induce a
spirit of compromise in the other party. Moreover,
despite the strong reservations often expressed with
regard to it, the evidence of the acceptance of the doctrine
in international law is so considerable that it seems to
indicate a recognition of a need for this safety-valve in
the law of treaties.

(7) In the past the principle has almost always been
presented in the guise of a tacit condition implied in
every "perpetual" treaty that would dissolve it in the
event of a fundamental change of circumstances. The
Commission noted, however, that the tendency to-day
was to regard the implied term as only a fiction by which
it was attempted to reconcile the principle of the dissolu-
tion of treaties in consequence of a fundamental change
of circumstances with the rule \textit{pacta sunt servanda}. In
most cases the parties gave no thought to the possibility
of a change of circumstances and, if they had done so,
would probably have provided for it in a different
manner. Furthermore, the Commission considered the
fiction to be an undesirable one since it increased the
risk of subjective interpretations and abuse. For this
reason, the Commission was agreed that the theory
of an implied term must be rejected and the doctrine
formulated as an objective rule of law by which, on
grounds of equity and justice, a fundamental change of
circumstances may, under certain conditions, be invoked
by a party as a ground for terminating the treaty. It
further decided that, in order to emphasize the objective
character of the rule, it would be better not to use the
term \textit{rebus sic stantibus} either in the text of the article
or even in the title, and so avoid the doctrinal implication
of that term.

\footnote{261 Ibid., pp. 22-23; the case was ultimately settled by the conclusion of a new treaty.}
\footnote{262 Ibid., Series A/B, No. 46.}
\footnote{263 Ibid., Series C, No. 58, pp. 578-579, 109-146, and 405-415; see also Series C, No. 17, I, pp. 89, 250, 256, 283-284.}
\footnote{264 Ibid., Series A/B, No. 46.}
\footnote{265 Ibid., Series C, No. 58, pp. 463-476.}
\footnote{266 Ibid., pp. 136-143.}
\footnote{E/CN.4/367, p. 37, see also E/CN.4/367/Add.1.}
(8) The Commission also recognized that jurists have in the past often limited the application of the principle to so-called perpetual treaties, that is, to treaties not making any provision for their termination. The reasoning by which this limitation of the principle was supported by these authorities did not, however, appear to the Commission to be convincing. When a treaty had been given a duration of ten, twenty, fifty, or ninety-nine years, it could not be excluded that a fundamental change of circumstances might occur which radically affected the basis of the treaty. The cataclysmic events of the present century showed how fundamentally circumstances may change within a period of only ten or twenty years. If the doctrine were regarded as an objective rule of law founded upon the equity and justice of the matter, there did not seem to be any reason to draw a distinction between “perpetual” and “long term” treaties. Moreover, practice did not altogether support the view that the principle was confined to “perpetual” treaties. Some treaties of limited duration actually contained what were equivalent to rebus sic stantibus provisions. The principle had also been invoked sometimes in regard to limited treaties, as for instance, in the resolution of the French Chamber of Deputies of 14 December 1952, expressly invoking the principle of rebus sic stantibus with reference to the Franco-American war debts agreement of 1926. The Commission accordingly decided that the rule should not be limited to treaties containing no provision regarding their termination, though for obvious reasons it would seldom or never have relevance for treaties of limited duration or which are terminable upon notice.

(9) Paragraph 1 defines the conditions under which a change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for terminating a treaty or for withdrawing from a multilateral treaty. This definition contains a series of limiting conditions: (1) the change must be of circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty; (2) that change must be a fundamental one; (3) it must also be one not foreseen by the parties; (4) the existence of those circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (5) the effect of the change must be radically to transform the scope of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. The Commission attached great importance to the strict formulation of these conditions. In addition, it decided to emphasize the exceptional character of this ground of termination or withdrawal by framing the article in negative form: “a fundamental change of circumstances...may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty unless etc.”.

(10) The question was raised in the Commission whether general changes of circumstances quite outside the treaty might not sometimes bring the principle of fundamental change of circumstances into operation. But the Commission considered that such general changes could properly be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty only if their effect was to alter a circumstance constituting an essential basis of the consent of the parties to the treaty. Some members of the Commission favoured the insertion of a provision making it clear that a subjective change in the attitude or policy of a Government could never be invoked as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty. They represented that, if this were not the case, the security of treaties might be prejudiced by recognition of the principle in the present article. Other members, while not dissenting from the view that mere changes of policy on the part of a Government cannot normally be invoked as bringing the principle into operation, felt that it would be going too far to state that a change of policy could never in any circumstances be invoked as a ground for terminating a treaty. They instanced a treaty of alliance as a possible case where a radical change of political alignment by the Government of a country might make it unacceptable, from the point of view of both parties, to continue with the treaty. The Commission considered that the definition of a “fundamental change of circumstances” in paragraph 1 should suffice to exclude abusive attempts to terminate a treaty on the basis merely of a change of policy, and that it was unnecessary to go further into the matter in formulating the article.

(11) Paragraph 2 excepts from the operation of the article two cases. The first concerns treaties establishing a boundary, a case which both States concerned in the Free Zones case appear to have recognized as being outside the rule, as do most jurists. Some members of the Commission suggested that the total exclusion of these treaties from the rule might go too far, and might be inconsistent with the principle of self-determination recognized in the Charter. The Commission, however, concluded that treaties establishing a boundary should be recognized to be an exception to the rule, because otherwise the rule, instead of being an instrument of peaceful change, might become a source of dangerous frictions. It also took the view that “self-determination”, as envisaged in the Charter was an independent principle and that it might lead to confusion if, in the context of the law of treaties, it were presented as an application of the rule contained in the present article. By excepting treaties establishing a boundary from its scope the present article would not exclude the operation of the principle of self-determination in any case where the conditions for its legitimate operation existed. The expression “treaty establishing a boundary” was substituted for “treaty fixing a boundary” by the Commission, in response to comments of Governments, as being a broader expression which would embrace treaties of cession as well as delimitation treaties.

(12) The second exception, dealt with in paragraph 2(b), provides that a fundamental change may not be invoked if it has been brought about by a breach of the treaty by the party invoking it or by that party's breach of...
other international obligations owed to the parties to the treaty. This rule is, of course, simply an application of the general principle of law that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong (Factory at Chorzow case, P.C.I.J. (1927), Series A, No. 9 at page 31). As such it is clearly applicable in any case arising under any of the articles. Nevertheless, having regard to the particular risk that a fundamental change of circumstances may result from a breach, or series of breaches, of a treaty, the Commission thought it desirable specifically to exclude from the operation of the present article a fundamental change of circumstances so brought about.

(13) Certain Governments in their comments emphasized the dangers which this article may have for the security of treaties unless it is made subject to some form of independent adjudication. Many members of the Commission also stressed the importance which they attached to the provision of adequate procedural safeguards against arbitrary application of the principle of fundamental change of circumstances as an essential condition of the acceptability of the article. In general, however, the Commission did not consider the risks to the security of treaties involved in the present article to be different in kind or degree from those involved in the articles dealing with the various grounds of invalidity or in articles 57, 58 and 61. It did not think that a principle, valid in itself, could or should be rejected because of a risk that a State acting in bad faith might seek to abuse the principle. The proper function of codification, it believed, was to minimize those risks by strictly defining and circumscribing the conditions under which recourse may properly be had to the principle; and this it has sought to do in the present article. In addition, having regard to the extreme importance of the stability of treaties to the security of international relations, it has attached to the present article, as to all the articles dealing with grounds of invalidity or termination, the specific procedural safeguards set out in article 62.

Article 60. Severance of diplomatic relations

The severance of diplomatic relations between parties to a treaty does not in itself affect the legal relations established between them by the treaty.

Commentary

(1) This article contemplates only the situation which arises when diplomatic relations are severed between two parties to a treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral, between which normal diplomatic relations had previously subsisted. For the reasons stated in paragraph 29 of this report the question of the effect upon treaties of the outbreak of hostilities—which may obviously be a case when diplomatic relations are severed—is not dealt with in the present articles. Similarly, any problems that may arise in the sphere of treaties from the absence of recognition of a Government do not appear to be such as should be covered in a statement of the general law of treaties. It is thought more appropriate to deal with them in the context of other topics with which they are closely related, either succession of States and Governments, which is excluded from the present discussion for the reasons indicated in paragraph 30 of the Introduction to this chapter, or recognition of States and Governments, which the Commission in 1949 decided to include in its provisional list of topics selected for codification.

(2) There is wide support for the general proposition that the severance of diplomatic relations does not in itself lead to the termination of treaty relationships between the States concerned. Indeed, many jurists do not include the severance of diplomatic relations in their discussion of the grounds for the termination or suspension of the operation of treaties. That the breaking off of diplomatic relations does not as such affect the operation of the rules of law dealing with other aspects of international intercourse is indeed recognized in article 2(3) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 which provides: "The severance of diplomatic relations shall not ipso facto involve the severance of consular relations"; while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 contains an article—article 45—dealing specifically with the rights and obligations of the parties in the event that diplomatic relations are broken off. It therefore seems correct to state that in principle the mere breaking off of diplomatic relations does not of itself affect the continuance in force of the treaty, or the continuance of the obligation of the parties to apply it in accordance with the rule pacta sunt servanda.

(3) The text of the article provisionally adopted in 1964 contained a second paragraph which expressly provided that severance of diplomatic relations may be invoked as a ground for suspending the operation of a treaty: "if it results in the disappearance of the means necessary for the application of the treaty". In other words, an exception was admitted to the general rule in the event that the severance of relations resulted in something akin to a temporary impossibility of performing the treaty through a failure of a necessary means. Certain Governments in their comments expressed anxiety lest this exception, unless it was more narrowly defined, might allow the severance of diplomatic relations to be used as a pretext for evading treaty obligations. In the light of these comments the Commission examined the question de novo. It noted that the text of article 58 dealing with supervening impossibility of performance, as revised at the second part of its seventeenth session, contemplates the suspension of the operation of a treaty on the ground of impossibility of performance only in case of the temporary "disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty"; and that the severance of diplomatic relations relates to "means" rather than to an "object".

(4) Furthermore, the Commission revised its opinion on the question of admitting the interruption of the normal diplomatic channels as a case of the disappearance of means indispensable for the execution of a treaty. It considered that to-day the use of third States and even of direct channels as means for making necessary communications in case of severance of diplomatic relations are so common that the absence of the normal channels ought not to be recognized as a disappearance of a "means" or of an "object" indispensable for the execution of a treaty. It appreciated that, as some members pointed out, the severance of diplomatic relations might be incompatible with implementation of certain kinds of political treaty such as treaties of alliance. But it concluded that any question of the termination or suspension of the operation of such treaties in consequence of the severance of diplomatic relations should be left to be governed by the general provisions of the present articles regarding termination, denunciation, withdrawal from and suspension of the operation of treaties. It therefore decided to confine the present article to the general proposition that severance of diplomatic relations does not in itself affect the legal relations established by a treaty, and to leave any special case to be governed by the other articles.

(5) The article accordingly provides simply that the severance of diplomatic relations between parties to a treaty does not in itself affect the legal relations between them established by the treaty. The expression "severance of diplomatic relations", which appears in Article 41 of the Charter and in article 2, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention of 1963 on Consular Relations, is used in preference to the expression "breaking off of diplomatic relations" found in article 45 of the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations.

Article 61. Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law

If a new peremptory norm of general international law of the kind referred to in article 50 is established, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.

Commentary

(1) The rule formulated in this article is the logical corollary of the rule in article 50 upon which a treaty is void if it conflicts with a "peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted". Article 50, as explained in the commentary to it, is based upon the hypothesis that in international law to-day there are a certain number of fundamental rules of international public order from which no State may derogate even by agreement with another State. Manifestly, if a new rule of that character—a new rule of jus cogens—emerges, its effect must be to render void not only future but existing treaties. This follows from the fact that a rule of jus cogens is an over-riding rule depriving any act or situation which is in conflict with it of legality. An example would be former treaties regulating the slave trade, the performance of which later ceased to be compatible with international law owing to the general recognition of the total illegality of all forms of slavery.

(2) The Commission discussed whether to make this rule part of article 50, but decided that it should be placed among the articles concerning the termination of treaties. Although the rule operates to deprive the treaty of validity, its effect is not to render it void ab initio, but only from the date when the new rule of jus cogens is established; in other words it does not annul the treaty, it forbids its further existence and performance. It is for this reason that the article provides that "If a new peremptory norm of general international law...is established", a treaty becomes void and terminates.

(3) Similarly, although the Commission did not think that the principle of separability is appropriate when a treaty is void ab initio under article 50 by reason of an existing rule of jus cogens, it felt that different considerations apply in the case of a treaty which was entirely valid when concluded but is now found with respect to some of its provisions to conflict with a newly established rule of jus cogens. If those provisions can properly be regarded as severable from the rest of the treaty, the Commission thought that the rest of the treaty ought to be regarded as still valid.

(4) In paragraph (6) of its commentary to article 50 the Commission has already emphasized that a rule of jus cogens does not have retroactive effects and does not deprive any existing treaty of its validity prior to the establishment of that rule as a rule of jus cogens. The present article underlines that point since it deals with the effect of the emergence of a new rule of jus cogens on the validity of a treaty as a case of the termination of the treaty. The point is further underlined by article 67 which limits the consequences of the termination of a treaty by reason of invalidity attaching to it under the present article to the period after the establishment of the new rule of jus cogens.

Section 4: Procedure

Article 62. Procedure to be followed in cases of invalidity, termination, withdrawal from or suspension of operation of a treaty

1. A party which claims that a treaty is invalid or which alleges a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under the provisions of the present articles must notify the other parties of its claim. The notification shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken with respect to the treaty and the grounds therefor.

2. If, after the expiry of a period which, except in cases of special urgency, shall not be less than three months after the receipt of the notification, no party has raised any objection, the party making the notification may carry out in the manner provided in article 63 the measure which it has proposed.

273 1963 draft, article 45.

274 1963 draft, article 51.
3. If, however, objection has been raised by any other party, the parties shall seek a solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations of the parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes.

5. Without prejudice to article 42, the fact that a State has not previously made the notification prescribed in paragraph 1 shall not prevent it from making such notification in answer to another party claiming performance of the treaty or alleging its violation.

Commentary

(1) Many members of the Commission regarded the present article as a key article for the application of the provisions of the present part dealing with the invalidity, termination or suspension of the operation of treaties. They thought that some of the grounds upon which treaties may be considered invalid or terminated or suspended under those sections, if allowed to be arbitrarily asserted in face of objection from the other party, would involve real dangers for the security of treaties. These dangers were, they felt, particularly serious in regard to claims to denounce or withdraw from a treaty by reason of an alleged breach by the other party or by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances. In order to minimize these dangers the Commission has sought to define as precisely and as objectively as possible the conditions under which the various grounds may be invoked. But whenever a party to a treaty invokes one of these grounds, the question whether or not its claim is justified will nearly always turn upon facts the determination or appreciation of which may be controversial. Accordingly, the Commission considered it essential that the present articles should contain procedural safeguards against the possibility that the nullity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty may be arbitrarily asserted as a mere pretext for getting rid of an inconvenient obligation.

(2) States in the course of disputes have not infrequently used language in which they appeared to maintain that the nullity or termination of a treaty could not be established except by consent of both parties. This presentation of the matter, however, subordinates the application of the principles governing the invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties to the will of the objecting State no less than the arbitrary assertion of the nullity, termination or suspension of a treaty subordinates their application to the will of the claimant State. The problem is the familiar one of the settlement of differences between States. In the case of treaties, however, there is the special consideration that the parties by negotiating and concluding the treaty have brought themselves into a relationship in which there are particular obligations of good faith.

(3) In 1963, some members of the Commission were strongly in favour of recommending that the application of the present articles should be made subject to compulsory judicial settlement by the International Court of Justice, if the parties did not agree upon another

means of settlement. Other members, however, pointed out that the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the two Vienna Conventions respectively on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations did not provide for compulsory jurisdiction. While not disputing the value of recourse to the International Court of Justice as a means of settling disputes arising under the present articles, these members expressed the view that in the present state of international practice it would not be realistic for the Commission to put forward this solution of the procedural problem. After giving prolonged consideration to the question, the Commission concluded that its appropriate course was, first, to provide a procedure requiring a party which invoked the nullity of a treaty or a ground for terminating it to notify the other parties and give them a proper opportunity to state their views, and then, in the event of an objection being raised by the other party, to provide that the solution of the question should be sought through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter. In other words, the Commission considered that in dealing with this problem it should take as its basis the general obligation of States under international law to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered" which is enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Charter, and the means for the fulfilment of which are indicated in Article 33 of the Charter.

(4) Governments in their comments appeared to be at one in endorsing the general object of the article, namely, the surrounding of the various grounds of invalidity, termination and suspension with procedural safeguards against their arbitrary application for the purpose of getting rid of inconvenient treaty obligations. A number of Governments took the position that paragraphs 1 to 3 of the article did not go far enough in their statement of the procedural safeguards and that specific provisions, including independent adjudication, should be made for cases where the parties are unable to reach agreement. Others, on the other hand, expressed the view that these paragraphs carry the safeguards as far as it is proper to go in the present state of international opinion in regard to acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. The Commission re-examined the question in the light of these comments and in the light also of the discussions regarding the principle that States "shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered", which have taken place in the two Special Committees on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation between States. It further took into account other evidence of recent State practice, including the Charter and Protocol of the Organization of African Unity. The Commission concluded that the article, as provisionally adopted in 1963, represented the highest measure of common ground that could be found among Governments as well as in the Commission on this question. In consequence,

275 Report of the 1964 Special Committee (A/5746), chapter IV; report of the 1966 Special Committee (A/6230), chapter III.
it decided to maintain the rules set out in the 1963 text of the article, subject only to certain drafting changes.

(5) Paragraph 1 provides that a party claiming the nullity of a treaty or alleging a ground for terminating it or withdrawing from it or suspending its operation shall put in motion a regular procedure under which it must first notify the other parties of its claim. In doing so it must indicate the measure which it proposes to take with respect to the treaty, i.e. denunciation, termination, suspension, etc. and its grounds for taking that measure. Then by paragraph 2 it must give the other parties a reasonable period within which to reply. Except in cases of special urgency, the period must not be less than three months. The second stage of the procedure depends on whether or not objection is raised by any party. If there is none or there is no reply before the expiry of the period, the party may take the measure proposed in the manner provided in article 63, i.e. by an instrument duly executed and communicated to the other parties. If, on the other hand, objection is raised, the parties are required by paragraph 3, to seek a solution to the question through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter. The Commission did not find it possible to carry the procedural provisions beyond this point without becoming involved in some measure and in one form or another in compulsory solution to the question at issue between the parties. If after recourse to the means indicated in Article 33 the parties should reach a deadlock, it would be for each Government to appreciate the situation and to act as good faith demands. There would also remain the right of every State, whether or not a Member of the United Nations, under certain conditions, to refer the dispute to the competent organ of the United Nations.

(6) Even if, for the reasons previously mentioned in this commentary, the Commission felt obliged not to go beyond Article 33 of the Charter in providing for procedural checks upon arbitrary action, it considered that the establishment of the procedural provisions of the present article as an integral part of the law relating to the invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties would be a valuable step forward. The express subordination of the substantive rights arising under the provisions of the various articles to the procedure prescribed in the present article and the checks on unilateral action which the procedure contains would, it was thought, give a substantial measure of protection against purely arbitrary assertions of the nullity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty.

(7) Paragraph 4 merely provided that nothing in the article is to affect the position of the parties under any provisions regarding the settlement of disputes in force between the parties.

(8) Paragraph 5 reserves the right of any party to make the notification provided in paragraph 1 by way of answer to a demand for its performance or to a complaint in regard to its violation, even though it may not previously have initiated the procedure laid down in the article. In cases of error, impossibility of performance or change of circumstances, for example, a State might well not have invoked the ground in question before being confronted with a complaint—perhaps even before a tribunal. Subject to the provisions of article 42 concerning the effect of inaction in debarring a State from invoking a ground of nullity, termination or suspension, it would seem right that a mere failure to have made a prior notification should not prevent a party from making it in answer to a demand for performance of the treaty or to a complaint alleging its violation.

Article 63. Instruments for declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty

1. Any act declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty pursuant to the provisions of the treaty or of paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 62 shall be carried out through an instrument communicated to the other parties.

2. If the instrument is not signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs, the representative of the State communicating it may be called upon to produce full powers.

Commentary

(1) This article and article 64 replace, with considerable modifications, articles 49 and 50 of the draft provisionally adopted in 1963.

(2) Article 50 of the 1963 draft dealt only with the procedure governing notices of termination, withdrawal or suspension under a right provided for in the treaty. In re-examining the article, the Commission noted that the procedure governing the giving of notices of termination under a treaty would be adequately covered by the general article on notifications and communications—now article 73—which it had decided to introduce into the draft articles. In other words, it came to the conclusion that the new article made paragraph 1 of article 50 of the 1963 draft otiose. At the same time, it decided that a general provision was required dealing with the instruments by which, either under the terms of the treaty or pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 51 (present article 62), an act declaring invalid, terminating or withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty may be carried out. This provision is contained in paragraph 1 of the present article, which the Commission considered should logically be placed after article 62, since the provision in paragraph 1 would necessarily operate only after the application of the procedures in article 62.

(3) Paragraph 2 of the present article replaces article 49 of the 1963 draft, which was entitled "authority to denounce, terminate, etc." and which in effect would have made the rules relating to "full powers" to represent the State in the conclusion of a treaty equally applicable in all stages of the procedure for denouncing, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty.

276 1963 draft, articles 49 and 50, para. 1.
One Government in its comments questioned whether the matter could be disposed of satisfactorily by a simple cross reference to the article concerning “full powers”. Meanwhile the Commission had itself considerably revised the formulation of the article concerning “full powers”. Accordingly, it re-examined the whole question of evidence of authority to denounce, terminate, withdraw from or suspend the operation of a treaty dealt with in article 49 of the 1963 draft. It concluded that in the case of the denunciation, termination, etc. of a treaty there was no need to lay down rules governing evidence of authority in regard to the notification and negotiation stages contemplated in paragraphs 1-3 of article 51 of the 1963 draft, since the matter could be left to the ordinary workings of diplomatic practice. In consequence it decided to confine paragraph 2 of the present article to the question of evidence of authority to execute the final act purporting to declare the invalidity, termination, etc. of a treaty. The Commission considered that the rule concerning evidence of authority to denounce, terminate, etc., should be analogous to that governing “full powers” to express the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty. Paragraph 2 therefore provides that “If the instrument is not signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs, the representative of the State communicating it may be called upon to produce full powers”.

(4) The importance of the present article, in the view of the Commission, is that it calls for the observance of a measure of formality in bringing about the invalidation, termination, etc. of a treaty, and thereby furnishes a certain additional safeguard for the security of treaties. In moments of tension the denunciation or threat to denounce a treaty has sometimes been made the subject of a public utterance not addressed directly to the other State concerned. But it is clearly essential that any such declaration purporting to put an end to or to suspend the operation of a treaty, at whatever level it is made, should not be a substitute for the formal act which diplomatic propriety and legal regularity would seem to require.

Article 64.277 Revocation of notifications and instruments provided for in articles 62 and 63

A notification or instrument provided for in articles 62 and 63 may be revoked at any time before it takes effect.

Commentary

(1) The present article replaces and reproduces the substance of paragraph 2 of article 50 of the 1963 draft.

(2) The Commission appreciated that in their comments certain Governments had questioned the desirability of stating the rule in a form which admitted a complete liberty to revoke a notice of denunciation, termination, withdrawal or suspension prior to the moment of its taking effect. It also recognized that one of the purposes of treaty provisions requiring a period of notice is to enable the other parties to take any necessary steps in advance to adjust themselves to the situation created by the termination of the treaty or the withdrawal of a party. But, after carefully re-examining the question, it concluded that the considerations militating in favour of encouraging the revocation of notices and instruments of denunciation, termination, etc. are so strong that the general rule should admit a general freedom to do so prior to the taking effect of the notice or instrument. The Commission also felt that the right to revoke the notice is really implicit in the fact that it is not to become effective until a certain date and that it should be left to the parties to lay down a different rule in the treaty in any case where the particular subject-matter of the treaty appeared to render this necessary. Moreover, if the other parties were aware that the notice was not to become definitive until after the expiry of a given period, they would, no doubt, take that fact into account in any preparations which they might make. The rule stated in the present article accordingly provides that a notice or instrument of denunciation, termination, etc. may be revoked at any time unless the treaty otherwise provides.

Section 5: Consequences of the invalidity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty

Article 65.278 Consequences of the invalidity of a treaty

1. The provisions of a void treaty have no legal force.

2. If acts have nevertheless been performed in reliance on such a treaty:

   (a) Each party may require any other party to establish as far as possible in their mutual relations the position that would have existed if the acts had not been performed;

   (b) Acts performed in good faith before the nullity was invoked are not rendered unlawful by reason only of the nullity of the treaty.

3. In cases falling under articles 46, 47, 48 or 49, paragraph 2 does not apply with respect to the party to which the fraud, coercion or corrupt act is imputable.

4. In the case of the invalidity of a particular State's consent to be bound by a multilateral treaty, the foregoing rules apply in the relations between that State and the parties to the treaty.

Commentary

(1) This article deals only with the legal effects of the invalidity of a treaty. It does not deal with any questions of responsibility or of redress arising from acts which are the cause of the invalidity of a treaty. Fraud and coercion, for example, may raise questions of responsibility and redress as well as of nullity. But those questions are excluded from the scope of the present articles by the general provision in article 69.

(2) The Commission considered that the establishment of the nullity of a treaty on any of the grounds set forth in section 2 of part V would mean that the treaty was void ab initio and not merely from the date when the

277 1963 draft, article 50, para. 2.

278 1963 draft, article 52.
ground was invoked. Only in the case of the treaty's becoming void and terminating under article 61 of section 3 of that part would the treaty not be invalid as from the very moment of its purported conclusion. Paragraph 1 of this article, in order to leave no doubt upon this point, states simply that the provisions of a void treaty have no legal force.

(3) Although the nullity attaches to the treaty ab initio, the ground of invalidity may, for unimpeachable reasons, have not been invoked until after the parties have for some period acted in reliance on the treaty in good faith as if it were entirely valid. In such cases the question arises as to what should be their legal positions in regard to those acts. The Commission considered that where neither party was to be regarded as a wrong-doer in relation to the cause of nullity (i.e. where no fraud, corruption or coercion was imputable to either party), the legal position should be determined on the basis of taking account both of the invalidity of the treaty ab initio and of the good faith of the parties. Paragraph 2(a) accordingly provides that each party may require any other party to establish as far as possible in their mutual relations the position that would have existed if the acts had not been performed. It recognizes that in principle the invalidation of the treaty as from the date of its conclusion is to have its full effects and that any party may therefore call for the establishment, so far as possible, of the status quo ante. Paragraph 2(b), however, protects the parties from having acts performed in good faith in reliance on the treaty converted into wrongful acts simply by reason of the fact that the treaty has turned out to be invalid. The phrase “by reason only of the nullity of the treaty” was intended by the Commission to make it clear that, if the act in question were unlawful for any other reason independent of the nullity of the treaty, this paragraph would not suffice to render it lawful.

(4) Paragraph 3, for obvious reasons, excepts from the benefits of paragraph 2 a party whose fraud, coercion or corrupt act has been the cause of the nullity of the treaty. The case of a treaty void under article 50 by reason of its conflict with a rule of jus cogens is not mentioned in paragraph 3 because it is the subject of a special provision in article 67.

(5) Paragraph 4 applies the provisions of the previous paragraphs also in the case of the nullity of the consent of an individual State to be bound by a multilateral treaty. In that case they naturally operate only in the relations between that State and the parties to the treaty.

Article 66. 279 Consequences of the termination of a treaty

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present articles:

   (a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;

   (b) Does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.

2. If a State denounces or withdraws from a multilateral treaty, paragraph 1 applies in the relations between that State and each of the other parties to the treaty from the date when such denunciation or withdrawal takes effect.

Commentary

(1) Article 66, like the previous article, does not deal with any question of responsibility or redress that may arise from acts which are the cause of the termination of a treaty, such as breaches of the treaty by one of the parties; questions of State responsibility are excluded from the draft by article 69.

(2) Some treaties contain express provisions regarding consequences which follow upon their termination or upon the withdrawal of a party. Article XIX of the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 280 for example, provides that even after the termination of the Convention, liability for a nuclear incident is to continue for a certain period with respect to ships the operation of which was licensed during the currency of the Convention. Again some treaties, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 281 expressly provide that the denunciation of the treaty shall not release the State from its obligations with respect to acts done during the currency of the Convention. Similarly, when a treaty is about to terminate or a party proposes to withdraw, the parties may consult together and agree upon conditions to regulate the termination or withdrawal. Clearly, any such conditions provided for in the treaty or agreed upon by the parties must prevail, and the opening words of paragraph 1 of the article (which are also made applicable to paragraph 2) so provide.

(3) Subject to any conditions contained in the treaty or agreed between the parties, paragraph 1 provides, first, that the termination of a treaty releases the parties from any obligation further to perform it. Secondly, it provides that the treaty's termination does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination. The Commission appreciated that different opinions are expressed concerning the exact legal basis, after a treaty has been terminated, of rights, obligations or situations resulting from executed provisions of the treaty, but did not find it necessary to take a position on this theoretical point for the purpose of formulating the rule in paragraph 1(a). On the other hand, by the words “any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty”, the Commission wished to make it clear that paragraph 1(b) relates only to the right, obligation or legal situation of the States parties to the treaties created through the execution, and is not in any way concerned with the question of the “vested interests” of individuals.

279 1963 draft, article 53.
(4) The Commission appreciated that in connexion with article 58 (supervening impossibility of performance) certain Governments raised the question of equitable adjustment in the case of a treaty which has been partially executed by one party only. The Commission, though not in disagreement with the concept behind the suggestions of these Governments, felt that the equitable adjustment demanded by each case would necessarily depend on its particular circumstances. It further considered that, having regard to the complexity of the relations between sovereign States, it would be difficult to formulate in advance a rule which would operate satisfactorily in each case. Accordingly, it concluded that the matter should be left to the application of the principle of good faith in the application of the treaties demanded of the parties by the rule \textit{pacta sunt servanda}.

(5) Paragraph 2 applies the same rules to the case of an individual State’s denunciation of or withdrawal from a multilateral treaty in the relation between that State and each of the other parties to the treaty.

(6) The present article has to be read in the light of article 67, paragraph 2 of which lays down a special rule for the case of a treaty which becomes void and terminates under article 61 by reason of the establishment of a new rule of \textit{jus cogens} with which its provisions are in conflict.

(7) The article also has to be read in conjunction with article 40 which provides, \textit{inter alia}, that the termination or denunciation of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party from it is not in any way to impair the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it is subject under any other rule of international law. This provision is likely to be of particular importance in cases of termination, denunciation or withdrawal. Moreover, although a few treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the humanizing of warfare, expressly lay down that denunciation does not impair the obligations of the parties under general international law, the majority do not.

**Article 67.**\(^{282}\) Consequences of the nullity or termination of a treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law

1. In the case of a treaty void under article 50 the parties shall:
   
   (a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act done in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and
   
   (b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

2. In the case of a treaty which becomes void and terminates under article 61, the termination of the treaty:
   
   (a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;
   
   (b) Does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination; provided that those rights, obligations or situations may thereafter be maintained only to the extent that their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new peremptory norm of general international law.

**Commentary**

(1) The nullity of a treaty \textit{ab initio} by reason of its conflict with a rule of \textit{jus cogens} in force at the time of its conclusion is a special case of nullity. The question which arises in consequence of the invalidity is not so much one of the adjustment of the position of the parties in relation to each other as of the obligation of each of them to bring its position into conformity with the rule of \textit{jus cogens}. Similarly, the termination of a treaty which becomes void and terminates under article 61 by reason of its conflict with a new rule of \textit{jus cogens} is a special case of termination (and indeed also a special case of invalidity, since the invalidity does not operate \textit{ab initio}). Although the rules laid down in article 66, paragraph 1, regarding the consequences of termination are applicable in principle, account has to be taken of the new rule of \textit{jus cogens} in considering the extent to which any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the previous execution of the treaty may still be maintained.

(2) The consequences of the nullity of a treaty under article 50 and of the termination of a treaty under article 61 both being special cases arising out of the application of a rule of \textit{jus cogens}, the Commission decided to group them together in the present article. Another consideration leading the Commission to place these cases in the same article was that their juxtaposition would serve to give added emphasis to the distinction between the original nullity of a treaty under article 50 and the subsequent annulment of a treaty under article 61 as from the time of the establishment of the new rule of \textit{jus cogens}. Having regard to the misconceptions apparent in the comments of certain Governments regarding the possibility of the retroactive operation of these articles, this additional emphasis on the distinction between the nullifying effect of article 50 and the terminating effect of article 61 seemed to the Commission to be desirable.

(3) Paragraph 1 requires the parties to a treaty void \textit{ab initio} under article 50 first to eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act done in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the rule of \textit{jus cogens}, and secondly, to bring their mutual relations into conformity with that rule. The Commission did not consider that in these cases the paragraph should concern itself with the mutual adjustment of their interests as such. It considered that the paragraph should concern itself solely with ensuring that the parties restored themselves to a position which was in full conformity with the rule of \textit{jus cogens}.

(4) Paragraph 2 applies to cases under article 61 and the rules regarding the consequences of the termination of a treaty set out in paragraph 1 of article 66 with the addition of one important proviso. Any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty may afterwards be maintained.

\(^{282}\) New article.
only to the extent that its maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new rule of *jus cogens*. In other words, a right, obligation or legal situation valid when it arose is not to be made retroactively invalid; but its further maintenance after the establishment of the new rule of *jus cogens* is admissible only to the extent that such further maintenance is not in itself in conflict with that rule.

**Article 68.**

Consequences of the suspension of the operation of a treaty

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the suspension of the operation of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present articles:

   (a) Relieves the parties between which the operation of the treaty is suspended from the obligation to perform the treaty in their mutual relations during the period of suspension;

   (b) Does not otherwise affect the legal relations between the parties established by the treaty.

2. During the period of the suspension the parties shall refrain from acts tending to render the resumption of the operation of the treaty impossible.

**Commentary**

(1) This article, like articles 65 and 66, does not touch the question of responsibility, which is reserved by article 69, but concerns only the direct consequences of the suspension of the operation of the treaty.

(2) Since a treaty may sometimes provide for, or the parties agree upon, the conditions which are to apply during the suspension of a treaty’s operation, the rule contained in paragraph 1 is subject to any such provision or agreement. This rule states in paragraph (a) that the suspension of the operation of a treaty relieves the parties between which the operation of the treaty is suspended from the obligation to perform the treaty in their mutual relations during the period of the suspension. The sub-paragraph speaks of relieving “the parties between which the operation of the treaty is suspended” because in certain cases the suspension may occur between only some of the parties to a multilateral treaty, for example, under article 55 (*inter se* agreement to suspend) and article 57, paragraph 2 (suspension in case of breach).

(3) Paragraph 1(b), however, emphasizes that the suspension of a treaty’s operation “does not otherwise affect the legal relations between the parties established by the treaty”. This provision is intended to make it clear that the legal nexus between the parties established by the treaty remains intact and that it is only the operation of its provisions which is suspended.

(4) This point is carried further in paragraph 2, which specifically requires the parties, during the period of the suspension, to refrain from acts calculated to render the operation of the treaty impossible as soon as the ground or cause of suspension ceases. The Commission considered this obligation to be implicit in the very concept of "suspension", and to be imposed on the parties by their obligation under the *pacta sunt servanda* rule (article 23) to perform the treaty in good faith.

**Part VI.—Miscellaneous provisions**

**Article 69.**

Cases of State succession and State responsibility

The provisions of the present articles are without prejudice to any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States or from the international responsibility of a State.

**Commentary**

(1) The Commission, for the reasons explained in paragraphs 29-31 of the Introduction to the present chapter of this Report, decided not to include in the draft articles any provisions relating (1) to the effect of the outbreak of hostilities upon treaties, (2) to the succession of States with respect to treaties, and (3) to the application of the law of State responsibility in case of a breach of an obligation undertaken in a treaty. In reviewing the final draft, and more especially its provisions concerning the termination and suspension of the operation of treaties, the Commission concluded that it would not be adequate simply to leave the exclusion from the draft articles of provisions connected with the second and third topics for explanation in the introduction to this chapter. It decided that an express reservation in regard to the possible impact of a succession of States or of the international responsibility of a State on the application of the present articles was desirable in order to prevent any misconceptions from arising as to the interrelation between the rules governing those matters and the law of treaties. Both these matters may have an impact on the operation of certain parts of the law of treaties in conditions of entirely normal international relations, and the Commission felt that considerations of logic and of the completeness of the draft articles indicated the desirability of inserting a general reservation covering cases of succession and cases of State responsibility.

(2) Different considerations appeared to the Commission to apply to the case of an outbreak of hostilities between parties to a treaty. It recognized that the state of facts resulting from an outbreak of hostilities may have the practical effect of preventing the application of the treaty in the circumstances prevailing. It also recognized that questions may arise as to the legal consequences of an outbreak of hostilities with respect to obligations arising from treaties. But it considered that in the international law of to-day the outbreak of hostilities between States must be considered as an entirely abnormal condition, and that the rules governing its legal consequences should not be regarded as forming part of the general rules of international law applicable in the normal relations between States. Thus, the Geneva Conventions codifying the law of the sea contain no reservation in

280 1963 draft, article 54.

284 New article.
regard to the case of an outbreak of hostilities notwithstanding the obvious impact which such an event may have on the application of many provisions of those Conventions; nor do they purport in any way to regulate the consequences of such an event. It is true that one article in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (article 44) and a similar article in the Convention on Consular Relations (article 26) contain a reference to cases of "armed conflict". Very special considerations, however, dictated the mention of cases of armed conflict in those articles and then only to underline that the rules laid down in the articles hold good even in such cases. The Vienna Conventions do not otherwise purport to regulate the consequences of an outbreak of hostilities; nor do they contain any general reservation with regard to the effect of that event on the application of their provisions. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that it was justified in considering the case of an outbreak of hostilities between parties to a treaty to be wholly outside the scope of the general law of treaties to be codified in the present articles; and that no account should be taken of that case or any mention made of it in the draft articles.

(3) The reservation regarding cases of a succession of States and of international responsibility is formulated in the present article in entirely general terms. The reason is that the Commission considered it essential that the reservation should not appear to prejudice any of the questions of principle arising in connexion with these topics, the codification of both of which the Commission already has in hand.

Article 70. Case of an aggressor State

The present articles are without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations with reference to that State's aggression.

Commentary

(1) In its commentary on article 31, which specifies that an obligation arises for a third State from a provision in a treaty only with its consent, the Commission noted that the case of an aggressor State would fall outside the principle laid down in the article. At the same time, it observes that article 49 prescribes the nullity of a treaty procured by the coercion of a State by the threat or use of force "in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations", and that a treaty provision imposed on an aggressor State would not therefore infringe article 49. Certain Governments also made this point in their comments on article 59 of the 1964 draft (present article 31), and suggested that a reservation covering the case of an aggressor should be inserted in the article. In examining this suggestion at the present session, the Commission concluded that, if such a reservation were to be formulated, a more general reservation with respect to the case of an aggressor State applicable to the draft articles as a whole might be preferable. It felt that there might be other articles, for example, those on termination and suspension of the operation of treaties, where measures taken against an aggressor State might have implications.

(2) Two main points were made in the Commission in this connexion. First, if a general reservation were to be introduced covering the draft articles as a whole, some members stressed that it would be essential to avoid giving the impression that an aggressor State is to be considered as completely ex lex with respect to the law of treaties. Otherwise, this might impede the process of bringing the aggressor State back into a condition of normal relations with the rest of the international community.

(3) Secondly, members stressed the possible danger of one party unilaterally characterizing another as an aggressor for the purpose of terminating inconvenient treaties; and the need, in consequence, to limit any reservation relating to the case of an aggressor State to measures taken against it in conformity with the Charter.

(4) Some members questioned the need to include a reservation of the kind proposed in a general convention on the law of treaties. They considered that the case of an aggressor State belonged to a quite distinct part of international law, the possible impact of which on the operation of the law of treaties in particular circumstances could be assumed and need not be provided for in the draft articles. The Commission, however, concluded that, having regard to the nature of the above-mentioned provisions of articles 49 and 31, a general reservation in regard to the case of an aggressor State would serve a useful purpose. At the same time, it concluded that the reservation, if it was to be acceptable, must be framed in terms which would avoid the difficulties referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) above.

(5) Accordingly, the Commission decided to insert in the present article a reservation formulated in entirely general terms and stating that the present articles on the law of treaties are "without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations with reference to that State's aggression".

Part VII.—Depositaries, notifications, corrections and registration

Article 71. Depositaries of treaties

1. The depositary of a treaty, which may be a State or an international organization, shall be designated by the negotiating States in the treaty or in some other manner.

2. The functions of a depositary of a treaty are international in character and the depositary is under an obligation to act impartially in their performance.

285 New article.
Commentary

(1) The depositary of a treaty, whose principal functions are set out in the next article, plays an essential procedural role in the smooth operation of a multilateral treaty. A multilateral treaty normally designates a particular State or international organization as depositary. In the case of a treaty adopted within an international organization or at a conference convened under its auspices, the usual practice is to designate the competent organ of the organization as depositary, and in other cases the State in whose territory the conference is convened. The text of this article, as provisionally adopted in 1962, gave expression to this practice in the form of residuary rules which would govern the appointment of the depositary of a multilateral treaty in the absence of any nomination in the treaty itself. No Government raised any objection to these residuary rules, but in re-examining the article at its seventeenth session, the Commission revised its opinion as to the utility of the rules and concluded that the matter should be left to the States which drew up the treaty to decide. Paragraph 1 of the article, as finally adopted, therefore simply provides that “The depositary of a treaty, which may be a State or an international organization, shall be designated by the negotiating States in the treaty or in some other manner”.

(2) At its seventeenth session the Commission also decided to transfer to the present article the substance of what had appeared in its 1962 draft as paragraph 1 of article 29. This paragraph stressed the representative character of the depositary’s functions and its duty to act impartially in their performance. In revising the provision the Commission decided that it was preferable to speak of a depositary’s functions being international in character. Accordingly, paragraph 2 of the present article now states that “The functions of a depositary of a treaty are international in character and the depositary is under an obligation to act impartially in their performance”. When the depositary is a State, in its capacity as a party it may of course express its own policies; but as depositary it must be objective and perform its functions impartially.

Article 72. Functions of depositaries

1. The functions of a depositary, unless the treaty otherwise provides, comprise in particular:

(a) Keeping the custody of the original text of the treaty, if entrusted to it;

(b) Preparing certified copies of the original text and any further text in such additional languages as may be required by the treaty and transmitting them to the States entitled to become parties to the treaty;

(c) Receiving any signatures to the treaty and any instruments and notifications relating to it;

(d) Examining whether a signature, an instrument or a reservation is in conformity with the provisions of the treaty and of the present articles and, if need be, bringing the matter to the attention of the State in question;

(e) Informing the States entitled to become parties to the treaty of acts, communications and notifications relating to the treaty;

(f) Informing the States entitled to become parties to the treaty when the number of signatures or of instruments of ratification, accession, acceptance or approval required for the entry into force of the treaty has been received or deposited;

(g) Performing the functions specified in other provisions of the present articles.

2. In the event of any difference appearing between a State and the depositary as to the performance of the latter’s functions, the depositary shall bring the question to the attention of the other States entitled to become parties to the treaty or, where appropriate, of the competent organ of the organization concerned.

Commentary

(1) Mention is made of the depositary in various provisions of the present articles and the Commission considered it desirable to state in a single article the principal functions of a depositary. In doing so, it gave particular attention to the Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Agreements. Paragraph 1, therefore, without being exhaustive, specifies the principal functions of a depositary. The statement of these functions in the text of an article provisionally adopted in 1962 has been shortened and modified in the light of the comments of Governments.

(2) Paragraph l(a) speaks of the depositary’s function of “keeping the custody of the original text of the treaty, if entrusted to it”. This is because sometimes, for example, the original text is permanently or temporarily deposited with the host State of a conference while an international organization acts as the depositary, as in the case of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.

(3) Paragraph l(b) needs no comment other than to mention that the requirement for the preparation of texts in additional languages may possibly arise from the rules of an international organization, in which case the matter is covered by article 4. Paragraph l(c) needs no comment.

(4) Paragraph l(d) recognizes that a depositary has a certain duty to examine whether signatures, instruments and reservations are in conformity with any applicable provisions of the treaty or of the present articles, and if necessary to bring the matter to the attention of the State in question. That is, however, the limit of the depositary’s duty in this connexion. It is no part of the functions to adjudicate on the validity of an instrument or reservation. If an instrument or reservation appears to be irregular, the proper course of a depositary is to draw the attention of the reserving State to the matter and, if the latter does not concur with the depositary, to communicate the reservation to the other interested States and bring the question of the apparent irregularity

287 1962 and 1965 drafts, article 29.

288 ST/LEG/7.
to their attention in accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article.

(5) *Paragraph 1* needs no comment except to recall the significance of article 73 in this connexion and to underline the obvious desirability of the prompt performance of this function by a depositary.

(6) *Paragraph 1* notes the duty of the depositary to inform the States entitled to become parties to the treaty when the number of signatures or of instruments of ratification, etc., required for the entry into force of the treaty have been received or deposited. The question whether the required number has been reached may sometimes pose a problem, as when questionable reservations have been made. In this connexion, as in others, although the depositary has the function of making a preliminary examination of the matter, it is not invested with competence to make a final determination of the entry into force of the treaty binding upon the other States concerned. However normal it may be for States to accept the depositary’s appreciation of the date of the entry into force of a treaty, it seems clear that this appreciation may be challenged by another State and that then it would be the duty of the depositary to consult all the other interested States as provided in paragraph 2 of the present article.

(7) *Paragraph 1* needs no comment.

(8) *Paragraph 2* lays down the general principle that in the event of any differences appearing between any State and the depositary as to the performance of the latter’s functions, the proper course and the duty of the depositary is to bring the question to the attention of the other negotiating States or, where appropriate, of the competent organ of the organization concerned. This principle really follows from the fact that, as indicated above, the depositary is not invested with any competence to adjudicate upon or to determine matters arising in connexion with the performance of its functions.

**Article 73.** Notifications and communications

Except as the treaty or the present articles otherwise provide, any notification or communication to be made by any State under the present articles shall:

(a) If there is no depositary, be transmitted directly to the States for which it is intended, or if there is a depositary, to the latter;

(b) Be considered as having been made by the State in question only upon its receipt by the State to which it was transmitted or, as the case may be, upon its receipt by the depositary;

(c) If transmitted to a depositary, be considered as received by the State for which it was intended only upon the latter State’s having been informed by the depositary in accordance with article 72, paragraph 1(e).

**Commentary**

(1) The drafts provisionally adopted by the Commission at its fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions contained a number of articles in which reference was made to communications or notifications to be made directly to the States concerned, or if there was a depositary, to the latter. Article 29 of the 1962 draft also contained provisions regarding the duty of a depositary to transmit such notifications or communications to the interested States. In re-examining certain of these provisions at its seventeenth session the Commission concluded that it would allow a considerable simplification to be effected in the texts of the various articles if a general article were to be introduced covering notifications and communications.

(2) If the treaty itself contains provisions regulating the making of notifications or communications required under its clauses, they necessarily prevail, as the opening phrase of the article recognizes. But the general rule contained in sub-paragraph (a), which reflects the existing practice, is that if there is no depositary, a notification or communication is to be transmitted directly to the State for which it is intended, whereas if there is a depositary it is to be transmitted to the latter, whose function it will be under article 72 to inform the other States of the notification or communication. Such is, therefore, the rule given in sub-paragraph (a) of this article. This rule relates essentially to notifications and communications relating to the “life” of the treaty—acts establishing consent, reservations, objections, notices regarding invalidity, termination, etc. Treaties which have depositaries, such as the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, may contain provisions relating to substantive matters which require notifications. Normally, the context in which they occur will make it plain that the notifications are to be made directly to the State for which they are intended; and in any event the Commission considered that in such cases the procedure to be followed would be a matter of the interpretation of the treaty.

(3) The problem which principally occupied the Commission related to the legal questions as to the points of time at which a notification or communication was to be regarded as having been accomplished by the State making it, and as operative with respect to the State for which it was intended. Sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) express the Commission’s conclusions on these questions. The Commission did not consider that there was any difficulty when the notification or communication was transmitted directly to the State for which it was intended. In these cases, in its opinion, the rule must be that a notification or communication is not to be considered as “made” by the State transmitting it until it has been received by the State for which it is intended. Equally, of course, it is not to be considered as received by, and legally in operation with respect to, the latter State until that moment. Such is the rule laid down in paragraph (b) for these cases.

(4) The main problem is the respective positions of the transmitting State and of the other States when a notification or communication is sent by the former to the depositary of the treaty. In these cases, there must in the nature of things be some interval of time before the notification is received by the State for which it is intended.

\(^{290}\) 1965 draft, article 29(bis).
Iinvariably, the working of the administrative processes of the depositary and the act of retransmission will entail some delay. Moreover, the Commission was informed that in practice cases are known to occur where the delay is a matter of weeks rather than of days. The question of principle at issue is whether the depositary is to be considered the agent of each party so that receipt of a notification or communication by a depositary must be treated as the equivalent of receipt by the State for which it was intended. On this question the majority of the Commission concluded that the depositary is to be considered as no more than a convenient mechanism for the accomplishment of certain acts relating to a treaty and for the transmission of notifications and communications to the States parties to or entitled to become parties to the treaty. Consequently, in its view the depositary should not be regarded as the general agent of each party, and receipt by the depositary of a notification or communication should not be regarded as automatically constituting a receipt also by every State for which it is intended. If the contrary view were to be adopted, the operation of various forms of time-limits provided for in the present articles or specified in treaties might be materially affected by any lack of diligence on the part of a depositary, to the serious prejudice of the intended recipient of a notification or communication, for example, under article 17, paragraphs 4 and 5, relating to objections to reservations, and article 62, paragraphs 1 and 2, relating to notification of a claim to invalidate, terminate, etc. a treaty. Equally, the intended recipient, still unaware of a notification or communication, might in all innocence commit an act which infringed the legal rights of the State making it.

(5) The Commission recognized that, owing to the time-lag which may occur between transmission by the sending State to the depositary and receipt of the information by the intended addressee from the depositary, delicate questions of the respective rights and obligations of the two States vis-à-vis each other may arise in theory and occasionally in practice. It did not, however, think that it should attempt to solve all such questions in advance by a general rule applicable in all cases and to every type of notification or communication. It considered that they should be left to be governed by the principle of good faith in the performance of treaties in the light of the particular circumstances of each case. The Commission therefore decided to confine itself, in cases where there is a depositary, to stating two basic procedural rules regarding (a) the making of a notification or communication by the sending State and (b) its receipt by the State for which it is intended.

(6) Accordingly, paragraph (b) provides that, so far as the sending State is concerned, the State will be considered as having made a notification or communication on its receipt by the depositary; a sending State will thus be considered as having, for example, made a notice of objection to a reservation or a notice of termination when it has reached the depositary. Paragraph (b), on the other hand, provides that a notification or communication shall be considered as received by the State for which it is intended only upon this State’s having been informed of it by the depositary. Thus, the commencing date of any time-limit fixed in the present articles would be the date of receipt of the information by the State for which the notification or communication was intended.

(7) The rules set out in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the article are prefaced by the words “Except as the treaty or the present articles may otherwise provide”. Clearly, if the treaty, as not infrequently happens, contains any specific provisions regarding notification or communication, these will prevail. The exception in regard to the “present articles” is stressed in the opening phrase primarily in order to prevent any misconception as to the relation between the present article and articles 13 (exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, etc.) and 21 (entry into force of treaties). As already explained in the commentary to article 13, what is involved in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of that article is only the performance of an act required by the treaty to establish the consent of a State to be bound. The parties have accepted that the act of deposit will be sufficient by itself to establish a legal nexus between the depositing State and any other State which has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty. The depositary has the duty to inform the other States of the deposit but the notification, under existing practice, is not a substantive part of the transaction by which the depositing State establishes legal relations with them under the treaty. Some conventions, such as the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, for that very reason provide that a short interval of time shall elapse before the act of ratification, etc. comes into force for the other contracting States. But unless the treaty otherwise states, “notification” is not, as such, an integral part of the process of establishing the legal nexus between the depositing State and the other contracting States. Similarly, in the case of entry into force, notification is not, unless the treaty so stipulates, an integral element in the process of entry into force. In consequence, it is not considered that there is, in truth, any contradiction between articles 13 and 21 and the present article. But in any event, the specific provisions of those articles prevail.

(8) The scope of the article is limited to notifications and communications “to be made...under the present articles”. As already mentioned in paragraph (2) of this commentary, the notifications and communications requiring to be made under treaties are of different kinds. As the rules set out in the present article would be inappropriate in some cases, the Commission decided to limit the operation of the article to notices and communications to be made under any of the present articles.
(b) By executing or exchanging a separate instrument or instruments setting out the correction which it has been agreed to make; or
(c) By executing a corrected text of the whole treaty by the same procedure as in the case of the original text.

2. Where the treaty is one for which there is a depositary, the latter:
   (a) Shall notify the contracting States of the error and of the proposal to correct it if no objection is raised within a specified time-limit;
   (b) If on the expiry of the time-limit no objection has been raised, shall make and initial the correction in the text and shall execute a proces-verbal of the rectification of the text, and communicate a copy of it to the contracting States;
   (c) If an objection has been raised to the proposed correction, shall communicate the objection to the other contracting States.

3. The rules in paragraphs 1 and 2 apply also where the text has been authenticated in two or more languages and it appears that there is a lack of concordance which the contracting States agree should be corrected.

4. (a) The corrected text replaces the defective text ab initio, unless the contracting States otherwise decide;
   (b) The correction of the text of a treaty that has been registered shall be notified to the Secretariat of the United Nations.

5. Where an error is discovered in a certified copy of a treaty, the depositary shall execute a proces-verbal specifying the rectification and communicate a copy to the contracting States.

Commentary

(1) Errors and inconsistencies are sometimes found in the texts of treaties and the Commission considered it desirable to include provisions in the draft articles concerning methods of rectifying them. The error or inconsistency may be due to a typographical mistake or to a misdescription or mis-statement due to a misunderstanding and the correction may affect the substantive meaning of the text as authenticated. If there is a dispute as to whether or not the alleged error or inconsistency is in fact such, the question is not one simply of correction of the text but becomes a problem of mistake which falls under article 45. The present article only concerns cases where there is no dispute as to the existence of the error or inconsistency.

(2) As the methods of correction differ somewhat according to whether there is or is not a depositary, the draft provisionally adopted in 1962 dealt with the two cases in separate articles. 291 This involved some repetition, and at its seventeenth session the Commission decided to combine the two articles. At the same time, in the light of the comments of Governments, it streamlined their provisions. The present article thus contains in shortened form the substance of the two articles adopted in 1962.

(3) Paragraph 1 covers the correction of the text when there is no depositary. Both the decision whether to proceed to a formal correction of the text and the method of correction to be adopted are essentially matters for the States in question. The rule stated in paragraph 1 is, therefore, purely residuary and its object is to indicate the appropriate method of proceeding in the event of the discovery of an error in a text. It provides that the text should be corrected by one of three regular techniques. 292 The normal methods in use are those in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). Only in the extreme case of a whole series of errors would there be occasion for starting afresh with a new revised text as contemplated in sub-paragraph (c). 293

(4) Paragraph 2 covers the cases where the treaty is a multilateral treaty for which there is a depositary. Here the process of obtaining the agreement of the interested States to the correction or rectification of the text is affected by the number of States, and the technique used hinges upon the depositary. In formulating the paragraph the Commission based itself upon the information contained in the Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Agreements. 294 The technique is for the depositary to notify all the interested States of the error or inconsistency and of the proposal to correct the text, while at the same time specifying an appropriate time-limit within which any objection must be raised. Then, if no objection is raised, the depositary, as the instrument of the interested States, proceeds to make the correction, draw up a proces-verbal recording the fact and circulate a copy of the proces-verbal to the States concerned. The precedent on page 9 of the Summary of Practice perhaps suggests that the Secretary-General considers it enough, in the case of a typographical error, to obtain the consent of those States which have already signed the offending text. In laying down a general rule, however, it seems safer to say that notification should be sent to all the contracting States, since it is conceivable that arguments might arise as to whether the text did or did not contain a typographical error, e.g. in the case of punctuation that may affect the meaning.

(5) Paragraph 3 applies the techniques of paragraphs 1 and 2 also to cases where there is a discordance between two or more authentic language versions one of which is agreed should be corrected. The Commission noted that the question may also arise of correcting not the authentic text but versions of it prepared in other languages; in other words, of correcting errors of translation. As, however, this is not a matter of altering an authentic text of the treaty, the Commission did not think it necessary that the article should cover the point. In these cases, it would be open to the contracting States to modify the translation by mutual agreement without any special formality. Accordingly, the Commission

291 Articles 26 and 27.
293 For an example, see Hackworth's Digest of International Law, loc. cit.
294 See pages 8-10, 12, 19-20, 39 (footnote), and annexes 1 and 2.
thought it sufficient to mention the point in the commentary.

(6) Paragraph 4(a), in order to remove any possible doubts, provides that the corrected text replaces the defective text ab initio unless it is otherwise agreed. Since what is involved is merely the correction or rectification of an already accepted text, it seems clear that, unless the contracting States otherwise agree, the corrected or rectified text should be deemed to operate from the date when the original text came into force.

(7) The rules contained in the article contemplate that in cases where there is a depositary it will be necessary to seek the assent of the “contracting States” to the making of the correction. The Commission appreciated that “negotiating States” which have not yet established their consent to be bound by the treaty also have a certain interest in any correction of the text, and that in practice a depositary will normally notify the “negotiating” as well as the “contracting” States of any proposal to make a correction to the text. Indeed, the Commission considered whether, at any rate for a certain period after the adoption of the text, the article should specifically require the depositary to notify all “negotiating States” as well as “contracting States”. However, it concluded that to do this would make the article unduly complicated and that, placing the matter on the plane of a right rather than simply of diplomacy, only “contracting States” should be considered as having an actual legal right to a voice in any decision regarding a correction. Accordingly, it decided to confine the obligation of a depositary to notifying and seeking the assent of “contracting States”. At the same time, it emphasized that the restriction of the provisions of the article to “contracting States” was not to be understood as in any way denying the desirability, on the diplomatic plane, of the depositary’s also notifying all the “negotiating States”, especially if no long period of time has elapsed since the adoption of the text of the treaty.

(8) Paragraph 4(b) provides that the correction of a text that has been registered shall be notified to the Secretariat of the United Nations. Its registration with the Secretary-General would clearly be in accordance with the spirit of article 2 of the General Assembly’s Regulations concerning the Registration and Publication of Treaties and International Agreements, and appeared to the Commission to be desirable.

(9) Certified copies of the text are of considerable importance in the operation of multilateral treaties, since it is the certified copy which represents a text of the treaty in the hands of the individual States. Since there exists a correct authentic text and it is only a question of making the copy accord with the correct text, the detailed procedure laid down in paragraph 2 for correcting an authentic text is unnecessary. Paragraph 5, therefore, provides for an appropriate process.
vvention could logically be regarded in practice as attracting that sanction.

(3) The second sentence of the article provides that the registration and publication are to be governed by the regulations adopted by the General Assembly. The Commission considered whether it should incorporate in the draft articles the provisions of the General Assembly’s Regulations adopted in its resolution 97 (I) of 14 December 1946 (as amended by its resolutions 364B (IV) of 1 December 1949 and 482 (V) of 12 December 1950). These regulations are important as they define the conditions for the application of Article 102 of the Charter. However, having regard to the administrative character of these regulations and to the fact that they are subject to amendment by the General Assembly, the Commission concluded that it should limit itself to incorporating the regulations in article 75 by reference to them in general terms.

CHAPTER III
Special missions

A. Historical Background

39. At its tenth session, in 1958, the International Law Commission adopted a set of draft articles on diplomatic intercourse and immunities. The Commission observed, however, that the draft dealt only with permanent diplomatic missions. Diplomatic relations between States also assumed other forms that might be placed under the heading of “ad hoc diplomacy”, covering itinerant envoys, diplomatic conferences and special missions sent to a State for limited purposes. The Commission considered that these forms of diplomacy should also be studied, in order to bring out the rules of law governing them, and requested the Special Rapporteur to make a study of the question and to submit his report at a future session.297 The Commission decided at its eleventh session (1959) to place the question of ad hoc diplomacy as a special topic on the agenda for its twelfth session (1960).

40. Mr. A. E. F. Sandström was appointed Special Rapporteur. He submitted his report298 to the twelfth session, and on the basis of this report the Commission took decisions and drew up recommendations for the rules concerning special missions.299 The Commission’s draft was very brief. It was based on the idea that the rules on diplomatic intercourse and immunities in general prepared by the Commission should on the whole be applied to special missions by analogy. The Commission expressed the opinion that this brief draft should be referred to the Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities convened at Vienna in the spring of 1961. But the Commission stressed that it had not been able to give this draft the thorough study it would normally have done. For that reason, the Commission regarded its draft as only a preliminary survey, carried out in order to put forward certain ideas and suggestions which should be taken into account at the Vienna Conference.300

41. At its 943rd plenary meeting on 12 December 1960, the General Assembly decided, on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, that these draft articles should be referred to the Vienna Conference with the recommendation that the Conference should consider them together with the draft articles on diplomatic intercourse and immunities.301 The Vienna Conference placed this question on its agenda and appointed a special Sub-Committee to study it.302

42. The Sub-Committee noted that the draft articles did little more than indicate which of the rules on permanent missions applied to special missions and which did not. The Sub-Committee took the view that the draft articles were unsuitable for inclusion in the final convention without long and detailed study which could take place only after a set of rules on permanent missions had been finally adopted. For this reason, the Sub-Committee recommended that the Conference should refer this question back to the General Assembly so that the Assembly could recommend to the International Law Commission further study of the topic, i.e., that it continue to study the topic in the light of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which was then drawn up. At its fourth plenary meeting, on 10 April 1961, the Conference adopted the Sub-Committee’s recommendation.303

43. The matter was again submitted to the General Assembly. On 18 December 1961, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, adopted resolution 1687 (XVI), in which it requested the International Law Commission to study the subject further and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

44. In pursuance of that resolution, the question was referred back to the International Law Commission, which decided, at its 669th meeting, on 27 June 1962, to place it on the agenda for its fifteenth session. The Commission also requested the Secretariat to prepare a working paper on the subject.

45. During its fifteenth session, at the 712th meeting, the Commission appointed Mr. Milan Bartoš as Special Rapporteur for the topic of special missions.

46. On that occasion, the Commission took the following decision:

"With regard to the approach to the codification of the topic, the Commission decided that the Special Rapporteur should prepare a draft of articles. These articles should be based on the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, but the Special Rapporteur should keep in mind that special missions are, both by virtue of their functions and by

299 Ibid., pp. 179 and 180.
300 Ibid., p. 179.
301 Resolution 1504 (XV).
302 The Sub-Committee was composed of the representatives of Ecuador, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Senegal, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.
their nature, an institution distinct from permanent missions. In addition, the Commission thought that the time was not yet ripe for deciding whether the draft articles on special missions should be in the form of an additional protocol to the Vienna Convention, 1961, or should be embodied in a separate convention or in any other appropriate form, and that the Commission should await the Special Rapporteur's recommendations on that subject. 304

47. In addition, the Commission considered again whether the topic of special missions should also cover the status of government delegates to congresses and conferences. In this connexion, at its fifteenth session, the Commission inserted the following paragraph in its annual report to the General Assembly:

"With regard to the scope of the topic, the members agreed that the topic of special missions should also cover itinerant envoys, in accordance with its decision at its 1960 session. 305 At that session the Commission had also decided 306 not to deal with the privileges and immunities of delegates to congresses and conferences as part of the study of special missions, because the topic of diplomatic conferences was connected with that of relations between States and inter-governmental organizations. At the present session, the question was raised again, with particular reference to conferences convened by States. Most of the members expressed the opinion, however, that for the time being the terms of reference of the Special Rapporteur should not cover the question of delegates to congresses and conferences." 307

48. The Special Rapporteur submitted his report, 308 which was placed on the agenda for the Commission's sixteenth session.

49. The Commission considered the report twice. First, at the 723rd, 724th and 725th meetings, it engaged in a general discussion and gave the Special Rapporteur general instructions for continuing his study and submitting the continuation of his report at the following session. Secondly, at the 757th, 758th, 760th-763rd and 768th-770th meetings, it examined a number of draft articles and adopted sixteen articles subject to their being supplemented, if necessary, during its seventeenth session. These articles were submitted to the General Assembly and to the Governments of Member States for information.

50. Owing to the circumstances prevailing at the time of its regular session in 1964, the General Assembly did not discuss the report and consequently did not express its opinion to the Commission. Accordingly, the Commission had to resume its work on the topic at the point it had reached at its sixteenth session in 1964. The Special Rapporteur expressed the hope that the reports on this topic submitted at the 1964 and 1965 sessions would be consolidated in a single report.

51. The topic of special missions was placed on the agenda for the Commission's seventeenth session, at which the Special Rapporteur submitted his second report. 309 The Commission considered that report at its 804th-809th, 817th, 819th and 820th meetings.

52. The Commission considered all the articles proposed in the Special Rapporteur's second report. It adopted 28 articles of the draft, which follow on from the 16 articles adopted at the sixteenth session. The Commission requested that the General Assembly should consider all the articles adopted at the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions as a single draft.

53. In preparing the draft articles, the Commission has sought to codify the modern rules of international law concerning special missions, and the articles formulated by the Commission contain elements of progressive development as well as of codification of the law.

54. In conformity with Articles 16 and 21 of its Statute, the Commission decided to communicate its draft articles on special missions to Governments through the Secretary-General, inviting their comments. The Governments were asked to submit their comments by 1 May 1966. This short time-limit was regarded as essential if the Commission was to be able to complete its final draft on special missions with its present membership.

55. The Commission decided to submit to the General Assembly and to the Governments of Member States, in addition to the draft articles in section B of the report, certain other decisions, suggestions and observations set forth in section C, on which the Commission requested any comments likely to facilitate its subsequent work.

56. The General Assembly discussed the draft articles, which were transmitted to the Governments of Member States for comment. By the opening of the Commission's eighteenth session, however, only a limited number of States had submitted their comments.

B. SUMMARY OF THE COMMISSION'S DISCUSSIONS AT ITS EIGHTEENTH SESSION

57. At its seventeenth session, the Commission decided to devote its next session to the consideration of the law of treaties and to the draft articles on special missions. At the beginning of its eighteenth session, it became apparent that the law of treaties alone would take up almost the whole of that session. As the Commission was anxious to complete its study of the draft articles on that topic during its eighteenth session, it decided to give priority to that topic and to devote only a limited amount of time to consideration of the draft articles on special missions.

58. The Special Rapporteur submitted his third report 310 to the Commission, which also had before it the comments received from Governments on the draft articles on special missions. 311

304 Ibid., p. 225, para. 64.
306 Ibid., para. 25.
59. The Commission considered the item at its 877th, 880th and 881st-883rd meetings, between 24 June and 4 July 1966. It examined certain questions of a general nature affecting special missions which had arisen out of the comments by Governments and which it was important to settle as a preliminary to the later work on the draft articles on the topic. Those general questions, which had been put by the Special Rapporteur, were as follows.

(a) Nature of the provisions relating to special missions

60. After examining the comments by Governments on this point, the Commission decided to ask the Special Rapporteur to base his draft on the view that the provisions of the draft articles on special missions could not in principle constitute rules from which the parties would be unable to derogate by mutual agreement. The Special Rapporteur was asked to submit to the Commission a draft article which would convey that view and indicate specifically which of the provisions, if any, should in his opinion be excepted from this principle.

(b) Distinction between the different kinds of special missions

61. The Commission gave attention to the comments by Governments on this point and in particular to the possibility of distinguishing between special missions of a political character and those which were of a purely technical character. The question thus arose whether it was not desirable to distinguish between special missions in respect of the privileges and immunities of members of missions of a technical character. The Commission reaffirmed its view that it was impossible to make a distinction between special missions of a political nature and those of a technical nature; every special mission represented a sovereign State in its relations with another State. On the other hand, the Commission concluded that there was some justification for the proposal by Governments that the extent of certain privileges and immunities should be limited in the case of particular categories of special missions. The Commission requested the Special Rapporteur to re-examine the problem, more particularly the question of applying the functional theory and the question of limiting the extent of certain privileges and immunities in the case of particular categories of special missions. The Commission instructed the Special Rapporteur to submit to it a draft provision on the subject which would provide inter alia that any limitation of that nature should be regulated by agreement between the States concerned.

(c) Question of introducing into the draft articles a provision prohibiting discrimination

62. After reviewing the comments by Governments and their opinions on the question raised by the Commission in paragraph 49 of its report on the work of the first part of its seventeenth session (1965), the Commission reconsidered its previous decision on the point and requested the Special Rapporteur to submit a draft article prohibiting discrimination, based on article 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and article 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The article would, however, have to allow for the diversity of the nature and tasks of special missions and for the fact that circumstances might lead to distinctions being made in practice.

(d) Reciprocity in the application of the draft

63. The Commission took note of one Government's opinion that there should be a provision on reciprocity in the draft article on special missions. The Commission, however, endorsed the Special Rapporteur's opinion that reciprocity was a condition underlying the provisions of any treaty; it was therefore unnecessary to include in the draft articles on special missions an explicit provision to the effect that the principle of reciprocity must be observed.

(e) Relationship with other international agreements

64. In paragraph 50 of its report on the work of the first part of its seventeenth session (1965), the Commission referred to the question whether the draft articles on special missions should include a provision on the relationship between the articles and other international agreements, corresponding to article 73 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. After considering the comments by Governments and the Special Rapporteur's views on the point, the Commission asked the Special Rapporteur to submit a draft article on the subject based on the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

(f) Form of the instrument relating to special missions

65. During its fifteenth session, at the 712th meeting, the Commission expressed the opinion that the time was not yet ripe for deciding whether the draft articles on special missions should be in the form of an additional protocol to the 1961 Vienna Convention, or should be embodied in a separate Convention or put in any other appropriate form; it decided to await the Special Rapporteur's recommendations on that subject. During the discussion by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the reports of the International Law Commission on its sixteenth and seventeenth sessions, several delegations stated their views on this question. In the light of those opinions and of the written comments by Governments, the Commission requested the Special Rapporteur to continue his work on the draft articles on special missions on the assumption that the draft would be in the form of a separate instrument, though keeping as closely as possible to the structure of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(g) Adoption of the instrument relating to special missions

66. Although the Commission did not ask Governments how, in their opinion, the text of the instrument relating to special missions should be adopted, several Governments expressed their views on this question, either in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly or in their written comments. The Commission deferred its decision on this question until its next session.
67. Although it is not current practice for the Commission to prepare preambles to the drafts which it submits to the General Assembly, one Government, in its written comments, expressed the view that the preamble to the convention on special missions should give a definition of a special mission and emphasize the differences between special missions and permanent diplomatic missions. After discussing the matter, the Commission instructed the Special Rapporteur to draft a preamble and submit it to the Commission.

(i) **Arrangement of the articles**

68. The Commission had intended to rearrange the articles on special missions when they had been put into final form. Several Governments too, both in their written comments and in the discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, suggested that the Commission should rearrange the articles when it finally adopted them. In accordance with the views of the Special Rapporteur, the Commission decided that it would be premature to undertake such a rearrangement at the present stage. However, it requested the Special Rapporteur to prepare a draft rearrangement of the articles and to submit it to the Drafting Committee of the Commission when the articles had been finally adopted.

(j) **Draft provisions concerning so-called high-level special missions**

69. At its sixteenth session, the International Law Commission decided to ask the Special Rapporteur to submit at its next session articles dealing with the legal status of so-called high-level special missions, in particular special missions led by Heads of States, Heads of Governments, Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and Cabinet Ministers. In his second report (A/CN.4/179), the Special Rapporteur submitted to the seventeenth session of the Commission a set of draft provisions concerning so-called high-level special missions. The Commission did not discuss this draft at its seventeenth session, but considered whether special rules of law should or should not be drafted for so-called high-level special missions, whose heads hold high office in their States. It said that it would appreciate the opinion of Governments on this matter, and hoped that their suggestions would be as specific as possible. After noting the opinions of Governments, the Commission recommended the Special Rapporteur not to prepare draft provisions concerning so-called high-level special missions, to include in part II of the draft articles a provision concerning the status of the Head of State as head of a special mission, and to consider whether it was desirable to mention the particular situation of this category of special missions in the provisions dealing with certain immunities. The Special Rapporteur was, accordingly, instructed to undertake the necessary studies on this subject and to submit appropriate conclusions to the Commission.

(k) **Introductory article**

70. In paragraph 46 of its report on the work of its seventeenth session (1965), the Commission instructed the Special Rapporteur to prepare and submit to the Commission an introductory article on the use of terms in the draft, in order that the text might be simplified and condensed. This idea met with general approval, both in the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and in the written comments of Governments. In pursuance of the Commission's decision and in the light of the opinions expressed by Governments, the Special Rapporteur submitted to the Commission at its eighteenth session a draft introductory article defining the terms and concepts used in several articles of the draft on special missions. This draft introductory article gives definitions for a number of the following terms: special mission, permanent diplomatic mission, consular post, head of a special mission, representative, delegation, members of a special mission, members and staff of the special mission, members of the staff of the special mission, members of diplomatic staff, members of the administrative and technical staff, members of the service staff, private staff, sending State, receiving State, third State, task of a special mission, and premises of the special mission. The Commission recognized the usefulness of an article of this kind which, if it were adopted, would help to shorten the text of a number of articles. The Commission decided to defer consideration of the introductory article, and instructed the Special Rapporteur to consider this new article again and, if necessary, to revise it, and to submit it to the Commission.

C. **Other decision of the Commission**

71. As the Commission did not have time to consider the comments of Governments on the draft articles on special missions, and as a limited number of Governments had communicated their comments, the Commission decided to request States Members to forward their comments on the subject as soon as possible and, in any case, before 1 March 1967.

**Chapter IV**

Other decisions and conclusions of the Commission

A. **Organization of future work**

72. The Commission noted that the terms of office of its present members will expire on 31 December 1966, and that an election for all seats will be held during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. The Commission, while not wishing to prejudice the freedom of action of its membership in 1967, nevertheless recognizes that it is a permanent body, and it must make arrangements to ensure the continuation of work on the topics selected for codification and progressive development.

73. Accordingly, the Commission recalls and reaffirms its decision recorded in its 1953 report that a Special Rapporteur who is re-elected as a member should continue his work on his topic, if not yet finally disposed of by the Commission, unless and until the Commission as newly constituted decides otherwise.

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74. The Commission is also in agreement that the provisional agenda of the nineteenth session in 1967 should include items on special missions, on relations between States and inter-governmental organizations, on State responsibility and on succession of States and Governments. Even if the Special Rapporteur on one or more of these topics should not be re-elected, with the result either that there would be no report on a topic or that there would be difficulties in discussing a report in the absence of its author, inclusion of all the above-mentioned items in the provisional agenda would give the newly reconstituted Commission the opportunity of reviewing the instructions and guidelines heretofore laid down by the Commission for previous Special Rapporteurs.

B. DATE AND PLACE OF THE NINETEENTH SESSION

75. The Commission decided to hold its next session at the Office of the United Nations at Geneva for ten weeks from 8 May to 14 July 1967.

C. CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER BODIES

Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee

76. The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee was represented by Mr. R. C. S. Koelmeyer.

77. At its 856th meeting on 23 May 1966 the Commission considered the standing invitation which had been extended to it to send an observer to the sessions of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee. The eighth session of the Committee is to be held in Bangkok from 1 to 10 August 1966. The Commission requested its Chairman, Mr. Mustafa Kamil Yasseen, to attend the session, or if he were unable to do so, to appoint another member of the Commission for the purpose.

European Committee on Legal Co-operation

78. The European Committee on Legal Co-operation was represented by Mr. H. Golsong. At the 880th meeting on 29 June 1966 Mr. Golsong informed the Commission that the European Committee had decided, at its fifth session held in Strasbourg from 20 to 24 June 1966, to establish working relations with the Commission, and that the Commission would be invited to future meetings of the European Committee to attend discussions on questions coming within the competence of both bodies.

Inter-American Council of Jurists

79. The Inter-American Juridical Committee, the standing organ of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, was represented by Dr. José Joaquín Caicedo Castilla.

D. REPRESENTATION AT THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

80. The Commission decided that it would be represented at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly by its Chairman, Mr. Mustafa Kamil Yasseen.

E. SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

81. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2045 (XX) of 8 December 1965, the United Nations Office at Geneva organized a second session of the Seminar on International Law for advanced students on the subject and young government officials responsible in their respective countries for dealing with questions of international law, to take place during the present session of the Commission. The Seminar, which held eleven meetings between 9 and 27 May 1966, was attended by twenty-two students from twenty-one different countries. Participants also attended meetings of the Commission during that period. They heard lectures by seven members of the Commission, two members of the Secretariat and one professor from Geneva University. The general subject of the discussions was the law of treaties, but lectures were also given on the question of special missions and on the relations between States and inter-governmental organizations. The Seminar was held without cost to the United Nations, which undertook no responsibility for the travel or living expenses of the participants.

82. The Governments of Israel and Sweden offered scholarships for participants from developing countries. Four candidates were chosen to be beneficiaries of the scholarships; due to unforeseen circumstances, two of the beneficiaries had to renounce the scholarships just before the opening of the session of the Seminar and only part of the funds offered could be used.

83. Due consideration was paid to remarks made by members of the International Law Commission at the preceding session and by representatives in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and that part of General Assembly resolution 2045 (XX) calling for the participation of a reasonable number of nationals from the developing countries. Special efforts were made with a view to admitting a fairly large number of nationals from those countries.

84. On behalf of the Commission, the Chairman expressed appreciation of the organization of the Seminar, which proved to be a useful experience for those who attended it. It helped to strengthen the ties between the Commission and the world of international law as a whole at both the theoretical and the practical level. The Commission recommends that further Seminars should be held in conjunction with its sessions.
ANNEX

Comments by Governments\(^1\) on parts I, II and III of the draft articles on the law of treaties drawn up by the Commission at its fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions

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1. AFGHANISTAN

[PARTS I AND II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 5 August 1964 from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations

[Original: English]

...The Government of Afghanistan wishes to extend its congratulations to the International Law Commission for the preparation of the first draft of parts I and II of the draft articles on the law of treaties. In the view of the Government of Afghanistan, both parts I and II are generally acceptable. The Afghan Government will prepare its detailed comments and observations when the preparation of part III of the draft articles on the law of treaties is completed by the Commission. Since the whole draft on the law of treaties and its various articles need rearrangement, the Afghan Government will reserve its observations for the final position in the light of the second reading by the International Law Commission.

The Government of Afghanistan looks forward to the completion of the codification of this important field which is the cornerstone of international law whose conclusion and acceptance will serve the cause of peace and understanding between nations...

2. AUSTRALIA

[PARTS I AND II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 12 February 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

**Article 1**

Definition of “treaty”. This is of course a problem of long standing and complexity. It is considered that the present definition may embrace a great quantity of informal understandings reached by exchange of notes, understandings between States which are not intended to give rise to legal rights and whose registration with the United Nations might cause the system of registration to break down. It may be thought that the phrase “governed by international law” restricts the scope of the definition; but the commentary gives a limiting explanation of this phrase, and it is considered that the definition should also include a reference to the intention of the parties to create legal obligations between themselves.

**Article 9**

The wording of paragraphs 1 and 2 is rather obscure, but it is understood that these two paragraphs are intended to be mutually exclusive. The expression “a small group of States” is particularly vague. It is not clear, for example, whether regional collective defence treaties would be included in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2; such treaties, by their nature, must be entitled to restrict their membership narrowly if they so wish. Accordingly, it is considered undesirable that paragraph 1 should apply to many multilateral treaties which seem to be included in its scope, and that paragraph 1 would be better restricted to general multilateral treaties only.

In paragraphs 1 and 2, the number of years is left blank. It is considered that this number should be high, perhaps 25.

Paragraph 3(a) might be better worded, since it is presumed paragraphs 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive. Paragraph 3 also raises the difficulty for the depositary of determining what is a “State”. This might be avoided (at some theoretical inconvenience) by substituting some other wording in the second line.

Paragraph 4 is inadequate on two grounds: (a) such a notification might be considered to have the effect of recognition, and notification to the depositary should be an alternative; and (b) this provision should apply also to article 8, paragraph 1.

**Article 17**

The Commission states in effect that it is extending an existing principle in this matter, to include States which participate in treaty-making even if they do not sign the treaty. This seems to go too far: if a State leaves a conference or votes against adoption, for example, it can have no moral obligation for the outcome. It is considered that the words “negotiation, drawing up or adoption of a treaty or which” should be deleted from paragraph 1.

**Article 19**

Paragraph 3 may in practice be unworkable. A non-party to the treaty should not be obliged to formulate objections within twelve months of the making of a reservation if the reservation is made before the treaty is in force; indeed it is considered no State should be obliged to make a reservation before it becomes a party itself. Nor is it State practice to do so. The proposal might lead to many “interim” objections, put in to safeguard a State while its final position is determined. It is considered that paragraph 3 as it stands should apply to existing parties only; any other States should be regarded as accepting a reservation if they do not object, either on becoming parties or within some reasonable time thereafter.

Paragraph 4 seems undesirable. There are a number of reasons why a State might delay its own ratification, and its objection should still be enforceable at whatever later date it acts. It is true that delay in ratification would cause difficulty with treaties under article 20, paragraph 3 (or if the majority system were used, which the Commission does not propose); it is considered that article 19, paragraph 4 should be moved to be article 20, paragraph 3(c) with consequential amendment; alternatively, our suggested amendments to paragraph 3 would make paragraph 4 unnecessary altogether, and this seems much the preferable solution.

**Article 20**

There seem to be two problems here. Paragraph 2(a) appears to make the reserving State a party vis-à-vis an accepting State at

\(^1\) Originally circulated as documents A/CN.4/175 and Add. 1-5; A/CN.4/182 and Add.1-3.
a stage when the reserving State may not be a party generally, because a reservation can be made at time of signature. Moreover, on its face, paragraph 2(a) means that failure to object to a reservation by an unrecognized State would specifically create a bilateral treaty relationship with that State. We wonder if the paragraph might read: "constitutes the reservation a part of the treaty in its application between the reserving State and the accepting State", or some similar wording. Finally, it might be desirable, in this article or in some other article, to make some reference to the effect of a reservation on the status of the reserving State as a party to the treaty, both before and after acceptance of the reservation.

Paragraph 2(b) appears to exclude any effect for an objection to a reservation which the objecting State does not consider "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty" but which is still objectionable. If the intention is that such an objection should be ineffective, this seems unacceptable in principle. Furthermore, it leads to a conflict with article 18, paragraph 1(d), because (assuming good faith) any reservation which is "incompatible with the object and purpose" is excluded from the beginning and paragraph 2(b), if limited to such reservations, should therefore have no effect. It is not understood why a State should be forced to accept any reservation which falls short of such incompatibility: such a rule appears to put the reserving State in a more advantageous position than the objecting State. Moreover, it seems undesirable to drive an objecting State into declaring a reservation to be incompatible so that its objection can be sustained. Finally, the 1951 decision of the International Court of Justice appears to refer to the status of a reserving State as a party to the treaty, and not to its treaty relationship with an individual objecting State. It is considered that the qualifying words "which considers it...purpose of the treaty" should be deleted.

[Part I]

Article 40
It is considered that twenty-five years would again be a suitable period: there are a number of cases of multilateral treaties which for years have languished with few parties, and have then proved more popular.

Article 42
Paragraph 2(d)(ii) seems to give a very large power, which might be out of proportion to the breach; the commentary mentions the case only of a treaty which provides for termination. It might be better to use a longer form of words, which would circumscribe the right more precisely; but if by "common" is meant "unanimous" this should be a sufficient safeguard. It is considered the clearer word should preferably be used.

Article 44
It is considered that paragraph 3(a) should at least extend also to any other determination of territorial sovereignty; all such territorial determinations need to be final, and not boundary determinations alone. It might also be worth discussing whether in paragraph 2(b) a word such as "continuing" might be added before "obligations", on the ground that if a treaty has been carried out completely on both sides, so that no obligations under it remain, it would be contrary both to common sense and to the need for stability and certainty if an attempt could be made to bring such a treaty within article 44.

3. Austria
[Part I]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 11 November 1963 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

The views of Austria on the draft articles on the law of treaties, prepared by the International Law Commission at its fourteenth session, are as follows:

1. General principles

The Austrian Government fully appreciates the work done by the International Law Commission.

The work of the Commission in the field of the law of treaties has led to the proposal of concrete articles and provisions. This result was possible only because of the extensive preparatory work and exhaustive discussions in the Commission. In fact, the law of treaties is complex and not easy to codify, despite the uniformity of the underlying legal concepts and the relative clarity of the existing norms of customary law. A special difficulty is that these are not problems of substantive law, but problems of adjective law, since the norms to be codified will govern the establishment of a rule of international law, or in other words, will define the procedure by which a rule of international law is legally created.

The particularly detailed preparatory work of the Commission, which has been dealing with the law of treaties since 1949, is commensurate with the breadth and importance of the subject. Four Special Rapporteurs have devoted their learning and experience to a number of reports, the importance of which to international law itself and to the knowledge of international law is beyond question.

However, the very importance of the subject-matter makes it necessary to raise the question of the form of codification. On this question of external form, the Commission decided at its thirteenth session in 1961 "that its aim would be to prepare draft articles on the law of treaties intended to serve as the basis for a convention"; but only two years earlier, the Commission, endorsing the well-founded opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, summed up their reply to the same question in the statement that "it seems inappropriate that a code on the law of treaties should itself take the form of a treaty". In the view of Austria, the latter opinion should prevail.

It must be borne in mind, in connexion with the codification of the law of treaties, that the task is to codify adjective law of a universal character. The norms of the law of treaties need to be codified, clarified, elucidated and progressively developed, but not to be enshrined in a treaty. A code on the law of treaties would be a kind of constitutional norm, laying down for the future the procedure for the creation of a norm—in other words, a norm ranking above others, or at least taking precedence over norms of equal rank. A code on the law of treaties in the form of a convention would, however, be concluded in the same manner as any other multilateral treaty. There is no way of distinguishing it from the other law-making treaties, to which, nevertheless, it will always thereafter be applicable.

In addition, a problem which will be difficult to solve would arise at the time of concluding such a convention on the law of treaties. As the Commission points out in paragraph 22 of the introduction, the draft articles on the law of treaties contain some "elements of progressive development". Wherever, therefore, the draft articles deviate in the direction of progressive development—which Austria welcomes—from the currently valid rules of customary law, the question will arise, when concluding a convention on the law of treaties, whether the rules of customary law valid at the time of concluding the convention or the new rules created by the convention itself should apply to it.

Other difficulties might arise in cases where, after the conclusion of such a convention on the law of treaties, States which have accepted the convention conclude treaties with States which have not accepted it. There is no possibility in law of giving precedence to such a convention and, as it were, forcing its provisions upon third States which have not accepted the convention by inducing them to observe the rules laid down in the convention when concluding treaties. Thus, such cases must again give rise to the question which law is to apply to specific treaties concluded in the future—the rules of customary law in that field, or the norms of the convention. In either case one of the contracting parties will be prevented from applying the norms (of the convention or of customary law) which it considers valid.
Finally—and this, in the view of Austria, appears to be a weighty argument against the conclusion of a convention on the law of treaties—such a convention, in all probability, will for a long time lack the universality which must be inherent in the “law of treaties” as the norm governing the creation of norms and which is needed in this field of law as in no other. Indeed, it is questionable, whether such a convention can ever achieve true universality. Even if all subjects of international law eventually accede to the convention, they will almost certainly do so only with a variety of overlapping reservations. The consequence would be that the conclusion of treaties on a bilateral or multilateral basis between subjects of international law would become considerably more difficult than it is now, when the norms of the existing customary law in this field have the sanction of the whole international community.

Austria wished to point out these difficulties, which are mentioned to some extent in the introduction to the report (A/5209, chap. II, para. 16). Austria considers a code on the law of treaties, perhaps in the form of a General Assembly resolution, more beneficial than the conclusion of a convention on the subject.

2. Definitions

In the view of Austria, the definition of “treaty” given in article 1, paragraph 1(a), is not complete, in that it omits an essential characteristic, namely, the intention to create between the contracting parties rights and obligations under international law, and the fact that such rights and obligations are indeed created by a treaty.

This significant point is mentioned in, for instance, article 2, paragraph 1, of the text of articles of code (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956, vol. II, p. 107) prepared by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, where the definition states, inter alia, that a “treaty” is “intended to create rights and obligations, or to establish relationships, governed by international law”. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht puts it even more precisely when he defines treaties as “agreements between States, including organizations of States, intended to create legal rights and obligations of the parties”. (Article 1 of the text of articles, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, vol. II, p. 93).

Some such terminology should be added to the definition of “treaty” in article 1, paragraph 1 of the International Law Commission’s latest draft.

Furthermore, there seems to be no real definition of “treaties in simplified form” (“accords en forme simplifiée”). The definition given in article 1, paragraph 1(b), does not differ in content from the definition of “treaty” in paragraph 1(a). The list of the ways of concluding a treaty (“exchange of notes...agreed minute”, etc.) appears in paragraph 1(a) also. It is difficult to see what constitutes the difference between the two kinds of treaties. The commentary (paragraph (11)) begs the question by stating, in the French version: “La Commission a défini cette forme de traités (i.e., "en forme simplifiée") en prenant pour critère sa forme simplifiée.”

Austria would suggest that “accord en forme simplifiée” should be defined by saying that this group of agreements between States does not require ratification. The requirement of ratification is, in fact, the essential characteristic which distinguishes the “traité” from the “accord en forme simplifiée”.

The definition of “general multilateral treaty” in article 1, paragraph 1(c), seems to refer to rather indefinite characteristics, such as “matters of general interest to States as a whole”. Here it might be wise to consider taking as the sole criterion the establishment of general norms by the treaty (law-making treaty).

Finally, it might be useful also to define the terms “signature”, “ratification”, “accession”, “acceptance” and “approval”, listed baldly in article 1, paragraph 1(d).

3. Capacity to conclude treaties

Article 3, paragraph 1, correctly points out that capacity to conclude treaties under international law is possessed by States and by other subjects of international law. The commentary explains that the phrase “other subjects of international law” is primarily intended to cover international organizations and the Holy See but also includes other legal persons regarded by traditional doctrine as subjects of international law. In the view of Austria, this provision is fully in accord with existing international law.

Paragraph 3 of this article, however, contains a restriction with respect to international organizations, stating that “in the case of international organizations, capacity to conclude treaties depends on the constitution of the organization concerned”.

In the view of Austria, this restriction does not appear absolutely necessary. Rather, the starting point might well be that capacity to conclude treaties must be an inherent right of any international organization, if it is at the same time a subject of international law. Indeed, capacity to conclude treaties even appears to be the essential criterion of the status of a subject of international law. An international organization lacking the capacity to include treaties would not be a subject of international law.

As may be seen in practice, the constitutions of many international organizations do not mention the question of the capacity of the organization in question to conclude treaties. In most of these cases, however, the organs of the organization in question have considered themselves competent to conclude treaties on behalf of the organization, either with other international organizations or with States. If, on the other hand, the constitutions do contain provisions concerning the conclusion of treaties, they either relate to the question which organs are competent for the purpose—in which case they are of a procedural nature—or limit the extent of freedom to conclude treaties, which in principle is all-embracing, by stipulating that only treaties on certain subjects are permitted. Constitutional restrictions do not, however, affect in principle the capacity to conclude treaties as such.

In the view of Austria, it would not be correct if the capacity to conclude treaties, as such, of an international organization were to be derived solely from the constitution of the organization. If the constitution does not contain any provisions concerning capacity to conclude treaties, it would have to be assumed, from the existing text of paragraph 3, that the organization would not possess the capacity to conclude treaties. Without such capacity, however, the organization would not be a subject of international law.

The judgments of the International Court of Justice dealing with the structure of international organizations, and in particular the opinions in the “reparation case” (I.C.J. Reports, 1949, pp. 174 et seq.) and the “expenses case” (I.C.J. Reports, 1962, pp. 151 et seq.), do not conflict with this interpretation if they concede to an international organization the competence which, though not provided for in the constituent treaty, is essential to the performance of its functions. According to the constitution of an international organization, such a reference to those functions of the organization which are mentioned in the constitution means primarily that the organization's freedom to conclude treaties is constitutionally limited by its prescribed field of activities. The Commission is therefore correct when it says, in the commentary to article 3, paragraph 3, that the provisions of the constituent treaty of an organization determine “the proper limits of its treaty-making activity”, whereas the statement that “it is the constitution as a whole...that determines the capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties” appears to be inadequate, in that organizations lacking the capacity to conclude treaties cannot be regarded as subjects of international law and are therefore not covered by article 3.

It is therefore suggested that article 3, paragraph 3, might be deleted altogether; at the very least, the wording “depends on the constitution” should be changed in such a way as to indicate that the constitution can only contain restrictions on the freedom to conclude treaties.
4. **Organs competent to conclude treaties**

In the view of Austria, article 4 raises an important problem.

For the most part, international law ascribes the question of the competence to conclude international treaties to domestic law. Thus, international treaties are created by organs authorized under domestic law and subject to constitutional provisions. “It is clear,” says Charles Rousseau (Droit International Public, 1953, p. 21) that, international law being silent on the subject the conditions for the exercise of competence to conclude treaties are determined, at discretion, by the domestic law of each State. Constitutional precepts are decisive in this respect.”

This principle—namely, that the determination of the organs competent to conclude treaties is ascribed to domestic law—is not mentioned at all in the existing text of article 4. Reference is made to it only in the commentary. In the view of Austria, a corresponding general reference should be included in the text of article 4 also.

The Commission previously took this into account in the text of articles tentatively adopted by the Commission at its third session, which included the following provision: “A treaty becomes binding in relation to a State by signature, ratification, accession or any other means of expressing the will of the State, in accordance with its constitutional law and practice through an organ competent for that purpose” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951, vol. II, p. 73, article 2; Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1952, vol. II, p. 51, article 4).

Perhaps, therefore, it would be appropriate, in article 4, to refer to a legal presumption that the organs mentioned there are duly authorized representatives. However, this legal presumption would have to be a *praesumptio juris* and not a *praesumptio juris ac de jure*, thus allowing for the possibility of a disclaimer. Guggenheim, for example, says: “There is a *rebuttable* presumption of competence to conclude international treaties in the case of Heads of State and Foreign Ministers” (Lehrbuch des Völkerrechtes, 1948, p. 61).

5. **Subsequent opening of treaties**

Austria whole-heartedly welcomes the opening of multilateral treaties to as many States as possible, as their acceptance strengthens the legal community and leads to a wider application of international law. In the view of Austria, article 8 is in this respect fully in accord with the present situation in international law and the present practice of States. In particular, it seems proper that multilateral treaties, unless the treaties provide otherwise, should be open to accession by all States.

Article 9, on the other hand, contains some formulae which deviate greatly from the prevailing concept of international law. If a multilateral treaty includes precise provisions on the question which States may accede to it, a more extensive opening of this treaty—outside the group of States to which the treaty was open from the beginning—means an amendment of the treaty. If, however, the treaty does not contain an amendment clause, so that no special procedure is laid down for possible amendments, the consent of all the contracting parties is needed for any legally valid amendment of the treaty. In the case of treaties concluded between a small group of States, the present draft explicitly recognizes the principle that the consent of all the parties is required (para. 2). Where other multilateral treaties are concerned, however, paragraph 1(a) makes it possible for other States to accede against the will of some of the contracting States and contrary to the explicit wording of the treaty (which expressly restricts the right of accession).

This provision seems to go too far, because it violates the principles of sovereignty. Paragraph 1(a) should therefore be amended, if not entirely deleted.

It may be emphasized in this connexion that the problem under consideration will not arise if the treaty contains an amendment clause along the lines of Article 108 of the United Nations Charter, providing that any amendment—including an extension of the right of accession—would be subject to the consent of a two-thirds majority. In such cases, the treaty can be opened to other States simply with the consent of two-thirds of the contracting States.

6. **Ratification**

Austria fully agrees that, as stated in article 12, treaties in principle require ratification. It is true that Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice thought otherwise (article 32 of articles of code, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956, vol. II, p. 113), but the two earlier Rapporteurs supported the principle now advocated by the Commission.

It is unfortunate that the term “ratification” (cf. article 1, paragraph 1(d) of the draft, and para. 2 of these comments) is not defined. In the view of Austria, such a definition, which should be included in article 1, could easily be based on the wording of article 6, paragraph 1, of the text of articles prepared by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, vol. II, p. 112).

7. **Reservations**

The question of reservations raises difficult legal problems. The Austrian Government particularly appreciates the fact that the Commission, in codifying this part of the law of treaties was guided by the idea of progressive development, although admittedly the traditional concept that reservations should, in principle, be restricted still enjoys wide support. The Commission accepted, by and large, the system recognized by the International Court of Justice in its opinion concerning the Genocide Convention.

The question may arise whether it is in keeping with the basic ideas of the law of treaties that very far-reaching reservations to multilateral treaties should be permitted and made possible, since the integrity of the text of the treaty in question may thereby be impaired, which is certainly not desirable. In addition, acceptance of and objections to reservations by individual States create relations of constantly different content and different scope between the States parties to one and the same multilateral treaty.

A flexible attitude towards reservations may perhaps result in the accession to multilateral treaties of a maximum number of States. Whether the practice of recent years justifies any encouraging conclusions in this respect is open to question.

Austria, therefore, fully shares the view of those members of the Commission who argued that, while an objection by a single State to a reservation could not prevent the accession of the reserving State, reservations objected to by a larger number of States—perhaps even the majority—were not admissible, and accession would not be possible unless the reservations were withdrawn (cf. commentary to articles 18-20, para. (11)). If the majority of the contracting States insists on the integrity of the text of the treaty, the reservation cannot be accepted.

In addition, Austria would consider it necessary to make it clear, in connexion with the provisions on reservations, in article 20 in particular, that even where a State accepts, explicitly or otherwise, a reservation by another State, the consequence is that the treaty comes into force as between the two States in question, but not in respect of those provisions to which the reservation related. The present wording leaves some room for doubt as to whether, in such a treaty relationship between two States, those provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates would apply to the State that has accepted the text of the treaty in its entirety but not, because of the reservation, to the other party to the treaty. This should be clarified by means of a reference to the principle of reciprocity.
The Royal Government accordingly considers it essential that paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 64 should be deleted.

6. CANADA

Transmitted by a letter of 26 November 1963 from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Original: English]

1. In its commentary on article 4, paragraph 6, the Commission has expressed the desire to have information from Governments as to their practice with regard to instruments of full powers. In Canadian practice, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs are considered to have general authority to bind the Government and full powers are therefore not issued for them. If full powers are requested and the representative of Canada is other than the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs, particular full powers are issued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. While it has not been Canadian practice to issue general full powers, it is realized that circumstances might arise in which it would be advantageous to do so and accordingly, the Canadian Government favours a provision recognizing such powers.

2. It is noted that in paragraph (7) of the commentary on article 4, it is stated that instruments of ratification, accession, acceptance and approval “are normally signed by Heads of State, though in modern practice this is sometimes done by Heads of Government or by Foreign Ministers”. The Commission might wish to be apprised that the usual Canadian practice in this regard is for such instruments to be executed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

3. It is noted that in article 8 the Commission has recommended that where a general multilateral treaty as defined in article 1, paragraph 1(e), is silent concerning participation, it is to be assumed that the parties intended the treaty to be open to participation by all States. It is noted that the Commission is not recommending a derogation of the fundamental principle of international law that contracting parties are free to determine for themselves the extent to which they are prepared to enter into treaty relations with one another. It is observed that the current practice with regard to treaties concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, as well as many other multilateral treaties, is to open them to participation by Members of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and, frequently, to such other States as may be invited by the General Assembly. In article 8 the Commission is recommending the establishment of a presumption of intention on the part of contracting States that the treaty is to be open to all States in a limited and very clearly defined case, namely where the parties to certain types of treaties have not expressed themselves on the question of participation. It is assumed that the new rule is not to have retroactive effect.

4. It is noted that in article 9, paragraph 3(b) and in article 19, paragraph 3, the Commission has proposed that silence should constitute a presumption of a State’s consent after the expiry of a given period. The arguments against such a presumption of consent are well known as is the very real difficulty that occasionally exists at present of eliciting any expression of opinion from States. It is
observed that under the rule formulated by the Commission, were a non-recognized State to enter a reservation, the consent of a non-recognizing contracting State to the reservation would be implied by the latter's silence. If the non-recognizing State were to object to the reservation, its position on recognition would seem to be jeopardized but it would presumably be open to the State to preface its objections with a denial of intent to recognize. In the course of the Commission's review of article 19, it might however wish to consider excluding from that article the presumption of a State's consent to reservations entered by States it does not recognize.

5. It is noted that under the rule set out in article 17 concerning obligations prior to the entry into force of a treaty, a State which has taken any part in the drafting process is obliged to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the treaty. The Commission might wish to consider whether it is appropriate that this rule should be so broad as to cover States which, although participating in the negotiation of a treaty, have done so reluctantly expressing the strongest reservations about it.

6. It is noted that in articles 18, 19 and 20 concerning reservations, the Commission has adopted the so-called flexible approach by which reservations to multilateral treaties are admissible providing they are compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. A reservation is to be regarded as accepted by a contracting State if the latter has raised no objection to it within twelve months. It is noted however that as phrased at present, some question might arise as to whether compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty is to be the basis on which a State may make a reservation (article 19, paragraph 1(d)) or the basis on which a State may object to a reservation (article 20, paragraph 2(b)). If the former, it would seem to be still open to contracting States to object to reservations on other grounds. However, it seems to be the Commission's intention to make compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty a prerequisite for the admissibility of reservations as well as the only grounds on which an objection can be taken to a reservation. The Commission might find it desirable to state this intention unequivocally in order to remove any basis for an argument that States may still object to reservations on other grounds. It is also noted that the Commission is recommending the establishment of this rule concerning the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty, only where the treaty is silent on the question of reservations (article 18, paragraph 1(d)). Treaties which permit reservations to some or all of their articles do not generally indicate standards of admissibility, and the effect of the Commission's recommendations would therefore seem to be the creation of separate criteria for the admissibility of reservations in the case of a treaty which is silent in this regard, and in the case of a treaty which permits them. The Commission might accordingly wish to consider the desirability of extending the standard of admissibility it has formulated to reservations made pursuant to express treaty provisions.

[PART II]

Transmitted by a letter of 7 April 1965 from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Original: English]

Article 40: Termination or suspension of the operation of treaties by agreement.

Comment: In clause 2 of this article the period of time set out in the second to last line has been left open to further consideration. Since it is not clear from the present text from when this period of time should run, it is suggested that as in article 9, it be from the date of adoption, (i.e. that it be from the time the treaty in question has been opened for signature).

It is to be noted that in article 9 of part I of the draft law of treaties, drawn up at the fourteenth session of the International Law Commission, in clause 1(a) and clause 2 there also exist similar as yet unspecified time periods. Consideration might be given to having the same period of time apply in all three cases. In his commentary on clause 2 of article 40 the Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, envisaged a period of ten years. This would seem a reasonable choice.

Article 42: Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach.

Comment: Article 42, in its present version, does not provide for a right, where there is a material breach of a treaty, of another party unilaterally (and not merely by common and perhaps even unanimous agreement with the other parties) to withdraw from the treaty in question. Instead it would appear, from the Commission's commentary on the provision in question, that the members considered that a right of suspension provided adequate protection to a State directly affected by such a breach.

The implication of the present draft rule, set out in article 42.2(a), as regards multilateral treaties of a sort under which the States parties agree to refrain from some action or other, is that in the case of a flagrant violation by one party no other party would have any recourse on its own. That is because it could not suspend its obligations vis-à-vis the violator (by doing whatever it had agreed to refrain from doing) without violating its own obligations to the other parties.

Since it would appear desirable that the provisions of the draft law of treaties be of such a nature that they not only attract the widest possible support but are also as widely observed as possible, consideration might be given to amending article 42 in such a way that, where there has been a violation of a treaty of the sort discussed above, the legitimate right of suspension of an individual party need not depend on a consensus but may be exercised erga omnes.

Both the present Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, and the previous Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in their draft articles on this matter, provided that in the case where one party were to commit a general breach of such a treaty, it would be open to individual States unilaterally to withdraw from it. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice recommended that “if a party commits a general breach of the entire treaty in such a way as to be tantamount to a repudiation, the other parties may treat it as being at an end, or any one of them may withdraw from further participation."

Sir Humphrey Waldock, in his commentary on his draft article 20(b), mentioned that its intention was to cover "cases such as these, where the defaults of a key State or of a number of States are so far to undermine the whole treaty régime and it seems desirable that individual parties should also have the right, not merely of terminating their treaty relation with the defaulting State but of withdrawing altogether from the treaty." 4

In the draft amendment which Mr. Erik Castrén proposed to the present Rapporteur's draft of this article, at the fifteenth session of the Commission, he too provided for a right of unilateral withdrawal, under certain circumstances, on the following terms:

"[2(b) in the relations between itself and the other parties, withdraw from the treaty, if the breach is of such a kind as to frustrate the object and purpose of the treaty]."

Article 44: Rebus sic stantibus. Fundamental change of circumstances.

Comment: The exclusion established under section 3(a) of this article, whereby a fundamental change in circumstances would not affect a treaty fixing a boundary, would appear to have been formul-
lated without the Commission having taken into consideration such
treaties (if any) under which a boundary has been established by
reference to a thalweg. Since it is conceivable that such boundary
provisions do exist and that a fundamental change in circum-
stances could indeed radically affect the boundary in question (to
an extent not contemplated when it was originally delineated),
it is at least arguable that article 44 (3)(a) should be modified to
cover such a case.

The modification might be along the following lines:
"To a treaty fixing a boundary, except if such a boundary is
based directly on a thalweg or other natural phenomenon the
physical location of which is subsequently significantly altered as
the result of a natural occurrence; or".

7. CYPRUS

[PART III]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 26 October 1965 from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[Original: English]

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus welcomes the com-
pletion of the draft law of treaties (part III), covering the broad
topics of the application, effects, modification and interpretation
treaties and expresses the hope that, once it is finally formulated
it will, together with the two earlier drafts (law of treaties (parts I
and II)), be considered in its final form as the basis for a multilateral
convention to be arrived at in due course at the appropriate diplo-
matic conference of plenipotentiaries. As the Commission has
rightly concluded, this process would give the opportunity to all
the new States to participate directly in the formulation of the law,
if they so wished, and this would—in the words of the Commis-
sion—"be extremely desirable in order that the law of treaties may
be placed upon the widest and most secure foundations".

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus will not enter upon
any detailed observations on individual draft articles, but will
simply make some remarks of general nature on certain of these
draft articles.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus would add in this
connexion—and hopes that many countries that do not at present
have a fully staffed legal section to deal with international law
questions bears it out—that there may be many reasons, apart from
lack of interest or reservations, to explain the fact that a given
Government does not furnish promptly and regularly the comments
requested. Consequently, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus
thinks that there is much substance in the statement made by Profes-
sor Bartoš to the effect that, in cases where Governments had
refrained from commenting, an inquiry had revealed agreement
rather than disagreement with the Commission's formulation.

As regards draft article 55, the Government of the Republic of
Cyprus finds itself in agreement with the way in which the Inter-
national Law Commission gave expression to the fundamental
rule of the law of treaties to the effect that pacta sunt servanda.
Indeed, "a treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith". The Commission very wisely
took the view that what appears to be a clear-cut rule in the Latin
maxim, just quoted, would be erroneous and misleading if stated
without qualification and therefore limited the application of this
article to treaties "in force". Consequently, the rule in draft article 55
must be read subject to the considerable number of draft articles
which may militate against a given treaty being "in force", such as
those dealing with the entry into force, provisional entry into force,
obligations resting upon the contracting States prior to entry into
force and—more significantly—the articles dealing with the invalidity
and the termination of treaties.

When compared with the wording of the Charter principle
contained in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which deals with
the obligations arising under the Charter itself, it appears that the
limiting qualification to the pacta sunt servanda rule, contained in
draft article 55, is even wider than that in Article 2(2). In the case
of Article 2(2), the express qualification is that the obligations
assumed must be "in accordance with the present Charter". In the
case of draft article 55 the qualification is that the treaty in question
must be "in force"—in which case a number of reasons and not
just one, as stated earlier, may have a bearing on the treaty being
"not in force". It would seem, however, that this distinction is
more apparent than real and that, by necessary implication, all the
factors that would make an ordinary treaty "not in force" would
also be relevant mutatis mutandis to the rule stated in Article 2(2)
of the Charter.

Under either rule and apart from the lack of any formal require-
ments, there exist a number of situations where clearly a treaty is
not "in force" for the purposes of draft article 55. One such situation
is where a treaty was enforced upon a State without its free consent,
contrary to the spirit of the Charter and of its fundamental principles.
In such a case—as provided in draft article 36 read in conjunction
with draft article 46 of part II of the law of treaties, the treaty as a
whole is ab initio null and void. Consequently it would be for the
State concerned to take its free decision in regard to the maintenance
or not of the treaty in question, once it found itself in a position
of complete equality with all other States. This observation could be
even more pertinent if such a treaty was imposed in circumstances
precluding free choice upon a people prior to, and as a condition for,
such a people according to independence.

Another such situation arises where, to use the wording of draft
article 37, a treaty conflicts "with a peremptory norm of international
law from which no derogation is permitted..." as e.g. a treaty which
contains provisions which contemplate the unlawful use of force by
one State against another in violation of the rule expressed by
Article 2(4) of the Charter, or containing provisions purporting to
deprove one State of the substance of its sovereignty and independence
in violation of Article 2(1) of the Charter. Such treaties bring into
play Article 103 of the Charter, and as provided in draft article 46—
referred to above—the nullity extends to the whole transaction and
not merely the offending clauses themselves.

Likewise a treaty is not "in force" for the purpose of draft
article 55 if it has been duly and properly terminated by one party
on the ground that its provisions were substantially violated by
the other party. No State can be in substantial breach of its obliga-
tions under a treaty and at the same time claim the benefits to itself
deriving from such a treaty.

Turning now to draft article 58, which gives expression to the
maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, and to draft article 59,
when the Government of the Republic of Cyprus finds itself in basic agree-
ment with the wording used, on the clear understanding, to use the
words of the Commission in its commentary on the latter draft
article, that the "primary rule...is that the parties to a treaty cannot
impose an obligation on a third State without its consent. That rule
is one of the bulwarks of the independence and equality of States,
and the present article does not depart from it. On the contrary
it underlines that the consent of a State is always necessary if it is
to be bound by a provision contained in a treaty to which it is not
a party".

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus feels that it should
simply add to what the commentary of the Commission so clearly
states, that the notion of duress and undue influence, and the
doctrine of unequal, inequitable and unjust treaties also applies to
the case where a State finds itself having no free choice and is
forced to undertake an obligation as a result of an agreement to
which it was not a party. This holds even more true when the third
party had not yet reached the stage of statehood but was still under
colonial domination.

As regards draft article 63, dealing with the application of treaties
having incompatible provisions, the Government of the Republic
of Cyprus fully shares the view of those of the members of the Com-
mission who insisted that the overriding character of Article 103 of
the Charter should find expression in the draft article in question. At the same time recognizing that it is logical to argue that, if a treaty were void under the operation of draft articles 37 or 45, such a treaty would not be a treaty in force and therefore there can be no question of its application. Such is the importance which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus attributes to Article 103, that it agrees emphatically to the present wording of the article in question. Moreover, in the opinion of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, whenever circumstances warrant it, the competent organs of the United Nations should be guided by and apply Article 103 unreservedly.

Likewise, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus notes carefully draft articles 65, 66, 67 and 68, as well as the commentaries attached to each and reserves the right to make detailed comments thereon through the appropriate channel. The same applies to the three articles (69, 70 and 71) dealing with the interpretation of treaties. However, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus takes the opportunity to remark in this respect that it might have been preferable if more weight were to be attached to the principle contained in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat through its express mention.

8. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[PART II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 23 September 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

...The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has closely followed and supported the activities of the United Nations International Law Commission in the field of the codification and progressive development of international law, which significantly contribute to the promotion of peaceful coexistence among States with different social and economic systems. The Czechoslovak Government appreciates the progress achieved by the Commission in the codification of the law of treaties, and as far as part II of the draft articles on the law of treaties is concerned, it associates itself in principle with the approach of the Commission to the solution of the question of invalidity and termination of international treaties.

The Czechoslovak Government agrees with the ideas underlying article 31 concerning provisions of international law regarding competence to enter into treaties, which reflect the appropriate and just balance between internal and international laws and ensure both respect for the sovereignty of a State and the right of nations to self-determination as well as the necessary legal security in treaty relations.

The Czechoslovak Government devotes special attention to articles 35, 36 and 37 and notes with satisfaction that those draft articles—in conformity with justice and international legality—declare to be null and void, ab initio, international treaties concluded through personal coercion of representatives of States or through coercion of a State by the threat or use of force, and treaties which are contrary to peremptory norms of international law.

In connexion with draft article 37 and draft article 45, which supplements the former, the Czechoslovak Government shares fully the view of the Commission contained in the commentary to article 45 that "there are a certain number of fundamental rules of international public order from which no State may derogate even by agreement with another State". The Czechoslovak Government believes that the codification of legal principles of peaceful coexistence which has been taken up by the United Nations General Assembly during the consideration of principles of international law pertaining to friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations will contribute to the stipulation of those rules which must be considered as peremptory norms of general international law.

The Czechoslovak Government does not doubt that the rules contained in articles 36 and 37 also declare the invalidity of unequal treaties which, as one of the instruments of modern colonialism, constitute a serious obstacle for the attainment of complete independence and sovereignty of a number of developing countries and a source of conflicts and situations endangering international peace and security.

Furthermore, the Czechoslovak Government is of the opinion that the final formulation of article 36 should also contain explicitly the principle of invalidity of international treaties imposed by such forms of coercion as, for example, economic pressure.

The Czechoslovak Government reserves the right to submit more detailed observations to the draft articles on the law of treaties during their final consideration.

[PART III]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 4 October 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

1. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has attentively and with great interest followed the work done for the last few years by the International Law Commission in the field of codification and progressive development of the law of treaties. It greatly appreciates the results achieved in these efforts thus far, which undoubtedly contribute to a further development of international law as a useful instrument of peaceful coexistence and co-operation among all States of the world. The last, third, part of the draft articles on the law of treaties successfully evolves from the preceding two parts and regulates the complicated questions of the application, effects, modification and interpretation of international treaties in a progressive spirit with due regard to the established practice of States and to the opinions of the doctrine of international law. Therefore, as well as in the case of the first and second parts of the draft, the Czechoslovak Government in principle agrees with the proposed formulations of the articles and commentaries attached to this part of the draft. In view of the fact that this is the first version of the draft articles and that at a later stage opportunities will present themselves for expressing views on the definitive version, the Czechoslovak Government has adopted a position with regard to only some of the main questions.

2. In principle, the Czechoslovak Government agrees with draft article 55, containing the fundamental principle of the law of treaties, that of "pacta sunt servanda", according to which the treaties in force are binding upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith. Consistent and faithful observance of obligations emanating from international treaties is of considerable significance for the strengthening of peaceful coexistence among States as well as for the development of fruitful and mutually advantageous international co-operation in the field of economic, technical, social and cultural co-operation. The Czechoslovak Government submits for consideration whether, in view of the tremendous practical and political purport of this principle, it would not be convenient to extend article 55 in such a way as to clarify in the text or at least in the commentary that the term "treaty in force" means an international treaty concluded freely and on the basis of equality, in accordance with international law. Czechoslovakia expounded this interpretation of the principle in 1962 in its Draft Declaration of the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: "Every State shall fulfil, in good faith, obligations ensuing for it from international treaties concluded by it freely and on the basis of equality, as well as obligations ensuing from international customary law" (document A/C.6/1/L.505). It is also believed that in drafting the final text of this provision, regard should be given to the results of the discussion in the General Assembly in connexion with the codification of the legal principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter, which should take place within the framework of the
debate on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (see item 90 of the Agenda of the twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations).

3. The Czechoslovak Government agrees with draft article 57 concerning the territorial scope of a treaty, according to which "the scope of application extends to the entire territory of each party". It considers this formulation to be more correct and more precise than the wording often used in the past, "all the territory or territories for which the parties are internationally responsible". The principle thus formulated was contrary to the requirement of a speedy liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, and was more than once misused by the colonial powers for temporary exclusion of the territories administered by them from the benefits and rights ensuing particularly from general international treaties of a humanitarian character. In modern international treaties there is no place for either the so-called colonial clause or for any other form of discrimination aiming at a limitation of the validity of a treaty only to certain parts of the territory of a State. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak Government, the exception contained in the draft article ("unless the contrary appears from the treaty") may only be applied to bilateral or multilateral treaties governing specific interests of the contracting parties within a limited territorial scope; in no way, however, may it be applied to a legal régime of a general contractual nature which the contracting parties are bound to observe and give effect to throughout their respective territories and with regard to all persons living therein.

4. The Czechoslovak Government also agrees with the formulation in article 58 of the draft, according to which a treaty applies only between the parties. In this way, the draft strictly respects the key principle of contemporary international law, that of the sovereign equality of States. Any transfer of obligations or rights to a third State requires, eo ipso, its consent. Without the free consent of a State not party to a treaty, it is impossible either to oblige or to authorize it by virtue of a treaty inter alios acta.

5. Ultimately, the Czechoslovak Government shares the view of the Commission that the proposed article 69 containing a general rule of interpretation should proceed from the assumption that the text of the treaty is an authentic expression of the intention of the contracting parties and that the text itself should be the basis from which any interpretation should proceed. However, unlike the International Law Commission which mentioned this assumption only in the commentary, the Czechoslovak Government deems it correct to include it expressly in the wording of draft article 69, paragraph 1, so that it would read as follows: "A treaty, whose text is presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties, shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to each term".

In conclusion, the Czechoslovak Government reserves its right to put forward detailed comments and proposals to the final text of the draft codification of the law of treaties at the international conference of plenipotentiaries which in its opinion, and in the sense of the preliminary recommendation of the International Law Commission, should be convened for the purpose of preparing a Convention on the Law of Treaties.

9. DENMARK

[PARTS I AND II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 2 March 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

Article 4

Article 4, paragraph 3, provides that a representative of a State other than the Head of State, Head of Government, Foreign Minister and the accredited head of a diplomatic mission, shall produce written credentials of his authority to negotiate, draw up and authenticate a treaty.

In the opinion of the Danish Government, this text does not correspond to general practice, nor does it seem adequate as a new rule of international law. In cases where two Governments wish to conclude a treaty on a given subject, the normal procedure is that they agree, through diplomatic channels, to open negotiations. The time and place of such negotiations are likewise agreed upon, and the parties inform each other of the names of the officials designated to represent them in the negotiations. This is considered to be a sufficient introduction of the representatives of the respective Governments, and the question of credentials does not arise until the treaty is to be signed, and sometimes not even then.

With the possible exclusion of treaties drawn up at general international conferences, it is therefore suggested that the article should be modified so as not to require credentials for the negotiation, drawing up and authentication of a treaty.

As to the authority to sign a treaty, whether or not subject to ratification, the Danish Government agrees that Heads of State or Government and Foreign Ministers shall never be required to produce full powers (article 4, paragraph 1). It is also accepted that full powers shall not be required, even of other representatives, in cases of treaties in simplified form, unless called for by the other negotiating State (paragraph 4(b)), and that full powers shall be produced in other cases (paragraph 4(e)). The question is, however, whether the definition of "treaties in simplified form" as contained in article 1, paragraph 1(b), is adequate for the purpose. After enumerating certain examples, this definition refers to the procedure ("other instrument concluded by any similar procedure"). In current practice an essential part of the simplified procedure is the omission of full powers. This obviously leads into circular reasoning: full powers are not required for treaties in simplified form; treaties in simplified form are those for which no full powers are required. It would appear to be in better conformity with current practice and more consistent with the requirements of logic to adopt a rule which would not provide for the production of full powers to sign a treaty, except where the other party so requires. A practical indication of such a requirement would be to insert in the text the classical clause about full powers having been produced and found to be in good and proper form.

Articles 8 and 9

The Danish Government shares the unanimous view of the International Law Commission to the effect that general multilateral treaties should be open to participation on as wide a basis as possible.

With regard to other treaties, the Danish Government is inclined to think that the proposals of the Commission go too far towards opening such treaties to the participation of other States than the original parties. In some cases where treaties are concluded by a small group of States, or between States belonging to a particular region, other States should not be allowed to become parties except by invitation of the original parties. In such cases, it should not be open to an outside State to present a request which would have the effect that the consent of the original parties would become automatic after the expiry of a certain period. A non-participating State should not be able to intrude, and possibly bring pressure to bear on the original parties to refrain from objecting. The initiative should belong to the original parties, and article 9, paragraph 3, should consequently not apply to such cases.

In general, article 9 should not apply to treaties which are the constituent instruments of international organizations. It should not be possible under the procedure laid down in article 9 to modify or circumvent the provisions concerning the admission of a new member to an international organization.

Article 11

The legal effects which under paragraph 2 are attributed to signature subject to ratification have no significance per se. In most cases the signature of a treaty subject to ratification is a formality.
which unduly complicates the treaty-making procedure and which has little rational justification in modern international relations. The necessary authentication of the text may well take place in other ways, as proposed in article 7, paragraph 1. The Danish Government recognizes, however, that the formal signature is so deeply embedded in international practice that proposals for a reform would have little chance of being accepted.

Article 12

In the opinion of the Danish Government, this article, which requires ratification of a treaty unless an exception is made, is not in conformity with international practice. Moreover, the article is drafted in unduly complicated terms. The article should be simplified by reversing the presumption on which it is based.

It should be presumed that a treaty which has been duly signed by representatives of States should need no ratification. In other words, ratification should be required only if the necessity appears from the text, from the full powers issued to representatives of the signatory States, from statements made in the course of the negotiations, or from other circumstances evidencing an intention to that effect. The constitutional necessity or ratification may be included in such circumstances.

This reversal of the basic principle would bring the article in line with international practice as understood and followed by the Danish Government.

Furthermore, it is submitted that the question whether or not ratification is required should not necessarily be answered in the same way with respect to both parties. In the practice followed by the Danish Government for the conclusion of bilateral treaties it has occurred that the signature of one party has been considered to be immediately binding, while the signature of the other party has been subject to ratification (acceptance or approval). This procedure may have practical advantages in certain cases, and it should not be precluded by the wording of the article.

Articles 18-20

The Danish Government welcomes the constructive proposals of the International Law Commission for the solution of this intricate problem, which has caused so many difficulties and so great uncertainty in recent years. Without committing itself definitely to the solution proposed, the Danish Government is ready to examine the proposals as a possible basis for achieving that general agreement on the subject which is so urgently needed.

Experience seems to suggest that no short and simple formula can solve the problem. The Commission has therefore chosen the right approach in distinguishing between different aspects of the problem and between different situations in which the problem arises. It is only on the basis of such a differentiation that realistic proposals can be drafted. But this approach has the inevitable consequence that the proposed rules will be lacking in that simplicity and clarity which should be aimed at in the process of codifying international law.

While thus admitting that the nature of the problem justifies complicated formulas, it may be asked whether the drafting methods chosen by the Commission—proposing separate articles concerning the conditions under which reservations are permissible (article 18) and the effect of reservations (article 20)—have not unduly complicated the wording of the articles. Before going further into this question, the Danish Government wishes to make a few comments on the text as it stands.

In article 18, paragraph 1, the words “when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty” seem to be redundant, as they are spelled out by paragraph 2 of the same article.

As stated by the Commission in the commentary to article 20, paragraph 1(d) of article 18 implies a subjective appreciation of the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty. As this question may therefore be subject to divergent interpretations, it does not seem appropriate to deal with it as a case of inadmissibility of reservations. As the rule now stands, it may cause difficulties for the depositary who would not be under a strict obligation to communicate a reservation which is clearly inadmissible under the rule, although it is not the function of the depositary to adjudicate upon the validity of a reservation (commentary to article 29, paragraph 5).

Article 19 concerning acceptance of or objection to reservations may, on the face of it, give the impression that it applies to any reservation, even reservations which are inadmissible. It seems evident, however, that in cases where a reservation is prohibited, explicitly or implicitly, it cannot be accepted by any other party, and an objection is not required to prevent the reservation from becoming effective in relation to another State.

The provisions of article 19, paragraph 2, seem to be self-evident, and may be omitted if a simplification of the article is attempted.

Article 20, paragraph 2(a), deals with acceptance of reservations and paragraph 2(b) with objections to reservations on the ground of alleged incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. It leaves open the question what will be the effect of an objection to a reservation which is not considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, but which is objected to on another ground, in particular the importance attached by the objection State to the provision to which the reservation relates. In its introductory commentary, paragraph (13), the Commission mentions a well-established rule to the effect “that a State which within a reasonable time signifies its objection to a reservation is entitled to regard the treaty as not in force between itself and the reserving State”. It would seem preferable to include this rule in the draft articles.

Furthermore, article 20, paragraph 2, deals with the question whether or not the reserving State becomes a party to the treaty in relation to other States which either accept or object to the reservation. The question whether or not the reserving State is a party to the treaty may, however, present itself in a more general and objective manner. Is its ratification to be included in the number of ratifications required for the treaty to enter into force? Is the reserving State entitled to ask for revision of the treaty, if such revision is requested to any contracting party or to a specified number of contracting parties? The answer to these and other similar questions should presumably be in the affirmative, provided that the reservation has not been objected to by all other contracting parties. It would be preferable, however, to insert provisions dealing explicitly with this question.

Article 20, paragraph 3, concerning treaties between a small group of States does not distinguish between express and implied acceptance. The considerations expressed in the commentary seem to warrant the conclusion that an express acceptance should be required in these particular cases.

Article 20, paragraph 4, deals with constituent instruments of international organizations. In its commentary, the Commission rightly attaches decisive weight to the integrity of such instruments. This would imply that the reservation should be submitted to the competent organ for decision in all cases—not only when an objection has been raised. In other words, the possibility of an implied or tacit acceptance of the reservation should not be left open in these cases.

In the light of the preceding observations and in an attempt to simplify the general structure and economy of the articles, the following redraft is offered for consideration:
Article A

1. In cases where the terms of a treaty or the established rules of an international organization prohibit the making of a reservation, no such reservation shall be admissible. No act or instrument—signature, ratification, accession, acceptance or approval—to which such a reservation is attached shall have legal effect.

2. In the case where a treaty expressly authorizes the making of a specified category of reservations, any other reservation shall be excluded.

Article B

In the case where a reservation is made to the constituent instrument of an international organization, the effect of the reservation shall be determined by decision of the competent organ of the organization in question, unless the treaty provides otherwise.

Article C

Where a reservation is expressly or impliedly permitted by the terms of the treaty, the reservation shall be admissible and the act or instrument to which it is attached shall have its usual legal effects, as limited or modified by the terms of the reservation.

Article D

1. Where the treaty is silent in regard to the making of reservations, a reservation shall not be considered inadmissible, but other States may object to the reservation, either because they consider it to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, or for any other reason. Any such objection precludes the entry into force of the treaty between the objecting and the reserving States, unless a contrary intention shall have been expressed by the objecting State.

2. Objection to a reservation may be raised by any State which is, or to which it is open to become, a party to the treaty. An objection by a State which has not yet established its own consent to be bound by the treaty shall have no effect if after the expiry of two years from the date when it gave formal notice of its objection it has still not established its consent to be bound by the treaty.

3. An objection to a reservation shall be formulated in writing and shall be notified:
   (a) In the case of a treaty for which there is no depositary, to the reserving State and to every other State party to the treaty or to which it is open to become a party; and
   (b) In other cases, to the depositary.

4. The right to object to a reservation shall be precluded by expressed or implied acceptance. A State shall be considered as having accepted a reservation implicitly if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation during a period of twelve months after it received formal notice of the reservation.

5. Acceptance of a reservation by a State which is bound by the treaty shall constitute the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to such State as well as for general purposes not connected with the relations to any other particular State. The same applies to an acceptance by a State to which it is open to become a party to the treaty as soon as the treaty has entered into force with respect to such State.

Article E

Notwithstanding the preceding article, a reservation to a treaty, which has been concluded between a small number of States, shall be conditional upon the express acceptance by all the States concerned. unless:

Corresponding provision in the ILC draft

Article 18, paras. 1(a) and (b)

Article 18, para. 1(c)

Article 20, para. 4

Article 20, para. 1(a)

Article 18, para. 1(d)

Article 19, para. 4

Article 19, para. 5

Article 19, para. 3

Article 20, para. 3
provisions merely limits the power to enforce a treaty within the State or the internal law of the State. Consequently, the second group of provisions should not be given special consideration in this context. The wording of article 31 seems to be entirely compatible with this point of view in so far as it refers to provisions of the internal law regarding "competence to enter into treaties".

The main problem dealt with in this article is one of considerable theoretical and dogmatic interest. As pointed out in the commentary, however, experience seems to indicate that the practical importance is less significant.

Although it is felt desirable, in States having a system of government based upon principles of parliamentary democracy, to safeguard the powers of representative bodies against encroachments by the executive, there is an equally strong and legitimate interest in being able to rely on the consent given in due form by a foreign Government. The point of balance between these conflicting interests is difficult to determine exactly.

The Danish Government has previously had an occasion to state its views on one particular aspect of this problem. In the course of the oral proceedings of the Eastern Greenland case before the Permanent Court of International Justice the Danish agent stated with reference to constitutional provisions limiting the power of a Foreign Minister:

"...the Danish standpoint is that such internal constitutional restrictions are of no importance in international law, in any case unless they are expressed in an absolutely clear and unequivocal manner in the Constitution of the State in question." (P.C.I.J., Series C, No. 66, pp. 2758 and 2759).

It appears from the written pleadings that the point at issue was the international relevance of Norwegian constitutional provisions concerning the procedure to be followed for the adoption of a decision by the Government, in particular the question whether
such a decision should necessarily be adopted by the King in Council. The question of parliamentary approval or countersignature of a Royal Resolution by a Minister did not arise in the case (P.C.I.J., Series C, No. 63, pp. 880-884). The statement contained in paragraph (9) of the commentary of the International Law Commission does not appear to reflect quite accurately the Danish position.

Although the proposal of the Commission seems to deprive constitutional provisions of their international relevance to a somewhat greater extent than recognized by the opinion which prevails in the doctrine of international law, the Danish Government is ready to accept the proposal as a basis for solving this intricate problem. It is essential, however, to maintain the safeguarding clause of the proposal according to which a State is not bound by the declaration of its representative if the violation of its internal law was manifest.

The last sentence of article 31 calls for an additional comment. This provision seems to be based on the juridical construction that the consent is valid even in cases of manifest violation of internal law, although the State is entitled in such cases to withdraw the consent thus expressed by its representative. It would seem preferable to consider the consent as not validly expressed from the point of view of international law. Consequently, the formula in articles 33 and 34 ("many invoke...as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty") should be employed in the present article also. The theoretical objections mentioned in paragraph (5) of the commentary do not seem to be decisive. As the question of invalidity under international law is considered to be distinct from the question of invalidity under national law, there does not seem to be any reason why the invalidity in international law should not be made dependent upon a criterion which is not necessarily relevant under national law, such as the manifest character of the violation of constitutional limitations.

Article 44

The Danish Government agrees that fundamental changes of the circumstances may be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty under the conditions specified in paragraph 2.

It must be borne in mind, however, that this is a field in which contracting parties are likely to evaluate factual circumstances differently and draw different legal conclusions from the facts. If the principle of the binding force of treaties is not to be unduly weakened, it seems essential to include an additional provision to the effect that a State should not be entitled to withdraw from a treaty under this article unless it is ready to submit any controversy on this point to the decision of an arbitral or judicial tribunal. Even if no general clause concerning the judicial settlement of disputes is ultimately added to the draft articles, it seems advisable to attach such a clause to this specific article.

10. FINLAND

[PART I]

Transmitted by a letter of 17 April 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

Part I of the draft articles on the law of treaties drawn up by the International Law Commission constitutes, in the opinion of the Government of Finland, an adequate basis for the codification of this branch of the law.

With regard to some specific articles, however, the Government of Finland would wish to submit the following observations:

Article 1

Since the definitions contained in article 1 considerably affect the subsequent articles every effort should be made to formulate these definitions as clearly and unequivocally as possible. As the definition contained in paragraph 1(a) of article 1 is given for the purposes of this Convention only and since the Convention deals exclusively with treaties concluded between States, there appears to be no need in this connexion to touch upon other subjects of international law. Consequently, the words "or other subjects of international law" could be deleted from sub-paragraph (a).

Article 3

For the same reason as stated above under article 1, the whole of paragraph 3 concerning international organizations could be deleted from article 3 as well as the words "and by other subjects of international law" from the end of paragraph 1. These words could perhaps be replaced by the words "which are subjects of international law", as all States do not possess international sovereignty. Another possibility would be to delete the whole of article 3 as superfluous, as suggested by some members of the International Law Commission.

The Government of Finland wish, in this context, to point out that, although the draft treaty deals only with States, nothing would prevent the inclusion, if desired, in the commentaries on certain articles, of statements indicating that these articles should ex analogia be applied to, for example, the Holy See and certain international organizations, and that a new draft agreement regarding this question could be worked out later.

Paragraph 2 of this article does not seem quite satisfactory, as it only mentions the federal State and its member states, although there exist several other types of composite States where the member states possess the capacity to conclude treaties in certain fields. The said paragraph might, therefore, read for example as follows: "In a union of States, the capacity of its members to conclude treaties depends on its constituent treaty or its constitution".

Article 12

The contents of the proposal of the International Law Commission on this article call for no comments, but its form invites some remarks. In the draft the two types of treaties, the formal treaties and those in simplified form, are not always dealt with separately. For instance, the principle embodied in paragraph 1 regarding the necessity of ratification applies to all treaties. Paragraph 2 of the same article contains so extensive exceptions, that they in fact cancel the principal rule, especially since most treaties are treaties concluded in simplified form. Paragraph 3, again, contains counter-presumptions, i.e. exceptions, which in part are contradictory to the preceding paragraph. This unnecessarily complicated and in a technical sense unsatisfactory article could be simplified, for instance, as follows: "All treaties which are not concluded in simplified form require ratification, unless the treaty otherwise provides or a contrary intention of the signatory States clearly appears from statements made in the course of negotiations or the signing of the treaty, from the credentials, full powers or other instrument issued to the representatives of the negotiating States, or from other circumstances evidencing such an intention".

Article 16

In article 16 regarding the legal effects of ratification, acceptance and approval, it would perhaps have been possible to deal with the question as to whether and on what conditions such acts could be revoked. Reasons can be given as well for as against the inclusion of such a possibility. Revocations may have a harmful effect on the position of other signatory States. But in some cases it may be unjust to prohibit revocation unconditionally. Such would be the case, for example, if a signatory State would be compelled to wait until the treaty enters into force and only then be able to denounce it, provided that this is allowed by the terms of the treaty.

Article 17

The view that a State, which has ratified a treaty (that has not yet entered into force) and which subsequently commits acts contrary to the objectives of the treaty, thereby violates its obligations,
is quite acceptable. One may even accept the presumption that the mere signing of a treaty puts the signatory State under obligation of good faith. It is, however, doubtful whether such an obligation should also ensue in respect of States which have only taken part in the negotiation of a treaty or in the drawing up or adoption (authentication) of its text.

**Article 18**

Paragraph 1 of article 18, which deals with the formulation of reservations, could be made simpler by combining—as has been suggested—sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) into one single paragraph. Another possibility would be to regard sub-paragraph (a) alone as sufficient.

**Article 27**

Although the provisions contained in article 27, paragraph 2, are in compliance with the practice of the Secretariat of the United Nations, it would appear sufficient to transmit the copy of the proces-verbal only to the State which has received the incorrect copy of the treaty, while the other States would be only notified of the action taken.

**[PART II]**

Transmitted by a letter of January 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

In the opinion of the Government of Finland, the draft articles submitted by the International Law Commission constitute an entirely satisfactory basis for the future work on the codification of the part of the law of treaties relating to the validity and termination of treaties.

With regard to certain of the draft articles, the Government of Finland would wish to make the following specific observations, which the Commission may wish to take into account in its further work.

In the title of part II of the draft articles as well as in the title of section II, it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak not of the invalidity but of the validity of treaties, since in article 30 the emphasis is placed on the validity of treaties in general and since the articles contained in section II deal both with the validity and the invalidity of treaties.

**Article 38**

The main part of the provisions contained in article 38 seem self-evident. Hence it would appear possible to delete them altogether. The last sentence of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 3, on the other hand, embodies an important principle which deserves to be explicitly recognized in the draft articles.

**Article 40**

The Government of Finland concur in the conclusion that a decision on termination and suspension of the operation of multilateral treaties requires, in addition to the agreement of all parties to the treaty, also the consent of not less than two thirds of all States which participated in the drawing up of the treaty in question. As to the length of time during which this principle should apply, a period of three to five years after the entry into force of the treaty would not seem unreasonable.

**Article 51**

The acceptance of that procedure contained in article 51 would undoubtedly be of great importance. However, the draft article still fails to establish the means which could be resorted to in the event negotiations and other efforts for the settlement of a dispute prove to be unsuccessful. This should not be interpreted to imply that unilateral measures for withdrawing from treaty obligations are permissible.

A particular difficulty arises from the fact that some States do not accept compulsory settlement of disputes, for instance, through arbitral or judicial procedure. For those States which in principle accept such compulsory settlement of disputes, there remains only the possibility to agree—for example, through a separate protocol, as was done in connexion with the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 1958, and with the two Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations, 1961 and 1963 respectively—to submit disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of a particular treaty or convention to this kind of procedure. As a compromise one may also accept the status quo, however, with an additional stipulation to the effect that, if the contracting party which wishes to withdraw from the treaty obligations proposes to the other parties to settle the dispute by judicial or arbitral procedure and this offer is rejected, the first party has the right of denunciation.

As to the details of this draft article, sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 appears inadequate in so far as it does not fix any period of time within which an answer must be given in urgent cases. This period could suitably be two weeks or one month.

**[PART III]**

Transmitted by a letter of 24 September 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

In the opinion of the Government of Finland the draft articles submitted by the International Law Commission constitute an entirely satisfactory basis for the future work on the codification of this part of the Law of Treaties.

With regard to certain of the draft articles the Government of Finland would wish to make the following specific observations, which the Commission may wish to take into account in its further work.

**Article 55**

There might be advantage also to state that the party must abstain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects and purposes of the treaty. Such an addition would complete the article in conformity with all that has already been stated concerning the same matter in other articles.

**Article 62**

Concerns the importance of custom as a source of international law; therefore this article does not really belong to the law of treaties.

Since international custom and the law of treaties are equivalent sources of law, the principle expressed in article 62 might be considered self-evident.

**Article 67**

This article does not in all respects satisfactorily solve the question of amendment of multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only.

A correction of a formal nature should be made to paragraph 1 of the article.

As it is admitted in the commentary (2), the second and third conditions overlap to some extent. The latter could be left out.

Critical observations should be made concerning paragraph 2 of the article. It would have been reasonable that States which wish to amend the treaty (inter se agreement) would notify all parties as stated in article 66 regardless of the fact that the treaty allows certain arrangements between certain of the parties only.

All parties should be notified of above-mentioned plans of amendment as soon as negotiations are under way.

The position of the parties not involved in the amendment is even worse due to the fact that no term has been set by the article for notification. It has not even been mentioned that it should take
place at earliest convenience or as soon as possible upon conclusion of the special treaty.

Articles 69-73

The Government of Finland considers the rules concerning the interpretation of treaties as both useful and appropriate.

11. Hungary

[part III]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 1 September 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

1. The last sentence in paragraph 3 of the commentary to draft article 59 indicates that a treaty provision imposed upon an aggressor State does not fall under the rule of nullity set forth in article 36. It clearly follows from this right statement that the consent of an aggressor State is not needed to establish an obligation for it by the provision of a treaty to which it is not a party. It would be advisable to include this highly important exception in the text of article 59 itself.

2. According to article 59 of the draft, an obligation may arise for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the State in question has expressly (italics added) agreed to be so bound, while a right—as provided for in article 60—may arise for a State if... (italics added) assents thereto. However, according to article 61, the provision of a treaty establishing a right or an obligation as referred to in articles 59 and 60 respectively may be revoked or amended only with the consent of the State in question, without any distinction being made—in contrast to articles 59 and 60—between an express consent which seems to be needed for the revocation or an unfavourable amendment of a provision establishing a right, on the one hand, and implied consent which may be enough for the revocation or a favourable amendment of a provision establishing an obligation, on the other. It would seem advisable to adjust the provisions of article 61 to the provisions of articles 59 and 60.

3. In draft article 64 the International Law Commission has determined the effect of severance of diplomatic relations on the application of treaties.

The draft contains no provision dealing with the effect of severance of consular relations on the application of treaties. Although it is without doubt that, considering the interests of co-operation of States, the maintenance of consular relations is desirable even in case of severance of diplomatic relations, the severance of consular relations cannot be considered impossible at the present stage of development of international law. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concluded on 24 April 1963 provides for this possibility in article 27. It would therefore seem desirable for the International Law Commission to deal also with the effect of severance of consular relations on the application of treaties in article 64 or in a separate article. It would be appropriate to draft a new provision according to which the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 3 of article 64 should apply to the severance of consular relations accordingly.

4. Article 66 deals with the question of the amendment of multilateral treaties. It seems desirable that the general rule set forth in paragraph 1 of this article should be complemented with a special rule in regard of general multilateral treaties.

According to paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of draft article 1 of the law of treaties, a general multilateral treaty is a multilateral treaty which concerns general norms of international law or deals with matters of general interest to States as a whole. It is clear from this definition that every State, even those which are not parties to the original treaty, should be invited to take part in a conference dealing with the amendment of general multilateral treaties.

Such an addition to article 66 presupposes the alteration of the text of article 8 by bringing the provisions of article 8 into accord with the definition of general multilateral treaties as contained in article 1.

5. The provision contained in paragraph 3 of article 66 lays down a specific rule dealing with a case which seems to be rather hypothetical. The question arises whether there is need to create a new rule for a hypothetical case whose regulation seems hardly justified by practice. The provision seems to be questionable also on the ground that it attaches a certain effect to the signature of a treaty. This, however, seems to be out of place in the section of the draft dealing with the modification of treaties.

6. The commentary to article 69 explains the textual approach to treaty interpretation adopted by the Commission. The text of the article itself seems to be more rigid than the commentary in this respect, not even mentioning the intention of the contracting parties. It would seem desirable to draft article 69 more flexibly in this respect and to give expression of the thought contained in paragraph 10 of the commentary, i.e. that it is the intention of the parties which is sought and it is presumed that their intention is that which appears from the text.

7. Article 70 of the draft refers to recourse to the preparatory work of a treaty merely as a further means of interpretation. This seems to be inconsistent with article 69, paragraph 3, where the subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the treaty is considered a primary means of interpretation. The preparatory work done prior to the conclusion of a treaty is believed to be of the same importance as the subsequent practice in regard to determining the intention of the parties.

12. Israel

[Part I]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 26 April 1965 from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations

[Original: English]

1. The Government of Israel is pleased to note the progress which has been made in connexion with the law of treaties. In general, the practical approach which has been adopted is seen to be adequate to present needs, and the Commission's general decision that its draft articles on the law of treaties shall serve as the basis for a convention on the topic is acceptable. Particular satisfaction is felt at the manner in which the problems of reservations to multilateral conventions and the functions of the depositary authority have been dealt with, thereby responding to requests which have been made by the General Assembly during recent sessions, and with the question of treaties in simplified form. It is noted that this progress is the consequence of the conscientious preparatory work which has been undertaken by the present Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties and by the previous Special Rapporteurs on the topic, and the Government is happy to express its appreciation for their work.

2. It is observed that several of the articles refer to tacit consent as a method by which various stages of the treaty-making process can be accomplished. Examples of this are found in articles 9, 19 and 27. The question of tacit consent appears to be of increasing practical significance; and it is believed that further consideration might be given to all its implications. Furthermore, it is being adopted in some domestic constitutional practices in connexion with the parliamentary ratification of treaties. The notion of tacit consent raises the question of the length of time which has to lapse before the presumption of consent may be inferred. Article 9, paragraph 3(b), and article 19, paragraph 3, refer to a period of twelve months.

Additional observations on part I are included in the comments on part II.
Article 19, paragraph 4, refers to a period of two years and article 27, paragraph 1, simply to "a specified time-limit". This Government feels that under certain circumstances a period of twelve months might prove too brief for such a presumption and therefore suggests that its extension be considered. At all events, it is believed that closer consideration might be given to the question of uniformity for the different periods of time involved.

II

The following specific observations are put forward.

3. With regard to paragraph (5) of the commentary to article 1, attention is called to the fact that in United Nations practice the designation "declaration" is used with increasing frequency for the purpose of distinguishing certain quasi-normative texts from instruments which are intended to be international treaties. This has been pointed out in the memoranda of the Office of Legal Affairs published in document E/CN.4/L.610. Without taking any position on the precise legal characterization of such declarations, it is suggested that appropriate mention of this aspect should appear in the final text of the commentary.

4. It is believed that the last member of the final sentence of paragraph (8) of the commentary to article 1 may be open to misconstruction. In a set of articles dealing with the conclusion, entry into force and registration of international treaties, it is probably unnecessary to consider whether individuals or corporations created under national law do or do not possess capacity to enter into agreements governed by public international law, or what is the proper law of such instruments. There are a number of such agreements which purport to be governed by public international law, or at least by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Perusal of the summary records of the Commission's fourteenth session suggests that this particular phrase may not adequately reflect the Commission's discussions on this matter.

5. The English and French texts of the draft articles do not fully correspond to one another in their definition of "reservation" (article 1, paragraph 1(f)). While the English text speaks of "a... statement...[reporting]...to exclude...the legal effect of some provisions", the French text refers to "certaines dispositions". Paragraph (13) of the commentary to this article would appear to support the view that the French text, in fact, reflects more precisely the Commission's intention that a true reservation relates to a specific provision of a treaty. An appropriate modification of the English text is therefore suggested.

6. It is felt that article 1, paragraph 2 ("Nothing contained in the present articles shall affect in any way the characterization of international agreements under the internal law of any State") might give rise to difficulties on the internal level, especially in the countries in which duly ratified international treaties become part of the law of the land. While accepting the principle, therefore, doubts are felt whether the provision itself is fully appropriate to an international treaty, and whether the idea would not better be expressed should it appear in the commentary.

7. With regard to article 3, it is suggested that for the present purposes the question of capacity would be adequately covered if paragraph 2 of this article were eliminated.

8. (a) With regard to article 4, it is suggested as a matter of principle that full powers to conclude a treaty in simplified form should not normally be dispensed with. On the other hand, it is believed that the transaction of international business would be facilitated if the representatives referred to in paragraph 2(a) and (b) to be regarded as normally having implied authority to conclude all treaties of the type referred to in that paragraph, whatever in solemn form or in simplified form. It is accordingly suggested that in paragraph 4(a) the word "shall" be substituted by "may" and that sub-paragraph (b) be eliminated.

(b) It is noted that reference is made to the language of full powers, and other like instruments, used in connexion with the making of treaties. It is assumed that each State is free to follow its own inclinations in this regard.

(c) With regard to paragraph (8) of the commentary to this article, by Government decision the Minister for Foreign Affairs has a standing Commission which covers the complete exercise of the treaty-making power. It has not hitherto been this Government's practice to clothe its diplomatic representatives abroad or its permanent representatives at the headquarters of international organizations with comparable full powers. However, it sees no objection to adopting this practice in the future.

(d) With regard to paragraph (9) of the commentary, it is suggested that, owing to developments in contemporary treaty-making practice, two types of precautionary signature, whether or not technically designated signature ad referendum, have to be contemplated. The first type is that dealt with by the Commission, concerning which no observations are made. The second type is exemplified by the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea. The four Conventions adopted by that Conference specifically state that they are each subject to ratification, whereas the Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes provides that it is "subject to ratification, where necessary, according to the constitutional requirements of the signatory States". The representative of Israel signed the Optional Protocol ad referendum in order to establish on the international level that ratification of any of the Conventions would not in itself imply ratification of the Optional Protocol. (Cf. doc. A/CN.4/121, sec. A, para. 1: Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1959, vol. II, p. 82). It is suggested that the Commission consider whether its articles adequately deal with that type of precautionary signature.

(e) With regard to provisional full powers also referred to in paragraph (9), the addressee of the letter or telegram is not indicated. It is the practice of the Government to address such letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the other party, or the Secretary-General of the organization concerned, and to transmit them through the diplomatic channel. On the other hand, telegrams are normally despatched to the Israel diplomatic mission concerned and handed over by it to the other party.

9. (a) With regard to article 5, despite its apparently descriptive character it relates to an essential phase of the treaty-making process. The negotiating phase may also be of importance for other aspects of the law of treaties. Its retention is accordingly urged.

(b) Attention is, however, drawn to a discrepancy between the English and French texts of this article. Whereas the English text refers to "some other agreed channel", the French text speaks of "une autre voie officielle". It is suggested that the French text be brought into line with the English.

10. Article 6(b) of the English text speaks of "a treaty drawn up within an organization". From paragraph (6) of the commentary to this article it appears that article 6(f) is intended to refer to treaties drawn up within an international organization. It is accordingly suggested that the word "international" be added in the text of article 6(b), thus making it conform more closely to the French text.

11. With regard to article 9, it is believed that a period of five years from the date of the adoption of the treaty would be sufficient for the purposes of paragraphs 1(a) and 2.

12. With regard to the expression "concluded between a small group of States" appearing in paragraph 2 of article 9, and again in paragraph 3 of article 20, it is observed that in paragraph (12) of the commentary to article 1 a different expression is used, namely "limited number of States". The distinction which the Commission seeks to draw between general multilateral treaties as defined in article 1 and treaties concluded between a small group of States is appreciated. However, it is felt that the smooth application of the law would be facilitated were the commentary to introduce more precision with regard to the concept of "small group of States".
13. The Government wishes to express its reservations to article 12 which, if it has been correctly understood, introduces doctrinal considerations alongside its practical rules. It is not considered necessary, for the purpose of drawing up practical rules, to adopt a position in principle on the controversial question of the necessity or otherwise in general international law for ratification of treaties which themselves are silent on the question. In the view of this Government, it is essentially for the negotiators of the treaty to establish whether ratification is necessary or not. The question of the necessity for ratification may itself be part of the negotiation, or it may be conclusively determined by the terms of the full powers of one or both of the negotiators. It is suggested that a pragmatic point of departure such as this could lead to a simplification of the article which, in its present form, is unduly complex.

14. With regard to the withdrawal of reservations dealt with in article 22, it is suggested that in respect of those treaties for which there is a depositary, the State wishing to withdraw its reservation will comply with the necessary requirements if it employs the depositary as the channel for the transmission of the necessary notification. This would appear to conform more to the general character of the multilateral treaty for which there is a depositary, as it emerges from the draft articles as a whole, than the present wording which is open to the interpretation that the State concerned is obliged to inform the other interested States individually. If the depositary is employed in these circumstances, the withdrawal of the reservations should normally take effect in accordance with the general provisions of the treaty, or the residual provisions of the draft articles (in the event of the silence of the treaty), for the taking of effect of communications transmitted by or through the depositary, unless of course the notice of withdrawal specifies otherwise.

15. (a) With regard to article 25, it is correct to include in the draft articles a reference to the registration of treaties. However, this Government hesitates to agree that the articles are the proper place for introducing any change in existing practices which distinguish between registration in implementation of Article 102 of the Charter and filing and recording in accordance with the regulations made by the General Assembly thereunder. It is recalled that the distinction between obligatory registration and voluntary filing and recording was deliberately maintained when the regulations were first drawn up in 1946. It may also be pointed out that the Charter is not the only international constitution which calls for the registration of treaties. Reference may be made, for instance, to article 81 of the Constitution of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

(b) It may be the case that upon the completion of the work on the law of treaties it will be necessary for the General Assembly to re-examine and consolidate the practices in connexion with the registration of treaties, and to co-ordinate them with the practices of the specialized agencies. The Commission therefore might well consider whether, in due course, the General Assembly's attention should not be drawn to this aspect.

16. With regard to article 29, it is suggested that in enumerating the functions of the depositary special reference should be made to the depositary's duty to register international treaties and related documents. In this connexion attention is called to the discussions which preceded General Assembly resolution 364 B (IV) of 1 December 1949 and also to relevant inter-agency agreements such as that of 17 February 1949 between the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 26, p. 323).

17. It is believed desirable to clarify de lege ferenda that as a residual rule phrases such as "promptly", "as soon as possible", etc., appearing in paragraphs 3 (d), 6 and 7 (a) of article 29, as well as in paragraph 3 of article 15, should, unless the treaty itself provides otherwise, be interpreted in such a way as to allow for the observance of the normal administrative processes customary in the depositary authority for the preparation of the relevant communications, and for the receipt of those notifications through the normal channels by the home authorities of the individual States. This mitigates against equating the concept of "promptness" with that of "immediacy", which was applied by the International Court in the Right of Passage case (preliminary objections), with particular reference to the terms of Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

18. It appears that the expression "any such matters" which occurs in article 29, paragraph 8, of the English text has a rather wider meaning than "autres actes similaires" of the same article of the French text. It is accordingly suggested that the term "acte" be replaced by another expression which more accurately accords with the English text.

19. This Government specifically welcomes the inclusion of the annex in the report of the fourteenth session of the Commission's work and suggests that it should also be included in the final text of the draft articles, when these are adopted.

[PART II] 

Transmitted by a note verbale of 15 May 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

1. The Ministry wishes again to express its appreciation to the Commission, and the Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, for the remarkable progress which has been achieved in placing the law of treaties upon the widest and most secure foundation, as desired by the General Assembly.

2. Careful reconsideration of the consistency of the terminology is desirable. The following instances are given:

(a) The expression "conclude a treaty" appears in articles 1(1)(a), (b) and (c), 3, 30, 36 and 49 of the draft, as well as in Articles 43 (3) and 80 of the Charter. On the other hand, the expression "enter into a treaty" is used in articles 25 (2), 31, 33, 34, 41 and 44 of the draft, and in Articles 63 and 102 of the Charter.

(b) Different expressions are used in draft articles 12(2)(c), 12(3)(b), 39 and 46(2)(b) in referring to the "travaux préparatoires" of a treaty, without it being clear whether this differentiation is intentional.

(c) The word "nullity" appears in the title of article 47, in the text of articles 30 and 46, in the title to section VI, and in the title and text of article 52. However, the terminology of the substantive articles dealing with "nullity" is more differentiated, since it distinguishes between relative voidability and absolute voidness. Thus: article 31 refers to "invalidate the consent" and "withdraw the consent", Article 32 uses the expressions "without any legal effect" and "invalidate the consent"! Articles 33 and 34 use the expression "invalidating its consent", Article 35 uses the expression "without any legal effect" and "invalidating its consent". Articles 36 and 37 use the word "void". Article 45 uses the expression "becomes void and terminates". While it is recognized that absolute uniformity of terminology is not possible, it is felt that the many variations employed may become a source of difficulty.

(d) The word "instrument" is being used in many different senses. Cf. articles 1(1)(a), 1(1)(b), 1(1)(c), 4(4), 4(5), 4(6), 12(3)(c), 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 26, 29, 40 and 52.

(e) There is inconsistency in the terms used to express a residual rule, without it always being clear whether this is intentional. Thus:

(i) "Unless another procedure has been prescribed in the text or otherwise agreed upon" in article 7;

(ii) "Unless it is otherwise prescribed by the terms of the treaty itself" in article 8;

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7 Including certain additional observations on part I.
(iii) "When...the treaty specifies..." in article 13, and "provides" in article 14;
(iv) "Unless the treaty itself expressly contemplates" in article 15;
(v) "Unless the treaty [itself] otherwise provides [prescribes]" in articles 20(3), 29, 40, 50, 53;
(vi) "where the treaty does not specify..." in article 23;
(vii) "Except as provided in the treaty itself..." in article 46;
(viii) "Subject to the provisions of the treaty..." in article 54.
This multiplicity of terms might become a source of confusion.

II

3. The following observations are made on article 30:
   (a) The French text ("est réputé être en vigueur") may introduce an element of legal fiction which is not present in the English text ("shall be considered as being in force").
   (b) Doubt is felt over the use of the word "nullity" in the absence of corresponding usage in the substantive articles.
   (c) This article does not foresee the operation of the rules for separability.

4. The following observations are made on article 31:
   (a) It is suggested that it would be preferable for the second member of the first sentence to refer to "competence to enter into the treaty" rather than "competence to enter into treaties", and that the end of the sentence should read "unless the violation of that law, etc." in order to take into account a situation, such as exists sometimes in Israel, where, without prejudice to the general treaty-making power, the exercise of the treaty-making power for a given treaty (e.g. a treaty of extradition) is subjected to specific conditions.
   (b) The first sentence of this article uses the expression "shall not invalidate the consent" and may be inconsistent with the second sentence, which uses the expression "may not withdraw the consent".
   (c) It appears that the general principle which underlies article 47 is operative as regards the subject matter of article 31. Accordingly, it is suggested that appropriate expression should be given to this interrelation, a matter which, it is considered, would permit of a more concise text for article 31.
   (d) It is understood that the word "manifest" is to be taken in an objective sense, and it is suggested that this should find expression in the text.

5. The following observations are made on article 32:
   (a) Redraft the first part of paragraph 1 so that it should refer to the "consent...to be bound by the treaty...".
   (b) Redraft the conclusion of paragraph 1 to read: "...the act of such representative shall have legal effect if it is afterwards confirmed..."
   (c) Redraft paragraph 2 to read:
      "In cases where the authority conferred upon a representative to express the consent of his State to be bound by the treaty has been made subject to particular instructions, his omission to observe those instructions...". (This redraft is based on paragraph (5) of the commentary, and assumes that article 4 will continue substantially in its present form.)
   (d) It is assumed that the particular instructions should be brought to the notice of the contracting States prior to the termination of the negotiation, and it is suggested that this should find expression in the text.
   (e) It is believed that, subject to article 46, an appropriate provision for voluntary separability should be introduced into this article.

6. The following observations are made on article 33:
   (a) Place this article after article 34, in order to distinguish the reprehensible from the non-reprehensible vices de consentement, and place the former in ascending order of calumny.

(b) In lieu of "fraudulent conduct" it would be preferable to refer to "fraudulent act or conduct".
   (c) Paragraph 2 as at present drafted can be interpreted as excluding the option of the injured State, contrary to what is stated in paragraph (6) of the commentary. That is the effect of the word "only" which, it is suggested, would be better omitted.

7. The following observations are made on article 34:
   (a) The error to which this article refers is described, in paragraph 1, as an error relating to a "fact or state of facts". However, paragraph (7) of the commentary is not so limiting and it is suggested to bring the text of the article into line with the commentary.
   (b) Redraft paragraph 4 to read:
      "When there is no error as to the substance of a treaty but there is a mistake in the wording of its text, the mistake shall not affect the validity of the treaty and articles 26 and 27 then apply."
   (c) Paragraph 4 is understood as intended to apply only to the case in which the parties are in agreement, or are presumed to be in agreement, as to the existence of the mistake. This appears from the commentary to article 10 of the Special Rapporteur's second report (A/CN.4/156). The judgment of the International Court in the Frontier Land case indicates that a mistake in transcription can vitiate the treaty (as opposed to invalidating a party's consent), subject to the necessary proof being forthcoming (I.C.J. Reports, 1959, pp. 222-6), and that in any event such a mistake can be cured by subsequent ratification of the treaty, its publication, and by acquiescence (p. 227). It is suggested, therefore, that the language of paragraph 4, and if necessary articles 26 and 27, be adjusted accordingly.
   (d) The proposed redraft of paragraph 4 will require consequential amendments to the title to section V of part I, and to articles 26 and 27, by substituting the word "mistake" for the word "error" wherever appearing therein (the same adjustment to be made in the final text of the commentary to those articles).

8. The following observations are made on article 35:
   (a) There is a possible inconsistency between the absolute expression "without any legal effect" found in paragraph 1 and the relative partial invalidation of the consent according to paragraph 2.
   (b) It is not clear whether any difference is intended between the expression "shall be without any legal effect" in paragraph 1 of article 35 and the expression "shall be void" appearing in article 36. Perhaps, therefore, it would be better to draft paragraph 1 as follows:
      "If an individual representative of a State is coerced...the State whose representative has been coerced may invoke the coercion as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty."
   (c) For the reasons stated in observation (e) to article 33, the word "only" should be omitted from paragraph 2. The provisions of articles 33 and 35 regarding separability should remain substantially identical.

9. It is suggested to complete article 36 by adding a provision to the effect that the article also applies where the participation of a State in an existing treaty was procured by the threat or use of force.

10. The only comment to article 37 is that it should be made quite clear in the commentary that for a rule of jus cogens to exist, the two elements, as set out in this article, must subsist simultaneously. This is already implicit in paragraph (4) of the commentary.

11. In order to clarify the significance of article 38 as determinative of the manner but of the time of termination, it is suggested that the factor of "time" be mentioned specifically in the title and in the opening part of paragraph 1. In its present form, the article is open to the misconception that it states the obvious, but it is
considered that this clarification of the time element would be useful.

12. It is suggested that article 39, while unobjectionable in itself, should open the possibility of suspending the operation of the treaty, as an alternative to terminating it, in the circumstances mentioned in the article. This could be achieved by an addition along the lines of article 40, paragraph 3.

13. The following observations are made on article 40:

(a) There is a possible inconsistency between paragraph 1 of the text and the reference to "new "treaty" in paragraph (1) of the commentary, in view of the formal definition of "treaty" contained in article 1, paragraph 1(a). The text of the article is acceptable, on the assumption that it includes the possibility of a tacit agreement of all the parties to terminate an existing treaty.

(b) After the words "A treaty" in paragraph 1, add "in whole or in part".

(c) It is suggested that in paragraph 2, the period should correspond to that adopted for article 9 (see paragraph 11 of the Government's observations on part I).

(d) Consideration should also be given to the question whether articles 9 and 40 should not refer to two-thirds of the States which drew up the treaty including two-thirds of the parties.

(e) In order to accommodate the functions of the depositary to the function sought to be conferred upon it by article 40, paragraph 1(a), appropriate modifications will be required in article 29.

14. With regard to article 41, in the light of what is stated in paragraph 15 of the Commission's report and paragraph (2) of the commentary, it is believed that the article contains an inherent contradiction. If the later treaty was intended to terminate the earlier treaty, then the termination of the later treaty would not bring about the revival of the earlier treaty. But if the later treaty was intended to suspend the operation of the earlier treaty, the termination of the later treaty will, following article 54, bring about the revival of the earlier treaty. In either event, the whole matter depends upon the interpretation of the intention of the parties to the later treaty. If the article is retained, it is suggested that the element of suspension (with the omission of the word "only" in paragraph 2) should precede the element of termination. A reconstruction of the article along these lines might facilitate the problem of the placing of this provision.

15. With regard to article 42, paragraph (8) of the commentary seems to suggest that the definition of breach in paragraph 3 is not exclusive.

16. The following observations are made on article 43:

(a) Redraft paragraph 2 to read:

"If it is not clear that the disappearance or destruction of the subject-matter of the rights and obligations contained in the treaty will be total and permanent, the impossibility may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty."

(b) It should be clarified that this provision does not apply in the case where the impossibility is the consequence of breach of the treaty by the party invoking the impossibility.

17. The following observations are made on article 44:

(a) It is suggested that the expression "fact or situation" appearing in paragraph 2 should coinide with whatever expression is used in article 34, which at present reads "fact or state of facts". Cf. observations on article 34 above.

(b) It is suggested that the article could also envisage the suspension of the operation of the treaty, in whole or in part.

18. In view of the problems of intertemporal law which arise, observations on article 45 are reserved until the Commission has completed its first draft of part III of the law of treaties.

19. Article 32 should be included among the articles mentioned in article 46.

20. It is believed that article 47 requires careful reconsideration to take account of the following aspects:

(a) The word "nullity" does not appear in any of the articles mentioned in article 47.

(b) No reference appears to the effect of the general principle on the exercise of the right to require the suspension of the operation of the treaty, despite the fact that suspension is included in one of the articles mentioned in article 47 (article 42).

(c) Since the principle itself is one of general application, article 47 should distinguish carefully between the general principle and the specific concept of tacit consent as it is employed in part I of the draft articles (cf. paragraph 2 of the Government's observations on part I).

(d) The drafting of the introductory part of the article could be simplified were it to be worded more positively. The following redraft is therefore suggested (also taking account of observation (c) to article 31):

"A State may not rely upon articles 31 to 35 and 42 and 44 if that State, after having become aware of the facts giving rise to the application of those articles, shall have elected by conduct or otherwise to consider itself bound..."

This text also makes redundant the specific reference to "waiver", which, in the context, may be a complicating factor, and avoids the awkwardness of the phrase "debarred from denying". The commentary should make it clear that the election will be presumed after the lapse of a reasonable period of time, such time depending, of course, on all the circumstances.

21. Consideration should be given to whether article 48, which is in principle correct, should not be framed in more general terms covering also sections III, IV, V and VI of part II, and placed after the present article 2. That could lead to a simplification of part I, similar to that intended for part II by article 48. In fact, similar provisions already appear in articles 5, 6, 7, 9, 18(1)(a), 20(4), 27(4), 28 and 29(8). Such generalization would correspond, it is believed, to existing practice as regards the two types of treaties to which article 48 applies. Nevertheless, it might be more satisfactory to draft two separate provisions, one relating to a treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization, and one relating to a treaty which has been drawn up within an international organization. It should, however, be indicated that sections I and II of Part II are fully applicable to both these classes of treaties. In the penultimate phrase of the article, the words "to that treaty" should be inserted after "the application".

22. There are no observations on article 49.

23. The following observations are made on article 50:

(a) The notice should correspond in principle, and subject only to the rules of separability, to the requirements for the instrument regarding participation contained in article 15, paragraph 1(b).

(b) It is believed that paragraph 1 should likewise be framed as a residual rule, operative in the event of the silence of the treaty.

(c) It is further suggested to substitute "to the depositary" for "through the depositary".

(d) A corresponding modification to article 29 will be required, in order to complete the enumeration of the functions of the depositary.

24. There are no observations on article 51.

25. The following general observations are made on section VI:

(a) It is assumed that all three articles will require reconsideration in the light of the conclusions to be reached by the Commission on the question of the effects of treaties on third States (pacta in favorem et in detrimentum tertii).
(b) Each one of the three articles deals with the treaty as a whole. Some provision should be added regarding the consequences of the operation of article 46 on the matters dealt with in section VI.

(c) The use of the word "nullity" in the title of section VI raises the question of terminology referred to generally in observation 2(c) above.

(d) Article 29 will require adjustment in order to authorize the depositary to perform functions which are the consequence of section VI.

26. The following observations are made on article 52:

(a) This article attempts to deal with two distinct matters, namely: treaties which are a "nullity" ab initio, and treaties the consent to which may be invalidated subsequently at the initiative of one of the parties. It is suggested that these two aspects should be brought more sharply into focus.

(b) It is suggested that these difficulties, as well as those of a terminological character, would be reduced were the text to be reconstructed by referring not to the general concept of "nullity", but more specifically to the legal consequences of the application of the different articles of section II of part II to which it relates.

(c) Subject to the foregoing, it is suggested that paragraph 1(a) should refer to the "legal consequences of acts performed in good faith by a party in reliance on the void treaty". While it is true that omnia pro rite praesumuntur, the invalidation of the consent to be bound by a treaty ought not in itself to impair claims based upon the alleged illegality of acts performed in reliance on that treaty. A passage in the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Northern Cameroons case (I.C.J. Reports, 1963, p. 34) alludes to this, in the case of termination of a treaty.

(d) It is suggested to commence paragraph 1(b) by a connecting word such as "Nevertheless".

(e) In paragraph 3, it would be better to substitute "invalidation of a State's participation in a multilateral treaty" for "nullity of a State's consent to a multilateral treaty", thus corresponding more closely to the language of articles 8 and 9.

27. The following observations are made on article 53:

(a) It is suggested to redraft paragraph 1(b) to read:

"(b) Shall not affect the legal consequences of any act done in conformity with the provisions of the treaty while that treaty was in force or..."

(b) For reasons similar to those given in observation 26(b), it would probably clarify matters if the article were to specify these articles of part II to which it relates.

(c) For reasons given in observation 18, paragraph 2 is reserved.

(d) The commentary should make it clear that once a treaty is terminated, it can only be revived, in the future, by some formal treaty (in the sense used in the draft articles). This is necessary because of differences of approach of different legal systems on the effect of the repeal of a statute which itself repeals an earlier statute. There is a statutory provision in force in Israel to the effect that where any enactment repealing any former law is itself repealed, such law repeal shall not revive the law previously repealed unless words be added reviving such law. It is assumed that the same principle applies in international law.

28. The following observations are made on article 54:

(a) It is assumed that this article does not refer to the consequences on the operation of a treaty of the suspension of diplomatic relations between the parties (in the case of a bilateral treaty), or between some of the parties (in the case of a multilateral treaty).

(b) The suspension of the operation of a treaty is mentioned in articles 30, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 49 and 50. Articles 42 and 43 also raise the possibility of the suspension of the operation of a part of a treaty. It is accordingly suggested that article 54 should specify the substantive articles to which it refers.

(c) It is suggested, having regard to the peremptory effect of the termination of a treaty, to extend the option to suspend the operation of a treaty also to the matters covered by articles 39 and 44, and thus facilitate the possibility of a later resumption of the operation of the treaty.

[PART III]

Transmitted by a letter of 8 September 1965 from the First Secretary of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations

1. The Commission's intention, as indicated in paragraph 15 of its Report (A/5809), to consider the possible amalgamation of the three parts of the law of treaties into a single draft convention, together with its observation that rearrangement of the material may be found to be desirable, have been duly noted. Since all the different parts and sections are in substance closely interconnected, it is considered appropriate for the Commission's final text to consist of a single draft of articles dealing as comprehensively as feasible with all the law of treaties. The necessity for rearrangement of the material is also appreciated. The only observation felt to be appropriate at this stage is that it is believed that the whole text would gain considerably in clarity were the section dealing with interpretation to appear as early in the final text as would be consistent with the logical exposition of the material.

2. With reference to paragraph 21 of the Report, the suggestion that most-favoured-nation clauses in general might at some future time appropriately form the subject of a special study by the Commission is noted with approval.

3. In the course of the examination of the draft articles, some further inconsistency in terminology and discordance between the three language versions has been noted. However, in view of the proposals advanced by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report (A/CN.4/177) on the question of terminology and definitions, it is not considered necessary in these observations to deal particularly with this aspect, except where either inconsistency in terminology, or discordance between different versions of the draft articles, may have occasioned difficulties in understanding the intention of any draft article.

4. With regard to article 55, the following observations are made:

(a) It is believed that the title of this article may be narrower than the scope of the article itself. It is assumed that in due course this article will be combined with article 30. Since the principle of pacta sunt servanda is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties, it would appear that it should be enunciated at the very beginning of the codification. In the Charter of the United Nations, the principle is indeed placed in the Preamble.

(b) On the other hand, the principle of good faith has a broader scope than the application and effects of treaties, and it is particularly appropriate as regards the application of the draft articles themselves. It would therefore appear to be necessary to avoid formulating the text in a way which could lead to the impression that the principle of good faith was limited to the application of treaties.

(c) Having regard to the reference, in paragraph (3) of the commentary, to the provisional entry into force of treaties, the question may arise, and require some mention in the commentary at least, of the interrelation of this article with article 24, it being understood, of course, that the general principle of pacta sunt servanda would apply to the underlying agreement upon which the provisional entry into force is postulated.

(d) Paragraph (4) of the commentary has been noted, and meets with approval.

(e) It is not clear whether the discordance between the three versions is a reflection of transient difficulties.

5. With regard to article 56, it is believed that the concordance of the three language versions requires further close examination.
In this article, too, the question of the interrelation with article 24 may arise.

6. There are no observations on articles 57 and 58.

7. With regard to article 59, it is considered that in general the French version expresses the substance of the rule somewhat better than the English, especially in the "if" clause. While the nature of the compromise solution which the Commission has proposed is appreciated, and it is not the intention of this observation to challenge the basic concept of this article, it is suggested that further attention be given to the actual language used. In addition, it is suggested that the last five words should be replaced by "agreed to by that obligation".

8. It is suggested to change the order of articles 59 and 60.

9. With regard to article 61, it is suggested that the provisions of this article require to be more closely co-ordinated with the provisions of part II relating to the termination of treaties, and those of part III relating to the modification of treaties. Article 61 in its present form may be open to the interpretation that it gives to the third State more extensive rights, possibly amounting to a right of veto, than the principal parties to the treaty themselves have under the general economy of the draft articles. It is suggested that the position of the principal parties should be safeguarded by some reference to articles 38-47 and 49-51, as regards revocation, and that the principles of articles 65-67 as regards modification should also be applicable, in order to govern the legal relationship between the third State and the principal parties to the treaty.

10. With regard to article 62, it is suggested that the opening words should read: "Nothing in these articles precludes".

11. With regard to article 63 the following observations are made:

(a) Further to No. 14 of this Government's observations to article 41 of part II, it is noted from paragraph (12) of the commentary to article 63 that the Commission inclines to the view that cases of partial termination should be removed from article 41 and placed in article 63. This is believed to be correct. In addition, it seems that the interrelation between articles 41 and 63 would be rendered clearer if the element of suspension were also removed from article 41 and placed either in article 63 or in a separate section which would collect together all the provisions relating to the suspension of the operation of a treaty, as distinct from its termination. If article 41 is then left to deal exclusively with implied termination of a treaty, its situation in the section dealing with termination will be logically correct and the implications of that article will be placed in better focus.

(b) Paragraph 1 should preferably refer not only to the obligations of States, but also to their rights.

(c) With regard to paragraph 2, the fundamental legal question which arises is whether the treaty provision must always be taken at its face value, which is what the text seems to imply, or whether it should not be made open to the possibility of a material examination in order to establish whether in fact there is an inconsistency.

(d) Examination of this article has led to a re-examination of all the articles on termination in the light of the proceedings in the Commission's fifteenth session. While the provisions on termination cover the topic quite extensively, it is noted that an important cause of termination, namely obsolescence, is not mentioned by the Commission. It is believed that an understanding of article 63 would be facilitated, and possibly the scope of its application reduced, if place were found in the draft articles, or at least in the commentaries, for the problem of obsolescence.

12. With regard to article 64, which, it is submitted, is at present out of place, it is suggested that the last words of paragraph 2 should read: "disappearance of the means necessary for its operation". At the same time, it is assumed that the Commission did not intend to open the door to a contention that the severance of diplomatic relations may become an excuse for even a temporary suspension of the operation of a treaty in the very contingency for which the treaty was made, a matter which can be illustrated by reference to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 regarding the protection of war victims. It is suggested that the article be re-examined from this point of view. It is possible that paragraph (3) of the commentary on this article may similarly be too categorical.

13. With regard to article 65, and having regard to paragraph (7) of the commentary, which correctly recognizes the possibility of an oral agreement or tacit agreement to amend a treaty, it is suggested to commence this article as follows: "A treaty may be amended by agreement in writing between the parties and the rules laid down in this part I shall apply...etc.". For comment on the expression "the established rules of an international organization", see No. 14, (d) and (e) below.

14. With regard to articles 66 and 67, the following observations are made:

(a) It is suggested that paragraph 1 of article 66 should carefully distinguish between the impersonal proposal to amend a multilateral treaty, and the right of a party to propose an amendment to a treaty, which right may be restricted by the terms of the treaty itself. In general, it is considered that the obligations of the other parties to the treaty should be determined in the first place by the treaty itself (if it contains provisions on the subject), and only in the second place by general rules. This distinction, it is believed, is not clearly made.

(b) It is noted that article 66 refers to a proposal initially made for amendment in relation to all the parties, and article 67 relates only to proposals initially made for inter se amendments. This distinction is accepted. However, the question arises whether the possibility should not be envisaged that a group of parties to a multilateral treaty might initiate consideration of amendments without it being clear initially what kind of amendments will result therefrom. It is believed that this kind of situation may be more prejudicial to the rights and positions of the other parties than the situations covered by articles 66 and 67. The suggestion is therefore made that the question of notice of proposed amendments should form the subject of an independent provision, coming between articles 65 and 66, which should be couched in such a way as will apply to all proposed amendments. In this connexion, it is pointed out that as this group of articles stands at present, notification of the conclusion of an Inter se agreement as provided in paragraph 2 of article 67 may come too late, having regard, particularly, to paragraph 1(b)(i) of article 67. The other parties to the treaty must be given an early opportunity to determine whether the enjoyment of their rights under the treaty, or the performance by them of their obligations, are likely to be adversely affected by a proposed amendment or modification of the treaty.

(c) It is furthermore suggested that the Commission re-examine the question whether the recipients of any notification regarding proposed amendments, whether general or Inter se, should be limited, at all events for a defined initial period, only to the parties to the treaty. Indeed, circumstances can be envisaged in which a multilateral treaty will not enter into force, for want of a sufficient number of ratifications, unless amendments, the necessity for which has been established only after adoption of the text, are made. The Commission's proposal does not take this possibility into account.

(d) The expression "established rules of an international organization" in article 65 and in paragraph 2 of article 66 seems highly ambiguous in the present context. Does it refer to the established rules of an international organization which apply to the members of that organization as such, or does it refer to those rules which apply to treaties concluded or treaties which have been drawn up within an international organization, the parties of which may not necessarily all be members of that organization?

(e) In this connexion, this Government's proposal to generalize article 48, contained in No. 21 of the observations on part II, is
recalled, and the Special Rapporteur’s proposal for a new article 3bis (A/CN.4/177) has been noted with appreciation. In the observation on article 48, it was suggested that two separate provisions are required. Further consideration of this aspect in the light of the provision under examination, and generally, leads to the question of the adequacy of the criterion that a treaty may have been drawn up within an international organization. It is believed that the real criterion has to be sought in the material connexion of the treaty with the organization within which it has been drawn up, so that, in effect, the treaty has a material link with the constitution of that organization. The International Labour Conventions supply a good illustration of this. Many treaties which have been drawn up within the United Nations have no material connexion of that kind, or at best one of an extremely tenuous character, with the United Nations, the standing machinery of which may be regarded as having been used primarily as a matter of diplomatic convenience. The connexion is even less evident with regard to conventions drawn up in conferences, convened by one of the organs of the United Nations, in which non-member States have participated on invitation of the convening organ.

(f) With regard to paragraph 2(b) of article 66, it is probably not sufficient to refer only to article 63, but, as indicated above, closer co-ordination generally between articles 59-61 and articles 65-67 seems to be required.

(g) It is suggested to amend paragraph 1(a) of article 67 to read: “The possibility of such an agreement is...etc.”.

15. With regard to article 68, the following observations are made:
(a) The meaning of the word “also,” in the first line, is not clear. Is it intended to refer only to articles 65 and 66, or does it in addition refer to article 67?

(b) Paragraphs (a) and (b) seem to be redundant. Sub-paragraph (a) is probably covered by articles 41 and 63, especially the latter, and sub-paragraph (b) seems to be indistinguishable, in its practical effect, from paragraph 3(b) of article 69.

(c) There remains sub-paragraph (c) which, from some points of view, may be regarded as also having a logical connexion with the problem dealt with in article 45. It is believed that the substance of sub-paragraph (c) should find an appropriate place in the draft articles. It is based on the passage in Judge Huber’s award in the Island of Palmas case quoted in paragraph (3) of the commentary. In that award it appears as the second leg of the intertemporal law, the first leg appearing in the passage from the same award quoted in paragraph (11) of the commentary to article 69. It is noted that in the original article numbered 56 submitted by the Special Rapporteur in his third report (A/CN.4/167), the correct order of presentation of the two branches of the law was maintained, as was the case in the Special Rapporteur’s original proposals for the articles numbered 70 and 73 in that report (A/CN.4/167/Add.3). No explanation is furnished by the Commission for its reversal of the order of the two branches of the intertemporal law, and the Commission is invited to reconsider whether this reversal of the order does not introduce new complications into a branch of the law which is already complicated enough. It is appreciated that the distinction between the interpretation of a treaty as a step logically prior to its application, and the modification of a treaty as a consequence of its reinterpretation through its application, does exist from a theoretical point of view. However, the practical consequences of that distinction appear to be so fine that the wisdom of expressing it in the way the Commission has sought to do is questioned. It is therefore suggested that paragraph (c) of article 68 should be brought into closer association with, but placed subsequent to, the first leg of the intertemporal law as it appears at present in article 69, paragraph 1(b).

16. With regard to articles 69 and 70, the following observations are made:
(a) In general, the considerations expressed more particularly in paragraphs (6), (7) and (8) of the commentary are appreciated. Without prejudice to ultimate decisions which will be taken in political organs, it is considered appropriate that the Commission’s final draft codification on the law of treaties should contain provisions on the question of interpretation along the lines of those drawn up by the Commission. As already indicated in No. 1 above, it is even considered that in a single draft of articles, the provisions on interpretation, or at all events on the matters dealt with in articles 69-71, should be placed early in the set of articles.

(b) The philosophy of the Commission’s approach as expounded in paragraph (9) of the commentary is also accepted as being most in accord with State practice and international requirements.

(c) Paragraphs 2 of article 69 does not, strictly speaking, seem to constitute part of any general rule of interpretation, but in reality to be a definition. This is confirmed by paragraph (12) of the commentary. Indeed, this definition in some respects completes that of “treaty” in article 1, and it also is of general application to the draft articles as a whole. Its removal from article 69 would make the general rule of interpretation clearer. It is accordingly suggested to insert it in article 1. With regard to its text, there may be room for ambiguity over the expression “drawn up” (which appears elsewhere in the draft articles). Compare Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and Webster’s Third International Dictionary. A possible understanding of that expression is that it relates to draft instruments, but presumably the intention is to refer to the final texts of the instruments in question.

(d) As a consequence of removing paragraph 2 of article 69, paragraph 3 could be suppressed as a separate paragraph, and its elements combined to form sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of the existing paragraph 1. The word “also” in paragraph 3 may give rise to confusion. Paragraph (13) of the commentary describes paragraph 3 as specifying “further authentic elements of interpretation”, while article 70 as a whole is entitled “Further means of interpretation”. It is suggested that the appropriate point of departure for the process of interpretation consists in each one of the four elements, at present separated in paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of article 69, which stand on an equal footing.

(e) The expression “ordinary meaning to be given to each term” in paragraph 1 of article 69 may become a source of confusion, to the extent that it seems to leave open the question of changes in linguistic usage subsequent to the establishment of the treaty text. Reference is made, in this connexion, to the following sentences in the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the U.S. Nationals in Morocco case: “...in construing the provisions of Article 20 [of the Treaty of 16 September 1836 between the United States and Morocco]...it is necessary to take into account the meaning of the word ‘dispute’ at the times when the two Treaties were concluded.” (I.C.J. Reports, 1952, at p. 189.)

(f) Apart from that, care must be taken not to formulate the rule as a whole in such a way as would lead to excessive molecularization of the treaty. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Maritime Safety Committee case drew attention to this aspect in the following sentences: “The meaning of the word ‘elected’ in Article 28 of the Constitution of IMCO cannot be determined in isolation by recourse to its usual or common meaning and attaching that meaning to the word where used in the Article. The word obtains its meaning from the context in which it is used.” (I.C.J. Reports, 1960, at p. 158). These difficulties could be overcome if the introductory sentence of article 69—and leaving aside the question of the time factor—read: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the language used in its context.” The reference to the “context of the treaty” would then have to be removed from sub-paragraph (a). In addition to the necessary adjustment to the introductory phrase of paragraph 1, it is believed that this aspect would be brought more into focus were the order of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) to be reversed.

(g) With regard to sub-paragraph (b), it seems that the text needs slight adjustment, in order to clarify that the rules of gener-
international law there referred to are the substantive rules of international law, including rules of interpretation, and not the rules of interpretation alone.

(b) In view of the proliferation of multilingual versions of treaties, it is considered that comparison between two or more authentic versions ought to be mentioned in article 69, as this seems to be normal practice. Article 73 deals only with the specific problem of what happens when that comparison discloses a difference. However, the importance of comparison is greater, as it frequently assists in determining the meaning of the text and the intention of the parties to the treaty, and to that extent it forms part of any general rule of interpretation in the case of multilingual treaties.

(i) The reconstruction which is proposed, including in particular the transfer of paragraph 2 of article 69 to article 1, may make it unnecessary and, indeed, confusing to refer specifically to the preparatory work of the treaty in article 70.

17. It is suggested that article 71 be either combined with article 69, or placed immediately after it.

18. With regard to articles 72 and 73, full consideration must await the information to be furnished by the Secretariat regarding drafting practices for multilingual instruments. At the same time it is suggested to make article 73 more consistent with article 72 by substituting the word "versions" for the word "texts" wherever appearing in article 73.

13. Jamaica

[PART II]

Transmitted by a letter of 22 September 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

Article 33

Where fraud is subsequently discovered, the defrauded party should take steps to invalidate its consent to the treaty within a stated time after the discovery of the fraud. In other words, a party who has discovered fraud at the hands of the other party and continues for an indefinite time to act upon the relevant clauses of the treaty should thereupon be deemed to have subsequently acquiesced in the fraud and be consequently precluded from invoking such fraud as a reason for the termination of the treaty unless the conditions of termination are agreed upon by both parties.

Article 36

The scope of the article could be extended to include circumstances where the threat or use of force does not necessarily involve any strict violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, but was nonetheless a material factor in bringing about the conclusion of a treaty.

It should be readily recognized that an improper use of force can be so manipulated as to avoid violation of the principles of the Charter. Such improper use of force (or concealed threat) tends to violate the essential elements of consent in much the same way as fraud may be taken to violate such consent with reference to article 33.

 Possibly, when the threat or use of force does not constitute a violation of the principles of the Charter, the treaty could be regarded not as void ab initio but voidable at the instance of the other State concerned.

Article 44

(a) The exceptions under paragraph 3 could possibly be extended to include "fundamental change of circumstances which the parties could reasonably have foreseen and the occurrence of which they impliedly undertook not to regard as affecting the validity of the treaty".

(b) On 14 October 1963, the Jamaican delegation mentioned in the Sixth Committee, inter alia, the desirability of making allowance in this article for fundamental change of circumstances which may sometimes arise out of State succession. This aspect of the matter is sufficiently important to be again mentioned in this memorandum.

Fundamental change of circumstances is not necessarily an inevitable consequence of State succession. There may be, however, instances when a newly independent State finds the terms of a treaty so manifestly unjust or inequitable that that State may be justified in not recognizing such a treaty as one which it should inherit. This situation will perhaps be dealt with by the International Law Commission when it considers succession of States, but it is considered appropriate that article 44 should provide for such a situation notwithstanding the possibility that it may again be dealt with by the Commission under "Succession of States".

General

The Jamaican delegation also raised in the Sixth Committee the advisability of making provision for the individual in the draft articles on the law of treaties.

Whilst the law of treaties is primarily concerned with States relationship, the individual is increasingly being made subject to rights and duties established under treaties and conventions. The Nürnberg Trials, the Genocide Convention and the draft covenants on human rights being considered by the General Assembly are but few examples of the increasing role of the individual in international law (and more precisely in the law of treaties).

The subject, therefore, is considered as deserving "special mention" in any contemporary codification of the law of treaties.

14. Japan

[PART I]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 4 February 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

1. General observations

1. The Government of Japan is of the opinion that the draft articles in their ultimate form should be a "code" rather than a "convention". In its view, much of the law relating to the conclusion of treaties is not very suitable for framing in conventional form, for two reasons. First, the conclusion of treaties always involves procedures on two different planes, internal and international. Although the draft articles profess to be concerned only with the international aspect of treaty making, this will inevitably bring repercussions on the internal aspect of treaty making. If it were decided that the draft articles should form conventional norms from which in principle no derogation is permitted, it would in effect be putting an unduly tight strait jacket on the procedural formalities of treaty making in each State. Second, an attempt to prescribe procedures of treaty making in great detail will entail the undesirable results of not being able to cope with the actual needs of finding mutually acceptable procedures by the contracting parties.

2. This is not to suggest that the code as proposed should be another addition to the already numerous codifying attempts of the past, none of which have been endowed with the authority of an official code. It would seem possible to employ a procedure through which the draft articles could be adopted, after full examination and discussion by all the Governments, as an authoritative recommendation regarding the procedures to be followed in concluding international agreements, but not in the form of a convention in the technical sense. This could be done, for instance, by an insertion in the draft articles of a provision of a general character along the following line:
General provisions

State parties to the present code recognize that the provisions of the present code are generally declaratory of established principles of international law and practice, and declare that they shall endeavour to conform themselves to these provisions as a common standard of conduct.

3. In case the draft articles were to take the form of a “convention”, the Government of Japan would like to see the convention formulated on the basis of the following two principles:

(a) That the provisions of the convention should be as concise as possible, leaving out all the detailed technicalities to the decisions of the parties to each individual international agreement.

(b) That the convention should include a provision of general character, which would enable States to derogate from any of the provisions of the convention by mutual agreement between the parties to each international agreement (see article 2 bis provisions of the convention).

4. The Government of Japan has no strong view on the title given to such code or convention. Nevertheless it is suggested that the term “treaties” in the present title might more appropriately be replaced by the term “international agreements”. Though the former is clearly used here in the generic sense and not in the specific sense, it might still lead to misunderstanding, as the discussions in the Commission in its second and third sessions have revealed. In spite of the proviso in article 1, paragraph 2, it would seem more appropriate to employ a neutral term like “international agreements”.

5. In the view of the Government of Japan, the three parts of the draft articles as envisaged by the Special Rapporteur should ultimately be amalgamated in one. As distinct from the case of the four conventions on the law of the sea, the three parts of the law of treaties are so closely interrelated with one another that it would serve no useful purpose if they form three separate conventions independent of one another.

II. Observations on individual articles

The Government of Japan submits its observations on individual articles as follows. These observations are made, however, with an eventual convention in view, and not a code, for which different considerations would apply.

The draft articles as amended in accordance with these observations are annexed hereto for reference.

Article 1

The definitions given in paragraph 1 should be kept, subject to the following observations:

(a) The enumeration of categories of international agreements by designation in paragraph 1 (a) is not very useful, as it could not hope to be exhaustive in any case.

(b) The term “treaty in simplified form” in paragraph 1 (b), though current in use, seems to be superfluous in the context of the present draft articles.

(c) The term “general multilateral treaty” in paragraph 1 (c) cannot be precisely defined, and will cause a great difficulty in application. It had better be dispensed with.

(d) The distinction between “full powers” and “credentials” as used in article 4 is not very clear. It is suggested to standardize the terminology employing the term “instrument of full powers” in paragraph 1 (e).

(e) It would seem better to replace the word “vary” in paragraph 1 (f) by the word “restrict”, since only such statement as would restrict the legal effect of the provisions of the international agreement will properly fall under the term “reservation”.

Article 3

1. Paragraph 2 should be deleted, since it does not appear to add much to the provisions of paragraph 1. It is even misleading in that it does not refer to the other element of international capacity to conclude international agreements—the requirement of recognition of such constitutional capacity by the other contracting party or parties concerned.

2. The same could be said of paragraph 3, which therefore should also be deleted.

Article 4

1. The requirement of furnishing evidence of authority referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 (a) could no doubt be waived by the other negotiating State or States, whatever the international agreement in question might be. This should be made clear in the article.

2. It would perhaps be too strict, in view of the current practice, if the requirement of subsequent production of the instrument of full powers were to be made absolute, in the contingency envisaged under paragraph 6 (b) and (c).

3. The rule stated in paragraph 6 (a) is no doubt correct, but it is doubtful whether this needs express provisions.

Article 5

The article would not have much utility in practice and is to be deleted in its entirety.

Article 6

The subject dealt with in this article does not appear to be directly relevant, though certainly related, to the procedure of treaty-making. It belongs rather to the problem of conference procedures and had better be left with the decision of the conference or of the States concerned.

Article 7

A general rule on authentication applicable both to bilateral and multilateral agreements is not easy to formulate. The precise legal nature of the acts enumerated in paragraph 1 may not be exactly the same. To illustrate the point, the rule stated in paragraph 3 would prove to be too strict in practice for bilateral agreements, if it excluded the possibility of subsequent modification, not of wording (the matter covered by articles 26 and 27), but of substance. It is not very unusual for the negotiating parties to add minor changes of substance to the text already authenticated. For this reason, the article had better be dispensed with, while the substance of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article may be incorporated into the provisions of articles 10 and 11.

Articles 8 and 9

It is believed best to leave the matter to the decision of the States participating in the conference. The articles should therefore be deleted in their entirety.

Article 10

There are cases where initialling is equivalent to signature (cf. article 21, paragraph 1, of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s first report). It seems desirable to take into account this eventuality (see article 10, paragraph 3 (e) of the Japan draft).

Article 12

1. The principle adopted in paragraph 1 should in our view be stated in the reverse, i.e. that the international agreement does not require ratification unless it expressly provides for the requirement of ratification.

2. The only exception to the principle stated above seems to be the one referred to in paragraph 3 (c), and this can be formulated in a new paragraph.
3. The same rule should be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to approval, which in practice is employed as a simplified procedure of ratification in most cases. For this reason, provisions on approval in article 14 should rather be amalgamated with the provisions in this article, and not with those in article 14.

Article 13
Since articles 8 and 9 are to be deleted, it will be necessary to incorporate provisions of paragraph 2 of article 9.

Article 15
1. Paragraphs 1 (b) and 1 (c) are perhaps too technical and trivial to merit inclusion here.
2. Paragraph 2 is stating the obvious and could be dispensed with.
3. The proper place for paragraph 3 would appear to be section V rather than here.
4. The article in its entirety could therefore be deleted, while the essence of paragraph 1 (a) could be combined with the provisions of article 16.

Article 17
1. This article would seem to impose a great obligation, admittedly of good faith, upon a State which has not decided to become a party to the international agreement. The obligation of the nature stated in this article, if any, should not in principle accrue to the State referred to in paragraph 1. For this reason paragraph 1 should be deleted.
2. The wisdom of having an article of this character may legitimately be doubted, since the whole idea underlying it would appear to be too legalistic in approach. Moreover, the criterion given in this article for refraining from certain kinds of acts is in any case too subjective and difficult of application. A better solution would seem to be to leave the matter entirely to the good faith of the parties.

Articles 18, 19 and 20
1. The Government of Japan takes exception to the rules proposed by the International Law Commission on the question of reservation to multilateral international agreements. In its view, the basic principle governing the question of reservation should rather be the reverse, that a State may make a reservation only if the intention of the parties is not against the reservation in question. There is no inherent right of a State to become a party to an international agreement with whatever reservation it pleases.
2. An international agreement is almost always the result of a compromise among various conflicting interests, arrived at through a series of negotiations. If it were allowed to upset this balance of interests, after the agreement has been established, through the loophole of reservations, then it is feared that the whole system under the agreement in question might fall to the ground. The parties to the agreement are entitled to protect this integrity of the agreement.
3. From the standpoint de lege ferenda, the rule proposed by the Commission is to be rejected in that it would in effect encourage the making of reservations by States parties to the international agreement. Since the reservation is the means through which a derogation from the principles established under the agreement is sought, its abuse should be carefully guarded against.
4. It must also be borne in mind that the rules to be proposed in these articles are residual by nature, and applicable only to those cases where the international agreement in question is silent on this point. The parties are always free to choose whatever rule they like on this question by agreement among themselves.
5. According to the provisions of article 18, paragraph 1 (d), a State may not formulate a reservation which is incompatible with the object and purpose of the agreement, which, in consequence, would seem to be null and void. Nevertheless, article 20, paragraph 2 (b) provides that the application of this test of compatibility with the object and purpose of the agreement is left entirely to individual parties, who are entitled to draw its legal consequences. It would seem more logical to set up a system under which the general intention of the parties is ascertained, be it by a certain majority decision or by unanimity.
6. The opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning reservations to the Genocide Convention is certainly to be respected. But it is submitted that the rule enunciated by the Court is not to be regarded as a sacred rule capable of universal application. The Court itself made it abundantly clear that "the replies which the Court is called upon to give to the questions asked by the General Assembly are necessarily and strictly limited to the [Genocide] Convention," and that the Court was seeking these replies "in the rules of law relating to the effect to be given to the intention of the parties [of the Genocide Convention]."
Thus the rule to be proposed de lege ferenda need not necessarily follow the line taken up by the Court, which after all was trying to find out what the intention of the parties was in this specific case.
7. It is not very seldom that a declaration attached by a State to an international agreement causes in practice a serious difficulty of determining whether it is in the nature of a reservation or of an interpretative declaration (see, for example, the case of an Indian declaration to the IMCO Convention). For this reason, a new paragraph is suggested in an attempt to eliminate this practical difficulty. Under these provisions, mere silence to a declaration not entitled as reservation will not produce the legal effect of a tacit acceptance of it as provided in article 19 (see paragraph 2 of article 18 of the Japan draft).

Article 21
The principle of reciprocity in the operation of a reservation would seem to require that a non-reserving State in its relations with the reserving State should not merely be entitled to claim, but should be definitively entitled to the same modification effected by the reservation. For this reason it is suggested to delete the word "claim" in paragraph 1 (b).

Article 23
The substance of paragraph 2 is acceptable, but the matter can safely be left to the interpretation of the international agreement in question.

Article 24
The technique of provisional entry into force is in fact sometimes resorted to as a practical measure, but the precise legal nature of such provisional entry into force does not seem to be very clear. Unless the question of legal effect of such provisional entry into force can be precisely defined, it would seem best to leave the matter entirely to the intention of the contracting parties. Provisions of article 23, paragraph 1 could perhaps cover this eventuality.

Article 25
The provisions in this article are on the whole acceptable. However, it is not clear from the letter of paragraph 1 whether the obligation to register under this article concerns the category of international agreements referred to in Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, or whether it concerns all the international agreements as defined in these draft articles.

Articles 26 and 27
These two articles will serve a useful purpose in establishing procedures for correction of errors, but they appear to be too detailed for a convention. In the case of a convention, the two articles could better be amalgamated in one article.
Article 29

1. Paragraph 1 is to a great extent redundant with paragraph 1 (g) of article 1. The first sentence should therefore be deleted.

2. Paragraphs 2 to 7 will no doubt provide a useful guide in a code, but it does seem a little out of place as well as proportion to provide for procedural details of a depositary in a general convention on the law of international agreements. The article could be reformulated in a more concise form.

ANNEX. JAPAN DRAFT
Draft articles on the law of international agreements

PART I. CONCLUSION, ENTRY INTO FORCE AND REGISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Section I: General provisions

Article 1

Definitions

1. For the purposes of the present articles, the following expressions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them:

(a) "International agreement" means any agreement in written form, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation, concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law and governed by international law.

(b) "Signature", "Ratification", "Accession", "Acceptance" and "Approval" mean in each case the act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by an international agreement. Signature, however, also means according to the context an act whereby a State authenticates the text of an international agreement without establishing its consent to be bound.

(c) "Instrument of full powers" means a formal instrument of whatever designation issued by the competent authority of a State authorizing a given person to represent the State either for the purpose of carrying out all the acts necessary for concluding an international agreement or for the particular purpose of negotiating or signing an international agreement or of executing an instrument relating to an international agreement.

(d) "Reservation" means a unilateral statement made by a State, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving an international agreement, whereby it purports to exclude or restrict the legal effect of some provisions of the international agreement in its application to that State.

(e) "Depositary" means the State or international organization entrusted with the functions of custodian of the text of the international agreement and of all instruments relating to the international agreement.

2. Nothing contained in the present articles shall affect in any way the characterization or classification of international agreements under the internal law of any State.

Article 2

Scope of the present articles

1. Except to the extent that the particular context may otherwise require, the present articles shall apply to every international agreement as defined in article 1, paragraph 1 (g).

2. The fact that the present articles do not apply to international agreements not in written form shall not be understood as affecting the legal force that such agreements possess under international law.

Article 2 bis

Derogation from the present articles

Notwithstanding the provisions of article 2, paragraph 1, States parties to the present articles may, by mutual agreement, derogate from any of the provisions of the present articles.

Article 3

Capacity to conclude international agreements

Capacity to conclude international agreements under international law is possessed by States and by other subjects of international law.

Section II. Conclusion of international agreements by States

Article 4

Authority to negotiate, draw up, authenticate, sign, ratify, accede to, approve or accept an international agreement

1. For the purpose of negotiating, drawing up or authenticating an international agreement on behalf of a State:

(a) The Head of State, Head of Government and Foreign Minister are not required to furnish any evidence of their authority;

(b) The Head of a diplomatic mission is not required to furnish any evidence of his authority in regard to an international agreement between his State and the State to which he is accredited;

(c) The Head of a permanent mission to an international organization is not required to furnish any evidence of his authority in regard to an international agreement drawn up under the auspices of the organization in question to which he is accredited;

(d) Any other representative of the State shall be required to furnish evidence of his authority by producing an instrument of full powers, unless this requirement is waived by the other negotiating State or States.

2. For the purpose of signing an international agreement on behalf of a State, except where the proposed international agreement expressly provides otherwise:

(a) The Head of State, Head of Government and Foreign Minister are not required to furnish any evidence of their authority;

(b) Any other representative of the State shall be required to furnish evidence of his authority by producing an instrument of full powers, unless this requirement is waived by the other negotiating State or States.

3. In the event of an instrument of ratification, accession, approval or acceptance being signed by a representative of a State other than the Head of State, Head of Government or Foreign Minister, that representative shall be required to furnish evidence of his authority by producing an instrument of full powers.

4. In case of urgency, a letter or telegram evidencing the grant of full powers sent by the competent authority of the State concerned shall be accepted, provided that the instrument of full powers shall be produced in due course unless this requirement is waived by the other negotiating State or States.

Article 5. [Delete]

Article 6. [Delete]

Article 7. [Delete]

Article 8. [Delete]

Article 9. [Delete]

Article 10

Signature and initialling of the international agreement

1. Where the international agreement has not been signed at the conclusion of the negotiations or of the conference at which the text was adopted, the States participating in the adoption of the text may provide either in the international agreement itself or in a separate agreement:

(a) That signature shall take place on a subsequent occasion; or

(b) That the international agreement shall remain open for signature at a specified place either indefinitely or until a certain date.
2. (a) The international agreement may be signed unconditionally; or it may be signed *ad referendum* to the competent authorities of the State concerned, in which case the signature is subject to confirmation.

(b) Signature *ad referendum*, if and so long as it has not been confirmed, shall operate only as an act authenticating the text of the international agreement.

(c) Signature *ad referendum*, when confirmed, shall have the same effect as if it had been a full signature made on the date when, and at the place where, the signature *ad referendum* was affixed to the international agreement.

3. (a) The international agreement, before being signed, may be initialled, in which event the initialling shall operate only as an authentication of the text. A further separate act of signature is required to constitute the State concerned a signatory of the international agreement.

(b) When initialling is followed by the subsequent signature of the international agreement, the date of the signature, not that of the initialling, shall be the date upon which the State concerned shall become a signatory of the international agreement.

(c) Notwithstanding sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, initialling may be equivalent to signature provided that the intention is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

**Article 11**

*Legal effects of a signature*

1. Where an international agreement is subject to ratification, approval or acceptance, signature does not establish the consent of the signatory State to be bound by the international agreement.

   However, the signature shall:

   (a) Operate as an authentication of the text, if the text has not been previously authenticated in another form; and

   (b) Qualify the signatory State to proceed to the ratification, approval or acceptance of the international agreement in conformity with its provisions.

2. Where the international agreement is not subject to ratification, approval or acceptance, signature shall establish the consent of the signatory State to be bound by the international agreement.

**Article 12**

*Ratification or approval*

1. An international agreement requires ratification or approval when the international agreement expressly prescribes that it shall be subject to ratification or approval, respectively, by the signatory States.

2. In addition to paragraph 1 above, ratification or approval is necessary in cases where the representative of the States in question has expressly signed "subject to ratification" or "subject to approval" respectively.

**Article 13**

*Accession*

A State may become a party to a multilateral international agreement by accession when it has not signed the international agreement and:

(a) The international agreement specifies accession as the procedure to be used by such a State for becoming a party; or

(b) The international agreement has become open to accession by the State in question through agreement of the States concerned.

**Article 14**

*Acceptance*

A State may become a party to an international agreement by acceptance when:

(a) The international agreement provides that it shall be open to signature subject to acceptance and the State in question has so signed the international agreement; or

(b) The international agreement provides that it shall be open to participation by simple acceptance without prior signature.

Article 15. [Delete]

**Article 16**

*Legal effects of ratification, accession, acceptance and approval*

Ratification, accession, acceptance or approval, which must be carried out by means of communication of a written instrument, establishes the consent of the ratifying, acceding, accepting or approving State to be bound by the international agreement.

**Article 17. [Delete]**

Section III. Reservations

**Article 18**

*Formulation of reservations*

1. A State may formulate a reservation to an international agreement, only if:

   (a) The making of reservations is authorized by the terms of the international agreement or by the established rules of an international organization; or

   (b) The international agreement expressly authorizes the making of reservations to specified provisions of the international agreement and the reservation in question relates to one of the said provisions; or

   (c) The international agreement expressly prohibits the making of a specified category of reservations, in which case the formulation of reservations falling outside the prohibited category is by implication authorized; or

   (d) In the case where the international agreement is silent concerning the making of reservations, the reservation is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the international agreement.

2. A reservation, in order to qualify as such under the provisions of the present articles, must be formulated in writing, and expressly stated as reservation.

3. A reservation may be formulated:

   (a) Upon the occasion of the adoption of the text of the international agreement, provided that it must be confirmed at the time of signature, ratification, accession, acceptance or approval of the international agreement; or

   (b) Upon signing the international agreement at a subsequent date; or

   (c) Upon the occasion of the exchange or deposit of instrument of ratification, accession, acceptance or approval.

Articles 19-20

*The effect of reservations formulated*

1. The effect of a reservation formulated in accordance with the provisions of article 18 shall be conditional upon its acceptance, express or tacit, by all States parties to the international agreement or to which the international agreement is open to become parties, unless:

   (a) The international agreement otherwise provides; or

   (b) The States are members of an international organization which applies a different rule to international agreements concluded under its auspices.

2. A reservation shall be regarded as having been tacitly accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation during a period of twelve months after it received formal notice of the reservation.
3. An objection by a State which has not yet established its own consent to be bound by the international agreement shall have no effect if after the expiry of two years from the date when it gave formal notice of its objection it has still not established its consent to be bound by the international agreement.

Article 21

The application of reservations

1. A reservation established in accordance with the provisions of Article 19-20 operates:
   (a) To modify for the reserving State the provisions of the international agreement to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and
   (b) Reciprocally to entitle any other State party to the international agreement to the same modification of the provisions of the international agreement in its relations with the reserving State.

2. A reservation operates only in the relations between the other parties to the international agreement which have accepted the reservation and the reserving State; it does not affect in any way the rights or obligations of the other parties to the international agreement inter se.

Article 22

The withdrawal of reservations

1. A reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for its withdrawal. Such withdrawal takes effect when notice of it has been received by the other States concerned.

2. Upon withdrawal of a reservation the provisions of Article 21 cease to apply.

Section IV. Entry into force and registration

Article 23

Entry into force of international agreements

1. An international agreement enters into force in such manner and on such date as the international agreement itself may prescribe.

2. If an international agreement does not specify the date of its entry into force:
   (a) In the case of a bilateral international agreement not subject to ratification, approval or acceptance, it enters into force on the date of its signature or, when the international agreement is embodied in two or more related instruments, on the date of signature of the last instrument; and
   (b) In other cases, it enters into force on the date to be determined by agreement between the States concerned.

3. The rights and obligations contained in an international agreement become effective for each party as from the date when the international agreement enters into force with respect to that party, unless the international agreement expressly provides otherwise.

Article 24. [Delete]

Article 25

The registration and publication of international agreements

1. The registration and publication of international agreements entered into by Members of the United Nations shall be governed by the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The procedure for the registration and publication of international agreements shall be governed by the regulations in force and established practices for the application of Article 102 of the Charter.

3. International agreements entered into by any party to the present articles, not a Member of the United Nations, shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations and published by it.

Articles 26-27

Correction of errors in the text of international agreements

1. Where an error is discovered in the text of an international agreement for which there is no depositary after the text has been authenticated, the interested States shall by mutual agreement correct the error in either of the following ways, unless another procedure has been agreed upon:
   (a) By having the appropriate correction made in the text of the international agreement and causing the correction to be initialled in the margin by representatives duly authorized for that purpose; or
   (b) By executing a separate protocol, a proces-verbal, an exchange of notes or similar instrument, setting out the error in the text of the international agreement and the corrections which the parties have agreed to make.

2. Where an error is discovered in the text of an international agreement for which there is a depositary, after the text has been authenticated:
   (a) The depositary shall bring the error to the attention of all the States which participated in the adoption of the text and to the attention of any other States which may subsequently have signed or accepted the international agreement, and shall inform them that it is proposed to correct the error if within a specified time-limit no objection shall have been raised to the making of the correction; and
   (b) If on the expiry of the specified time-limit no objection has been raised to the correction of the text, the depositary shall make the correction in the text of the treaty, initialling the correction in the margin, and shall draw up and execute a proces-verbal of the ratification of the text and transmit a copy of the proces-verbal to each of the States which are or may become parties to the international agreement.

3. Whenever the text of an international agreement has been corrected under paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the corrected text shall replace the original text as from the date on which the latter was adopted, unless the parties shall otherwise determine.

4. Notice of any correction to the text of an international agreement made under the provisions of this article shall be communicated to the Secretariat of the United Nations if that international agreement has been registered therewith under article 25.

Article 28

The depositary of multilateral international agreements

1. Where a multilateral international agreement fails to designate a depositary of the international agreement, and unless the States which adopted it shall have otherwise determined, the depositary shall be:
   (a) In the case of an international agreement drawn up within an international organization or at an international conference convened by an international organization, the competent organ of that international organization;
   (b) In the case of an international agreement drawn up at a conference convened by the States concerned, the State on whose territory the conference is convened.

2. In the event of a depositary declining, failing or ceasing to take up its functions, the negotiating States shall consult together concerning the nomination of another depositary.

Article 29

The functions of a depositary

1. A depositary of an international agreement shall act impartially in the performance of his functions as custodian of the original
text of the international agreement and of all instruments relating thereto.

2. In addition to any functions expressly provided for in the international agreement and unless the international agreement otherwise provides, a depositary shall have the duty:

(a) To prepare certified copies of the original text or texts and transmit such copies to all States parties to the international agreement or to which the international agreement is open to become parties;

(b) To furnish to the State concerned an acknowledgement in writing of the receipt of any instrument or notification relating to the international agreement and promptly to inform the other States, mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, of the receipt of such instrument or notification, or when appropriate, of the fulfillment of the conditions laid down in the international agreement for its entry into force;

(c) On a reservation having been formulated, to communicate the text of such reservation and any notification of its acceptance or objection to the interested States as prescribed in articles 18 and 19-20;

(d) On receiving a request from a State desiring to accede to the international agreement, to communicate the request to the States whose consent to such participation is specified in article 13 as being material; and

(e) On an error having been discovered in the text of the international agreement, to inform all States concerned of such error, and the objection, if any, to the correction of such error, raised by any of them and, on proceeding with the correction thereof under the provisions of article 26-27, draw up and execute a procès-verbal of such correction and furnish them a copy thereof.

3. The depositary shall have the duty of examining whether a signature, an instrument, a notification, a reservation, or an objection to a reservation is in due form under the provisions of the international agreement in question or of the present articles, and, if need be, to communicate on the point with the States concerned. In the event of any difference arising between a State and the depositary as to the performance of these functions, the depositary shall, upon the request of the States concerned or on its own initiative, bring the question to the attention of the other interested States or of the competent organ of the organization concerned.

15. LUXEMBOURG

[PART I]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 14 December 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: French]

Part I: Conclusion, entry into force and registration of treaties (articles 1-29)

Before dealing in detail with the twenty-nine articles which make up the first series of provisions drawn up by the International Law Commission on the law of treaties, the Luxembourg Government would like to stress the importance it attaches to this part of the Commission’s work and to express its very deep appreciation of the value of the draft articles.

The Luxembourg Government hopes that the Commission’s work will soon result in the conclusion of a world-wide convention on this fundamental subject. It is with that object that the Luxembourg Government takes the liberty of submitting herewith a number of critical comments and proposals. Those articles or parts of articles on which no observations have been made are fully approved by the Luxembourg Government.

Article 1

The expression “treaty”. Paragraph 1(a) of this article assigns the following meaning to the expression “treaty”: “Treaty means any international agreement in written form...concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law and governed by international law.” It is obviously difficult to define a notion so fundamental as that of an international treaty: indeed, a point has been reached beyond which ideas can no longer be defined in strictly juridical terms. The question therefore arises whether it is advisable to give a legal definition of the terms “treaty” or whether it might not be better simply to state the idea and leave it to doctrine to define it.

The essence of the paragraph quoted lies in defining a treaty as “any international agreement”. But the term “agreement” is nothing else than a synonym of “treaty”. If the International Law Commission wished to maintain a provision of this nature, it appears to the Luxembourg Government that a valid definition of the idea of a treaty should concentrate on three elements:

(a) the consensual nature of a treaty, which represents an agreement between two or more parties;

(b) the nature of the parties, who are either States or other subjects of international law;

(c) the binding effect sought by the parties, in the sense that the treaty (unlike a mere declaration of common purpose, of a political nature) has always as its purpose a legal commitment entered into by the parties.

On the other hand, there might be some question whether it is correct to include in the actual definition of the treaty two elements stated in the International Law Commission’s text, namely, the written form and the reference to international law.

According to the draft text (which should be clear in itself, without reference to the commentary), the question may well arise whether the written form should be regarded as a matter of substance, that is, whether it ought to be a factor in determining the validity of treaties or whether it is simply a way of saying that the future convention shall apply only to treaties in written form. If the second interpretation is the correct one, it would be preferable to eliminate that element from the definition and to add at the end of the article a provision stating that: “The rules laid down by these articles relate only to international treaties in written form”.

Further, the question arises whether it is really necessary to say that the draft articles refer exclusively to treaties “governed by international law”. That qualification seems to be implied by the very nature of the contracting parties; hence, the rules of international law could only be made inapplicable as an exception by inserting a specific reference to another system of juridical rules or possibly by virtue of the very special subject of a particular agreement. That is such an exceptional case that it would be better not to complicate the general definition of a treaty by a reference to that unlikely assumption.

In the opinion of the Luxembourg Government, if the term “treaty” is to be defined, the definition might read somewhat as follows:

“The expression, ‘treaty’ means any agreement between two or more States or other subjects of international law designed to create a mutual obligation for the parties, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation etc.”

“Treaties in simplified form”. The term “treaty in simplified form”, as stated in paragraph (11) of the commentary, could be defined by the form, or rather the absence of form of the treaty. Actually, the indications under sub-paragraph (b) of article 1, paragraph 1, do not constitute a definition, but are merely an enumeration of the various formal procedures characteristic of this category of agreements.

The term described in this sub-paragraph recurs twice in the articles which follow: in article 4, paragraph 4(b) which states that treaties in simplified form may be signed without requiring the representatives of the parties to produce instruments of full powers; and in article 12, paragraph 2(d), which states that such
treaties shall be presumed not to be subject to ratification. Juridically, a treaty in simplified form is therefore characterized by the absence of full powers and the waiving of ratification. The use of certain procedures, such as those indicated in article 1(f), appears to betoken a determination to waive such formalities. That being the case, the real definition of “treaty in simplified form” would be something like the following: “A treaty concluded in circumstances which indicate as regards the parties the willingness to enter into a commitment without observing the formalities of full powers and ratification”.

The foregoing shows that the term “treaty in simplified form” does not describe a category of agreements which is sufficiently precise to constitute a normative idea; in reality, it is a purely descriptive term, certainly interesting from the point of view of juridical doctrine, but only with difficulty usable in framing a legal definition. For the purposes of these draft articles, it should be sufficient to indicate at the appropriate places in what circumstances the parties should be regarded as having renounced the production of full powers and ratification.

Consequently, the Luxembourg Government proposes the deletion of this part of the definitions.

“General multilateral treaty”. Paragraph 1(c) defines the term “general multilateral treaty” to mean a multilateral treaty which concerns general norms of international law or deals with matters of general interest to States as a whole. Subsequently, this term is used in only one other place in the draft articles, namely in paragraph 1 of article 8, which states that “every State” may become a party to such a treaty. The Luxembourg Government reserves its right to express its views on the substance of this question in its commentary on article 8. For the time being, confining itself to the matter of definitions, it would like to make the following comments.

(a) This specific term is introduced without the text having previously defined the term “multilateral treaty” in general.

(b) In the opinion of the Luxembourg Government, “of general interest to States as a whole” is much too vague a criterion to form the substance of a workable definition. Since the use of the term defined in this sub-paragraph will actually govern the question of the participation of States in multilateral treaties, the application of such a debatable criterion might give rise to insoluble conflicts concerning the general nature of the norms established by a multilateral treaty, or whether they are of interest to States as a whole.

For the reasons given, the Luxembourg Government considers that this sub-paragraph should be deleted from the article on definitions.

The term “approval”. “Approval” is one of the many terms enumerated in paragraph 1(f). As it is commonly understood, the term means the internal formalities to which an international treaty is subject and, more particularly, parliamentary approval of treaties. It is only as a result of an unfortunate confusion of terms that “approval” has come to be used in international affairs as the equivalent of the term “ratification”; the converse is also true, moreover, since the term “ratification” is also frequently used in municipal law to mean parliamentary approval.

The Luxembourg Government invites the Commission to consider whether it should not take advantage of this opportunity to perfect the terminology once and for all; in these draft articles, which are concerned solely with the external and international aspect of the problem, references to the term “approval” of international treaties should be systematically eliminated and only the terms “ratification” and “accession” should be maintained.

Article 4

This article seeks to define the powers of the different organs of the State—Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Heads of Missions—with regard to the different operations leading to the conclusion of international treaties. According to their position in the national and international hierarchy, these officials can, to a greater or lesser degree, act quasibly quas, i.e., without being required to furnish the other party or parties with evidence of their authority to perform the various acts designed to bring international treaties into being and into force. This conception, which is based on the idea that trust should prevail in international relations, must be fully approved.

Since the norms defined in this article do not, however, necessarily coincide with the powers granted by the municipal law of various States—in fact, they attribute to Heads of Governments, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Mission wider powers than those which they possess by virtue of the internal laws and usages of certain countries—it would be advisable to make it quite clear that article 4 concerns only mutual relations between States, and is not intended to modify the powers accorded to external organs by municipal law. A clarification of this type would be extremely useful, and even indispensable, for States, such as Luxembourg, which accept the principle that international treaties become an integral part of municipal law.

In practice, it would be a question of completing this article by a final sub-paragraph, worded as follows: “The provisions of this article do not have the effect of modifying national constitutions, laws and usages as regards the powers of organs of the State in foreign relations.”

Moreover, paragraph 4(b) of this article provides that in the case of “Treaties in simplified form”, it shall not be necessary for a representative to produce an instrument of full powers, unless called for by the other party. This provision opens the door to great uncertainty, for it would be practically impossible to distinguish between treaties which are invalid owing to lack of full powers and treaties which are valid as a result of the utilization of the “simplified form”.

In reality, in the text as drafted it is a question of establishing the cases in which a treaty can be validly negotiated, drawn up, authenticated and signed without it being necessary for the person executing these formalities to possess an instrument of full powers executed in good and due form. Observation of practice shows that the so-called “treaties in simplified form” are most frequently concluded either within the established diplomatic relations between two countries (this is the case of “exchanges of diplomatic notes”), or within an existing international organization (this is the case of the “agreed minute” mentioned in article 1, paragraph 1(b). If full powers are dispensed with in such cases, it is because the negotiation and signing of the agreement take place on the basis of an established and well-tested relationship of trust. It is for this reason that in such cases it is not necessary to call for full powers.

This being so, it would seem dangerous to adopt provisions which would have the effect of encouraging the practice of treaties in simplified form beyond the limits so defined. The Government of Luxembourg therefore proposes that sub-paragraph 4(b) should be deleted.

In fact, it believes that the problem is already solved by paragraph 2, except that in this provision the idea of a “Head of a permanent mission to an international organization” would have to be replaced by the more general idea of “representative”. Indeed, it sometimes happens that a country is represented in an international organization by a member of its Government or by other persons designated ad hoc as representatives.

Article 5

The International Law Commission rightly notes that the contents of this article are more descriptive than normative. It is indeed difficult to formulate precise juridical rules for the first phase when drawing up treaties: this is governed by simple usages, but from the juridical point of view it is subject to the principle of liberty.

At the most, the period of negotiation could only give rise to juridical problems involving the responsibility which participating
States might incur as a result of their actions during the negotiations. The Government of Luxembourg feels that article 5 in its present form should be deleted.

**Article 6**

This provision is of capital importance to the structure of the whole. The article prepared by the International Law Commission is based on the following system:

(a) The text of treaties drawn up by an international conference convened by the participating States themselves or by an international organization is adopted by a two-thirds majority;

(b) The text of treaties drawn up within an international organization is adopted by the voting rules applicable in that organization;

(c) The text of other treaties is decided upon by the mutual agreement of the States participating in the negotiations. In the commentary it is specified that these "other cases" include bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties concluded between a small group of States otherwise than at an international conference.

This systematization elicits an initial comment. It is difficult to conceive how a multilateral treaty, even between a small group of States, could be concluded otherwise than at an international conference. Any negotiations designed to result in the signing of a multilateral treaty assume, by the force of circumstances, the character of a meeting of representatives of several Governments, which is itself the definition of an international conference, even if such a conference is constituted and operates in an informal manner. Thus, a great number of multilateral treaties which, although the number of parties is more or less limited, play a role of the greatest importance in the European and Atlantic regions, have been drawn up in international conferences. Such is the case of the Conventions which established Benelux, the European Communities, the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, the Atlantic Alliance, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the European Free Trade Association, the Treaty of Brussels and the Treaty establishing the Western European Union, etc. This shows that sub-paragraph (c) of article 6 in reality concerns only the case of bilateral treaties, whereas the general rule regarding multilateral treaties is the clause of sub-paragraph (a) which subjects "international conferences" to the principle of the two-thirds majority.

This rule appears to be based on the general practice at conferences convened under the auspices of the United Nations. It must be recognized that this rule is totally unsuited to the conditions prevailing at conferences of a regional character, where it is inconceivable for negotiations to be undertaken otherwise than on the basis of mutual agreement, that is, unanimity.

The Government of Luxembourg believes that the only principle which is truly consistent with the consensual character of treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, is the principle of mutual agreement. It must be recognized that as soon as this principle is abandoned, the transition is made from the contractual plane to the institutional plane. For this reason, the Government of Luxembourg believes that a derogation from the principle of unanimity between the contracting parties is conceivable only when a multilateral treaty is drawn up within the framework or under the auspices of an international organization. It recognizes, moreover, that there is a growing tendency for the negotiation of international conventions to take place within an organized structure and consequently in accordance with the voting rules applicable in the various organizations. For this reason it believes that article 6 could without disadvantage be composed as follows:

(a) At the beginning, it would be necessary to affirm as a general principle that the adoption of the text of treaties takes place by mutual agreement of the States participating in the negotiations.

(b) On the other hand, when a treaty is drawn up within or under the auspices of an international organization, establishment of the text would be governed by the voting rules applicable in the organization. Even this position cannot be affirmed without reservations, for it is known that there are examples of international institutions which make decisions according to the majority principle whose constitutions explicitly refer certain questions to subsequent agreements, precisely in order to guarantee the application of the principle of unanimous agreement. (Sec, as an example, articles 220, 236 and 237 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.)

(c) Finally, at international conferences the voting rules unanimously adopted by those conferences would be applicable.

The Government of Luxembourg therefore has the honour to submit the following draft to the International Law Commission:

1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the unanimous agreement of the States participating in the negotiations.

2. In the case of a treaty drawn up at an international conference, the adoption of the text takes place according to the voting rule established by the rules of procedure of that conference.

3. In the case of a treaty drawn up within an international organization, the adoption of the text takes place according to the voting rule applicable in the competent organ of the organization, except in the case of a derogation resulting from the constitution of the latter.

**Article 8**

This article distinguishes between "general multilateral treaties", that is, generally, open to "every State", and other treaties that are only open to States which took part in the adoption of its text, States to which accession to the treaty was made open by its terms, or States which were invited to attend the conference at which the treaty was drawn up.

It will be recalled that the "general multilateral treaty" is defined in article 1 as being a treaty which establishes "general norms of international law" or "deals with matters of general interest to States as a whole". In its commentary on article 1, the Government of Luxembourg has already explained why it does not think that this definition can be used, in view of the uncertainties that are inherent in the notions it employs.

With regard to the provisions of article 8 itself, the Government of Luxembourg considers that the parties to any multilateral convention have the sovereign right to decide on the participation of States which were not among the original parties. It is not possible to find an a priori solution to this question, since the solution depends very much on the purpose of each individual treaty and on the political and juridical aims of the original parties. The Government of Luxembourg therefore considers that paragraph 1 of this article should be deleted, since the three hypotheses contained in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 give a complete and satisfactory ruling on the matter.

**Article 9**

This article is based on the following distinction: Multilateral treaties may be opened to the participation of other States:

in the case of most multilateral treaties, either by a two-thirds majority decision by participating States—or, as the case may be, by a decision of the competent organ of an international organization;

in the case of multilateral treaties "concluded between a small group of States", by mutual agreement of all the parties.

We first wish to draw attention to the debatable nature of the notion of "a small group of States" to which is subordinated the distinction, a very important one in view of its consequences, between treaties that may be made open by a majority decision and treaties that may be made open by a unanimous decision. But whenever a multilateral treaty is not simply opened to any State whatsoever it could be claimed that one is dealing with a "small group of States".
In accordance with the views just expressed regarding article 6, relating to the adoption of the text of a treaty, the Government of Luxembourg considers the procedure suggested in article 9, paragraph 1, to be inadmissible. Such a procedure would enable third States to accede in spite of the objections that might be raised by a minority of the parties. It would also make it possible to introduce subsequent alterations to the instruments of accession of multilateral treaties. In reality, the opening of a multilateral treaty to the participation of States other than those to which it was originally open is equivalent to altering the accession clauses of a multilateral treaty or to introducing such clauses into a treaty where they did not exist. Such a provision should therefore in principle be subject to the same requirements as the revision of the treaty.

The Government of Luxembourg therefore proposes replacing article 9 with a clause which could be combined with paragraph 2 of article 8 to form a new article, stating simply that:

“A multilateral treaty may be opened to the participation of States other than those to which it was originally open, subject to the provisions regarding revision of the treaty.”

Having established this principle, the question arises as to whether it might not be appropriate to introduce to that effect a simplified procedure which would obviate the need for another international conference. The provisions of article 9, paragraph 3, could, mutatis mutandis, provide the model for such a solution: When the depositary of a treaty receives a request for admission from a third State, he shall consult the original parties in order to discover whether the provisions regarding revision of the treaty are being complied with. Provision could also be made that, at the expiry of a specified time-limit, consent of a party shall be presumed if it has not notified the depositary of its objection.

The Government of Luxembourg considers that this solution, while respecting the consensual nature of international treaties, would provide enough flexibility to allow multilateral conventions to be opened to the accession of other States, without undue inconvenience, subject to the agreement of all the original parties.

Article 10

This article gives rise to two questions which are intended to clear up certain doubtful points.

In paragraph 1, the meaning of the words “in the treaty itself or in a separate agreement” does not seem very clear. International treaties are often set out in a number of documents, including “annex protocols” and “signature protocols”. But the treaty in the legal sense of the word is represented by all these documents put together. The words quoted therefore seem superfluous in this context.

Further, in the text of this article the distinction is not drawn very clearly between a signature “ad referendum” and a signature “subject to ratification”. It seems certain that a signature ad referendum followed by a confirmation only has the effect of a signature within the meaning of article 11, and that such a signature, even if confirmed, can still be subject to ratification, should the occasion arise. In order to avoid any misunderstandings in this matter, it would seem advisable to delete the word “full” in paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c), as this wording could give the impression that, once a State had confirmed a signature ad referendum, it would be fully committed to the terms of the treaty. This does not, however, seem to be the scope of the confirmation: it simply has the effect of transforming the signature ad referendum into a signature pure and simple, which, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, will have one of the effects defined in article 11.

Article 11

The Government of Luxembourg would like to make a remark regarding the terminology employed in connexion with this article. As was pointed out with regard to article 1, the use of the word “approval” should be forbidden in any instrument referring exclusively to the international operation of treaties.

Article 12

In accordance with the lengthy explanation given earlier, the Government of Luxembourg proposes deleting paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (d) relating to treaties “in simplified form”. The assumption contained in this sub-paragraph is already implicit in sub-paragraph (e), referring to the intention to dispense with ratification resulting from “other circumstances evidencing such an intention”. Now the form in which an agreement is concluded is one such circumstance.

The deletion of sub-paragraph (d) would have the added advantage of making it possible to delete the whole of paragraph 3 which, in any case, is merely a repetition of the provisions of paragraph 2. Once the assumption contained in paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (d) is eliminated, paragraph 3 will no longer refer to treaties which themselves expressly provide that they shall come into force upon signature (paragraph 2(e)). Now it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the hypothetical cases mentioned in paragraph 3 can arise when a treaty expressly provides that it shall come into force upon signature. The cases referred to in this connexion in paragraph (8) of the commentary are not sufficiently representative to warrant inserting an actual provision in the draft articles.

The question raised in the same paragraph of the commentary regarding treaties that come into force provisionally is another matter. In such cases, application will be subject to the treaty subsequently coming into force and will still be made only within the limits of the powers normally held by the Governments of the contracting parties.

Article 14 et seq.

In this article—and the same holds true for articles 15, 16 and 17—the International Law Commission attempted to clear up an unfortunate confusion in terminology resulting from replacing the ideas of ratification and accession by those of “acceptance” and “approval”, respectively. As stated in paragraph (2) of the Commission’s commentary, this terminology seems to be due to considerations connected with the internal constitutional structure of certain States; from the international point of view, it creates confusion.

The Luxembourg Government, for its part, proposes that the expressions “acceptance” and “approval” in articles 14, 15, 16 and 17 should be eliminated entirely. Regarding the idea of approval, it has already been said that it is an expression peculiar to the internal juridical structures which should be completely banished from international practice. On the other hand, account could be taken of terminology using the idea of “acceptance” by means of an additional article, inserted after article 17, saying that the provisions concerning ratification and accession shall be applicable to “acceptance”, according to whether acceptance follows prior signature or not. That article could be worded as follows:

“The provisions of the foregoing articles concerning ratification shall be applicable to treaties signed subject to acceptance; the provisions concerning accession shall be applicable to treaties containing the provision that they shall be open to participation by simple acceptance, without prior signature.”

Article 15

This article calls first of all for two comments concerning terminology. In paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c), it would be preferable to say “two alternative texts” rather than “two differing texts”. In paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), the word “certified” (French text only) refers to the exchange of instruments, and therefore should be in the singular.

The Luxembourg Government also considered the relationship between the provisions of article 15, paragraph 2, and the provisions of article 23, respecting the entry into force of treaties. Not only does article 15 define the procedures applicable to ratification, accession or acceptance, it also determines the time at which the instruments shall enter into force. Article 23, in its turn, determines
the entry into force of treaties, which it is difficult to dissociate from the effect of the instruments mentioned in article 15.

It would seem necessary to distinguish here between two things: firstly, the time at which the mutual undertaking between the parties begins (from that time on, the parties can no longer withdraw unilaterally); secondly, the time at which the treaty enters into force—that is, becomes effective. When a treaty makes no provision in this respect, those two effects (the mutual undertaking and the entry into force) take place at the same time. On the other hand, some treaties provide that the entry into force shall take place later than the mutual engagement.

This analysis reveals that we must distinguish between the procedure for bringing about ratification, accession or acceptance (the subject of article 15) and the question of the time at which the treaty will enter into effect (the subject of article 23). As for such effect, we must distinguish, in accordance with the foregoing, between the time of the commitment of the parties (which takes place at the time agreement is documented by the exchange or deposit of the formal documents) and the time of the entry into force of the treaty (which may take place later).

In view of these distinctions, the Luxembourg Government considers that articles 15 and 23 should be redrafted.

New provision

The Luxembourg Government now proposes the insertion of a new provision stating that, owing to the effect of the entry into force of a treaty, the parties shall be obliged to take all appropriate measures to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty, especially by ensuring its publication and by taking the necessary measures for it to be carried out. Such a provision would remind States that the first obligation they incur in becoming bound by an international treaty is to take the measures necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty in their national territories. Sometimes clauses of this type appear in some treaties (for example, one could cite article 86 of the Treaty to establish the European Coal and Steel Community and article 5 of the Treaty to establish the European Economic Community), but the same obligation is implicit in any international treaty.

The provision proposed above could be drafted as follows:

"By the entry into force of the treaty, the parties thereto shall be bound to take all measures, both general and particular, and above all measures of publicity, that are necessary to secure the application in full of the treaty in their territories."

Article 25

The Luxembourg Government fully approves the provisions of this article, but queries whether paragraph 2, as drafted, is not, in fact, an amendment to the United Nations Charter. In order to overcome this difficulty, it would be sufficient to redraft the paragraph as follows:

"States which are parties to the present article and are not Members of the United Nations shall undertake to register with the Secretariat of that Organization the treaties which they have concluded."

PART II

Transmitted by a note verbale of 23 December 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: French]

The Luxembourg Government approves the solution adopted by the International Law Commission with respect to failure to observe a provision of the internal law of a State regarding competence to enter into treaties. The rule drafted by the Commission, however, leaves another question open, viz, failure on the part of the representatives of a State to comply with other rules of internal law (more specifically of constitutional law), beside the provisions regarding competence to enter into treaties.

The following might be quoted as examples: a treaty of alliance concluded by a State that is constitutionally neutral; a military treaty concluded by a constitutionally demilitarized State; a treaty modifying the structure and competence of internal authorities as a result of the transfer of sovereign powers to an international organization (this difficulty led to discussions in various European countries at the time when the treaties setting up the European communities came into force); a treaty containing clauses contrary to the guarantees of fundamental freedoms granted under the constitution, etc. There is no need to point out that to subordinate the validity of international treaties to the observance of such rules, even if included in the constitution of a State, might lead to great uncertainty in international relations. A treaty must be presumed valid once it has been concluded by the organs competent to represent a State internationally; the violation of constitutional provisions—except those relating to the competence to enter into treaties, in the exceptional case referred to in this article—should not therefore be adduced as justification for questioning the validity of a treaty duly entered into.

It would perhaps be advisable for the International Law Commission in its commentary to deal more fully with the question we have just mentioned.

Article 37

The clause proposed by the International Law Commission is likely to create a great deal of legal uncertainty.

From a formal point of view one should ask first of all what "peremptory norms of general international law" mean here. Does it mean international usage, certain general principles of law, or can it also mean peremptory norms defined by international treaties? If the latter assumption is correct—and such would indeed appear to be the case from the commentary to the article—we should then ask, starting from what general level could an international treaty be regarded as validly establishing a peremptory norm which would be binding on other treaties. Moreover, the proposed clause would have the effect of introducing the whole question of the conflict of rules resulting from successive international treaties, whenever the source of a norm regarded as peremptory was an international treaty concluded previous to the treaty in dispute. By combining with this article the rule pacta sunt servanda (which is undoubtedly a peremptory norm), any international treaty incompatible with a previous treaty could be claimed to be null and void, except where the authors of the later treaty unquestionably have the power to abrogate the first treaty.

The uncertainty would be no less great from the substantive point of view. Indeed, as the Commission itself has pointed out, there is no authority in international law that is competent to define which norms are peremptory in relations between States and which are not. Precisely because of the contractual nature of all international treaties, it may even be claimed that all rules formulated by treaty are peremptory since each one represents an undertaking of a State towards other States. Indeed, a law which has its origin in a contract, owing to the mutual undertaking which it implies, is always more coercive than the law which is simply the law of a country, certain provisions of which allow wider freedom to the subjects to whom they relate.

It appears to the Luxembourg Government that the International Law Commission wished to introduce here a cause of nullity similar to the criteria of morality and "public policy" which in internal law are used to assess the compatibility of private contracts with certain fundamental conceptions of the social order. It is questionable whether such conceptions are suitable for transfer to international life, which is characterized by the lack of any authority, political or judicial, capable of imposing on all States certain standards of international justice and morality. Consequently, the proposed clause, far from serving its purpose, is likely only to have the effect of creating uncertainty and confusion. Much to its regret, the Luxembourg Government concludes that
in the present state of international relations it is not possible to define in juridical terms the substance of peremptory international law.

Lastly, the question arises who would be qualified to claim the nullity contemplated by this article: could such nullity be claimed only by the States parties to the treaty held to be incompatible with a peremptory norm? In that case the application of the provision would imply a contradictory attitude of the party claiming nullity, since that party itself would have contributed to the preparation and entry into force of the treaty disputed by it; it would be a kind of *venire contra factum proprium*. On the other hand, if it was assumed that third parties could claim the nullity of a treaty which they regarded as incompatible with a peremptory rule, this would be inconsistent with the principle of relativity, which, in the absence of any supra-national authority, continues to dominate the entire subject of international treaties.

**Article 39**

The Luxembourg Government proposes that the part of the text concerning "statements of the parties" should be clarified by the insertion of the word "concordant". This addition would prevent a party from invoking its own unilateral statements in order to secure the right to denounce a treaty or withdraw from it.

**Article 40**

The situation contemplated by the International Law Commission as justification for the provisions of paragraph 2 is not sufficient reason for the introduction of such a complicated rule. If it was really desired to safeguard against the—in fact highly improbable—inclinations of a small number of States which were the first to accede to a multilateral convention and wished to terminate it by mutual agreement, paragraph 2 might be replaced by a provision to the effect that States that had taken part in drawing up a treaty, but had not become parties to it, could still bring that treaty into force among themselves, even after the original parties had terminated it by mutual agreement.

It would certainly be preferable, however, to delete paragraph 2 of this article altogether.

**Article 45**

In accordance with its comments on article 37, the Luxembourg Government proposes that article 45 too should be deleted.

**Article 48**

The distinction drawn in the commentary between treaties drawn up "within" and those drawn up "under the auspices" of an international organization is too vague to serve as the criterion for the application of this provision. The Luxembourg Government considers that the clause in article 48—the fundamental idea of which it fully approves—should apply only in cases where a connecting link is established between a treaty and the statute of the organization concerned. Such a link should be considered to exist, for example, whenever there is a necessary relationship between the position of a State as a party to a treaty and its position as a member of the organization within which the treaty was negotiated and concluded. On the other hand, this clause should not apply when an international treaty, although concluded under the auspices of a specified organization, is open to States which are not also members of that organization.

Thus, to give some specific illustrations, the Treaty instituting the Benelux Economic Union provides that the States parties should conclude supplementary conventions on various matters (e.g. freedom of movement and legal co-operation) included in the Union's aim: in this case the connecting link is clearly established. The same is true of the conventions envisaged in article 220 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the object of which is the protection of persons and their rights, the elimination of double taxation, the mutual recognition of companies and the reciprocal recognition and execution of judicial decisions. The same is also true of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is intimately linked to the aims and operations of the Council of Europe.

The difficulty is to define this connecting link between a treaty and the law of an international organization in a sufficiently specific and precise way. For this purpose, a second sentence worded as follows might perhaps be added to the article:

"This provision shall not apply when a treaty drawn up within an international organization is open to States which are not members of that organization."

**General comments on grounds of nullity and the termination of treaties**

Articles 33 to 37 and 42 to 43 indicate a number of grounds the effect of which is either to make a treaty void *ab initio* (fraud, error, coercion, conflict with a peremptory norm) or to terminate its operation (breach, impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances, emergence of a new peremptory norm). These rules are not without analogy in certain civil law provisions. But unlike internal law, where there is always a judge competent to settle disputes arising out of contracts concluded between individuals, there is no authority at the international level capable of determining if the nullity or termination of a treaty on one of the grounds indicated, is invoked with good reason by a particular State. As the International Law Commission has repeated time and again in its commentary, this state of affairs entails a real danger for the permanence of international treaties. The danger is particularly marked in the case of a ground of nullity as vague as that of conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law, and, as far as the termination of treaties is concerned, in cases of breaches of undertakings, impossibility of performance, and, even more, fundamental changes of circumstances.

The Luxembourg Government considers that it is not possible in practice to embody in a formal treaty the various grounds of nullity, and particularly the motives for termination of treaties, if the various States do not undertake at the same time to submit, as far as the application of those provisions is concerned, to a jurisdiction or compulsory arbitration. Since it is illusory to believe that such a state of law can be reached in the foreseeable future, the Luxembourg Government ventures to propose the following solution.

At the end of the articles, a new provision should be inserted authorizing States parties to make a reservation, under which the provisions mentioned could not be invoked against them by States which were not bound in regard to them by the acceptance of arbitration or a compulsory jurisdiction. The effect of such a clause would be that the provisions of these articles could be taken in two ways:

In relations between States bound by an undertaking of an arbitral or judicial nature, the provisions relating to the nullity and termination of treaties would have full legal force;

In the relations with other States, only the general rules of international law would be applicable. That would not mean that the provisions drawn up by the International Law Commission would be unimportant; but between such States they would be for guidance only, and not have the force of legal rules proper.

The article proposed by the Luxembourg Government might be worded as follows:

"Upon acceding to these articles, States parties may, without prejudice to the general rules of international law, exclude the application of the provisions relating to the invalidity and termination of treaties in regard to any State that has not accepted in respect to them an undertaking concerning compulsory jurisdiction or compulsory arbitration, regarding a treaty alleged to be invalid or to have terminated."
The provisions of this article would not apply to the extent that a State had made use of the reservation proposed in the new article given above. In fact, as no legal obligation would then exist between such a State and any other State which had not undertaken with regard to the former State an obligation to submit to arbitration or a jurisdiction, the procedure laid down in the article would no longer serve any purpose.

16. MALAYSIA

[PART I]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 25 July 1963 from the Ministry of External Affairs

[Original: English]

The Ministry of External Affairs, Federation of Malaya presents its compliments to the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and ... has the honour to inform the latter that the Government of the Federation of Malaya has no objection to part I of the draft articles on the law of treaties of the report of the International Law Commission issued at its fourteenth session held from 24 April to 29 June 1962.

[PART II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 15 September 1964 from the Ministry of External Affairs

[Original: English]

...the Government of Malaysia has no objection to part II of the draft articles on the law of treaties...

17. NETHERLANDS

[PARTS I AND II]

Transmitted by a letter of 26 February 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[PART I]

[Original: English]

The scope of the draft articles

Although the Netherlands Government endorses the principle on which, in paragraph 21 of its report, the Commission bases its commentary on the introduction, it believes it would be better if no mention were made yet in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the draft of the fact that the provisions apply to treaties entered into by international organizations and if the question as to which articles could be made to apply in their original form to treaties concluded by international organizations, and to what extent special articles would have to be drafted for those organizations, were gone into later. The Netherlands Government has in mind the method adopted for laying down the "Régime Relating to Honorary Consular Officers" in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963.

Article 1

The Netherlands Government believes the word "party" should be defined; it occurs so frequently in the draft that some definition is essential. The Government would suggest the following:

"'Party' to a treaty means a State that is bound by the provisions of the treaty."

Quite apart from the adoption of the definition of the word "party" proposed above, the Netherlands Government believes it is self-evident that the same meaning should be attached to the word "party" in all treaties; if a definition of the word "party" is given, it even becomes essential to do so. The Netherlands Government would draw attention to the anomalous meaning of the word "party" in paragraph 2 (a) of article 15 and to the suggested amendment.

The Netherlands Government would prefer to have the words "concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law" deleted from the definition of the word "treaty" in paragraph 1 (a), because the term "subjects of international law" can be interpreted in different ways in view of the provisions of article 3.

If it is deleted, the last sentence in paragraph (8) of the commentary should also be deleted, for the question as to whether individuals and corporations can be considered as subjects of international law is a different matter altogether and had better not be dealt with in this context; it certainly cannot be disposed of in a single definition.

Other amendments suggested are:

Paragraph 1 (c): "...deals with other matters of general interest to the community of States";

Paragraph 1 (d): in the first and second lines, "Acceptance" and "Approval" to be replaced by "and Acceptance" (see below under article 14);

Paragraph 1 (f): "accepting or approving" to be replaced by "or accepting".

Article 3

The Netherlands Government doubts whether everyone will attach the same meaning to the term "other subjects of international law", even in the light of the interpretation in paragraph (2) of the commentary.

Paragraph 2

The Netherlands Government would point out that this paragraph may also be applicable to other forms of States than "federal unions", for instance, to the Kingdom of the Netherlands with its three autonomous countries. The Statute of the Kingdom provides for the delegation by the Government of the Kingdom to the Governments of the individual countries of powers to conclude certain categories of treaties. The Netherlands Government would be glad if the Commission would refer in its commentary to this example of a form of State that is different from the better-known federal form.

Paragraph 3

With reference to the above remarks under the heading "The scope of the draft articles", it is suggested that this matter be dealt with in connexion with rules with regard to international organizations.

Article 4

The Netherlands Government would suggest deleting "approve" in the title and "approval" in paragraph 5 of this article (see below under article 14).

Article 5

This article can hardly be interpreted as a treaty rule; it would be more appropriate in a code. Apart from that, the Netherlands Government would observe that the word "representatives" in the first sentence should read "government representatives".

Article 6

The Netherlands Government believes that the Commission's reason for including this article, the need for which is also felt by the Netherlands Government, was to provide for the adoption of treaties at large international conferences. The growing practice of following the procedure of majority vote referred to in paragraph (2) of the Commission's commentary indeed applies to the adoption of the texts of general multilateral treaties.

However, at smaller conferences such as regional ones, or conferences on some specific subject in which only a limited number of States are interested, it is still the general rule for texts to be
adopted by unanimous vote. Though the unanimity rule may sometimes cause trouble at small conferences, making the majority vote the general rule at all conferences, including those of a small group of States to each of whom settlement of the problem under discussion may be of vital concern is likely to have much more serious consequences.

Accordingly, it is suggested that the scope of article 6 be restricted to the drawing up of general multilateral treaties. It might also be stipulated in this paragraph that replacement of the majority rule by some other voting rule may only be decided upon at the opening of a conference.

In view of the fact that general multilateral treaties are in the minority among the aggregate of bilateral and multilateral treaties, it would seem more correct if paragraph (c) came first as being the general rule. The present paragraphs (a) and (b) give special provisions that apply only in the particular circumstances described therein.

It is not impossible that in actual practice the principle of unanimity will be dropped in favour of some special voting rule that is also suitable for smaller conferences. However, this special voting rule may differ from that now being put forward by the Commission for large international conferences. The Netherlands Government would therefore prefer, at this stage of the development of international law, not to lay down any hard and fast rules in respect of small conferences.

Accordingly, it is suggested that the following alterations be made to the text:

"The adoption of the text of a treaty shall take place:

(a) As a general rule, by agreement between the States taking part in the negotiations;

(b) In the case of a general multilateral treaty drawn up at an international conference... (thenceforth reading as the text of paragraph (a) up to)...shall decide at the beginning of the conference to adopt another voting rule;

(c) In the case of a treaty drawn up within an international organization, by... (thenceforth reading as the text of paragraph (b))."

Article 8

Paragraph 1

The Netherlands Government shares the views of the members whose opinion is quoted in paragraph (4) of the Commission's commentary on article 9.

Paragraph 2

There is no Commission commentary on paragraph 2 of this article, which deals with becoming a party to treaties other than "general multilateral" treaties.

The Netherlands Government believes that sub-paragraph (b) gives the main rule and that other contingencies are mentioned under (a) and (c), unless the treaty should stipulate otherwise. The right order would therefore appear to be:

(a) becomes (b);
(b) becomes (a) and "unless the treaty states otherwise, or," should be inserted after "text";
(c) unaltered.

Article 9

A new principle underlies this article. It concerns the modifications of the participation clause in the event such a clause appears in or is implied in a multilateral treaty (paragraph 1) or in a treaty concluded between a small number of States (paragraph 2). Needless to say, it is always possible to make the necessary changes in a treaty in the normal way by obtaining the approval of all the parties to the treaty. It is therefore only a question of deciding whether a more "simple" procedure should be laid down for extending participation in a treaty. The Netherlands Government doubts whether a procedure of this type is really necessary.

At any rate, it would like to see its application restricted to future general multilateral treaties (unless there is an express stipulation in the treaty itself that debar its application), while special procedures might be made for treaties to which the provisions governing accession can no longer be applied on account of changed circumstances, as is the case, for instance, with treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations.

Paragraph 1

See comments on paragraph 1 of article 17 regarding the obligations referred to in paragraph 2 (b).

Suggested modifications of text:

In line 2 of paragraph 2, in line 2 of paragraph 2 (a) and in line 2 of paragraph 3: "acceptance or approval" to be replaced by "or acceptance" (see below under article 14).

Article 12

The unsystematic arrangement of this article may cause some confusion for a clear distinction has not been made between cases in which the obligation or otherwise to ratify a treaty does not apply in equal measure to all the States that have taken part in drafting the text and cases in which one of the parties signs a treaty.

Accordingly it might be better to start with the cases described in paragraphs 3 (a) and (b), which now appear as exceptions to exceptions of the general rule. That would make it clear that further provisions would have to be made only for cases where the treaty is silent upon the question of ratification and the common intention of the drafters of the treaty cannot be gathered from the circumstances either. The Netherlands Government feels some hesitation as to the words "statements...or other circumstances evidencing such an intention", unless these words are elucidated.

The following text is proposed:

"Article 12

"Ratification"

"1. A treaty requires ratification where:

(a) The treaty itself expressly contemplates that it shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States;

(b) The common intention that the treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States clearly appears from statements made in the course of the negotiations [or from other circumstances evidencing such an intention];

(c) It does not fall within one of the exceptions provided for in paragraph 2 below.

"2. A treaty shall not be subject to ratification by the signatory States where:

(a) The common intention to dispense with ratification clearly appears from statements made in the course of the negotiations [or from other circumstances evidencing such an intention];

(b) The treaty is one in simplified form;

(c) The treaty itself provides that it shall definitively come into force upon signature.

"3. In cases not covered by paragraph 1 (a) and (b) a signatory State will become bound by the treaty by signature alone, if the credentials, full powers, or other instrument issued to the representative of the State in question authorize him by his signature alone to establish the consent of the State to be bound by the treaty without ratification."
“4. In cases covered by paragraph 2 above, a signatory State shall nevertheless become bound by the treaty only upon ratification, if the representative of the State in question has expressly signed ‘subject to ratification’.”

Article 13

It would appear that the first six words of paragraph (a) apply equally to paragraph (b). Accordingly, the words “it has not signed the treaty and” might be deleted from paragraph (a) if the words “it is not a signatory State and” are added to the opening sentence of the article.

This article does not provide for States becoming a party to a treaty by accession in accordance with the provisions of article 8 in so far as article 8 refers to treaties in which it is not expressly stipulated that States can become parties by another procedure than by signing the treaty (either followed by ratification or not). Consequently, the article should be supplemented.

The Netherlands Government would also observe that in the text no account has been taken of the not unusual case of a signatory State not ratifying the treaty with the time-limit, but becoming a party to the treaty all the same because the latter provides for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, dated 26 June 1948.

The Commission’s commentary might also make mention of the fact that a State can also become a party to a treaty by virtue of a later treaty providing for such a contingency.

Article 14

The Netherlands Government feels that the new term “approval” should not be adopted. The term does not denote a form that differs essentially from “acceptance”: its use might cause confusion in national procedures and it cannot be regarded as a common term. Accordingly, article 14 might be restricted to “acceptance”.

This article does not provide for States becoming parties to treaties by “acceptance” in accordance with the provisions of article 8 in so far as article 8 refers to treaties in which it is not expressly stipulated that States can become parties by “acceptance”. Consequently, the article needs supplementing.

It is proposed that the text be modified as follows:

The words “or (by) approval” to be deleted in four places, viz. in the title and in the second, fifth and eighth lines.

Article 15

Suggested modifications to the text:

The words “acceptance and (or) approval” to be replaced by “and (or) acceptance” in four places, viz. in the title, in paragraph 1(a) and in paragraphs 2 and 3;

The words “two differing texts” in paragraph 1(c) to be replaced by “two alternative texts”;

The words “party or parties” in paragraph 2(a) to be replaced either by “signatory States” or by the phrase used in article 18, paragraph 3(a).

Article 16

The Netherlands Government believes there have been two instances (one within the United Nations and one connected with the Greek ratification of the IMCO Treaty) of instruments of ratification having been withdrawn a short time after they had been deposited. Opinions may vary as to whether depositing an instrument of ratification, accession or acceptance constitutes an irrevocable act. It might be argued that the final formality in the procedure of becoming a party to a treaty is so important (in most countries the relative documents must be signed by the Head of State) that it cannot but be looked upon as an irrevocable act. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the former Special Rapporteur, endorses this view in paragraph 5 of article 31 of his first report in the following words: “Ratification once made cannot, as such, be withdrawn” (see also paragraph 1 of article 33). On the other hand, it cannot very well be argued that the effect of such an act is irrevocable.

Circumstances may change to such an extent after an instrument of ratification has been deposited that the State concerned may be compelled to withdraw it without waiting for the treaty to come into force and then giving notice of termination. If this line of argument is adopted, the right of withdrawal should only be recognized after three years from the date on which the instrument was deposited.

Since this has become a pressing problem in view of the two precedents already mentioned, the Netherlands Government would suggest that the Commission take it up again, but with due regard for the rules for giving notice of termination of treaties or of withdrawal from international organizations that will be the subject of later discussions.

Suggested modifications:

The words “acceptance and (or) approval” to be replaced by “and (or) acceptance” in three places, viz. in the title and in the second and fifth lines;

“Article 13” in the third line to be replaced by “articles 12, 13 and 14”.

Article 17

Paragraph 1

The Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the “obligation of good faith” mentioned in this paragraph cannot be held to apply to all cases in which a State that has taken part in the negotiation, the drawing up or adoption of a treaty (provided it is a multilateral treaty) does not append its signature to the treaty. An obligation of good faith may only be presumed to exist if a State has signified that it is seriously considering becoming a party to a treaty, either by having signed it or in any other manner. Consequently, the words “which takes part in the negotiation, drawing up or adoption of a treaty, or” should be deleted.

Paragraphs 1 and 2

The words “acceptance or approval” should be replaced by “or acceptance”.

Article 18

The Netherlands Government would point out that this section should also apply to “statements” that are actually reservations. (See paragraph (13) of the Commission’s commentary on article 1.)

Suggested modifications of the text:

The words “accepting or approving” in the second line of paragraph 1 to be replaced by “or accepting”;

The words “acceptance or approval” to be replaced by “or acceptance” in paragraph 2(a)(iii) and in paragraph 2(b).

Article 19

The Netherlands Government would suggest that “two years” be substituted for “twelve months” in paragraph 3, and “four years” for “two years” in the fourth line of paragraph 4; the two periods proposed by the Commission are really too short in view of current State practice.

Suggested modification of the text:

The words “acceptance or approval” in paragraph 2(a) to be replaced by “or acceptance”.

Article 20

The Netherlands Government fears that the expression “a small group of States” in paragraph 3 (and likewise in paragraph 2 of


article 9) is not sufficiently clear and might lead to difficulties of interpretation.

Article 22

The Netherlands Government presumes that any notifications of withdrawal of reservations are sent through the authority with whom the relative documents have been deposited.

Article 23

From the brief commentary it might be concluded that a treaty comes into force in its entirety on one particular date. However, some treaties come into force in stages on different dates. If such a contingency is covered by the words “in such manner”, there is no need to supplement the text. The Netherlands Government would merely point out that in the next article (article 24) the coming into force of a treaty is qualified by the words “in whole or in part”.

Suggested modifications of the text:
The word “small” in paragraph 2(b) to be replaced by “same”;
In paragraphs 2(a) and (b), “acceptance, or approval” to be replaced by “or acceptance”;
The words “accepted or approved” in paragraph 2(c) to be replaced by “or accepted”.

Article 24

The Netherlands Government interprets this article as referring only to cases in which States have legally committed themselves to a provisional entry into force. The signatory States may also enter into a non-binding agreement concerning provisional entry into force (within the limits imposed by their respective national laws, of course). In the latter case as opposed to the former they enter into a non-binding agreement concerning provisional entry into force. The signatory States may also only to cases in which States have legally committed themselves to a provisional entry into force as prescribed and shall continue in force on a provisional basis until either the treaty shall have entered into force definitively or the States concerned shall have agreed to terminate the provisional entry into force or one of the States shall have notified the other State or States that it has decided not to become a party to the treaty”.

Article 27

The Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the manner of describing States that have to be notified of any amendments to texts is too cumbersome and that it is even too broad in paragraph (b). Accordingly, it would suggest using the phrase “each interested State” everywhere, i.e. in paragraphs 1(a) (lines 5 to 8) and 1(b) (last 3 lines), in paragraph 2 (last 2 lines) and in paragraph 4 (fourth line).

Article 29

In this article the Commission uses six expressions to define certain duties of depositaries:

“To execute a procès-verbal” (paragraph 3(c));
“To furnish an acknowledgment in writing” (paragraph 3(d));
“To communicate” (paragraph 5(a) and (b));
“To inform” (paragraph 7(a));
“To draw up a procès-verbal” (paragraph 7(b)); and
“To bring to the attention” (paragraph 8).

The Netherlands Government feels that it would be preferable to use a single, uniform, simplified formula, unless the treaty expressly states otherwise. Another advantage of a uniform formula is that it could include by implication the notifications not mentioned in the article about denunciation, extension of territorial application, amendments, renewal, statements to the effect that States continue to be bound, etc. The Netherlands Government has in mind the text of article 19 of the Convention on the Recovery of Maintenance concluded at New York on 20 June 1956,

titled “Notifications by the Secretary-General”, the beginning of which reads:

“1. The Secretary-General shall inform all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States referred to in article 13:

“(a) Of communications under paragraph...
“(b) Of information received under paragraph...
“(c) Of declarations and notifications made under...
“(d) Of signatures, ratifications and accessions under...
“(e) Of the date on which the Convention has entered into force under...
“(f) Of denunciations made under...
“(g) Of reservations and notifications made under...

“2. The Secretary-General shall also inform all Contracting Parties of requests for revision and replies thereto received under...

Suggested modifications of the text:
The words “acceptance or approval”, in paragraph 4, to be replaced by “or acceptance”.

[PART II]

Terminology

Some inconsistency in terminology was noticed in the second group of articles, different terms being used in various articles to express the same idea.

In articles 31, 33 and 34, for example, we read “invalidate the consent (expressed by the representative of a State)”, whereas in articles 32 and 35 it says “the expression of consent shall be without any legal effect”. The legal consequences of the contingencies described in those five articles are next referred to in article 52, the provisions of which apply in equal measure to all those contingencies, yet the term used in paragraph 3 of that article to express the same idea is “the nullity of a State’s consent”.

In articles 36 and 37 on the other hand it is stated that under certain circumstances a treaty will become “void”. This “voidness”, too, falls under the provisions of article 52 but there it is termed the “nullity of a treaty”. (It is only the “voidness” referred to in article 45 that has different legal consequences in virtue of article 53, paragraph 2.)

The expression “nullity” in article 52 and in articles 30, 46, 47 and 51 therefore applies to all the contingencies described in articles 31 to 37, although these articles come under section II, the title of which is “Invalidity of treaties”.

Accordingly, endeavours should be made to secure greater uniformity of terminology.

Section I: General provision

The possible effects of an outbreak of hostilities on the validity and operation of treaties have obviously been deliberately omitted from the Commission’s report. Although the Netherlands Government appreciates the Commission’s motives for doing so, it feels that a general provision covering this point is indispensable.

Since it is a recognized fact in international law that a state of war invalidates some treaties while it suspends the operation of others, it would be irrational to ignore in part II of the draft articles on the law of treaties the fact that treaties may be invalidated or rendered inoperative for reasons other than those mentioned in article 31 and subsequent articles, as has been done in article 30.

The same thing is true of the succession of States, which also prompts questions regarding the validity of treaties previously concluded.

The Netherlands Government would suggest that it be made quite clear in the text of the present draft articles that the possible consequences of an outbreak of hostilities or of a succession of States on the validity or operation of treaties have not been dealt with the following articles.

Article 30

No comment.

Article 31

The Netherlands Government endorses the Commission’s guiding principle underlying this article, namely that as a rule the violation of national laws regarding the manner in which the consent of a State to a treaty is to be obtained or the way in which it is to be conveyed does not invalidate consent expressed by a State internationally. The Netherlands Government considers the principle that international law takes precedence over national laws of great importance to the development of the international legal system.

The exception to the rule, which is made in the draft article by the addition of “unless the violation of its internal law was manifest”, may, however, seriously undermine the rule itself. It would be easy for States wishing to shirk their obligations under treaties to make every breach of their national regulations appear to other parties as manifest violations of their national laws.

The Netherlands Government would therefore propose that the clause “unless..., etc.” be altered and the word “manifest” replaced by a more objective term. The Netherlands Government would suggest that the wording of part of the Commission’s own text of paragraph (7) of the commentary be used as the basis of the new text and that the eighth line of the article, after the comma, should read:

“unless the other parties have been actually aware of the violation of internal law or unless this violation was so manifest that the other parties must be deemed to have been aware of it. Except in...”.

Article 32

No comment.

Article 33

Since paragraph 1 mentions both the defrauded State and the State which has committed the fraud, the reference to “the State in question” in paragraph 2 is not sufficiently clear. It is suggested that “the State in question” in the second line of paragraph 2 be changed to “the injured State”.

However, the Netherlands Government believes that paragraph 2 of article 33 should be omitted altogether if its suggestions in regard to the complete revision of article 46 are adopted (see comments on article 46).

Article 34

No comment, except that the suggested revision of article 46 would also affect the text of paragraph 3 of article 34.

Article 35

No comment, except that the suggested revision of article 46 would also affect the text of paragraph 2 of article 35.

Article 36

The Netherlands Government fully endorses the principle underlying this article, but the manner in which it is formulated prompts a few questions.

First, it should be noted that, also in the light of paragraph (3) of the Commission’s commentary, a rule like the one in question is only acceptable and can only be applied in practice if the term “use of force” is taken in its strict sense, i.e. to mean “armed aggression”, to the exclusion of all forms of coercion of an economic or psychological nature. However reprehensible such forms of coercion may be in certain circumstances, under the present international conditions they cannot be lumped together under a single right rule prohibiting coercion without creating rather than clearing away uncertainties, in other words, without making the rule of law ineffective even in its strict sense.

Secondly, the question arises to what extent this stipulation would be enforceable with retrospective effect. Would it be assumed that the “principles of the Charter” did not become valid until 1945 when the United Nations Charter came into force?

Article 37

The Netherlands Government endorses the principle underlying this article, i.e. that according to modern ideas the will of the contracting parties is no longer the sole criterion by which to determine what can be lawfully contracted. However, the Netherlands Government feels that it is a pleonasm to say “a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted”.

Article 38

No comment.

Article 39

With the possible exception of some old treaties, the insertion in which of a clause regulating the termination or the denunciation of treaties was simply overlooked, it is hard to imagine that contracting parties nowadays would be so careless as to “forget” to make such provisions. Consequently, the fact that no mention is made of ways in which a modern treaty may be denounced should be ascribed rather to the parties deliberately having avoided the subject. If in such cases the travaux préparatoires were referred to, it would almost invariably be found that the subject had indeed been discussed by the parties, but that for political reasons it was not thought opportune to mention the conditions under which the treaty should cease to operate, or that the parties disagreed on what those conditions should be, or that they took the effect of such conditions as a matter of course, or that there were some other reasons or a combination of reasons for the parties having refrained from making any stipulations in respect of the duration or termination of the treaty.

Accordingly, in all such cases it may be assumed that the contracting parties indeed had the possible termination of the treaty in mind, though often in exceptional circumstances only.

It hardly seems right that all the provisions intended but not actually made in the articles of the treaty in question should be replaced by the single provision that any treaty can be terminated by giving one year’s notice. This provision, embodied in the last sentence of article 39, may be diametrically opposed to the contracting parties’ intentions. Inclusion of the provision would only be justified on the grounds that it would supply the missing clause in a few old treaties. But it is precisely those treaties to which article 39 does not apply.

It is suggested that article 39 be modified as follows to make it suitable for existing and future treaties:
Seventh line: "...intended to admit under certain conditions denunciation or withdrawal. Under those conditions, a party may denounce or...".

**Article 40**

**Paragraph 2**

No single period can be laid down that would be reasonable for all the different kinds of treaties. The Netherlands Government endorses the opinion voiced by the United States representative at the 784th meeting of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly that the contracting parties should be at liberty to lay down in the treaties shorter or longer periods to suit each particular case.

The best general period would be ten years, because a shorter period of say five years might constitute a drawback, especially for technical treaties, in that a number of States interested in the project might still be engaged in making the necessary preparations such as adapting their national laws when the contracting parties are discussing the termination of the treaty.

Suggested changes in the text:

Paragraph 2, last line but one, to read: "...expiry of ten years, or such other period as the treaty may stipulate, the agreement...".

**Article 41**

No comment.

**Article 42**

**Paragraph 2(a)**

In the Netherlands Government's opinion the Commission's intention, which is clear from paragraph (7) of its commentary, is not quite realized in paragraph 2(a) of the above article. Whereas the Commission explains that it is only the injured party that has the right described in paragraph 2(a), paragraph 2(a) has the unrestricted term "any other party".

Paragraph 2(a) could be clarified by modifying the text in the manner suggested by the United States representative at the 784th meeting of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, viz.: "Any other party, whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach, to invoke...".

**Paragraph 2(b)**

The same representative's suggestion that a similar alteration be made in paragraph 2(b) must be due to some misunderstanding. If paragraph 2(b) were modified in that manner paragraph 2(b)(i) would have the same effect as paragraph 2(a), while paragraph 2(b)(ii) could then be taken to mean that a decision to terminate a treaty could be made fewer than all the other parties. It should not be possible for so far-reaching a decision as that on the termination of a treaty to be made unless there is unanimity among all the other parties. It is therefore suggested that the Commission's draft text for paragraph 2(b) be left as it is.

**Paragraph 4**

As regards paragraph 4, see remarks under article 46.

**Article 43**

No comment, except that the remarks on article 46 also apply to paragraph 3 of article 43.

**Article 44**

The Netherlands Government agrees with the Commission that the settlement of boundaries should be excepted from the *rebus sic stantibus* principle (see paragraph 3(a) of article 44 and paragraph (12) of the commentary). However, treaties by which boundaries are settled often cover other points as well. For example, the Netherlands-German treaty of 8 April 1960 settling the boundaries and regulating matters closely connected therewith also contains provisions on matters that have nothing to do with determining territorial boundaries; for instance, on the maintenance in good condition of the waterways forming part of the frontier. Besides, this treaty on boundaries itself forms an integral part of a complex of greatly divergent regulations, all of which are embodied in a single, general treaty.

Accordingly, it would be more rational not to exclude in their entirety from paragraph 3(a) treaties the main purpose of which is to determine territorial boundaries but only in so far as they regulate transfers of territory or the settlement of boundaries. The text of paragraph 3(a) might be modified as follows:

"To stipulations of a treaty which effect a transfer of territory or the settlement of a boundary."

On the other hand, one might well ask whether not only treaties concluded to settle territorial boundaries (including treaties concerning transfers of territory) but also other "dispositive" treaties should be excluded from the *rebus sic stantibus* principle, i.e. treaties by which certain *de facto* conditions are created or modified, after which they have served their purpose, only the conditions created by them remaining. However, one can rightly say of this category of "executed treaties" that, once treaties have served their purpose, the *rebus sic stantibus* principle can no longer be applied to them; the most it can be applied to is the condition created, but that is outside the scope of the law of treaties.

If treaties settling territorial boundaries were included in the category of "dispositive" treaties for the purpose of applying the above-mentioned principle, it might be concluded that those treaties, too, would cease to operate and lapse the moment settlement of the boundaries was completed, because they establish a real right to the delimited territory, and that testing that fact against the theory of change of circumstances falls outside the scope of the law of treaties, so that paragraph 3(a) might be deleted from article 44. Such a theory seems unrealistic; at any rate, it does not agree with the views hitherto expressed in the literature on the subject and in the jurisprudence.

Accordingly, the Netherlands Government believes that it would be more correct to adopt the principle that treaties concerning the settlement of boundaries or transfer of territories constitute a separate category. They are treaties that regulate the territorial delimitation of sovereignty. All other treaties, including those that establish a so-called "easement" or "servitude", regulate in some way or another the exercise of that sovereignty.

The remarks on article 46 also apply to paragraph 4 of the above article.

**Article 45**

As regards paragraph 2, see remarks on article 46.

**Article 46**

The Netherlands Government's comments are given in the attached annex and it is suggested that the text of this article be modified accordingly; the reasons that have prompted the Netherlands Government to make this suggestion will also be found in the annex.

If the text of article 46 is modified in the manner suggested, the separate paragraphs regarding the separability of treaties in articles 33, 34, 35, 42, 43, 44 and 45 will become redundant.

**Article 47**

In the opinion of the Netherlands Government this article should also be made to apply to article 31. The plea of invalidity admitted by way of exception in the clause in article 31 reading: "unless... etc." should be restricted by article 47. Whether this clause should be left as it is or be modified as suggested in the Netherlands Government's comments on article 31 is irrelevant. Restricting the plea of invalidity is believed to be inherent in the primacy of international law.

The Netherlands Government also wonders whether article 47 should apply to article 36, too. However, assuming that the word
"force" in article 36 only means "armed aggression", the Netherlands Government can agree with the Commission's views that article 36 should not be referred to in article 47.

Suggested modifications:
Third line: "...under articles 31 to 35 and...";
Paragraph (b), second and third lines: "...in the case of articles 31 to 35...".

Article 48
The Netherlands Government endorses the provision of this article and would emphasize that under that provision the general rules of part II, section III, shall not apply to the treaties referred to in the article but only in so far as the organizations concerned have their own rules. However, the category of treaties that have been drawn up "within an international organization" might be more clearly defined—in keeping with the gist of paragraph (3) of the commentary—by modifying the phrase "drawn up within an international organization" to read "drawn up by the competent organ of an international organization".

Article 49
No comment.

Article 50
It is stated in paragraph 1 that a right to give notice of termination must be either expressed or implied in the treaty, but no mention is made of the fact that such notice should in the first place be given in the manner prescribed in the treaty. It is therefore suggested that the third line of paragraph 1 be modified to read "provided for in the treaty must, unless the treaty otherwise provides, be communicated ...".

Article 51
This article has once again brought home to the Netherlands Government how desirable it is that it be made obligatory for disputes about points of law that cannot be resolved in any other way to be submitted to the International Court of Justice. In this matter the Netherlands Government agrees wholeheartedly with "members of the Commission" who voice their opinion in the second half of paragraph (2) of the Commission's commentary.

Article 52
No comment.

Article 53
Paragraph 3(c)
Since some treaties remain in force for a certain period after notice of termination has been given, the text of the second and third lines of this subsidiary clause might be modified to read:
"...prior to the date upon which the denunciation or withdrawal has taken effect and the validity ..."

Article 54
No comment.

Annex
Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly

1. If treaties are split up into various parts (in the absence of explicit provisions for such division in the texts of the treaties), difficulties are sure to arise, on the one hand, "subjectively"—on balance, the advantages to a party to a treaty would be outweighed by the disadvantages in the event of division per se (if that were not so, agreement would be sure to be reached still on express division)—and, on the other hand, "objectively"; it is difficult to say whether the effect of a certain division would be compatible with the "object and purpose" of the treaty as a whole.

2. The Commission realizes this and has endeavoured to find a solution by making a distinction in article 46, which excludes the possibility of splitting up a treaty, between inseparability for "objective" (paragraph 2(a)) and for "subjective" (paragraph 2(b)) reasons.

3. The Commission also rules out division in a number of cases where division might theoretically be thought possible (i.e. those described in articles 31, 32, 36, 37 and 39).

4. However, the difficulties outlined under 1 have not been overcome completely by the distinction made under 2. They have not been overcome in respect of the "objective" reasons, because it might well be that the cancellation of part of a treaty does not "interfere with the operation of the remaining provisions" (see paragraph (6) of the Commission's commentary under article 46), while that cancellation might still run counter to the "object and purpose" of the treaty.

The "subjective" difficulty has not been entirely obviated either, because in article 46, paragraph 2(b), the subjective inseparability involves both parties, while proof is demanded deriving from either the text of the treaty or statements made by both the parties during the negotiations culminating in the conclusion of the treaty. This is not very rational, because what may be essential to one party may be precisely the opposite to the other; if during the negotiations no difficulties arise in regard to certain texts, there will be nothing whatever to indicate what is essential to them and what is not; moreover, the parties may well change their minds during the period of operation of a treaty regarding the value they attach to certain of its clauses.

5. If difficulties arise after a treaty has been concluded, either immediately or later, they can be solved only by the parties to the treaty or by judicial settlement. No directives need be given for the solving of difficulties by the parties themselves. If no solution can be found, it would of course be helpful if each party could substantiate its accusations by quoting the provisions of a convention on the law of treaties, but obviously such provisions (if they are to be just and not merely designed to "cut Gordian knots") can never be so clear-cut as to exclude the possibility of the other party coming forward with counter-arguments deriving from the very same provisions. Accordingly, the question is whether the Courts should be given directives.

A very broadly worded article might meet the case (deleting the special provisions regarding separation in articles 33, 34, 35, 42, 43, 44 and 45). Something on the following lines might do:
"1. Except as provided in the treaty itself, the nullity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty or withdrawal from a treaty shall in principle relate to the treaty as a whole.

2. If a ground mentioned in articles 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44 and 45 for nullity, termination, suspension of the operation of a treaty or withdrawal from a treaty, applies only to particular clauses of a treaty, and a party to the treaty wishes to uphold the remainder of the treaty, the other party or parties shall accept the continuing validity and operation of the remainder of the treaty, unless such acceptance cannot reasonably and in good faith be required from such other party or parties.

3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not apply if:
(a) the clauses in question are not separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application; or
(b) it appears either from the treaty or from the statements made during the negotiations that acceptance of the clauses in question was an essential element of the consent of a party to the treaty as a whole."
Such a text would lay down: (a) the principle of inseparability; (b) separability depending on the circumstances at the moment at which the treaty was concluded and at the moment when difficulties arose; and (c) the limited absolute exclusion of separability if it should simply be impracticable, or if during the negotiations one or more of the parties made it clear that the coherence of the various parts of the treaty was essential. Since paragraphs 1 and 3 of the suggested text were largely modelled on the Commission's draft, the same objections attach to the text as were raised against the corresponding parts of the Commission's text; but it is believed that these objections have been practically eliminated by the text of paragraph 2, which makes the whole matter subject to the rules of good faith between the contracting parties.

[PART III]

Transmitted by a letter of 1 March 1966 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations [Original: English]

Introduction

1. In its report on part II of the draft articles, the Netherlands Government expressed the desire with regard to article 51 that the obligation to submit to international jurisdiction disputes on points of law which cannot be resolved in any other way be generally recognized. The article under consideration at the time concerned the procedure for suspending or terminating other treaties, in which no provision was made for their suspension or termination. In pursuance of a regulation to be inserted in article 51, disputes on such treaties could be referred to the International Court of Justice.

The points raised in the ILC's comments on that article included the absence of a regulation governing disputes on the interpretation and application of the articles in question concerning the law of treaties. In its commentary on this last part of the law of treaties, the Netherlands Government would lay particular stress on the desirability of an article on the settlement of disputes that may arise in connexion with the articles in question. To formulate such treaties could be referred to the International Court of Justice.

2. If the articles relating to the law of treaties are included in one or more treaties, it would seem desirable to arrange at the same time in what circumstances States which are, or are to become, parties to that treaty or those treaties may make reservations with respect to such articles. It might not be advisable to place a general ban on reservations. This can only be decided when the articles are available in a more definitive form.

Section 1: “The application and effects of treaties”

Article 55: “Pacta sunt servanda”.

3. No comment.

Article 56: “Application of a treaty in point of time”.

4. Paragraphs 5 and 7 of the ILC’s comments have not convinced the Netherlands Government of the desirability of choosing for the end of paragraph 2 of this article a wording different from that chosen for the end of paragraph 1. The Netherlands Government would not expressly rule out the possibility that the “very nature of a treaty indicates that it is intended to have” certain legal consequences even after its termination. Therefore the Netherlands Government proposes (to emulate the set-up originally proposed by rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock in his article 57) that one and the same wording be used for both contingencies.

5. Where the first paragraph rightly excepts “any situation which ceased to exist”, the second makes a similar exception for “any situation which exists”. The Netherlands Government assumes that what is meant in the second paragraph is a “situation which comes into existence”.

6. Proposal concerning the text of article 56, paragraph 2: “... or any situation which comes into existence after the treaty has ceased to be in force with respect to that party, unless the contrary appears from the treaty.”

Article 57: “The territorial scope of a treaty”.

7. The Netherlands Government considers this provision acceptable as a general principle. It is assumed that the subject of international law constitutes a unity.

Only the word “territory” implies a limitation which is not always encountered in practice. In fact, treaties intended to apply mainly to the territories of the parties need not to that end be limited in their operation. The operation of treaties which lend themselves to application by diplomatic or consular representatives in the territory of a State which is not a party to the treaty; or for application on the continental shelf, which does not belong to the territory of a State but falls within the jurisdiction of the coastal State for certain purposes pursuant to the relevant 1958 Treaty of Geneva. Particularly in the latter case it is quite conceivable that disputes may arise, for instance, on whether or not customs treaties relating to minerals won on the continental shelf or to operational material placed on that shelf are applicable.

Accordingly, account should be taken in article 57 of the operation of treaties outside the territory of the parties, as far as the jurisdiction of a State extends under international law. A proposal for a text to this effect will be found in point 11.

8. Article 57 only gives the general rule, without allowing for special factors such as the federal structure of a State or the position of dependent territories. It might be said that protectorates, trust territories and colonies do not form part of the “entire territory” of a State; this cannot be so readily said of autonomous parts of a State, such as the Isle of Man and also Zanzibar in certain respects, or of the component parts of a federal State such as the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Swiss Federal State. Yet nowadays the autonomous or component parts of States with different constitutional structures are frequently seen to be competent to decide for themselves whether or not they shall be bound by treaties, vide the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the three parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, to mention only three.

9. If the territorial validity of a treaty is not laid down in the treaty itself, a State may in the first instance wish to become a party for one of its territories, leaving it to the government of each other part to decide whether or not the treaty shall be accepted later for that part, too. If the treaty itself prescribes no other procedure, expression can be given to this territorial differentiation when the treaty is signed and/or ratified. It would not be appropriate to lay down in the law of treaties a rule depriving States of the opportunity of availing themselves of territorial differentiation which present international legal practice offers them, thus curtailing the autonomy due to a single part of the State within the whole and obstructing in the future the conclusion of treaties whose purpose is to serve the common weal.

In practice, it is only States with federal structures and constitutions granting the component parts autonomy with respect to treaty commitments that need (at all events initially) the opportunity to become parties to treaties for only one or some of their component parts, and perhaps for some other part or parts at a later stage. The Netherlands Government does not know of any instance of this faculty having been abused by a State with a different structure.
Nevertheless, if the existing faculty is expressed in a rule of the law of treaties, it would seem right to make that rule as accurate a reflection of the usual practice as possible and to restrict it to States whose component parts, under the constitution of the State, can decide for themselves autonomously whether or not to accept the rights and obligations of a treaty.

Moreover, it is natural that the federal government should be required to make it clear, when the State becomes a party to a treaty, whether it is doing so as a complete unit or for some of its federal States only, and in the latter event, for which. Generally speaking, the other parties to the treaty cannot be expected to be so well acquainted with the constitutional structure of a federal State that without any notification from that State they can be certain that the treaty is effective in one or all of its parts.

10. This point might conceivably be settled under article 19 and succeeding articles on reservations. However, as a rule "territorial reservation" is not reservation in the material sense, i.e. not a reservation on any provision laid down in the treaty. (It is of course a different matter where territorial treaties are concerned.) It would not seem right therefore to adopt in respect of statements regarding the territorial application the same procedure as that prescribed for material reservations.

11. The foregoing considerations have prompted the drafting of the following, which is suggested for article 57:

"The scope of a treaty extends to the entire territory of each party, and beyond it as far as the jurisdiction of the State extends under international law, unless the contrary appears from the treaty or, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, from the act by which the State expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty.

A State consisting of parts which under constitutional provisions decide autonomously and individually whether they shall accept a treaty shall, provided the contrary does not appear from the treaty, declare in the act by which it expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty to which of its constituent parts it shall apply. This declaration shall not be regarded as a reservation within the meaning of article 18. In the absence of such a declaration the State shall be deemed to be bound by the treaty with respect to all the constituent parts of that State."

Article 58: "General rule limiting the effects of treaties to the parties."

12. The principle that a treaty "neither imposes any obligations nor confers any rights upon a State not party to it without its consent" does not apply to all treaties. One consequence of a treaty defining the frontier between two States or transferring a piece of territory is to alter the area over which the consuls of third States may exercise jurisdiction. Another consequence may be that agreements formerly effective in the area transferred are no longer so, or vice versa. A treaty relating to the demarcation of the continental shelf, concluded in pursuance of article 6 of the relevant 1958 Treaty of Geneva, may result in a customs agreement becoming, or ceasing to be, applicable to minerals won from the part of the shelf concerned.

Broadly speaking, treaties governing the territorial demarcation of sovereignty (or with respect to the continental shelf, the territorial delimitation of "sovereign rights") certainly do involve rights and obligations for third States. Such treaties constitute a separate category as opposed to all other treaties, which concern matters relating to the exercise of that sovereignty. Cf. a similar commentary by the Netherlands Government on article 44.

The ILC might consider the addition of a clause to article 58 covering this exception to the general principle.

Article 59: "Treaties providing for obligations for third States."

13. No comment.

Article 60: "Treaties providing for rights for third States."

14. In some circumstances the faculty of "implied consent" by a third State provided in paragraph 1(b), combined with the ban imposed by article 61 on revoking or amending the provision in question without the third State's consent may place a very heavy burden indeed on the contracting parties. This combination will be particularly unfortunate in the case of a treaty that accords rights to a large group of States or to the community of States in general, like the treaties on the freedom of shipping in some of the international waterways. Giving a voice in matters concerning the regulations operative for those waterways to a State which has never formally reacted to the conclusion of the treaty, and whose subjects have only in exceptional cases availed themselves of the rights accorded, would be going further than is compatible with reasonable practice, quite apart from the fact that the parties concluding the treaty would then be unable to find out which States had given "implied consent".

15. Suggested modification end of article 60, para. 1:

"...and (b) the State expressly assents thereto."

Article 61: "Revocation or amendment of provisions regarding obligations or rights of Third States."

16. The combination of articles 60 and 61 has already been commented on under point 14. The Netherlands Government has considered whether the objective, i.e. the denial of rights to third States which have scarcely if at all reacted to the offer of a right, could also be achieved by leaving article 60 intact and adding to article 61 the requirement: "and provided the State has actually exercised the right" (and, if desired: "and complied with the obligation"). Although theoretically formulation on these lines would appear to have a more equitable effect than that described under 14 and 15, in practice it would be so difficult to produce evidence of "traditional rights", that the clearer arrangement recommended under 14 and 15 is preferable.

17. The Netherlands Government would make three remarks on the text of article 61:

Firstly, the ILC has not made it clear in paragraph 1 of its commentary why the complete or partial withdrawal of an obligation imposed on a third State should require the assent of the third State. Its assent does indeed seem to be required if modification of the original obligation gives rise to a new or more onerous obligation, but article 59 would appear to be automatically applicable in such a contingency.

Secondly, the modification of a right granted to a third State need not be mentioned separately in article 61. For if such modification amounts to partial withdrawal of the right, it is governed by the rule governing withdrawal, and if the modification involves the granting of a new or more comprehensive right, article 60 is applicable.

Finally, the Netherlands Government considers that the rule laid down in article 61 is intended to protect the third State against withdrawal (or modification) of the right accorded, and not against withdrawal (or modification) of the treaty provision from which that right is derived.

For these reasons it is suggested that article 61 be worded as follows:


"When under article 60 a right has arisen for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party, the right may be revoked only with the consent of that State, unless it appears from the treaty that the right was intended to be revocable."

Article 62: "Rules in a treaty becoming generally binding through international custom."

18. No comment.
Article 63: “Application of treaties having incompatible pro-
visions.”
19. Paragraph 4: Unlike the wording of article 67, in para-
graph 1(b)(ii) of which account is rightly taken of the object and 
purpose of the treaty as a whole, that of article 63, paragraph 4, 
suggests that every multilateral treaty can simply be divided up 
into a number of bilateral legal relationships, leaving no remain-
der. The ILC itself does indeed acknowledge in paragraph 13 of its 
commentary, that paragraph 4 is worded as though the problem of 
successive treaties between parties, some of which are the same 
parties, giving rise to incompatible obligations only has to be 
settled from the points of view of priority of the rights and obli-
gations of the States concerned (paragraph 4) and of liability for 
non-compliance with the obligations of a treaty (paragraph 5).

The ILC has not lost sight of the coherence of the various pro-
visions and of their joint connexion with the object and purpose 
of the treaty, i.e. of its integrity. On the contrary, paragraphs 14, 15 
and 16 of the commentary are evidence of the great care with 
which it has approached this problem from various angles. Never-
theless, the very one-sided result seen in paragraph 4 is unsatisfactory.

There might be some justification for concluding that the problem 
is not yet ripe for codification. Customary international law has 
not yet crystallized in this respect. So far, international relations 
have not been regulated well enough to allow a clear rule of law 
to be formulated.

Article 64: “The effect of severance of diplomatic relations on the 
application of treaties.”
20. No comment, except that paragraph 3 can be dispensed with 
in the light of the proposal made earlier by the Netherlands Govern-
ment for the modification of article 46, which should then include 
reference to article 64.

Section II: “Modification of treaties.”

Article 65: “Procedure for amending treaties.”
21. The first few words of the second sentence, viz. “If it is in 
writing”, imply recognition of the possibility of a written and ratified 
treaty being amended by a verbal agreement. Although in practice 
this is very occasionally resorted to, it is not recommended. The 
Netherlands Government would therefore suggest that no mention 
be made of it in this article.

It should be noted that deletion of these words does not rule out 
the possible significance of a verbal agreement in connexion with 
the present article. A verbal agreement with “subsequent practice” 
is recognized in article 68(b). Without “subsequent practice” a 
verbal agreement would be of little or no importance.

22. Suggested text, second line:
“...the parties. The rules laid down...”.

Article 66: “Amendment of multilateral treaties.”
23. Paragraph 3: In its present form, this paragraph could be 
taken to mean that, conversely, a State party which has not 
signed the agreement (nor otherwise clearly intimated that it does 
not wish to oppose the amendment) is indeed liable if there is a breach 
of a treaty.

The Netherlands Government would note here in the first place 
that under paragraph 1 of the article the said treaty State would 
have taken part in the preliminary consultation on the desirability of 
an amendment, in fact initially it would probably have assisted in 
drawing up the amendment agreement. Adopting the line of 
thought expounded by the ILC in paragraph 13 of its commentary, 
the Netherlands Government considers that liability for a breach 
of treaty would as a rule be out of place in this amendment procedure, 
even if it involved a State party that had dissociated itself from the 
proposed amendment in the course of the procedure.

24. Suggested modification of text:
It would be advisable to delete paragraph 3.

Article 67: “Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between 
certain of the parties only.”
25. The notification prescribed in paragraph 2 may be post-factum 
negotiation. A considerable time might even elapse between conclu-
sion of the “inter se agreement” and its being made known to 
the other States parties, without the regulation in paragraph 2 
being violated. The Netherlands Government considers that notifica-
tion should be given in good time. In many instances it will be 
virtually impossible to notify the other States parties when the first 
proposals for the agreement are tabled. But when the States con-
cerned have reached an accord in substance on the proposed inter 
se agreement and when its conclusion is only a question of making 
that accord definitive, there would seem to be nothing to prevent 
the other States parties from being informed at once.

26. Suggested modification of paragraph 2:
“Except in a case falling under paragraph 1(a), the intention 
to conclude any such agreement shall be notified to the other 
parties to the treaty.”

Article 68: “Modification of a treaty by a subsequent treaty, by 
subsequent practice or by customary law.”
27. No comment.

Section III: “Interpretation of treaties.”

Article 69: “General rule of interpretation.”
28. If it must be assumed that it is desirable to lay down inter-
pretation rules, the Netherlands Government can concur with 
the ILC on the two basic principles adopted, namely that the actual 
text of the treaty is the most authoritative source from which to 
learn the parties’ intentions, and that the text should be judged in 
the very first place in good faith.

29. Paragraph 1: The rule given in paragraph 1(b) is applicable 
only to terms used in treaties whose significance derives partly 
from the fact that they have a more or less established meaning in 
international law. In other words, where a treaty refers, or appears 
to refer to concepts of international law, observance of this rule 
would mean that efforts must be made to discover the intention of 
the parties concluding the treaty by considering the meaning of 
these concepts elsewhere in international law and independently 
of the treaty to be interpreted. The Netherlands Government 
believes that when interpreting a treaty it is essential that the inten-
tion of the parties be ascertained from the treaty itself in accordance 
with the rule under (a); any endeavour to discover that intention 
from international law in general is a matter of secondary importance. 
The rules under paragraph 1(a) and (b) are therefore not of equal 
value: rule (b) is less important than rule (a) and would not be applied 
until rule (a) had proved ineffective.

Rule (b): The Netherlands Government cannot agree to reference 
to the “law in force at the time of (the) conclusion (of the treaty)”. 
Some legal terms will certainly have to be given the meaning they 
had when the treaty was concluded. The example given in para-
graph 11 of the ILC’s comments, viz. the interpretation of the term 
(Canadian) “bay” according to its meaning at the time, confirms 
this. But it is just as certain that in other cases legal terms will have 
to be interpreted according to their meaning in the legal rules in 
force at the time the dispute arises and again in other cases in the 
light of the law in force at the time of interpretation. For example, 
in treaties concerning a specific use of the “territorial sea” or of the 
“open sea”, the meaning of these terms will have to be regarded as 
keeping abreast of changing legal views.

Accordingly, the Netherlands Government is in favour of deleting 
paragraph 1(b). Deletion of the entire sentence is more likely than 
deletion merely of the words “in force at the time of its conclusion”
to leave unanswered the question whether any term should be interpreted in any specific case according to the law in force at the time or to that in force now. It would seem more correct and quite enough in itself to allow oneself to be guided solely by good faith when answering the question.

30. Paragraph 3: Having regard to the ILC’s arguments as set down in paragraph 14 of its commentary, the Netherlands Government can agree to no separate reference being made in paragraph 3(b) to “subsequent practice of organs of an international organization upon the interpretation of its constituent instrument”. This question should indeed be dealt with under the law relating to international organizations. Meanwhile, however, the present article may not discount the possible influence of what is conventional within the organization.

The present wording of paragraph 3(b) would appear to rule out that influence, or at least greatly to restrict it, by requiring the “understanding of all the parties”.

Yet even after deletion of the word “all” the clause “which clearly establishes the understanding... etc.” would amount to a needless and therefore undesirable curb on the interpretation procedure, making it unnecessarily rigid. The Netherlands Government suggests that the words “which clearly... etc.” up to and including “its interpretation” be deleted from paragraph 3(b).

31. Proposed texts for paragraph 1 and paragraph 3(b):
“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to each term in the context of the treaty and in the light of its objects and purposes.”
“5. ...(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty.”

Articles 70 to 73 inclusive:

32. No comment.

General remarks:

33. As regards the form in which the codification of the law of treaties would take, the Netherlands Government has noted that in the years 1956-1960 the ILC and its rapporteur Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice assumed when drafting the articles that they would be included not in a treaty but in an “expository code”. Paragraph 16 of the 1962 ILC report reiterates some arguments for this form, “a code of a general character”. The set-up was modified in 1961, when the ILC decided to reword the articles in such a way that they could be incorporated in a treaty. The arguments supporting such a move are given in paragraph 17 of the 1962 ILC report.

The final choice between Code and Treaty will have to be made by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Before the final decision is taken as to the form in which the findings shall be set down, it would be a good thing if the ILC were to study the various possibilities more closely and state how they imagine a code would be put into effect and what binding force or authoritative power it is likely to possess.

18. Pakistan

[PART I]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 7 January 1963 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations has the honour to state that all the draft articles contained in chapter II of the report of the International Law Commission covering the work of the fourteenth session are in accordance with settled principles of international law and the Government of Pakistan are in full agreement with all the provisions thereof.

[PART II AND III]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 10 December 1965 from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations

[Original: English]

PART II

Article 43: The following sub-paragraph may be added to this draft article:

“A party to a treaty may not plead impossibility of performance if the impossibility is based upon a change of circumstances deliberately brought about by that party. Such a party should restore the status quo and carry out its obligations under the treaty.”

Article 44: In paragraph 3 of this article, after clause (b), the following clause may be added as clause (c):

“(c) To changes of the circumstances which have not been foreseen by the parties but which have been deliberately brought about or created by one of the parties to the treaty.”

Article 45: This article should be deleted. A separate specific provision should be made to the effect that the interpretation and application of, as well as disputes under, sections II and III of draft articles 31 to 45 should be made subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

[PART III]

Article 61: This article should be amended so that instead of requiring the consent of the third party, a mere notice to the third party will do.

Article 67: This article should be deleted altogether.

Article 68: Clause (c) of this article should be deleted.

19. Poland

[PART I]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 25 October 1963 from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations

[Original: English]

1. It is the view of the Polish Government that since general international treaties relate to universal norms of international law or refer to problems of interest to the entire international community, they should be opened for accession to all States without exception.

Any limitation of the participation in such treaties would be contrary to their universal character and might result in discrimination of some States, which is contradictory with the universal character of international law.

Therefore, the second part of article 8, paragraph 1, which follows the just principle that “in the case of a general multilateral treaty, every State may become a party to the treaty”, should be deleted as being restrictive in relation to that very principle.

2. The expression “a small group of States”, used in several articles of the draft, raises serious doubts, for it is too general, and it allows for different, sometimes even contradictory, interpretations, which in the future can bring about considerable difficulties of practical nature.

3. Too far-reaching obligations of States participating in international negotiations are contained in article 17, paragraph 1.

It seems unjustified and inconsistent with international practice to extend the obligation specified in this article to States which only participated in the elaboration of the draft treaty or only took part in the negotiations. Acceptance of such a concept could lead, in certain cases, some States to refrain from participating in the negotiations of international treaties.
4. It might be advisable to consider whether the adoption of such a wide formula as "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty", contained in article 18, paragraph 1(d), would not lead in practice to a considerable restriction of the right of States to make reservations to treaties. Such a restriction might consequently reduce the possibility of their participation in certain treaties. This would be particularly undesirable with regard to general international treaties.

[PART II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 21 July 1964 from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations

[Original: English]

In the view of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, part II of the draft articles on the law of treaties constitutes a considerable contribution to the codification and progressive development of international law and, in general, is acceptable. The following provisions, however, rouse some reservations:

Article 36

Coercion as defined in this article should include not only "the threat or use of force" but also some other forms of pressure, in particular economic pressure, which in fact represents quite a typical kind of coercion exercised sometimes on concluding treaties.

Article 39

In the phrase "from the character of the treaty and from the circumstances..." the conjunction "and" should be replaced by "or". For it seems sufficient that the appropriate intention of the parties should result only from the character of the treaty or only from the circumstances accompanying its conclusion, or from the statements made by the parties.

Article 40, paragraph 2

In order to avoid any excessive dependence of the future operation of a treaty upon the will of countries that have not undertaken any obligations under that treaty, the term provided for under this paragraph should be as short as possible and at any rate should not exceed four years. Such a period of time is in general quite sufficient for carrying out in the countries concerned the procedure connected with the ratification or adoption of the treaty.

Article 50, paragraph 2

The revocation of the notice by a party to the treaty should be subject to the agreement of the remaining parties. For their interests should be safeguarded, taking into consideration the fact that after the notice of termination, etc., has been communicated by the country concerned, the other parties to the treaty frequently take appropriate steps in order to adjust themselves to a new situation that will arise if that country ceases to be a party to the treaty. Moreover, it may happen that in connexion with a notice communicated by a country, another country withholds its own intended notice and, after the revocation of the notice by the former country, the latter country would be unable to communicate its own notice on account of the expiration of the period of time provided for under the relevant agreement for giving such a notice.

20. PORTUGAL

[PART II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 27 August 1964 from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations

[Original: English]

Article 30

This article contains a general provision affirming the principle of the validity of treaties and of their continuance in force and operation, provided that the prerequisite conditions laid down in part I are complied with.

At the same time the exceptions it mentions give a concise notion of the structure of Part II, since it foresees the nullity, termination or suspension of the operation of the treaty or the withdrawal of one of the contracting parties.

Our observations on this principle and the various exceptions will be found in the commentaries on the articles under these specific headings.

Article 31

The subject-matter of this article is of the highest importance, as is apparent not only from its possible practical implications but also from the special attention devoted to it as a matter of doctrine. The object is to determine the scope of the constitutional provisions of each State governing its competence to conclude treaties, or more precisely to find out if these provisions can affect the validity, in international law, of the consent given to a treaty by the representative of a State, if it is apparent that he was qualified to express such consent.

Logically, the position to be taken must be based upon consideration of the constitutional texts in question. In the case of Portugal, these do not solve the problem. Article 81, paragraph 7 of the Portuguese Constitution empowers the President of the Republic to negotiate international conventions and treaties, submitting them through the Government to the National Assembly for its approval. This approval is expressly mentioned in article 91, paragraph 7, as being among the powers of the Assembly. 11

This approval enables the President of the Republic to ratify the treaties.

The question has arisen with regard to similar constitutional provisions whether they should be considered as determining whether the State can be deemed to be bound by the consent given by a representative who was apparently authorized to give it.

Two opposing currents of opinion have come to light concerning the doctrine of the powers of representatives of contracting States, one upholding the pre-eminence of internal law and the other that of international law.

According to the first, international juridical validity ought to be attributed only to a treaty concluded by representatives who are fully (plenamente) authorized by internal law to contract the obligations in question. The provisions of internal law concerning the limitations placed upon the competence of the State organs to conclude treaties must be considered as part of international law. Hence if the agent of a State purports to represent it in violation of its constitutional law, that State is bound neither under its internal law nor under international law.

On the other hand, the second group maintains that internal constitutional law should be resorted to only for the purpose of determining which organ or person has the power to represent the State; but that when this representative has definitely bound himself in the name of the State in question, this obligation subsists in international relations, even if an excess has been committed in the exercise of the powers of representation. International law lays down only the procedure and the conditions which permit States to express their consent to treaties, as well as the conditions which must be fulfilled by the different organs and agents in order to be recognized as authorized to act under these procedures in the name of the State. Again, while internal law determines the organs and the procedures by which the will of the State to conclude treaties is formed, international law only takes into account the external manifestations of that will on the international plane. It is thus possible that a treaty may be valid in international law,

11 Only in urgent cases is the Government permitted to approve international conventions and treaties (article 109, paragraph 2). The existence of an urgent situation is assessed at his discretion by the President of the Republic. (Cf. Prof. Marcelo Caetano, Curso de Ciencia Politica e Direito Internacional, 3rd ed., vol. II, p. 182).
while remaining invalid in internal law, a situation which may render the agent responsible under domestic law, because of the juridical consequences of his actions.\textsuperscript{12}

The growing complexity of the constitutional provisions in each State and the difficulties of their interpretation, even without underrating recourse to internal law, have in the meanwhile increasingly emphasized the need in international law for placing treaties under the shelter of the juridical questions thus raised. That is the reason why restrictions designed to ensure stability in the application of treaties are placed in the way of referring back to internal law—a point on which there are an important number of opinions both in theory and in international practice.

Whether one speaks of incorporating national law into international law as regards the competence of the organs acting in representation of the State, or of the mere conformity of international law with national law in this respect, it is certain that, leaving aside those two opposing trends, an attempt is made to formulate a rule which should, without refusing to apply constitutional law, appropriately safeguard the position of the contracting States. A principle of good faith is thus invoked, by virtue of which, where the organ acting in the name of a certain State did so in such a way as to convince the opposing State in good faith that it was competent to enter into the contract, the treaty will be binding upon the State thus represented, even if the representative exceeded the powers conferred on him by his internal law.\textsuperscript{13}

On the other hand, it is taken as generally recognized that a treaty concluded in disregard of the provisions of the constitutional law governing the formation of the will of a State does not bind the latter, if such provisions are expressly laid down and have a “sufficiently notorious character”.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus, as a result of this preoccupation with safeguards in concluding a treaty, and principally in executing it, a doctrine has emerged which, without affecting the applicability of constitutional restrictions, formulates reservations with regard to their indiscriminate application, centred as it is, above all, on the apparent powers of the organs representing the States in accordance with their constitutional laws.

It is precisely this doctrine that article 31 seeks to establish. Naturally, in order to achieve a proper understanding of this article, it is not possible to think only of cases where a representative of the Portuguese State may conclude a treaty in violation of constitutional rules. If it is advantageous to invoke such a violation in order to consider the treaty as not binding, it is also necessary to bear in mind, and perhaps with greater reason, those other cases of treaties in which Portugal may intervene in good faith, in the rightful belief that the intervention of the organ of the other State or States is in conformity with their domestic laws.

From this point of view it appears to be more in conformity with the requirements of the international community to regard as valid the intervention of an organ having authority as set forth in article 4, and only to accept that the State may declare itself not bound when the violation of its internal law is manifest.

This exceptional hypothesis is couched in rather vague terms, but it does not seem appropriate, or even possible in the present stage of international law to substitute a different wording with a more limited and stricter connotation. We might speak of a violation that is “absolutely manifest”, as in paragraph (12) of the commentary on the draft, or of one that is “sufficiently notorious”, as preferred by De Visscher, without achieving appreciably greater precision. It is even necessary to underline that cases in which a binding treaty results, despite disregard of constitutional norms, are exceptional. And it would seem that a vague expression such as that in article 31 will make it possible to decide, according to the circumstances of each case, whether knowledge of the rule or rules of the internal law of another State regarding competence to conclude treaties could be demanded from a State about to enter into a contract with that other State.

Hence, while recognizing the imprecise nature of the limitation contained in this article, we do not see any juridical disadvantage in accepting the proposed text, which appears otherwise to conform best to international practice and jurisprudence.

Finally, it should be stated that what is perhaps the most flagrant instance of a failure to bind a State—namely, that in which the representative does not fulfil the conditions laid down in article 4 and is nevertheless permitted to express the consent of this State—is regulated by article 32 in terms which in practice amount to an important limitation within this exception. And this is one more reason for rendering it acceptable.

\textit{Article 32}

Once it is pointed out that this article has in view only those cases where an unauthorized representative claims to express the consent of his State definitively so as to produce a binding effect and where consequently there is no possibility of a subsequent ratification or approval, it becomes obvious that the only solution can, in principle, be that the treaty is not binding upon the State: the representative has failed to comply with the conditions laid down in article 4 necessary to express the consent of his State, and nevertheless has expressed it.

This solution becomes inescapable not only in view of the principles regulating representation in national and international law, but also because of the exigencies of the very structure of the draft, which in article 4 sets out the qualifications which the representative should have in order to be accepted as such.

It would be stretching this consequence too far, however, if we refused to concede that the State can ratify the action of its representative, expressly or implicitly. It is on this basis that the exception contained in the last part of paragraph 1 of this article is understood.

Paragraph 2 contains a principle related to the preceding article—the external appearances of consent are relevant in international law—but which naturally gives way when the limitations imposed upon the powers of the representative have been communicated in due form to the other contracting States. Since the latter cannot allege ignorance of these limitations, it must strictly be held that they entered into the contract with the representative in the precise terms in which he was empowered to do so. It would, therefore, be unjustifiable that despite this knowledge these States should be able to take advantage of the circumstance that the representative expressed consent unconditionally.

\textit{Article 33}

The theory of vitiated consent has not been studied in international law with the same precision and to the same extent as in domestic law. This has been prevented by the circumstances in which international agreements have developed, allowing the contracting parties to obtain a more profound knowledge of each other, and requiring as a rule safeguards as to the manner of action. For this reason the list of cases where such flaws have existed and produced an effect is restricted. On the other hand, a complete theory concerning these vitiations has been considered in international law as a possible cause of conflicts, and a dangerous weapon enabling States to refuse compliance with obligations assumed.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{14} See Balladore-Pallieri, op. cit., p. 130.

\textsuperscript{15} Charles De Visscher, \textit{Théories et réalités en droit international public}, 2nd ed., p. 311.

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. Balladore-Pallieri, op. cit., p. 212.
This does not in any way imply the irrelevance of error, fraud and coercion in international law, which in this regard avails itself of many of the principles in force in domestic law on this question. And it must be stressed that, despite the rare occasions on which these vitiations are found to occur in practice, they occasion certain scruples in this field for two reasons which we must set out: firstly, because international law, following in this aspect the less evolved juridical orders, contents itself with the external manifestation of the will, making it correspond, in principle, to the real will; and secondly, because as a rule the declaration of the will is imputed, not to its physical author, but to the juridical community in representation of which the organ has acted. For this reason, the vitiation normally occurs only when the will expressed by the representative does not correspond with the real will of the competent internal organ. Lack of accord between the declaration of the organ of representation and its own will is an exceptional situation. 18

Now, passing over these particular aspects which we may call internal, article 33 only refers, in the commentary, to the "fraudulent conduct" of a contracting State as having induced a State to give consent to a treaty.

The difficulty, stressed in the Report, of being unable to arrive at a universally accepted notion of deceit led to the use in the various texts of the draft of the French word "dol", the English word "fraud" and the Spanish word "dolo". In the absence of any precedents that would help to elucidate the precise scope of the notion of fraud, it was thought best to leave it to be worked out in practice and in the decisions of international tribunals. This appears to be reasonably prudent.

On the positive side, article 33 lays stress upon deceit as vitiating the will, just as in domestic law, and considers it as a cause of nullity of a treaty. This nullity is relative, and this corresponds to the present state of theory: that is to say, only the State whose will has been so vitiated can invoke and avail itself of the nullity. 19

We note that this article omits aspects that are doubtful in theory, for instance, the question who is to decree the annulment. It is, however, understandable that the draft should not make allusion to it, this being a matter to be regulated if necessary in texts regarding arbitration or the competence of international tribunals.

Paragraph 2 makes it possible to apply the allegation of fraud only to the clauses affected by it. The mere statement of this possibility would soon provoke the objection that partial nullity of a treaty is in some cases impracticable, because the clauses which have been the object of the fraud are not separable from the instrument. Nevertheless, the reference to article 46 restricts partial nullity to cases in which such clauses are clearly separable from the rest of the treaty with regard to their application, or in which the acceptance of these clauses has not been made an essential condition of the consent of the parties to the treaty as a whole. This being so, partial nullity is restricted in reasonable terms.

The consequences of nullity are set out in article 52.

**Article 34**

Regarding error as vitiating consent, the considerations set out above in regard to fraud are valid mutatis mutandis. Further error is seldom proved and the solutions given in the present article are based on the rare cases which become obvious.

Paragraph 1 formulates a general principle regarding an error as it may affect the substance of a treaty. It attributes to it the same effects of relative nullity as in the case of fraud; it is permissible to conclude that only essential error was contemplated. No distinc-

18 See in this respect Paul Guggenheim, Traité de droit international public, vol. I, pp. 92 and 93.
19 Cf. in this respect, Guggenheim, op. cit., p. 92; Louis Cavaré, Le droit international public positif, vol. I, p. 56.

The statement in the report that an error of law is admissible on the same footing as one of fact does not seem satisfactory to us. This is because the expression "error related to a fact or state of facts" in the text does not imply exclusion of an error of law. But these terms do without doubt designate an error of fact. The report recognizes this since it subsequently seeks to show that the line between law and fact is not always an easy one to draw and that an error as to internal law would for the purposes of international law be considered an error of fact.

This effort at interpretation could easily have been omitted (on the basis of elements outside the draft) had it been provided that an error alleged as the ground of annulment can be an error of fact just as much as an error of law, the admissibility of which is not otherwise placed in doubt by the authorities. 18

It is also interesting to record that in the report one is given to understand that the effect of invalidating consent will be to make the treaty void ab initio, that is to give it a retroactive effect. There is thus a clash with the theory most in vogue, which even in cases of annulment on the ground of error does not allow such effects. 19 Article 52, however, seeks to mitigate the application of this principle.

Paragraph 2 excludes from nullity cases in which the party led into error has contributed to it up to a point. This exception finds a precedent in a decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, according to which it is not permissible for a party to enter a plea of error when it has contributed to that error by its own conduct, or where it could have avoided it, or even where the circumstances were such as to put the party on notice of a possible error.

As has been seen, there is complete accord between the content of this decision and the exceptions laid down in paragraph 2.

An identical principle is to be found in article 659 of the Portuguese Civil Code. Also articles 217 to 222 of the Draft Civil Code, Book I, General Part (1st Ministerial Revision), now in hand, are in our view based on it.

Paragraph 3 refers to article 46, as in cases of fraud, for the permissibility of partial annulment in cases where the error related to particular clauses only of the treaty.

Finally, paragraph 4, which deals with errors in the wording of the text, does not permit the invalidation of the treaty, but provides for correction of these errors in accordance with articles 26 and 27 of Part I. This is another application of the principle of stability of treaties, which permits their invalidation, even if only partial, solely in extreme cases.

**Articles 35 and 36**

These two articles deal with matters the importance and novelty of which we are bound to emphasize. An attempt is here made to assign juridical effects to coercion exercised in order to secure consent to the conclusion of a treaty.

From ancient times to present days, international law has moved in the direction of considering as valid treaties that are concluded under coercion, thus departing from the theory of vitiation of consent applied in private law. This departure is due to the favouring of the use of force for the settlement of international disputes and to the absence of a supra-national body which could take up these disputes and find a solution for them. The result has been that the tenacious defence of treaties concluded under coercion has come to base itself on the right of the strongest and on the anti-juridical ground that the weakest can only choose one of two alternatives, either total ruin or signature of the treaty—and the latter is considered the more favourable! This reasoning has been opposed as being manifestly devoid of foundation. Therefore, it
remained for the advocates of this view to support the validity of these treaties on grounds of the social order, or rather the desirability of establishing a general stability which demanded that there should be an end to conflicts—an end which, it is claimed, would be secured precisely by a respect for such international instruments. Although it is recognized that this solution in no way satisfies our sense of justice, it has been persistently supported on the ground that it is in conformity with the nature of positive law, which has to limit itself to a realistic basis and to achieve a modus vivendi acceptable among States.

The establishment of the United Nations, however, and the acceptance of its Charter, Article 2, paragraph 4 of which prohibits any recourse to the threat or use of force in the solution of international disputes, ought to have opened new perspectives in this field, with a corresponding and necessary influence on the positive law of treaties, as indeed had previously been brought about by the old League of Nations.

What has just been stated relates to coercion exercised collectively on the State itself. But this may be very clearly distinguished from the coercion which is brought to bear on the will of the physical person representing the State. If this person is coerced the principles of private law are applied and the consent thus obtained is considered null. The most important innovating aspect of these two articles lies in the unification of the rules in the two cases. Whether the coercion is exercised upon the subject of the law or upon his agent, it is always relevant: in the first case it annuls the treaty, and in the second, the consent on which its conclusion was based.

This nullity is absolute, for it does not need to be invoked by the State concerned as in the cases of fraud and error which have been examined above. Also, in assessing the gravity of the consequences resulting from coercion, the two articles are in accord with the most modern theory, which admits in international law both kinds of nullity, absolute and relative, but upholds only the latter in cases of consent procured under coercion.

We may thus see the gravity which is attributed in the draft to procuring consent by coercion, since it is given a unique position, that of the more rigorous of those two kinds of nullity.

This approach is praiseworthy as being the best calculated to ensure the rule of morality in international relations.

Article 35, which deals with coercion of the representative of a State, refuses juridical protection of any kind to consent thus expressed and, as can be seen, adopts the line of traditional doctrine.

Its paragraph 2 is similar to articles 33, paragraph 2, and 34, paragraph 2, already examined when dealing with fraud and mistake, and does not call for observations different from those made in those cases.

The doctrine expressed in article 36 is also an innovation; it lays down the law concerning the coercion of a State by the threat or use of force. The report states that it was thought desirable to go back to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and that it was considered that the precise scope of the acts in question should be determined in practice by interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter.

Given the close connexion between this subject of coercion in the conclusion of treaties and the above-mentioned principle of the Charter, which is of almost universal validity, it is judged best as a precaution, not to go more deeply into details respecting the methods of this coercion.

**Article 37**

Even in our times it is still stated that the rules of international law are not of a peremptory character, and that treaties may have a wide content, without limitations of any sort. The reason for this is seen in the absence of any norm prohibiting treaties which are contra bonos mores or contrary to a fundamental principle of international law. However, it may be stated that mainly from the coming into force of Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, it has come to be understood that there are limitations to the juridical objects of a treaty. Under Article 20 members of the League agreed that in future they would not undertake obligations contrary to the Covenant. And doctrine has been moving with increasing force towards acceptance of the rule that every convention violating international law, rules of universal morality and fundamental human rights must be considered null owing to the unlawful character of its purpose. Even those authors who, keeping in mind the possibility of a treaty modifying international custom, recognize the difficulty of solving the question, and ask if all treaties which affect principles which are essential to the structure of international society should not be considered null, as for example, those providing for recourse to piracy or disrespect for the human person.

Today, under Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, it is accepted that the obligations of Member States under the Charter shall prevail over those under any international agreement if there is a conflict between the two.

Article 37 of the draft seeks to confirm this new trend in positive international law. But it is evident that we are still in the early phase of producing a positive rule, compatible with the evolution of this branch of law. That this is so is shown by the allusion made to "a peremptory norm of general international law", without singling out from among these rules those from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm having the same character. A mere enumeration of examples, as emphasized in the report, would incur the risk of rendering interpretation difficult in regard to other cases of incompatibility not expressly mentioned.

Nor would it profit much, as far as the certainty of this provision is concerned, to include in it, according to some suggestions, acts constituting crimes against international law, such as genocide, or other offences constituting violations of human rights or the principle of self-determination. It is well known how much these notions have become corrupt in reality, so that any reference to them would in no way contribute in practice towards removing them from the confusion existing with regard to them. Again, any reference would not in any way add to the clarity or efficacy of this article.

We are of the opinion, therefore, that the position adopted by the Commission regarding article 37 is a balanced one, and that it will be difficult to go further in the definition of jus cogens and its effect on treaties which appear to be incompatible with it.

**Article 38**

Section III of the draft contains a series of articles relating to the duration of treaties. Although it would be possible to evaluate
them as a whole, it is more convenient to study each one of the cases, or groups of cases, provided for in each rule.

Article 38 mentions the most frequent of the relevant cases, generally deemed in international affairs to be causes of termination intimately connected with the nature of the treaties. This makes detailed comments superfluous.

Paragraph 1 deals with the termination of treaties through the operation of their own provisions. Such clauses are currently applied in international instruments and fulfill the function of resolutory conditions.

Paragraph 2, which refers to denunciation of bilateral treaties, points out the special advantage of fixing a date on which the denunciation is to take effect. The formula used is not very clear, since reference is made to the date of denunciation of the treaty, a circumstance which in certain cases lead to difficulties in interpretation. However, it would be difficult to lay down a more precise principle. It is understood that denunciation is effected by the normal procedure, that is through notification of the desire to exercise the right of denunciation.

The same can be said of clause (a) of paragraph 3, which deals with the application of the principle of the denunciation of bilateral treaties to multilateral treaties.

The ground for termination of a treaty provided in clause (b) of paragraph 3—reduction of the number of parties below a minimum number agreed upon as being necessary for the treaty to continue in force—covers the application of a clause like those in some treaties, for example, that on the political rights of women. The final part of this clause, which states that termination does not result from the mere fact that the number of parties falls below the number initially fixed as a condition for the treaty to enter into force, represents in reality a restrictive interpretation of the first part of the clause. It might, indeed, be understood that to fix the number of parties necessary to enable the treaty to enter into force showed a belief that this number was a requisite and paramount condition for its continuance in force. It was sought to do away with this condition, for a plausible reason: a treaty may be terminated by agreement, by denunciation or by withdrawal of the contracting parties. This means that when it is desired to terminate a treaty by reason of the reduction of the number of parties it is necessary to state this in an express clause inserted in the instrument.

This rule is commendable since it ensures a greater certainty in application.

Article 39

If a treaty contains no provisions regarding its termination, then it is possible to lay down two principles: either to make its denunciation upon the withdrawal of one of the parties impossible in any event or purely and simply to let the solution of each case depend upon the will of the parties or an appreciation of other factors.

The discussion of this issue, of which the report gives an account, makes fully patent the difficulties experienced in reconciling the need for stability of treaties with the exigencies of a just solution and of a balanced satisfaction of interests. It is conceded that, side by side with treaties the nature of which excludes the supposition that the contracting States had any intention of permitting denunciation or withdrawal of one of the parties, e.g. treaties of peace and of delimitation of frontiers, there are others in which the existence of such an intention may be easily proved. On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account the fact that there is no clause regarding denunciation or withdrawal. It seems therefore reasonable to establish, as is done in article 39, a negative principle, in order later on to admit such a possibility of denunciation or withdrawal on the basis of three factors:

The character of the treaty;
The circumstances of its conclusion;
The statements of the parties, made either before or after conclusion.

This rule is not supplemented by any guidance as to the method for interpreting the joint will of the contracting parties. Once the interpretation of treaties is classified as an operation of juridical technique, the existence of a certain number of general rules is recognized, which make up a logical system very often not coinciding with private law. Any interpretation that may be given to them cannot be separated from their useful effect, expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat. On the other hand, the express mention of the statements of the parties, which the report explains as including the preparatory work and the subsequent conduct of the parties, gives the required emphasis to this spirit of interpretation, which De Visscher calls "the politic in the interpretation of treaties". 24

We think, in brief, that the summary of the basic elements of interpretation contained in article 39 leaves sufficient latitude for the application of those principles, and leads one to believe that the special nature of the subject discussed was kept in mind.

The notice period of at least twelve months for signifying intention to denounce or to withdraw is justified as being a means of duly safeguarding the interests of States which may continue to be parties to the treaty.

Article 40

International theory recognizes as a rule that treaties may be terminated either when an intention of such a possibility is made clear in a clause initially inserted, or when a common declaration to that effect is made later on. It is with this latter manner of terminating a treaty that the present article deals.

There is nothing noteworthy about paragraph 1, which admits three fully justifiable forms of agreement.

Paragraph 2, which relates especially to multilateral treaties, embodies one of the points of view evolved during the discussion of the draft. According to this point of view, it is laid down as a supplementary rule that such treaties may be terminated with the consent of all the parties and, in addition thereto, with the consent of at least two-thirds of the States which drew up the treaty.

This rule is noteworthy because it seeks to give importance to the consent of States which took part in the drafting of the treaty and which still have the right of becoming parties to it. It does not seem reasonable, however, to wait indefinitely for them to become parties and in the meantime to continue to require their consent to termination. Their consent will be of importance only up to a certain moment. The draft does not mention the number of years after which their consent will no longer be necessary, but the report states that the points of view of the various Governments consulted are being awaited.

In our view this period should not exceed 5 years. The operation of the treaty over this period appears to us normally sufficient to enable the States to decide whether to become parties to a treaty; and when they are not interested in becoming parties, no principle involving protection of their interests, even potential interests, can render defensible the need for their consent to the termination of the treaty.

But we wish to say clearly that other considerations bearing on international practice may not prevail over this logical reasoning and make advisable a different time-limit. The period would then depend upon the evaluation of factors not placed before us.

24 Op. cit., pp. 313 et seq. Regarding the true will of the parties to treaties, the difficult situation of the student is better understood when one recalls the phrase of Paul Valéry: "Les véritables traités sont ceux qui se concluent entre les arrière-pensées"—cited in Principes de droit international public by Charles Rousseau (Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International, 1958, p. 501).
The extension of the rules laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 to cases in which application of a treaty is suspended does not call for any detailed criticism.

**Article 41**

This article, dealing with the total or partial termination of a treaty by another subsequent treaty, points in clause (a) to an incontestable case, namely that the parties have indicated their intention that the matter should be governed by a later treaty.

But clause (b) is more complex and raises a question of interpretation to which the observations made regarding article 39 could apply. The issue here is to demonstrate the incompatibility of the provisions of the new treaty with those of the old one, and to assess the true intention of the parties as to whether the latter should prevail.

The text of this article indicates that the incompatibility here dealt with is true incompatibility. From this it follows that it is not possible to harmonize the obligations resulting from the new treaty with those resulting from the old one. 32

There is no doubt that where a new treaty is concluded which shows this degree of incompatibility in relation to the old treaty, the will of the parties can only be understood as intending to put an end to the latter. Hence the impossibility of applying the provisions of both treaties simultaneously will lead to the application only of the provisions of the more recent one.

However, in a desire to respect the will of the parties, paragraph 2 lays down that the original treaty must be applied where it appears from the circumstances that the later treaty was only intended to suspend the application of the first. On a very strict construction, this principle is already contained in paragraph 1, since in the case it deals with there was no intention to regulate the matter wholly in the new treaty, nor is there true incompatibility between the two. Thus complete interpretation permits us to find in paragraph 1 the guidelines for the situation dealt with in paragraph 2.

Despite this, this last paragraph is useful, as it stresses the intention of the draft to ascertain the will of the States, and as it gives a greater sureness for asserting that the first treaty is suspended, notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent treaty regulates the same matter.

**Article 42**

Failure to comply with the obligations assumed in a treaty is generally recognized as a ground for suspending or even for terminating its operation. This is a principle of domestic law at present in force (see article 709 of the Portuguese Civil Code), but it is modified in public international law.

The solution contained in paragraph 1 for bilateral treaties does not raise doubts as to the possibility of one party dissociating itself from a treaty with which the other party has failed to comply, and even less as regards the possibility of simple suspension.

In any case, it appears necessary to recognize this right only when the violation is of a certain gravity, or renders impossible the achievement of the objectives aimed at. This is laid down in paragraph 1 which speaks of "material breach" and in clauses (a) and (b).

When dealing with multilateral treaties, certain aspects will be seen which did not pass unperceived by the Commission. There is indeed a need for distinguishing between cases where only one party reacts to the violation, and cases where all affected parties by common agreement invoke the breach. In the first case the situation is the same as in bilateral treaties, but the affected party may not go further than suspension of the treaty, wholly or partly.

Where, however, all the affected parties combine to take joint action, they are permitted to suspend the treaty, wholly or partly in relation to the defaulting State, or may even terminate it.

On this point we have two observations to make.

The first observation relates to the terms of the solution given in the draft, for a certain current of opinion among jurists makes a distinction, as far as the rights of the parties affected by the violation are concerned, between contractual treaties and law-making treaties. Although in regard to contractual treaties the principle is applied without hesitation that it is permissible for the injured party to free itself of its obligations under the treaty, in regard to normative treaties—that is to say, treaties which formulate rules of objective international law—it is held rather that the norms continue in force despite the violation, and despite the fact that the injured parties have also for their part temporarily given up complying with them.

Paragraph 2 of this article does not go beyond permitting the injured parties the alternatives of suspending or terminating the treaty, without making any distinction between the categories to which the treaty is question may belong.

In connexion with this, a second observation must be made.

Should the decision to suspend or terminate the treaty be left to the free determination of the parties? Or should not rather a guiding principle be laid down, according to which the party or parties concerned should go beyond suspension only where the violation is of a certain character?

In our opinion, the latter is the preferable solution, in order to ensure greater stability of treaties and better discipline in international relations. The Commission naturally must have also had in mind these requirements, as its report, when alluding to the cessation of application through concerted action of the injured parties, mentions the case where the violation has frustrated or undermined the operation of the treaty as between all parties.

It appears necessary, however, that this should be embodied in an article or at least mentioned in paragraph 2(b)(ii). Expressed as a mere observation in the report, it will not even possess the value given by article 39 to the statements made by the parties before the coming into force of the treaty in relation to that treaty.

Paragraph 4 refers to article 46, as is done by articles 33, paragraph 2, and 34, paragraph 3. On this we have no comment to make.

Paragraph 5 gives emphasis to any provisions in the treaty or in any related instrument which may regulate in a different manner the rights of the parties in the event of a breach. This rule justifies itself.

**Article 43**

International doctrine has always admitted impossibility of performance as a ground for terminating a treaty. 33 This impossibility may be either physical or juridical, and both cases are covered by the letter of this article.

As an example of the first, we may mention the submersion of an island, and of the second, the case where the performance of a treaty in relation to one of the contracting parties constitutes per se a breach of that treaty, e.g. a treaty of alliance among three States, two of whom are at war with each other.

It is obvious that the disappearance or the total and permanent destruction of the subject-matter of the rights and obligations agreed upon in the treaty should not involve the same consequences as when such disappearance or destruction are temporary. Permanent impossibility permits the termination of a treaty, but temporary impossibility permits only its suspension (No. 2).

The reference to article 46 regarding impossibility of performance only in respect of a few clauses, contained in paragraph 3, is justified.

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32 This case is distinguished from non-authentic incompatibility, which does not render impossible the simultaneous application of two documents; as the later one limits itself to restricting the rights flowing from the first. Cf. Guggenheim, op. et vol. cit., pp. 144 and 145.

in the same manner as in the case of similar provisions examined by us earlier.

Article 44

Although this article does not mention the principle rebus sic stantibus, it provides for its application. The article is thus in line with theory, jurisprudence and positive international law.

The difficulty does not lie in the acceptance of the principle, but in the terms in which it has to be formulated. The great majority of writers accept the principle where there is a substantial alteration of the circumstances which really determined or influenced the conclusion of the treaty. 23

It is considered that it is not logical to presume that this principle is implicit in the generality of treaties. On the contrary, where there are no elements for concluding that there was a will, either tacit or express, as to the consequences of any alteration of the de facto circumstances in regard to the rights of the parties, the most that can be said is that the parties did not foresee this contingency. And if this alteration is liable to affect the treaty to a greater or lesser degree, this is because a norm of international law permits it. This norm, which may be more or less clearly expressed, and which has been accepted since long ago, even in international litigation, is now incorporated in this article 44.

In the interests of the stability of treaties, already mentioned, this principle cannot be accepted without limitations, for it is certain that States are subject to continuous changes of circumstances, and it would not be in any manner justifiable that such changes should serve as a ground for each State to liberate itself, by a unilateral denunciation, from complying with the obligations under a treaty which they had freely concluded. Hence the State should not be able to make indiscriminate use of such changes.

Even more: this principle must be invested with an exceptional character, since it is very important to the international community that undertakings subscribed to in instruments of this kind should be fulfilled. It is this character that is implicitly recognized when speaking of a fundamental change in the de facto circumstances, or of the danger of persisting in a binding obligation that might seriously affect the right of self-preservation of a contracting State (Diéna), or of a grave change of circumstances (Cavaré), or of an essential change (Anzilliotti), etc.

It is precisely this exceptional character that is recognized in paragraph 1 of article 44.

Paragraph 2 stresses only the “fundamental change” which has occurred with regard to a fact or situation existing at the time when the treaty was entered into and defines it in terms which, although not indisputable, we deem adequate in the present phase of evolution of this branch of law. Clause (a), when speaking of the essential basis of the consent of the parties to a treaty, goes back in the last resort to the interpretation of the will of the parties. Clause (b), although strictly speaking covered by the preceding clause, should be maintained.

The essential change in the character of the obligations undertaken in a treaty should only be taken as relevant when it is proved that they constitute an essential basis of the consent of the parties to the treaty. But in any event, the usefulness of clause (b) is to be found in its positive reference to the change in the nature of obligations.

It is clear that, with only these two clauses, this article permits some doubts to subsist in regard, for example, to substantial political changes within each contracting State. Nevertheless, we are of the view that it is better to have a somewhat vague formula such as the one on “fundamental change of circumstances”, so as to permit consideration in each case of the applicability of the said principle.

23 For all writers, see Balladore-Pallieri, op. cit., pp. 301 et seq., and the authors there cited on p. 302, note 22.

The two exceptions contained in paragraph 3 have been justified on unequal grounds. The first—a treaty fixing a boundary—justifies itself more in a negative way; that is to say, as being an exception destined to avoid friction between States on account of the frontier delimitation, tends to reflect the change of circumstances referred to in paragraph 2.

But clause (b) justifies itself in a positive fashion, to the extent that it provides for cases which the parties indirectly agreed would not be subject to the application of the principle rebus sic stantibus, since with regard to the change in certain circumstances of fact they inserted special clauses in the treaty itself, adopting various solutions.

Paragraph 4 makes the principle of the separability of treaty provisions applicable to this article and is fully acceptable.

Article 45

This provision is closely linked to article 37, to such an extent that during the work of the Commission doubts arose as to whether both should not be incorporated in a single article. Thus, just as a treaty incompatible with jus cogens is null, so too it is inevitable to establish that even where a treaty was concluded under conditions of perfect validity it would lose that validity so soon as an imperative norm begins to take effect, causing the nullity of all treaties concluded in conflict with that norm. Paragraph 2 is yet another reference to article 46, which is reasonable because the new imperative norm of international law may be incompatible with only one or some of the clauses of the treaty.

This article is likewise connected with article 53, paragraph 2, wherein are set out the consequences of the application of a treaty which becomes invalid when a new rule of jus cogens is established. These consequences will be commented on later.

Article 46

The indivisibility of a treaty is established in paragraph 1 of this article as the rule, for the purposes of nullity, termination, suspension or withdrawal by one of the parties.

Paragraph 2 has a double object: it establishes an express relation with the provisions, already examined by us, in which the separability of a treaty is admitted, and, on the other hand, it defines the cumulative conditions necessary for a partial utilization of the treaty. The first of these conditions is based on a practical criterion, whether the treaty can be executed if the clauses in question are separated from the rest of the treaty. The second condition rests on an interpretation of the will of the parties and leads to the functioning of the principle of indivisibility, notwithstanding the fact that the clauses are clearly separable from the rest of the treaty as regards performance. For indivisibility it is sufficient that the clauses in question constituted an essential condition of the consent of the parties to the treaty as a whole.

Once the object and the functioning of the principle of indivisibility are understood in these balanced terms, we have no fundamental objection to it.

Article 47

The loss of the right to allege the nullity of a treaty as a ground for terminating it or withdrawing from it is regulated in terms which are in our opinion reasonable. Clause (a), in recognizing waiver of the right as a ground for loss, seeks to apply a general principle. We are dealing here with a right which does not have an unrenounceable character.

Clause (b) refers to the conduct of the parties and gives importance to it in this context, where its unequivocal result has been that the party has elected to consider itself bound by the treaty.

We wish, however, to call attention to a divergence between the text of this article and the comments which are made on it in the report. Although in the introduction and in clause (b) reference is made to articles 32 and 35, the report refers twice to cases of
nullity mentioned in articles 31 and 34 as being the ones provided for in the article.

We suppose that there is an inexactitude in the text of the article, which probably goes back to one of the earlier drafts before the final draft was agreed upon. For when we deal with the loss of that right, the loss is only understandable when the application of the treaty depends on the attitude of the parties, either by waiving the right or by conducting themselves in a manner equivalent to an express waiver.

Article 35, dealing with the consequences of coercion exercised on the person of the representative of a State, has not established that the treaty may be annulled, nor, therefore, that the State has the right to invoke the fact of coercion. On the contrary, the solution presented is nullity ipso facto, that is to say absolute nullity of the treaty to which consent was secured in such circumstances. This being so, it is not understood why, in relation to such a rule, article 47 should seek to regulate the waiver of a right to invoke the nullity of a treaty which is considered automatically void.

On the other hand, one does not see the reason why the case covered by article 31, according to which the validity of consent may be disputed by a State whose representative acted in manifest violation of his domestic law, is excluded from the waiver provision.

We think for this reason that it is through error that reference is made in the text of article 47 to articles 32 and 35 and that in reality the intention was to refer to the cases considered under articles 31 and 34.

Article 48

The reciprocal relations between multilateral treaties and international organizations are of particular interest. The latter owe their existence to the former.

These treaties also form the basis of numerous other treaties. Thus the character, structure and working of such organizations owe much to them, as Manfred Lachs points out.

It is therefore inevitable that when a treaty is the constitutional act on which such an organization is based, or has been drawn up within such an organization, the clauses of the present draft on the termination of treaties should remain subject to the rules established in the organization concerned. If, for instance, the International Labour Organization is the organization concerned, it will be evident that the treaties which have been or may be concluded under its auspices will have to take into account the rules which govern that organization.

This approach could be extended to section II of the draft which deals with the grounds of the invalidity of treaties. If the report suggests the Commission did not think it necessary to make any special provision, it was because the principles embodied in that section appeared by their very nature not to require modification when applied to the treaties with which article 48 deals.

Only on this supposition can the objection be avoided that to refer only to section III is excessively restrictive.

Article 49

The knowledge which we have of the rules contained in article 4 of part I of the draft, relating to evidence of authority to conclude a treaty, comes from a copy of the first report on the law of treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, a document in the archives of the Office of the Attorney-General (Procuradoria Geral da República) of Portugal.

After examining the text of this article 4 as worded in the above-mentioned report, we do not have any hesitation in accepting

The procedure to be followed in the cases mentioned in the preceding article, otherwise than under a provision of the treaty, is set out in a manner which is somewhat cautious as well as vague. The fundamental purpose is to find a method of settling disputes between States. The Commission has recognized that the obligation to give notice to the other party or parties, and the conditions incumbent upon the State alleging the nullity of a treaty with respect to the States that are notified, constitutes a step forward. If the parties notified should raise objections, the course will lie in searching for a solution of the dispute in conformity with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations which, as is known, calls upon the parties to any dispute likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

We are convinced that to go much further in the formulation of this rule in article 39 would be tantamount to considering it a dead letter in anticipation, and we judge paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 acceptable.

As regards paragraph 4, we must observe that, since this draft comes from an organ of the United Nations, the reservation which it makes regarding "the rights or obligations of the parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes" is too broad. We are of the opinion that these rights or obligations should have been reserved only when they are incompatible with the Charter.

It would, in fine, be the application of a principle based on the same grounds as article 48.

Paragraph 5 presents another opportunity, independent of the formalities described above, enabling a party to invoke the nullity of or a ground for terminating a treaty in answer to a demand for the performance of the treaty or to a complaint alleging violation of the treaty.

No reason is seen why in such cases such invocation should be impeded. Perhaps in a well-systematized discipline of private interests such a solution would not have been the most appropriate. Since, however, we are dealing with relations between States, it is not possible to deny that paragraph 5 shows an exact consideration of the realities involved.
Article 52

Apart from any considerations of doctrine, this article purports, through logical criteria, to determine the effects of the nullity of a treaty with regard to acts executed before such nullity was alleged. It would be possible to support views that nullity produces effects ex tunc, since the nullity vitiates not merely acts executed under the aegis of the treaty, but the international instrument itself. It is not possible, however, to ignore the good faith with which a party has acted till then, and this consideration compels recognition of the legality of acts done by that party in the conviction that the treaty was valid. This is what results from paragraph 1, clause (a).

In order to prevent the legality of these acts from subsisting beyond the moment when nullity is invoked, clause (b) permits the re-establishment, as far as possible, of the position which would have existed if the acts had not been performed.

Under paragraph 2 the validity of the said act cannot be invoked by the party whose fraud or coercion has been the cause of the nullity. This position seems to us defensible, on the basis of exactly the same principle of good faith which confers legality on such acts.

There is no reason for refusing to extend these same principles to the legal consequences of nullity of consent given to a multilateral treaty. This is done in paragraph 3 in terms which do not call for any observation.

Article 53

The legal consequences of the nullity of a treaty are summarized in a principle formulated in paragraph 1. The parties are freed from any obligation to continue to apply the treaty; on the other hand, the legality of acts performed in conformity with the treaty, of any situation which may have resulted from the application of the instrument, are preserved.

A reservation is made, however, in paragraph 2 which deals with the case where a rule of jus cogens is the ground for the nullity of the treaty. Whenever this happens, any situation resulting from the operation of the treaty retains its legality only in so far as it is compatible with this rule.

This solution is not free from doubt. It may be considered more equitable to apply in this case the rule of paragraph 1, and respect, therefore, the situations resulting from the treaty, for its nullity does not go back to its constitution which was according to rule but to a later moment and to an extraneous fact, that is, to the subsequent coming into existence of a peremptory norm of law. The imperative nature of the latter would have made itself sufficiently felt if it only produced the nullity of the treaty, but respected the situations existing prior to its own date which were brought about legitimately.

It seems to us that this question is linked, to a certain extent, with the lawfulness of the content of treaties, a matter examined already in our comments on article 37. If it is understood, as we have presumed, that contents are limited by imperative norms of international law, it will be easier to maintain that situations brought about in conformity with the juridical order in force at the time might subsist when a change occurs therein through a new rule.

The contrary course laid down in paragraph 2 does not appear to us, in substance, to be completely divorced from the view which does not accept any limitation on the content of treaties, because of a want of norms of international law which could establish such limitations. If this were so, the formulation of one of these rules should refuse legitimacy to prior treaties where they are not in harmony with it. It would then be easy to foresee the existence of treaties contrary to certain structural principles of international society.

We must bear in mind, however, that today, as we have shown, such treaties, where they exist, must be considered null.

For the rest, confronted by the possible formulation of rules of imperative law that have their source in international organizations, which are not representative of the highest principles of social inter-course, it would be advisable to safeguard situations having their origin in the application of treaties lawfully executed.

On the other hand, however, one must recognize that the solution preferred in paragraph 2 adapts itself better to the basic factor of invalidity of a treaty, or rather to the imperative nature of the supervening norm.

Paragraph 3 represents the application of the principle of paragraph 1 to the case where a State withdraws from participation in a multilateral treaty. Clauses to the contrary are naturally safeguarded.

Paragraph 4 underlines that, in spite of the provisions of paragraphs 1 or 3, a State is not exempted from its duty to comply with obligations contained in another treaty to which it remains subjected under any other rule of international law. It thus seeks to safeguard the application of general international law, in the absence of a clause stating that the denunciation of a given treaty does not affect the obligations of the parties imposed upon them under this right.

Article 54

This article is clearly consequential upon the preceding one as regards the juridical consequences of the suspension of the operation of a treaty. Paragraph 1 is an adaptation of paragraph 1 of article 53 to this situation; although suspension temporarily affects the obligation of applying the treaty, it does not modify the juridical relations set up by it between the contracting States, or the legitimate character of acts and situations that are in conformity with the treaty.

Paragraph 2 logically regulates the conduct of the parties during the period of suspension.

[Part III]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 1 June 1966 from the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. to the United Nations

[Original: English]

Article 55

To begin part III of the draft articles with an article stating that “a treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith” gives expression to a principle which is universally accepted, though not always observed. It proved absolutely necessary, in regulating the application and effects of treaties, to begin by expressly stating the fundamental rule “Pacta sunt servanda”. This rule is of such importance that one school of thought regards it as the foundation for the binding force of the rules of public international law. But even when the view is taken that this branch of law cannot be reduced solely to rules expressed in treaties, because customary international law must also be taken into account, the principle “Pacta sunt servanda” is certainly recognized as having sufficient force to be the foundation for the legal rules expressly or tacitly accepted or recognized by States. 29

It is with precisely these rules of treaty law that the present case is concerned, and this is sufficient justification for according complete approval to article 55. It must be pointed out that failure to obey the rule it lays down is partly responsible for the existing crisis in international relations.

The discussion which took place on the question whether the rule should refer to treaties “in force”, and which is mentioned in the commentary on this article, led to the best solution: since a number of articles deal specifically with the entry into force of treaties, their nullity, termination, etc., it is from all points of view advisable to make the rule laid down in article 55 secure by relating it to treaties in force.

29 On the validity of this principle, and on the claim that it possesses objective, immutable and metaphysical validity, see Paul Guggenheim, Traité de droit international public, vol. 1, pp. 8 and 57.
In relation to other principle grounds for misgivings. It is, after all, an application of the old rights upon a State not party to it without its consent, affords no justification for it: namely, the clause making the application of res inter alios acta, the parties, and neither imposes any obligations nor confers any "colonial clause", with all the interpretations to which that clause would immediately have focused attention on the so-called the Commission has allowed for exceptions to the principle where mission has embodied in this article the rule that treaties apply in national tribunals and the teachings of the literature, the Com-

The doubt felt about the doctrine propounded in article 53 was expressed in the commentary on that article, to which the reader is referred. However, it appears that the Commission has now come to consider that the text of article 53 needs revision.

On the basis of international practice, the decisions of international tribunals and the teachings of the literature, the Commission has embodied in this article the rule that treaties apply in principle to the entire territory of the parties. However, since many treaties are, by their very nature, limited in territorial application, the Commission has allowed for exceptions to the principle where indicated by the treaty itself.

It should be noted that care was taken to avoid any reference to "territories for which the parties are internationally responsible", which would immediately have focused attention on the so-called "colonial clause", with all the interpretations to which that clause has given rise. We have no further comment to make on this article.

The affirmation of the principle that a treaty applies only between the parties, and neither imposes any obligations nor confers any rights upon a State not party to it without its consent, affords no grounds for misgivings. It is, after all, an application of the old principle "Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec praeendent". In relation to other States a treaty is res inter alios acta, constituting an affirmation of their independence and equality. Many decisions handed down by international tribunals have been guided by this fundamental rule. However, the question which is discussed in the literature, and which the Commission itself discussed, is whether exceptions can be made to this rule of international law. This problem will be taken up in our comments on the articles which follow, and which record the solutions favoured by the Commission after long discussion.

The commission of obligations for a State not a party depends, according to this article, upon two conditions:

(a) The parties must have intended the provision in question to be the means of establishing an obligation for the State not a party to the treaty;

(b) The State in question must have expressly agreed to be bound by the obligation.

This means that the State not a party can be bound only with its express consent, and not ipso jure. It may be said, then, that the basis of this obligation is not the treaty, but the agreement thus established between the parties to the treaty, on the one hand, and the third State on the other. Consequently the sovereignty of the last-mentioned State is not affected.

This being so, there is no objection to the acceptance of the rule laid down in this article, which is also accepted in the literature.

We also note with approval that, keeping aloof from the more liberal school of thought, the article gives no weight to tacit consent but requires that consent should be express.

In essentials, this article re-states the rule laid down in the preceding article as it affects the rights arising for a State from a treaty to which it is not a party.

Although at first sight this seems a less complex aspect of the subject than the one dealt with in article 59, inasmuch as it relates to the recognition of rights and not the imposition of obligations, it is really a more delicate matter, because the rights thus conferred can be waived at any time, so that the treaty would tend to lack the necessary sureness and stability in this respect.

From the discussion of this point in the literature we may discern two main trends of thought: one asserting that rights conferred on a State not a party arc non-existent until that State manifestly its expressed acceptance of them, and the other maintaining that such rights exist until they are disclaimed or waived, even if tacitly, by the State concerned.

In an endeavour to reconcile these trends of thought, and noting that in practice they would produce different results only in very exceptional circumstances, the Commission sought a solution as nearly neutral as possible. It therefore prescribed, firstly, that the treaties must intend to accord such a right, and secondly that the beneficiary State not a party must give its express or implied acceptance.

This appears to be a balanced solution resembling, in the view of some authors, the requirements of ratification which are put forward in the transaction of business.

Paragraph 2 of this article states, in fairly broad terms, the conditions for the exercise of the right by the beneficiary State not a party; those conditions are not confined to the express and direct provisions of the treaty concerning the exercise of the right, but also include conditions established in conformity with it. The latter clause takes into account cases in which the treaty provides for this matter to be dealt with in a supplementary instrument or even by unilateral decision of one of the parties.


31 See, in this connexion, Cavare, op. et vol. cit., p. 129.
Article 61

It is reasonable that, in principle, the consent of a State not a party should be required for the revocation or amendment of treaty provisions from which obligations or rights have arisen for that State.

Some attempt is thus made to avoid placing the beneficiary State in the unprotected situation described by writers on the subject, in which that State would have no right to demand, through effective legal and practical channels, the application of the treaty, and would be unable to ask for its revision.

It is naturally understood that, in the absence of the consent referred to above, the provisions of the treaty can be revoked or amended only by the parties, without producing any effects for the State not a party.

Article 62

The Commission prudently took the view that it would be premature to formulate rules on treaties creating so-called "objective régimes"—that is, rights and obligations valid erga omnes—and preferred to rely on international custom. Thus, if a provision which is included in a treaty, and which is intended to bind third States not parties to the treaty, has already become a customary rule of international law, there is nothing to prevent it from overriding what is laid down in articles 58 to 60.

This takes into account both the existence in international practice of treaties creating "objective régimes", such as those relating to freedom of navigation in international rivers or maritime waterways, and the teachings of legal theorists in favour of the admissibility of treaties which are of general importance and which are applicable even to States not parties to them.

Such multilateral treaties, containing "objective" legal rules which are laid down in the interests of States in general and which represent a stage in the progressive evolution of international law, cannot fail to influence all States not parties provided that they conform to the principles of international law, and thus possess general binding force. 23

This binding force will certainly be required where there is no doubt about the existence of the customary principle or about its general binding force.

It is on this basis, therefore, that article 62 is acceptable. The customary rules of international law which we are discussing must, of course, meet the prescribed requirements. Only thus can they be recognized as affording sufficient grounds for a departure from the rules laid down in articles 58 to 60.

Article 63

Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, providing that the rules laid down in the Charter shall prevail over rules which are laid down in treaties and which are incompatible with the Charter rules, finds expression in article 63, paragraph 1.

Paragraph 2 provides for the case in which an earlier or a later treaty prevails in virtue of a provision to that effect in another treaty. It is clear, however, that this rule is to be applied only when the parties to both treaties are the same.

If this is not the case, the situation calls for the application of the two rules that follow.

Paragraph 2 determines in the most acceptable manner, by means of a current rule of interpretation of law, the applicability of a treaty to which any other treaty refers.

Paragraph 3 establishes a connexion with article 41, which was examined in the aforementioned Opinion No. 74/63. The Commission considered it necessary to regulate, in this paragraph, cases of total or partial incompatibility, suggesting at the same time that the expression "in whole or in part" should be eliminated from article 41. The relationship between an earlier treaty, still in force, and a later treaty on the same subject is regulated as follows: the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the later treaty.

Paragraph 4, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), concerning the hypothesis that not all the same States are parties to both treaties, give effect to the principle laid down in article 58 and do not call for any comment from us.

The same can be said of sub-paragraph (a), which deals with the case where the same States are parties to both treaties.

The reservation concerning the responsibility incurred by concluding or applying a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with obligations towards another State under another treaty is acceptable in the terms in which it is expressed.

When the various solutions given in this article are examined in the light of contemporary theory, it is seen that they represent a laudable attempt to stabilize practice in the settlement of conflicts between treaties.

It is often found that there are no special difficulties in connexion with treaties of a type for which the scope of practical application has already been demonstrated by experience, whereas, in the case of treaties embodying clauses of new or uncommon content, the lack of reliable legal criteria on which to determine their compatibility or incompatibility is bound to be felt.

The more or less markedly political character of some treaties makes the determination of this compatibility a delicate undertaking. Conflicts between the rules laid down in international treaties are dominated by political factors to this day.

Once incompatibility has been established, it is a praiseworthy step forward to be able to determine which treaty is applicable. This is accomplished in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article.

The whole difficulty, however, will lie in establishing incompatibility. As Charles Rousseau points out, the application of the technical process of positive law cannot but leave a certain virtually irreducible and insoluble margin of incompatibility. 30

For this reason it would be imprudent to go further by laying down criteria for incompatibility.

Moreover, the solution given in paragraph 3 and paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (a), seeks to reconcile so far as possible the application of two treaties having the same objective; and the solutions given in paragraph 4, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), are conditioned by the position of the State not a party.

In view of all the foregoing, we see no reason to object to this article.

Article 64

Of the various grounds admissible in international relations for suspension of the operation of treaties, this article deals specifically with the severance of diplomatic relations between parties. It does so, however, in order to affirm that such severance does not in itself constitute grounds for suspension, and to make it a condition for suspension that the severance of diplomatic relations should make the application of the treaty a practical impossibility (paragraphs 1 and 2).

Consistently with the general view that the parties should so far as possible be held to compliance with the obligations they have assumed, paragraph 3 seeks to safeguard all those clauses of the treaty which are not affected by the impossibility of application.

Article 46, which is referred to in paragraph 3, states the principle of the inseparability of treaty provisions and lays down the conditions


30 Principes de droit international public, in Recueil des cours, 1958, I, p. 506.
in which such provisions may be recognized as separable or may be partially applied; this article was analysed in Opinion No. 74/63.

Moreover, the principle calling for isolation of the effects of severance of diplomatic relations is already expressed in article 2 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, which provides that such severance shall not ipso facto involve the severance of consular relations.

It should also be borne in mind that the other cases in which the application of a treaty depends upon the unbroken continuity of diplomatic relations fall within the scope of the rules relating to the termination or suspension of the application of treaties, which are studied in the aforementioned Opinion.

As it stands, this article represents an acceptable application of the principle “Pacta sunt servanda”, which was stated in article 55 and whose value we emphasized in our comments on that article.

Article 65

In view of the difficulty of deriving from international practice a code of rules on the modification of treaties, the Commission confined itself to formulating certain general rules concerning the process of amendment and the use of inter se agreements.

Not being in possession of the text of part I, we are unable to evaluate the relationship between the rules in question and the Principles laid down in that part of the treaty.

Apart from the specified relationship to part I of the draft articles, the rule laid down in article 65 merely recognizes the possibility that a treaty may be amended by the parties; this seems a desirable provision.

Writers on the subject frequently refer to the need to modify treaties which, because of a change in the circumstances in which they are applied, have ceased to afford effective protection for interests. Provided that the amendment is made by agreement between the parties, there is no reason why the possibility of such amendment should not be accepted in broad terms.

Article 66

Article 66 is concerned only with the modification of multilateral treaties in relation to all the parties thereto.

In this article, the Commission rejects the idea sometimes put into practice that certain States can proceed to alter a treaty without consulting the others.

There is no doubt that such a practice violates the principle of equality among States. This principle is not upheld in its entirety, even on the hypothesis that some of the States parties may proceed to modify the treaty by themselves and that the remainder will then accept or ratify the modification.

For this reason it must be considered desirable to recognize the rights defined in article 1, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), which must be regarded as clearly linked to the obligation assumed by the parties to perform the treaty in good faith.

The provision of paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), is a consequence of the foregoing principle and an application of the rule laid down in article 58; it is justified on the same grounds as that principle and that rule.

The reference made to article 63 covers those cases in which the amendment to the treaty does not receive the approval of all the States parties and hence gives rise to a problem of application in relation to the non-ratifying States where there is incompatibility between the provisions of the treaty and those of the agreement amending it.

Paragraph 3 is fully justified since, if a State is not a party to the agreement amending the treaty and afterwards signs that agreement or otherwise clearly indicates its consent thereto, it cannot invoke the application of that agreement as a breach of the treaty. Its signature of consent places it under the same legal obligation as the States among which the agreement was concluded.

Article 67

This article, unlike articles 65 and 66, is concerned with the modification of a treaty by what it termed an inter se agreement: i.e., an agreement entered into by some only of the parties to a multilateral treaty and designed ab initio to modify it between themselves alone.

However, in laying down rules to cover this case it is impossible to ignore the existence of other States not parties to the modifying agreement, and for this very reason agreement must not produce a substantial change of such a nature as to affect the enjoyment of the rights or the performance of the obligations of those States; nor must the agreement be incompatible with the treaty as a whole, or with its objectives.

It is stated in the commentary that the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), of this article are not alternative, but cumulative. This is, indeed, the most logical inference, since the disjunctive “or” is used only in the transition from sub-paragraph (a) to sub-paragraph (b), and in the latter the copulative “and” is used between sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii).

Nevertheless this article is very broad in scope and great care should be taken in the drafting, inasmuch as a restricted agreement may frustrate the treaty or affect the position of the States not parties to the amending agreement, which will continue to abide by the treaty in its original form.

We therefore think it advisable that sub-paragraph (b) should begin with an expression which will make it clear that the conditions therein specified are cumulative.

We note that, according to paragraph 2, notification of the parties not participating in the agreement is required only in cases other than that mentioned in paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a).

At first sight this seems a balanced solution. But it should be borne in mind that even where the agreement is provided for in the treaty it is necessary to bring it to the notice of the other States. For the decisive reason that it is important to know whether the agreement concluded in virtue of a provision of the treaty is within the limits of what that provision allows.

We consider, therefore, that notification should be required without making an exception for the case mentioned in paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a).

Article 68

Sub-paragraph (a) of this article applies the principle laid down in article 63, paragraph 3, and nothing further need be said about it.

The possibility of modification by subsequent practice is admissible provided that this article refers, as it appears to us to do without any doubt, only to cases where all the parties join in concluding the new treaty, or in the modifying practice, and where all of them are covered by the new customary rule.

Only on this basis, therefore, are the principles laid down in the article acceptable.

Sub-paragraph (c), in particular, should be read in conjunction with article 45 in part II of the draft articles, which is analysed in Opinion No. 74/63.

Article 69

This article, like those which follow, deals with the controversial question of the interpretation of treaties. The difficulty of formulating rules for guidance is bound up with the very nature of interpretation; there are those who maintain that interpretation should be avoided where the text is unequivocal, while others retort that only after certain technical processes have been applied is it possible to vouch for the unequivocality of the text in question.

Generally speaking, this problem of international law presents no special features when considered solely in relation to treaties. Indeed, some of the doubts occasioned are common to the general theory of interpretation of laws and legal acts.
However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the trend of opinion which claims that the interpretation of treaties requires a logic of its own, often irreconcilable with that applied to the interpretation of contracts in private law.

Hence the references made in conversation to "the political element in the interpretation of treaties", and the divergence observed between judicial practice, stamped with the particular characteristics of specific cases, and the theoretical ideas found in the literature.44

The Commission endeavoured to encroach as little as possible on the freedom of the interpreter, but without refusing him a number of guiding principles drawn from the practice of international tribunals and from a common fund of theoretical writings.

In article 69, the Commission accordingly formulated four rules.

The first of these flows from the principle expressed in article 55 (Pacta sunt servanda)—the true starting point in determining the meaning of any provision; it proclaims that this should be done in good faith.

Closely bound up with this is the second rule, to the effect that the ordinary meaning must be given to the text. It seems to us that on this point, notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of the formula, many doubts may arise, as indeed they do arise in matters of private law. The expressions “ordinary meaning”, “natural meaning”, “normal meaning” and “clear meaning” are used in an attempt to describe texts which do not require any reference to other sources for the purpose of defining their meaning.

It is assumed, to begin with, that the words of the provision have been used in their usual sense. However, the determination of that sense is not so straightforward as it would appear at first sight.

This observation is not made in order to replace that formula by another, or in order to shift the use of that formula to a later stage in the process of interpretation, for it seems to us common sense that, in the absence of convincing reasons to the contrary, the ordinary meaning should be accepted. Our intention is merely to stress that the true practical efficacy of this second rule lies in so guiding the interpreter that he will seek that meaning before anything else; but in order to arrive at it he may have to use the various technical processes open to him. Thus it is not a matter of avoiding interpretation, but of interpreting according to certain logical guidelines.

The third rule needs no clarification, given the evident and recurrent necessity of referring to the context of the treaty and to its objects and purposes.

Lastly the fourth rule, which enjoins that attention should be paid to the rules of international law in force at the time of conclusion of the treaty, is based upon many decisions of international tribunals.

However, we feel bound to point out that, while this rule is clearly included in the general theory of interpretation of legal acts, its broad application may in many cases present considerable difficulties where treaties are concerned. It should be borne in mind that a dispute may arise many years after the treaty was concluded, and that the conditions of international life and the rules of international law may have changed considerably in the interim.

What, then, stands in the way of an up-to-date interpretation of the provisions in question? Fear that one of the parties may take refuge in the pretext that de facto conditions have changed and that innovations have been made in the rules of international law? But the same fear may be felt where the party concerned relies on a state of affairs that has ceased to exist.

At all events it was necessary to point out that this rule is perhaps excessively rigid when applied to the interpretation of treaties, especially the so-called law-making treaties. It is also necessary to relate it to the principle of “rebus sic stantibus”, which is evaluated in the aforementioned Opinion in connexion with article 44 in part II of the draft articles.

Article 69, paragraph 2, states a rule that is generally accepted in the literature and in the practice of international tribunals: the rule that a treaty should be read as a whole, and its clauses clarified by reference to one another.35 It seems to us that recourse to elements outside the treaty, but bearing a close connexion with it, is wholly justified.

Paragraph 3 calls for no comment, since an agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty and subsequent practice in its application may often constitute important sources of information from which to deduce the true intention they expressed in concluding the treaty.

Article 70

This provision supplements the preceding one by providing for recourse to further means of interpretation when the interpretation according to article 69 proves to be insufficient. Although it has been affirmed, manifestly on the basis of municipal law, that once treaties have entered into force they have an autonomous existence independent of the preparatory work, there is no doubt that the preparatory work is generally recognized as important in reconstructing the real intention of the parties.36

This article does not make a distinction, as the writers sometimes do, between preparatory work latu sensu and stricto sensu; it should be noted that the former category includes some work, such as the records of closed meetings between heads of delegations, which may give a false picture of the course of negotiations.

We believe that there is nothing to be gained by making such a distinction, and that the interpreter should be left free to make use of the various items of preparatory work in whatever way seems most appropriate in each case.

Article 71

The principle embodied in this article is not open to question: since the purpose of interpretation of the provisions is to determine the real intention of the parties in concluding the treaty, it is natural that in some cases they will be found to have used certain terms in a meaning other than their ordinary meaning.

It is, however, open to question whether there is any need to make this rule, which is clearly included in the preceding ones, the subject of a separate provision.

However, the rule was formulated in the interests of greater clarity, and in particular in order to emphasize that cogent reasons are needed to carry the conviction that the parties have departed from the ordinary meaning referred to in article 69, paragraph 1.

On the basis of these considerations, the formulation of a separate rule is accepted.

Article 72

The principle laid down in paragraph 1 of this article seems to us acceptable inasmuch as it gives equal validity to the text of a treaty in different languages when the text has been authenticated in those languages, and makes a reasonable exception where a different rule has been agreed upon by the parties.

Paragraph 2 also recognizes an agreement between the parties as conferring authenticity on a version of the treaty drawn up in a language other than one of those in which the text of the treaty was authenticated; it also recognizes the existence of a rule laid down by an international organization to the same effect.

There is no doubt that this article will help to determine the exact validity of the text of a treaty in the various languages in which it has been drawn up.

44 In this connexion see De Visscher, op. cit., p. 313.

35 On this point see Cavaret, op. et vol. cit., p. 95.

The only question which might arise is whether it would not be appropriate to allow here for a possibility similar to that envisaged in article 69, paragraph 3, and recognize, in addition to an agreement between the parties, any practice adopted by them which shows in an unequivocal manner that they have conferred authority on a version drawn up in a language not used for the authenticated texts.

**Article 73**

Paragraph 1, in conferring equal validity on the different authentic texts of a treaty, makes a natural exception where the treaty itself provides that, in the event of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.

It follows from this that, as provided in paragraph 2, the terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each text. The second sentence of paragraph 2, which refers back to the general rules for interpretation laid down in articles 69 to 72, provides for cases, other than that referred to in paragraph 1, in which a comparison between authentic texts discloses a difference in meaning or some ambiguity or obscurity. As a remedy for this deficiency, a rule is laid down which, although vague, provides some guidance, namely, that the different texts should be reconciled so far as possible.

We see no valid reason why this principle should not be accepted.

21. SWEDEN

**[PART I]**

*Transmitted by a letter of 7 October 1963 from the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

*Original: English*

The law of treaties is of fundamental importance to the regulation of relations between States, and clarification, codification and development of its contents may be expected to facilitate treaty relations and reduce the risk of controversies caused by differing views of the law. It is, therefore, most gratifying that the International Law Commission has devoted much time and energy to this field of international law. The repeated changes of rapporteur on the topic and the Commission's engagement upon other fields of law have delayed the presentation of draft articles on the law of treaties. Although this may be regrettable, there is fair compensation in the fact that the successive reports on the topic have been of great value and, in themselves, useful not only to the scholar but also to the judge and the legal practitioner.

The Commission has now submitted a first group of draft articles for consideration. Without prejudicing the position it will take to the final proposals that the Commission will submit, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs wishes to make the following observations at this stage.

The question whether the codification of the law of treaties should take the form of a convention—or several interconnected conventions—or of a code has been discussed in the Commission. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has no objection to the draft articles for a convention that are now presented. It seems, nevertheless, that a number of the articles presented are still of this character. In the opinion of this Ministry, it would be wise to omit such provisions. They appear to be unnecessary and may prove to become quickly obsolete and a burden in an instrument that is intended to be legally binding for a long time to come. There is no need for such an instrument to cover all the phases of the conclusion of treaties, if legal rules do not attach to all of them.

The rules of the law of treaties are largely dispositive, i.e. the parties may depart from them by agreement. There is hardly any need to state examples of the various ways in which such departures may be made, or in which the parties may exercise their freedom where no rule exists. What is needed, rather, are statements of the residuary rules of international law which govern a specific question where the parties have not solved the question. In addition, cogent rules—from which the parties may not depart—should obviously be stated, if indeed any are found.

Applied to the present draft, the considerations advanced above lead to the conclusion that certain articles might be omitted, or perhaps transferred to a code of recommended practices.

As there is nothing in the law of treaties to prevent States from issuing full powers either “restricted to the performance of the particular act in question” or more generally, article 4, paragraph 6(a) seems unnecessary and rather in the nature of a procedural recommendation. Article 5, as the Commission itself recognizes, is only descriptive and seems superfluous unless there be the ambition systematically to present all aspects of the conclusion of treaties.

Similarly, article 6, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) seem redundant as, in effect, they only state that an agreement between the parties on the manner in which a text is to be adopted shall be governing. They do not appear to lay down any residuary rules.

**Article 7** seems to be more instructive as indicating possible procedures than helpful as legal guidance. Legal content may, however, be read into the article if it is meant to lay down that, in case of doubt, signature *ad referendum*, initialling, incorporation of a text into the final act of a conference, or in a resolution of an international organization, amounts to an authentication of the text. This would require also that the act of authentication has any legal effect, which seems very doubtful. The commentary to **article 7** suggests that after authentication, any change in the wording of the text would have to be brought about by an agreed correction of the authenticated text. But, it may be asked, can any modifications be made, but for agreement, in a text before authentication?

**Article 8**—the substance of which will be discussed below—read along the following lines might be simplified if drafted in accordance with the approach suggested here.

In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in a treaty or in the established rules of an international organization adopting treaties;

A general multilateral treaty shall be deemed to be open to every State;

Other treaties shall be deemed to be open to States which took part in the adoption of the text or which, although they did not participate in the adoption of the text, were invited to attend the conference at which the treaty was drawn up.

As the article reads at present, the impression may be gained by paragraph 2 that a State which took part in the adoption of a treaty text cannot be excluded from participation even by an express clause to that effect, a contingency that is most unlikely, but would hardly be illegal.

While most of the provisions of **article 9** contain legal—and indeed seemingly new rules, from which States may not depart even by agreement—the stipulations of sub-paragraph 3(a) relate to procedure, and it is hard to see why they should be non-dispositive. If that is not the intention, they might perhaps be transferred to a code of recommended practices or to a commentary.

**Article 10** would be improved and considerably abbreviated if recast as residuary rules, governing only in the absence of agreement between the parties. Paragraphs 1 and 2(a) would be un-
necessary. Paragraphs 2(b) and (c) and 3 contain useful rules. It should be made clear, however, that they operate only in the absence of agreement between the parties. As it reads, paragraph 3(a) gives the impression that INITAILLY can only function as authentication, which is not true in all instances. Under article 10, paragraph 2(b), signature ad referendum is only treated as an act authenticating a treaty. It would perhaps be well if States agreed that this would always be the significance they attach to the reservation. The Commission has not expressed any view on the practice, which nevertheless exists, attributing to this reservation the meaning "subject to ratification".

Given the provisions in articles 8 and 9 and the freedom of States to prescribe in treaties applicable procedures for participation in a treaty, the need for articles 13 and 14 may perhaps be doubted. While some provisions of article 15 contain important legal rules, other parts appear to be exclusively procedural. Illustrative of this is paragraph 1(c). It requires that in case a treaty offers to the participating States a choice between two differing texts, the instrument of ratification must indicate to which text it refers. It does not, however, give any legal guidance in case this procedure is not observed.

Articles 18 and 19, likewise, contain much that simply exemplifies what the parties may prescribe and much that merely amounts to procedural rules, which would fit better in a code of recommended practices. Such a code would also, it seems, be the most appropriate place for the rules contained in articles 26 and 27 relating to the correction of errors. Both article 28 and article 29 regarding depositaries contain legal rules of a dispositive nature. Even so, it may perhaps be questioned whether the rather detailed duties imposed upon depositaries in article 29, paragraphs 3-8 are of such permanent nature that they ought to be included in a convention.

The observations made above are not intended as criticism of the various provisions the omission of which is suggested, but are only prompted by a desire to see the convention limited to basic rules of a strictly legal nature, and to see convenient procedures and rules, possibly subject to frequent modifications, treated only in a special code of recommended practices. In addition to these observations, the Ministry wishes to offer a few comments upon the contents of some of the rules which, in its opinion, should be retained in a convention.

The provision on capacity—article 3, paragraph 1—is stated in broad terms, and necessarily so. In view of the circumstance that the conclusion of treaties by an entity may perhaps constitute the chief indication of its being a subject of international law, it becomes obvious that the statement that treaty-making capacity is possessed by subjects of international law is not very helpful. However, any elaboration in detail on this point is bound to meet great difficulties. The development of the law on the point might better be left to take place in the practice of States and of international organizations and in the judgements of international tribunals.

The formulation of article 4 is not wholly satisfactory. The point seems to have been lost that the legally relevant question is whether a representative is competent to bind the authority he purports to represent. The procedural rule that the Head of a State or a Foreign Minister is not required to produce an instrument of full powers, for instance, is a consequence of the legally more important rule that they are, by their offices, deemed competent to bind at any rate the executive branch of the Government they represent. The rule contained in paragraph 3 gives the impression that States must furnish the representatives concerned with full powers. In practice, this is often dispensed with. To have legal meaning, the paragraph should state that the competence of these agents depends upon their being authorized to bind the Governments they purport to represent, and that the existence of such authorization shall be deemed to be conclusively established by the presentation of full powers emanating from a competent authority. Such formulation would not oblige States actually to make use of full powers, but would indicate that a State which accepts the signature of certain representatives without examining full powers takes the risk of the treaty being denounced as concluded by one who did not have requisite authority or one who has exceeded his authority.

Paragraph 4(b) of article 4 merely reflects and accepts the common practice that States, when concluding treaties of an informal character, often do not ask for full powers. The legally interesting question, however, is whether they do so at their own risk. It is believed that the answer must be in the affirmative. The rationale of such a rule would be that it is easier for a State to ask a foreign representative to present full powers than it is for a State to prevent all its representatives from acting without authority. If the answer were in the negative, the conclusion would ensue that representatives signing this kind of treaties are always competent to bind the authorities they purport to represent. This can hardly be accepted.

The rule embodied in paragraph 6(b) of article 4 regarding telegraphic full powers again merely seems to record what has been thought to be common procedure. In fact, telegraphic full powers are often accepted as sufficient evidence of authority without any requirement of subsequent confirmation. The question is whether they offer adequate guarantees of authenticity. If not, the rule should be that States accepting them do so at their own peril.

The novel provision in article 6, sub-paragraph (a), although in itself perhaps not undesirable, may have complicated consequences at conferences between States some of which are parties to the convention on the law of treaties and others are not. Less than universal adherence to that convention may also very much complicate the application of article 9.

The "all States" formula which has been proposed in article 8, paragraph 1 seeks to establish a right—which does not exist under present customary international law—for every State to participate in general multilateral treaties. Although the effect of the provision may, if so desired, be excluded by express provisions in such a treaty, and although there are arguments in favour of the inclusion of such a residuary rule as is submitted, the objection must be raised that such a rule should preferably not be introduced without a complementary provision on method or machinery for determining which entities purporting to be States shall be deemed to possess statehood. A similar problem, it must be admitted, arises with respect to the question which of two rival governments is competent to bind a State under a treaty. A suggested solution to this problem, too, would be welcome.

Article 12 seeks to solve, in a very complex form, an old problem which the Commission characterizes as largely theoretical. The Commission recognizes that the difference between the elaborate procedures it submits and the very simple ratification is not necessary unless expressly agreed upon by the parties is not very substantial. If the same boldness were displayed on this point as on several others, the latter formulation should be preferred, perhaps with the qualification that ratification would also be required in cases where there is a clear implication that the parties intended the treaty to be subject to that procedure. No dangers would flow for States from such a residuary rule, as they may always by express clauses prescribe ratification.

A rule along the lines expressed in article 17 may be usefully included in a convention. It seems, however, that the present draft goes too far in imposing obligations, e.g., upon States which only take part in the drawing up of a treaty text within the framework of an international organization—and perhaps even vote against the adoption of such text.

The legal problem of reservations is admittedly most difficult. The draft provisions submitted in articles 18-20 represent a respectable effort to cover the problem. Further analysis nevertheless seems necessary, and an attempt should perhaps be made to differentiate even more between different types of treaties.

With respect to article 23, it should be noticed that the cases do not seem to be covered where a treaty does not stipulate any date on which or the mode in which it is to enter into force, but is simply
signed or simply provides for ratification. The residuary rule of treaties comes closest to the legal position underlying present practice. The commentary seems to suggest, however, that termination on the date of signature and ratification, respectively.

The expression "ipso facto" would mean that the treaty is void and absolu-
tional procedures have not been completed, and as there is often no absolute assurance that the outcome will be to confirm the prov-

void and absolute. Sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 4 would not call for any modification. Sub-paragraph 3, however, might be changed to read along the following lines:

"No other representative of a State shall be deemed (by his offices and functions), and without presenting evidence in the form of written credentials, to possess authority to negotiate on behalf of his State."

While the original text would seem to imply a duty to request the presenting of full powers—which in practice is commonly dispensed with—the above text would simply lay down that a State which negotiates or signs an agreement with a representative not presenting full powers may find that the latter was not authorized. Such a formulation would tie up well with draft article 32(1). Sub-paragraph 4(a) of article 4 might similarly be changed to read along the following lines:

"Subject to the provision of sub-paragraph 1, a representative of a State shall not be deemed (by his offices and functions), and without presenting evidence in the form of written credentials, to possess authority to sign a treaty on behalf of his State."

Such formulation, again, would well tie up with the provision of article 32(1), while the present formulation of sub-paragraph 4(a) would seem to lay down as mandatory that full powers must be requested.

The substance of draft article 4, sub-paragraph 4(d) relating to agreements in simplified form was criticized in the earlier Swedish comments. It was suggested to be easier for a State to ask a foreign representative to present a full power than it is for a State to prevent all its representatives from acting without authority. To this argu-

[PART II]
Transmitted by a letter of 2 April 1965 from the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs

[Original: English]

The Swedish Government wishes first to submit some views on the terminology used in the draft to describe the various forms of invalidity of treaties and the various grounds for invalidating treaties.

In article 31 a State is authorized to withdraw its consent to a treaty under certain circumstances. It does not seem clear, however, whether such withdrawal of consent will affect the treaty only from the moment it is expressed or retroactively from its conclusion.

Articles 32(1) and 35(1) prescribe that treaties are to be without any legal effect. According to comment (3) to the latter article, this expression would mean that the treaty is ipso facto void and absolutely null. It is not clear whether the expression is deemed to have the same meaning in article 32, although this is made likely by the fact that article 47 refers to nullity both under article 32 and article 35 and provides that treaties stricken by such nullity may nevertheless be valid by acquiescence. It may be queried whether it would not be desirable to use more uniform terminology.

Under articles 36, 37 and 45 treaties become void under certain circumstances. In comment (6) to article 36 the treaties dealt with in the article are said to be "void ab initio", rather than voidable. It is not clear whether this flows from the article itself or from articles 47 and 52. Nor is it clear whether the treaties void under article 37 because of conflict with a peremptory norm are, likewise, void "ab initio". They are characterized as null in comment (4) to article 37, but unlike the treaties dealt with in article 36, they are subject to article 52.

Under articles 33 and 34 fraud and error may be invoked as invalidating the consent given by a State to a treaty. Comment (8) to article 34 declares this to mean that the treaties are not automatically void, but if the ground is invoked, the treaties will be void ab initio. It appears from article 47 that these treaties may also be characterized as null. Again, it would seem desirable to achieve more uniform terminology. It may be queried whether the expression may be invoked as invalidating the consent is adequate to convey the desired meaning. Any fact, presumably, may be invoked. The relevant question is whether a given fact has any legal consequence. The expression does not appear to answer that question.

With respect to the particular articles, the Swedish Government, without prejudice to the final position it may take, wishes to submit the following comments:

(Article 30. In view, inter alia, of the draft article 8 submitted by the Commission, that "every State may become a party to general multilateral treaties unless otherwise provided by the treaties or the established rules of an international organization the case must be envisaged that a State recognized by some parties to a multilateral convention may become a party to such a convention, although it is not recognized by one or several of the other parties to the convention. The practice seems to be followed in this matter that a party which, because of non-recognition, finds itself unable to accept the obligation to apply the multilateral convention to another party, formally notifies the depositary of the position taken.

(Article 31. The Swedish Government shares the view of the Commission that it would introduce serious risks for the security of treaties generally to leave it to internal law to determine the competent treaty-making organ of a State, and that the basic principle should be, as the Commission suggests, "that non-observance of a provision of internal law regarding competence to enter into treaties does not affect the validity of a consent given in due form by a State organ or agent competent under international law to give that consent".

The exception to this rule contemplated by the Commission covers the cases where a violation of internal law is manifest. The formulation of that exception does not seem quite satisfactory: if the consent in these cases is indeed "invalidated", it could not very well be "withdrawn". A better formulation of the present substance would seem to be:

"... shall not invalidate the consent expressed by its representative. Nevertheless, in case the violation of its internal law was manifest, a State may withdraw the consent expressed by its representative. In other cases it may not withdraw such consent unless the other parties to the treaty so agree."

(Article 32. The provisions contained in this draft article are closely connected with the draft presented on article 4, which was criticized by the Swedish Government in its comments to the first part of the Commission's draft. It was pointed out in that context that rather than prescribing that agents should be provided with full powers—something that is often dispensed with in practice—the draft ought to answer the legally interesting question what effect, if any, should be attributed to consent expressed by a representative who had not been asked to present any evidence of authority and who, in fact, had not possessed authority.

For systematic reasons it may be desirable to retain in the first part of the draft rules regarding the existence of competence, and to insert into the second part the corresponding rules relating to the effect of lack of competence. A reformulation of article 4 seems nevertheless desirable to eliminate what may be viewed as procedural recommendations and to insert only rules of legal significance. Sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 4 would not call for any modification. Sub-paragraph 3, however, might be changed to read along the following lines:

"No other representative of a State shall be deemed (by his offices and functions), and without presenting evidence in the form of written credentials, to possess authority to negotiate on behalf of his State."

While the original text would seem to imply a duty to request the presenting of full powers—which in practice is commonly dispensed with—the above text would simply lay down that a State which negotiates or signs an agreement with a representative not presenting full powers may find that the latter was not authorized. Such a formulation would tie up well with draft article 32(1). Sub-paragraph 4(a) of article 4 might similarly be changed to read along the following lines:

"Subject to the provision of sub-paragraph 1, a representative of a State shall not be deemed (by his offices and functions), and without presenting evidence in the form of written credentials, to possess authority to sign a treaty on behalf of his State."

Such formulation, again, would well tie up with the provision of article 32(1), while the present formulation of sub-paragraph 4(a) would seem to lay down as mandatory that full powers must be requested.

The substance of draft article 4, sub-paragraph 4(b) relating to agreements in simplified form was criticized in the earlier Swedish comments. It was suggested to be easier for a State to ask a foreign representative to present a full power than it is for a State to prevent all its representatives from acting without authority. To this argu-
that a State may be tempted to advance on the basis of any one of the many grounds provided in the draft. Even more discouraging is the fact that the article does not appear to answer whether a treaty is subject to unilateral termination or remains valid, once the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter have been exhausted without result.

In this connexion attention must also be paid to article 51(5). If the meaning of this provision is that a State—to take the examples cited in paragraph (7) of the comment—discovering that an error or change of circumstances has occurred, may cease immediately to perform under the treaty and merely invoke the error or the change of circumstances as a ground for termination, the strength of the article, limited as it is, will be even further reduced.

Problems connected with a policy of “non-recognition” of treaties deemed invalid would not, of course, disappear even if compulsory jurisdiction were given to the International Court of Justice to determine claims of invalidity based upon provisions regarding, for instance, changed circumstances. Such jurisdiction would, however, do much to reduce the risk of abusive claims.

Articles 38(1), (2) and (3)(a) (termination of treaties through the operation of their own provisions) contain interpretative rules, the need for which may be somewhat doubtful. The provision laid down in sub-paragraph (3)(b) seems to be a useful residuary rule.

Article 39 offers a reasonable and partly new solution to the problem raised by treaties containing no provisions regarding their termination.

Article 40(2) and (3) likewise seem to contain useful innovations regarding the termination or suspension of the operation of multilateral treaties, while the need for sub-paragraph 1 is less obvious.

Article 41 (termination implied from entering into a subsequent treaty) likewise lays down a rule of construction that may be useful.

Article 42 deals with the important question of the effect of breach of treaty obligations. The limitation of the article to “material breach” seems well advised and the definition of that concept acceptable. The question may be raised whether the procedure prescribed in article 51 offers an adequate and sufficiently rapid response to the urgent problem of breach of a treaty.

With respect to breach of a multilateral treaty the provisions suggested might, in most instances, be adequate. It is noted, however, that the draft only entitles a party to a multilateral treaty to suspend or terminate the treaty in relation to another party which has violated it or to seek the agreement of the other parties in order to free itself wholly from the treaty. Circumstances might be such, however, that the State ought to be allowed even to terminate or suspend the treaty unilaterally, e.g. if the participation of the State committing the breach was an essential condition for the adherence of the other State.

Article 43 on supervening impossibility of performance may be useful, even though the contingency envisaged is probably rare.

(Articles 44 and 45 have been commented upon above.)

Article 46 on separability appears on the whole to be a most useful and necessary complement to the development of grounds of nullity and termination. The—perhaps inadvertent—reference in sub-paragraph (1) to the possibility of a treaty providing about its own nullity might well be avoided.

Article 47 on waiver and acquiescence seems likewise to be an indispensable complement to the rest of the draft. It would seem desirable in addition expressly to provide in this article that a State may by its conduct through acquiescence be debarred from exercising its right under article 31 to withdraw its consent.

Article 48 contains a special rule on the termination of constituent instruments of international organizations and of treaties which have been drawn up within international organizations. Such a rule would seem to be required. As several of “the provisions of part II, section III” referred to will be clearly inapplicable to
the treaties concerned, it might be preferable to refer to "relevant provisions of part II, section III".

The provision contained in article 49 on evidence of authority to denounce, terminate or withdraw from a treaty might perhaps with advantage be attached to article 4 itself. It would seem even more important to provide expressly that lack of such authority might entail invalidity of the act in accordance with article 32.

The rule contained in article 50 that a State may revoke its notice of termination or denunciation may be framed in too general terms. While the rule suggested may be reasonable in cases such as a breach, it is doubtful whether it is acceptable regarding normal notices of termination in accordance with express provisions for notice in treaties. The purpose of such provisions would seem to be to enable other parties to take suitable measures in good time to meet the new situation. These measures could not be taken with confidence if notices of termination were susceptible of being revoked. The rule suggested might also have the effect of neutralizing provisions requiring advance notice, as it would, in fact, make it possible for a State to defer its decision to terminate until the day before the notice given would take effect.

Article 51 has been commented upon above.

Article 52 regarding the legal consequences of the nullity of a treaty deals in very general and abstract terms with problems of great complexity. A fuller discussion than that offered in the commentary would seem desirable to illustrate and analyse the various political questions. Such a political interpretation can hardly be rules might be clarifying.

previous articles, further illustration of the effect of the abstract

rate to all treaties termed void, a term used in article 52(l)(a),

cases that may arise. The expression "may be required" in sub-

great complexity. A fuller discussion than that offered in the com-

l(b) paragraph

seems inadequate.

Article 53 regarding the legal consequences of the termination of a treaty similarly calls for further clarification. The delimitation between article 53(2) and article 52 is not obvious: article 52 deals with the nullity of treaties, and thereby presumably refers at any rate to all treaties termed void, a term used in article 52(l)(a), but article 53(2) too, refers to treaties which are void.

It might perhaps be preferable to speak, in article 53, of releasing parties "from any further obligation to apply a treaty", rather than releasing the same parties "from application of the treaty". Cf. article 54. The expression "a situation...shall retain its validity" also seems to require improvement.

Although article 54 on the legal consequences of the suspension of the operation of a treaty is somewhat less complex than the previous articles, further illustration of the effect of the abstract rules might be clarifying.

22. TURKEY

[PART II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 15 January 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

1. It is envisaged in article 36 of the draft that treaties concluded under the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations shall be void. In order to enforce this article, it is essential that the threat or use of force be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The article does not specify what kind of threat or use of force is intended. This has been left to the interpretation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Presumably, it is thought that the evolution resulting from such interpretation will be applied in the field of the law of treaties. It is obvious that this will have certain disadvantages. First of all, as a rule, the principles in question will in general be interpreted in connexion with the solution of political questions. Such a political interpretation can hardly be expected to possess the degree of clarity required in juridical matters. Besides, this interpretation may not be acceptable to countries not members of the United Nations. Furthermore, it is always possible that the principles in question may be changed in the future. Therefore, it would be helpful to define the threat or use of force envisaged in this article in order to eliminate these drawbacks.

2. Article 37 of the draft states that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. This article, which at first glance appears to be essential and useful, cannot easily be applied without modification. First of all, the examples cited to prove the usefulness of this article are not compatible with reality. It is not customary today for nations to conclude treaties dealing with the use of force, with crime, traffic in slaves and genocide. That is why one should act with caution before including the notion of *jus cogens* in international law. What is meant by *jus cogens* is not defined in the article. This will make it possible for every nation to interpret *jus cogens* to fit its own needs. As a matter of fact, this is just what has happened. Since the mechanism of compulsory jurisdiction has not been set up in international law, these different interpretations, rather than meeting the needs of the international community, will give rise to new misunderstandings. For this reason, it would be wrong to include the notion of *jus cogens* unilaterally in the law of treaties without first establishing a competent machinery vested with authority to settle the differences arising between nations over *jus cogens* or entrusting existing organizations such as the International Court of Justice with this duty.

3. Although article 39 stipulates that a treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is subject to denunciation, it recognizes exceptions from this principle for certain treaties. These exceptions do not exactly reflect the needs of our times. As the International Court of Justice has observed, the majority of treaties concluded today contain provisions regarding termination or withdrawal. When such a provision is not inserted into a treaty, it means that the parties do not desire to make termination or withdrawal possible. Despite this practice, to recognize exceptions for certain treaties might, in the final analysis, result in ignoring the will of the parties. It is not appropriate to cite as an example the commercial treaties of today which are generally concluded for short durations. In case no exception was recognized, would treaties concluded without limitation last forever? The answer to this question depends upon whether priority should be given to the interest of one party, of both or all parties concerned or to the maintenance of international law and order. We believe that it will be in the benefit of the international community if in exceptional cases envisaged in article 39, each party were to be given the right to request the reviewing of the treaty in question instead of the right of termination or withdrawal.

4. In our opinion, in paragraph 2 of article 40, the period after which a treaty may be terminated with the agreement only of the States parties to it should be ten years.

5. Article 44 of the draft has accepted the principle that a change in the circumstances existing at the time when the treaty was entered into may only be invoked as grounds for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty under the conditions set out in the present article. Although it is gratifying that the International Law Commission has taken care to state the essential limitations to the application of this principle—which happens to be one of the most controversial subjects in international law—the acceptance of this principle without first providing for full guarantees in regard to its application might create conditions harmful to international law and order. Since the commentary on this article does not define the place of this principle in present day international law with sufficient clarity, we will refrain from expressing a detailed opinion on this subject. What we are concerned with here is the end result reached by the article. The article recognizes, under certain limitations, the right to invoke termination of or withdrawal from a treaty because of change of circumstances. Turkey does not concur in this view. Substantial changes in conditions taking place after the treaty has been signed can only entitle the parties to request negotiations for the adaptation of the treaty to changed circumstances. If the parties cannot reach an agreement in this respect,
they can always seek arbitration or apply to international juridical organs. Therefore, Turkey suggests that the article be amended in such a way as to provide that the parties concerned should first enter into discussion among themselves and subsequently refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice should they fail to reach an agreement.

6. Regarding article 45 of the draft, Turkey believes that the views expressed in article 37 are valid in respect of this article also. We would like to add as a reminder that in the majority of the present day multilateral treaties, certain clauses are included to show the connexion between these treaties and those signed previously.

7. Article 51 of the draft defines the methods to be followed in determining the nullity or for terminating, withdrawing from and suspending a treaty. Paragraph 3, which sets out the methods to be employed, contains the most important provisions of the article. According to this paragraph, if the parties cannot reach an accord on the points cited above, they shall resort to methods enumerated in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.

The commentary on article 51 states that in the opinion of some delegations no compulsory settlement is envisaged, with the explanation that no such clause exists in other treaties. Reference is also made to the view expressed by some members that the method of compulsory settlement is not realistic. Turkey believes that this remark holds true in respect of other articles as well.

Provisions which do not enjoy the concurrence of all nations cannot be incorporated in international law without first providing for appropriate guarantees. Therefore, Turkey proposes that paragraph 3 of article 51 should be complemented by the addition of a paragraph to the effect that the parties shall have the right to apply to the International Court of Justice.

[PART III]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 4 October 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

Article 55. The confirmation by the International Law Commission of the rule of pacta sunt servanda, which is the basis of the law of treaties, is useful and necessary in view of the opinions which have been advanced during the last few years. Particularly the effectiveness of this principle may be enhanced if it is strengthened by the principle of good faith. The draft prepared by the Special Rapporteur has put a clear emphasis on the principle of good faith. Although the International Law Commission observed in its commentary on the article that the principle of good faith constitutes an inseparable part of the rule of pacta sunt servanda, this observation has not, nevertheless, been fully and clearly reflected in the text. The Government of Turkey is, therefore, of the opinion that a paragraph similar to the second paragraph of the draft submitted by the Special Rapporteur should be included in the article, and that it should be clearly stipulated that the parties to a treaty should refrain from calculated acts to prevent the application of treaties. Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the draft of the Special Rapporteur stated that the parties not respecting the treaties shall be held responsible for their action. Although this rule is principally concerned with the subject of international responsibility of States, the Government of Turkey believes that a paragraph similar to paragraph 4 of the draft of the Special Rapporteur should be added to the article until the eventual codification of the international responsibilities of States. The fact that such a specific provision was incorporated in paragraph 5 of article 63 renders this addition as suggested by the Turkish Government necessary.

Article 56. The Government of Turkey recognizes that the provisions of a treaty should, as a principle, be applied only in relation to facts and acts taking place while the treaty is in force. Nevertheless, it would seem that in view of the nature of the exception to this principle set out in the last part of paragraph 1 of the article and for the sake of avoiding misunderstandings which might subsequently arise in its interpretation, the exception should be restricted to more specific and definite cases. The Turkish Government therefore suggests that the words "unless the contrary appears from the treaty" in the last part of paragraph 1 of the article should be replaced by the words "unless the treaty stipulates otherwise".

Article 60. The Government of Turkey recognizes the general principle formulated in the article with regard to treaties providing rights for third States. Nevertheless, it considers that the conditions required for enjoying such rights are inadequate. Paragraph 2 of the article stipulates that a State, which is not a party to a treaty, exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1, should comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty established in conformity with the treaty. This paragraph, in actual fact, restricts the powers of States, parties to the treaty, to conclude, a new treaty in the extent of vested rights of third States. This situation is not only a restriction of the powers of sovereign and independent States, but it also causes an imbalance and injustice between their responsibilities. It may be possible for a certain number of States, parties to a treaty, to amend the rights recognized to third States under certain conditions by concluding among themselves a separate treaty similar to the original treaty but not based on provisions thereof.

To restrict the right to conclude a new agreement to exclusive compliance with the provisions of the existing treaty, as provided for in paragraph 2, runs contrary to the changing requirements of international life. With this view, the Government of Turkey suggests that the words "or established in conformity with the treaty" in the last part of paragraph 2 of the article should be deleted from the text and replaced by the words "or established by a new similar treaty".

Article 61. According to this article, a third State, acquiring an implicit right pursuant to section (b) of paragraph 1 of article 60, may suspend the application of the treaty to which it had not given its expressed consent. Such a legal situation is untenable. Article 61 can only be accepted if the word "impliedly" in section (b) of paragraph 1 of article 60 is deleted. Article 61 which would thus be based on a collateral agreement would be acceptable to parties. The stipulation that "unless it appears from the treaty that the provision was intended to be revocable" in article 61 would not suffice to remedy this shortcoming. Turkey can accept article 60 only if the word "impliedly" is deleted from section (b) of paragraph 1 of article 60.

Article 68. Although the commentary on section (c) of the article includes a statement to the effect that account was taken of a new general rule of international law, this point was not reflected in the text of the article with sufficient clarity. Because of this, difficulties may arise in the future. For instance, since the term "general international law" has been utilized in paragraph (b) of article 69, it may be claimed that the terminology of article 68 has a different connotation. In order to avoid such misunderstandings, the Turkish Government proposes the inclusion in the text of section (c) of article 68 of the word "general" immediately after the word "international".

Article 69. Interpretation of international treaties is an important subject related to their application. There are sufficient number of rules for interpretation as confirmed in the decisions of the International Court. A consensus to be reached on the principles on which these rules are based and on the order of their priority will pave the way for their codification and remove the difficulties encountered in their application. The elimination of the difficulties and disputes arising from differences of interpretation will enhance the application of international treaties. The Turkish Government, imbued with this desire, supports the efforts of the International Law Commission in codifying the rules concerning the interpretation of treaties. Turkey is also in accord with the principles employed by the International Law Commission as the basis of the rules of interpretation of treaties.
23. **UGANDA**

[PART II]

*Transmitted by a letter of 16 October 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations*

([Original: English]

As far as I can see there may be some difficulties in the interpretation of article 31 of the draft. This article stipulates that if a representative who had been given authority to conclude a treaty signs a treaty the terms of which conflict with any internal legislation of that State, this fact will not invalidate the treaty unless the parties should agree that the internal law is clearly violated. In this respect I feel that the other parties will have to examine the “internal law” which is alleged to be violated by the treaty so concluded, thereby interfering with the sovereignty of that State. Am I right in assuming that the procedures followed in the ratification of treaties will take account of any conflicts between the proposed treaty and internal law? I am aware that the other contracting parties would wish to have some sort of assurance that the treaty they have signed would not be declared null and void, but still it is, I think, a dangerous principle which leaves room for internationally concluded treaties to bypass constitutional procedures of a Member State.

I am very much in favour of article 36 which attempts to depart from the hitherto recognized procedure of coercing States to accede to treaties, and we are glad to see that article 36 eliminates this element of coercion which has definitely become out of date.

24. **UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

[PARTS I AND III]

*Transmitted by a note of 15 June 1965 from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations*

([Original: Russian]

The competent authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have the following comments on the draft articles on the law of treaties, prepared by the United Nations International Law Commission at its fourteenth to sixteenth sessions:

**Participation in multilateral treaties (articles 8 and 9)**

The competent Soviet authorities consider that, in codifying the law of treaties, it is necessary to proceed from the assumption that general international agreements should be open to participation by all States. This is required by the principle of the equality of States. Moreover, as such treaties usually regulate matters of interest to each and every State and are intended to establish or develop universally recognized principles and rules of contemporary international law which are binding on all States, to deny certain States the possibility of becoming parties to such treaties is contrary to their very spirit and purpose and is harmful to international cooperation.

**Ratification (article 12)**

Since the expression “treaty” in draft article 1 means any agreement (treaty, convention, exchange of notes or letters, etc.) concluded between two or more States and since the majority of such agreements are not at present subject to ratification, article 12 must be based on the assumption that an international treaty is subject to ratification if the treaty itself so stipulates or if the representative of a State has signed it “subject to ratification”.

[PART III]

**Treaties providing for obligations for third States (article 59)**

It must be borne in mind that there are cases where obligations under a treaty may be extended to a third State without its consent being required. This is true, for example, of treaties which, in accordance with the principle of the responsibility of States, impose obligations on aggressor States guilty of launching and conducting a war of aggression.

The above comments on the draft articles on the law of treaties are not exhaustive or final. The competent authorities of the Soviet Union reserve the right to present further comments and observations on the draft articles at the appropriate time.

25. **UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

[PART I]

*Transmitted by a letter of 20 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations*

([Original: English]

**Article 1, paragraphs 1(a) and (b)**

Her Majesty’s Government are not entirely satisfied with the definitions of “treaty” and “treaty in simplified form”. In particular it is doubted whether the list of expressions contained in the definition of the term “treaty” is either necessary or desirable. It would be better to mention any examples in the commentary. The element of an intention on the part of the States concerned to create legal obligations has not been, but should be, included in the definition.

**Article 3, paragraph 1**

In the view of Her Majesty’s Government, article 3, paragraph 1, in the Special Rapporteur’s draft articles is to be preferred to the International Law Commission’s formulation, which does not adequately define the expression “subjects of international law”. There exist many States and territories which possess less than full sovereignty. In certain cases, such States and territories have been enabled themselves to conclude treaties with foreign States by treaty entrenchments and similar means. The article and commentary do not take account of the existence of these means.

**Article 8**

In the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government, the presumption in paragraph 1 is unsatisfactory and, in any event, the drafting of the article will require further attention. Particularly, in paragraph 2 it is unclear to which cases the opening words (“In all other cases,...”) relate; what constitutes taking part in the adoption of the text; and whether the final expression (“...unless the treaty otherwise provides”) qualifies sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) as well as (c). It is considered that the final expression should qualify at least sub-paragraphs (a) and (c). An international conference should not be rendered incapable of excluding from participation in a treaty a State which has taken part in the adoption of the text. Economic conditions might for instance justify exclusion in the case of a commodity agreement; or a State may be excluded until it has fulfilled a prior condition, such as the ratification of a related convention.

**Article 9**

Whilst the underlying idea of this article is acceptable, it may be difficult to operate in practice. For example, it will be many years before a convention on the law of treaties comes into force for all States and during that interim period some States will be parties and others will not. In relation to a particular multilateral treaty, it is likely therefore that some contracting States will also be parties to a convention on the law of treaties and some will not. A proposal to open the multilateral treaty to new States in accordance with this article might be opposed by these latter States who would be under no obligation to comply with the article. Again, it is unclear what effect the provision would have upon a treaty forming the constitution of an international organization and containing express provisions on membership. The majority of such organizations have comprehensive membership articles.
The expression “a small group of States” is imprecise and should be clarified both here and wherever it occurs in these articles.

**Article 12**

The principle in paragraph 1 that treaties require ratification unless the contrary intention appears reflects the provisions regarding the ratification of treaties which appear in the constitutions of many States. However, this is a principle which has not been applied by many other States. As a practical matter there is much to be said for the contrary rule that a treaty does not require ratification and comes into force on signature unless the treaty itself provides otherwise. Her Majesty's Government fear that the rather complicated system of presumptions laid down in the present text will give rise to difficulties which do not at present exist.

**Article 17**

Whilst the principle of this article is sound, its application in practice may cause difficulties unless the drafting is made more precise. Particularly, the expressions “takes part in the negotiation...” (paragraph 1), “signify that it does not intend...” (paragraph 1) and “unduly delayed...” (paragraph 2) are unclear.

**Article 18**

Her Majesty's Government note that this article deals only with reservations and assumes that the International Law Commission intends to take up the related matter of statements of interpretation in a later report.

**Articles 19 and 20**

Her Majesty's Government appreciate the effort of the International Law Commission to deal with this difficult and controversial subject. However, they feel that the two articles are not completely satisfactory and there may be difficulties in applying them in detail in practice. This comment relates in particular to paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 19 and to paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 20.

In general, it is considered that a reservation which is incompatible with the spirit and purpose of a treaty should not be capable of being accepted under article 19, and that provisions such as those made in articles 19 and 20 might be more readily acceptable if this interpretation and application were made subject to international adjudication.

**Article 22**

The article provides that a withdrawal of a reservation shall take effect when notice of it has been received by the other States concerned. Such a withdrawal might, however, necessitate adjustments by these other States to their laws or to their administrative practices and, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, they should be allowed a reasonable time (e.g. three months) before becoming bound by any new obligations resulting from the withdrawal, unless the treaty expressly provides otherwise.

**Article 23**

Her Majesty's Government consider that an automatic rule would be preferable to that provided in paragraph 3, which depends on the parties reaching a further agreement. The rule should, it is suggested, be that a treaty which is not covered by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the article enters into force on the date of signature or, if it is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, when it has been ratified, accepted or approved by all the participants.

**Article 25**

The registration of treaties is already dealt with under Article 102 of the Charter and it is considered unnecessary and undesirable to duplicate those provisions.
policy or a change of a government can ever be regarded as a fundamental change of circumstances.

In the view of Her Majesty's Government, the security of treaties would be impaired if procedural steps in addition to those proposed in article 51 were not required. In connexion with the principle of rebus sic stantibus, the view is taken that a party alleging a fundamental change of circumstances is under an obligation, before it may invoke the change in any way, to propose negotiations to the other party and if the negotiations are not successful at least to offer arbitration of the issue. Her Majesty's Government consider that this element of the principle should be retained.

Article 49

Article 4 draws a distinction in certain circumstances between authority to negotiate, draw up and authenticate a treaty, on the one hand, and authority to sign, on the other. It does not, however, use the word "conclude", unlike article 49. It is not certain, therefore, whether the rule which is to apply in similar circumstances, to authority to denounce, etc., is that relating to authority to negotiate, draw up and authenticate or that relating to authority to sign.

Article 51

Her Majesty's Government consider that the fundamental principle underlying the law of treaties is pacta sunt servanda. Paragraph 1 of this article is of great importance and value. With regard to paragraphs 3 and 4, however, Her Majesty's Government consider that whilst the draft articles on the invalidity and termination of treaties, when in force, would mark an advance in the law of treaties, they would, paradoxically, constitute an impairment of the general security of numerous existing and future treaties unless there were provisions for independent international adjudication or arbitration, as appropriate. The possibilities of abuse, in the absence of proper safeguards, exist most plainly in relation to practically all the articles and, in particular, in relation to articles 36, 41, 42, 43 and 44. Articles such as these would be acceptable only if coupled with the protection of an ultimate appeal to an independent judicial tribunal. This accords with Article 36, paragraph 3 of the Charter by which legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice, and with the intent of resolution 171 (II) of the General Assembly. In general, Her Majesty's Government suggest that the draft articles should be subject to interpretation and application by the International Court of Justice or, if such a provision is not generally acceptable, should only be capable of being invoked against a State which has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court if the State relying on the article is willing to submit the issue to the Court.

Article 52

The operation of article 52, paragraph 1(b) might be difficult in practice, especially if a treaty had been executed to a large extent or if formal legislative or other internal steps had been taken to give effect to it. It is not clear in what manner and by whom the parties may be required to restore the status quo ante.

Article 53

The article as drafted does not make provision with regard to the accrued obligations of a State under a treaty at the time of its denunciation by that State.

(PART III)

Transmitted by a letter of 11 January 1966 from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations

[Original: English]

The Government of the United Kingdom have studied with interest part III of the International Law Commission's draft articles on the law of treaties and wish first to offer the following general comments:

(a) They recall their comment upon the need to provide for independent adjudication of disputes in the operation of certain articles in part II, and in particular the comment on article 51. Certain articles in part III also demonstrate the need for independent adjudication; for example, the test of compatibility in articles 63(3) and 67(1)(b)(ii), the test contained in article 67(1)(b)(i), the provisions of article 68 and the articles in Section III on Interpretation.

(b) The articles in part III raise again the question of the extent to which the provisions of the draft articles would affect treaties in force before the conclusion of any instrument on the law of treaties. To the extent to which the articles state customary law, the effect of any convention on the law of treaties should be identical with that of customary law. However, difficult problems might arise with regard to any provisions in a convention on the law of treaties which amounted to progressive development of international law. In their revision of the draft articles, it is suggested that the Commission should consider the possible retroactive effects of their proposals and also their effect upon existing treaties.

(c) The United Kingdom Government regret the deletion of the article proposed by the Special Rapporteur on the application of treaties to individuals (A/CN.4/167, article 66). It is felt that contemporary international law supports the proposal of the Special Rapporteur, particularly having regard to the development of the law relating to human rights by the United Nations and other international organizations.

In addition, the United Kingdom Government have the following comments upon individual articles in part III:

Article 61. It is felt that the rule proposed might over-safeguard the position of the third State to the detriment of the States parties to the treaty. It is suggested that States parties should be permitted to amend a provision affecting a third State unless it appears from the treaty or the surrounding circumstances that the provision was intended not to be revocable or unless the third State is entitled to invoke the rule of "estoppel" or "preclusion" (which forms the basis of article 47) against the amendment.

Article 63. It is suggested that paragraph 2 should be drafted so as to avoid any appearance of referring to a specific earlier or later treaty, for example, by making it read "any earlier or later treaty".

Article 64. It is considered that, if the exception in paragraph 2 is not carefully and narrowly defined, the rule in paragraph 1 of article 64 will be impaired. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of its commentary, the Commission recognizes that "cases of supervening impossibility of performance...may occur in consequence of the severance of diplomatic relations". The question of supervening impossibility of performance is dealt with in article 43, but only as regards the disappearance of the "subject matter of the rights and obligations contained in the treaty". The severance of diplomatic relations affects not the subject-matter of the rights and obligations, but rather "the means necessary for the application of the treaty". In view of this difference, it is considered that the requirement of "impossibility of performance", referred to by the Commission in the commentary on article 64 and set out in article 43, should be expressly included in the formulation of article 64 (2).

Treaty obligations concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes should not be capable of being suspended by reason only of the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 68. The United Kingdom Government consider that the operation of paragraph (c) would not be satisfactory. The question of the exact point of time at which a new rule of customary law can be said to have emerged is an exceedingly difficult one. Moreover, treaties ought not to be modified without the consent of the parties. For these reasons article 68(c) should be deleted.

Article 69. The United Kingdom Government support the view favoured by the Commission that the text of a treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the
parties (paragraph 9 of the commentary). The concept of the "context" of a treaty is considered to be a useful one, not only with regard to interpretation but also with regard to other draft articles which contain expressions such as "unless the treaty otherwise provides", "unless the contrary appears from the treaty", and "unless it appears from the treaty that ...". As regards the definition of the "context" in paragraph 2, it is considered that the words "including its preamble and annexes" should be omitted on the ground that they constitute parts of a treaty.

The United Kingdom Government support the Commission's proposal in paragraph 1(b).

26. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Part I]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 17 February 1964 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

The Government of the United States of America commends the International Law Commission and expresses appreciation for the Commission's efforts and contributions in the development of the law of treaties.

The following comments are submitted by the United States Government on the group of draft articles (1-29) on the conclusion, entry into force and registration of treaties submitted by the Commission in its report to the General Assembly. These comments are submitted with the understanding that they do not express the final views of the United States Government regarding the articles involved.

**Article 1**

The only parts of this article about which any immediate suggestions are made are paragraph 1(b) and paragraph 2.

The provisions of paragraph 1(b), when considered in conjunction with the provisions of article 4, paragraph 4(b), give rise to the question whether the definition should be based upon and limited to form only. If paragraph 1(b) is retained as now drafted the result of the application of paragraph 4(b) of article 4 will be to require full powers in connexion with many informal agreements which at present are signed without any requirement of full powers. Many such informal agreements have the appearance of a formal treaty so far as form is concerned but are not subject to ratification or other subsequent approval. On the other hand, it would seem that agreements which require ratification or other subsequent acceptance, even though in one of the forms specified in the definition, should be excluded from the definition.

In view of the foregoing it is suggested that consideration be given to replacing the definition in paragraph 1(b) of article 1 by a definition reading somewhat as follows:

"(b) 'Informal treaty' means a treaty not subject to ratification or other subsequent approval that is concluded by an exchange of notes, exchange of letters, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, joint declaration or other instrument."

The disclaimer in paragraph 2 seems to be satisfactory as far as it goes. The characterizations and classifications given in paragraphs 1 and 2 are undoubtedly useful in international law but they may be misleading in that they might be understood by some as a part of international law that had the effect of modifying internal law. For example, the characterization, or designation, or even the form given an international agreement is often of little legal significance. In many instances the name given an agreement or the form in which it is cast is purely a matter of convenience rather than one of legal significance.

In view of this the suggestion is made that paragraph 2 be expanded to read as follows:

"2. Nothing contained in the present articles shall affect in any way the characterization or classification of international agreements under the internal law of any State or affect the requirements of that law regarding the negotiation, signature, and entry into force of such agreements."

**Article 2**

This article is useful in calling attention to the necessity of considering the articles in their context. It is also useful in avoiding a question whether the absence of a written text affects the legal force of an international agreement.

**Paragraph 1**

It would appear that unless the provisions of the paragraph are given a broader meaning than that assigned it in the Commission's commentary, it would constitute a narrow limitation on areas emerging to independence. The reference to "other subjects of international law" is so general that it may be of little value. On the other hand, to limit its scope to international organizations, the Holy See, and cases such as an insurgent community is too limiting. Colonies and similar entities given some measure of authority in foreign relations, especially when approaching statehood, should not have to be in a state of insurgency to conclude a valid international agreement. Where the parent State has entrusted a colony or other subordinate jurisdiction with authority to conduct its foreign relations with respect to certain matters, or specifically authorized it to conclude a particular agreement, the new law of treaties should not preclude commitments entered into in such circumstances from constituting valid international agreements. So far as such colony or entity is entrusted with a measure of authority by the parent State in the conduct of its foreign relations it necessarily becomes a "subject of international law" for the purposes of article 3, paragraph 1. It would be a cruel paradox if, in the face of the existing movement of new entities toward full independence, areas approaching independence could not be encouraged by the parent State giving them authority to conclude agreements in their own names.

**Paragraph 2**

No objection is perceived to this paragraph.

**Paragraph 3**

The use of the word "constitution" in this paragraph may be too limiting, especially in view of the use of the word "constitution" in an apparently different sense in paragraph 2 in connexion with a federal State and the statement in the Commission's commentary that "...the treaty-making capacity of an international organization does not depend exclusively on the terms of the constituent instrument of the organization but also on the decisions and rules of its competent organs. Comparatively few constituent treaties of international organizations contain provisions concerning the conclusion of treaties by the organization; nevertheless the great majority of organizations have considered themselves competent to enter into treaties for the purpose of furthering the aims of the organization."

The reference in the commentary to the dictum of the International Court of Justice in its opinion on "Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations" would seem to serve as a good measure of the authority of an international organization to conclude international agreements. The statement in the dictum, which refers to the Charter of the United Nations, reads:

"Under international law, the organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided for in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties."

The word "authority" would seem to be less likely to create confusion than the word "constitution" which is generally understood to be a written document.

Considerable further attention should be given to the wording of this paragraph so that its meaning would be clear without
reference to the commentary. It would be desirable, for example, to be more specific as to what “international organizations” are being referred to. It is assumed that the intention is to limit the phrase to organizations established by Governments, normally by some form of international agreement, and intended to constitute an international entity between the Governments as such rather than merely a forum for exchange of information or discussion by informal groups.

Article 4

Paragraph 1

The provisions of paragraph 1 seem to be highly desirable. So far as they apply to Heads of State and Heads of Government those provisions are fully consistent with long-established practice in relations between nations. The practice is not as fully developed and widespread so far as Foreign Ministers are concerned but no objection is seen to applying the provisions to them.

Paragraph 2

This paragraph reflects widespread practice and its inclusion should help to clarify those cases where some question may exist particularly in international organizations where treaties are formulated.

Paragraph 3

The requirement imposed by the phrase “shall be required” may be too strong in this provision. In some cases very high-level delegations are sent from one State to another to negotiate or draw up a treaty and the insistence upon any particular credentials may in certain circumstances be out of place and perhaps viewed as a discourtesy, particularly in view of the efficiency of modern communications which make it possible to check upon the authority of any given individual. In view of this it may be desirable to replace the phrase “shall be required” by “may be required”.

Paragraph 4

Sub-paragraph (a)

This provision is simply declaratory of widespread practice and it may be helpful in resolving any questions that arise, even though such questions may seem unlikely.

Sub-paragraph (b)

This sub-paragraph, when applied in conjunction with paragraph 1(b) of article 1, could, as stated above in the comment on article 1, result in full powers being required for many informal agreements that are now signed without any requirement of documentary evidence of authority. Adoption of the revision of paragraph 1(b) of article 1 as suggested in the comment on article 1 would avoid such a result. If that revision is adopted the phrase “treaties in simplified form” in sub-paragraph (b) should be replaced by “informal treaties”.

Paragraph 5

This paragraph may have the effect of encouraging the preparation in the field of many instruments of ratification, accession, approval or acceptance that have long been prepared in foreign ministries. Whether this would be desirable may be questionable because of the likelihood of considerably more mistakes being made in such documents when they are drawn up in the field than when they are prepared in a foreign ministry.

Paragraph 6(a)

The recognition in this provision of full powers of a general or “blanket” character may be very helpful in relieving the pressure imposed upon Heads of State and others by the issuance of numerous full powers. There may be instances, however, where because of the importance of a particular treaty, a State would wish to see a specific authorization. Such special cases could be handled by a request by the State desiring the evidence of specific authorization, a procedure that would not be precluded by paragraph 6(a).

Paragraph 6(b)

The word “shall” in the phrase “shall be provisionally accepted” should be replaced by “may”. The acceptance of a letter or telegram pending the receipt of full powers is a relatively recent innovation based purely upon convenience and courtesy and should not be made a requirement of international law.

Article 5

This article is more in the nature of a statement of existing practices. It is purely informative rather than rule-making in its substance. No objection is perceived to the article other than that it may unnecessarily contribute to the length of the convention in which it is included.

Article 6

No objection is perceived to this article. It would seem to serve a useful purpose by stating general rules that may be helpful guidelines and controlling in the absence of agreement upon some other procedure as provided in paragraph (a).

Article 7

It seems questionable whether this article is at all necessary or useful. In its present wording the article is more confusing than helpful.

Placing the initialling as the first of the procedures for authentication seems to overemphasize that procedure far beyond the importance heretofore given it. In most instances the initialling procedure is not used at all. Placing the initialling procedure first would have the effect of adding an additional procedure that is usually dispensed with but which would be considered necessary in many more cases simply because it was included in a convention on treaties. Initialling a text does not always have the effect of making a given text the definitive text of a treaty. In some instances initialling merely constitutes agreement by the representatives negotiating the treaty that they have reached agreement upon a particular text to refer to their respective Governments for consideration. At the same time it may be understood that the governments concerned may decide whether that particular text shall be the definitive text of a treaty to be signed, whether it may be modified before it is signed, or whether any treaty will be concluded at all. In making a determination as to which alternative will be adopted, the governments may decide that further negotiations will be necessary before a definitive text can be agreed upon. (Paragraph 4 of the Commission’s commentary on article 10 states, in part, “Initialling is employed for various purposes. One is to authenticate a text at a certain stage of the negotiations, pending further consideration by the Governments concerned.”)

Article 8

Paragraph 1 of article 8 seems to contemplate that a general multilateral treaty would be open to all States even though it contained no provision for such—that the terms of the treaty or the established rules of an international organization would have to specifically preclude participation by other States.

Such a provision as that in paragraph 1 of article 8 may not come into play very often because most multilateral treaties as such permit additional States to become parties by signature, signature and ratification, or accession. However, the existing rule, and it is one of the fundamental rules of treaty law, is that in the absence of provision for additional parties to participate it is impossible for them to do so in the absence of agreement by the parties.

It is recognized, of course, that the emergence of many new States to independence requires attentive consideration to the matter of opening many existing treaties to their participation. It is believed, however, that such participation can be accomplished just as
effectively and in a more orderly manner by procedures more in keeping with established treaty law.

Paragraph 2(a) of article 8 is equally unacceptable. The mere fact that a State participated in formulating and adopting a particular treaty may not necessarily entitle it to become a party. After a considerable period of years has elapsed following the entry into force of a given treaty the parties may find it necessary to make some adjustments with respect to States desiring to become parties. There may be circumstances justifying or requiring such adjustments and it would seem to be a backward step to preclude the parties from taking such action. It may not always be possible to anticipate what change in circumstances may justify a new look at a treaty in connexion with participation by a State that stood idly by for years while the parties, through their initiative, co-operation, and forbearance brought a particular organization or subject of international law to a fruitful state. Inclusion of such a provision as paragraph 2(a) in a general convention on treaties may have exactly the reverse effect of the apparent intention of the provision. It may result in States entering into certain new multilateral treaties including specific provisions limiting the States that may actually become parties. It may also result in some States approving the treaty with reservations to assure that it would have a voice in later participation by States that did not join in the actual development of the application of the treaty.

No objection is perceived to paragraph 2(b) since it merely states that the intention of the parties is to be given effect. Inclusion of such an obvious rule in a convention on the law of treaties could, however, have the effect of establishing a strong presumption that every possible international problem that could arise in connexion with treaties had been anticipated by the formulators of the convention and covered by the convention. The difficulty of any such farsighted anticipation is well evidenced by the developments that have taken place in the law of treaties during the past two decades. These developments were not anticipated—they were brought about by changing circumstances.

Paragraph 2(c) would be subject to all the comments made with respect to paragraph 2(a) above.

Article 9

The comments regarding paragraphs 1 and 2(a) of article 8 apply equally to paragraph 1 of article 9.

There are, however, additional objections to article 9, paragraph 1.

The use of the phrase "multilateral treaty" in paragraph 1 is too indefinite to serve as a descriptive term in any rule of law having such new and broad effects as those contemplated by that paragraph. Apparently the words "multilateral treaty" are intended to include "general multilateral treaty" as defined in article 1, paragraph 1(c) and any group of States other than "a small group of States". How small must a group be to constitute "a small group"? Are the members of the Organization of American States, the parties to the Antarctic treaty, or the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty a "small group" of States? If not, then the provisions of those treaties as to what States could participate would be rendered meaningless by the provisions of article 9, paragraph 1(a).

Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of article 9 would not only permit—indeed necessitate—the amendment of a treaty without concurrence of all the parties but would involve another new concept. Sub-paragraph (b) would, in effect, permit the amendment of treaties by international organizations. This new concept, rather than providing flexibility in the negotiation and application of treaties, might have the reverse effect of eliciting reservations by many States in approving a convention on the law of treaties and on other new treaties to be concluded, particularly States whose legislatures must approve treaties before they can become binding.

Paragraph 2 has the obvious defect of uncertainty as to what is meant by the phrase "a small group of States".

Paragraph 3 is consequential upon paragraphs 1 and 2 and procedural for the application of those earlier paragraphs, and could stand as written if the substantive paragraphs were adopted.

Paragraph 4 of article 9 assumes that all treaties are divisible as to parties and can be applied between some of the parties while certain other parties are not in treaty relations with each other. This is not the case in many instances, such as treaties establishing international organizations and treaties for defence. The Charter of the United Nations is a prime example of a treaty where all Members must be in treaty relations with each other.

Article 10

It is assumed that the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article are not intended to exclude the possibility of a treaty being adopted by an international body, authenticated by its officers and opened to ratification without any procedure or requirement for signature, such as the International Labour Organisation Conventions. However, even though the provisions of paragraph 1 are permissive, they might give rise in some instances to a question whether they exclude the procedure of bringing the treaty into force without signature. Such a question could be avoided by inserting the phrase "but with respect to which signature is contemplated", between the words "adopted", and "the States".

Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of article 10 may cause some difficulty, particularly if signature alone can bring the treaty into force. A State may have to satisfy certain national requirements before it can agree to be bound by a particular treaty and it may find it undesirable or impossible to have its obligations date from the time of signature ad referendum rather than from the date when its national requirements are satisfied. This difficulty could be overcome by adding after the word "treaty" at the end of the present wording the phrase "unless the State concerned specifies a later date when it confirms its signature".

Paragraph 3(a) of article 10 may give rise to some question in connexion with certain documents, such as memorandums or minutes of interpretation that are intended to be binding solely on the basis of initialling. Such documents sometimes accompany a more formal document that is signed and brought into force by signature.

Although the article addresses itself to the procedures by which a State becomes a signatory to a treaty, it may be advisable to include a disclaimer in a fourth paragraph in the article reading somewhat as follows:

"4. Nothing in this article shall prevent the initialling of any document, particularly a subsidiary one, from having a final effect when the parties intend that such initialling completes the document without any signature."

Article 11

All of the provisions of this article appear to be in conformity with long and widely accepted practices and procedures on treaty making. The provisions serve a useful purpose in crystallizing principles that are now being followed.

Article 12

As the principal effect of this article is that treaties require ratification in the absence of certain circumstances, it may be more appropriate to list first the requirement for ratification than to begin by enumerating the exceptions. Furthermore, the phrase in paragraph 3(b) reading "other circumstances evidencing such intention" might well be clarified by including as an example the fact that similar treaties concluded by the parties with each other or by either with third States have been subject to ratification. It is suggested, accordingly, that the second and third paragraphs of article 12 be rearranged and revised to read somewhat as follows:

"2. Ratification of a treaty is necessary where:

(a) The treaty itself expressly contemplates that it shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States;"
"(b) The intention that the treaty shall be subject to ratification clearly appears from statements made in the course of negotiations or from other circumstances evidencing such an intention, including, but not limited to the practice of either or both of the States concerned to ratify similar treaties previously concluded between them or concluded by one of them with a third State;

"(c) The representative of the State in question has expressly signed ‘subject to ratification’ or his credentials, full powers or other instruments duly exhibited by him to the representatives of the other negotiating States expressly limit the authority conferred upon him to signing ‘subject to ratification’.

"3. A treaty shall be presumed not to be subject to ratification by a signatory State where:

"(a) The treaty itself provides that it shall come into force on signature and the treaty does not fall under any of the cases provided for in paragraph 1 above;

"(b) The credentials, full powers, or other instruments issued to the representative of the State in question authorize him by his signature alone to establish the consent of the State to be bound by the treaty, without ratification;

"(c) The intention to dispense with ratification clearly appears from statements made in the course of the negotiations or from other circumstances evidencing such an intention, including in the case of a bilateral treaty, but not limited to, the practice of either or both States concerned to conclude similar treaties previously concluded between them, or with third States, without ratification;

"(d) The treaty is informal.

Article 13

The final determination on the wording and acceptability of this article is dependent upon the acceptability of articles 8 and 9 to which it refers. A question may arise under the provisions of article 13 as now written whether article 11 would permit the admission of new States to membership in the United Nations contrary to the provisions of the Charter, particularly under the provisions of article 9 which may be somewhat broader than, and possibly in conflict with some respects with, article 8. Article 8 appears to be fully in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. The first paragraph of that article appears to make participation subject to the terms of the Charter. However, paragraph 1(a) of article 9 seems to permit the admission of additional States to participation in a multilateral treaty without regard to the provisions of that treaty. The two-thirds rule in paragraph 1(a) would appear to be in conflict with the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 14

The acceptability of this article, like article 13, is dependent upon the acceptability of articles 8 and 9 to which it refers. Like article 13, it is completely silent as to the requirements of the particular treaty involved and makes the rules to be established in a convention on the law of treaties paramount.

Article 15

This article as a whole is a very desirable one that would clarify and crystallize international practices and procedures to a great extent but a few changes seem necessary for achieving that objective.

Paragraph 1(a)

The phrase “a written instrument” in paragraph 1(a) of article 15 should be expanded to read “a signed written instrument” or “a written instrument signed by an appropriate authority”. The phrase as written would seem to condone an infrequent practice of submitting a written instrument that merely bears a stamped seal. Such instruments do not appear to be sufficient evidence of a State’s intention to become bound by an international agreement that requires an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.

Paragraph 3 omits any reference to the date of deposit, a detail sometimes omitted in a depositary’s notification to other Governments, and would seem to impose an unnecessary burden on a depositary by the phrase “and the terms of the instrument”.

Although the phrase “shall be notified promptly...of the fact of such deposit” might well be understood by many as necessarily including the date, the failure of some depositaries to mention the date of deposit and the importance of the date justifies a specific reference to the date in the requirement on notification.

The requirement that the depositary shall notify “the terms of the instrument” would seem to require that the depositary transmit to each of the many States concerned a copy of the instrument received or at least a statement of its terms. Such a requirement would seem not only unnecessary but could become quite burdensome to the depositary and delay transmission of the notification.

The practice that appears to be most generally followed by depositaries at the present time is to give the States concerned a notification that a given State deposited its instrument of ratification or accession on a certain date. The text of any reservation or understanding included in or accompanying the instrument when it is deposited is included in the notification. Such a notification seems to be acceptable to most States and no need for any change is perceived.

It is suggested, accordingly, that the final clause of paragraph 3 of article 15 be revised to read somewhat as follows: “shall be notified promptly both of the fact and of the date of such deposit”.

Article 16

This provision is declaratory of existing international practices and understandings. It appears to be fully in keeping with the requirements of orderly treaty making. It appears, however, that the reference to “article 13” should be replaced by a reference to “article 15”.

Article 17

This appears to be a highly desirable provision. So far as it pertains to action following signature or deposit of an instrument of ratification, accession or approval, it reflects generally accepted norms of international law. Moving the obligation back to cover the period of negotiation and drawing up to the time of adoption appears to be an addition not generally considered. Such additional coverage would, however, seem to be an improvement that would permit the States participating in a given negotiation or drawing up to proceed with confidence that their efforts would not be frustrated without some advance warning.

Article 18

Section III at the outset should specify that it applies to multilateral treaties. The introduction to the commentary on articles 18, 19 and 20 shows clearly that the articles are intended for application only with respect to multilateral treaties. Articles 21 and 22 are equally limited to multilateral treaties. However, if let stand in the general terms in which it is written, it may be misleading and become a source of confusion so far as bilateral treaties are concerned. Accordingly, section III should be entitled not merely “Reservations” but “Reservations to multilateral treaties”.

The use of the word “formulate” in the introductory clause in paragraph 1 of article 18 is not clear. The word “formulate” normally means, according to the Webster’s New International Dictionary, “To reduce to, or express in or as in a formula; to put in a systematized statement or expression”. However, from the provisions that follow the initial clause in article 18 the word “formulate” in paragraph 1 seems to be intended to permit a State to propose a reservation and to become a party to a treaty with that reservation. This meaning is supported especially by the four exceptions, (a)-(d), enumerated in paragraph 1. Viewed in this sense article 18 is intended to specify that a State has the right to become a party to any multilateral treaty with a reservation provided none of the
first three of the exceptions in paragraph 1 apply. Paragraph 1(d), the fourth of the exceptions, appears from the commentary to be completely subject to the provisions of article 20. The last sentence of paragraph (15) of the commentary in the Commission’s report reads:

“Paragraph 1(d) has to be read in conjunction with article 20 which deals with the effect of a reservation formulated in cases where the treaty contains no provisions concerning reservations.”

Under such a construction any State could become a party to a multilateral treaty under the provisions of article 20, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b), if any State party to that treaty accepts the reservation, regardless of objection by other parties and regardless of the “object and purpose of the treaty”. Under such provisions many States could have become parties to the Charter of the United Nations with reservations that could have seriously weakened its structure and created chaos on matters of voting, planning, and similar matters requiring co-operative action based upon each Member being in treaty relations with all the other Members.

The provisions of paragraph 1(d) do not seem to take into account the nature or character of a multilateral treaty which in itself would preclude ratification with a reservation that was not accepted by all or at least a large majority of the parties.

Consideration should be given to the inclusion in article 18, paragraph 1(d) of a reference to the character of the treaty involved. This could be accomplished by revising paragraph 1(d) to read somewhat as follows:

“(d) In the case where the treaty is silent concerning the making of reservations, the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, or the treaty is of such a character that each party to it must be in treaty relations with every other party.”

Article 19

The provisions of paragraph 3 of article 19 regarding tacit acceptance of reservations is of considerable merit so far as concerns admission to a treaty of States making reservations to the treaty. It is questionable, however, whether a State should be presumed to make reservations, the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, or the treaty is of such a character that each party to it must be in treaty relations with every other party.

Paragraph 2

In paragraph (15) of the Commission’s commentary on article 18 the following statement is made:

“Paragraph 1(d) has to be read in conjunction with article 20 which deals with the effect of a reservation formulated in cases where the treaty contains no provisions concerning reservations.”

Under such a construction the provisions of paragraph 1(d) of article 18 could be rendered almost meaningless. For example, if such a rule had been in force when the Charter of the United Nations was being ratified, any State ratifying with a reservation would have become a Member of the United Nations with that reservation if at least one party had accepted that reservation. In this connection consideration could be given to the relation of such a rule to the ratification of amendments to the Charter of the United Nations adopted under Article 108 thereof.

Sub-paragraph (a)

The phrase “any State to which it is open to become a party to the treaty” would include a State which, although having the right to become a party, never becomes a party. In such circumstances, acceptance of a reservation by a non-contracting State could not bring the treaty into force between that State and the reserving State. Perhaps the phrase “as soon as the treaty is in force” may have been intended to mean when the treaty is in force between the two States referred to as well as the normal connotation that the treaty has become a binding instrument with respect to any two or more States. In its present wording, however, the intended effect of the provision is not clear.

Sub-paragraph (b)

These provisions imply that a State may not object to a reservation on any ground other than that it is “incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”. Such an implication could lead to endless disagreement and confusion. For example, the reserving State might insist that its reservation was compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and the objecting State would insist that it was not so. The “incompatibility” criteria might well be employed in connexion with determinations whether a State may be considered a party to a treaty with a given reservation but it seems to be an unnecessarily limited basis for objecting to treaty relations with the reserving State. A State may feel that, because of the type of treaty and the circumstances, a given reservation by another State would render relations under the treaty between the two States inequitable. If each State were not free to decide which reservations it will accept and which reservations it will reject, on such bases as it considers appropriate in its national interest, it would have to accept all reservations except those “incompatible...with the treaty”. If the criteria for objecting to a reservation is limited to “incompatibility” the treaty rights expected by a State under a multilateral treaty it ratified with respect to other ratifying States could be changed considerably by reservations without that State’s consent. It is doubted that the authors of the provision intend any such result. Such a result would be in serious conflict with the statement in paragraph (4) of the introduction to the Commission’s commentary on articles 18, 19 and 20, quoting from the opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the Genocide Convention, and reading “...no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto”.

Paragraph 4

The phrase “the effect of the reservation” is not clear. It is assumed that the phrase, as well as the paragraph as a whole, is intended to refer to the bearing of the reservation upon the question whether or not the State involved shall be considered as a contracting party to the constituent instrument of the international organization and a member and not to relations between the reserving State and States which object to the reservation.

If it is intended that the paragraph shall mean that the organization shall decide all legal aspects of the reservation and determine what legal relationships shall be established, it would be in conflict with the above-quoted phrase that “...no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto”. When paragraph 4 is read in conjunction with article 21 it would be clear that the rights of the objecting State would be preserved but difficulties may arise and it would be well to avoid them by casting paragraph 4 in more precise terms.

Even if the intention of paragraph 4 were limited to admitting the reserving State to membership in the organization it could create difficulties and confusion. States which objected to the reservation may feel that they should in no manner be bound nor their interests affected by the vote of the reserving State in the making of decisions by the organization.

The example, given in paragraph (25) of the Commission’s commentary to article 20, of the handling of the “alleged reser-
"reservation" to the IMCO Convention appears to be taken as the basis for suggesting the rule of international law proposed in article 20, paragraph 4. The commentary in paragraph (25) concludes: "The Commission considers that in the case of instruments which form the constitutions of international organizations, the integrity of the instrument is a consideration which outweighs other considerations and that it must be for the members of the organization, acting through its competent organ, to determine how far any relaxation of the integrity of the instrument is acceptable."

Four questions arise in connexion with the example given and the conclusion reached by the Commission, namely:

1. Was the "reservation" involved in the IMCO case an appropriate one on which to base a rule of international law?

2. In view of the essentially consultative character of the IMCO organization, can an example of a case involving its membership be considered applicable to other international organizations whose character may be considerably different, such as the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation?

3. As the effect of a reservation is essentially a legal matter, doesn't the rule in paragraph 4 assign to an international organization judicial functions that should more properly be handled by the International Court of Justice?

4. Is it proper to assume that "integrity of the instrument" involves not only the integrity of the organizational structure but also the integrity of commitments by States that ratify without reservations and that the latter is not normally a matter for determination by a body constituted for other than judicial purposes?

**Article 21**

The acceptability of this article is dependent, at least in part, on the acceptability of the provisions of article 20 to which it refers.

On the assumption that a satisfactory text can be agreed upon for article 20 and articles 18 and 19 to which article 20 is closely related, the following comments are offered on article 21:

**Paragraph 1(a)**

Sub-paragraph (a) reflects a long recognized and widely accepted principle of international law. In this connexion an interesting question would exist where, in the case of a bilateral treaty, one of the parties in giving the approval required by the treaty does so with a condition or reservation that is not expressly accepted or rejected by the other party. The two parties proceed with the application of the treaty but one subsequently asserts that the condition or reservation is of no effect. Should such a condition or reservation be considered as having been accepted by implication? If the entire group of articles under section III is limited to multilateral treaties such a case would not need to be taken into account in articles 19 and 20. However, if section III is not limited to multilateral treaties, consideration should be given to the question of what, if anything, should be provided in articles 19 and 20 with respect to implications arising from acts taken by the parties other than a specific statement of acceptance or objection.

**Paragraph 1(b)**

The phrase "to claim" in the context of paragraph 1(b) is ambiguous. It is assumed that the phrase "to claim" is intended to permit any State to apply the same modification... in its relations with the reserving State. However, without the Commission's commentary, the phrase may be understood as implying that the first State must notify the reserving State of an intention to invoke the reservation before the former could take advantage of the reservation in its relations with the reserving State. The Commission's commentary to article 21 states that "a reservation operates reciprocally between the reserving State and any other party, so that it modifies the application of the treaty for both of them in their mutual relations...".

In view of the lack of clarity in the phrase "to claim" and the purpose of the provision as stated in the commentary, the article would be made clearer and more acceptable if the phrase "to apply" were substituted in place of "to claim".

**Paragraph 2**

In some instances States have objected to or refused to accept a reservation but have nevertheless considered themselves in treaty relations with the reserving State. Such a situation is unusual but the present wording of paragraph 2 not only makes no allowance for but appears to preclude such a situation. Perhaps such a situation could be more properly referred to as one in which the provisions to which the reservation applies are rendered inoperative between the reserving State and the State objecting to the reservations but nevertheless accepting treaty relations. This could be provided for by a third paragraph to article 21 reading somewhat as follows:

"3. Where a State rejects or objects to a reservation but considers itself in treaty relations with the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation applies shall not apply between the two States."

**Article 22**

This article has considerable merit. It may have the effect of encouraging the withdrawal of reservations and thereby contribute to uniformity in treaty relations among the parties. Its principal merit is the clarification afforded by the provision that "Such withdrawal takes effect when notice of it has been received by the other States concerned". As indicated in the Commission's commentary on the article, a State should not be held responsible for a breach of a term of a treaty, to which the reservation relates, committed in ignorance of the withdrawal of the reservation.

**Article 23**

This article as a whole is clearly worded and its merit should be self-evident. As indicated in the Commission's commentary, the provisions reflect accepted present-day practices that are recognized as desirable.

**Article 24**

The provisions of this article are in accord with present-day requirements and practices. Provisional entry into force is required in various circumstances where the urgency of a situation makes it desirable to provide for giving effect to the treaty prior to completion of all the requirements for its definitive entry into force.

It may be questioned, however, whether such a provision in a convention on treaties is necessary.

**Article 25**

A question might well be raised whether the provisions of this article are appropriate for inclusion in the draft articles or whether it should be left to the United Nations. Under Article 102 of the Charter, Members of the United Nations have the obligation to register their treaties with the Secretariat and the Secretariat is responsible for publishing the treaties registered.

Paragraph 1 of article 25 merely reiterates the obligations imposed on Members of the United Nations and upon the United Nations Secretariat by Article 102 of the Charter. That paragraph would not impose any new obligations upon Members or any obligations upon non-members.

Paragraph 2 would not only impose a new obligation upon non-member States but also a new obligation upon the United Nations Secretariat. It is recognized that it would be highly desirable to have all treaties registered with the United Nations and published by it. However, although the present United Nations regulations on registration permit the "filing and recording" of treaties submitted by States not members of the United Nations,
it is questionable whether the draft articles should seek to impose that function upon the Secretariat as an obligation without some recognition that the United Nations consent is necessary. Perhaps before the texts of the draft articles are finally agreed upon arrangements could be made for a resolution by the General Assembly inviting all non-member States to register their treaties and providing for their publication.

More direct recognition of the United Nations role in the adoption of the regulations on registration could be given by replacing the words "in force" in paragraph 3 by the words "adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations".

Article 26

This article would serve as a useful guide on procedures for correcting errors in texts. There are a few minor changes in the wording that may be helpful, namely:

Paragraph 1

Although the various procedures outlined would seem to cover all methods that have been followed in the correction of errors, States may wish to follow some other procedure or may not wish to take any action because of the insignificance of the errors involved. In view of this, consideration might well be given to replacing the word "shall" in the phrase "shall by mutual agreement" by the word "may", making the matter of correcting errors and the procedure permissive rather than mandatory.

Paragraph 1(b)

The word "of" in the phrase "notes of similar instrument" should be replaced by the word "or".

Paragraph 4

Since Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations on registration do not provide for registration of a treaty until after it has entered into force, the communication to the Secretariat of corrections to texts should not be required before the treaty is registered. As the paragraph stands States may feel obliged to communicate the corrections to the Secretariat even though the treaty has not entered into force and has not been registered or may never enter into force and never be registered.

In view of these circumstances, consideration should be given to the revision of paragraph 4 along the following lines:

"Notice of any correction made under the provisions of this article to the text of a treaty that has entered into force shall be communicated to the Secretariat of the United Nations."

It is assumed that a correction embodied in a text at the time the text is registered would require no special mention or separate communication.

Article 27

These provisions would serve as a useful guide in the correction of errors in multilateral treaties for which there is a depositary.

Paragraph 6, article 27, as in the case of paragraph 4 of article 26, may result in notifications of corrections being communicated to the Secretariat prior to registration of the treaty. In view of this, consideration might well be given to the revision of paragraph 6 of article 27 along the lines of the suggested revision of paragraph 4 of article 26 above.

Article 28

This article is declarative of well-accepted practice and its inclusion in the draft articles would serve as a useful guide.

Article 29

This article as a whole should serve as a useful guide with respect to the functions of a depositary. There are, however, several provisions of the article that are questionable.

The provisions of paragraph 3(a) requiring the preparation of any further texts in an additional language as may be required "under...the rules in force in an international organization" may result in an unusual burden being placed upon the depositary if the organization involved should adopt a new rule that the text of a treaty should be prepared in many additional languages. Accordingly, rather than impose an obligation that might be vague in scope, it is suggested that the following phrase be added between the word "organization" and the semicolon: "at the time the depositary is designated".

The provisions of paragraph 3(b) may impose an unnecessary burden upon the depositary if they are construed as meaning that the depositary is required to transmit certified copies to all States to which a treaty "is open to become parties" regardless of the interest in the treaty on the part of such States. Such a provision may result in certified copies of a treaty being sent to States that not only had no interest in the treaty but would become offended and protest the communication of the copies. In view of this it may be advisable to revise the provision to read:

"(b) To prepare certified copies of the original text or texts and transmit such copies to all signatory, ratifying or acceding States, and any other States mentioned in paragraph 1 that request copies;"

The revised provision would not prevent a depositary from transmitting certified copies to any State or group of States but it may avoid unnecessarily burdening the depositary and possibly also embarrassment in some instances.

Paragraph 3(c) gives rise to two questions, namely:

(1) The relationship between these provisions and the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of article 29 is not clear. It may be assumed that paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 would be applied before the signature takes place, particularly if it is with a reservation, or before an instrument of ratification is considered as deposited. This relationship is not clear, however, and serious differences and confusion might arise with respect to the precedence to be given the provisions involved. If, for example, an instrument contains a serious error, the submitting Government would expect the depositary to give it an opportunity to correct the error before the instrument is deposited. There may also be reservations which should be considered by the other States concerned before the deposit is considered as completed.

In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 3 be amended by revising the first part thereof to read:

"(c) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of this article, to receive in deposit..."

(2) The phrase "and to execute a procès-verbal of any signature of the treaty or of the deposit of any instrument relating to the treaty" seems to require a formality that is unnecessary and perhaps in many cases would serve no useful purpose. For example, where a treaty remains open for signature and each signatory writes in the date of signature, the treaty itself is sufficient evidence of the action without the execution of any further formal document.

The execution of a procès-verbal of the deposit of instruments would also appear to be an unnecessary requirement. In many instances this requirement would be understood as requiring the execution of a document by both the depositary and the State submitting the instrument, imposing on each a requirement that they felt unnecessary. The United States has served, and continues to serve, as depositary for many important multilateral treaties with respect to which the formality of procès-verbaux in connexion with deposits has been dispensed with and no problems or complaints appear to have arisen from this practice.

The provisions of paragraph 3(d) would appear to be adequate and make the requirement of a procès-verbal unnecessary in all cases unless the State depositing felt otherwise. Such cases could be taken care of as they arise.
In view of the apparent lack of any real need for procès-verbaux in such cases it is recommended that the words “and to execute a procès-verbal of any instrument relating to the treaty” be deleted from paragraph 3(e).

Paragraph 3(d) reflects the procedures followed with respect to multilateral treaties in general and is a helpful guide and clarification.

The remaining provisions of article 29 appear to be declaratory of existing practices and procedures that are widely accepted and effective. Those provisions constitute useful guides on the matters they cover.

[Part II]

Transmitted by a note verbale of 11 February 1965 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations

[Original: English]

The Government of the United States of America commends the International Law Commission and expresses appreciation for the Commission’s efforts and major contributions in the development of the law of treaties.

The following comments are submitted by the United States Government on the group of draft articles (30-54) on the invalidity and termination of treaties submitted by the Commission in its report to the General Assembly. These comments are submitted in the understanding that they do not express the final views of the United States Government regarding the articles involved.

Article 30

This article states a conclusion that is normally self-evident, namely, that a treaty concluded and brought into force shall be considered as being in force and in operation with regard to any State that has become a party to the treaty in accordance with its terms, unless the rules spelled out in later articles concerning nullity, termination, suspension, or withdrawal apply. Article 30 has merit in that it places, in the articles as a whole, a formal presumption which might otherwise be deviated from for reasons beyond those permitted by other articles. On the other hand, article 30, by stating what is readily assumed, seems to imply that every aspect of treaty law is covered by the convention, or series of conventions, which may be adopted on the law of treaties. Article 30 might well be omitted if the convention, or conventions, could be simplified to state only those aspects of the law of treaties which require statement.

Article 31

The provisions of article 31, when considered along with the commentary thereon, should prove to be self-enforcing in the course of time. Those provisions should encourage States to take account of the need for precision in meeting the requirements of their internal law. On the other hand, a State which invokes such a provision to withdraw, on the ground that the violation of its internal law was manifest, may very likely—as a political matter—find that in subsequent negotiations, even with different States, it will be required to give assurances that all necessary municipal requirements have been fulfilled.

Article 32

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 4 of the Commission’s text on the law of treaties provides that Heads of State, Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers, Heads of a diplomatic mission and Heads of a permanent mission to an international organization are not required to furnish evidence of their authority to negotiate or sign a treaty on behalf of their State. Paragraph 3 of that article provides that any other representative shall be required to furnish written credentials of his authority to negotiate. In considering this provision of article 4, we have pointed out that the word “shall” in paragraph 3 could well be replaced by “may”. In many instances, the appointment of a representative to negotiate and draw up a text is preceded by an agreement at high levels on substance. Also, the surrounding circumstances may make clear that a given individual or mission is fully authorized. For these reasons, we do not think that article 4, paragraph 3, should use mandatory terminology.

Also, the reference in article 32 to article 4 is somewhat ambiguous in that it seems to ignore the fact that a representative may be furnished with some credentials as required under the existing wording of paragraphs 3-6 of article 4.

Accordingly, we would suggest the following revision of article 32:

“1. If the representative of a State, who cannot be considered under the provisions of article 4 or in the light of the surrounding circumstances as being furnished with the necessary authority to express the consent of his State to be bound by a treaty, nevertheless executes an act purporting to express its consent, the act of such representative may be considered by any of the parties to be without any legal effect, unless it is afterward confirmed, either expressly or impliedly, by his State.”

Paragraph 2 of article 32 deals with the situation in which a State places restrictions upon the authority of its representative. The Commission quite properly provides that a treaty shall not become invalid by reason of failure of the representative to observe those restrictions “unless the restrictions upon his authority had been brought to the notice of the other contracting States”. The only reasonable meaning of this exception to the rule is that effect shall be given to such notice only if it is received before his unauthorized consent to the treaty in the name of his State has been given. The words “prior to his expressing the consent” thus might well be added at the end of paragraph 2.

Article 33

Article 33, which deals with the relationship between fraudulent conduct and invalidity, could be a source of controversy and disagreement. It might very well create more problems than it would solve. One of the difficulties which the Commission faced in preparing these articles on invalidity and termination was the paucity of State practice in this area. The absence of State practice is reflected in article 33. A serious question arises as to when an injured State is required to assert the existence of the fraud or of any other disabling factor in order to take advantage of it. Suppose, for example, a State becomes aware of a fraud with regard to a given treaty but waits two, or ten years before asserting it. Should that State have the benefit of this provision? It seems extremely doubtful that it should. If article 33 is retained it might be well to add a clause at the end of paragraph 1 reading somewhat as follows, “provided that the other contracting States are notified within ——— months after discovery of the fraud”. We also believe it would be highly desirable to include in the article a requirement that the fraud be determined judicially.

Article 34

The point about limit of time is relevant also to article 34, which deals with error. Some limitation as to the time within which the error must be asserted after its discovery, or after ample time to discover the error, should be included in this provision. Also, as in the case of article 33, provision should be made for judicial determination.

Article 35

Paragraph 1 perhaps goes too far in providing that an expression of consent attained by means of coercion “shall be without any legal effect”. It would seem that it would be better to provide that “such expression of consent may be treated by the State whose representatives were coerced as being without any legal effect”. This revision would accomplish three things. First, it would prevent the State which applied the coercion from asserting that coercion as a basis for considering the treaty invalid; we do not think that the coerced State would have this right. Second, the State against which coercion was applied should not be required to take the view that the treaty is “without any legal effect”; the coerced State conceivably may wish to avail itself of the option of ignoring the
coercion if its interest in maintaining the security of the treaty is dominant. Third, a revision along the lines suggested would tend to prevent third States from attempting to meddle in a situation where the parties immediately involved were satisfied to continue with the treaty.

Article 36

Article 36 states that a treaty whose conclusion is procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter shall be void. This article, if agreed upon, with certain safeguards, would constitute an important advance in the rule of law among nations. One can agree with the Commission that this rule should be restricted to the threat or use of physical force; it is this threat or use of force which is prohibited by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. But the Commission should deal in its commentary with the important question of the application of this provision in terms of time. As the Commission points out, the traditional doctrine prior to the League Covenant was that the validity of a treaty was not affected by the fact that it had been entered into under the threat or use of force. With the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, this traditional doctrine came under attack. With the Charter, this traditional doctrine was overturned. It was thus only with the coming into effect of the Charter that the concept of the illegitimacy of threats or uses of force in violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, was accepted. It is accordingly doubtful whether invalidity due to an illegitimate threat or use of force should be retroactively applied. If it were, the validity of a large number of treaties, notably peace treaties, would be thrown into question. There is even a question whether such a provision should have effect from 1945 or, alternatively, from the conclusion of a convention on the law of treaties incorporating this rule. Retroactivity of the article would create too many legal uncertainties.

Article 37

The concept embodied in these provisions would, if properly applied, substantially further the rule of law in international relations. The provisions should be supported if it can be made certain that they will not conduct to abuse and create undesirable disruption in treaty relations.

The examples given in paragraph (3), points (a), (b) and (c), of the commentary on article 37 are readily acceptable. However, even the application of those examples, if applied retroactively, might possibly result in injustices to one or more of the parties concerned and disrupt beneficial relations on the basis of clearly acceptable treaty provisions included among others that have long been recognized by the parties as obsolete and inapplicable but which, under the concept stated in article 37, would render the entire treaty void.

Without derogating from the merit of the concept embodied in article 37, it is suggested that the Commission reconsider the provisions of that article and all aspects of the manner in which it might be applied, particularly the question as to who would decide when the facts justify application of the rule.

Article 38

The rules spelled out in article 38 seem self-evident and axiomatic. It would appear that this article could well be omitted if the convention on the law of treaties were to be simplified. However, if it should be the consensus that an article of this character is desirable, its terms as written appear to be satisfactory.

Article 39

Article 39 has the distinct merit of overcoming the alleged presumption that a treaty may be denounced unilaterally where there is no provision for denunciation. However, the intention of the parties to permit denunciation or withdrawal should be a clear intention and this should be emphasized by including the word "clearly" before the word "appears".

Article 40

The provisions of paragraph 1 of article 40 are declaratory of existing principles of international law. The requirement that the agreement for termination be by all the parties emphasizes the cardinal principle that a State cannot be deprived of its legitimate treaty rights without its consent.

On the other hand, paragraph 2 embodies a new concept. It provides that the parties to a multilateral treaty can, by unanimous agreement among themselves, terminate the treaty only if at least two thirds of all the States which drew up the treaty consent to termination if that termination is to be effected before the expiration of a stated number of years. This provision would permit parties to a multilateral treaty to terminate it by agreement, without regard to any of the provisions in the treaty regarding termination, if—after the expiration of the given period of years—they were to find it not feasible to continue applying the treaty because of the failure of other States to join or for other reasons. There might be great difficulty in reaching agreement upon the number of years which would be practical with respect to all treaties. Such a figure is to be inserted in paragraph 2.) Therefore, it is suggested that consideration be given to amending the final clause in the following manner: "however, after the expiry of—after any period of five years, or such other period as the treaty may provide, the agreement of all the States parties to the treaty shall be necessary".

Article 41

Article 41 concerns the termination of an earlier treaty which is implied from entering into a subsequent treaty. The provision is sound in principle. Although its concept is self-evident, it would be helpful in resolving apparent questions in this area.

Article 42

Paragraph 1 of article 42 states that a material breach of a bilateral treaty by one party entitles the other party to invoke that breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part. This concept is widely supported but, apparently, seldom invoked. It should be crystallized as a rule of conventional law. To do so would go far toward eliminating much controversy in this area.

Paragraph 2 of article 42 likewise has merit in that it would discourage treaty violators but it requires some clarification. The paragraph seems to a certain extent to ignore the differing varieties of multilateral treaties. Paragraph 2 could well be applied to law-making treaties on such matters as disarmament, where observance by all parties is essential to the treaty's effectiveness. But we question whether a multilateral treaty such as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—which is essentially bilateral in its application—should be subjected to the provisions of paragraph 2 as it is now worded. Let us take an example. If part A refuses to accord to part B the rights set forth in the Consular Convention, should parties X, Y, and Z—in addition to party B (the wronged party)—have the right to treat the convention as suspended or no longer in force between themselves and party A? Another example: an international convention for the exchange of publications. Assume that a first convention for the exchange of publications. Assume that a first party violates the convention in its relations with a second party. Should a third party have the right to suspend or terminate the convention in its relations with the first party? We think that these examples show that certain of the provisions of article 42 could have an undesirable effect.

Termination or suspension in the case of a multilateral treaty should follow the rule applicable to bilateral treaties. That is, an injured party should not be required to continue to accord rights illegally denied to it by the offending party. This could be accomplished by revising paragraph 2(a) to provide that a material breach of a multilateral treaty by one party entitles: "Any other party,
whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach, to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State”. Similarly, we would suggest revising paragraph 2(b) to read: “The other parties whose rights or obligations are adversely affected by the breach, either...”, and so forth.

It is hoped that Governments and the Commission will review this matter with care.

**Article 43**

Article 43 concerns supervening impossibility of performance. Although this provision may be highly desirable as far as it goes, a question exists as to what rules should govern in a case in which certain provisions of the treaty have been executed, while others remain executory. For example, suppose that State A makes a cession of land to State B on the condition that State B will forever maintain and permit the use of a navigable channel in the river. Now if the river dries up, or its course is seriously altered by a flood rendering the river permanently useless for the purposes of the agreed navigation, should State B continue to enjoy the benefits of the cession while State A is deprived of its rights under the treaty or does the cession simply become revoked? This question leads to the suggestion that article 43 might contain a new, a fourth, paragraph, somewhat along the following lines:

"4. The State invoking the impossibility of performance as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending the operation of a treaty may be required to compensate the other State or States concerned for benefits received under executed provisions."

**Article 44**

The concept of *rebus sic stantibus* embodied in article 44 has long been of so controversial a character and recognized as being so liable to the abuse of subjective interpretation that the United States has reservations about its incorporation in the draft, at any rate in its present form. In the absence of accepted law, it seems highly questionable whether this concept is capable of codification. Moreover, we doubt whether its incorporation, at least in its present form, would be a progressive development of international law. The doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* would have unquestionable utility if it were adequately qualified and circumscribed so as to guard against the abuses of subjective interpretation to which it lends itself. If it is applied with the agreement of the parties to the treaty, so as to give rise to a novation of the treaty, it would certainly be acceptable. If, failing that, an international court or arbitral body were entrusted with making a binding, third-party determination of the applicability of the doctrine to the particular treaty, that, too, would be acceptable. But, while there is opportunity to consider the question further, particularly in the light of comments of other Governments, the United States desires at this juncture to place on record its opposition to article 44 as it is now drafted.

**Article 45**

Article 45 provides that a treaty becomes void and terminates when a new peremptory norm of general international law is established in conflict with the treaty. The Commission’s commentary notes that this is a logical corollary of the *jus cogens* rule of article 37. But considerable further study is needed to decide whether this “logical corollary” is workable as well as to decide whether, as suggested in the comments on article 37, the *jus cogens* rule as presently embodied in the draft is workable. The determination as to just when a new rule of international law has become sufficiently established to be a peremptory rule is likely to be extremely difficult.

Furthermore, it appears that under the provisions of article 37 peremptory norms developed after the conclusion of many early treaties may void the provisions of those treaties if, as appears to be the case, the provisions of that article apply retrospectively. It appears that the article could not be accepted unless agreement is reached as to who is to define a new peremptory norm and determine how it is to be established.

**Article 46**

The provisions of article 46 would seem useful in clarifying, to some extent, the manner in which the articles to which it refers are to be applied. However, the expressions “33 to 35” and “42 to 45” may be somewhat misleading, even though their meaning can be ascertained by a study of the text of the articles to which they refer. It would seem that in order to clearly express the intention of the drafters, expressions such as “33 through 35” and “42 through 45” would be more appropriate.

It also is believed that, if the general concept of article 37 is to be retained, it will be found after some consideration of its implications that a second paragraph like that in article 45 should be added, and that article 37 should be among the articles referred to in article 46.

**Article 47**

Provisions along the lines of article 47 are essential to prevent abuses of the rights set forth in the articles to which it refers. It cannot prevent all abuses which may arise, but it does help to support the principle that a party is not permitted to benefit from its own inconsistencies.

There are two matters of drafting in connexion with article 47.

First, it would seem that the references involved would be clearer if the articles were referred to as “articles 32 through 35” and “articles 42 through 44”.

Second, it would seem advisable to (a) either place article 47 ahead of the other articles to which it refers or (b) include in each of those articles a reference to article 47 in order to avoid those articles being considered out of context.

**Article 48**

The United Nations, as a party in interest, will recognize that article 48 of the draft has particular importance. The text concerns the very special case of treaties which are the constituent instruments of international organizations or which have been drawn up by international organizations. The text recognizes that an international organization must proceed in accordance with its established rules in reaching decisions and taking action. The United States emphatically agrees with this principle. But considerable study is apparently necessary to determine whether, and to what extent, a general convention on the law of treaties can easily include a provision such as article 48. The phrase “subject to the established rules of the organization” might, for example, be construed as meaning that the organization was completely free to ignore the provisions covered in section III if it chose to do so on the basis of some established rule of the organization.

**Article 49**

Article 49 constitutes a useful clarification. It should have the effect of removing any uncertainty or doubt concerning the authorization, or evidence of authorization, for taking the actions mentioned in the article.

**Article 50**

Paragraph 1 of article 50 provides that notice of termination of a treaty under a right expressly or implicitly provided for in that treaty must be communicated, through the diplomatic or other official channel, to every other party to the treaty, either directly or through the depositary. This provision is sound. It correctly states the procedures and principles normally applied. Paragraph 2 of article 50 states that notice to terminate, for example, may be revoked at any time before the date on which it takes effect unless the treaty otherwise provides. It should be pointed out that the reason for specifying a given period of time before a notice of termination becomes effective is to allow the other party or parties to adjust to the new situation created by the termination.
Accordingly, the State receiving the notice in the case of a bilateral treaty is entitled to proceed on the basis that the notice will stand and will prepare to make such readjustments as may be necessary. Perhaps the other party to the bilateral treaty would have given a notice of termination if the first party had not done so.

In the latter circumstances a party to a bilateral treaty might prevent the giving of a notice of termination by the other party by giving such notice itself and then withdrawing the notice with a view to prolonging the treaty beyond the period contemplated by the other party. Such a situation should not be encouraged.

The most reasonable rule would appear to be that, where notice of the termination would bring the treaty to an end with respect to all other parties, the withdrawal of the notice must be concurred in by at least a majority of the other parties to the treaty. For this reason, it is suggested that paragraph 2 of article 50 be revised to read: "Unless the treaty otherwise provides, the notice may be revoked at any time before the date on which it takes effect, except in a case in which the notice would have caused the treaty to terminate with respect to all parties." We would then add a new sentence to paragraph 2, namely: "Where the notice would cause the treaty to terminate with respect to all parties, the notice of withdrawal will not be effective if objected to by the other party in the case of a bilateral treaty, or if objected to by more than one third of the other parties in the case of a multilateral treaty."

**Article 51**

The International Law Commission considers in its commentary that this is a key article. It points out that a number of the members of the Commission thought that some of the grounds under which treaties could be considered invalid or terminated could involve real danger for the security of treaties if allowed to be arbitrarily asserted in face of objection by other parties. It is regretted that the Commission did not find it possible to incorporate a rule subjecting the application of these articles to compulsory judicial settlement by the International Court of Justice. It would appear that the rule of law—particularly in an area such as the law of treaties—argues most strongly for compulsory reference to the Court. The Commission did not dispute "the value of recourse to the International Court of Justice as a means of settling disputes arising under the present articles". As it is, it is not certain that the provisions of article 51 will supply the safeguards that may be required in connexion with some of the articles to which they apply. A requirement of compulsory arbitration or judicial settlement in the absence of settlement of differences by other means seems necessary. It is hoped that further consideration will be given to this matter.

**Article 52**

The provisions of article 52 would appear to be a useful clarification of the consequences resulting from the nullity of a treaty.

**Article 53**

The provisions of article 53, like those of article 52, would appear to be a useful clarification of the consequences of the termination of a treaty.

**Article 54**

There may be a question whether article 54 is intended to apply as broadly as it appears. For example, if one party to a multilateral treaty suspends the application of the treaty with respect to one other party, only the latter party should be relieved of the obligation to apply the treaty unless the nature of the treaty were such that the suspension affected the immediate interests of all parties. In view of this, it is recommended that consideration be given to the rewording of paragraph 1(a) along the following lines:

"(a) Shall relieve the parties affected from the obligation to apply the treaty during the period of the suspension."

**Article 55**

**Pacta sunt servanda**

The United States is in full agreement with the Commission's comment that the rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in good faith is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties. This rule is the foundation stone upon which any treaty structure must be based. Without this rule and its faithful observance by parties to treaties the remaining rules would be of little value. It is the keystone that supports the towering arch of confidence among States. We feel that this cardinal rule is clearly and forcefully defined in article 55.

**Article 56**

**Application of a treaty in point of time**

Article 56, which deals with the application of a treaty in point of time, is helpful in clarifying a rule that should be obvious but which, history has shown, is not always followed. The first paragraph of the article will not only be helpful to governments in the correct consideration of treaty rights and obligations in point of time but will also remind the drafters of new treaties that a retroactive effect can be accomplished by a provision specifically designed or clearly intended for that purpose.

Paragraph 2 of article 56, like the provisions of article 53 in part II, seems to state a self-evident rule. However, the Commission points out in paragraph (7) of its commentary regarding article 56 that "In re-examining article 53 in connexion with the drafting of the present article, the Commission noted that its wording might need some adjustment in order to take account of acquired rights resulting from the illegality of acts done while the treaty was in force". There is a further need for adjustment which arises with respect to acquired rights resulting from the operation of the treaty. For example, a treaty right to property received by inheritance, together with the right to sell the property within three years and withdraw the proceeds, should not be defeated by the termination of a treaty if the right to the property was acquired prior to such termination. Part of this adjustment might be accomplished by replacing the phrase "unless the treaty provides otherwise" as used at the end of paragraph 2, by the phrase "unless the contrary appears from the treaty."

**Article 57**

**The territorial scope of a treaty**

The definition of the scope of application of a treaty as extending to the entire territory of each party unless the contrary appears from the treaty seems to be a rule that is self-evident.

An important question raised by the wording of the provision is the effect of such a provision upon treaties recognizing rights and imposing obligations with respect to such areas as the high seas. And although it is clear from the Commission's commentary that the application of a treaty is not necessarily confined to the territory of a party, the provision standing alone may imply that such is the intention. It would seem that this question would be resolved by wording the article as follows:
"1. A treaty applies throughout the entire territory of each party unless the contrary appears from the treaty.

"2. A treaty also applies beyond the territory of each party whenever such wider application is clearly intended."

**Article 58**

**General rule limiting the effect of treaties to the parties**

The general rule stated in article 58 limiting the effects of treaties to the parties is, as stated in the Commission's commentary, the fundamental rule governing the effect of a treaty upon States not parties. The existence of a difference of views among the learned members of the Commission on the matter of a treaty of its own force conferring rights upon third parties is evidence of the need for a precise provision on the subject.

**Article 59**

**Treaties providing for obligations for third States**

Article 59 regarding treaties providing obligations for third States wisely includes the important proviso that a State in question has expressly agreed to be bound. A question might exist, however, as to whether the concept embodied in paragraph 3 of the Commission's comment on article 59 is apparent in the text of that article, namely, that treaty provisions imposed upon an aggressor State would fall outside the principle laid down in that article. The commentary makes the intended scope of article 59 clear in this respect but, without the commentary, the present text of the article may be somewhat misleading. There exists also an open problem as to the time at which assent by the third party must be indicated.

**Article 60**

**Treaties providing for rights for third States**

The provisions of the first paragraph of article 60 as presently worded might be understood as preventing two or more States from dedicating, by a treaty, a right to all States in general without such dedication being subject to the condition that each State wishing to exercise the right has first assented thereto. In view of this possible implication, it is suggested that consideration be given to rewording the first paragraph of article 60 somewhat along the following lines:

1. A right may arise for a State from a provision of a treaty to which it is not a party if the parties intend to accord that right either (a) to the State in question or (b) to States to which it belongs and the State expressly or impliedly assents thereto.

Paragraph 2, requiring that a third State exercise a right in accordance with the conditions for its exercise provided in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty, expresses a self-evident rule. The inclusion of such a rule as part of the provisions would seem highly desirable as a useful aide both in the formulation of treaties and in their application. However, further consideration of the overall effect of the article is required.

**Article 61**

**Revocation or amendment of provisions regarding obligations or rights of third States**

Such a rule may give rise to more problems than it would resolve. It may, for example, seriously hamper efforts of original parties to revise or even terminate a treaty in its entirety. Changes in circumstances may result in the principal benefits flowing almost wholly or completely to the third State. The parties primarily concerned should not be impeded in their desire to reach a new agreement between themselves, especially if the third State has undertaken few, if any, reciprocal obligations under the treaty. A question arises as to what the situation would be if one of the parties to the treaty gives a notice of termination of the treaty in accordance with its provisions. Would the provision in the treaty permitting termination be evidence of the revocability of the provision regarding an obligation or a right for a State not a party? Considerably more study of this rule is required.

**Article 62**

**Rules in a treaty becoming generally binding through international custom**

The disclaimer in article 62 that the rules in articles 58-60 do not preclude rules in a treaty from becoming generally binding through international custom seems desirable. Articles 58 through 60 standing alone might be looked upon as a digression from the well-established practice of recognizing that rules contained in a treaty sometimes extend beyond the contracting States. Such recognition is in no manner in conflict with the concepts embodied in articles 58 through 60 because, as stated in the Commission's commentary, the rules embodied in a given treaty may come to be generally accepted as enunciating rules of customary law. Once the rules have been generally accepted they extend beyond the parties to the treaty and are no longer subject to the requirements of treaty law.

**Article 63**

**Application of treaties having incompatible provisions**

This article as a whole enunciates rules long and widely accepted in the application of incompatible treaties and is a valuable clarification. Paragraph 5 is especially important in calling attention to the fact that by entering into a later treaty a State cannot divest itself of treaty obligations under an earlier treaty with a State that does not become a party to the later treaty. Although a multilateral treaty may provide that it replaces and terminates an earlier multilateral treaty as between States parties to the later treaty, it cannot justify those parties taking action with respect to each other that is incompatible with their obligations to parties to the earlier treaty which have not become parties to the later treaty.

**Article 64**

**The effect of severance of diplomatic relations on the application of treaties**

Paragraph 1 of article 64 states a rule that is of long standing and widely accepted but is sometimes overlooked. It is a valuable clarification and reminder of a necessary rule for the effective maintenance of the obligations and rights embodied in treaties. The rule enunciated in paragraph 2 requires careful study. Although the normal means necessary for the application of the treaty may be lacking in a case where diplomatic relations are severed, there may be other avenues for satisfying, in part at least, the requirements of the treaty. In paragraph 3 of the commentary on the article, the expression "supervening impossibility of performance" is used. It is questionable whether that concept is clearly reflected in either paragraph 2 or in paragraph 3 of the article. A further paragraph reading as follows may more fully reflect the intention of the Commission as set forth in its commentary and serve to avoid abuse of the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3:

"4. The suspension may be invoked only for the period of time that application is impossible."

It is questionable, however, whether this addition would avoid the abuses that might occur under paragraphs 2 and 3. The better solution would be to retain only the paragraph numbered 1, leaving the subject-matter of the remaining paragraphs to be governed by other provisions of the draft articles, such as paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 43. However, further consideration of the overall effect of the rules in paragraphs 2 and 3 is required.
Section II. Modification of treaties

Article 65

Procedure for amending treaties

The first sentence of this article expresses a rule that seems self-evident but should serve as a useful guide in reminding those considering the amendment of a treaty that the amending process involves the same substantive principles as the making of a new treaty, namely, agreement between the parties.

The second sentence applies the rules set out in part I to a written agreement between the States, intended to amend a treaty between them, with two exceptions: (1) if the treaty provides otherwise and (2) if the established rules of an international organization provide otherwise. Where the treaty “provides otherwise” the parties to it have made express provision concerning the amendment of the treaty and it follows that their intent in this respect should govern. The element of agreement with respect to amendment is fully satisfied because in the treaty itself the parties have agreed upon the manner in which amendment may be effected. The reasons for the inclusion of the second exception is not, however, apparent from the text of the provision nor from the commentary.

Questions may arise whether the first or the second of the two exceptions shall prevail where a treaty concluded under the auspices of an international organization contains express provisions regarding the manner of amendment and the rules of the international organization subsequently provide for some other manner of amendment.

It is recognized that, where the constituent instrument of an international organization embodies rules regarding the amendment of that instrument or of treaties concluded under the auspices of that organization, those rules represent agreement of the parties upon the manner in which such instrument or treaties shall be amended. New treaties drawn up under the auspices of international organizations or any other new treaties may contain express provisions with regard to their amendment which, under the exception with respect to the provisions of a treaty, would properly govern amendment of those treaties. The substance of those provisions may be based, at least in part, upon the established rules of one or more international organizations. It may also be agreed that, by reference in a treaty to the rules of an international organization, certain rules shall govern the amendment of the treaty. In all such cases the crucial requirement is the agreement of the parties that certain rules shall govern amendment of the treaty.

Difficulty may arise, however, in the case of treaties that have been concluded outside an international organization and are to be amended by agreements concluded under the auspices of an international organization, and in the case of treaties which contain no provision for amendment and are concluded under the auspices of an international organization which subsequently develops rules that would permit amendment without agreement of all the parties. A question arises whether the provisions of article 65 with respect to international organizations would prevail over the provisions of article 67 regarding agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only.

Under the provisions of article 65 it might be contended that, because of the inclusion of the reference therein to “the established rules of an international organization”, an amendment of a treaty, under the auspices of an international organization, could deprive some of the parties to that treaty of rights under it and relieve States that became parties to the amendment from obligations to parties to the treaty that did not approve the amendment. Although it is not believed that any such result is intended, the inclusion of the reference to international organizations seems to imply that a separate body of treaty law has been and can continue to be formulated and applied by those organizations, not only with respect to the amendment of treaties concluded under the auspices of those organizations but other treaties as well.

In view of the foregoing comments regarding the inclusion of the reference to international organizations in the second sentence of article 65, the Government of the United States must reserve its position with respect to that sentence.

Article 66

Amendment of multilateral treaties

The provisions of article 66 as a whole may serve as a useful guide in the consideration of the formulation of amendments to a multilateral treaty.

The provision in paragraph 1 reading “subject to the provisions of the treaty or the established rules of an international organization” is appropriate so far as it applies to treaties but the same comments apply with respect to the inclusion of the phrase “established rules of an international organization” in article 66 as are mentioned in connexion with its inclusion in article 65 above. The same applies to the use of the phrase in paragraph 2. The Government of the United States must, accordingly, reserve its position with respect to the inclusion of that phrase in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 66.

The provision in paragraph 3 that a State which signs an amendment is precluded from contesting the application of the amendment may be too severe. At the end of paragraph (13) in the Commission’s commentary on paragraph 3, the statement is made, with reference to a State signing but not ratifying an amendment, that “It is precluded only from contesting the right of other parties to bring the amendment into force as between themselves”. Paragraph 3 seems to go much further. It addresses itself to the “application of an amending agreement”. “Application” would include the giving of effect to provisions in the amending agreement that derogate from or are otherwise incompatible with the rights of parties under the earlier agreement. Under such circumstances the rule would have the effect of discouraging States from signing the amendment if they were not certain that they could ratify it. In some instances the application of the rule may lead States to consider it necessary to go through their entire treaty-making procedures, including approval by a legislature or parliament, before proceeding to sign. Signature, under such a rule, would constitute a waiver of treaty rights, a matter that normally requires considerably more time and study than is involved in signing subject to or followed by ratification.

Article 67

Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only

This article appears to serve the useful purpose of further developing the principle that two or more parties to a multilateral treaty cannot, by a separate treaty, derogate from their existing obligations to the other parties to the multilateral one. It is a useful rule that should serve as a guide to parties contemplating a special treaty as well as a guide to other parties who are interested in protecting their rights under an existing multilateral treaty.

Article 68

Modification of a treaty by a subsequent treaty, by subsequent practice or by customary law

Both paragraphs (a) and (b) of this article reflect long-standing and widely accepted practice. Paragraph (c), although literally accurate and in keeping with the long-recognized principle that treaties are to be applied in the context of international law and in accordance with the evolution of that law, may lead to serious differences of opinion because of differing views on what constitutes customary law. In view of this it may be advisable to omit paragraph (c), leaving the principle to be applied under the norms of international law in general rather than to have it included as a specific provision in a convention on treaty law.
Section III. Interpretation of treaties

Articles 69-71

The provisions of articles 69 through 71 regarding the interpretation of treaties would seem to serve a useful purpose. There are, however, a number of questions that arise from the consideration of those articles. There is, for example, a question whether the provisions should be stated as guidelines rather than as rules. There is the question whether the provisions should enumerate other means of interpretation in addition to those mentioned. It is assumed that the order in which the means of interpretation are stated in those articles has no significance respecting the relative weight to be given to each of those means.

However, as presently drafted the ordinary meaning rule apparently is given primacy, even though there may be, for example, an agreement between the parties regarding interpretation which requires that terms be given some special or technical meaning. This possible conflict could be avoided by listing in paragraph 1 six rules of interpretation seriatim: (a) ordinary meaning; (b) context; (c) objects and purposes; (d) rules of international law; (e) agreement regarding interpretation; (f) subsequent practice in application. This would eliminate paragraph 3. If context is to be defined, it is suggested that the present paragraph 2 could be improved. It is unclear, for example, whether a unilateral document is included in the phrase or on which several but not all of the parties to a multilateral instrument have agreed.

With respect to the formulation of the six rules, the present texts, mutatis mutandis, appear satisfactory except that use of the term “general” before “international law” could add an element of confusion and should be eliminated. The comment refers to “the general rules of international law” which may or may not be the same concept.

The use of the word “all” in the phrase in paragraph 3(b) reading “establishes the understanding of all the parties regarding its interpretation” could be construed as requiring some affirmative action by each and every party. A course of action by one party which is not objected to by other parties would appear worthy of consideration as a substantial guide to interpretation.

Article 70 may be unduly restrictive with respect to recourse to preparatory work and other means of interpretation. A treaty provision may seem clear on its face but, if a dispute has arisen with respect to its meaning, recourse to other means of interpretation should not be made dependent upon the existence of the conditions specified in (a) and (d) of that article. It is suggested that in the event of a dispute on interpretation of a treaty provision, recourse to further means of interpretation should be permissible if the rules set forth in article 69 are not sufficient to establish the correct interpretation.

The use of the word “conclusively” in the provisions of article 71 may be unnecessary. The word “established” standing alone is definite and precise. Adding the word “conclusively” may cause confusion in many cases.

A general comment with respect to the articles on interpretation is that further study should be given to the relationship of these articles with certain other draft articles which, while they may not technically be rules of interpretation, nevertheless have, at the least, interpretive overtones. These articles include 43 on supervening impossibility of performance, 44 on fundamental change of circumstances, and 68 on modification of a treaty by a subsequent treaty, by subsequent practice or by customary law.

Article 72

Treaties drawn up in two or more languages

Paragraph 1 of this article states a widely accepted rule that has proved effective. Clause (b) of paragraph 2 may be of questionable utility. When the negotiators have an opportunity to examine and concur in, or disagree with, a version which they personally authenticate, there is a basis for considering them as having accepted it as accurate. However, a provision that a version drawn up separately, and with respect to which the negotiators have no opportunity to make suggestions shall also be authoritative, would introduce a new factor that should not be crystallized as a part of the law of treaties. If any such non-authenticated version is to have authenticity it should be made so by the provisions of the treaty to which that version applies or by a supplementary agreement between the parties.

Because of these considerations, it is recommended that the whole of sub-paragraph (b) regarding “the established rules of an international organization”, be deleted.

Article 73

Interpretation of treaties having two or more texts

Although the use of the word “texts” is becoming more frequent in the wording of treaties written in two or more languages, it is questionable whether that word aptly describes the parts involved. A treaty as such is more properly conceived of as a unit, consisting of one text. Where that text is expressed in two or more different languages, the several versions are an integral part of and constitute a single text. The use of the word “texts” seems, on the contrary, to derogate from the unity of the treaty as a single document.

It is suggested accordingly that the heading for article 73 be replaced by one based upon the heading of article 72 and reading somewhat as follows:

“Interpretation of treaties drawn up in two or more languages.”

In line with the foregoing, it is suggested that paragraph 1 of article 73 be revised to read as follows:

“1. Each of the language versions in which the text of a treaty is authenticated is equally authoritative, unless the treaty itself provides that, in the event of divergence, a particular language version shall prevail.”

This rewording avoids the use of the word “texts” in referring to the various language versions in which a treaty is done and avoids the use of the word “different” when the emphasis should be upon similarity and equality.

Similarly, it is suggested that paragraph 2 of article 73 be revised to read as follows:

“2. The terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each of the languages in which the text is authenticated. Except in the case referred to in paragraph 1, when a comparison between two or more language versions discloses a difference in the expression of a term or concept and any resulting ambiguity or obscurity is not removed by the application of articles 69-72, a meaning which so far as possible reconciles the two or more language versions shall be adopted.”

27. YUGOSLAVIA

[PARTS I AND II]

Transmitted by a letter of 31 December 1965 from the Chief
Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[Original: French]

[Part I]

Article 0

In view of the importance and scope of international agreements concluded by international organizations, which were taken duly into account in part I of the draft convention as adopted in 1962, the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers it desirable that the future convention on the law of treaties should not be confined exclusively to treaties concluded between States, but should cover also agreements concluded by other subjects of international law, such as international organizations.
As is well known, States and international organizations are linked by more than 1,000 treaties; these, therefore, are of great significance, particularly having regard to the fact that it is realistic to expect such a large number of contractual relationships to give rise to problems and difficulties which will have to be resolved within a reasonable period of time.

Finally, the Commission itself, recognizing the importance of treaties concluded by international organizations, deals in its article 2 with the legal force of treaties concluded between international organizations and other subjects of international law.

**Article 1**

The Yugoslav Government considers that it would be advisable to broaden the definition of the term "treaty" so that it would specifically include also the cases covered by article 1(b) of the earlier draft, namely treaties in simplified form.

The provisions regarding the definition should perhaps be re-examined.

**Articles 8 and 9**

With regard to the participation of States in general multilateral treaties, the Yugoslav Government considers that such treaties should be open to signature by all States, since this is in the interests not only of the international community but also of the States parties to the treaty.

The exclusion of various States from participation in general multilateral treaties is not only contrary to the generally recognized principle of the sovereign equality of States but would also constitute discrimination inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

**Article 12**

The Yugoslav Government considers that the ratification of treaties is based on democratic principles and that it would be desirable to provide for ratification as a residuary rule in the convention on the law of treaties.

It would, indeed, be desirable that the principle that ratification is unnecessary should only be applied in exceptional cases, where the particular treaties contain an express provision to that effect or if such was the intention of the signatory States.

However, if the treaty contains no special provisions concerning ratification, it should be considered that ratification is necessary; article 12 of the draft should therefore be supplemented accordingly.

**[Part II]**

The substance of the provisions concerning defects in the consent given by contracting parties, provisions which appear in articles 33, 34 and 35 of the draft, should be made to ensure that the genuine will of the contracting parties is expressed under the conditions of normal negotiations, in conformity with the present-day needs of the international community.

**Articles 37 and 45**

In the Yugoslav Government's view, the International Law Commission was right to proceed from the hypothesis that there exist peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens).

The two articles mentioned above underline the fact that there exist peremptory norms of international law which must be respected by States when they conclude treaties.

Nevertheless, as members of the international community, States participate in the creation of the international legal order, which changes, evolves and progresses, as do the peremptory norms.

Within the framework of a given international order, treaties which are incompatible with this order should be regarded as contrary to law, and in the same way treaties which are incompatible with a new peremptory norm of general international law, within the meaning of article 45 of the draft, should be void.

**Article 39**

It would be desirable for the provisions of this article relating to treaties containing no denunciation clause to be worded more precisely.

It is difficult to imagine that in the circumstances of the world today, there could be treaties extending in perpetuity. It would therefore be appropriate not only to provide for the possibility of denouncing treaties of this kind but also to lay down the procedure for their denunciation, in view of the historical experience connected with contractual relationships of a perpetual nature.

**[Part III]**

Transmitted by a letter of 9 April 1966 from the Chief Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Article 55**

The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the text of article 55 of the draft convention on the law of treaties which embodies one of the fundamental principles of international law—*pacta sunt servanda*—is satisfactory.

However, the commentary on this article should include more detailed explanations concerning the substance and effects of the *pacta sunt servanda* principle in relation to other fundamental principles of international law laid down in the United Nations Charter and other international instruments, particularly where *jus cogens* is concerned.

Application of the *pacta sunt servanda* principle would not in fact suffice to ensure observance of an international treaty in a case where peremptory norms of international law or other accepted general rules of international law were not observed: e.g., in case of nullity, absence of mutual agreement of the contracting parties, etc. Accordingly, the conscious performance of international treaties means the application of international treaties that are concluded in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the other general principles of international law.

It would be desirable also to determine the relationship between the universal *jus cogens* and a regional *jus cogens*.

**Article 56**

The wording of this article should be clearer concerning the non-retroactive effect of international treaties.

The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the intention of the contracting parties, the same verb should be used in both paragraphs of the article, and that that verb should be "provide" rather than "appear".

**Article 57**

In the view of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this article is incomplete.

The contracting parties have rights and obligations under a treaty even outside the national territory in the narrow sense of the word, e.g., in the case of the high seas, the epicontinental zone, outer space, international administrations, etc.

Hence it would be desirable to complete this article in the sense indicated, on the assumption that the scope of application of an international treaty extends to the entire territory of each contracting party, wherever the territory is linked to, and subject to the State, unless the contrary appears from the international treaty.

**Articles 38, 59 and 60**

The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that these three articles could be combined in one article which would be drafted in more precise and consistent terms.
The commentary should perhaps distinguish between the establishment by an international treaty of rights and obligations for a particular State or generally for several States, and, for example, the creation of a new rule by means of an international convention.

If these three articles are still deemed necessary, however, it would be advisable to delete in article 58 the words "without its consent" and to insert "subject to the rights and obligations referred to in articles 59 and 60".

**Articles 63, 66 and 67**

In the final draft of these articles relating to the modification of multilateral treaties either in relation to all the parties or in relation to certain of the parties only, a single, comprehensive and clearer solution should be provided.

Indeed, it would be desirable, in so far as possible, to place on an equal footing the consequences that may arise under article 63, paragraph 5, and article 67, paragraphs (a) and (b), in connexion with the modification of a treaty.

**Article 68**

The expressions used for international customary law in the French and English texts of this article must be made consistent.

**Articles 69, 70, 71, 72 and 73**

In the opinion of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the provisions concerning the interpretation of treaties should also be expanded.

There should be a special provision excluding the possibility of depriving a treaty of its real force and effect through a process of interpretation.

Moreover, in the case of accession to multilateral treaties, States ordinarily have in mind the actual text of the treaty and not the preparatory work which preceded the adoption of the text. That point also should be covered.

The solution whereby the preparatory work may be used as further means of interpretation of international treaties only in the cases specified in article 70 is acceptable. Indeed, it is only proper to specify explicitly that, when the text of a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there can be no reference to provisional understandings in the course of negotiations during which exclusive positions were necessarily taken by the contracting parties and compromise solutions followed. In other words, the contracting parties are authorized in such cases to refer in good faith only to the compromise solution finally adopted.

Consideration must also be given to the case where an international instrument is the work of several States having different legal systems and conceptions and where the interpretation of a solution must be in conformity with the juridical conceptions of all the contracting parties.
APPENDIX

Table of references indicating the correspondence between the numbers allocated to the articles, sections and parts of the draft articles on the law of treaties in the reports of the Commission since 1962.

*Note.* The following table is intended to show the correspondence between the draft articles provisionally adopted by the Commission in 1962, 1963 and 1964, which are the subjects of the comments of Governments reproduced in the annex of the present report, and the revised and final texts of the draft articles adopted by the Commission respectively at the first part of its seventeenth session in 1965 and at its eighteenth session in 1966. The table is arranged in the order of the articles in the 1962, 1963 and 1964 reports; to find the earlier texts corresponding to articles in the final draft, use may also be made of the foot-notes relating to each article which are given in chapter II of the present report.

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*Note.* The following table is intended to show the correspondence between the draft articles provisionally adopted by the Commission in 1962, 1963 and 1964, which are the subjects of the comments of Governments reproduced in the annex of the present report, and the revised and final texts of the draft articles adopted by the Commission respectively at the first part of its seventeenth session in 1965 and at its eighteenth session in 1966. The table is arranged in the order of the articles in the 1962, 1963 and 1964 reports; to find the earlier texts corresponding to articles in the final draft, use may also be made of the foot-notes relating to each article which are given in chapter II of the present report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
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<th>Observations and references</th>
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<tr>
<td>A/5687</td>
<td>Depositary practice in relation to reservations: report of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>Printed in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1965, vol. II.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/CN.4/41</td>
<td>Reservations to multilateral conventions: report by Mr. J. L. Brierly, Special Rapporteur</td>
<td>Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951, vol. II.</td>
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<td>A/CN.4/43</td>
<td>Law of treaties: second report by Mr. J. L. Brierly, Special Rapporteur</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
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<td>A/CN.4/150</td>
<td>Succession of States in relation to general multilateral treaties of which the Secretary-General is the depositary: memorandum prepared by the Secretariat</td>
<td><em>Ibid.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/CN.4/166</td>
<td>Special missions: report by Mr. Milan Bartoš, Special Rapporteur</td>
<td><em>Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, vol. II.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/CN.4/175 and Add.1-5</td>
<td>Comments by Governments on parts I and II of the draft articles on the law of treaties drawn up by the Commission at its fourteenth and fifteenth sessions</td>
<td>Printed in this volume; see annex to document A/6309/Rev.1, p. 279.</td>
</tr>
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<td>A/CN.4/182</td>
<td>Comments by Governments on part III of the draft articles on the law of treaties drawn up by the Commission at its sixteenth session</td>
<td>Printed in this volume; see annex to document A/6309/Rev.1, p. 279.</td>
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<td>A/CN.4/L.117 and Add.1</td>
<td>Law of treaties: revised draft articles</td>
<td>Printed in this volume, p. 112.</td>
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# Check List of Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eighteenth Session Not Reproduced in This Volume

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Observations and references</th>
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<tr>
<td>A/CN.4/185</td>
<td>Provisional agenda of the eighteenth session *</td>
<td>Printed in vol. I.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/CN.4/188 and Add.1-3</td>
<td>Comments by Governments on the draft articles on special missions drawn up by the Commission at its seventeenth session</td>
<td>Mimeographed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/CN.4/L.112</td>
<td>Draft report of the International Law Commission on the work of the second part of its seventeenth session</td>
<td>Mimeographed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILC(XVIII)MISC.1</td>
<td>Law of treaties: procedural and organizational problems involved in a possible diplomatic conference on the law of treaties</td>
<td>Mimeographed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILC(XVIII)MISC.2</td>
<td>Responsibilities of United Nations organs in furthering co-operation in the development of the law of international trade and in promoting its progressive unification and harmonization</td>
<td>Mimeographed.</td>
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</table>

* The agenda of the seventeenth session was printed in *Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1965*, vol. I.
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