Chapter XI
Provisional application of treaties

A. Introduction

244. At its sixty-fourth session (2012), the Commission decided to include the topic “Provisional application of treaties” in its programme of work and appointed Mr. Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo as Special Rapporteur for the topic. At the same session, the Commission took note of an oral report, presented by the Special Rapporteur, on the informal consultations held on the topic under his chairmanship. The General Assembly subsequently, in resolution 67/92 of 14 December 2012, noted with appreciation the decision of the Commission to include the topic in its programme of work.

245. At its sixty-fifth session (2013), the Commission had before it the first report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/664) which sought to establish, in general terms, the principal legal issues that arose in the context of the provisional application of treaties by considering doctrinal approaches to the topic and briefly reviewing the existing State practice. The Commission also had before it a memorandum by the Secretariat (A/CN.4/658), which traced the negotiating history of article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“1969 Vienna Convention”) both in the Commission and at the Vienna Conference of 1968-69, and included a brief analysis of some of the substantive issues raised during its consideration.

246. At its sixty-sixth session (2014), the Commission considered the second report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/675) which sought to provide a substantive analysis of the legal effects of the provisional application of treaties.

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

247. At the present session, the Commission had before it the third report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/687), which continued the analysis of State practice, and considered the relationship of provisional application to other provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention, as well as the question of provisional application with regard to international organizations. The report included proposals for six draft guidelines on provisional application. 394

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394 The text proposed by the Special Rapporteur read as follows:

**Draft guideline 1**

States and international organizations may provisionally apply a treaty, or parts thereof, when the treaty itself so provides, or when they have in some other manner so agreed, provided that the internal law of the States or the rules of the international organizations do not prohibit such provisional application.

**Draft guideline 2**

The agreement for the provisional application of a treaty, or parts thereof, may be derived from the terms of the treaty, or may be established by means of a separate agreement, or by other means such as a resolution adopted by an international conference, or by any other arrangement between the States or international organizations.

**Draft guideline 3**

A treaty may be provisionally applied as from the time of signature, ratification, accession or acceptance, or as from any other time agreed by the States or international organizations,
248. The Commission also had before it a memorandum (A/CN.4/676), prepared by the Secretariat, on provisional application under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, of 1986 (“1986 Vienna Convention”).

249. The Commission considered the second report at its 3269th to 3270th, and 3277th to 3279th meetings, held on 14, 15, 23, 24 and 28 July 2015.

250. At its 3279th meeting, on 28 July 2015, the Commission referred draft guidelines 1 to 6 to the Drafting Committee.

251. At its 3284th meeting, on 4 August 2015, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee presented an interim oral report on draft guidelines 1 to 3, as provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee at the sixty-seventh session. The report was presented for information only at this stage, and is available, together with the draft guidelines, on the Commission’s website.\footnote{395}

1. Introduction by the Special Rapporteur of the third report

252. In introducing his third report, the Special Rapporteur recalled the work carried out by the Commission at previous sessions, and the content and purpose of his first two reports. In particular, he recalled his assessment that, subject to the specific characteristics of the treaty in question, the rights and obligations of the State which had consented to provisionally apply a treaty were the same as the rights and obligations that stemmed from the treaty itself as if it were in force; and that a violation of an obligation stemming from the provisional application of a treaty activated the responsibility of the State.

253. Approximately twenty member States had provided comments on their practice. While he noted that the practice of States was not uniform, the Special Rapporteur continued to be of the opinion that it was not necessary to carry out a comparative study of internal laws. He noted that the number of treaties that provided for the provisional application of treaties and which had been applied provisionally was relatively high.

254. His third report focused on two major issues: first, the relationship with other provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention, and, second, the provisional application of treaties with regard to the practice of international organizations. As regards the former, his analysis, which had not been intended to be exhaustive, focused on articles 11 (Means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty), 18 (Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty), 24 (Entry into force), 26 (\textit{Pacta sunt servanda}) and 27 (Internal law and observance of treaties). Those provisions were chosen because

\begin{quote}
having regard to the terms of the treaty or the terms agreed by the negotiating States or negotiating international organizations.
\end{quote}

**Draft guideline 4**

The provisional application of a treaty has legal effects.

**Draft guideline 5**

The obligations deriving from the provisional application of a treaty, or parts thereof, continue to apply until: (i) the treaty enters into force; or (ii) the provisional application is terminated pursuant to article 25, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, as appropriate.

**Draft guideline 6**

The breach of an obligation deriving from the provisional application of a treaty, or parts thereof, engages the international responsibility of the State or international organization.\footnote{395} Located at \(<http://legal.un.org/ilc>\).
they enjoyed a natural and close relationship with provisional application. As regards
the provisional application of treaties between States and with international
organizations, or among international organizations, the Special Rapporteur observed
that the Secretariat’s memorandum had clearly indicated that the States took as valid
the formulation adopted in the 1969 Vienna Convention. Nonetheless, the Special
Rapporteur reiterated his view that an analysis of whether article 25 of the 1969
Vienna Convention reflected customary international law would not affect the general
approach to the topic.

255. Chapter IV of his report focused on several aspects: (1) international
organizations or international regimes created through the provisional application of
treaties; (2) the provisional application of treaties negotiated within international
organizations, or at diplomatic conferences convened under the auspices of
international organizations; and (3) the provisional application of treaties of which
international organizations were parties. As regards the creation of the international
organizations or international regimes, the Special Rapporteur clarified that he was
referring to those international bodies created by treaties, and which played a
significant role in the application of the treaty, even though they were not designed to
become fully fledged international organizations. As regards the provisional
application of treaties negotiated within international organizations, or at diplomatic
conferences convened under the auspices of international organizations, the Special
Rapporteur referred, in particular, to the establishment of the Organization for the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO). Despite the fact that the convention was not in
force, the CTBTO in its transitional form had been operating for nearly twenty years.
The Special Rapporteur also referred to more than fifty treaties negotiated under the
auspices of ECOWAS, a significant number of which made provision for the
provisional application of treaties. He submitted for the consideration of the
Commission the possibility of studying the practice of the provisional application of
treaties in the context of regional international organizations.

256. In his view, the task before the Commission was to develop a series of guidelines
for States wishing to resort to the provisional application of treaties, and he proposed
that the Commission could also consider within those guidelines the preparation of
model clauses to guide negotiating States. He noted that the six draft guidelines on the
provisional application of treaties were the outcome of the consideration of the three
reports which had to be read each in the light of the other. The starting point for their
drafting was article 25 of both the 1969 and 1986 Vienna conventions.

2. Summary of the debate

(a) General remarks

257. The view was generally expressed that internal laws and practice on the way in
which States enter into treaties, whether or not provisionally, differed considerably,
and any attempt at categorization, even if possible, would likely not be pertinent for
the purpose of identifying relevant rules under international law. Caution was also
advised with regard to the classification of States as to whether their internal law
accepted or not, and to what extent, the provisional application of treaties. It was
pointed out that in some national legal systems, the possibility of provisionally
applying treaties was the subject of ongoing dispute.

258. Others were of the view that internal rules could not be ignored. There was value
in analysing the different internal laws and practices on the processes applied prior to
consenting to provisional application, which could provide greater insights into how
States viewed the nature of provisional application as a legal phenomenon. It could,
for example, be worth assessing whether States, in their practice, appeared to interpret
article 25 in a manner that suggested that, as a matter of international law, it could
only be resorted to by a State where its internal law so provided. It was also suggested that the Commission had to first take a position on the applicability of article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention (Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties) to the provisional application of treaties. It was observed that the interplay between internal law and international law could take two different forms. First, provisions of internal law could address the procedure or conditions for the expression of the consent of a State to its provisional application of the treaty. Second, the relevant provisions of a given treaty that allows for provisional application sometimes referred also to internal substantive law.

259. Some members of the Commission noted that while article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention was the basis of the legal regime of provisional application of treaties, it did not answer all the questions related to the provisional application of treaties. It was suggested that the Commission should provide guidance to States on such questions as: which States may agree on the provisional application of treaties (only negotiating States or other States as well); whether an agreement on provisional application must be legally binding; and whether such an agreement can be tacit or implied. It was also noted that the Commission should provide guidance to States as to which other rules of international law, for example on responsibility and succession, apply to provisionally applied treaties.

260. It was generally agreed that the provisional application of treaties had legal effects and created rights and obligations. The Special Rapporteur was nonetheless called upon to further substantiate his conclusion that the legal effects of provisional application were the same as those after the entry into force of the treaty, and that such effects could not be subsequently called into question in view of the provisional nature of the treaty’s application. What was not entirely clear was whether provisional application would produce the exact same effects as the entry into force of the treaty. Several possibilities were raised. One solution was to compare provisional application to the regime of the termination of treaties, under article 70 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Another possibility was to refer to the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the consequences of the invalidity of treaties (art. 69), whereby acts performed in good faith are opposable to the parties to the treaty. A further view was that, while the legal effects of provisional application might be practically the same as those after entry into force of the treaty, provisional application was merely provisional, had legal effects for only those States that agreed to apply a treaty provisionally, and had such effects for only those parts of a treaty on which there was such agreement. Furthermore, it was suggested that the Special Rapporteur could also address whether the termination and suspension processes for both regimes were identical.

261. Members endorsed the Special Rapporteur’s assessment that the legal effects of a provisionally applied treaty were the same as those stemming from a treaty in force. It was maintained that a State could not hide behind the fact that the treaty was being provisionally applied to contend that it could not accept the validity of some of the effects produced by the obligation to provisionally apply that treaty. Accordingly a provisionally applied treaty was subject to the pacta sunt servanda rule in article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Its breach would also trigger the operation of the applicable rules on international responsibility for wrongful acts, as in the case of the breach of a treaty in force. A further view was that the distinction between treaties in force and those being provisionally applied was less substantive and more procedural, with provisional application simpler to commence and to end. Some members noted that that article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention was also applicable to provisionally applied treaties.
262. As regards the example, cited in the report, of the provisional application of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a result of a unilateral declaration by Syria, the view was expressed by some members that it did not concern provisional application *stricto sensu* under article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, unless the Special Rapporteur considered that the agreement of the Parties had been evidenced by their silence or inaction in relation to Syria’s unilateral declaration. If so, then further analysis of the phrase “have in some other manner so agreed”, in article 25, was needed, with a view to determining whether acquiescence in the form of silence or inaction could represent agreement for the provisional application of the treaty. The view was also expressed that the Parties in question had tacitly consented to the provisional application of the treaty in view of the fact that the declaration of provisional application by Syria was notified by the depositary to the States Parties and none objected to such decision.

263. As regards future work, it was proposed that the Special Rapporteur focus on the legal regime and modalities for the termination and suspension of provisional application. For example, it would be interesting to know to what extent the provisional application of a treaty might be suspended or terminated by, for example, violations of the treaty by another party which was also applying it provisionally, or in situations where it was uncertain if the treaty would enter into force. The view was expressed that the indefinite continuation of provisional application, particularly given that it allowed for a simplified means of termination as provided in article 25, paragraph 2, could have undesirable consequences.

264. It was also suggested that the Special Rapporteur could seek to identify the type of treaties, and provisions in treaties, which were often the subject of provisional application, and whether or not certain kinds of treaties addressed provisional application similarly. Likewise, the question of who the beneficiaries of provisional application were was considered worth discussing. It was also suggested that the Special Rapporteur could undertake an analysis of limitation clauses used to modulate the obligations being undertaken in order to comply with internal law, or conditioning provisional application on respect for internal law.

265. Some members supported the view that it was worth drafting model clauses which could be of practical importance to States and international organizations in the context of the draft guidelines. However, the Special Rapporteur was cautioned by other members against developing model clauses on the provisional application of treaties which could prove complex due to the differences between national legal systems.

(b) Relationship with other provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention

266. The report’s treatment of the relationship of article 25 with the other provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention was welcomed. It was pointed out that additional provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention were also relevant. For example, article 60 was relevant, since the material breach of a provisionally applied treaty could, according to that view, lead to the suspension or termination of provisional application. The view was also expressed that it was to be doubted that article 60 would operate in the same manner in relation to a treaty being provisionally applied. With regard to the relationship with article 26, it was noted that the *pacta sunt servanda* rule could be used to explain the situation which might result from the unilateral termination of provisional application.

267. By another view, it was not necessary to extend the review of the relationship of article 25 to other rules of the law of treaties and also study the relationship with articles 19 and 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, as the focus was best placed on
specifying the differences between a treaty being provisionally applied and from that which is in force for a particular State.

(c) ** Provisional application of a treaty with the participation of international organizations **

268. Some speakers expressed doubts as to the assertion that the 1986 Vienna Convention, in its entirety, reflected customary international law. It was noted, however, that it could be possible to assert that article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, and perhaps article 25 of the 1986 Vienna Convention, reflected a rule of customary international law. However, further analysis into the matter, in a future report of the Special Rapporteur, would be necessary before any such conclusion could be reached.

269. It was observed that even if a treaty was negotiated within an international organization, or at a diplomatic conference convened under the auspices of an international organization, the conclusion of the treaty was an act of the States concerned and not of the international organization.

270. It was further observed that the provisional application of treaties with the participation of international organizations was different. Such arrangements were more complicated, because they were often designed to ensure the greatest participation simultaneously of the members of the Organization and of the Organization itself. It was considered worth investigating whether international organizations had considered or were considering provisional application as being a useful mechanism, and if such mechanism had been incorporated in their constituent rules.

271. It was also suggested that the Special Rapporteur look at other categories of treaties which might be subject to a special form of provisional application. For example, headquarters agreements were not typically permanent, but were often agreed for a specific conference or event to be held by the international organization in the State in question. By their nature they needed to be implemented immediately and therefore often provided for provisional application.

272. Some members noted that it would be appropriate to undertake first the examination of questions related to the provisional application of treaties concluded by States and only afterwards to proceed to the consideration of provisional application of treaties with the participation of international organizations.

(d) ** Comments on the draft guidelines **

273. In general, members supported the approach taken by the Special Rapporteur to prepare draft guidelines for the purpose of providing States and international organizations with a practical tool. Some members were, however, of the view that the draft guidelines proposed by the Special Rapporteur were better presented as draft conclusions. Another general remark was that it would be better to separate the case of States from that of treaties with the participation of international organizations.

274. Several drafting suggestions were made concerning draft guideline 1, with a view to bringing the provision more into line with article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. For example, it was noted that the reference to internal law not prohibiting provisional application did not appear to be in accordance with article 25, and needed to be deleted since it suggested that States could turn to their internal laws to escape an obligation to provisionally apply a treaty. It was also suggested that the draft guideline could be coupled with another on the scope of the draft guidelines.
275. Concerning draft guideline 2, it was proposed that the reference to a resolution by an international organization be clarified. The view was expressed that resolutions in many cases could not be equated with an agreement establishing provisional application. It was also suggested that reference be made to other forms of agreement such as an exchange of letters or diplomatic notes. The view was also expressed that the provision could also be clearer as to the possibility of acquiescence by negotiating or contracting States to provisional application by a third State.

276. Regarding draft guideline 3, it was suggested, *inter alia*, that the provision could be simplified; and that reference be made to the fact that provisional application only occurred prior to the entry into force of the treaty for the relevant party. It was suggested that the elements of the means of expressing consent, and the temporal starting point of provisional application, could be separated into two draft guidelines.

277. It was suggested that the term “legal effects” in draft guideline 4 be clarified and the provision further developed, since it was the key provision of the draft guidelines. For example, it could be considered whether the obligations of provisional application extended to the whole treaty or only to select provisions. Another possibility was to indicate that the legal effect of provisional application of a treaty could continue after its termination. It was also suggested that the provision could be drafted taking into account the formulation of article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, and that it could be specified that the provisional application of a treaty could not result in the modification of the content of the treaty.

278. Concerning draft guideline 5, it was suggested that it be clarified that the effects of obligations arising from provisional application depended on what States had provided for when they agreed upon the provisional application. Furthermore, it was necessary to take into account which entry into force of a treaty was being referred to, i.e., that of the treaty itself or of the entry into force for the State itself. It was observed that when a multilateral treaty entered into force, provisional application terminated only for those States that had ratified or acceded to the treaty. Provisional application continued, however, for any State that had not yet ratified or acceded to the treaty, until such time as the treaty entered into force for that State. The view was also expressed that the draft guideline could recognize the possibility of setting specific terms for the termination of provisional application.

279. While some members expressed doubts on the need to include draft guideline 6, others expressed support. It was pointed out that the draft guideline had omitted the question of whether the unilateral suspension or termination of provisional application, under the law of treaties, was wrongful under international law, thereby triggering the rules of international law on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.

3. **Concluding remarks of the Special Rapporteur**

280. The Special Rapporteur indicated that, in his opinion, article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention was the point of departure for the Commission’s consideration of the topic. It could go beyond the article only to the extent that it proved useful to ascertain the legal consequences of provisional application. In his view, the primary beneficiary of provisional application was the treaty itself, since it was being applied despite not being in force. In addition, those negotiating States who could partake in the provisional application were also potentially beneficiaries.

281. The Special Rapporteur observed that the preponderance of views within the Commission were not in favour of undertaking a comparative study of internal legislation applicable to provisional application. At the same time, he recalled that he continued to receive submissions from member States as to their practice, which
invariably also included information about the prevailing position under their respective internal law. Nonetheless, this did not contradict his stated intention of not undertaking a comparative law analysis, as the primary focus was on the international practice of States. To remove any doubt, he could accept the deletion of the reference to internal law in draft guideline 1, and the discussion of the matter instead in the corresponding commentary.

282. The Special Rapporteur did not agree with the assertion that the provisional application of a treaty might also be terminated if it were uncertain that the treaty would enter into force, or if it had been applied provisionally for a prolonged period of time. In his view, it was not feasible to refer to termination of provisional application of the treaty solely on the basis of the unpredictability of its entry into force. Furthermore, article 25 imposed no such limitation on the termination of provisional application.

283. He indicated his intention to consider the question of the termination of provisional application and its legal regime, in his next report, together with a study of other provisions in the 1969 Vienna Convention of relevance to provisional application, including articles 19, 46 and 60.