Draft articles on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts with commentaries 1981

autonomous source of law".\textsuperscript{45} According to a resolution of the Institute of International Law,

1. ... Equity is normally inherent in a sound application of the law ...;

2. The international judge ... can base his decision on equity, without being bound by the applicable law, only if all the parties clearly and expressly authorize him to do so.\textsuperscript{79}

Under article 38, paragraph 2, of its Statute, the International Court of Justice may in fact decide a case ex \textit{aequo et bono} only if the parties agree thereto.

83. The Court has, of course, had occasion to deal with this problem. In the \textit{North Sea Continental Shelf} cases, it sought to establish a distinction between \textit{equity} and \textit{equitable principles}. The Federal Republic of Germany had submitted to the Court, in connection with the delimitation of the continental shelf, that the \textit{"equidistance method"} should be rejected, since it \textit{"would not lead to an equitable apportionment"}.\textsuperscript{80} The Federal Republic asked the Court to refer to the notion of equity by accepting the \textit{"principle that each coastal State is entitled to a just and equitable share"}.\textsuperscript{81} Of course, the Federal Republic made a distinction between deciding a case \textit{ex \textit{aequo et bono}} which could be done only with the express agreement of the parties, and invoking equity as a general principle of law. In its Judgment, the Court decided that, in the cases before it, international law referred back to equitable principles which the parties should apply in their subsequent negotiations.

84. The Court stated:

... it is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles, in accordance with the ideas which have always underlain the development of the legal regime of the continental shelf in this field.\textsuperscript{82}

In the view of the Court, \textit{"equitable principles"} are \textit{"actual rules of law"} founded on \textit{"very general precepts of justice and good faith"}.\textsuperscript{83} These \textit{"equitable principles"} are distinct from \textit{"equity"} viewed \textit{"as a matter of abstract justice"}. The decisions of a court of justice:

must by definition be just, and therefore in that sense equitable. Nevertheless, when mention is made of a court dispensing justice or declaring the law, what is meant is that the decision finds its objective justification in considerations lying not outside but within the rules, and in this field it is precisely a rule of law that calls for the application of equitable principles.\textsuperscript{84}

85. Having in mind the Court's elaboration of the concept of equity, the Commission wishes to emphasize that equity, in addition to being a supplementary element throughout the draft, is also used therein as part of the material content of specific provisions, and not as the equivalent of the notion of equity as used in an \textit{ex \textit{aequo et bono}} proceeding, to which a tribunal can have recourse only upon express agreement between the parties concerned.

B. Recommendation of the Commission

86. At its 1696th meeting, on 22 July 1981, the Commission decided, in conformity with article 23 of its Statute, to recommend that the General Assembly should convene an international conference of plenipotentiaries to study the draft articles on Succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts and to conclude a convention on the subject.\textsuperscript{75}

C. Resolution adopted by the Commission

87. The Commission, at its 1696th meeting, on 22 July 1981, adopted by acclamation the following resolution:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The International Law Commission, \\
Having adopted the draft articles on succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts, \\
Desires to express to the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui, its deep appreciation of the outstanding contribution he has made to the treatment of the topic by his scholarly research and vast experience, thus enabling the Commission to bring to a successful conclusion its work on the draft articles on succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts.}
\end{quote}

D. Draft articles on succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts

\textbf{PART I}

\textbf{GENERAL PROVISIONS}

\textit{Commentary}

Part I, following the model of the 1969 Vienna Convention\textsuperscript{6} and the 1978 Vienna Convention,\textsuperscript{7} contains certain general provisions which relate to the present draft articles as a whole. Its title reproduces that of Part I of the 1978 Vienna Convention. Also, in order to maintain structural conformity with the corresponding parts of those Conventions, the order of articles 1 to 3 follows that of the articles dealing with the same subject-matter in those conventions.

\textit{Article 1. Scope of the present articles}

The present articles apply to the effects of a succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts.

\textsuperscript{6} Certain members reserved their position on this recommendation.

\textsuperscript{7} See footnote 63 above.

\textsuperscript{7} See footnote 16 above.
(1) This article corresponds to article 1 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. Its purpose is to limit the scope of the present draft articles in two important respects.

(2) First, article 1 takes account of the decision by the General Assembly that the topic under consideration should be entitled: "Succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties". In incorporating the words "of States" in article 1, the Commission intended to exclude from the field of application of the present draft articles the succession of Governments and the succession of subjects of international law other than States, an exclusion which also results from article 2, subparagraph 1 (a). The Commission also intended to limit the field of application of the draft articles to certain "matters other than treaties".

(3) In view of General Assembly resolution 33/139 of 19 December 1978, recommending that the Commission should aim at completing at its thirty-first session the first reading of "the draft articles on succession of States in respect of State property and State debts", the Commission considered that session the question of reviewing the words "matters other than treaties", which appeared both in the title of the draft articles and in the text of article 1, to reflect that further limitation in scope. It decided, however, to do so at its second reading of the draft, so as to take into account observations of Governments. The Commission nevertheless decided, at the thirty-first session, to change the article "les" before "matières" to "des" in the French version of the title of the topic, and consequently of the title of the draft articles, as well as in the text of article 1, in order to align it with the other language versions. As explained above, at its present session the Commission decided, on the basis of governmental observations, to entitle the final draft: "Draft articles on succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts". The present text of article 1 is a reflection of that decision. Although the word "State" appears only once, for reasons of style, it must be understood that it is intended to qualify all the three matters described.

(4) The second limitation is that of the field of application of the draft articles to the effects of succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts. Article 2, subparagraph 1 (a), specifies that "succession of States means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory". In using the term "effects" in article 1, the Commission wished to indicate that the provisions included in the draft concern not the replacement itself but its legal effects, i.e., the rights and obligations deriving from it.

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"succession of States" means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory;

"predecessor State" means the State which has been replaced by another State on the occurrence of a succession of States;

"successor State" means the State which has replaced another State on the occurrence of a succession of States;

"date of the succession of States" means the date upon which the successor State replaced the predecessor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory to which the succession of States relates;

"newly independent State" means a successor State the territory of which, immediately before the date of the succession of States, was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible;

"third State" means any State other than the predecessor State or the successor State.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present articles are without prejudice to the use of those terms or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of any State.

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(1) This article, as its title and the introductory words of paragraph 1 indicate, is intended to state the meaning with which terms are used in the draft articles.

(2) Paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) of article 2 reproduces the definition of the term "succession of States" contained in article 2, subparagraph 1 (b), of the 1978 Vienna Convention.

(3) In its report on its twenty-sixth session (1974), the Commission specified, in the commentary to article 2 of the draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties, on the basis of which article 2 of the 1978 Vienna Convention was adopted, that the definition of succession of States given in that article referred exclusively to the fact of the replacement of one State by another "in the responsibility for the international relations of territory", leaving aside any connotation of inheritance of rights or obligations on the occurrence of that event. It went on to say that the rights and obligations deriving from a succession of States were those specifically provided for in those draft articles. The Commission noted further, that it had considered that the expression "in the responsibility for the international relations of territory" was preferable to other expressions such as "in the sovereignty in respect of territory" or "in the treaty-making competence in respect of territory", because it was a formula commonly used in State practice and more appropriate to cover in a neutral manner any specific case, independently of the particular status of the territory in question (national territory, trusteeship,
mandate, protectorate, dependent territory, etc.). The Commission specified that the word “responsibility” should be read in conjunction with the words “for the international relations of territory” and was not intended to convey any notion of “State responsibility”, a topic being studied separately by the Commission.80

(4) The Commission decided to include in the present draft articles the definition of “succession of States” contained in the 1978 Vienna Convention, considering it desirable that, where the Convention and the draft articles refer to one and the same phenomenon, they should, as far as possible, give identical definitions of it. Furthermore, article 1 supplements the definition of “succession of States” by specifying that the draft articles apply, not to the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory, but to the effects of that replacement.

(5) Subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 reproduce the terms of paragraph 1, subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e) of article 2 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. The meaning that they attribute to the terms “predecessor State”, “successor State” and “date of the succession of States” derives, in each case, from the meaning given to the term “succession of States” in paragraph 1(a), and would not seem to call for any comment.

(6) Subparagraph 1(e) reproduces the text of article 2, subparagraph 1(f), of the 1978 Vienna Convention, which was based on article 2, subparagraph 1(f), of the draft articles adopted by the Commission in 1974. The part of the commentary to that article relating to the definition is equally applicable in the present case. As the Commission stated:

... the definition given in paragraph 1 (f) includes any case of emergence to independence of any former dependent territories, whatever its particular type may be [colonies, trusteeships, mandates, protectorates, etc.]. Although drafted in the singular for the sake of simplicity, it is also to be read as covering the case ... of the formation of a newly independent State from two or more territories. On the other hand, the definition excludes cases concerning the emergence of a new State as a result of a separation of part of an existing State, or of a uniting of two or more existing States. It is to differentiate clearly these cases from the case of the emergence to independence of a former dependent territory that the expression “newly independent States” has been chosen instead of the shorter expression “new State”.81

(7) The expression “third State” does not appear in article 2 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. This was because the expression “third State” was not available for use in that Convention, since it had already been made a technical term in the 1969 Vienna Convention to denote “a State not a party to the treaty”. As regards the draft articles on succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts, however, the Commission took the view that the expression “third State” was the simplest and clearest way of designating any State other than the predecessor State or the successor State.82

(8) Lastly, paragraph 2 corresponds to paragraph 2 of article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention as well as of the 1978 Vienna Convention, and is designed to safeguard in matters of terminology the position of States in regard to their internal law and usages.

Article 3. Cases of succession of States covered by the present articles

The present articles apply only to the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

Commentary

(1) This provision reproduces mutatis mutandis the terms of article 6 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, which is based on article 6 of the draft articles on the topic prepared by the Commission.

(2) As it stated in the report on its twenty-fourth session, the Commission, in preparing draft articles for the codification of general international law, normally assumes that these articles are to apply to facts occurring or situations established in conformity with international law. Accordingly, it does not as a rule state that their application is so limited. Thus, when the Commission, at its twenty-fourth session, was preparing its draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties, several members considered that it was unnecessary to specify in the draft that its provisions would apply only to the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with international law.83

(3) Other members, however, pointed out that when matters not in conformity with international law called for specific treatment the Commission had expressly so noted. They cited as examples the provisions of the draft articles on the law of treaties concerning treaties procured by coercion, treaties which conflict with norms of jus cogens, and various situations which might imply a breach of an international obligation. Accordingly, those members were of the opinion that, particularly in regard to transfers of territory, it should be expressly stipulated that only transfers occurring in conformity with international law would fall within the concept of “succession of States” for the purpose of the draft articles being prepared. The Commission adopted that view. However, in its report it noted that:

Since to specify the element of conformity with international law with reference to one category of succession of States might give rise to misunderstandings as to the position regarding that element in other categories of succession of States, the Commission decided to include amongst the general articles a provision safeguarding the ques-

80 Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II (Part One), pp. 175-176, document A/9610/Rev.1, chap. II, sect. D, paras. (3) and (4) of the commentary to art. 2.

81 ibid., p. 176, para. (8) of the commentary.


tion of the lawfulness of the succession of States dealt with in the present articles. Accordingly, article 6 provides that the present articles relate only to the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with international law.

(4) At its twenty-fifth session, the Commission decided to include in what was then the introduction to the draft articles on succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties a provision identical with that of article 6 of the draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties. It took the view that there was now an important argument to be added to those which had been put forward at the twenty-fourth session in favour of article 6: the absence from the present draft articles of the provision contained in article 6 of the draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties might give rise to doubts as to the applicability to the present draft of the general presumption that the texts prepared by the Commission relate to facts occurring or situations established in conformity with international law.\footnote{Ibid., para. (2) of the commentary.}

**Article 4. Temporal application of the present articles**

1. Without prejudice to the application of any of the rules set forth in the present articles to which the effects of a succession of States would be subject under international law independently of these articles, the articles apply only in respect of a succession of States which has occurred after the entry into force of the articles except as may be otherwise agreed.

2. A successor State may, at the time of expressing its consent to be bound by the present articles or at any time thereafter, make a declaration that it will apply the provisions of the articles in respect of its own succession of States which has occurred before the entry into force of the articles in relations to any other contracting State or State Party to the articles which makes a declaration accepting the declaration of the successor State. Upon the entry into force of the articles as between the States making the declarations or upon the making of the declaration of acceptance, whichever occurs later, the provisions of the articles shall apply to the effects of the succession of States as from the date of that succession of States.

3. A successor State may at the time of signing or of expressing its consent to be bound by the present articles make a declaration that it will apply the provisions of the articles provisionally in respect of its own succession of States which has occurred before the entry into force of the articles in relation to any other signatory or contracting State which makes a declaration accepting the declaration of the successor State; upon the making of the declaration of acceptance, those provisions shall apply provisionally to the effects of the succession of States as between those two States as from the date of that succession of States.

4. Any declaration made in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 shall be contained in a written notification communicated to the depositary, who shall inform the Parties and the States entitled to become Parties to the present articles of the communication to him of that notification and of its terms.

**Commentary**

(1) The Commission, having recommended to the General Assembly that the present draft articles be studied by a conference of plenipotentiaries with a view to the conclusion of a convention on the subject,\footnote{Yearbook ... 1973, vol. II, pp. 203-204, document A/9010/Rev.1, chap. III, sect. B, para. (4) of the commentary to art. 2.} recognized that participation by successor States in the future convention would involve problems relating to the method of giving consent to be bound by the convention expressed by the successor State, and the retroactive effect of such consent. In fact, under the general law of treaties, a convention is not binding upon a State unless and until it is a party to the convention. Moreover, under a general rule now codified in article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the provisions of a treaty, in the absence of a contrary intention "do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place ... before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party". Since a succession of States in most cases brings into being a new State, a convention on the law of succession in respect of State property, archives and debts would ex hypothesi not be binding on the successor State unless and until it took steps to become a party to that convention; and even then the convention would not be binding upon it in respect of any act or fact which took place before the date on which it became a party. Nor would other States be bound by the convention in relation to the new State until the latter had become a party.

(2) At its present session the Commission, conscious that in the absence of a provision in these draft articles concerning their temporal application, article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention would apply, concluded that it was necessary to include the present article 4 in order to avoid the problems referred to in the preceding paragraph. As in the case of article 3, this article reproduces, mutatis mutandis, the corresponding provision (art. 7) of the 1978 Vienna Convention, which is intended to solve in the context of the law of succession of States in respect of treaties as codified in that convention problems similar to those which arise in the case of the present draft, as explained above.

(3) Article 7 of the 1978 Vienna Convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties after long and careful consideration at both the first and resumed sessions of the Conference, with the help of an Informal Consultations Group set up to consider, inter alia, its
subject-matter. Paragraph 1 of article 7 reproduces without change the text of the only paragraph constituting draft article 7 of the final draft on succession of States in respect of treaties adopted by the Commission in 1974. Paragraphs 2 to 4 of article 7 of the 1978 Vienna Convention were elaborated by the Conference as a mechanism intended to enable successor States to apply the provisions of the Convention, or to apply them provisionally, in respect of their own succession which had occurred before the entry into force of the Convention. Article 4 aims at achieving similar results in the case of a future convention embodying rules applicable to a succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts.

(4) In its commentary to draft article 7 of the final draft on succession of States in respect of treaties adopted in 1974, the Commission stated, inter alia, the following:

Article 7 is modelled on article 4 of the [1969] Vienna Convention but is drafted having regard to the provisions on the non-retroactivity of treaties in article 28 of that Convention. The article has two parts. The first, corresponding to the first part of article 4 of the Vienna Convention, is a saving clause which makes clear that the non-retroactivity of the present articles will be without prejudice to the application of any of the rules set forth in the articles to which the effects of a succession of States would be subject under international law independently of the articles. The second part limits the application of the present articles to cases of succession of States which occur after the entry into force of the articles except as may be otherwise agreed. The second part speaks only of “a succession of States”, because it is possible that the effects of a succession of States which occurred before the entry into force of the articles might continue after their entry into force and this possibility might cause confusion in the application of the article. The expression “entry into force” refers to the general entry into force of the articles rather than the entry into force for the individual State, because a successor State could not become a party to a convention embodying the articles until after the date of succession of States. Accordingly, a provision which provided for non-retroactivity with respect to “any act or fact ... which took place before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party,” as in article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, would, if read literally, prevent the application of the articles to any successor State on the basis of its participation in the convention. The words “except as may be otherwise agreed” are included to provide a measures of flexibility and reflect the sense of the introductory words to article 28 of the [1969] Vienna Convention.

The foregoing passage, which is applicable to paragraph 1 of article 4 of the present draft, is to be read, for the purposes of this draft, keeping in mind the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the article.

Article 5. Succession in respect of other matters

Nothing in the present articles shall be considered as prejudging in any respect any question relating to the effects of a succession of States in respect of matters other than those provided for in the present articles.

Commentary

In view of the fact that the present draft articles do not deal with succession of States in respect of all matters other than treaties but are, rather, limited in scope to State property, archives and debts, the Commission, in second reading, deemed it appropriate to include this safeguard clause relating to the effects of a succession of States in respect of matters other than three to which the draft applies. The wording of article 5 is modelled on that of article 14 of the 1978 Vienna Convention.

Article 6. Rights and obligations of natural or juridical persons

Nothing in the present articles shall be considered as prejudging in any respect any question relating to the rights and obligations of natural or juridical persons.

Commentary

As is explained below in the commentary to article 31, the Commission, at its present session, decided not to include in the definition of State debt a reference to any financial obligation chargeable to a State other than those owed to another State, an international organization or any other subject of international law. Other provisions, such as article 12, might be misunderstood as implying some prejudice to the rights of natural or juridical persons. In these circumstances the Commission found it especially appropriate to insert in the draft the safeguard clause contained in article 6. It is intended to avoid any implication that the effects of a succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts, for which the present articles provide, could in any respect prejudice any question relating to the rights and obligations of individuals, whether natural or juridical persons. The article is cast in general form and has therefore been included in the present Part I, containing the “General provisions” applicable to the draft as a whole.

PART II
STATE PROPERTY

SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

Article 7. Scope of the articles in the present Part

The articles in the present Part apply to the effects of a succession of States in respect of State property.

Commentary

The purpose of this provision is simply to make it clear that the articles in Part II deal with only one of the three “matters other than treaties” mentioned in article 1, namely, State property.

Footnotes:

77 For the summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole held during the first (1977) and resumed (1978) sessions of the Conference, see Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, vols. I and II respectively (United Nations publications, Sales Nos. E.78.V.8 and E.79.V.9).
79 Ibid., p. 182, para. (3) of the commentary to art. 7.
Succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties

Article 8. State property

For the purposes of the articles in the present Part, “State property” means property, rights and interests which, at the date of the succession of States, were, according to the internal law of the predecessor State, owned by that State.

Commentary

(1) The purpose of article 8 is not to settle what is to become of the State property of the predecessor State, but merely to establish a criterion for determining such property.

(2) There are in practice quite a number of examples of treaty provisions which determine, in connection with a succession of States, the State property of the predecessor State, sometimes in detail. They include article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht between France and Great Britain of 11 April 1713; article II of the Treaty of 30 April 1803 between France and the United States of America for the cession of Louisiana; article 2 of the Treaty of 9 January 1895 by which King Leopold II ceded the Congo to the Belgian State; article II of the Treaty of Peace of Shimonoseki of 17 April 1895 between China and Japan; and article I of the Convention of Retrocession of 8 November 1895 between the same States; article VIII of the Treaty of Peace of 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States of America, and the annexes to the Treaty of 16 August 1960 concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.

(3) An exact specification of the property to be transferred by the predecessor State to the successor State in two particular cases of succession of States is also to be found in two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in pursuance of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 10 February 1947. The first of these, resolution 388 (V), was adopted on 15 December 1950, with the title “Economic and financial provisions relating to Libya”. The second, resolution 530 (VI), was adopted on 29 January 1952, with the title “Economic and financial provisions relating to Eritrea”.

(4) No generally applicable criteria, however, can be deduced from the treaty provisions mentioned above, the content of which varied according to the circumstances of the case, or from the two General Assembly resolutions, which were adopted in pursuance of a treaty and related exclusively to special situations. Moreover, as the Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission stated in an award of 26 September 1964, “customary international law has not established any autonomous criterion for determining what constitutes State property”.

(5) Up to the moment when the succession of States takes place, it is the internal law of the predecessor State which governs that State’s property and determines its status as State property. The successor State receives it as it is into its own juridical order. As a sovereign State, it is free, within the limits of general international law, to change its status, but any decision it takes in that connection is necessarily subsequent to the succession of States and derives from its competence as a State and not from its capacity as the successor State. Such a decision is outside the scope of State succession.

(6) The Commission notes, however, that there are several cases in diplomatic practice where the successor State has not taken the internal law of the predecessor State into consideration in characterizing State property. Some decisions by international courts have done the same in relation to the property in dispute.

(7) For example, in its Judgment of 15 December 1933 in the Péter Pázmány University case, the Permanent Court of International Justice took the view that it had “no need to rely upon” the interpretation of the law of the predecessor State in order to decide whether the property in dispute was public property. It is true that the matter was governed by various provisions of the Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920), which limited the Court’s freedom of judgement. In another case, in which Italy was the predecessor State, the United Nations Tribunal in Libya ruled on 27 June 1955 that in deciding whether an institution was public or private, the Tribunal was not bound by Italian law and judicial decisions. Here again, the matter was governed by special provisions—in this case those of resolution 388 (V), already mentioned (para. (3) above), which limited the Court’s freedom of judgement.

(8) The Commission nevertheless considers that the most appropriate way of defining “State property” for the purposes of part II of the present draft articles is to refer the matter to the internal law of the predecessor State.

(9) The opening words of article 8 emphasize that the rule it states applies only to the provisions of part II of the present draft and that, as usual in such cases, the

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* Ibid., p. 1195.
* Malloy, op. cit., p. 1693.
* Ibid., vol. 49, p. 3.

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* Award in “Dispute regarding property belonging to the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus” (Annuaire français de droit international, 1965 (Paris), vol. XI, p. 323).
* P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 61, p. 236.
Commission did not in any way intend to put forward a general definition.

(10) The Commission wishes to stress that the expression “property, rights and interests” in article 8 refers only to rights and interests of a legal nature. This expression is to be found in many treaty provisions, such as article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles (28 June 1919), article 249 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (10 September 1919), article 177 of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (27 November 1919), article 232 of the Treaty of Trianon and article 79 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy.

(11) In article 8, the expression “internal law of the predecessor State” refers to rules of the legal order of the predecessor State which are applicable to State property. For States whose legislation is not unified, these rules include, in particular, those which determine the specific law of the predecessor State—national, federal, metropolitan or territorial—that applies to each peace of its State property.

Article 9. Effects of the passing of State property

A succession of States entails the extinction of the rights of the predecessor State and the arising of the rights of the successor State to such of the State property as passes to the successor State in accordance with the provisions of the articles in the present Part.

Commentary

(1) Article 9 makes it clear that a succession of States has a dual juridical effect on the respective rights of the predecessor State and the successor State as regards State property passing from the former to the latter. It entails, on the one hand, the extinction of the rights of the predecessor State to the property in question and, on the other hand and simultaneously, the arising of the rights of the successor State to that property. The purpose of article 9 is not to determine what State property passes to the successor State. Such determination will be done “in accordance with the provisions of the articles in the present Part”, and more specifically, of articles 12 to 17.

(2) Article 9 gives expression in a single provision to a consistent practice, and reflects the endeavour to translate, by a variety of formulae, the rule that a succession of States entails the extinction of the rights of the predecessor State and the arising of those of the successor State to State property passing to the successor State. The terminology used for this purpose has varied according to time and place. One of the first notions found in peace treaties is that of the renunciation by the predecessor State of all rights over the ceded territories, including those relating to State property. This notion already appears in the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659, and found expression again in 1923 in the Treaty of Lausanne and in 1951 in the Treaty of Peace with Japan. The Treaty of Versailles expresses a similar idea concerning State property in a clause which stipulates that “Powers to which German territory is ceded shall acquire all property and possessions situated therein belonging to the German Empire or to the German States”. A similar clause is found in the treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Neuilly-sur-Seine and Trianon. The notion of cession is also frequently used in several treaties. Despite the variety of formulae, the large majority of treaties relating to transfers of territory contain a consistent rule, namely, that of the extinction and simultaneous arising of rights to State property.

(3) For article 9, the Commission adopted the notion of the “passing” of State property, rather than of the “transfer” of such property, because it considered that the notion of transfer was inconsistent with the juridical nature of the effects of a succession of States on the rights of the two States in question to State property. On the one hand, a transfer often presupposes an act of will on the part of the transferor. As indicated by the word “entails” in the text of article 9, however, the extinction of the rights of the predecessor State and the arising of the rights of the successor State take place as of right. On the other hand, a transfer implies a certain continuity, whereas a simultaneous extinction and arising imply a break in continuity. The Commission nevertheless wishes to make two comments on this latter point.

(4) In the first place, the successor State may create a certain element of continuity by maintaining provisionally in force the rules of the law of the predecessor State relating to the régime of State property. Such rules are certainly no longer applied on behalf of the predecessor State, but rather on behalf of the successor State, which has received them into its own law by a decision taken in its capacity as a sovereign State. Although, however, at the moment of succession, it is another juridical order that is in question, the material

103 Ibid., pp. 434-437.
104 Ibid., pp. 839-842.
105 Ibid., 1920, vol. CXIII (op. cit.), pp. 585 et seq.
110 Art. 256 (British and Foreign State Papers, 1919, vol. CXII (op. cit.), p. 125.
111 Art. 208 (ibid., pp. 412-414).
112 Art. 142 (ibid., pp. 821-822).
114 See, for example, art. 1 of the Convention of 4 August 1916 between the United States of America and Denmark concerning the cession of the Danish West Indies (in Supplement to the American Journal of International Law (New York, Oxford University Press), vol. 11 (1917), pp. 61-62, and art. V of the Treaty of 2 February 1951 concerning the cession to India of the Free Town of Chandernagore (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 203, p. 158)).
content of the rules remains the same. Consequently, in the case envisaged, the effect of the succession of States is essentially to change the entitlement to the rights to the State property.

(5) In the second place, the legal passing of the State property of the predecessor State to the successor State is often, in practice, followed by a material transfer of such property between the said States, accompanied by the drawing-up of inventories, certificates of delivery and other documents.

*Article 10. Date of the passing of State property*

Unless otherwise agreed or decided, the date of the passing of State property is that of the succession of States.

Commentary

(1) Article 10 contains a residuary provision specifying that the date of the passing of State property is that of the succession of States. It should be read together with article 2, subparagraph 1(d), which states that "date of the succession of States' means the date upon which the successor State replaced the predecessor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory to which the succession of States relates".

(2) The residuary character of the provision in article 10 is brought out by the subsidiary clause with which the article begins: "Unless otherwise agreed or decided". It follows from that clause that the date of the passing of State property may be fixed either by agreement or by a decision.

(3) In fact, it sometimes occurs in practice that the States concerned agree to choose a date for the passing of State property other than that of the succession of States. It is that situation which is referred to by the term "agreed" in the above-mentioned opening clause. Some members of the Commission suggested that the words "between the predecessor State and the successor State" should be added. Others, however, opposed that suggestion on the grounds that for State property situated in the territory of a third State the date of passing might be laid down by a tripartite agreement concluded between the predecessor State, the successor State and the third State.

(4) There have also been cases where an international court has ruled on the question what was the date of the passing of certain State property from the predecessor State to the successor State. The Commission therefore added the words "or decided" after the word "agreed" at the beginning of article 10. However, the Commission did not intend to specify from whom a decision might come.

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114 See above, para. (1) of the commentary to art. 9.
115 These exceptions are to be found, inter alia, in four of the peace treaties concluded after the First World War. See art. 256 of the Treaty of Versailles, art. 208 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, art. 142, of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, and art. 191 of the Treaty of Trianon (for references, see footnotes 110-113 above). Under the terms of these treaties, the value of the State property ceded by the predecessor States to the successor States was deducted from the amount of the reparations due by the former to the latter. It should, however, be noted that in the case of some State property, the treaties in question provided for transfer without any quid pro quo. Thus, art. 56 of the Treaty of Versailles specified that "France shall enter into possession of all property and estate within the territories referred to in Article 51, which belongs to the German Empire or German States [i.e. in Alsace-Lorraine], without any payment or credit on this account to any of the States ceding the territories." (British and Foreign State Papers, 1919, vol. CXII (op. cit.), p. 43.).
117 Art. X of the Treaty of Utrecht of 11 April 1713 concerning the cession of the Bay and Straits of Hudson by France to Great Britain (Israel, op. cit., p. 207).
118 Annex X, para. 1 and Annex XIV, para. 1 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 49, pp. 209 and 225); and United Nations General Assembly resolutions 388 (V), of 15 December 1950, entitled "Economic and financial provisions relating to Libya" (art. 1, para. 1) and 530 (VI), of 29 January 1972, entitled "Economic and financial provisions relating to Eritrea" (art. 1, para. 1).

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*Article 11. Passing of State property without compensation*

Subject to the provisions of the articles in the present Part and unless otherwise agreed or decided, the passing of State property from the predecessor State to the successor State shall take place without compensation.

Commentary

(1) Article 11 comprises a main provision and two subsidiary clauses. The main provision lays down the rule that the passing of State property from the predecessor State to the successor State in accordance with the provisions of the articles in the present Part shall take place without compensation. It constitutes a necessary complement to article 9, but like that article—and for the same reasons—it is not intended to determine what State property passes to the successor State.

(2) With some exceptions, practice confirms the rule set forth in the main provision of article 11. In many treaties concerning the transfer of territories, acceptance of this rule is implied by the fact that no obligation is imposed on the successor State to pay compensation for the cession by the predecessor State of public property, including State property. Other treaties state the rule expressly, stipulating that such cession shall be without compensation. These treaties contain phrases such as "without compensation", "in full Right", "without payment" ("sans paiement" or "gratuitement").

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118 See for example Judgment No. 7 handed down on 25 May 1926 by the P.C.I.J. in the case Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7), and its Advisory Opinion of 10 September 1923 on the case German Settlers in Poland (ibid., Series B, No. 6, pp. 6-43).
(3) The first subsidiary clause of article 11 (“Subject to the provisions of the articles in the present Part”) is intended to reserve the effects of other provisions in part II. One notable example of such provisions is that of article 12, regarding the absence of effect of a succession of States on the property of a third State.

(4) The purpose of the second subsidiary clause of article 11 (“unless otherwise agreed or decided”) is to provide expressly for the possibility of derogating from the rule in this article. It is identical with the clause in article 10 on which the Commission has already commented. 122

**Article 12. Absence of effect of a succession of States on the property of a third State**

A succession of State shall not as such affect property, rights and interests which, at the date of the succession of States, are situated in the territory of the predecessor State and which, at that date, are owned by a third State according to the internal law of the predecessor State.

**Commentary**

(1) The rule formulated in article 12 stems from the fact that a succession of States, that is, the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory, can have no legal effect with respect to the property of a third State. At the outset, the Commission wishes to point out that the article has been placed in part II of the draft, which is concerned exclusively with succession with respect to State property. Consequently, no argument *a contrario* can be drawn from the absence from article 12 of any reference to private property, rights and interests.

(2) As emphasized by the words “as such” appearing after the words “a succession of States shall not”, article 12 deals solely with succession of States. It in no way prejudices any measures that the successor State, as a sovereign State, might adopt subsequently to the succession of States with respect to the property of a third State, in conformity with the rules of other branches of international law.

(3) The words “property, rights and interests” have been borrowed from article 8, where they form part of the definition of the term “State property”. In article 12 they are followed by the qualifying clause “which, at the date of the succession of States, are situated in the territory of the predecessor State”. The Commission regarded it as obvious that a succession of States could have no effect on the property, rights and interests of a third State situated outside the territory affected by the succession, and that the scope of the present article should therefore be limited to such territory.

(4) The words “according to the internal law of the predecessor State” are also borrowed from article 8.

The Commission wishes to refer to observations previously expressed in this connection. 123

(5) Certain members of the Commission considered this article unnecessary.

**SECTION 2. PROVISIONS CONCERNING SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF SUCCESSION OF STATES**

**Commentary**

(1) In section 1 of the present part, the draft articles dealt with various questions relating to succession of States in respect of State property applicable generally to all categories of succession. Articles 13 to 17 comprise section 2, and deal with the question of the passing of State property from the predecessor State to the successor State separately for each category of succession. This method was deemed to be the most appropriate for section 2 of part II of the draft, as it was for section 2 in parts III and IV as well, in view of the obvious differences existing between various categories of succession, owing to the political environment in each of the cases where there is a change of sovereignty over or a change in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory to which the succession of States relates. In addition, it is justified in the case of part II by the various constraints which the movable nature of certain kinds of property places on the quest for solutions. Before going into the individual draft articles, the Commission wishes to make the following general observations concerning certain salient aspects of the provisions in the present section.

Choice between general rules and rules relating to property regarded in concreto

(2) On the basis of the reports submitted by the Special Rapporteur, the Commission considered which of three possible methods might be followed for determining the kind of rules that should be formulated for each category of succession. The first method consisted in adopting, for each category of succession, special provisions for each of those kinds of State property affected by a succession of States which are most essential and most widespread, so much so that they can be said to derive from the very existence of the State and represent the common denominators, so to speak, of all States, such as currency, treasury and State funds. The second method involved drafting, for each type of succession, more general provisions, not relating in concreto to each of these kinds of State property. A third possible method consisted in combining the first two and formulating, for each type of succession, one or two articles of a general character, adding perhaps one or two articles, where appropriate, relating to specific kinds of State property.

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122 See above, paras. (2)-(4) of the commentary to art. 10.

123 See above, para. (11) of the commentary to art. 8.
(3) The Commission decided to adopt the method to which the Special Rapporteur had reverted in his eighth report, namely, that of formulating, for each type of succession, general provisions applicable to all kinds of State property. The Commission decided not to follow the first method, which was the basis of the Special Rapporteur’s seventh report and which it had discussed at the twenty-seventh session (1975), not so much because a choice based on property regarded in concreto might be considered as being artificial, arbitrary or inappropriate as because of the extremely technical character of the provisions it would have been obliged to draft for such complex matters as currency, treasury and State funds.

**Distinction between immovable and movable property**

(4) In formulating, for each category of succession, general provisions applicable to all kinds of State property, the Commission found it necessary to introduce a distinction between immovable and movable State property, since these two categories of property cannot be given identical treatment and, in the case of succession to State property, must be considered separately, irrespective of the legal systems of the predecessor State and the successor State. The distinction, known to the main legal systems of the world, corresponds primarily to a physical criterion for differentiation, arising out of the very nature of things. Some property is physically linked to territory, so that it cannot be moved; this is immovable property. Then there are other kinds of property which are capable of being moved, so that they can be taken out of the territory; these constitute movable property. However, it seems desirable to make it clear that in adopting this terminology the Commission is not leaning towards the universal application of the laws of a particular system, especially those that derive purely from Roman law, because, as is the case with the distinction between public domain and private domain, a notion of internal law should not be referred to when it does not exist in all the main legal systems. The distinction made thus differs from the rigid legal categories found, for example, in French law. It is simply that the terms “movable” and “immovable” seem most appropriate for designating, for the purposes of succession to State property, property which can be moved or which is immobilized.

(5) Referring both categories of State property to “territory” is simply a reflection of the historical fact that State sovereignty developed over land. Whoever possessed land possessed economic and political power, and this is bound to be a far-reaching effect on present-day law. Modern State sovereignty is based primarily on a tangible element: territory. It can, therefore, be concluded that everything linked to territory, in any way, is a base without which a State cannot exist, whatever its political or legal system.

**Criteria of linkage of the property to the territory**

(6) Succession of States in respect of State property is governed, irrespective of the specific category of succession, by one key criterion applied throughout section 2 of part II of the draft: the linkage of such property to the territory. Applying this criterion, the basic principle may be stated that, in general, State property passes from the predecessor State to the successor State. It is through the application of a material criterion, namely, the relation which exists between the territory and the property by reason of the nature of the property or where it is situated, that the existence of the principle of the passing of State property can be deduced. Moreover, behind this principle lies the further principle of the actual viability of the territory to which the succession of States relates.

(7) As regards immovable State property, the principle of the linkage of such property to the territory finds concrete application by reference to the geographical situation of the State property concerned. Consequently, for the types of succession dealt with in section 2 of the present Part, as appropriate, the rule regarding the passing of immovable State property from the predecessor to the successor State is couched in the following terms, used in subparagraphs 2 (a) of article 13 and 1 (a) of articles 14 and 16:

... immovable State property of the predecessor State situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State.

or in the somewhat different form used in subparagraph 1 (a) of article 17:

... immovable State property of the predecessor State shall pass to the successor State in the territory of which it is situated.

As adopted by the Commission, the rule relating to the passing of immovable State property does not apply to such property when it is situated outside the territory to which the succession of States relates, except in the cases of the newly independent State and of dissolution of a State, as is explained in the commentary to articles 14 and 17.

**Special aspects due to the mobility of the property**

(8) As regards movable State property, the specific aspects which are due to the movable nature or mobility of State property add a special difficulty to the problem of the succession of States in this sphere. Above all, the fact that the property is movable, and can therefore be moved at any time, makes it easy to change the control over the property. In the Commission’s view, the mere fact that movable State property is situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates should not automatically entitle the successor State to claim such property, nor should the mere fact that the property is situated outside the territory automatically entitle the predecessor State to retain it. For the predecessor State to retain or the successor State to receive such property, other conditions must be fulfilled. Those conditions are not unrelated to the general conditions concerning viability, both of the territory to which the succes-
sion of States relates and of the predecessor State. They are closely linked to the general principle of equity, which should never be lost from view and which, in such cases, enjoins apportionment of the property between the successor State or States and the predecessor State, or among the successor States if there is more than one and the predecessor States ceases to exist. The predecessor State must not unduly exploit the mobility of the State property in question, to the point of seriously disorganizing the territory to which the succession of States relates and of jeopardizing the viability of the successor State. Attention should therefore be drawn to the limits imposed by good faith, beyond which the predecessor State cannot go without failing in an essential international duty.

(9) Any movable State property of the predecessor State which is quite by chance in the territory to which the succession of States relates at the time when the succession of States occurs should not ipso facto, or purely automatically, pass to the successor State. If solely the place where the property is situated were taken into account, that would in some cases constitute a breach of equity. Moreover, the fact that State property may be where it is purely by chance is not the only reason for caution in formulating the rule. There may even be cases where the predecessor State situates movable property, not by chance, but deliberately, in the territory to which a succession of States will relate, without that property having any link with the territory, or at least without its having such a link to that territory alone. In such a case, it would again be inequitable to leave the property to the successor State alone. For example, it might be that the country’s gold reserves or the metallic cover for the currency in circulation throughout the territory of the predecessor State had been left in the territory to which the succession of States relates. It would be unthinkable, merely because the entire gold reserves of the predecessor State were in that territory, to allow the successor State to claim them if the predecessor State was unable to evacuate them in time.

(10) On the other hand, while the presence of movable State property in the part of the territory which remains under the sovereignty of the predecessor State after the succession of States normally justifies the presumption that it should remain the property of the predecessor State, such a presumption, however natural it may be, is not necessarily irrefutable. The mere fact that property is situated outside the territory to which the succession of States relates cannot in itself constitute an absolute ground for retention of such property by the predecessor State. If the property is linked solely, or even concurrently, to the territory to which the succession of States relates, equity and the viability of the territory require that the successor State should be granted a right on that property.

(11) In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission came to the conclusion that as far as movable State property is concerned, the principle of the linkage of such property to the territory should not find concrete application by reference to the geographical situation of the State property in question. Having in mind that, as explained above (para. 8), the legal rule applicable to the passing of movable State property should be based on the principle of viability of the territory and take into account the principle of equity, the Commission considered the question of how to give expression to the criterion of linkage between the territory and the movable State property concerned. Various expressions were suggested, including property having a “direct and necessary link” between the property and the territory, “property appertaining to sovereignty over the territory” and “property necessary for the exercise of sovereignty over the territory”. Having discarded all these as not sufficiently clear, the Commission adopted the formula “property … connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates”. Consequently, for the categories of succession dealt with in section 2 of part II of the draft, as appropriate, the rule regarding the passing of movable State property from the predecessor to the successor State is couched in the following terms, which are used in articles 13 (subpara. 2 (b)), 14 (subpara. 1 (d)), 16 (subpara. 1 (b) and 17 (subpara. 1 (c)):

movable State property of the predecessor State connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory [territories] to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State.

Article 13. Transfer of part of the territory of a State

1. When part of the territory of a State is transferred by that State to another State, the passing of State property of the predecessor State to the successor State is to be settled by agreement between them.

2. In the absence of such an agreement:

(a) immovable State property of the predecessor State situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State;

(b) movable State property of the predecessor State connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State.

Commentary

(1) As was indicated above, the Commission, when establishing in 1974 its final draft on succession of States in respect of treaties, concluded that for the purpose of the codification of the modern law relating to that topic it was sufficient to arrange the cases of succession of States under three broad categories: (a) succession in respect of part of territory; (b) newly independent States; and (c) unifying and separation of States. In the 1974 draft, succession in respect of part of territory was dealt with in article 14, the introductory sentence of which reads as follows:

When part of the territory of a State, or when any territory, not being part of the territory of a State, for the international relations of
which that State is responsible, becomes part of the territory of another State.

In adopting the foregoing text for the category of succession characterized as "succession in respect of part of territory", the Commission added the case of non-self-governing territory which achieves its decolonization by integration with a State other than the colonial State to the case of part of the territory of a pre-existing State which becomes part of the territory of another State. The Commission considered that, for the purposes of succession in respect of treaties, the two cases could be dealt with together in the same provision, since one single principle, that of "moving treaty-frontiers", was applicable to both of them.

(2) The quite unique nature of "succession in respect of part of territory" as compared with other categories of succession gives rise to difficulties in the context of the topic of succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties. A frontier adjustment, which as such raises a problem of "succession in respect of part of territory", may in some cases affect only a few unpopulated or scarcely populated acres of a territory, but in the case of some States may cover millions of square miles and be populated by millions of inhabitants. It is very unlikely that frontier adjustments affecting only a few unpopulated acres of land, such as that which enabled Switzerland to extend the Geneva-Cointrin airport into what was formerly French territory, will give rise to problems of State property such as currency and treasury and State funds. It should also be borne in mind that minor frontier adjustments are the subject of agreements between the States concerned, whereby they settle all questions arising between the predecessor State transferring territory and the successor State to which it is transferred, without the need to consult the population of that territory, if any. But while it is true that "succession in respect of part of territory" covers the case of a minor frontier adjustment which, moreover, is effected through an agreement providing a general settlement of all the problems involved, without the need to consult the population, it is nevertheless a fact that this category of succession also includes cases affecting territories and tracts of land that may be densely populated. In these cases, problems concerning the passing of State property such as currency and treasury and State funds certainly do arise, and in fact they are particularly acute.

(3) It is this situation—namely, the fact that the area affected by the territorial change may be either very densely populated or very sparsely populated—that accounts for the ambiguities, the uniqueness, and hence the difficulty, of the specific case of "succession in respect of part of territory" in the context of succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts. In short, the magnitude of the problems of the passing of State property varies not just with the size of the territory transferred, but mainly according to whether or not it is necessary to consult the population of the territory concerned. These problems arise in each and every case, but more perceptibly and more conspicuously when the area of the transferred territory is large and densely populated. This incontrovertible reality is simply a reflection of the phenomenon of substitution of sovereignty over the territory in question, which inevitably manifests itself through an extension to the territory of the successor State's own legal order, and hence through a change, for example, in the monetary tokens in circulation. Currency, in particular, is a very important item of State property, being the expression of a regalian right of the State and the manifestation of its sovereignty.

(4) It should be added that cases of "succession in respect of part of territory" do not always involve agreements the existence of which would explain giving a residual character to the rules to be formulated to govern succession of States in respect of State property. Moreover, it is in those cases where a densely populated part of the territory of a State passes to another State—in other words, precisely the cases in which the problems of State property such as currency and treasury and State funds arise on a larger scale—that agreements for the settlement of such problems may be lacking. This is not a theoretical hypothesis. Apart from war or the annexation of territory by force, both of which are prohibited by contemporary international law, the case can be envisaged of detachment of part of a State's territory and its attachment to another State following a referendum on self-determination, or of secession by part of a State's population and attachment of the territory in which it lives to another State. In such situations, it is not always possible to count on the existence of an agreement between the predecessor State and the successor State, especially in view of the politically charged circumstances which may surround such territorial changes.

(5) It was in the light of the foregoing considerations that the Commission decided that, for the purposes of codifying the rules of international law relating to succession of States in respect of State property, in particular, it was appropriate to distinguish and deal separately in the present part with three cases covered by one single provision in article 14 of the 1974 draft on succession in respect of treaties: (i) the case where part of the territory of a State is transferred by that State to another State, which is the subject of the present article 13; (ii) the case where a part of the territory separates from that State and unites with another State, which is the subject of paragraph 2 of article 16 (Separation of part or parts of the territory of a State); and (iii) the case where a dependent territory becomes part of the territory of a State other than the State which was responsible for its international relations, which forms the subject of paragraph 3 of article 14 (Newly independent State).

(6) Article 13 is therefore limited to cases of transfer of part of the territory of a State to another State. The word "transfer" in the title of the article and the words "is transferred" in paragraph 1 are intended to emphasize the precise scope of the provisions of article 13.
The cases of transfer of territory envisaged are those where the fact of the replacement of the predecessor State by the successor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the part of the territory concerned does not presuppose the consultation of the population of that part of the territory, in view of its minor political, economic or strategic importance, or the fact that it is scarcely inhabited, if at all. Furthermore, in the cases envisaged are always those where, according to article 3 of the draft, occur in conformity with international law and, in particular, the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. In most of these cases, problems concerning the passing of such State property as currency, treasury and State funds, etc., do not actually arise or have no great relevance, and it is by the agreement of the predecessor and the successor States that the passing of State property, whether immovable or movable, from one State to the other, is normally settled. This primacy of the agreement in the situation covered by article 13 is reflected in paragraph 1 of the article, according to which, “When part of the territory of a State is transferred by that State to another State, the passing of State property of the predecessor State to the successor State is to be settled by agreement between them”. It should be understood that, according to paragraph 1, such passing of State property should in principle be settled by agreement and that the agreement should govern the disposition of the property, no duty to negotiate or agree being thereby implied.

(7) In the absence of an agreement between the predecessor and successor States, the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 apply. Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 concerns the passing of immovable State property, whereas subparagraph (b) of the same paragraph deals with the passing of movable State property. As explained above, introductory commentary to sect. 2, para. (7), subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 states the rule regarding the passing of immovable State property from the predecessor State to the successor State by reference to the geographical situation of the State property concerned, in conformity with the basic principle of the passing of State property from the predecessor State to the successor State. It provides, therefore, that “immovable State property of the predecessor State situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State”. It may be convenient to repeat here that this rule does not extend to immovable State property situated outside the territory to which the succession of States relates—property which is and remains that of the predecessor State.

(8) Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 states the rule regarding the passing of movable State property from the predecessor State to the successor State by reference to the material criterion of the connection between the property concerned and the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates, as explained above. By that criterion, there is no distinction to be made as to the actual location of the movable State property in question, and consequently, there is no need to refer expressly to the passing of property “on the date of the succession of States”, the time element being, moreover, already implied in the definition of State property contained in article 8 of the draft. Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 therefore provides that “movable State property of the predecessor State connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State”.

(9) The situation covered by the provisions of article 13 is to be distinguished from that of a part of the territory of a State which separates from that State and unites with another State, contemplated in paragraph 2 of article 16, as is indicated above (para. 5). In the case of such separation, as opposed to the case of transfer of a part of territory, the fact of the replacement of the predecessor State by the successor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the part of the territory concerned presupposes the expression of a conforming will on the part of the population of the separating part of the territory, in consequence of its extent and large number of inhabitants or of its importance from a political, economic, strategic or other point of view. It is in these cases of separation of part of the territory of a State that problems concerning the passing of such State property as currency, treasury and State funds arise or have a greater significance, and the resolution of these problems is not always achieved by agreement between the predecessor and the successor States, such agreement being unlikely when the territorial change in question is surrounded by politically charged circumstances, as is often the case. An agreement between the predecessor and successor States is certainly to be envisaged, but not with the primacy that is accorded it in article 13, since what is paramount in the case to which paragraph 2 of article 16 relates is the will of the population expressed in the exercise of the right to self-determination. Consequently, the formulation of paragraph 1 of article 16, which applies to the case of separation of part of the territory of a State when that part unites with another State, departs from that of paragraph 1 of article 13 and contains the following clause: “and unless the predecessor State and the successor State otherwise agree”.

(10) A further difference between the rules applicable in the cases covered by article 13, on the one hand, and by paragraph 2 of article 16, on the other, resulting likewise from the factual differences between them as described in the preceding paragraph, is reflected in the provision whereby in the absence of the agreement envisaged in both articles, it is only in the latter case that a third category of State property passes to the successor State. Thus, according to article 16, when part of the territory of a State separates from that State and unites...
with another State (para. 2), unless the predecessor State and the successor State otherwise agree (para. 1), movable State property of the predecessor State other than that connected with activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State in an equitable proportion (subpara. 1 (c) in conjunction with subpara. 1 (b)). No such provision is required in the cases covered by article 13.

(11) The rules relating to the passing of State property in cases where part of the territory of a State is transferred to another State (art. 13) and where part of the territory of a State separates from that State and unites with another State (art. 16, para. 2) are founded in State practice, judicial decisions and legal theory, which admit generally the devolution of the State property of the predecessor State. Some examples may illustrate the point, even if they may seem broader in scope than the rules adopted.

(12) The devolution of such State property is clearly established practice. There are, moreover, many international instruments which simply record the express relinquishment by the predecessor State, without any *qui pro quo*, of all State property without distinction situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates. It may be concluded that relinquishment of the more limited category of immovable State property situated in that territory should *a fortiori* be accepted. The immovable State property which thus passes to the successor State is property which the predecessor State formerly used, as appropriate, in the portion of territory concerned, for the manifestation and exercise of its sovereignty, or for the performance of the general duties implicit in the exercise of that sovereignty, such as the defence of that portion of territory, security, promotion of public health and education, national development, and so on. Such property can easily be listed: it includes, for example, barracks, airports, prisons, fixed military installations, State hospitals, State universities, local government office buildings, premises occupied by the main central government services, buildings of the State financial, economic or social institutions, and postal and telecommunications facilities where the predecessor State was itself responsible for the functions which they normally serve.

(13) Two types of case will be omitted from the examples to follow, as being not sufficiently illustrative because the fact that they reflect the application of a general principle of devolution of State property is due to other causes of a peculiar and specific kind. The first type comprises all cessions of territories against payment. The purchase of provinces, territories and the like was an accepted practice in centuries past but has been tending towards complete extinction since the First World War, and particularly since the increasingly firm recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination. It follows from this right that the practice of transferring the territory of a people against payment must be condemned. Clearly, these old cases of transfer are no longer demonstrative. On purchasing a territory, a State purchased everything in it, or everything it wanted, or everything the other party wanted to sell there, and the transfer of State property does not here constitute proof of the existence of the rule, but simply of the capacity to pay.

(14) The second type consists of forced cessions of territory, which are prohibited by international law, so that succession in respect of property in such cases cannot be regulated by international law. In this connection, reference is made to the provisions of article 3 of the draft.

(15) A third set of cases, which are perhaps only too demonstrative, consists of those involving "voluntary cessions without payment". In these very special and marginal cases, the passing of immovable State property is neither controversial nor ambiguous, because it takes place not so much under the general principle of succession of States as by an expressly stated wish.

(16) Territorial changes such as those covered by article 13 and article 16, paragraph 2, have occurred relatively often following a war. In such cases, peace treaties contain provisions relating to territories ceded by the defeated Power. For that reason, the provisions

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128 See, for example, the Convention of Gastein of 14 August 1865, whereby Austria sold Lauenburg to Prussia for the sum of 2.5 million Danish rix-dollars (see, Malloy, *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1865-1866 (London, Ridgway, 1870), vol. LI, p. 1028; the Convention ceding Alaska signed at Washington on 30 March 1867, whereby Russia sold its North American possessions to the United States of America for $7.2 million (ibid., vol. II, p. 1521); the Convention whereby France ceded Louisiana to the United States of America for $15 million (ibid., vol. I, p. 508).

129 In former times, such forced cessions were frequent and widespread. Of the many examples which history affords, one may be cited here as documentary evidence of the way in which the notion of succession to property that was linked to sovereignty could be interpreted in those days. Article XVI of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which gave France Arras, Béthune, Lens, Bapaume, etc., specified that those places:

"... shall remain ... unto the said Lord the most Christian King, and to his Successors and Assigns ... with the same rights of Sovereignty, Propriety, Regality, Patronage, Wardship, Jurisdiction, Nomination, Prerogatives and Preeminences upon the Bishopricks, Cathedral Churches, and other Abby's, Priorys, Dignitys, Parsonages, or any other Benefices whatsoever, being within the limits of the said Countries ... formerly belonging to the said Lord the Catholick King ... And for that effect, the said Lord the Catholick King ... doth consent to be ... united and incorporated to the Crown of France; all Laws, Customs, Statutes and Constitutions made to the Contrary ... notwithstanding." (For reference, see footnote 107 above.)

130 See, for example, the cession by the United Kingdom to the United States in 1850 of part of the Horse-Shoe Reef in Lake Erie; the decision in July 1821, by an assembly of representatives of the Uruguayan people held at Montevideo, concerning the incorporation of the Cisplatina Province; the voluntary incorporation in France of the free town of Mulhouse in 1798; the voluntary incorporation of the Duchy of Courland in Russia in 1795; the Treaty of Río de 30 October 1909, between Brazil and Uruguay, for the cession without compensation of various lagoons, islands and islets; the voluntary cession of Lombardy by France to Sardinia, without payment, under the Treaty of Zurich of 10 November 1859, etc.
of peace treaties and other like instruments governing the problems raised by transfers of territory must be treated with a great deal of caution, if not with express reservations. Subject to that proviso, it may be noted that the major peace treaties which ended the First World War opted for the devolution to the successor States of all public property situated in the ceded German, Austro-Hungarian or Bulgarian territories.  


137 Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission, “Dispute concerning the apportionment of the property of local authorities whose territory had been divided by a new delimitation of the frontier between France and Italy,” the above-mentioned Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission noted that:

the Treaty of Peace did not reflect any distinctions ... between the public domain and the private domain that might exist in the legisl-
tion of Italy or the State to which the territory is ceded. However, the nature of the property and the economic use to which it is put have a certain effect on the apportionment.

The apportionment must, first of all, be just and equitable. However, the Treaty of Peace does not confine itself to this reference to justice and equity, but provides a more specific criterion for a whole category of municipal property and for what is generally the most important category.

The question may be left open whether the ... [Treaty] provides for two types of agreement ..., one kind apportioning the property of the public authorities concerned, the other ensuring "the maintenance of the municipal services essential to the inhabitants" ...". But even if that were so, the criterion of the maintenance of the municipal services necessary to the inhabitants should a fortiori play a decisive role when these services—as will usually be the case—are provided by property belonging to the municipality which must be apportioned. The apportionment should be carried out according to a principle of utility, since in this case that principle must have seemed to the drafters of the Treaty the most compatible with justice and equity. 14

(21) As regards, more specifically, movable State property, the cases of currency (including gold and foreign exchange reserves) and State funds will be discussed in turn below, by way of example, these cases being sufficiently illustrative for the present purpose.

Currency

(22) A definition of currency for the purposes of international law should take account of the following three fundamental elements: (a) currency is an attribute of sovereignty, (b) it circulates in a given territory and (c) it represents purchasing power. It has been observed that this legal definition:

necessarily relies on the concept of statehood or, more generally, that of de jure or de facto sovereign authority. It follows from this proposition that media of exchange in circulation are, legally speaking, not currency, unless their issue has been established or authorized by the State and, a contrario, that currency cannot lose its status otherwise than through formal demonetization. 14

For the purposes of the present topic, this means that the predecessor State loses and the successor State exercises its own monetary authority in the territory to which the succession of States relates. That should mean that, at the same time, the State patrimony associated with the expression of monetary sovereignty or activity in that territory (gold and foreign exchange reserves, and real property and assets of the institution of issue situated in the territory) must pass from the predecessor State to the successor State.

(23) The normal relationship between currency and territory is expressed in the idea that currency can circulate only in the territory of the issuing authority. The concept of the State's "territoriality of currency" or "monetary space" implies, first, the complete surrender by the predecessor State of monetary powers in the territory considered and, secondly, its replacement by the successor State in the same prerogatives in that territory. But both the surrender and the assumption of powers must be organized on the basis of a factual situ-

peace treaties concluded, the new Soviet regime became fully responsible for the debt represented by the paper money issued by the Russian State Bank in these four countries. The provisions of some of these instruments indicated that the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia (FSRSR) released the States concerned from the relevant portion of the debt, as if this was a derogation by treaty from a principle of automatic succession to that debt. Other provisions even gave the reason for such a derogation, namely, the destruction suffered by those countries during the war. At the same time, and in these same treaties, part of the bullion reserves of the Russian State Bank was transferred to each of these States. The ground given in the case of Poland is of some interest: the 30 million gold roubles paid by the FSRSR under this head corresponded to the “active participation” of the Polish territory in the economic life of the former Russian Empire.

**State funds**

(27) State public funds in the territory to which the succession of States relates should be understood to mean cash, stocks and shares which, although they form part of the over-all assets of the State, have a link with that territory by virtue of the State’s sovereignty over or activity in that region. If they are connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates, State funds, whether liquid or invested, pass to the successor State. The principle of connection with the activity is decisive in this case, since it is obvious that funds of the predecessor State which are in transit through the territory in question, or are temporarily or fortuitously present in that territory, do not pass to the successor State.

(28) State public funds may be liquid or invested; they include stocks and shares of all kinds. Thus, the acquisition of “all property and possessions” of the German States in the territories ceded to Poland included also, according to the Supreme Court of Poland, the transfer to the successor of a share in the capital of an association.

(29) As part of the “free transfer of State property”, the USSR received public funds situated in the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, which, within the boundaries specified in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, was ceded by Czechoslovakia in accordance with the Treaty of 29 June 1945.

**Article 14. Newly independent State**

1. When the successor State is a newly independent State:

(a) immovable State property of the predecessor State situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State;

(b) immovable property having belonged to the territory to which the succession of States relates, situated outside it and having become State property of the predecessor State during the period of dependence, shall pass to the successor State;

(c) immovable State property of the predecessor State other than that mentioned in subparagraph (b) and situated outside the territory to which the succession of States relates, to the creation of which the dependent territory has contributed, shall pass to the successor State in proportion to the contribution of the dependent territory;

(d) movable State property of the predecessor State connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State;

(e) movable property having belonged to the territory to which the succession of States relates and having become State property of the predecessor State during the period of dependence, shall pass to the successor State;

(f) movable State property of the predecessor State other than the property mentioned in subparagraphs (d) and (e), to the creation of which the dependent territory has contributed, shall pass to the successor State in proportion to the contribution of the dependent territory.

2. When a newly independent State is formed from two or more dependent territories, the passing of the State property of the predecessor State or States to the newly independent State shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.

3. When a dependent territory becomes part of the territory of a State other than the State which was responsible for its international relations, the passing of the State property of the predecessor State to the successor State shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.

4. Agreements concluded between the predecessor State and the newly independent State to determine succession to State property otherwise than by the application of paragraphs 1 to 3 shall not infringe the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources.

**Commentary**

(1) Article 14 concerns succession to State property in the case of a newly independent State. The term “newly independent State” is defined in Article 21.
In contrast to other categories of State succession where, until the occurrence of the succession, the predecessor State possesses the territory to which the succession of States relates and exercises its full sovereignty there, the category covered by this article involves a dependent or non-self-governing territory which has a special juridical status under the Charter of the United Nations. As the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations states, such a territory has:

a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.

Moreover, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, every people, even if it is not politically independent at a certain stage of its history, possesses the attributes of national sovereignty inherent in its existence as a people. There is also no doubt, as is explained below (paras. (26)-(32)) that every people enjoys the right of permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources.

Although the question might be raised as to the usefulness of the Commission’s making special provisions relating to newly independent States, in view of the fact that the process of decolonization is practically finished, the Commission is convinced of the need to include such provisions in the present draft. A draft of articles on a topic which, like succession of States in matters other than treaties, necessarily presupposes the exercise of a right which is at the forefront of United Nations doctrine and partakes of the character of jus cogens the right of self-determination of peoples, cannot ignore the most important and widespread form of the realization of that right in the recent history of international relations: that is, the process of decolonization which has taken place since the Second World War. In fact, the Commission cannot but be fully conscious of the precise mandate it has received from the General Assembly, in regard to its work of codification and progressive development of the rules of international law relating to succession of States, to examine the problems of succession of States with appropriate reference to the views of States that have achieved independence since the Second World War. Although the process of decolonization has already been largely effected, it has not yet been completed, as is confirmed in the 1980 report of the Special Committee of 25, which points out that many dependent or Non-Self-Governing Territories still remain to be decolonized. Moreover, the usefulness of the present draft articles is not limited to dependent or Non-Self-Governing Territories yet to be decolonized. In many instances, the effects of decolonization, including, in particular, problems of succession to State property, remain for years after political independence is achieved. The necessity of including provisions on newly independent States was fully recognized by the Commission in the course of its work on succession of States in respect of treaties and found reflection in the final draft on that topic submitted in 1974 for consideration by the General Assembly, as well as in the 1978 Vienna Convention adopted on the basis of that final draft. In the present case, there is no reason to depart from the categorization established in the draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties; on the contrary, the reasons for maintaining the category of succession involving “newly independent State” are equally, if not more compelling, in the case of succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts. Besides, in view of the close link and the parallelism between the two sets of draft articles, there would be an inexplicable gap in the present draft if no provision were made for newly independent States.

(5) The rules relating to the passing of State property in the case of newly independent States vary somewhat from those relating to other categories of succession, in order to take full account of the special circumstances surrounding the emergence of such States. The principle of viability of the territory becomes imperative in the
case of States achieving independence from situations of colonial domination, and the principle of equity requires that preferential treatment be given to such States in the legal regulation of succession to State property. Two main differences are, therefore, to be indicated. First, immovable property situated in the dependent territory concerned and movable property connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the dependent territory concerned should, as a general rule, pass to the successor State upon the birth of a newly independent State, whether it is formed from one or two or several dependent territories, or upon the dependent territory’s decolonization through integration or association with another existing State, reference to an agreement being unnecessary, by contrast with the case of the articles relating to other categories of succession. The reason why article 14 does not, with reference to newly independent States, use the expressions “in the absence of an agreement” or “unless the predecessor State and the successor State otherwise agree”, which are employed in other articles of section 2, is not so much because a dependent territory which is not yet a State could not, strictly speaking, be considered as possessing the capacity to conclude international agreements; rather, it is principally in recognition of the very special circumstances which accompany the birth of newly independent States as a consequence of decolonization and which lead, when negotiations are undertaken for the purpose of achieving independence, to results that are, in many instances, distinctly unfavourable to the party acceding to independence, because of its unequal and unbalanced legal, political and economic relationship with the former metropolitan country.

(6) The second difference resides in the introduction of the concept of the contribution of the dependent territory to the creation of certain immovable and movable State property of the predecessor State so that such property shall pass to the successor State in proportion to the contribution made by the dependent territory. This provision represents a concrete application of the concept of equity forming part of the material content of a rule of positive international law, which is designed to preserve, inter alia, the patrimony and the historical and cultural heritage of the people inhabiting the dependent territory concerned. In cases of newly independent States, entire nations are affected by the succession of States which have contributed to the creation of the predecessor State’s property. It is only equitable that such property should pass to the successor State in proportion to the contribution of the dependent territory to its creation.

(7) Subparagraph 1 (a) of article 14 regulates the problem of immovable State property of the predecessor State situated in the territory which has become independent. In accordance with the principle of the passing of State property based on the criterion of linkage of the property to the territory, this subparagraph provides, as in the articles concerning other categories of succession, that immovable property so situated shall pass to the successor State. This solution is generally accepted in legal literature and in State practice, although in neither case is express reference always made to “immovable” property of the predecessor State “situated in the territory”; rather, the reference is frequently to property in general, irrespective of its nature or its geographical situation. Thus, if general transfer is the rule, the passing to the successor State of the more limited category of property provided for in this subparagraph must a fortiori be permitted.

(8) Reference may be made in this connection to article 19, first paragraph, of the Declaration of Principles concerning Economic and Financial Co-operation of 19 March 1962 (Evian agreement between France and Algeria), which provided that:

Public real estate of the [French] State in Algeria will be transferred to the Algerian State ...

In fact, all French military real estate and much of the civil real estate (excluding certain property retained by agreement and other property which is still in dispute) has, over the years, gradually passed to the Algerian State.

(9) A great many bilateral instruments or unilateral enactments of the administering or constituent Power simply record the express relinquishment by the predecessor State, without any quid pro quo, of all State property or, even more broadly, all public property without distinction, situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates. For example, the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya (1957) provided that all property and assets in the Federation or one of the colonies which were vested in Her Majesty should on the date of proclamation of independence vest in the Federation or one of its States. The term used, being general and without restrictions or specifications, authorizes the transfer of all the property, of whatever kind, of the predecessor State.154 Reference may also be made to the Final Declaration of the International Conference in Tangier, of 29 October 1956, although it is not strictly applicable since the International Administration of Tangier cannot be regarded as a State. Article 2 of the Protocol annexed to the Declaration stated that the Moroccan State, “which recovers possession of the public and private domain entrusted to the International Administration ... receives the latter’s property ...”.155 Among other examples that may be given is the “Draft Agreement on Transitional Measures” of 2 November 1949 between Indonesia and the Netherlands, adopted at the end of the Hague Round-Table Conference (August-November 1949),156

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154 Materials on Succession of States (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.68.V.5), pp. 85-86. See also the Constitution of the Independent State of Western Samoa (1962), which declared: “All property which immediately before Independence Day is vested in Her Majesty ... or in the Crown ... shall, on Independence Day, vest in Western Samoa” (ibid., p. 117).
156 Ibid., vol. 69, p. 266.
which provided for the devolution of all property, and not only immovable property, in the Netherlands public and private domain in Indonesia. A subsequent military agreement transferred to Indonesia, in addition to some warships and military maintenance equipment of the Netherlands fleet in Indonesia, which constituted movable property, all fixed installations and equipment used by the colonial troops.\textsuperscript{167} Similarly, when the Colony of Cyprus attained independence, all property of the Government of the island (including immovable property) became the property of the Republic of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{118} In the case of Libya, it was to receive "the movable and immovable property located in Libya owned by the Italian State, either in its own name or in the name of the Italian administration in Libya".\textsuperscript{119} In particular, the following property was to be transferred immediately: "the public property of the State (demanio pubblico) and the inalienable property of the State (patrimonio indisponibile) in Libya", as well as "the property in Libya of the Fascist Party and its organizations".\textsuperscript{120} Likewise, Burma was to succeed to all property in the public and private domain of the colonial Government,\textsuperscript{121} including fixed military assets of the United Kingdom in Burma.\textsuperscript{122}

(10) The Commission is not unaware of agreements concluded between the predecessor State and the newly independent successor State under which the latter has relinquished in favour of the former its right of ownership to the part of the State property which had passed to it on the occurrence of the succession of States.\textsuperscript{163} The independence agreements were followed by various protocols concerning property under which the independent State did not succeed to the whole of the property belonging to the predecessor State. This was usually done in order to provide for common needs in an atmosphere of close co-operation between the former metropolitan State and the newly independent State. The forms those agreements took were, however, varied. In some cases, the pre-independence status quo, with no transfer of property, was provisionally maintained.\textsuperscript{164} In others, devolution of the (public and private) domain of the former metropolitan State was affirmed as a principle, but was actually implemented only in the case of property which would not be needed for the operation of its various military or civilian services.\textsuperscript{165} Sometimes the agreement with the territory that had become independent clearly transferred all the public and private domain to the successor, which incorporated them in its patrimony, but under the same agreement expressly retroceded parts of them either in ownership or in usufruct.\textsuperscript{166} In some cases the newly independent State agreed to a division of property between itself and the former metropolitan State, but the criterion for this division is not apparent except in the broader context of the requirements of technical assistance and the presence of the former metropolitan State.\textsuperscript{167} Lastly, there have been cases where a treaty discarded the distinctions between public and private domains of the territory or of the metropolitan State, and provided for a division which would satisfy "respective needs", as defined by the two States in various co-operation agreements:

The Contracting Parties agree to replace the property settlement based on the nature of the appurtenances by a global settlement based on equity and satisfying their respective needs.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 288.

\textsuperscript{118} Treaties concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960, with annexes, schedules, maps, etc. (ibid., vol. 382, annex E, pp. 130-138, art. 1 and passim).

\textsuperscript{119} General Assembly resolution 388 (V) of 15 December 1950, entitled "Economic and financial provisions relating to Libya", art. 1.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., para. 2 (b). The inalienable property of the State is defined in arts. 822-828 of the Italian Civil Code and includes, in particular, mines, quarries, forests, barracks (i.e. immovable property), and arms, munitions, etc. (i.e. movable property).


\textsuperscript{164} Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of Chad concerning the transitional arrangements to be applied until the entry into force of the agreements of co-operation between the French Republic and the Republic of Chad, signed in Paris on 12 July 1960 (art. 4) (Materials on Succession of States (op. cit.), pp. 153-154). A protocol to a property agreement was signed later, on 25 October 1961. It met the concern of the two States to provide for "common needs" and enabled the successor State to waive the devolution of certain property (see Decree No. 63-271 of 15 March 1963 publishing the Protocol to the property agreement between France and the Republic of Chad of 25 October 1961 (with the text of the Protocol annexed) (Journal officiel de la Republique francaise, Lois et decrets (Paris), 95th year, No. 69 (21 March 1963), pp. 2721-2722)).

\textsuperscript{165} See Decree No. 63-270 of 15 March 1963 publishing the Convention concerning the property settlement between France and Senegal of 18 September 1962, with the text of the Convention annexed (ibid., p. 2720). Article 1 establishes the principle of the transfer of "ownership of State appurtenances registered ... in the name of the French Republic" to Senegal. However, art. 2 specifies: "Nevertheless, State appurtenances shall remain under the ownership of the French Republic and be registered in its name if they are certified to be needed for the operation of its services ... and are included in the list" given in an annex. This provision concerns, not the use of State property for the needs of the French services, but the ownership of such property.

\textsuperscript{166} A typical example is the public property Agreement between France and Mauritania of 10 May 1963 (Decree No. 63-1077 of 26 October 1963) (ibid., No. 256 (31 October 1963), pp. 9707-9708). Article 1 permanently transfers the public domain and the private domain. Article 2 grants ownership of certain public property needed for the French services. Article 3 retrocedes to France the ownership of military premises used for residential purposes. Article 4 states that France may freely dispose of "installations needed for the performance of the defence mission entrusted to the French military forces" under a defence agreement.


\textsuperscript{168} Art. 31 of the Franco-Malagasy agreement of 27 June 1960 concerning economic and financial co-operation, approved by a Malagasy Act of 5 July 1960 and by a French Act of 18 July 1960 (ibid.,
However, it should be pointed out that these instruments have usually been of a temporary character. The more balanced development of the political relations between the predecessor State and the newly independent successor State has in many cases enabled the successor State, sooner or later, to regain the immovable State property situated in its territory which had been the subject of agreements with the former metropolitan State.

Subparagraphs 1 (b) and 1 (e) of article 14 deals with a problem unique to newly independent States. It concerns the cases of immovable and movable property which, prior to the period of dependence, belonged to the territory to which the succession of States relates. During the period of its dependence, some or all of such property may well have passed to the predecessor State administering the territory. This might be immovable property such as embassies and administrative buildings or movable property of cultural or historical significance. The subparagraphs set forth a rule of restitution of such property to the former owner. The text of subparagraph (b) refers to “immovable property”, and that of subparagraph (e) to “movable property”, and both state that such property shall pass to the successor State. In the provisional draft, immovable property had been excluded from paragraph 1 in the present case since it was thought that the provision now embodied in subparagraph 1 (a) covered all “immovable State property of the predecessor State situated in the territory...”, including immovable property which had belonged to the territory before it became independent. In second reading, however, the Commission, in order to avoid problems of interpretation, deemed it appropriate to make specific provision in paragraph 1 for this case as regards immovable property as well.

The situation covered by paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b) and (e), needs to be provided for expressly, even though it might be considered to be a particular aspect of the larger question relating to the “biens propres” of the dependent territory. The provisions of article 14 are not intended to apply to property belonging to the Non-Self-Governing Territory, as that property is not affected by the succession of States. Generally speaking, colonies enjoyed a special régime under what was termed a legislative and conventional speciality. They possessed a certain international personality so that they could own property inside and outside their territory. Consequently, there is no reason why succession should cause colonies to lose their own property. In the absence of express regulations for the situations covered by subparagraphs 1 (b) and 1 (e), the question might be raised whether, in the case of a State having become a dependent territory, property which, having belonged to that State, passed to the administering Power, was still to be regarded as property of the dependent territory or not.

It should be noted that, unlike the other subparagraphs of paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b) and (e) do not mention “State property”, but merely “property”, at the beginning of the sentence. This is intended to widen the scope of the provision in order to include the property which, prior to the period of dependence, belonged to the territory of the successor newly independent State, whether that territory, during the pre-dependence period, was an independent State or an autonomous entity of other form, such as a tribal group or a local government.

Subparagraph 1 (c) of article 14 relates to the apportionment between the predecessor State and the successor State of immovable State property of the predecessor State, other than that mentioned in subparagraph (b) and situated outside the territory to which the succession of States relates, to the creation of which the dependent territory has contributed. As in the case of subparagraph (b), this provision has been included in paragraph 1 during the second reading in order to make it as complete as possible so as to avoid problems of interpretation that might arise from a lacuna on the point. Subparagraph (e) corresponds to the provision of subparagraph (f), which relates to the apportionment between the predecessor State and the successor State of movable State property of the predecessor State other than the property falling under subparagraphs (d) and (e), to the creation of which the dependent territory contributed. Like subparagraph (e), subparagraph (f) deals with such movable property regardless of whether it is situated in the territory of the predecessor State, of the successor State or of a third State. In this connection, the question may be asked, for example, whether successor States can claim any part of the subscriptions made by the administering States to the shares of the capital stock of international or regional financial institutions such as the World Bank. Although there seems to be no precedent regarding the apportionment of such assets between the predecessor State and the successor State, the question may well arise in view of the fact that participation in various intergovernmental bodies of a technical nature is open to dependent territories as such. Such property may well be considered property which belonged as of right to the dependent territory in the proportion determined by the territory’s contribution. The Commission believes that the rule set forth in subparagraph (f), as well as the similar rule provided for in subparagraph (e), will make it possible to solve more easily and equitably many of the problems arising in this respect.

Subparagraph 1 (d) of article 14 concerns the movable State property “connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which
the succession of States relates”, and states the common rule adopted with respect to the transfer of part of the territory of a State, the separation of part or parts of the territory of a State, and the dissolution of a State. It should be noted that movable State property that may be located in the dependent territory only temporarily or fortuitously, like the gold of the Banque de France which was evacuated to West Africa during the Second World War, is to be excluded from the application of the rule, since it is not actually connected with the activity of the State “in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates”.

(17) State practice relating to the rule enunciated in paragraph 1 can be discussed with reference to two main categories of movable State property, namely, currency and State funds.

(18) The practice of States relating to currency is not uniform, although it is a firm principle that the privilege of issue belongs to the successor State, since it is a regalian right and an attribute of public authority. In this sense, as far as the privilege of issue is concerned, there is no question of succession of States involved; the predecessor State loses its privilege of issue in the dependent territory and the newly independent State exercises its own privilege, which it derives from its own sovereignty, upon achieving independence. Nor does the question of monetary tokens issued in the dependent territory by its own institution of issue relate directly to succession of States.

(19) Among the examples that may be given is that of the various Latin American colonies which became independent at the beginning of the nineteenth century, from which the Spanish currency was generally not withdrawn. The various republics confined themselves to substituting the seal, arms or inscription of the new State for the image and name of His Most Catholic Majesty on the coins in circulation, or to giving some other name to the Spanish peso, without changing its value or the structure of the currency.

(20) In the case of India, that country succeeded to the sterling assets of the Reserve Bank of India, estimated at £1,160 million. However, these assets could not be utilized freely, but only progressively. A sum of £65 million was credited to a free account and the remainder—i.e., the greater part of the assets—was placed in a blocked account. Certain sums had to be transferred to the United Kingdom by India as working balances and were credited to an account opened by the Bank of England in the name of Pakistan. The conditions governing the operation of that account were specified in 1948 and 1949 in various agreements concluded by the United Kingdom with India and Pakistan.

(21) The French Government withdrew its monetary tokens from the French Establishments in India, but agreed to pay compensation. Article 23 of the Franco-Indian Agreement of 21 October 1954 stated:

The Government of France shall reimburse to the Government of India within a period of one year from the date of the de facto transfer the equivalent value at par in £ sterling or in Indian rupees of the currency withdrawn from circulation from the Establishments after the de facto transfer.

(22) State practice not being uniform, it is not possible to establish a rule applicable to all situations regarding succession in respect of currency; it is necessary to examine the concrete situation obtaining on the date of the succession of States. If the currency is issued by an institution of issue belonging to the territory itself, independence will not change the situation. However, if the currency issued for the territory by and under the responsibility of a “metropolitan” institution of issue is to be kept in circulation, it must be backed by gold and reserves, for reasons already explained in the commentary to article 13.

(23) With regard to State funds, some examples may be given. On termination of the French Mandate, Syria and Lebanon succeeded jointly to the “common interests” assets, including “common interests” treasury funds and the profits derived by the two States from various concessions. The two countries succeeded to the assets of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, although most of these assets were blocked and were released only progressively over a period extending to 1958. In the case of the advances which the United Kingdom had made in the past towards Burma’s budgetary deficits, the United Kingdom waived repayment of £15 million and allowed Burma a period of twenty years to repay the remainder, free of interest, starting on 1 April 1952. The former colonial Power also waived repayment of the costs it had incurred for the civil administration of Burma after 1945 during the period of reconstruction.

(24) Paragraph 2 concerns the cases of newly independent States formed from two or more dependent territories. It states that the general rules set out in paragraph 1 of article 14 apply to such cases. As ex-

169 Reference may be made in this connection to paras. (8) to (11) of the introductory commentary to section 2, which are relevant to this subparagraph.
171 India, Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1947-64 (New Delhi, Lok Sabha (Secretariat), 1966), p. 212.
172 For Syria, see the Convention on Winding-up Operations, the Convention on Settlement of Debt-claims and the Payments Agreement, all three dated 7 February 1949 (Journal officiel de la République française, Lois et décrets (Paris), 82nd year, No. 60 (10 March 1950), pp. 2697-2700); for Lebanon, see the Franco-Lebanese monetary and financial agreement of 24 January 1948 (ibid., 81st year, No. 64 (14 and 15 March 1949), pp. 2651-2654; also United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 173, p. 99).
173 The United Kingdom also reimbursed Burma for the cost of supplies to the British Army incurred by that territory during the 1942 campaign and for certain costs relating to demobilization.
samples of such newly independent States, mention may be made of Nigeria, which was created out of four former territories, namely, the colony of Lagos, the two protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and the northern region of the British Trust Territory of the Cameroons; Ghana, which was formed from the former colony of the Gold Coast, Ashanti, the Northern Territories Protectorate, and the Trust Territory of Togoland; and the Federation of Malaya, which emerged in 1957 out of two colonies, Malacca and Penang, and nine Protectorates. The Commission finds no reason to depart from the formula contained in article 30, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, which deals with the case of newly independent States formed from two or more territories in the same way as the case of newly independent States which emerge from one dependent territory, for the purpose of applying the general rules concerning succession in respect of treaties.

(25) Paragraph 3 involves a dependent territory which becomes part of the territory of an existing State other than the administering State of the dependent territory. As explained above, the Commission considered it more appropriate to deal with this case together with that of newly independent States, unlike the 1978 Vienna Convention, in which this case is included under “Succession in respect of part of territory” together with the case of simple transfer of part of a territory. Association or integration with an independent State is a mode of implementing the right of self-determination of peoples, exactly like the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, as is clearly stated in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It is therefore more logical to include this paragraph in an article dealing with newly independent States. In view of the basic similarity of the questions involved in succession in respect of State property when the successor State is a newly independent State and when it is a State with which a dependent territory has been integrated or associated, the present paragraph calls for the application to both cases of the same general rules provided for in paragraph 1 of the article.

(26) Paragraph 4 is a provision which confirms that the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources takes precedence over agreements concluded between the predecessor State and the newly independent State to determine succession to State property otherwise than by the application of the principles stated in article 14. The principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources has been forcefully affirmed in a number of General Assembly resolutions and in other United Nations instruments.

(27) The formulation of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development looms large among recent developments within the United Nations system concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This Charter, which was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, should, according to the resolution, “constitute an effective instrument towards the establishment of a new system of international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality and interdependence of the interests of developed and developing countries”. The fifteen fundamental principles which, according to this Charter (chap. I), should govern economic as well as political relations among States, include:

Remedying of injustices which have been brought about by force and which deprive a nation of the natural means necessary for its normal development.*

State property is certainly one of those necessary “natural means”. Article 2 (para. 1) of this Charter states that:

Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.

Expanding the passage from the resolution quoted above, article 16 (para. 1) states:

It is the right and duty of all States, individually and collectively, to eliminate colonialism ... neo-colonialism ... and the economic and social consequences thereof, as a prerequisite for development. States which practise such coercive policies are economically responsible to the countries, territories and peoples affected for the restitution* and full compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the natural and all other resources of those countries, territories and peoples. It is the duty of all States to extend assistance to them.

(28) The General Assembly, meeting in special session for the first time in the history of the United Nations to discuss economic problems following the “energy crisis”, gave due prominence to the “full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities” in its Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974). In section VIII of its Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974), the Assembly stated that:

All efforts should be made:

(a) To defeat attempts to prevent the free and effective exercise of the rights of every State to full and permanent sovereignty over its natural resources.

(29) Just as individuals are equal before the law in a national society, so all States are said to be equal in the international sphere. However, in spite of this theoretical equality, flagrant inequalities remain among States so long as sovereignty—a system of reference—is
not accompanied by economic independence. When the elementary bases of national economic independence do not exist, it is idle to speak of the principle of sovereign equality of States. If it is really desired to free the principle of the sovereign equality of States from its large element of illusion, the formulation of the principle should be adapted to modern conditions in such a way as to restore to the State the elementary bases of its national economic independence. To this end, the principle of economic independence, invested with a new and vital legal function and elevated accordingly to the status of a principle of contemporary international law, must be reflected, in particular, in the right of peoples to dispose of their natural resources and in the prohibition of all forms of unwarranted intervention in the economic affairs of States, together with the outlawing of the use of force and of any form of coercion in economic and commercial relations. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, which did not neglect the right of peoples to dispose of their natural resources, and, more particularly, resolution 1803 (XVII) and other subsequent resolutions which affirmed the principle of the permanent sovereignty of States over their natural resources, demonstrate the efforts of the General Assembly to make a legal reality of the fundamental matter of the principle of economic independence, and to remedy the disturbing fact that the gap between developed and developing States is constantly widening.

(30) It is by reference to these principles that an appraisal should be made of the validity of the so-called “co-operation” or “devolution” agreements and of all bilateral instruments which, under the pretext of establishing “special” or “preferential” ties between the new States and the former colonial Powers, impose on the former excessive conditions which are ruinous to their economies. The validity of treaty relations of this kind should be measured by the degree to which they respect the principles of political self-determination and economic independence. Some members of the Commission expressed the view that any agreements which violate these principles should be void ab initio, without even any need to wait until the new State is in a position formally to denounce their unfair character. Their invalidity should derive intrinsically from contemporary international law and not simply from their subsequent denunciation.

(31) Devolution agreements must therefore be judged according to their content. Such agreements do not, or only rarely, observe the rules of succession of States. In fact, they impose new conditions for the independence of States. For example, the newly independent State can remain independent only if it agrees not to claim certain property, or to assume certain debts, extend certain laws or respect certain treaties of the administering Power. Therein lies the basic difference from the other categories of succession, where the independence of the will of the contracting parties must be recognized. In the case of devolution agreements, freedom to conclude an agreement results in conditions being imposed on the very independence of the State itself. Through their restrictive content such agreements institute a “probation” system, the conditional independence, of the newly independent State. It is for this reason that the question of their validity must be raised with respect to their content.

(32) In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, while being aware that the principle of permanent sovereignty over wealth and natural resources applies in the case of every people and not only of peoples of newly independent States, nevertheless thought it particularly relevant and necessary to stress that principle in the context of succession of States relating to newly independent States.

Article 15. Uniting of States

1. When two or more States unite and so form a successor State, the State property of the predecessor States shall pass to the successor State.

2. Without prejudice to the provision of paragraph 1, the allocation of the State property of the predecessor States as belonging to the successor State or, as the case may be, to its component parts shall be governed by the internal law of the successor State.

Commentary

(1) In the present draft, the Commission uses the term “uniting of States” in the same sense as it did in the 1974 draft articles on the succession of States in respect of treaties, namely, the “uniting in one State of two or more States, which had separate international personalities at the date of the succession”. Article 15 covers the case where one State merges with another State, even if the international personality of the latter continues after they have united. It should thus be distinguished from the case of the emergence of a newly independent State out of two or more dependent territories, or from the case of a dependent territory which becomes integrated or associated with a pre-existing State, which have been dealt with in article 14.

(2) As the Commission wrote in 1974, the succession of States envisaged in the present article does not take account of the particular form of the internal constitutional organization adopted by the successor State:

The uniting may lead to a wholly unitary State, to a federation or to any other form of constitutional arrangement. In other words, the degree of separate identity retained by the original States after their uniting, within the constitution of the successor State, is irrelevant for the operation of the provisions ...

Being concerned only with the uniting of two or more States in one State, associations of States having the character of intergovernmental organizations such as, for example, the United Nations, the specialized agencies, OAS, the Council of Europe, CMEA, etc., fall completely outside the scope ...; as do some hybrid unions which may ap-

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177 See above, footnote 176.
pear to have some analogy with a uniting of States but which do not result in a new State and do not therefore constitute a succession of States. 19

(3) The formulation in article 15 of the international legal rule governing succession to State property in cases of the uniting of States is limited to setting forth a general rule for the passing of State property from the predecessor States to the successor State, while making a provision of renvoi to the internal law of the successor State as far as the internal allocation of the property which passes is concerned. Thus, paragraph 1 states that when two or more States unite and so form a successor State, the State property of the predecessor States shall pass to the successor State, and paragraph 2 provides that the allocation of the property so passed as belonging to the successor State itself or to its component parts, shall be governed by the internal law of the successor State. Paragraph 2 is, however, qualified by the words "Without prejudice to the provision of paragraph 1", in order to stress the provision of paragraph 1 as the basic international legal rule of the article.

(4) "Internal law" as referred to in paragraph 2 includes, in particular, the constitution of the State and any other kind of internal legal rules, written or unwritten, including those which effect the incorporation into internal law of international agreements. 20

Article 16. Separation of part or parts of the territory of a State

1. When part or parts of the territory of a State separate from that State and form a State, and unless the predecessor State and the successor State otherwise agree:

(a) immovable State property of the predecessor State situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State;

(b) movable State property of the predecessor State connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State;

(c) movable State property of the predecessor State other than that mentioned in subparagraph (b) shall pass to the successor State in an equitable proportion.

2. Paragraph 1 applies when part of the territory of a State separates from that State and unites with another State.

1. The International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-third session

Commentary to articles 16 and 17

1. Articles 16 and 17 both deal with cases where part or parts of the territory of a State separate from that State and form one or more individual States. However, article 16 concerns the case of secession of States where the predecessor State continues its existence, while article 17 relates to the case of dissolution of States where the predecessor ceases to exist after the separation of parts of its territory.

2. It may be recalled that, in its 1972 provisional draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties, the Commission made a clear distinction between the dissolution of a State and the separation of part of a State, or secession. 191 However, that approach having been disputed by a number of States in their comments on the draft 192 and also by certain representatives in the Sixth Committee at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Commission subsequently, in its 1974 draft articles, somewhat modified the treatment of these two cases. While maintaining the theoretical distinction between the dissolution of a State and the separation of parts of a State, it dealt with both cases together in one article from the standpoint of the successor States (art. 33), and at the same time made provi

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19 Ibid., paras. (2) and (3) of the commentary.


that "India would remain a constant international per-
dia, and the presumption guiding its deliberations was
not cases of decolonization: the separation of Pakistan
from India, the withdrawal of Singapore from
Malaysia, and the secession of Bangladesh. In the case
of the separation of parts of a State from
the standpoint of the predecessor State which continues
to exist (art. 34). 141

(3) With regard to the question of succession in respect
of State property, the Commission believes that the distinc-
tion between secession and dissolution should be
maintained in view of the special characteristics of suc-
cession in that sphere. It considers that if the distinction
was deemed to be valid for succession in respect of
treaties, it is the more so for the purposes of succession
in respect of State property. If the predecessor State sur-
vives, it cannot be deprived of all its State property; and
if it disappears, its State property cannot be left
uninherited.

(4) Subparagraph 1 (a) of articles 16 and 17 lays down
a common rule relating to the passing of immovable
State property according to which, unless it is otherwise
agreed by the predecessor State and the successor State
or, when the predecessor State ceases to exist, by the
successor States concerned, immovable State property
of the predecessor State shall pass to the successor State
in the territory of which it is situated. This last wording,
which is the one used in article 17, has been modified in
article 16 to read: "immovable State property of the
predecessor State situated in the territory to which the suc-
cession of States relates shall pass to the successor State",
which is the formula used in subparagraph 1 (a)
of article 14. As has been explained, the basic rule, with
slight variations, has been given for all the categories
of succession of States provided for in section 2 of Part II
of the draft. 144

(5) Some examples of relevant State practice can be
cited in the present context. With regard to the separa-
tion of a part or parts of a State under article 16, it
should first be noted that before the establishment of
the United Nations most examples of secession were to
be found among cases of the "secession of colonies";
because colonies were considered, through various legal
and political fictions, as forming "an integral part of
the metropolitan country". These cases are therefore
not relevant to the situation being considered here, that
of the separation of parts of a State, for according to
contemporary international law what we are concerned
with is newly independent States resulting from
decolonization under the Charter of the United Nations.
Since the establishment of the United Nations, there
have been at least three cases of secession which were
not cases of decolonization: the separation of Pakistan
from India, the withdrawal of Singapore from
Malaysia, and the secession of Bangladesh. In the case
of Pakistan, according to one author, an Expert Com-
mittee was appointed on 18 June 1947 to consider the
problem of apportionment of the property of British
India, and the presumption guiding its deliberations was
that "India would remain a constant international per-
son, and Pakistan would constitute a successor
State". 145 Thus, Pakistan was regarded as a successor
State by a pure fiction. On 1 December 1947, an agree-
ment was concluded between India and Pakistan under
which each of the Dominions would become the owner
of the immovable property situated in its territory. 146

(6) An old example of State practice is to be found in
the Treaty of 19 April 1839 concerning the Netherlands
and Belgium, article XV of which provided as follows:

Public or private utilities, such as canals, roads or others of a
similar nature constructed, in whole or in part, at the expense of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, shall belong, with the benefits
and charges attaching thereto, to the country in which they are situated. 147

The same rule was applied in the case of the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, after which
"freehold property of the Federation situated in a Ter-
ritory would vest in the Crown in right of the Territory". 148

(7) As far as doctrine is concerned, this aspect of State
succession, namely, succession through secession or
dissolution, has not been given much attention in legal
literature. The writings of Sánchez de Bustamante y
Sírvén may, however, be cited. On the question of seces-
sion, he stated that:

In the sphere of principles, there is no difficulty about the general
principle of the passing of public property, except where the devolu-
tion of a particular item is agreed on for special reasons. 149

He also refers to the draft code of international law by
E. Pessoa, article 10 of which provided that "If a State
is formed through the emancipation of a province or
region, property in the public and private domain
situated in the detached territory passes to it". 150 The
same author writes on the cases of dissolution of States
as follows:

In cases where a State is divided into two or more States and none of
the new States retains or perpetuates the personality of the State which
has ceased to exist, the doctrines with which we are already familiar
[the principle that property passes to [the successor State] must be ap-
plied to public and private property which is within the boundaries
of each of the new States]. 151

(8) As for immovable State property of the
predecessor State situated outside its territory, no
specific provision is made in article 16, in conformity
with the general principle of the passing of State property
applied in most of the articles of section 2 of part II
of the draft, which requires the geographical location of
that State property in the territory to which the suc-
cession of States relates. The common rule stated in sub-
paragraph 1 (a) is, however, tempered in the case of

141 D. P. O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and Interna-
Relations, p. 220.
142 Ibid.
143 British and Foreign State Papers, 1838-1839, vol. XXVII (Lon-
don, Harrison, 1856), pp. 997-998.
144 O'Connell, op. cit., p. 230.
145 A. Sánchez de Bustamante y Sírvén, Derecho Internacional
146 Ibid., p. 265.
147 Ibid., p. 316.
both articles by the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 16 and paragraph 2 of article 17, which reserve any question of equitable compensation that may arise as a result of a succession of States. However, in the case of dissolution of the predecessor State, immovable State property should naturally pass to the successor States. That passing, under article 17, subparagraph 1 (b) is to be made in "equitable proportions".

(9) The foregoing rule conforms to the opinions of publicists, who generally take the view that the predecessor State, having completely ceased to exist, no longer has the legal capacity to own property and that its immovable property abroad should therefore pass to the successor State or States. It is the successor State which has the better title to such property, having, after all, formed part of the State that has ceased to exist. The question is not that on the extinction of the predecessor State the successor receives the State property of the predecessor because otherwise the property would become abandoned and ownerless. Abandonment of the property, if that is the case, is not the cause for the occurrence of a right of succession; at the most, it is the occasion for it. In any event, in practice, such property is normally apportioned under special agreements between the successor States. Thus, in the Agreement of 23 March 1906 concerning the settlement of economic questions arising in connection with the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway, the following provisions are found in article 7:

The right of occupation of the consular premises in London, which was acquired on behalf of the "Joint Fund for Consulates" in 1877 to have effect until 1945, and which is at present enjoyed by the Swedish Consul-General in London, shall be sold by the Swedish Consulate-General ... The proceeds of the sale shall be apportioned equally between Sweden and Norway.113

(10) In connection with a more recent case, it has been reported that, upon the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, agreements were concluded for the devolution of property situated outside the territory of the union under which Southern Rhodesia was given Rhodesia House in London and Zambia the Rhodesian High Commissioner's house.115

(11) Article 16, subparagraph 1 (b) and article 17, subparagraph 1 (c) set forth the basic rule relating to movable State property, which is applied consistently throughout section 2 of part II of the draft. It stipulates that movable State property of the predecessor State connected with the activity of that State in respect of the territory (territories) to which the succession relates shall pass to the successor State.114

(12) When Pakistan was separated from India under an agreement signed on 1 December 1947, a great deal of equipment, especially arms, was attributed to India, which undertook to pay Pakistan a certain sum to contribute towards the construction of munitions factories.116 Upon the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the assets of the joint institution of issue and gold and foreign exchange reserves were apportioned in proportion to the volume of currency circulating or held in each territory of the predecessor State which became a successor State.117

(13) Article 16, subparagraph 1 (c) and article 17, subparagraph 1 (d) enunciate a common rule according to which movable State property of the predecessor State other than that connected with the activity of that State in respect of the territory (territories) to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State or States in equitable proportions. The reference to equity, a key element in the material content of the provisions regarding the distribution of property which thus has the character of a rule of positive international law, has already been explained.118

(14) The agreement of 23 March 1906 concerning the settlement of economic questions arising in connection with the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway contains the following provisions:

Article 6. (a) Sweden shall repurchase from Norway its ... half-share in movable property at legations abroad which was purchased on joint account. An expert appraisal of such property shall be made and submitted for approval to the Swedish and Norwegian Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

(b) Movable property at consulates which was purchased on joint account shall be apportioned between Sweden and Norway, without prior appraisal, as follows:

There shall be attributed to Sweden the movable property of the consulates-general in ... There shall be attributed to Norway the movable property of the consulates-general in ...119

(15) The practice followed by Poland when it was constituted as a State upon recovering territories from Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia was, as is known, to claim ownership, both within its boundaries and abroad, of property which had belonged to the territories it regained or to the acquisition of which those territories had contributed. Poland claimed its share of such property in proportion to the contribution of the territories which it recovered. However, this rule apparently has not always been followed in diplomatic practice. Upon the fall of the Hapsburg dynasty, Czechoslovakia sought the restitution of a number of vessels and tugs for navigation on the Danube. An arbitral award was made.119 In the course of the proceedings, Czechoslovakia submitted a claim to ownership of a part of the property of certain shipping com-

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114 O'Connell, op. cit., p. 231.
115 See above, paras. 76-85.
116 See above, paras. 76-85.
117 See above, paras. 76-85.
panies which had belonged to the Hungarian monarchy and to the Austrian Empire or received a subsidy from them, on the ground that these interests had been bought with money obtained from all the countries forming parts of the former Austrian Empire and of the former Hungarian Monarchy, and that those countries had contributed thereto in proportion to the taxes paid by them, and were therefore to the same proportionate extent the owners of the property.

The position of Austria and Hungary was that, in the first place, the property was not public property, which alone could pass to the successor States, and, in the second place, even admitting that it did have such status because of the varying degree of financial participation by the public authorities, "the Treaties themselves do not give Czecho-Slovakia the right to State property except to such property situated in Czecho-Slovakia." The arbitrator did not settle the question, on the ground that the treaty clauses did not give him jurisdiction to take cognizance of it. There is no contradiction between this decision and the principle of the passing of public property situated abroad. It is obviously within the discretion of States to conclude treaties making exceptions to a principle.

(16) Article 16, paragraph 2, states that the rules enunciated in paragraph 1 of the same article apply when part of the territory of a State separates from that State and unites with another State. Reference to this provision has already been made in the commentary to article 13, where the case concerned is distinguished from that covered by the provisions of article 13, namely, the transfer of part of the territory of a State. In the 1974 draft articles on succession in respect of treaties, the situations covered by paragraph 2 of article 16 and by article 13 were dealt with in a single provision, since the question was the applicability to both cases of the same principle of treaty law, that of moving treaty-frontiers. In the context of succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts, however, there are differences between the two situations which call for regulation by means of separate legal provisions. These differences are connected principally with whether or not it is necessary to consult the population of the territory to which the succession of States relates, depending on the size of the territory and of its population and, in consequence, its political, economic and strategic importance, and also with the fact of the usually politically charged circumstances that surround the succession of States in the case to which paragraph 2 of article 16 relates. As was explained above, the differences which ensue in the legal sphere are of two kinds: first, in the case covered by article 16, paragraph 2, where part of the territory of a State separates from that State and unites with another State, the agreement between the predecessor State and the successor State is not given the pre-eminent role it has under article 13, which is concerned with the transfer of part of the territory of a State to another State. Secondly, by contrast with article 13, article 16 provides for the passing to the successor State of a third category of movable State property, namely, movable State property of the predecessor State other than that connected with the activity of that State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates.

(17) Lastly, article 16, paragraph 3 and article 17, paragraph 2 lay down the common rule that the general rules contained in these articles are without prejudice to any question of equitable compensation that may arise as a result of a succession of States. There is a further example, in section 2, of a rule of positive international law incorporating the concept of equity, to which reference has already been made. It is intended to ensure a fair compensation for any successor State, as well as any predecessor State which would be deprived of its legitimate share as a result of the exclusive attribution of certain property either to the predecessor State or to the successor State or States. For example, there may be cases where all or nearly all the immovable property belonging to the predecessor State is situated in that part of its territory which later separates to form a new State, although such property was acquired by the predecessor State with common funds. If, under subparagraph 1 (a) of articles 16 and 17, such property were to pass to the successor State in the territory of which it is situated, the predecessor might be left with little or no resources permitting it to survive as a viable entity. In such a case, the rule contained in article 16, paragraph 3, and article 17, paragraph 2, should be applied in order to avoid this inequitable result.

### Part III

#### STATE ARCHIVES

**General commentary**

(1) The Commission considers that, even if State archives may be treated as a type of State property, they constitute a very special case in the context of succession of States. The principle of the transfer of State property taken in abstracto applies to all property, whether movable or immovable, and is readily applicable to concrete situations involving the transfer of such property as administrative premises or buildings of the State, barracks, arsenals, dams, military installations, all kinds of research centres, factories, manufacturing facilities, railway equipment, including both rolling stock and fixed installations, airfields, including their movable and immovable equipment and installations, claims outstanding, funds, currency, etc. By virtue of their nature, all these forms of State property are susceptible

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200 **Ibid.**, p. 120.
201 **Ibid.**, pp. 120-121. The reference was to art. 208 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (see footnote 111 above) and art. 191 of the Treaty of Trianon (see footnote 113 above).
202 See above, paras. (9), (9) and (10) of the commentary to art. 13.
203 Art. 14, which corresponds to art. 15 of the 1978 Vienna Convention.
204 See above, paras. (9) and (10) of the commentary to art. 13.
205 See above, paras. 76 to 85.
of appropriation and, hence, of assignment to the successor State, as appropriate, in accordance with the rules on succession of States. Such is not necessarily the case with archives, which, by virtue of their physical nature, their contents, and the function which they perform, may seem to be of interest at one and the same time both to the predecessor State and to the successor State. A State building situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates can only pass to the successor State or, where there is more than one successor State, to the successor States in equitable proportions. Similarly, monetary reserves, such as gold, for example, can be transferred physically to the successor State, or apportioned between the predecessor State and the successor State, or among several successors, if one or the other solution is agreed upon by the parties. There is nothing in the physical nature of State property of this kind that would stand in the way of any solution that is agreed upon by the States concerned.

(2) Archives, by contrast, may prove to be indispensable both to the successor State and to the predecessor State, and owing to their nature they cannot be divided or split up. However, State archives are objects which have the peculiarity of being reproducible, which is not true of the other immovable and movable property involved in the succession of States. Of all State property, archives alone are capable of being duplicated, which means that both the right of the successor State to recover the archives and the interest of the predecessor State in their use can be satisfied.

(3) This point should be stressed even more in the contemporary setting where the technological revolution has made it possible to reproduce documents of almost any kind with extreme speed and convenience.

(4) Archives, jealously preserved, are the essential instrument for the administration of a community. They both record the management of State affairs and enable it to be carried on, while at the same time embodying the "ins and outs" of human history; consequently, they are of value to both the researcher and the administrator. Secret or public, they constitute a heritage and a public property which the State generally makes available to the citizen's claim to his rights. According to a group of experts convened by UNESCO in March 1976, archives are an essential part of the heritage of any national community. Not only do they provide evidence of a country's historical, cultural and economic development and provide the foundation of the national identity, but they also constitute the essential title deeds supporting the citizen's claim to his rights.

(5) The destructive effects of wars have seriously impaired the integrity of archival collections. In some cases, the importance of documents is such that the victor hastens to transfer these valuable sources of information to its own territory. Armed conflict may result not only in the occupation of a territory, but also in the spoliation of its records. All, or almost all, annexation treaties in Europe since the Middle Ages have required the conquered to restore the archives belonging to or concerning the ceded territory. Without being under any delusion as to the draconian practice of the victors who carried off archives and recklessly disrupted established collections, legal doctrine considered clauses calling for the handing over of archives to the annexing State as implicit in the few treaties from which they had been omitted. These practices have been followed in all periods and in all countries. The fact is that archives handed over to the successor State—forbibly, if necessary—served primarily as evidence and as "title deeds" to the annexed territory; they were used as instruments for the administration of the territory, and are so used even more today.

(6) Reflecting the importance of archives in domestic affairs as well as in international relations, disputes have never ceased to occur regarding State archives, and numerous agreements have been concluded for their settlement.

(7) From an analysis of State practice, as reflected in such agreements, a number of conclusions can be drawn, as has been done by one writer, which can be summarized as follows:

(a) Archival clauses are very common in treaties on the cession of territories concluded between European Powers and are almost always absent in cases of decolonization.

(b) The removal of archives is a universal and timeless phenomenon. In almost all cases, they are returned sooner or later to their rightful owners, except, it seems, in cases of decolonization. But time has not yet run its full course to produce its effect in this field.

(c) Archives of an administrative or technical nature concerning the territory affected by the succession of States pass to the successor State in all categories of State succession and, generally, without much difficulty.

(d) Archives of an historical nature pass to the successor State, depending to some extent on the circumstances; archivists cannot always explain their...
transfer to the successor State nor, in the converse case, can jurists explain why they are kept by the predecessor State.

(8) With regard to the first conclusion, practically all treaties on the transfer of territory concluded in Europe since the Middle Ages contain special, and often very precise, clauses concerning the treatment of the archives of the territories to which the succession of States relates.216 The categories of State succession dealt with in such treaties are, by and large, according to the categorization of succession established by the Commission, the transfer of part of the territory of one State to another State and the separation of one or more parts of the territory of a State.

(9) In modern cases of decolonization, on the other hand, very few treaty provisions exist regarding the treatment of archives, despite the large number of newly independent States. The absence of archival clauses from agreements relating to the independence of colonial territories seems the more surprising as these agreements, of which there are many, govern succession not only to immovable but also to movable property, i.e. property of the same type as the archives themselves.217

(10) There may be many reasons for this. For example, decolonization cannot be total and instantaneous ab initio; rather, at least to begin with, it is purely nominal and only gradually acquires more substance and reality, so that the question of archives seldom receives priority treatment during the early, almost inevitably superficial, stage of decolonization. Newly independent States are plunged straight away into day-to-day problems, and have to cope with economic or other priorities which absorb all their attention and prevent them from perceiving immediately the importance of archives for their own development. Moreover, the under-development inherited in all fields by newly independent States is also reflected precisely in an apparent lack of interest in the exercise of any right to the recovery of archives. Lastly, the power relationship existing between the former administering Power and the newly independent State most often enables the former to evade the question of the passing of archives and to impose unilateral solutions in this matter.

(11) In view of the above-mentioned historical background, the Commission wishes to emphasize the importance of close co-operation among States for settling archival disputes, taking into account especially the relevant recommendations of international organizations such as UNESCO, which reflect the contemporary demands of States concerning their right to archives and their cultural heritage.218 The predecessor and successor States should be under a duty to negotiate in good faith and with unimpeachable determination to reach a satisfactory settlement of such disputes. As the Director-General of UNESCO has said,

> Because the patrimonial character of archives as State property derives from the basic sovereignty of the State itself, problems involved in the ownership and transfer of State archives are fundamentally legal in character. Such problems should therefore be resolved primarily through bilateral or multilateral negotiations and agreements between the States involved.219

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216 Jacob, op. cit.
217 There are very many treaties relating to the transfer of judicial archives in cases of decolonization. However, such cases involve the transfer of judicial records of litigation still under adjudication in courts of appeal or cassation situated in the territory of the former administering Power and involving nationals of the newly independent State. The predecessor State cannot continue to adjudicate cases henceforward falling under the judicial sovereignty of the successor State. Many agreements on this subject could be cited. See, for example, as regards France and the newly independent territories: Agreement concerning the transitional provisions in respect of justice between France and the Central African Republic of 12 July 1960 (Journal Officiel de la République française, Lois et décrets (Paris), 92nd year, No. 176 (30 July 1960), p. 7043, and Materials on Succession of States in respect of Matters other than Treaties (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.77.V.9), p. 150); Agreement between France and the Congo of the same date (Journal officiel ... p. 7044, and Materials ..., p. 157); Agreement between France and the Congo of 15 July 1960 (Journal officiel ..., p. 7048, and Materials ..., p. 182); Agreement between France and Gabon of 15 July 1960 (Journal officiel ..., p. 7043, and Materials ..., p. 163); Agreement between France and Gabon of 15 July 1960 (Journal officiel ..., p. 7048, and Materials ..., p. 182); Agreement between France and Gabon of 15 July 1960 (Journal officiel ..., p. 7043, and Materials ..., p. 163); Agreement between France and Gabon of 15 July 1960 (Journal officiel ..., p. 7048, and Materials ..., p. 182); Agreement between France and Gabon of 15 July 1960 (Journal officiel ..., p. 7043, and Materials ..., p. 163); Agreement between France and Gabon of 15 July 1960 (Journal officiel ..., p. 7048, and Materials ..., p. 182).
218 See above, para. (1) of the general commentary to this Part.
219 UNESCO, document 20 C/102, para. 19 (see footnote 209 above).
archives have their own intrinsic characteristics which, in turn, impart a specific nature to the disputes they give rise to and call for special rules. In order to give better assistance in resolving such disputes between States, appropriate rules have been drafted in the present part which are more closely adapted to the specific case envisaged.

Article 19. State archives

For the purposes of the present articles, “State archives” means all documents of whatever kind which, at the date of the succession of States, belonged to the predecessor State according to its internal law and had been kept by it as archives.

Commentary

(1) Article 19 defines the term “State archives” as used in the present articles. It means “all documents of whatever kind” which fulfill two conditions. First, the documents must have “belonged to the predecessor State according to its internal law” and second, they must have “been kept by [the predecessor State] as archives”. The first condition thus follows the formula of renvoi to internal law adopted for article 8, defining the term “State property”. The second condition, however, is not qualified by the words “according to its internal law”. By detaching this second element from the internal law of a State, the Commission attempted to avoid an undesirable situation where certain predecessor States could exclude the bulk of public papers of recent origin—the “living archives”—from the application of the present articles simply because they are not designated under their domestic law as “archives”. It should be pointed out that in a number of countries such “living archives” are not classified as “archives” until a certain time, for example twenty or thirty years, has elapsed.

(2) Although in archival science “archives” are generally taken to mean:

(a) the documentary material amassed by institutions or natural or legal persons in the course of their activities and deliberately preserved; (b) the institution which looks after this documentary material; (c) the premises which house it;

the present articles deal with “all documents of whatever kind”, corresponding to only (a) of those three categories. The other categories, namely, the custodial institutions and the premises, are considered as immovable property and thus fall into part II of the present draft.

(3) The word “documents” (of whatever kind) should be understood in its widest sense. An archival document is anything which contains “authentic data which may serve scientific, official and practical purposes”, according to the reply of Yugoslavia to the questionnaire drawn up by the International Round Table Conference on Archives. Such documents may be in written form or unwritten, and may be in a variety of material, such as paper, parchment, fabric, stone, wood, glass, film, etc.

(4) Of course, the preservation of written sources remains the very basis for the constitution of State archives, but the criterion of the physical appearance of the object, and even that of its origin, play a part in the definition of archival documents. Engravings, drawings and plans which include no “writing” may be archival items. Numismatic pieces are sometimes an integral part of archives. Quite apart from historic paper money, or samples or dies or specimens of bank notes or stamps, there are even coins in national archives or national libraries. This is the case in Romania, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom (where the Public Record Office owns a collection of stamps and counterfeit coins) and France (where the Bibliothèque nationale, in Paris, houses a large numismatic collection from the Cabinet des médailles). Iconographic documents, which are normally kept in museums, are sometimes kept in national archival institutions, most frequently because they belong to archives. Iconographic documents which have to do with important persons or political events are filed and cared for as part of the national archives. This is the case in the United Kingdom, where the Public Record Office has a large number of iconographic documents as well as a large series of technical drawings from the Patent Office Library; in Italy, where the Archivio centrale dello Stato keeps photographs of all political, scientific and ecclesiastical notables; and in Argentina, where the Archivo gráfico fulfills the same function. Photographic prints are part of the archives themselves in certain countries. Thus, in Poland, the national archives receive prints from State photographic agencies. Some sound documents and cinematographic films are considered to be “archives” under the law of many countries (for example, France, Sweden, Czechoslovakia) and are therefore allocated under certain conditions either to the State archival administration, or to libraries or museums, or to other institutions. In cases where they are allocated to the State archival administration, sound documents must be considered an integral part of the archives and must be treated in the same way as the latter in the case of succession of States. In the United States, commercial films are subject to copyright and are registered with the Library of Congress, whereas cinematographic productions by the army and certain American public institutions are placed in the State archives. In Finland, a committee chaired by the director of the national archives is responsible for the establishment and preservation of cinematographic archives.

(5) The term “documents of whatever kind” is intended to cover documents of whatever subject-matter—diplomatic, political, administrative, military,
(6) The term “documents of whatever kind”, however, excludes objets d’art as such and not as archival pieces which may also have cultural and historical value. The passing of such objects is covered either by the provisions relating to State property or is dealt with as the question of their return or restitution, rather than as a problem of State succession.

(7) Various wordings have been used in diplomatic instruments to refer to archives falling under the present article. Examples are “archives, registers, plans, title deeds and documents of every kind”, 214 “the archives, documents and registers relating to the civil, military, and judicial administration of the ceded territories”, 219 “all title deeds, plans, cadastral and other registers and papers”, 218 “any government archives, records, papers or documents which relate to the cession or the rights and property of the inhabitants of the islands ceded”; 221 “all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded ..., the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial”; 221 “documents, deeds and archives ..., registers of births, marriages and deaths, land registers, documents or cadastral papers ...”, 222 and so forth.

(8) A most detailed definition of “archives” is to be found in article 2 of the Agreement of 23 December 1950 between Italy and Yugoslavia, 224 concluded pursuant to the Treaty of Peace of 10 February 1947. It encompasses historical and cultural archives as well as administrative archives, and among the latter category, documents relating to the various parts of the population, and to categories of property situations or private juridical relations. Article 2 reads as follows:

The expression “archives and documents of an administrative character” shall be construed as covering the documents of the central administration and those of the local public administrative authorities.

The following [in particular shall be covered] ...:

Documents ... such as cadastral registers, maps and plans; blueprints, drawings, drafts, statistical and other similar documents of technical administration, concerning inter alia the public works, railways, mines, public waterways, seaports and naval dockyards;

Documents of interest either to the population as a whole or to part of the population, such as those dealing with births, marriages and deaths, statistics, registers or other documentary evidence of diplomas or certificates testifying to ability to practise certain professions;

Documents concerning certain categories of property, situations or private juridical relations, such as authenticated deeds, judicial files, including court deposits in money or other securities ...;

The expression “historical archives and documents” shall be construed as covering not only the material from archives of historical interest properly speaking but also documents, acts, plans and drafts concerning monuments of historical and cultural interest.

(9) It should be noted that no absolute distinction exists between “archives” and “libraries”. While archives are generally thought of as documents forming part of an organic whole and libraries as composed of works which are considered to be isolated or individual units, it is nevertheless true that archival documents are frequently received in libraries and, conversely, library items are sometimes taken into the archives. The inclusion of library documents in archives is not confined to rare or out-of-print books, which may be said to be “isolated units”, or to manuscripts, which by their nature are “isolated units”. Conversely, libraries acquire or receive as gifts or legacies the archives of important persons or statesmen. There are therefore certain areas in which archives and libraries overlap, and these are extended by the system of the statutory deposit of copies of printed works (including the press) in certain countries, and by the fact that the archival administration sometimes acts as the author or publisher of official publications.

(10) Similarly, “archives” and “museums” cannot be placed in completely separate categories; some archives are housed in museums and various museum pieces are found in archives. According to Yves Pérotin:

... in England, it is considered normal that archival documents connected with museographical collections should follow the latter and
conversely that certain objects (such as chests) should be treated in the same way as papers; ... local museums own archival documents that have been bought or received as gifts, or come from learned societies ... In the Netherlands, historical atlases are cited as an example of documents legitimately kept in museums, while dies of seals are kept in the archives. In the Land of Westphalia, reference is made to chests and other objects which by their nature belong to the archives. ... in the USSR, collections of manuscript documents provisionally kept in the national museums are supervised by the Archives Administration; the major autonomous "archive museums", established by special decision (Gorky, Mendeleev, etc.) are not exempt. ... in Portugal, the Viseu regional museum keeps some of the parchments from the cathedral chapter of the See, and the remainder are in the district archives or in Lisbon in the Torre do Tombo. ... In Turkey, ... the archives of the palace of the former sultans are kept in the Topkapi-Sarayi museum with part of the records of the religious courts, whereas the provincial counterparts of those records are, in exactly nineteen cases, kept in museums.  

**Article 20. Effects of the passing of State archives**

A succession of States entails the extinction of the rights of the predecessor State and the arising of the rights of the successor State to such of the State archives as pass to the successor State in accordance with the provisions of the articles in the present Part.

**Article 21. Date of the passing of State archives**

Unless otherwise agreed or decided, the date of the passing of State archives is that of the succession of States.

**Article 22. Passing of State archives without compensation**

Subject to the provisions of the articles in the present Part and unless otherwise agreed or decided, the passing of State archives from the predecessor State to the successor State shall take place without compensation.

**Article 23. Absence of effect of a succession of States on the archives of a third State**

A succession of States shall not as such affect State archives which, at the date of the succession of States, are situated in the territory of the predecessor State and which, at that date, are owned by a third State according to the internal law of the predecessor State.

**Commentary to articles 20, 21, 22 and 23**

(1) Having decided to devote a separate part to State archives, the Commission found it appropriate to include in section 1 a few introductory articles by way of general provisions, in keeping with the example followed in the parts relating to State property and State debts, in order to accentuate the specificity of the subject of State archives in relation to that of State property. With a view to avoiding the creation of too great a difference between the two sets of general rules, the provisions concerning archives in section 1 of part III have been drafted in identical terms to those used in the corresponding articles of section 1 of part II on State property, except that the word "property" has been replaced by the word "archives". In this manner, a perfect correspondence has been achieved between the two sets of articles, as follows: articles 18 and 7 (as was already explained in the commentary to article 18); articles 20 and 9; articles 21 and 10; articles 22 and 11; and articles 23 and 12.

(2) Article 20 calls for no special comments. As regards article 21, it may at first sight appear ill-advised to provide that State archives shall pass on the date of the succession of States. It may even be thought unreasonable, unrealistic and illusive, inasmuch as archives generally need sorting in order to determine what shall pass to the successor State, and that sometimes requires a good deal of time. In reality, however, archives are usually well identified as such and quite meticulously classified and indexed. They can be transferred immediately. Indeed, State practice has shown that this is possible. The "immediate" transfer of the State archives due to the successor State has been specified in numerous treaties. Article 93 (concerning Austria) of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, of 10 September 1919, article 77 (concerning Hungary) of the Treaty of Trianon, of 4 June 1920, and articles 38 and 52 (concerning Belgium and France) of the Treaty of Versailles, of 28 June 1919, 226 provided that the archives in question should be transferred "without delay". Provision was also made for the "immediate" transfer of archives in General Assembly resolution 388 (V) of 15 December 1950, concerning the position of Libya as a successor State (art. 1, subpara. (2) (a)).

(3) It is, furthermore, necessary to make the date for the passing of State archives the date of the succession of States, even if delays are granted in practice for copying, microfilming, sorting or inventory purposes. It is essential to know that the date of the succession is the date on which the successor State becomes the owner of the archives that pass to it, even if practical considerations delay the actual transfer of those archives. It must be made clear that, should a further succession of States affecting the predecessor State occur in the meanwhile, the State archives that were to pass to the successor State in connection with the first succession of States are not affected by the second such event, even if there has not been enough time to effect their physical transfer.

(4) Lastly, it should be pointed out that the rule concerning the passing of the archives on the date of the succession of States is tempered in article 21 by the possibility open to States at all times to agree on some other solution and by the allowance made for whatever may be "decided"—for example, by an international court—contrary to the basic rule. As a matter of fact, quite a number of treaties have set aside the rule of the immediate passing of State archives to the successor State. Sometimes the agreement has been for a period of three months (as in art. 158 of the Treaty of Ver-

226 For the references to these treaties, see footnote 218 above.
sailles\(^{227}\) and sometimes "within eighteen months" (as in art. 37 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 10 February 1947,\(^{228}\) which required Italy to return within that period the archives and cultural or artistic objects "belonging to Ethiopia or its nationals"). It has also been stipulated that the question of the handing over of archives should be settled by agreement "so far as is possible within a period of six months* following the entry into force of [the] Treaty" (art. 8 of the Treaty of 8 April 1960 between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning various frontier areas).\(^{229}\) One of the most precise provisions concerning time-limits is article 11 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, of 10 February 1947;\(^{230}\) it sets out a veritable calendar for action within a period of eighteen months. In some instances, the setting of a time-limit has been left to a joint commission entrusted with identifying and locating the archives which should pass to the successor State and with arranging their transfer.

(5) Article 22 refers only to "compensation", or reparation in cash or in kind (provision of property or of a collection of archives in exchange for the property or archives that pass to the successor State); but the notion must be understood broadly, in the sense that it not only precludes all compensation but also exonerates the successor State from the payment of taxes or dues of whatever nature. In this case, the passing of the State property or archives is truly considered as occurring "by right", entirely free and without compensation. Article 22 is justified by the fact that it reflects clearly established State practice. Furthermore, the principle of non-compensation is implicitly confirmed in the later articles of this part, which provide that the cost of making copies of archives shall be borne by the requesting State.

(6) The Commission, having decided to retain article 12 in the draft, found it only appropriate to include article 23 as its counterpart, in the part on State archives. As regards article 23, two eventualities are conceivable. The first is that in which the archives of a third State are housed for some reason within a predecessor State. For example, the third State might be at war with another State and have deposited valuable archives for safekeeping within the territory of the State where a succession of States occurs. Again, it might simply have entrusted part of its archives for some time, for example, for restoration or for a cultural exhibition, to a State where a succession of States supervenes. The second eventuality is that in which a successor State to which certain State archives should pass fails, for extraneous reasons, to have them handed over immediately or within the agreed time-limit. If a second succession of States affecting the same predecessor State occurs in the interim, the successor State from the first succession will be considered as a third State in relation to that second succession; those of its archives situated within the territory of the predecessor State which it has not by then recovered must remain unaffected by the second succession.

**Article 24. Preservation of the unity of State archives**

Nothing in the present Part shall be considered as prejudging in any respect any question that might arise by reason of the preservation of the unity of State archives.

**Commentary**

The Commission, on second reading, decided to include in a separate article the provision originally contained in paragraph 6 of article 29 as adopted on first reading, relating to the preservation of the unity of State archives. The reference to the preservation of the unity of State archives reflects the principle of indivisibility of archives, which underlies the questions of succession to documents of whatever kind that constitute such State archives, irrespective of the specific category of succession of States involved. Article 24, therefore, provides for a safeguard in the application of the substantive rules stated in the articles constituting section 2 of the present part.

**SECTION 2. PROVISIONS CONCERNING SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF SUCCESSION OF STATES**

**Article 25. Transfer of part of the territory of a State**

1. When part of the territory of a State is transferred by that State to another State, the passing of State archives of the predecessor State to the successor State is to be settled by agreement between them.

2. In the absence of such an agreement:

   (a) the part of State archives of the predecessor State which for normal administration of the territory to which the succession of States relates should be at the disposal of the State to which the territory concerned is transferred, shall pass to the successor State;

   (b) the part of State archives of the predecessor State, other than the part mentioned in subparagraph (a), that relates exclusively or principally to the territory to which the succession of States relates, shall pass to the successor State.

3. The predecessor State shall provide the successor State with the best available evidence from its State archives which bears upon title to the territory of the transferred territory or its boundaries, or which is necessary to clarify the meaning of documents of State archives which pass to the successor State pursuant to other provisions of the present article.

4. The predecessor State shall make available to the successor State, at the request and at the expense of that State, appropriate reproductions of its State archives connected with the interests of the transferred territory.
5. The successor State shall make available to the predecessor State, at the request and at the expense of that State, appropriate reproductions of State archives which have passed to the successor State in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2.

Commentary

(1) The present article concerns the passing of State archives in the case of transfer of part of the territory of a State to another. The practice of States in this case of succession to State archives is somewhat suspect, inasmuch as it has relied on peace treaties that were generally concerned with providing political solutions that reflected relationships of strength between victors and vanquished rather than equitable solutions. It had long been the traditional custom that the victors took archives of the territories conquered by them and sometimes even removed the archives of the predecessor State.

(2) Without losing sight of the above-stated fact, the existing State practice may, nevertheless, be used in support of the proposals for more equitable solutions which are embodied in the text of this article. That practice is referred to in the present commentary under the following six general headings: (a) transfer to the successor State of all archives relating to the transferred territory; (b) archives removed from or constituted outside the territory of the transferred territory; (c) the "archives-territory" link; (d) special obligations of the successor State; (e) time-limits for handing over the archives and (f) State libraries.

Transfer to the successor State of all archives relating to the transferred territory

(3) Under this heading, it is possible to show the treatment of the sources of archives, archives as evidence, archives as instruments of administration, and archives as historical fund or cultural heritage.

(4) The practice on sources of archives, about which there seems to be no doubt, originated a long time ago in the territorial changes carried out as early as the Middle Ages. It is illustrated by examples taken from the history of France and Poland. In France, in 1194, King Philippe-Auguste founded his "Repository of Charters", which constituted a collection of the documents relating to his kingdom. When in 1271 King Philippe III inherited the lands of his uncle, Alphonse de Poitiers (almost the entire south of France), he immediately transferred to the Repository the archives relating to these lands: title deeds to land, chartularies, letter registers, surveys and administrative accounts. This practice continued over the centuries as the Crown acquired additional lands. The same happened in Poland, from the fourteenth century onwards, during the progressive unification of the kingdom by the ab-

(5) Under the old treaties, archives were transferred to the successor State primarily as evidence and as titles of ownership. Under the feudal system, archives represented a legal title to a right. That is why the victorious side in a war made a point of removing the archives relating to their acquisitions, taking them from the vanquished enemy by force if necessary: their right to the lands was guaranteed only by the possession of the "terriers". An example of this is provided by the Swiss Confederates who in 1415 manu militari removed the archives of the former Habsburg possessions from Baden Castle.

(6) As from the sixteenth century, it came to be realized that, while archives constituted an effective legal title, they also represented a means of administering the country. It then became the accepted view that, in a transfer of territory, it was essential to leave to the successor as viable a territory as possible in order to avoid any disruption of management and facilitate proper administration. Two possible cases may arise.

The first is that of a single successor State. In this case, all administrative instruments are transferred from the predecessor State to the successor State, the said instruments being understood in the broadest sense: fiscal documents of all kinds, cadastral and domanial registers, administrative documents, registers of births, marriages and deaths, land registers, judicial and prison archives, etc. Hence it became customary to leave in the territory all the written, pictorial and photographic material necessary for the continued smooth functioning of the administration. For example, in the case of the cession of the provinces of Jämtland, Härjedalen, Gotland and Ösel, the Treaty of Brömsebro of 13 August 1645 between Sweden and Denmark provided that all judicial deeds, registers and cadastres (art. 29), as well as all information concerning the fiscal situation of the ceded provinces must be delivered to the Queen of Sweden. Similar provisions were subsequently accepted by the two Powers in their peace treaties of Roskilde 26 February 1658 (art. 10) and Copenhagen 27 May 1660 (art. 14). Article 69 of the Treaty of Münster between the Netherlands and Spain of 30 January 1648 provided that "all registers, maps, letters, archives and papers, as well as judicial records, concerning any of the United Provinces, associated regions, towns ... which exist in courts, chancelleries, councils and chambers ... shall be delivered ..." under the

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232 See Direction des archives de France, Les archives dans la vie internationale (op. cit.), p. 16.
233 Ibid.
Treaty of Utrecht of 11 April 1713, Louis XIV ceded Luxembourg, Namur and Charleroi to the (Dutch) States General "...with all papers, letters, documents and archives relating to the said Low Countries". In fact, almost all treaties concerning the transfer of part of a territory contain a clause relating to the transfer of archives, and for this reason it is impossible to list them all. Some treaties are even accompanied by a separate convention dealing solely with this matter. Thus, the Convention between Hungary and Romania signed at Bucharest on 16 April 1924, which was a sequel to the peace treaties marking the end of the First World War, dealt with the exchange of judicial records, land registers and registers of births, marriages and deaths, and specified how the exchange was to be carried out.

(7) In the second case, there is more than one successor State. The examples given below concern old and isolated cases and cannot be taken to indicate the existence of a custom, but it is useful to mention them because the approach adopted would today be rendered very straightforward through the use of modern reproduction techniques. Article 18 of the Barrier Treaty of 15 November 1717 concluded between the Holy Roman Empire, Great Britain and the United Provinces provides that the archives of the dismembered territory, namely, Gelderland, would not be divided up among the successor States, but that an inventory would be drawn up, one copy of which would be given to each State, and the archives would remain intact and at their disposal for consultation. Similarly, article VII of the Territorial Treaty between Prussia and Saxony of 18 May 1815 refers to "...deeds and papers which ... are of common interest to both parties". The solution adopted was that Saxony would keep the originals and provide Prussia with certified copies. Thus, regardless of the number of successors, the entire body of archives remained intact in pursuance of the principle of the conservation of archives for the sake of facilitating administrative continuity. However, this same principle and this same concern were to give rise to many disputes in modern times as a result of a distinction made between administrative archives and historical archives.

According to some writers, administrative archives must be transferred to the successor State in their entirety, while so-called historical archives in conformity with the principle of the integrity of the archival collection, must remain part of the heritage of the predecessor State unless established in the territory being transferred through the normal functioning of such institutions. This argument, although not without merit, is not altogether supported by practice: history has seen many cases of transfers of archives, historical documents included. For example, article XVIII of the Treaty of Vienna of 3 October 1866, by which Austria ceded Venezia to Italy, provides for the transfer to Italy of all "...title deeds, administrative and judicial documents ..., political and historical documents of the former Republic of Venice", while each of the two parties undertakes to allow the others to copy "...historical and political documents which may concern the territories remaining in the possession of the other Power and which, in the interests of science, cannot be separated from the archives to which they belong". Other examples of this are not difficult to find. Article 29, paragraph 1, of the Peace Treaty between Finland and Russia signed at Dorpat on 14 October 1920:

The Contracting Powers undertake at the first opportunity to restore the Archives and documents which belong to public authorities and institutions which may be within their respective territories, and which refer entirely or mainly to the other Contracting Power or its history.

Archives removed from or constituted outside the transferred territory

(8) There would seem to be ample justification for accepting, as adequately reflecting the practice of States, the rule whereby the successor State is given all the archives, historical or other, relating to the transferred territory, even if these archives have been removed from or are situated outside this territory. The Treaties of Paris of 1814 and of Vienna of 1815 provided for the return to their place of origin of the State archives that had been gathered together in Paris during the Napoleonic period. Under the Treaty of Tilsit of 7 July 1807, Prussia, having returned that part of Polish territory which it had conquered, was obliged to return to the new Grand Duchy of Warsaw not only the current local and regional archives relating to the restored territory but also the relevant State documents ("...Berlin Archives"). In the same way, by the Treaty of Riga of 18 March 1921 (art. 11), Poland recovered the central archives of the former Polish Republic, transferred to Russia at the end of the eighteenth century, as well as those of the former autonomous Kingdom of Poland for the period 1815-1863 and the following period up to 1876. It also obtained the documents of the Office of the Secretary of State for the Kingdom of Poland (which acted as the central Russian administration at St. Petersburg from 1815 to 1863), those of the Tsar's Chancellery for Polish Affairs, and lastly, the archival collection of the Office of the Russian Ministry of the Interior responsible for agrarian reform in Poland. Reference can also be made to the case of the Schleswig
archives. Under the Treaty of Vienna of 30 October 1864, Denmark had to cede the three duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. Article XX of the said Treaty provided as follows:

The deeds of property, documents of the administration and civil justice, concerning the ceded territory which are in the archives of the Kingdom of Denmark shall be dispatched to the Commissioners of the new Government of the Duchies as soon as possible. 244

For a more detailed examination of this practice, see footnote 246 above. Some French writers of an earlier era seemed for a time to accept a contrary rule. Referring to partial annexation, which in those days was the most common type of State succession, owing to the frequent changes in the political map of Europe, Despagnet wrote: "The dismembered State retains ... archives relating to the ceded territory which are preserved in a repository situated outside that territory". 245 Fauchille did not go so far as to support this contrary rule, but implied that distinction could be drawn: if the archives are outside the territory affected by the change of sovereignty, exactly which of them must the dismembered State give up? As Fauchille put it:

If the French State, which prior to 1871 had an imprescriptible and inalienable right of ownership over all these archives, was in no way divested of that right by the change of nationality imposed on a part of its territory, 246

It should be noted that the main purpose in this case was not to deny Germany (which was not a party to the proceedings) a right to the archives relating to the territories under its control at that time, but to deprive an individual of public archives which were improperly in his possession. 247 Hence the scope of this isolated decision, which appeared to leave to France the right to claim from individuals archives which should or which might fall to Germany, seems to be somewhat limited.

(10) This isolated school of thought is being mentioned because it seemed to prevail, at least for some time and in some cases, in French diplomatic practice. If credence is to be given to at least one interpretation of the texts, this practice seems to indicate that only ad

244 Direction des archives de France, Les archives dans la vie internationale (op. cit.), p. 26; English trans. in Oakes and Mowat, op. cit., p. 199.
245 See footnote 219 above.
246 See footnote 218 above.
ministative archives should be returned to the territory affected by the change of sovereignty, while historical documents relating to that territory which are situated outside or are removed from it remain the property of the predecessor State. For example, the Treaty of Zurich of 10 November 1859 between France and Austria provided that archives containing titles to property and documents concerning administration and civil justice relating to the territory ceded by Austria to the Emperor of the French "which may be in the archives of the Austrian Empire", including those at Vienna, should be handed over to the commissioners of the new Government of Lombardy. If there is justification for interpreting in a very strict and narrow way the expressions used—which apparently refer only to items relating to current administration—it may be concluded that the historical part of the imperial archives at Vienna relating to the ceded territories was not affected. Article 2 of the Treaty of the same date between France and Sardinia refers to the aforementioned provisions of the Treaty of Zurich, while article XV of the Treaty of Peace concluded between Austria, France and Sardinia, also on the same date, reproduces them word for word. Similarly, a Convention between France and Sardinia signed on 23 August 1860, pursuant to the Treaty of Turin of 24 March 1860 confirming the cession of Savoy and the district of Nice to France by Sardinia, includes an article X which is cast in the same mould as the articles cited above when it states:

Archives containing titles to property and administrative, religious and judicial ["de justice civile"] documents relating to Savoy and to the administrative district of Nice which may be in the possession of the Sardinian Government shall be handed over to the French Government.

(11) It is only with some hesitation that it may be concluded that these texts contradict the existence of a rule permitting the successor State to claim all archives, including historical archives, relating to the territory affected by the change of sovereignty which are situated outside that territory. Would it, after all, be very rash to permit the successor State to claim all archives, included that these texts contradict the existence of a rule which adequately reflects State practice the fact that the successor State should receive all the archives, historical or other, relating exclusively or principally to the territory to which the succession of States relates, even if those archives have been removed or are situated outside that territory.

(12) There are also examples of the treatment of items and documents that relate to the territory involved in the succession of States but that have been established and have always been kept outside this territory. Many treaties include this category among the archives that must pass to the successor State. As mentioned above (para. (11)), under the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy, France was able to obtain archives relating to Savoy and Nice established by the city of Turin. Under the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Yugoslavia obtained all titles to property meant only titles to public property, they would be covered by the words "administrative and judicial documents". Such an interpretation would seem to be supported by the fact that these treaties usually include a clause which appears to create an exception to the transfer of all historical documents, in that private documents relating to the reigning house, such as marriage contracts, wills, family mementos, and so forth, are excluded from the transfer. What really clinches the argument, however, is the fact that these few cases which occurred in French practice were deprived of all significance when France, some ninety years later, claimed and actually obtained the remainder of the Sardinian archives, both historical and administrative, relating to the cession of Savoy and the administrative district of Nice, which were preserved in the Turin repository. The agreements of 1860 relating to that cession were supplemented by the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 10 February 1947, article 7 of which provided that the Italian Government should hand over to the French Government:

all archives, historical and administrative, prior to 1860, which concern the territory ceded to France under the Treaty of 24 March 1860, and the Convention of 23 August 1860.

Consequently, there seems to be ample justification for accepting as a rule which adequately reflects State practice the fact that the successor State should receive all the archives, historical or other, relating exclusively or principally to the territory to which the succession of States relates, even if those archives have been removed or are situated outside that territory.

255 Art. 2 of the Treaty between France and Sardinia concerning the cession of Lombardy, signed at Zurich on 10 November 1859 (de Martens, ed., Nouveau Recueil général de traités, vol. XVI (op. cit.), part II, p. 256).
256 Art. XV of the Treaty between Austria, France and Sardinia, signed at Zurich on 10 November 1859 (ibid., p. 537).
257 Ibid., vol. XVII (op. cit., 1869), part II, p. 25.
258 Art. X of the Convention of 23 August 1860 between France and Sardinia (see footnote 257 above) provided that France was to return to the Sardinian Government "titles and documents relating to the royal family" (which implied that France had already taken possession of them together with the other historical archives). This clause relating to private papers, which is based on the dictates of courtesy, is also included, for example, in the Treaty of 28 August 1736 between France and Austria concerning the cession of Lorraine, art. 16 of which left to the Duke of Lorraine family papers such as "marriage contracts, wills or other papers".
eighteenth-century archives concerning Illyria that had been kept by Hungary. Under the Craiova agreement of 7 September 1940 between Bulgaria and Romania concerning the cession by Romania to Bulgaria of the Southern Dobroja, Bulgaria obtained, in addition to the archives in the ceded territory, certified copies of the documents being kept in Bucharest and relating to the region newly acquired by Bulgaria.

(13) What happens if the archives relating to the territory affected by the change in sovereignty are situated neither within the frontiers of this territory nor in the predecessor State? Article 1 of the agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia signed at Rome on 23 December 1950 provides that:

Should the material referred to not be in Italy, the Italian Government shall endeavour to recover and deliver it to the Yugoslav Government.

In other words, to use terms dear to French civil law experts, what is involved here is not so much an “obligation of result” as an “obligation of means”.142

(14) The rule concerning the transfer to the successor State of archives relating to a part of another State’s territory is taken to be so obvious that there is no risk of its being jeopardized by the lack of references to it in agreements. This is the view of one writer, who states:

Since the delivery of public archives relating to the ceded territories is a necessary consequence of annexation, it is hardly surprising that in any treaties of annexation there is no clause concerning this obligation. It is implied, for it flows from the renunciation by the ceding State of all its rights and titles in the ceded territory.261

The terminology used has aged, and annexation itself is obsolete. However, the idea on which the rule is based is still valid, the object being, according to the same author, to “provide [the successor State] with whatever is necessary or useful for the administration of the territory”.264

The “archives-territory” link

(15) As has been mentioned above, State practice shows that the link between archives and the territory to which the succession of States relates is taken very broadly into account. But the nature of this link should be made quite clear. Expert archivists generally uphold two principles, that of “territorial origin” and that of “territorial or functional connection”, each of which is subject to various and even different interpretations, leaving room for uncertainties. What seems to be obvious is that the successor State cannot claim just any archives; it can claim only those that relate exclusively or principally to the territory. In order to determine which those archives are it should be taken into account that there are archives which were acquired before the succession of States, either by or on behalf of the territory, against payment or free of cost, and with funds of the territory or otherwise.265 From this standpoint, such archives must follow the destiny of the territory on the succession of States. Furthermore, the organic link between the territory and the archives relating to it must be taken into account.266 However, a difficulty arises when the strength of this link has to be appraised by category of archives. Writers agree that, where the documents in question “relate to the predecessor State as a whole, and ... only incidentally to the ceded territory”, they “remain the property of the successor State, [but] it is generally agreed that copies of them must be furnished to the annexing State at its request”.267 The “archives-territory” link was specifically taken into account in the aforementioned Rome Agreement of 23 December 1950 between Yugoslavia and Italy concerning archives.268

142 See art. 11, para. 3, of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of 10 February 1947 (ibid., vol. 41, p. 178).
141 Ibid., vol. 171, p. 292.
143 There are other cases in history of the transfer to the successor State of archives constituted outside the territory involved in the succession of States. These examples do not fall into any of the categories provided for in the system used here for the succession of States, since they concern changes in colonial overlords. These outdated examples are mentioned here solely for information purposes. (In old works, they were regarded as transfers of part of a territory from one State to another or from one colonial empire to another.) The Protocol concerning the return by Sweden to France of the Island of St. Bartholomew in the West Indies states that:

... the papers and documents of all kinds concerning the acts [of the Swedish Crown] that may be in the hands of the Swedish administration ... will be delivered to the French Government" (art. III, para. 2, of the Protocol of Paris of 31 October 1877 to the Treaty between France and Sweden signed at Paris on 10 August 1877 (British and Foreign State Papers, 1876-1877 (London, Kngsway, 1884), vol. LXVIII, p. 625).

In section VIII of the Treaty of Versailles concerning Shantung, art. 158 obliges Germany to return to Japan the archives and documents relating to the Kiaochow territory, "wherever they might be" (see footnote 218 above).

Art. 1 of the convention between the United States of America and Denmark of 4 August 1916 concerning the cession of the Danish West Indies awards to the United States any archives in Denmark concerning these islands (see footnote 221 above), just as art. VIII of the Peace Treaty between Spain and the United States of America of 10 December 1898 had already given the United States the same right with regard to archives in the Iberian peninsula relating to Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and the island of Guam (see footnote 222 above).

264 Jacob, op. cit., p. 17.
265 See art. 11, para. 3, of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of 10 February 1947 (see footnote 260 above) rightly states, in para. 2, that the successor States, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, shall have no right to archives or objects “acquired by purchase, gift or legacy” or to “original works of Hungarians”.

By the Treaty of Peace of 10 February 1947 (art. 11, para. 1) Hungary handed over to the successor States, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, objects “constituting [their] cultural heritage [and] which originated in those territories ... ”.


268 Art. 6 of the Agreement (see footnote 248 above) provides that archives which are indivisible or of common interest to both parties: "shall be assigned to that Party which, in the Commission’s judgement, is more interested in the possession of the documents in question, according to the extent of the territory or the number of persons, institutions or companies to which these documents relate. In this case, the other Party shall receive a copy of such documents, which shall be handed over to it by the Party holding the original".

261 Art. 6 of the Agreement (see footnote 224 above) provides that the archives of the other Party shall be handed over to the Party which, in the Commission’s judgement, is more interested in the possession of the documents in question, according to the extent of the territory or the number of persons, institutions or companies to which these documents relate. In this case, the other Party shall receive a copy of such documents, which shall be handed over to it by the Party holding the original".

260 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-third session
(16) Attention is drawn at this point to the decision of the Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission, in which the Commission held that archives and historical documents, even if they belong to a municipality whose territory is divided by the new frontier drawn in the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy, must be assigned in their entirety to France, the successor State, whenever they related to the ceded territory. As was mentioned in an earlier context (para. (9) above), after the Franco-German war of 1870 the archives of Alsace-Lorraine were handed over to the German successor State. However, the problem of the archives of the Strasbourg educational district and of its schools was amicably settled by means of a special convention. In this case, however, the criterion of the "archives-territory" link was applied only in the case of documents considered to be "of secondary interest to the German Government". 570

Special obligations of the successor State

(17) The practice of States shows that many treaties impose upon the successor State an essential obligation which constitutes the normal counterpart of the predecessor State's duty to transfer archives to the successor State. Territorial changes are often accompanied by population movements (new frontier lines which divide the inhabitants on the basis of a right of option, for instance). Obviously, this population cannot be governed without at least administrative archives. Consequently, in cases where archives pass to the successor State by agreement, it cannot refuse to deliver to the predecessor State, upon the latter's request, any copies it may need. Any expense involved must, of course, be defrayed by the requesting State. It is understood that the handing over of these papers must not jeopardize the security or sovereignty of the successor State. For example, if the predecessor State claims the purely technical file of a military base it has constructed in the territory or the judicial record of one of its nationals who has left the ceded territory, the successor State can refuse to hand over copies of either. Such cases involve elements of discretion and expediency of which the successor State, like any other State, may not be deprived. The successor State is sometimes obliged, by treaty, to preserve carefully certain archives which may be of interest to the predecessor State in the future. The aforementioned Convention of 4 August 1916 between the United States and Denmark providing for the cession of the Danish West Indies stipulates, in the third paragraph of article 1, that:

archives and records shall be carefully preserved and authenticated copies thereof, as may be required, shall be at all times given to the ... Danish Government, ... or to such properly authorized persons as may apply for them. 571

Time-limits for handing over the archives

(18) These time-limits vary from one agreement to another. The finest example of the speed with which the operation can be carried out is undoubtedly to be found in the Treaty of 26 June 1816 between Prussia and the Netherlands, article XLI of which provides that:

Archives, maps and other documents ... shall be handed over to the new authorities at the same time as the territories themselves. 572

State libraries

(19) In earlier discussion on this topic, it was explained how difficult it has been to find information about the transfer of libraries. 573 Three peace treaties signed after the First World War nevertheless expressly mentioned that libraries must be restored at the same time as archives. The instruments in question are the Treaty of Moscow between Russia and Latvia of 11 August 1920, article 11, para. 1; 574 the Treaty of Moscow between Russia and Lithuania of 12 July 1920, article 9, para. 1; 575 and the Treaty of Riga between Poland, Russia and the Ukraine of 18 March 1921, article 11, para. 1. 576 The formulation in the two Treaties of Moscow and rephrased in the Treaty of Riga is as follows:

The Russian Government shall at its own expense restore to ... and return to the ... Government all libraries, records, museums, works of art, educational material, documents and other property of educational and scientific establishments, Government, religious and communal property and property of incorporated institutions, in so far as such objects were removed from ... territory during the world war of 1914-1917, and in so far as they are or may be actually in the possession of the Governmental or Public administrative bodies of Russia.

(20) The conclusions and solutions to which a review of State practice gives rise would not appear to provide very promising material on which to base a proposal for an acceptable draft article on the problem of succession to State archives in the event of the transfer of part of a State's territory to another State. There are many reasons why the solutions adopted in treaties cannot be taken as an absolute and literal model for dealing with this problem in a draft article:

570 Decision No. 163, rendered on 9 October 1953 (United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XIII (United Nations publication, Sales No. 64.V.3), p. 503). This decision contains the following passage:

"Communal property which shall be apportioned pursuant to paragraph 18 of annex XIV to the Treaty of Peace with Italy should be deemed not to include all relevant archives and documents of an administrative character or historical value; such archives and documents, even if they belong to a municipality whose territory is divided by a frontier established under the terms of the Treaty, pass to what is termed the successor State if they concern the territory ceded or relate to property transferred (annex XIV, para. 1); if these conditions are not fulfilled, they are not liable either to transfer under paragraph 1 or to apportionment under paragraph 18, but remain the property of the Italian municipality. What is decisive, in the case of property in a special category of this kind, is the notional link with other property or with a territory." (Ibid., pp. 516-517.)

571 See footnote 221 above.


575 Ibid., vol. III, p. 129.

576 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 139.
(a) First, it is clear that peace treaties are almost inevitably an occasion for the victor to impose on the vanquished solutions which are most advantageous for the former. Germany, the victor in the Franco-German war of 1870, dictated its own law as regards the transfer of archives relating to Alsace-Lorraine right until 1919 when France, in turn, was able to dictate its own law for the return of those same archives, as well as others, relating to the same territory. History records a great many instances of such reversals, involving first the break-up and later the reconstitution of archives, or, at best, global and massive transfers one day in one direction and the next day in the other.

(b) The solutions offered by practice are not very subtle nor always equitable. In practice, decisions concerning the transfer to the successor State of archives of every kind—whether as documentary evidence, instruments of administration, historical material or cultural heritage—are made without sufficient allowance for certain pertinent factors. It is true that in many cases of the transfer of archives, including central archives and archives of an historical character relating to the ceded territory, the predecessor State was given an opportunity to take copies of these archives.

(c) As regards this type of succession, the general provisions of the article already adopted should be borne in mind, lest the solutions chosen conflict, without good reason, with those general provisions.

(21) In this connection, reference is made to the corresponding provision in Part II on State property (art. 13, paragraph 1 of which places the emphasis on the agreement between the predecessor State and the successor State, and subparagraph (b) of which states that, in the absence of such an agreement moveable State property of the predecessor State connected with the activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass to the successor State.

(22) It should not be forgotten that, in the view of the Commission, the type of succession referred to here concerns the transfer of a small portion of territory. The problem of State archives where part of a territory is transferred may be stated in the following terms: State archives of every kind which have a direct and necessary link with the management and administration of the part of the territory transferred, must unquestionably pass to the successor State. The basic principle is that the part of territory concerned must be transferred so as to leave to the successor State as viable a territory as possible in order to avoid any disruption of management and facilitate proper administration. In this connection, it may happen that in consequence of the transfer of a part of one State’s territory to another State some—or many—of the inhabitants, preferring to retain their nationality, leave that territory and settle in the other part of the territory which remains under the sovereignty of the predecessor State. Parts of the State archives that pass, such as taxation records or records of births, marriages and deaths, concern these transplanted inhabitants. It will then be for the predecessor State to ask the successor State for all facilities, such as microfilming, in order to obtain the archives necessary for administrative operations relating to its evacuated nationals. But in no case, inasmuch as it is a minority of the inhabitants which emigrates, may the successor State be deprived of the archives necessary for administrative operations relating to the majority of the population which stays in the transferred territory. The foregoing remarks concern the case of State archives which, whether or not situated in the part of territory transferred, have a direct and necessary link with its administration. This means, by and large, State archives of an administrative character. There remains the case of State archives of an historical or cultural character. If these historical archives relate exclusively or principally to the part of territory transferred, there is a strong presumption that they are distinctive and individualized and constitute a homogeneous and autonomous collection of archives directly connected with and forming an integral part of the historic and cultural heritage of the part of territory transferred. In logic and equity this property should pass to the successor State.

It follows from the preceding comments that where the archives are not State archives at all, but are local administrative, historical or cultural archives, owned in its own right by the part of territory transferred, they are not affected by these draft articles, for these articles are concerned with State archives. Local archives which are proper to the territory transferred remain the property of that territory, and the predecessor State has no right to remove them on the eve of its withdrawal from the territory or to claim them later from the successor State.

(23) These various points may be summed up as follows:

Where a part of a State’s territory is transferred by that State to another State:

(a) State archives of every kind having a direct and necessary link with the administration of the transferred territory pass to the successor State.

(b) State archives which relate exclusively or principally to the part of territory transferred pass to the successor State.

(c) Whatever their nature or contents, local archives proper to the part of territory transferred are not affected by the succession of States.

(d) Because of the administrative needs of the successor State, which is responsible for administering the part of territory transferred, and of the predecessor State, which has a duty to protect its interests as well as those of its nationals who have left the part of territory transferred, and secondly, because of the problems of the indivisibility of certain archives that constitute an administrative, historical or cultural heritage, the only desirable solution that can be visualized is that the parties should settle an intricate and complex issue by agreement. Accordingly, in the settlement of these prob-
lems, priority should be given, over all the solutions put forward, to agreement between the predecessor State and the successor State. This agreement should be based on principles of equity and take account of all the special circumstances, particularly of the fact that the part of territory transferred has contributed, financially or otherwise, to the formation and preservation of archive collections. The principles of equity relied upon should make it possible to take account of various factors, including the requirements of viability of the transferred territory and apportionment according to the shares contributed by the predecessor State and by the territory separated from that State.

(24) The Commission, in the light of the foregoing considerations, prepared the present text for article 25, which concerns the case of succession of States corresponding to that covered by article 13, namely, transfer of part of the territory of a State. The cases of transfer of territory envisaged have been explained in the commentary to article 13 (para. 6). Paragraph 1 of article 25 repeats, for the case of State archives, the rule contained in paragraph 1 of article 13, which establishes the primacy of agreement.

(25) In the absence of an agreement between the predecessor and successor States, the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 25 apply. Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 deals with what is sometimes called “administrative” archives, providing that they shall pass to the successor State. To avoid using such an expression, which is not legally precise, the Commission referred to that category of archives as “the part of State archives of the predecessor State which for normal administration of the territory to which the succession of States relates should be at the disposal of the State to which the territory concerned is transferred”, terminology which is largely followed in the corresponding provision of article 26 (subpara. 1 (b)). The Commission preferred to use the phrase “should be at the disposal of the State to which the territory in question is transferred” instead of that found in subparagraph 1 (b) of article 26, “should be in that territory”, as being more appropriate to take account of the specific characteristics of the case of succession of States covered by article 25. Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 embodies the rule according to which the part of the State archives of the predecessor State other than the part referred to in subparagraph (a) shall pass to the successor State if it relates exclusively or principally to the territory to which the succession of States relates. The words “exclusively or principally” were likewise regarded as being the most appropriate to delimit the rule, bearing in mind the basic characteristic of the case of succession of States dealt with in the article, namely, the transfer of small areas of territory.

(26) Paragraph 3 provides, for the case of a succession of States arising from the transfer of part of the territory of a State, the rule embodied in paragraph 3 of article 26. The relevant paragraphs of the commentary to that provision (paras. (20) to (24)) are also applicable to paragraph 3 of the present article.

(27) Paragraphs 4 and 5 establish the duty for the State to which State archives pass or with which they remain, to make available to the other State, at the request and at the expense of that other State, appropriate reproductions of its State archives. Paragraph 4 deals with the situation where the requesting State is the successor State, in which case the documents of State archives to be reproduced are those connected with the interests of the transferred territory, a qualification which is also made in paragraph 2 of article 26. Paragraph 5 covers the situation where the requesting State is the predecessor State: in such a case, the documents of State archives to be reproduced are those which have passed to the successor State in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 or 2 of article 25.

Article 26. Newly independent State

1. When the successor State is a newly independent State:

(a) archives having belonged to the territory to which the succession of States relates and having become State archives of the predecessor State during the period of independence shall pass to the newly independent State;

(b) the part of State archives of the predecessor State which for normal administration of the territory to which the succession of States relates should be in that territory shall pass to the newly independent State.

2. The passing or the appropriate reproduction of parts of the State archives of the predecessor State other than those mentioned in paragraph 1, of interest to the territory to which the succession of States relates, shall be determined by agreement between the predecessor State and the newly independent State in such a manner that each of those States can benefit as widely and equitably as possible from those parts of the State archives.

3. The predecessor State shall provide the newly independent State with the best available evidence from its State archives which bears upon title to the territory of the newly independent State or its boundaries, or which is necessary to clarify the meaning of documents of State archives which pass to the newly independent State pursuant to other provisions of the present article.

4. The predecessor State shall co-operate with the successor State in efforts to recover any archives which, having belonged to the territory to which the succession of States relates, were dispersed during the period of dependence.

5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 apply when a newly independent State is formed from two or more dependent territories.

6. Paragraphs 1 to 4 apply when a dependent territory becomes part of the territory of a State other than the State which was responsible for its international relations.

7. Agreements concluded between the predecessor State and the newly independent State in regard to State
archives of the predecessor State shall not infringe the right of the peoples of those States to development, to information about their history, and to their cultural heritage.

Commentary

(1) The present article principally envisages, like articles 14 and 36, the case where a newly independent State appears on the international scene as a result of decolonization. In such a case, the problem of succession in respect of archives is particularly acute.

(2) The Commission has clarified the notion of a “newly independent State” several times within the framework of the categorization used in the present draft. Reference should be made in particular to the definition in article 2, subparagraph 1 (e) and the commentary (para. (b)) to that subparagraph, as well as to articles 14 and 36.

(3) The present article is closely modelled on article 14, though certain new elements have been added in view of the uniqueness of State archives as a category of matters which pass at a succession of States.

(4) Subparagraph 1 (a) deals with “archives”—not necessarily “State archives”—which had belonged to the territory to which the succession of States relates before it became dependent and which became State archives of the predecessor State during its dependency. Since no reason can be found for deviating from the rule enunciated in article 14, subparagraph 1 (e), concerning movable property satisfying the same conditions, subparagraph 1 (a) of the present article uses the same wording, except the word “archives”, as that adopted for the former provision.

(5) By the use of the word “archives” rather than “State archives” at the beginning of subparagraph 1 (a), it is intended to cover archives which belonged to the territory in question, whatever the political status it had enjoyed or under whatever ownership the archives had been kept in the pre-colonial period—whether by the central Government, local governments or tribes, religious missions, private enterprises or individuals.

(6) Such historical archives of the pre-colonial period are not the archives of the predecessor State, but the archives of the territory itself, which has constituted them in the course of its history or has acquired them with its own funds or in some other manner. They must consequently revert to the newly independent State, quite apart from any question of succession of States, if they are still within its territory at the time of its accession to independence or can be claimed by it if they have been removed from the territory by the colonial Power.

(7) Examples of the passing of historical archives may be found in some treaties. Italy was obliged to return the archives it had removed from Ethiopia during its annexation when, after the Second World War, its colonization was terminated. Article 37 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 10 February 1947 provides that:

... Italy shall restore all ... archives and objects of historical value belonging to Ethiopia or its nationals and removed from Ethiopia to Italy since October 3, 1935.278

In the case of Viet Nam, a Franco-Vietnamese agreement in the matter of archives, signed on 15 June 1950, provided in its article 7 that the archives constituted by the Imperial Government and its Kinh Luoc279 and preserved at the Central Archives before the French occupation were to revert to the Government of Viet Nam.

(8) In the case of Algeria, the archives relating to its pre-colonial history had been carefully catalogued, added to and preserved in Algiers by the French administering authority until immediately before independence, when they were taken to France (to Nantes, Paris and, more particularly, a special archives depot at Aix-en-Provence). These archives consisted of what is commonly known as the “Arabic collection”, the “Turkish collection” and the “Spanish collection”. As a result of negotiations between the two Governments, some registers of the pay of Janissaries, forming part of the documents in the “Turkish collection”, and microfilms of part of the “Spanish collection” were returned in 1966. By a Franco-Algerian exchange of letters of 23 December 1966, the Algerian Government obtained the restitution of “450 original registers in the Turkish and Arabic languages relating to the administration of Algeria before 1830”, i.e. before the French colonial occupation. Under the terms of this exchange of letters, the National Library of Algiers was to receive before July 1967, free of charge, microfilms of documents in Spanish, which had been moved from Algeria to Aix-en-Provence immediately before independence and which constituted the “Spanish collection” of Algeria relating to the Spanish occupation of Algerian coastal regions. The same exchange of letters provided that questions concerning archives not settled by that instrument would form the subject of subsequent consultations. Thus Algeria raised the problem of its historical archives again in 1974. In April 1975, on the occasion of the visit to Algeria of the President of the French Republic, 153 boxes of Algerian historical archives forming part of the “Arabic collection” were returned by the French Government.280

(9) The historical documents of the Netherlands relating to Indonesia were the subject of negotiations

278 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 49, p. 142. On the basis of that article (and art. 75) of the Treaty of Peace, Ethiopia and Italy concluded an Agreement concerning the settlement of economic and financial matters issuing from the Treaty of Peace and economic collaboration, signed at Addis Ababa on 5 March 1956, which had three annexes, A, B and C, listing the archives and objects of historical value that had been or were to be returned to Ethiopia by Italy (ibid., vol. 267, pp. 204-216).

279 The “Kinh Luoc” were governors or prefecrs of the Emperor of Indo-China before the French occupation of the Indo-Chinese peninsula.

Succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties

between the former administering Power and the newly independent State within the framework of cooperation in the field of cultural and historical property. The relevant agreement concluded between the two countries in 1976 provides, inter alia:

That it is desirable to make cultural objects such as ethnographical and archival material available for exhibitions and study in the other country in order to fill the gaps in the already existing collections of cultural objects in both countries, with a view to promoting mutual understanding and appreciation of each other's cultural heritage and history:

That in general principle, archives ought to be kept by the administration that originated them. 144

(10) The rule enunciated in subparagraph 1 (a) was stressed in the proceedings of an international round table conference on archives, which state that:

It appears undeniable that the metropolitan country should return to States that achieve independence, in the first place, the archives which antedate the colonial regime, which are without question the property of the territory .... It is regrettable that the conditions in which the passing of power from one authority to another occurred did not always make it possible to ensure the regularity of the handing over of archives, which may be considered indispensable. 142

(11) Subparagraph 1 (b) deals with what is sometimes called "administrative" archives and provides that they shall also pass to the newly independent State. The Commission, avoiding the use of that expression, which is not sufficiently precise to be used as a legal term, decided to refer to such category of archives as "the part of State archives of the predecessor State which, for normal administration of the territory to which the succession of States relates, should be in that territory". 144

(12) In the case of the decolonization of Libya, General Assembly resolution 388 A (V) of 15 December 1950, entitled "Economic and financial provisions relating to Libya", expressed the wish of the United Nations that the newly independent State should possess at least the administrative archives most indispensable to current administration. Accordingly, article 1, paragraph 2, (a), of the resolution provided for the immediate transfer to Libya of "the relevant archives and documents of an administrative character or technical value concerning Libya or relating to property the transfer of which is provided for by the present resolution". 143

(13) The international conference of archivists mentioned above (para. (10)) stated in this connection:

It seems undeniable that [the former administering Powers] have .... the duty to hand over all documents which facilitate the continuity of the administrative work and the preservation of the interests of the

local population. ... Consequently, titles of ownership of the State and of semi-public institutions, documents concerning public buildings, railways, roads and bridges, etc., land survey documents, census records, records of births, marriages and deaths, etc., will normally be handed over with the territory itself. This assumes the regular transfer of local administrative archives to the new authorities. It is sometimes regrettable that the conditions under which the transfer of powers from one authority to the other occurred have not always been such as to ensure the regularity of this transfer of archives, which may be regarded as indispensable. 144

(14) Paragraph 2 of article 26 concerns those parts of State archives which, though not falling under paragraph 1, are "of interest" to the territory to which the succession of States relates. The paragraph provides that the passing of such archives, or their appropriate reproduction, shall be determined by agreement between the predecessor State and the newly independent State. Such agreement, however, is subject to the condition that each of the parties must "benefit as widely and equitably as possible" from the archives in question.

(15) One of the categories of State archives covered by paragraph 2 are those accumulated by the administering Power during the colonial period, relating to the imperium or dominium of that Power and to its colonial policy generally in the territory concerned. The former metropolitan country is usually careful to remove all such archives before the independence of the territory, and many considerations of policy and expediency prevent it from transferring them to the newly independent State.

(16) The same international conference of archivists stated:

There are apparently legal grounds for distinguishing in the matter of archives between sovereignty collections and administrative collections: the former, concerning essentially the relations between the metropolitan country and its representatives in the territory, whose competence extended to diplomatic, military and high policy matters, fall within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan country, whose history they directly concern. 143

An author expresses the same opinion:

Emancipation raises a new problem. The right of new States to possess the archives essential to the defence of their rights, to the fulfilment of their obligations, to the continuity of the administration of the populations, remains unquestionable. But there are other categories of archives kept in a territory, of no immediate practical interest to the successor State, which concern primarily the colonial Power. On closer consideration, such archives are of the same kind as those which, under most circumstances in European history, unquestionably remain the property of the ceding States. 144

(17) Nevertheless, it is undeniable that some of the archives connected with the imperium or dominium of the former administering Power are "of interest" also (and sometimes even primarily) to the newly independent State. They are, for instance, the archives relating to the conclusion of treaties applicable to the territory con

144 Report of the Secretary-General on restitution of works of art to countries victims of expropriation (A/32/203), p. 7.

142 Direction des archives de France, Les archives dans la vie internationale (op. cit.), pp. 43-44.

143 In the case of Eritrea, however, the General Assembly adopted certain provisions of which some are not wholly in accord with those that it had one year earlier adopted with regard to Libya. Article 11, para. 2, of resolution 530 (VI) of 29 January 1952, entitled "Economic and financial provisions relating to Eritrea", permitted Italy to hand over at its convenience to the provisional administering Power either the originals or copies of documents and archives.

144 Direction des archives de France, Les archives dans la vie internationale (op. cit.), pp. 43-44.

145 Ibid., p. 44.

cerned, or to the diplomatic relations between the administering Power and third States with respect to the territory concerned. While it would be unrealistic for the newly independent State to expect the immediate and complete transfer of archives connected with the imperium or dominium of the predecessor State, it would be quite inequitable for the former State to be deprived of access to at least those of such archives in which it shares interest.

(18) No simple rule of passing or non-passing, therefore, would be satisfactory in the case of such State archives. The Commission considers that the best solution would be for the States concerned to settle the matter by an agreement based on the principle of mutual benefit and equity. In negotiating such an agreement, due account should be taken of the need to preserve the unity of archives and of the modern technology which has made rapid reproduction of documents possible through microfilming or photocopying. It should also be borne in mind that almost all countries have laws providing that the State other than the State which was responsible for its territory—or even about its contents. The Commission considers, therefore, that the predecessor State has a duty to transmit to the newly independent State the "best evidence" available to it.

(22) The first type of evidence covered by paragraph 3 is often intermingled with others relating to the imperium or dominium of the administering Power over the territory concerned. The evidence from the archives which bears upon title to such territory or its boundaries is, however, of vital importance to the very identity of the newly independent State. The need for such evidence is especially crucial when the latter State is in dispute or litigation with a third State concerning the title to part of its territory or its boundaries. The Commission considers, therefore, that the predecessor State has a duty to transmit to the newly independent State the "best evidence" available to it.

(23) As to the second type of evidence, the words "documents ... which pass ... pursuant to other provisions of the present article" are intended to cover all types of documents which pass to the successor State by the direct application of paragraphs 1 and 2 and the first part of paragraph 3, as well as indirectly by the application of paragraphs 5 and 6.

(24) One example of this type of document may be found in documents relating to the interpretation of treaties applicable to the territory concerned concluded by the administering Power. It should be noted that the hesitation of newly independent States in notifying their succession to certain treaties is sometimes due to their uncertainty about the application of those treaties to their territory—or even about their contents.

(25) Paragraph 4 establishes a duty of co-operation between the predecessor State and the newly independent successor State for the purpose of recovering those archives which, having belonged to the territory to which the succession of States relates, were dispersed during the period of dependence, a common occurrence. This paragraph is a corollary and should be read in the light of paragraph 1 (a) of this article.

(26) Paragraphs 5 and 6 reflect the decision which the Commission adopted in regard to article 14, to assimilate to the case of a newly independent State falling under paragraphs 1 to 3 of article 26 situations in which a newly independent State is formed from two or more dependent territories, or a dependent territory becomes part of the territory of an already independent State other than the State which was responsible for its international relations.

(27) Paragraph 7 refers to certain inalienable rights of the peoples of the predecessor State and the newly independent State, providing that agreements concluded between those States in regard to State archives of the
former State “shall not infringe the right of the peoples of those States to development, to information about their history and to their cultural heritage”. The paragraph is thus intended to lay down three major rights which must be respected by such States when they negotiate the settlement of any question regarding State archives of the predecessor State.

(28) These rights have been stressed in various international forums, in particular in the recent proceedings of UNESCO.

(29) At its eighteenth session, held in Paris in October-November 1974, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted the following resolution:

The General Conference,

Bearing in mind that a great number of Member States of UNESCO have been in the past for longer or shorter duration under foreign domination, administration and occupation,

Considering that archives constituted within the territory of these States have, as a result, been removed from that territory,

Mindful of the fact that the archives in question are of great importance for the general, cultural, political and economic history of the countries which were under foreign occupation, administration and domination,

Recalling recommendation 13 of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Planning of National Documentation, Library and Archives Infrastructure, held in September 1974, and desirous of extending its scope,

1. Invites the Member States of UNESCO to give favourable consideration to the possibility of transferring documents from archives constituted within the territory of other countries or relating to their history, within the framework of bilateral agreements;

(30) UNESCO’s concern with problems of archives as such has been combined with an equal concern for archives considered as important parts of the cultural heritage of nations. UNESCO and its committees and groups of experts have at all times considered archives as “an essential part of the heritage of any national community”—a heritage which they are helping to reconstitute and whose restitution or return to the country of origin they are seeking to promote. In their view, historical documents, including manuscripts, are “cultural property” forming part of the cultural heritage of peoples.

(31) In 1977, pursuant to a resolution adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its nineteenth session, the Director-General made a plea for the return of an irreplaceable cultural heritage to those who created it, as follows:

The vicissitudes of history have ... robbed many peoples of a priceless portion of this inheritance in which their enduring identity finds its embodiment.

... The peoples who were victims of this plunder, sometimes for hundreds of years, have not only been denuded of irreplaceable masterpieces but also robbed of a memory which would doubtless have helped them to greater self-knowledge and would certainly have enabled others to understand them better.

... These men and women who have been deprived of their cultural heritage therefore ask for the return of at least the art treasures which best represent their culture, which they feel are the most vital and whose absence causes them the greatest anguish.

This is a legitimate claim...

... I solemnly call upon the Governments of the Organization’s member States to conclude bilateral agreements for the return of cultural property to the countries from which it has been taken; to promote long-term loans, deposits, sales and donations between institutions concerned in order to encourage a fairer international exchange of cultural property...

... I call on universities, libraries... that possess the most important collections, to share generously the objects in their keeping with the countries which created them and which sometimes no longer possess a single example.

I also call on institutions possessing several similar objects or records to part with at least one and return it to its country of origin, so that the young will not grow up without ever having the chance to see, at close quarters, a work of art or a well-made item of handicraft fashioned by their ancestors.

... The return of art objects or works to the countries which created them enables a people to recover part of its memory and identity, and proves that the long dialogue between civilizations which shapes the history of the world is still continuing in an atmosphere of mutual respect between nations.

(32) The protection and restoration of cultural and historical archives and works of art with a view to the preservation and future development of cultural values have received a great deal of attention in the United Nations, as evidenced in General Assembly resolutions 3206 A (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, 3148 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, 3187 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3391 (XXX) of 19 November 1975, 31/40 of 30 November 1976, 32/18 of 11 November 1977, 33/50 of 14 December 1978, 34/64 of 29 November 1979 and 35/128 of 11 December 1980. The last-mentioned resolution contains the following passages:

The General Assembly,

... Aware of the importance attached by the countries of origin to the return of cultural property which is of fundamental spiritual and cultural value to them, so that they may constitute comprehensive or single collections representative of their cultural heritage,
Reaffirming that the return or restitution to a country of its objets d'art, monuments, museum pieces, manuscripts, documents and any other cultural or artistic treasures constitutes a step forward in the strengthening of international co-operation and the preservation and further development of cultural values,

...  

Supporting the solemn appeal launched on 7 June 1978 by the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the return to those who created it of an irreplaceable cultural heritage,

...  

2. Requests the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to intensify its efforts to help the countries concerned to find suitable solutions to the problems relating to the return or restitution of cultural property and urges Member States to cooperate with that organization in this area;

3. Invites Member States to draw up, in cooperation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, systematic inventories of cultural property existing in their territories and of cultural property abroad;

(33) The Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers from 5 to 9 September 1973, adopted a Declaration on the Preservation and Development of National Cultures which stresses the need to reassert indigenous cultural identity and eliminate the harmful consequences of the colonial era and call for the preservation of their national culture and traditions.**

(34) At the following Conference, which took place at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, two resolutions on the subject were adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries.*** Resolution No. 17 ("Restitution of Art Treasures and Ancient Manuscripts to the Countries from which they have been looted") contains the following passages:

The fifth Conference ...

...  

2. Reaffirms the terms of United Nations General Assembly resolution 3187 (XXVIII) and General Assembly resolution 3391 (XXX) concerning the restitution of works of art and manuscripts to the countries from which they have been looted.

3. Requests urgently all States in possession of works of art and manuscripts to restore them promptly to their countries of origin.

4. Requests the Panel of Experts appointed by UNESCO which is entrusted with the task of restoring those works of art and manuscripts to their original owners to take the necessary measures to that effect.

(35) Lastly, the seventeenth International Round Table Conference on Archives, held in October 1977 at Cagliari, adopted a resolution reaffirming the right of peoples to their cultural heritage and to information about their history which reads, in part:

... The Round Table reaffirms the right of each State to recover archives which are part of its heritage of archives which are currently kept outside its territory, as well as the right of each national group to access, under specified conditions, to the sources wheresoever preserved, concerning its history, and to the copying of these sources.


Considering the large number of archival disputes and, in particular, those resulting from decolonization,

...  

Considering that this settlement should be effected by means of bilateral or plurilateral negotiations,

The Round Table recommends that:

(a) The opening of negotiations should be encouraged between all parties concerned, first, regarding the problems relating to the ownership of the archives and, secondly, regarding the right of access and the right to copies,

...  

The Round Table recognizes the legitimate right of the public authorities and of the citizens of the countries which formed part of larger political units or which were administered by foreign Powers to be informed of their own history. The legitimate right to information exists per se, independently of the right of ownership in the archives. ***

Article 27. Uniting of States

1. When two or more States unite and so form a successor State, the State archives of the predecessor State shall pass to the successor State.

2. Without prejudice to the provision of paragraph 1, the allocation of the State archives of the predecessor States as belonging to the successor State or to its component parts shall be governed by the internal law of the successor State.

Commentary

(1) The present article deals with succession to State archives in the case of unifying States. The agreement of the parties has a decisive place in the matter of State succession in respect of State property, archives and debts. But nowhere is it more decisive than in the case of a unifying of States. Union consists, essentially and basically, of a voluntary act. In other words, it is the agreement of the parties which settles the problems arising from the union. Even where the States did not, before unifying, reach agreement on a solution in a given field—for example, archives—such omission or silence may be interpreted without any risk of mistake as the common will to rely on the future provisions of internal law to be enacted instead by the successor State for the purpose, after the unifying of States has become a reality. Thus, if the agreement fails to determine what is to become of the predecessor State's archives, internal law prevails.

(2) It is the law in force in each component part at the time of the unifying of States that initially prevails. However, pending the unifying, such law can only give expression to the component part's sovereignty over its own archives. Consequently, in the absence of an agreed term in the agreements concerning the union, the archives of each component part do not pass automatically to the successor State, because the internal law of the component part has not been repealed. Only if the successor State adopts new legislation repealing the
component parts' law in the matter of archives are those archives transferred to the successor State.

(3) The solution depends on the constitutional nature of the uniting of States. If the union results in the creation of a federation of States, it is difficult to see why the archives of each component part which survives (although with reduced international competence) should pass to the successor State. If, on the other hand, the uniting of States results in the establishment of a unitary State, the predecessor States cease to exist completely, in international law at least, and their State archives can only pass to the successor State.

(4) The solution depends also on the nature of the archives. If they are historical in character, the archives of the predecessor State are of interest to it alone and of relatively little concern to the union, unless it is decided by treaty, for reasons of prestige or other reasons, to transfer them to the seat of the union or to declare them to be its property. Any change of status or application, particularly a transfer to the benefit of the successor State of other categories of archives needed for the direction administration of each constituent State, would be not only unnecessary for the union but highly prejudicial for the administration of the States forming the union.

(5) Referring to the case of a uniting of States leading to a federation, Fauchille has said:

The unitary State which becomes a member of a federal State or a union ... ceasing to exist not as a State, but only as a unitary State, should retain its own patrimony; for the existence of this patrimony is in no way incompatible with the new regime to which it is subject. There is no reason to attribute either to the federation or the union ... the property of the newly incorporated State, since the State, while losing its original independence, none the less retains, to some extent, ... its legal personality.

Erik Castrén shares that opinion: “Since the members of the union of States retain their statehood, their public property continues as a matter of course to belong to them”.

Thus, both international treaty instruments and instruments of internal law, such as constitutions or basic laws, effect and define the uniting of States, stating the degree of integration. It is on the basis of these various expressions of will that the devolution of State archives must be determined.

(6) Once States agree to constitute a union among themselves, it must be presumed that they intend to provide it with the means necessary for its functioning and administration. Thus State property, particularly State archives, are normally transferred to the successor State only if they are found to be necessary for the exercise of the power devolving upon that State under the constituent act of the union. The transfer of the archives of the predecessor States does not, however, seem to be necessary to the union, which will in time establish its own archives. The archives of the component parts will continue to be more useful to those parts than to the union itself, for the reasons given in paragraph (4) above.

(7) In this connection, an old but significant example may be recalled, that of the unification of Spain during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. That union was effected in such a way that the individual kingdoms received varying degrees of autonomy, embodied in appropriate organs. Consequently, there was no centralization of archives. The present organization of Spanish archives is still profoundly influenced by that system.

(8) The text of article 27 repeats that of the corresponding article in part II, namely, article 15, also entitled “Uniting of States”, except for the substitution of the word “archives” for the word “property” in both paragraphs of the article. The parallel between articles 27 and 15 is obvious, and the Commission therefore refers to the commentary to the latter article as being equally applicable to the present text.

Article 28. Separation of part or parts of the territory of a State

1. When part or parts of the territory of a State separate from that State and form a State, and unless the predecessor State and the successor otherwise agree:

(a) the part of State archives of the predecessor State, which for normal administration of the territory to which the succession of States relates should be in that territory, shall pass to the successor State;

(b) the part of State archives of the predecessor State, other than the part mentioned in subparagraph (a), that relates directly to the territory to which the succession of States relates, shall pass to the successor State.

2. The predecessor State shall provide the successor State with the best available evidence from its State archives which bears upon title to the territory of the successor State or its boundaries, or which is necessary to clarify the meaning of documents of State archives which pass to the successor State pursuant to other provisions of the present article.

3. Agreements concluded between the predecessor State and the successor State in regard to State archives of the predecessor State shall not infringe the right of the peoples of those States to development, to information about their history and to their cultural heritage.

4. The predecessor and successor States shall, at the request and at the expense of one of them, make available appropriate reproductions of their State archives connected with the interests of their respective territories.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 apply when part of the territory of a State separates from that State and unites with another State.
**Article 29. Dissolution of a State**

1. When a predecessor State dissolves and ceases to exist and the parts of its territory form two or more States, and unless the successor States concerned otherwise agree:

   (a) the part of the State archives of the predecessor State which should be in the territory of a successor State for normal administration of its territory shall pass to that successor State;

   (b) the part of the State archives of the predecessor State, other than the part mentioned in subparagraph (a), that relates directly to the territory of a successor State shall pass to that successor State.

2. The State archives of the predecessor State other than those mentioned in paragraph 1 shall pass to the successor States in an equitable manner, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

3. Each successor State shall provide the other successor State or States with the best available evidence from its part of the State archives of the predecessor State which bears upon title to the territories or boundaries of that other successor State or States, or which is necessary to clarify the meaning of documents of State archives which pass to that State or States pursuant to other provisions of the present article.

4. Agreements concluded between the successor States concerned in regard to State archives of the predecessor State shall not infringe the right of the peoples of those States to development, to information about their history and to their cultural heritage.

5. Each successor State shall make available to any other successor State, at the request and at the expense of that State, appropriate reproductions of its part of the State archives of the predecessor State connected with the interests of the territory of that other successor State.

**Commentary to articles 28 and 29**

(1) Articles 28 and 29 concern, respectively, succession to State archives in the cases of separation of part or parts of the territory of a State and of dissolution of a State. These cases are dealt with in separate draft articles, with respect both to State property and State debts, in parts II and IV of the draft, but the commentaries on each pair of articles are combined. A similar presentation is followed in the present commentary. Separation and dissolution both concern cases where a part or parts of the territory of a State separate from that State to form one or more individual States. The case of separation, however, is associated with that of secession, in which the predecessor State continues to exist, whereas in the case of dissolution the predecessor State ceases to exist altogether.

(2) An important and multiple dispute concerning archives arose among Scandinavian countries, particularly at the time of the dissolution of the Union between Norway and Sweden in 1905 and of the Union between Denmark and Iceland in 1944. In the first case, it seems that both countries, Norway and Sweden, retained their respective archives which the Union had not merged, and also that it was eventually possible to apportion the central archives between the two countries, but not without great difficulty. In general, the principle of functional connection was combined with that of territorial origin in an attempt to reach a satisfactory result. The convention of 27 April 1906 concluded between Sweden and Norway one year after the dissolution of the Union settled the allocation of common archives held abroad. That convention, which settled the problem of the archives of legations that were the common property of both States, provided that:

- documents relating exclusively to Norwegian affairs, and compilations of Norwegian laws and other Norwegian publications, shall be handed over to the Norwegian diplomatic agent accredited to the country concerned.  

Later, pursuant to a protocol of agreement between the two countries dated 25 April 1952, Norway arranged for Sweden to transfer certain central archives which had been common archives.

(3) A general arbitration convention concluded on 15 October 1927 between Denmark and Iceland resulted in a reciprocal handing over of archives. When the Union between Denmark and Iceland was dissolved, the archives were apportioned haphazardly. There was, however, one problem which was to hold the attention of both countries, to the extent that public opinion in Iceland and Denmark was aroused, something rarely observed in disputes relating to archives. What was at stake was an important collection of parchments and manuscripts of great historical and cultural value containing, *inter alia*, old Icelandic legends and the "Flatey Book", a two-volume manuscript written in the fourteenth century by two monks of the island of Flatey, in Iceland, and tracing the history of the kingdoms of Norway. The parchments and manuscripts were not really State archives, since they had been collected in Denmark by an Icelander, Arne Magnusson, who was Professor of History at the University of Copenhagen. He had saved them from destruction in Iceland, where they were said to have been used on occasion to block up holes in the doors and windows in the houses of Icelandic fishermen.

(4) These parchments, whose value had been estimated at 600 million Swiss francs, had been duly bequeathed in perpetuity by their owner to a university foundation in Copenhagen. Of Arne Magnusson's 2,855 manuscripts and parchments, 500 had been restored to Iceland after the death of their owner and the rest were kept by the foundation which bears his name. Despite the fact that they were private property, duly bequeathed to an educational establishment, these archives were finally handed over in 1971 to the Icelandic Government, which had been claiming them since the end of the Union between Denmark and Iceland, as the local
Succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties

... governments which preceded them had been doing since the beginning of the century. This definitive restitution occurred pursuant to Danish judicial decisions. The Arne Magnussen’s University Foundation of Copenhagen, to which the archives had been bequeathed by their owner, had challenged the Danish Government’s decision to hand over the documents to Iceland, instituting proceedings against the Danish Minister of National Education in the Court of Copenhagen. The court ruled in favour of the restitution of the archives by an order of 17 November 1966. The foundation having appealed against this ruling, the Danish Supreme Court upheld the ruling by its decision of 18 March 1971. Both Governments had agreed on the restitution of the originals to Iceland, which was to house them in a foundation having objectives similar to those set forth in the statute of the Arne Magnussen Foundation. They also agreed on the conditions governing the loan, reproduction and consultation of these archives in the interest of scholarly research and cultural development. The agreement ended a long and bitter controversy between the Danes and the Icelanders, who both felt strongly about this collection, which is of the greatest cultural and historical value to them. On 21 April 1971 the Danish authorities returned the Flatey Book and other documents; over the following 25 years the entire collection of documents will join the collection of Icelandic manuscripts at the Reykjavik Institute.

(5) In the event of dissolution of a State, each of the successor States receives the archives relating to its territory. The central archives of the dissolved State are apportioned between the successor States if they are divisible, or placed in the charge of the successor State they concern most directly if they are indivisible. Copies are generally made for any other successor State concerned.

(6) The disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy after the First World War gave rise to a very vast and complicated dispute concerning archives, which has not yet been completely settled. The territories that were detached from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to form new States, such as Czechoslovakia after the First World War, arranged for the archives concerning them to be handed over to them. The treaty concluded between Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State at Sevres on 10 August 1920, provides as follows in article 1:

Allied States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy has been or will be transferred or which were established as a result of the dismemberment of that monarchy, undertake to restore to each other of the following objects which may be in their respective territories:

1. Archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind of the civil, military, financial, judicial or other administrations of the transferred territories. ...

(7) The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919 between the Allied Powers and Austria contained many provisions obliging Austria to hand over archives to various new (or preconstituted) States. A convention dated 6 April 1922 concluded between Austria and various States attempted to settle the difficulties which had arisen as a result of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye in the matter of archives. It provided, inter alia, for exchanges of copies of documents, for the allocation to successor States of various archives relating to industrial property, and for the establishment of a list of reciprocal claims. An agreement of 14 October 1922 concluded at Vienna between Czechoslovakia and Romania provided for a reciprocal handing over of archives inherited from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by each of the two States and concerning the other State. On 26 June 1923, the convention concluded between Austria and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919, provided for the handing over by Austria to the Kingdom of archives concerning the Kingdom. A start was made with the implementation of this convention. On 24 November 1923 it was Romania’s turn to conclude a convention with the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for the reciprocal handing over of archives, which was signed at Belgrade. Similarly, the Convention concluded between Hungary and Romania at Bucharest on 16 April 1924 with a view to the reciprocal handing over of archives settled, so far as the two signatory countries were concerned, the dispute concerning archives that had resulted from the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In the same year, the same two countries, Hungary and Romania, signed another convention, also in Bucharest, providing for exchanges of adminis-

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108 British and Foreign State Papers, 1920, vol. CXIII (op. cit.), p. 960. [Translation by the Secretariat.]
109 See arts. 97, 92, 192, 193, 194, 196, 249 and 250 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (see footnote 218 above).
110 See arts. 1-6 of the Convention of 6 April 1922 concluded between Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trattati e convenzioni fra il Regno d’Italia e gli altri Stati, vol. 28 (Rome, 1931), pp. 361-370).
A treaty of conciliation and arbitration was concluded on 23 April 1925 between Czechoslovakia and Poland for a reciprocal handing over of archives inherited from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia subsequently obtained from Hungary after the Second World War, by the Treaty of Peace of 10 February 1947, all historical archives that had been constituted by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy between 1848 and 1919 in those territories. Under the same Treaty, Yugoslavia was also to receive from Hungary the archives concerning Illyria, which dated from the eighteenth century. Article 11, paragraph 1, of that same Treaty specifically states that the detached territories which had formed States (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) were entitled to the objects “constituting [their] cultural heritage [and] which originated in those territories”; thus, the article was based on the link existing between the archives and the territory. Paragraph 2 of the same article, moreover, rightly stipulates that Czechoslovakia would not be entitled to archives or objects “acquired by purchase, gift or legacy and original works of Hungarians”; by a contrario reasoning, it follows, presumably, that objects acquired by the Czechoslovak territory should revert to it. In fact, these objects have been returned to Czechoslovakia.

The aforementioned article 11 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary is one of the most specific with regard to time-limits for the handing over of archives; it establishes a veritable timetable within a maximum time-limit of eighteen months.

This simple enumeration of only some of the many agreements reached on archives upon the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy gives some idea of the complexity of the problem to be solved in the matter of the archives of that monarchy. Certain archival disputes that arose in this connection concern the succession of States by “transfer of part of the territory of a State to another State”, as has been indicated in the commentary to article 25.

Other disputes, also resulting from the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, concerned the “separation of one or more parts of the territory of a State” to form a new State and the dissolution of a State resulting in two or more new States. The archival dispute caused by the disappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy has given rise to intricate, even inextricable, situations and cross-claims in which each type of succession of States cannot always easily be separated.

The convention concluded at Baden on 28 May 1926 between the two States, Austria and Hungary, which had given its name to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, had partly settled the Austro-Hungarian archival dispute. Austria handed over the “Registraturen”, documents of a historical nature concerning Hungary. The archives of common interest, however, formed the subject of special provisions, pursuant to which a permanent mission of Hungarian archivists is working in Austrian State archives, has free access to the shelves and participates in the sorting of the common heritage. (The most difficult question concerning local archives related to the devolution of the archives of the two countries of Sopron (Odenburg) and Vas (Eisenburg), which, having been transferred to Austria, formed the Burgenland, while their chief towns remained Hungarian. It was decided to leave their archives, which had remained in the chief towns, to Hungary, except for the archives of Eisenstadt and various villages, which were handed over to Austria. This solution was later supplemented by a convention permitting annual exchanges of microfilms in order not to disappoint any party.)

The case of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War is similar to that of a separation of several parts of a State’s territory, although the Turkish Government upheld the theory of the dissolution of a State when, during negotiation of the Treaty signed at Lausanne in 1923, it considered the new Turkish State as a successor State on the same footing as the other States which had succeeded to the Ottoman Empire. This controversy adds a justification for the joint commentaries on the cases of separation and dissolution. The following provision appears in the Treaty of Lausanne:

**Article 139**

Archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other documents of every kind relating to the civil, judicial or financial administration, or the administration of Wakfs, which are at present in Turkey and are only of interest to the Government of a territory detached from the Ottoman Empire, and reciprocally those in a territory detached from the Ottoman Empire which are only of interest to the Turkish Government shall reciprocally be restored.

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511 Arts. 1 (para. 5) and 18 of the convention signed at Bucharest on 3 December 1924, for an exchange of papers relating to judicial proceedings, land, registers of births, marriages and deaths.


513 Art. 11 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary (see footnote 260 above).

514 The provisions of art. 11, para. 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary apply to Yugoslavia as well.

515 See, in addition to the agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Convention of Nettuno of 20 July 1925 between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (arts. 1 to 15); the Convention of 26 October 1927 concluded between Czechoslovakia and Poland for the handing over of archives inherited from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and concerning each of the two contracting States; the Convention of Rome of 23 May 1931 concluded between Czechoslovakia and Italy for the apportionment and reproduction of archives of the former Austro-Hungarian army (arts. 1 to 9); the Agreement of Vienna of 26 October 1932, which enabled Poland to obtain various archives from Austria; the Convention of Belgrade signed on 30 January 1933 between Romania and Yugoslavia; etc.

516 See the statements by Mr. Szedő at the sixth International Conference of the Archives Round Table (Direction des archives de France, Les archives dans la vie internationale (op. cit.), p. 137).
Archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other documents mentioned above which are considered by the Government in whose possession they are as being also of interest to itself, may be retained by that Government, subject to its furnishing on request photographs or certified copies to the Government concerned.

Archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other documents which have been taken away either from Turkey or from detached territories shall reciprocally be restored in original, in so far as they concern exclusively the territories from which they have been taken.

The expense entailed by these operations shall be paid by the Government applying therefor.\(^{31}\)

(14) Without expressing an opinion on the exact juridical nature of the operation of the dissolution of the Third German States, a brief reference will here be made to the controversies that arose concerning the Prussian Library. Difficulties having arisen with regard to the allocation of this large library, which contains 1,700,000 volumes and various Prussian archives, an Act of the Federal Republic of Germany dated 25 July 1957 placed it in the charge of a special body, the "Foundation for the Ownership of Prussian Cultural Property". This legislative decision is at present being contested by the German Democratic Republic.

(15) In adopting the present text for articles 28 and 29, the Commission has basically maintained the approach previously followed as regards the articles dealing with similar cases of succession of States—that is, separation of part or parts of the territory of a State and dissolution of a State—in the contexts of State property (arts. 16 and 17) and of State debts (arts. 38 and 39). Paragraphs 1 to 4 of article 28 and paragraphs 1 and 3 to 5 of article 29 embody the rules concerning succession to State archives that are common to both cases of succession of States. Those rules find inspiration in the text of article 26, which concerns succession to State archives in the case of newly independent States. In reflecting in articles 28 and 29, as appropriate, the applicable rules contained in article 26, the Commission has attempted to preserve as much as possible the terminological consistency while taking due account of the characteristics that distinguish the case of succession of States covered in the latter articles from those dealt with in articles 28 and 29.

(16) Paragraph 1 of articles 28 and 29 reaffirms the primacy of the agreement between the States concerned by the succession of States, whether predecessor and successor States or successor States among themselves, in governing succession to State archives. In the absence of agreement, subparagraph 1 (a) of those two articles embodies the rule contained in subparagraph 1 (b) of article 26, providing for the passing to the successor State of the part of State archives of the predecessor State which, for normal administration of the territory to which the succession of States relates, should be in the territory of the successor State. The use of the expression "normal administration of ... territory", also found in paragraph 2 (a) of article 25, has been explained in paragraphs (25) and (11) of the commentaries to articles 25 and 26 respectively. In addition, under subparagraph 1 (b) of articles 28 and 29, the part of State archives of the predecessor State, other than the part mentioned in subparagraph 1 (a), that relates directly to the territory of the successor State or to a successor State, also passes to that successor State. A similar rule is contained in paragraph 2 (b) of article 25, the commentary to which (para. (25)) explains the use in that article of the words "exclusively or principally", instead of the word "directly" employed in articles 28 and 29.

(17) Paragraph 2 of article 28 and paragraph 3 of article 29 embody the rule, also incorporated in paragraph 3 of articles 25 and 26, according to which the successor State or States shall be provided, in the case of article 28 by the predecessor State and in the case of article 29 by each successor State, with the best available evidence from State archives of the predecessor State which bears upon title to the territory of the successor State or its boundaries or which is necessary to clarify the meaning of documents of State archives which pass to the successor State pursuant to other provisions of the article concerned. The Commission refers, in this connection, to the paragraphs of the commentary to article 26 relating to the foregoing provision (paras. (20)-(24)).

(18) Paragraphs 3 of article 28 and paragraph 4 of article 29 include the safeguard clause found in paragraph 7 of article 26 regarding the rights of the peoples of the States concerned in each of the cases of succession of States envisaged in those articles, to development, to information about their history and to their cultural heritage. Reference is made in this regard to the relevant paragraphs of the commentary to article 26 (paras. (27)-(35)).

(19) Paragraph 4 of article 28 and paragraph 5 of article 29 embody, with the adaptations required by each case of succession of States covered, the rule relating to the provision, at the request and at the expense of any of the States concerned, of appropriate reproductions of State archives connected with the interests of the territory of the requesting State.

(20) Paragraph 5 of article 28 reproduces the provision of paragraph 2 of articles 16 and 38. Paragraph (16) of the commentary to articles 16 and 17 is also of relevance in the context of article 28.

(21) According to paragraph 2 of article 29, the State archives of the predecessor State other than those mentioned in paragraph 1 of that article shall pass to the successor States in an equitable manner, taking into account all relevant circumstances. The wording of this provision finds inspiration in the text of the corresponding articles in parts II and IV (arts. 17 and 39, respectively) and has been adapted to suit the specific characteristics of succession to State archives in the case of the dissolution of a State.

\(^{31}\) Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Romania and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, of the one part, and Turkey, of the other part, signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, p. 109).
PART IV
STATE DEBTS

SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

Article 30. Scope of the articles in the present Part

The articles in the present Part apply to the effects of a succession of States in respect of State debts.

Commentary

As already noted,²¹⁸ the Commission, with a view to maintaining as close a parallelism as possible between the provisions concerning succession in respect of State debts in the present part and those relating to succession in respect of State property and State archives in parts II and III, decided to include at the beginning of part IV a provision on the scope of the articles contained therein. Article 30, therefore, provides that the articles in part IV apply to the effects of a succession of States in respect of State debts. It corresponds to article 7 of the draft and reproduces its wording, with the required replacement of the word “property” by the word “debts”. The article is intended to make it clear that Part IV of the draft deals with only one category of public debts, namely, State debts, as defined in the following article.

Article 31.²¹⁹ State debt

For the purposes of the articles in the present Part, “State debt” means any financial obligation of a State towards another State, an international organization or any other subject of international law.

Commentary

(1) Article 31, which corresponds to articles 8 and 19, contains a definition of the term “State debt” for the purposes of the articles in part IV of the draft. In order to determine the precise limits of this definition, it is necessary at the outset to ascertain what a “debt” is, what legal relationships it creates between what subjects creates such relationships, and in what circumstances such relationships may be susceptible to novation through the intervention of another subject. Also, it is necessary to specify which “State” is meant.

The concept of debt and the relationships which it establishes

²¹⁸ See above, para. 71.
²¹⁹ A subparagraph reading:
“(6) any other financial obligation chargeable to a State” was rejected by the Commission by a roll-call vote of 8 in favour (Messrs. Aldrich, Calle y Calle, Francis, Quentin-Baxter, Reuter, Riphagen, Šahović and Verosta) to 8 against (Messrs. Barboza, Bedjaoui, Díaz González, Njenga, Tabibi, Thiam, Ushakov and Yankov). One member (Mr. Dadzie) did not participate in the voting (see paras. (45) and (46) of the commentary to the present article).

(2) The concept of “debt” is one which writers do not usually define because they consider the definition self-evident. Another reason is probably that the concept of “debt” involves a two-way or two-sided problem, which can be viewed from the standpoint either of the party benefiting from the obligation (in which case there is a “debt-claim”) or of the party performing the obligation (in which case there is a “debt”). This latter point suggests one element of a definition, in that a debt may be viewed as a legal obligation upon a certain subject of law, called the debtor, to do or refrain from doing something, to effect a certain performance for the benefit of a certain party, called the creditor. Thus, the relationship created by such an obligation involves three elements: the party against whom the right lies (the debtor), the party to whom the right belongs (the creditor) and the subject-matter of the right (the performance to be effected).

(3) It should further be noted that the concept of debt falls within the category of personal obligations. The scope of the obligation is restricted entirely to the relationship between the debtor and the creditor. It is thus a “relative” obligation, in that the beneficiary (the creditor) cannot assert his right in the matter erga omnes, as it were. In private law, only the estate of the debtor as composed at the time when the creditor initiates action to obtain performance of the obligation due to him is liable for the debt.

(4) In short, the relationship between debtor and creditor is personal, at least in private law. Creditor-debtor relationships unquestionably involve personal considerations which play an essential role, both in the formation of the contractual link and in the performance of the obligation. There is a “personal equation” between the debtor and the creditor:

Consideration of the person of the debtor, says one writer, is essential, not only in viewing the obligation as a legal bond, but also in viewing it as an asset; the debt-claim is worth what the debtor is worth.²¹⁰

Discharge of the debt depends not only on the solvency of the debtor but also on various considerations connected with his good faith. It is therefore understandable that the creditor will be averse to any change in the person of his debtor. National laws do not normally allow the transfer of a debt without the consent of the creditor.

(5) For the purposes of the present part, the question arises whether the foregoing also applies in international law. Especially where succession of States is concerned, the main question is whether and in what circumstances a triangular relationship is created and dissolved between a third State as creditor,²¹¹ a predecessor State as
clearly unconnected with the succession of States which successor State on its own account, and in this case it is.

To speak of a debt of the successor State to a precisely when the successor State acquired the status of this instance, the debt came into existence at the time

not cause the successor State to forfeit its rights vis-à-vis perfectly clear that the acquisition of statehood would

tial to become independent or to detach itself from the national personality as a State at the time the debt of the third State arose (e.g. in the case of a commercial debt territory of a State in order to form another State), it is

A third State might assume financial obligations towards another third State, towards the successor State or towards the predecessor State. In the first case, the financial relationship—like any other relationship of whatever kind between two States both of which are third parties as regards the State succession—obviously cannot be affected in any way by the phenomenon of territorial change that has occurred, or by its consequences with respect to State succession. The same can be said of any financial relationship which may exist between a third State and the successor State. There is no reason why, and no way in which, debts owed by the third State to the successor State (or to a potential successor State) should come to be treated differently simply because of the succession of States. This succession does not alter the international personality of the successor State in cases where it existed as a State before the occurrence of the succession. The fact that the succession may have the effect of modifying, by enlargement, the territorial composition of the successor State does not affect, and should not in future affect, debts owed to it by a third State. If the successor State had no international personality as a State at the time the debt of the third State arose (e.g. in the case of a commercial debt between a third State and a territory having the potential to become independent or to detach itself from the territory of a State in order to form another State), it is perfectly clear that the acquisition of statehood would not cause the successor State to forfeit its rights vis-à-vis the third State.

As to debts owed by a third State to the predecessor State, they are debt-claims of the predecessor State against the third State. Such debt-claims are State property and are considered in the context of succession of States in respect of State property. They are, therefore, not covered in the present part.

The successor State might assume financial obligations to either a third State or the predecessor State. In the case of a debt to a third State, no difficulty arises. In this instance, the debt came into existence at the time when the succession of States occurred—in other words, precisely when the successor State acquired the status of successor. To speak of a debt of the successor State to a third State, that debt must have been assumed by the successor State on its own account, and in this case it is clearly unconnected with the succession of States which has occurred. The category of debt of the successor State to a third State which must be excluded from this part is precisely that kind of debt which, in the strict legal sense, is a debt of the successor State actually assumed by that State with respect to the third State and coming into existence in a context completely unconnected with the succession of States. In cases where this kind of debt was incurred after the succession of States, it is a fortiori excluded from the present part. On the other hand, any debt for which the successor State could be held liable vis-à-vis a third State because of the very fact of the succession of States would, strictly speaking, be not a debt assumed directly by the former with respect to the latter but rather a debt transmitted indirectly to the successor State as a result of the succession of States.

The debt of the successor State to the predecessor State can have three possible origins. First, it may be completely unconnected with the relationship between the predecessor State and the successor State created and governed by the succession of States, in which case it should clearly remain outside the area of concern of the draft. Second, it can have its origin in the phenomenon of State succession, which may make the successor State responsible for a debt of the predecessor State. Legally speaking, however, this is not a debt of the successor State, but a debt of the predecessor State transmitted to the successor State as a result of the succession of States. This case will be discussed in connection with the debt of the predecessor State (see para. 12 below). It concerns a debt which came into existence as part of the liabilities of the predecessor State prior to the succession of States, and the subject-matter of State succession is, precisely, to determine what happens to such debt. Strictly speaking, however, this case is no longer one of a debt to the predecessor State assumed previously by the successor State.

Lastly, the debt may be owed by the successor State to the predecessor State as a result of the succession of States. In other words, there may be liabilities which would have to be assumed by the successor State during, and as a result of, the process of State succession. For example, the successor State might be required to pay certain sums in compensation to the predecessor State as a financial settlement between the two States. This no longer involves debts which originated previously, and the subject-matter of State succession is what ultimately happens to the latter type of debt. Here, the problem has already been solved by the succession of States. This is not to say that such debts do not relate to State succession, but simply that they no longer relate to it.

The predecessor State may have assumed debts with respect to either the potential successor State or a third State. In both cases, these are debts directly related to the succession of States, the difference being that, in the case of a debt of the predecessor State to the successor State, the only possibility to be envisaged is non-transmission of the debt, since deciding to transmit it to
the successor State, which is the creditor, would mean cancellation or extinction of the debt. In other words, in this case, transmitting the debt would in fact mean not transmitting it, or extinguishing it. In any event, the basic subject-matter of State succession to debts is what becomes of debts assumed by the predecessor State, and by it alone; for it is the territorial change affecting the predecessor State, and it alone, that triggers the phenomenon of State succession. The change which has occurred in the extent of the territorial jurisdiction of the predecessor State raises the problem of the identity, continuity, diminution or disappearance of the predecessor State and thus causes a change in the territorial jurisdiction of the debtor State. The whole problem of succession of States in respect of debts is whether this change has any effects, and if so what effects, on debts contracted by the State in question.

Exclusion of debts of a non-State organ

(13) Debts occur in a variety of forms, the exact features of which should be ascertained in the interests of a sounder approach to the concept of State debt. The following brief review of different categories of debts may help to clarify that concept.

In State practice, in judicial decisions and in legal literature, a distinction is made in general between:

(a) State debts and debts of local authorities;
(b) General debts and special or localized debts;
(c) State debts and debts of public establishments, public enterprises and other quasi-State bodies;
(d) Public debts and private debts;
(e) Financial debts and administrative debts;
(f) Political debts and commercial debts;
(g) External debt and internal debt;
(h) Contractual debts and delictual or quasi-delictual debts;
(i) Secured debts and unsecured debts;
(j) Guaranteed debts and non-guaranteed debts;
(k) State debts and other State debts termed “odious debts”, war debts or subjugation debts and, by extension, regime debts.

(14) A distinction should first of all be made between State debts and debts of local authorities. The latter are contracted not by an authority or department responsible to the central Government but by a public body which usually is not of the same political nature as the State and which is in any event inferior to the State. Such a local authority has a territorial jurisdiction which is limited, and is in any case less extensive than that of the State. It may be a federal unit, a province, a Land, a departement, a region, a country, a district, an arrondissement, a cercle, a canton, a city or municipality, and so on. The local authority may also have a degree of financial autonomy in order to be able to borrow in its own name. It nevertheless remains subordinate to the State, not being a part of the sovereign structure which is recognized as a subject of public international law. That is why the defining of “local authority” is normally a matter of internal public law, and no definition of it exists in international law.

(15) Despite this, writers on international law have at times concerned themselves with the question of defining an authority such as “the commune”. The occasion for this arose in particular when article 56 of the Regulations annexed to the Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land, signed at The Hague on 18 October 1907, and following the example of the 1899 Hague Convention, attempted to make provision for a system to protect public property, including property owned by municipalities (communes), in case of war. The term “commune” then attracted the attention of writers. In any event, a local authority is a public-law territorial body other than the State. Whatever debts it may contract by virtue of its financial autonomy are not legally debts of the State and do not bind the latter, precisely because of that financial autonomy.

(16) Strictly speaking, State succession should not be concerned with what happens to “local” debts because, prior to succession, such debts were, and after succession will be, the responsibility of the detached territory. Having never been assumed by the predecessor State, they cannot be assumed by the successor State. The territorially diminished State cannot transfer to the enlarged State a burden which it did not itself bear and had never borne. In this case, there is no subject-matter of State succession, which consists in the substitution of one State for another. Unfortunately, legal theory is not as clear on this point as would be desirable. There is in legal literature almost unanimous agreement on the rule that “local” debts should pass to the successor State. This may not be incorrect in substance, but at least it is badly expressed. If it is established absolutely that the debts in question are local debts, duly distinguished from other debts, then they will be debts proper to the detached territory. They will not of course be the responsibility of the diminished predecessor State, and from that standpoint the writers concerned are justified in their view. But it does not follow that they will become the responsibility of the successor State, as these writers claim. They were, and will continue to be, debts to be borne solely by the territory now detached. However, in the case of one type of State succession, namely, that of newly independent States, debts proper to the territory which are called “local” (in relation to the metropolitan territory of the colonial Power) would be assumed by the successor State, since in this case the detached territory and the successor State are one and the same.

(17) However, a careful distinction must be drawn between local debts, meaning those contracted by a territorial authority inferior to the State, for which the

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detached territory was responsible before the succession of States and for which it alone will be responsible afterwards, and debts which may be the responsibility of the State itself and for which the State is liable, incurred either for the general good of the national community or solely for the benefit of the territory now detached. Here there is subject-matter for the theory of State succession, the question being what happens to these two categories of debt on the occurrence of a succession of States. The comparison of general debts and special or "localized" debts which follows is intended to make the distinction clear.

(18) In the past, a distinction was made between "general debt", which was regarded as State debt, and regional or local debts contracted, as was noted above, by an inferior territorial authority, which was solely responsible for this category of debts. It is possible nowadays to envisage a further category, comprising what are called "special" or "relative" debts incurred by the predecessor State solely to serve the needs of the territory concerned. A clear distinction should therefore be drawn between a local debt (which is not a State debt) and a localized debt (which may be a State debt). The criterion for making this distinction is whether or not the State itself contracted the loan earmarked for local use. It has been accepted to some extent in international practice that local debts remain entirely the responsibility of the part of territory which is detached, without the predecessor State’s having to bear any portion of them. This is simply an application of the adage res transiti cum suo onere.

(19) Writers differentiate between several categories of "local" debts, but do not always draw a clear dividing line between those debts and "localized" debts. This should be gone into with more precision. "Local" debt is a concept that may sometimes appear to be relative. Before a part of a State’s territory detaches itself, debts are considered local because they have various links to that part of the territory. At the same time, however, there may also be an obvious linkage to the territorially-diminished State. The question is whether the local character of the debt outweighs its linkage to the predecessor State. It is mainly a problem of determination of degree.

(20) The following criteria may be tentatively suggested for distinguishing between localized State debt and local debt:

(a) Who the debtor is: a local authority or a colony or, for and on behalf of either of those, a central Government;

(b) Whether the part of territory which is detached has financial autonomy, and to what degree;

(c) To what purpose the debt is to be put: whether for use in the part of territory which is detached;

(d) Whether there is a particular security situated in that part of territory.

Although these criteria are not absolutely sure guides, each of them can provide part of the answer to whether the debt should be considered more a local debt or more a localized State debt. The criteria show why legal theory on the question fluctuates. It is not always easy to ascertain whether a territorial authority other than the State really has financial autonomy and what the extent of its autonomy is in relation to the State. Moreover, even when the State’s liability (in other words, the fact that the debt assumed is a State debt) is clear, it is not always possible to establish with certainty what the intended purpose of each individual loan is at the time when it is assumed, where the corresponding expenditure is to be effected, and whether the expenditure actually serves the interests of the detached territory.

(21) The personality of the debtor is still the least uncertain of the criteria. If a local territorial authority has itself assumed a debt, there exists a strong presumption that it is a local debt. The State is not involved, nor will it be any more involved simply because it becomes a predecessor State. Hence, the successor State will also not be involved. There will be no subject-matter for State succession here. If the debt is assumed by a central Government, but expressly on behalf of the detached local authority, it is legally a State debt. It could be called a localized State debt because the State intends the funds borrowed to be used for a specific part of the territory. If the debt was contracted by a central Government on behalf of a colony, the same situation should in theory prevail.

(22) The financial autonomy of the detached part of territory is another useful criterion, although in practice it may prove difficult to draw absolutely certain conclusions from it. A debt cannot be considered local unless the part of territory to which it relates has a "degree" of financial autonomy. But does this mean that the province or colony must be financially independent? Or is it sufficient that its budget is separate from the general budget of the predecessor State? Again, is it sufficient that the debt is distinguishable, or, in other words, identifiable by the fact that it is included in the detached territory’s own budget? What, for example, of certain "sovereignty expenditures" covered by a loan which a central Government requires to be included in the budget of a colony and the purpose of which is to install settlers from the metropolitan country or to suppress an independence movement? Inclusion of the loan in the local budget of the territory because of its financial autonomy does not suffice to conceal the fact that debts assumed for the purpose of making such expenditures are State debts.

(23) The third criterion, namely, the intended purpose and actual use of the debt contracted, in and of itself cannot provide the key for distinguishing between local (non-State) debts and localized (State) debts. A central Government, acting in its own name, may decide, just as a province would always do, to devote the loan which it has assumed to a local use. It is a State debt ear-

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There is here the problem of "odious" debts, regime debts, war debts or subjugation debts; see below, paras. (41)-(43) of this commentary.
marked for territorial use. The criterion of intended purpose must be combined with the others in determining whether the debt is or is not a State debt. In other words, implicit in both the concept of local debt and that of localized debt is a presumption that the loan will actually be used in the territory concerned. This may or may not be a strong presumption. It is therefore necessary to determine the degree of linkage needed to justify a presumption that the loan will be used in the territory concerned. In the case of local debts, contracted by an inferior territorial authority, the presumption is naturally very strong: a commune or city generally borrows for itself and not in order to allocate the proceeds of its loan to another city. In the case of localized debts, contracted by the central Government with the intention of using them specifically for a part of territory, the presumption is obviously less strong.

(24) To refine the argument still further, it may be considered that from this third point of view there are three successive stages in the case of a localized State debt. First, the State must have intended the corresponding expenditures to be effected for the territory concerned (the principle of earmarking or intended use). Second, the State must actually have used the proceeds of the loan in the territory concerned (the criterion of actual use). Third, the expenditure must have been effected for the benefit and in the actual interest of the territory in question (the criterion of the interest or benefit of the territory). On these terms, abuses by a central Government could be avoided and problems such as those of regime debts or subjugation debts could be solved in a just and satisfactory manner.

(25) An additional item of evidence is the possible existence of securities or pledges for the debt. This is the last criterion. A debt may be secured, for instance, by real property or fiscal resources, and the property may be situated or the taxes levied either throughout the territory of the predecessor State or in the part of the territory detached from that State. This may provide additional indications as to whether the debt is or is not a State debt—but the criterion should be cautiously applied for this purpose, since both the central Government and the province may offer securities of this nature for their respective debts.

(26) When it has been ascertained with sufficient certainty that the debt is a State debt, it remains to be determined—and this is the subject-matter of State succession to debts—what finally happens to the debt. The successor State is not necessarily liable for it. For example, in the case of a State debt secured by property belonging to the detached territory, it is by no means certain that the loan was contracted for the benefit of the detached territory. Perhaps the predecessor State had no other property which could be used as security. It would therefore be unfair to place the burden of such a debt on the successor State, simply because the territory which has become joined to it had the misfortune to be the only part capable of providing the security. In any case, such a debt is a State debt (not a local debt) for which the predecessor State was liable. In the case of debts secured by local fiscal resources, the presumption is stronger. As this form of security is possible in any part of the territory of the predecessor State (unless special revenue is involved), the linkage with the part of the territory which has been detached is specific in this case. However, as in the case of debts secured by real property, the debt may be either a State debt or a local debt, since the State and the province can both secure their respective debts with local fiscal resources.

(27) The International Law Association, for its part, subdivide public debts into three categories:

(a) National debt: “The national debt, that is, the debt shown in the general revenue accounts of the central government and unrelated to any particular territory or any particular assets”;

(b) Local debt: “Local debts, that is, debts either raised by the central government for the purposes of expenditure in particular territories, or raised by the particular territories themselves”;

(c) Localized debt: “Localized debts, that is, debts raised by a central government or by particular territorial governments with respect to expenditure on particular projects in particular territories”.

(28) In conclusion, a local debt can be said to be a debt which is contracted by a territorial authority inferior to the State, to be used by that authority in its own territory; which territory has a degree of financial autonomy, with the result that the debt is identifiable. In addition, a “localized debt” is a State debt which is used specifically by the State in a clearly defined portion of territory. Because State debts are not generally “localized”, it is considered that they should be described as such if that is in fact what they are. This is superfluous in the case of local debts, all of which are “localized”, in that they are situated and used in the territory. The reason to specify that a debt is “localized” is that it is a State debt which happens to be, by way of exception, geographically “situated”. In short, while all local debts are by definition “localized”, State debts usually are not; when they are, this must be expressly indicated so that it will be known that such is the case.

(29) The present part is limited to State debts, excluding from this term any debts which might be contracted by public enterprises or public establishments. It is sometimes difficult, under the domestic law of certain countries, to distinguish the State from its public enterprises. When it does prove possible to do so, it is even more difficult not to consider debts contracted by a public establishment in which the State itself has a financial participation to be State debts. There arises, first of all, a problem in defining a public establishment or public enterprise. These are entities distinct from

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324 These two terms will be used interchangeably, even though the legal regime for the bodies in question may be different under the internal law of certain countries. In French and German administrative law, the "établissement public" or "öffentliche Anstalt" is...
the State which have their own personality and usually a
degree of financial autonomy, are subject to a sui
generis juridical régime under public law, engage in an
economic activity or provide a public service and have a
public or public-utility character. The Special Rap
porteur on State responsibility described them as
"public corporations and other public institutions
which have their own legal personality and autonomy of
administration and management, and are intended to
provide a particular service or to perform specific func
tions". In the Certain Norwegian Loans case, con
sidered by the International Court of Justice, the agent
of the French Government stated:

In internal law..., a public establishment is brought into existence in
response to a need for decentralization; it may be necessary to allow a
degree of independence to certain establishments or bodies, either for
budgetary reasons or because of the purpose they serve; for example,
an assistance function or a cultural purpose. This independence is
achieved through the granting of legal personality under internal
law.144

(30) In its draft on State responsibility, the Commis
sion has settled the question whether, in respect of inter
national responsibility of the State, the debt of a public
establishment can be considered a State debt. In respect
of State succession, however, the answer to the question
whether the debt of such a body is a State debt can ob
viously only be in the negative. The category of debts of
public establishments will therefore be excluded from
the scope of the present Part of the draft in the same
way as that of debts of inferior territorial authorities,
despite the fact that both are of a public character. This
public character does not suffice to make the debt a
State debt, as will be seen below in the case of another
category of debts.

(31) The preceding paragraphs show that the public
character of a debt is absolutely necessary, but by no
means sufficient, to identify it as a State debt. A
"public debt" is an obligation binding on a public
authority, as opposed to a private body or an indi
vidual. However, the fact that a debt is called "public" does not make it possible to identify more
completely the public authority which contracted it, so
that it may be the State, a territorial authority inferior
to it, or a public institution or establishment distinct
from the State. The term "public debt" (as opposed to
private debt) is therefore not very helpful in identifying a State debt. The term is too broad, and covers not only
State debts, which are the subject of the present part,
but also the debt of other public entities, whether or not
of a territorial character.

(32) Financial debts are associated with the concept of
credits. Administrative debts, on the other hand, result
automatically from the activities of the public services,
without involving any financing or investment. The ILA
cites several examples: certain expenses of former
State services; debt-claims resulting from decisions of
public authorities; debt-claims against public
establishments of the State or companies belonging to
the State; building subsidies payable by the State;
salaries and remuneration of civil servants. While
financial debts may be either public or private, ad
ministrative debts can only be public.

(33) Regarding political debts and commercial debts,
while commercial debts may be State debts, debts of
local authorities or public establishments or private
debts, political debts are always State debts. The term
"political debts", as described by one writer, should be
taken to refer to:

... those debts for which a State has been declared liable or has
acknowledged its liability to another State as a result of political
events. The most frequent case is that of a debt imposed on a defeated
State by a peace treaty (war reparations, etc.). Similarly, a war loan
made by one State to another State gives rise to a political debt.150

The same writer adds that "a political debt is one which
exists only between Governments, between one State
and another. The creditor is a State, and the debtor is a
State. It is of little consequence whether the debt arises
from a loan or from war reparations". He contrasts
political debts, which establish between the creditor and
the debtor a relationship between States, with commer
cial debts, which "are those arising from a loan con

144 ILA, op. cit., pp. 118-121.
145 See Poldermans v. State of the Netherlands, judgement of
8 December 1955 (Materials on Succession of States (United Nations
146 G. Jeze, "Les defaillances d'Etat", Recueil des cours de
l'Academie de droit international de La Haye, 1935-III (Paris, Sirey,
147 Ibid., pp. 383-384.
tracted by a State with private parties, whether bankers or individuals. 333

(34) The ILA makes distinctions between debts according to their form, their purpose and the status of the creditors:

The loans may be made by:

(a) Private individual lenders by means of individual contracts with the government;

(b) Private investors who purchase “domestic” bonds, that is, bonds which are not initially intended for purchase by foreign investors ... ;

(c) Private investors who purchase “international” bonds, that is, bonds issued in respect of loans floated on the international loan market and intended to attract funds from foreign countries;

(d) Foreign governments, for general purposes and taking the form of a specific contract of credit;

(e) Foreign governments, for fixed purposes and taking the form of a specific contract of loan;

(f) International organizations. 334

(35) The distinction between external debt and internal debt is normally applied only to State debts, although it could conceivably be applied to other public debts or even to private debts. An internal debt is one for which the creditors are nationals of the debtor State, 335 while external debt includes all debts contracted by the State with other States or with foreign bodies corporate or individuals.

(36) Delictual debts, arising from unlawful acts committed by the predecessor State, raise special problems with regard to succession of States, the solution of which is governed primarily by the principles relating to international responsibility of States. 336

(37) Although all debts, whether they are private, public or State debts, may or may not be secured in some manner, this part deals exclusively with State debts. In that connection, the notion of secured debt is an extremely important one. A distinction must be made between two categories of debt. First, there are State debts which are specially secured by certain tax funds, having been decided or agreed that the revenue from certain taxes would be used to secure the services of the State debt. Second, there may be cases in which State debts are specially secured by specific property, the borrowing State having in a sense mortgaged certain national assets.

(38) A State’s liability can arise not only from a loan contracted by that State itself but also from a guarantee which it gives in respect of the debt of another party, which may be a State, an inferior territorial authority, a public establishment or an individual. The World Bank, when granting a loan to a dependent territory, often requires a guarantee from the administering Power. Thus, when the territory in question attains independence, two States are legally liable for payment of the debt. 337 However, a study of the actual record of loans contracted with IBRD shows that a succession of States does not alter the previously existing situation. The dependent territory which attains independence remains the principal debtor, and the former administering Power remains the guarantor. The only difference, which has no real effect on what happens to the debt, is that the dependent territory has changed its legal status and become an independent State.

(39) The distinction to be made here serves not only to separate two complementary concepts but also to distinguish among a whole set of terms which are used at various levels. For the sake of strict accuracy, a contrast might be attempted between State debts and regime debts, since the latter, as the term indicates, are debts contracted by a political regime, or a Government having a particular political form. However, the question here is not whether the Government concerned has been replaced in the same territory by another Government with a different political orientation, since that would involve a mere succession of Governments in which regime debts may be repudiated. On the contrary, what is here involved is a succession of States, or, in other words, the question whether the regime debts of a predecessor State pass to the successor State. For the purposes of this part, regime debts must be regarded as State debts. The law of State succession does not concern itself with Governments or any other organs of the State, but with the State itself. Just as internationally wrongful acts committed by a Government give rise to State responsibility, so also regime debts, i.e. debts contracted by a Government, are State debts.

(40) In the opinion of one writer, what is meant by regime debts is:

depts contracted by the dismembered State in the temporary interest of a particular political form, and the term can include, in peacetime, subjugation debts specifically contracted for the purpose of colonizing or absorbing a particular territory and, in wartime, war debts. 338

This is one application of the broader theory of “odious” debts, to which reference will be made in the ensuing paragraphs.

The question of “odious debts”

(41) In his ninth report, 339 the Special Rapporteur included a chapter entitled “Non-transferability of

333 Ibid., p. 583.
334 ILA, op. cit., p. 106.
‘odious’ debts”. That chapter dealt, first, with the
definition of “odious debts”. The Special Rapporteur
recalled inter alia, the writings of jurists who referred to
“war debts” or “subjugation debts”340 and those who
referred to “regime debts”.341 For the definition of
odious debts, he proposed an article C, which read as
follows:

Article C. Definition of odious debts

For the purposes of the present articles, “odious debts” means:

(a) all debts contracted by the predecessor State with a view to at-
taining objectives contrary to the major interests of the successor State
or of the transferred territory;

(b) all debts contracted by the predecessor State with an aim and
for a purpose not in conformity with international law and, in par-
ticular, the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations.

(42) Second, the chapter dealt with the determination
of the fate of odious debts. The Special Rapporteur
reviewed State practice concerning “war debts”,
including a number of cases of the non-passing of such
debts to a successor State,342 as well as cases of the pass-
ing of such debts.343 He further cited cases of State prac-
tice concerning the passing or non-passing to a successor
State of “subjugation debts”.344 He proposed the

140 For example, A. Sánchez de Bustamante y Sirvín, Derecho Inter-
nacional Publico (Havana, Carasa, 1936), vol. III, pp. 279-280;
and P. Fauchille, Traité de droit international public (8th ed. of
Manuel de droit international public by H. Bonfils) (Paris, Rousseau,

141 For example, G. Jèze, Cours de science des finances et de législa-
tion financière française, 6th ed. (Paris, Giard, 1922), vol. I, part I,
pp. 302-305, 327.

The report mentions, inter alia, the following examples: article
XXIV of the Treaty of Tilsit between France and Prussia (see E. H. Feilchenfeld, Public Debts and State Succession (New York,
Macmillan, 1931), p. 91); the annexation of the Transvaal (“South
African Republic”) by the United Kingdom (ibid., pp. 380-396,
cf. J. de Louter, Le droit international public positif (Oxford,
University Press, 1920), vol. I, p. 229); peace treaties following the
end of the First and Second World Wars, in particular art. 254 of
the Treaty of Versailles (British and Foreign State Papers, 1919
(London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1922), vol. CXII, pp. 124-125);
art. 203 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (ibid., pp. 805-808);
art. 141 of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (ibid., p. 821); art. 186 of the Treaty
of Trianon (ibid., 1920 (1923), vol. CXIII, pp. 556-560); art. 50 of
the Treaty of Lausanne (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XX-
VIII, pp. 41 and 43); and annexes X and XIV of the Treaty of Peace
with Italy (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 40, pp. 209, 225)

142 For example, the 1720 treaty between Sweden and Prussia (see
Feilchenfeld, op. cit., p. 75, footnote 6); the unification of Italy
(ibid., p. 269); and the assumption by Czechoslovakia, for a short
period of time, of certain debts of Austria-Hungary (see D. P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and Interna-
tional Law (Cambridge, University Press, 1957), vol. I: Internal Re-
lations, pp. 420-421). The Special Rapporteur made reference to the 1847 treaty be-
tween Spain and Bolivia (see below, para. (11) of the commentary to
art. 36); the question of Spanish debts with regard to Cuba in the con-
text of the 1898 Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States
of America (see Feilchenfeld, op. cit., pp. 337-342 and Rousseau,
op. cit., p. 459); art. 255 of the Treaty of Versailles (see footnote 342
above) and the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers concerning
the German colonization of Poland (British and Foreign State Papers,
1919 (op. cit.), p. 290); the question of Netherlands debts with regard
to Indonesia in the context of the 1949 Round Table Conference and
the subsequent 1956 denunciation by Indonesia (see below, para.
(16)-19 of the commentary to art. 36); and the question of
French debts in Algeria (see below, para. (36) of the commentary to
art. 36).

143 See footnote 319.
their view, fell outside the scope of the present draft. Although protected, such debts were not the subject of the law of succession of States. Furthermore, in the view of some of those members, the proposed subparagraph (b) should not extend to “any other financial obligation chargeable to a State” when the creditor was an individual who was a national of the debtor predecessor State, whether a natural or juridical person. On the other hand, the members who favoured subparagraph (b) stressed the volume and importance of the credit currently extended to States from foreign private sources. It was considered that the deletion of subparagraph (b) would lead to a limitation of the sources of credit available to States and international organizations, which would be detrimental to the interests of the international community as a whole and, in particular, to those of the developing countries that were in dire need of external financing for their development programmes and whose easier access to private capital markets was one of the objectives of the “North-South dialogue” on economic matters.146 It was also indicated by some of those members that the deletion of subparagraph (b) would create an inconsistency between the definition of State debt and that of State property in article 8, which extended to the property, rights and interests that were owned by the predecessor State, in accordance with its internal law, at the date of the succession of States, without distinguishing whether debtors were subjects of international law or not.

Article 32. Effects of the passing of State debts

A succession of States entails the extinction of the obligations of the predecessor State and the arising of the obligations of the successor State in respect of such State debts as pass to the successor State in accordance with the provisions of the articles in the present Part.

Commentary

(1) Articles 9 and 20 lay down a rule confirming the dual juridical effect of a succession of States upon the respective rights of the predecessor State and the successor State as regards, respectively, State property and State archives passing from the former to the latter, consisting in the extinction of the rights of the predecessor State to the property or archives in question and the simultaneous arising of the rights of the successor State to that property or those archives. Article 32 embodies a parallel rule regarding the obligations of the predecessor and successor States in respect of State debts which pass to the successor State in accordance with the provisions of the articles in part IV.

(2) It should be stressed that this rule applies only to the State debts which actually pass to the successor State “in accordance with the provisions of the articles in the present Part”. Particularly important among such provisions is article 34, which, as a complement to article 32, guarantees the rights of creditors.

146 Originally, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, which opened in Paris in December 1975.

Article 33. Date of the passing of State debts

Unless otherwise agreed or decided, the date of the passing of State debts is that of the succession of States.

Commentary

(1) At the present session, the Commission decided to include in the final draft the present article, which corresponds to articles 10 and 21 concerning, respectively, the date of the passing of State property and of State archives. Article 33 is its own justification and fills what had been a gap in the past on State debts.

(2) It should, however, be noted that the assumption by the successor State from the date of the succession of States of the servicing of the State debt that passes to it will probably not be feasible in practice. The predecessor State may continue to service the debt directly for some period of time, and that for practical reasons, since the debt, as a State debt, will have given rise to the issuance of acknowledgements signed by the predecessor State, which is bound to honour its signature. Before the successor State can honour directly the acknowledgements pertaining to a debt that passes to it, it must endorse them; until that operation, which constitutes novation in the legal relationship between the predecessor State and the creditor third State, has been completed, it is the predecessor State which remains accountable to the creditors for its own debt.

(3) There can, however, be no question of such temporal or practical constraints altering the legal principle of the passing of the debt on the date of the succession of States. In reality, until such time as the successor State endorses or takes over the acknowledgements of the debts that pass to it, it will pay the predecessor State the servicing charges associated with those debts, and the predecessor State will provisionally continue to discharge the debts to the creditor third State.

(4) The principal purpose of article 33 is to show that, however long the transitional period required for the resolution of the organizational problems associated with the replacement of one debtor (the predecessor State) by another (the successor State), the legal principle is clear and must be observed: interest accrues on the State debt that passes to the successor State, and that debt is chargeable to that State, from the date of succession of States. Should a predecessor State which has been released from certain debts by virtue of the present articles none the less provisionally continue, for material reasons, to service those debts to the creditors, it must receive due repayment from the successor State.

Article 34. Effects of the passing of State debts with regard to creditors

1. A succession of States does not as such affect the rights and obligations of creditors.

2. An agreement between the predecessor State and the successor State or, as the case may be, between successor States, concerning the respective part or parts of
the State debts of the predecessor State that pass, cannot be invoked by the predecessor State or by the successor State or States, as the case may be, against a third State, an international organization or any other subject of international law asserting a claim unless:

(a) the consequences of that agreement are in accordance with the provisions of the present Part; or

(b) the agreement has been accepted by that third State, international organization or other subject of international law.

Commentary

(1) In part II (State property) of the present draft articles, the Commission has adopted a rule, i.e., article 12, for the protection of the property of a third State from any “disturbance” as a result of territorial change through a succession of States. If article 12 were to be given a narrow interpretation, it could be said to relate only to tangible property, such as land, buildings, consulates and possibly bank deposits, whose location in the territory of the predecessor State in accordance with article 12 could, by their nature, be determined. However, no restriction was placed on the expression “property, rights and interests” of the third State that would enable third State debt-claims which constitute intangible property, whose location it might prove difficult to determine, to be excluded from it. If, therefore, article 12 is taken to refer also to third State debt-claims, this would mean that the debts of the predecessor State corresponding to those debt-claims of the third State should in no way be affected by the succession of States. In other words, it would be pointless to study the general problems of succession of States in respect of debts, since the debts of the predecessor State (which are nothing more than the debt-claims of the third State) must remain in a strict status quo, which cannot be changed by the succession of States.

(2) What article 12 really means is that the debt-claims of the third State must not cease to exist or suffer as a result of the territorial change. Prior to the succession of States, the debtor State and the creditor State were linked by a specific, legal debtor/creditor relationship. The problem which then arises is whether the succession of States is, in this case, intended not only to create and establish a legal relationship between the debtor predecessor State and the successor State, enabling the former to shift on to the latter all or part of its obligation to the creditor third State, but also to create and establish a new “successor State/third State” legal relationship to replace the “predecessor State/third State” relationship in the proportion indicated by the “predecessor State/successor State” relationship with respect to assumption of the obligation. The answer must be that succession of States in respect of State debts can create a relationship between the predecessor State and the successor State with regard to debts which linked the former to a third State, but that it cannot, in itself, establish any direct legal relationship between the creditor third State and the successor State, should the latter “assume” the debt of its predecessor. From this point of view, the problem of succession of States in respect of debts is much more akin to that of succession of States in respect of treaties than to that of succession in respect of property.

(3) Considering here only the question of the transfer of obligations, and not that of the transfer of rights, there are certainly grounds for stating that a “succession of States”, in the strict sense, takes place only when by reason of a territorial change certain international obligations of the predecessor State to third parties pass to the successor State solely by virtue of a norm of international law providing for such passing, independently of any manifestation of will on the part of the predecessor State or the successor State. But the effect, in itself, of the succession of States should stop there. A new legal relationship is established between the predecessor State and the successor State with regard to the obligation in question. However, the existence of this relationship does not have the effect either of automatically extinguishing the former “predecessor State/third State” relationship (except where the predecessor State entirely ceases to exist) or of replacing it with a new “successor State/third State” relationship in respect of the obligation in question.

(4) If, then, it is concluded that there is a passing of the debt to the successor State (in a manner which it is precisely the main purpose of the succession of States to deterine), it cannot be argued that it must automatically have effects in relation to the creditor third State in addition to the normal effects it will have vis-à-vis the predecessor State. As in the case of succession of States in respect of treaties, there is a personal equation involved in the matter of succession in respect of State debts. The legal relationship which existed between the creditor third State and the predecessor State cannot undergo a twofold novation, in a triangular relationship, which would have the effect of establishing a direct relationship between the successor State and the third State.

(5) The problem is not a theoretical one, and its implications are important. In the first place, if the successor State is to assume part of the debts of the predecessor State, in practice this often means that it will pay its share to the predecessor State, which will be responsible for discharging the debt to the creditor third State. The predecessor State thus retains its debtor status and full responsibility for the old debt. This has frequently occurred, if only for practical reasons, the debt of the predecessor State having led to the issue of bonds signed by that State. For the successor State to be able to honour those bonds directly, it would have to guarantee them; until that operation, which constitutes the novation in legal relations, has taken place, the predecessor State remains liable to the creditors for the whole of its debts. Nor is this true only in cases where the territorial loss is minimal and where the predecessor State is bound to continue servicing the whole of the old debt. Moreover, if the successor State defaults, the predecessor State remains responsible to the creditor
third State for the entire debt until an express novation has taken place to link the successor State specifically and directly to the third State.

(6) The above position has been supported by an author, who wrote:

If the annexation is not total, if there is partial dismemberment, there can be no doubt on the question: after the annexation, as before it, the bondholders have only one creditor, namely the State which floated the loan. ... Apportionment of the debt between the successor State and the dismembered State does not have the immediate effect of automatically making the successor State the direct debtor vis-à-vis the holders of bonds issued by the dismembered State. To use legal terms, the right of the creditors to institute proceedings remains as it was before the dismemberment; only the contribution of the successor State and of the dismembered State is affected; it is a legal relationship between States.

... Annexation or dismemberment does not automatically result in novation through a change of debtor.

In practice, it is desirable, for all the interests involved, that the creditors should have as the direct debtor the real and principal debtor. Treaties concerning cession, annexation or dismemberment should therefore settle this question. In fact, that is what usually occurs.

... In case of partial dismemberment, and when the portion of the debt assumed by the annexing State is small, the principal and real debtor is the dismembered State. It is therefore preferable not to alter the debt, but to leave the dismembered State as the sole debtor to the holders of the bonds representing the debt. The annexing State will pay its contribution to the dismembered State and the latter alone will be responsible for servicing the debt (interest and amortization), just as before the dismemberment.

The contribution of the annexing State will be paid by the latter in the form either of a periodic payment ... or of a one-time capital payment.

(7) For the sake of the argument, reference may be made to the case of a State debt which has come into existence as a result of an agreement between two States. In this case, the creditor third State and the debtor predecessor State may set out their relationship in a treaty. The fate of that treaty, and thus of the debt to which it gave rise, may have been decided in a "devolution agreement" concluded between the predecessor State and the successor State. The creditor third State may, however, prefer to remain linked to the predecessor State, even though it is diminished, if it considers it more solvent than the successor State. In consequence of its debt-claim, the third State possessed a right which the predecessor State and the successor State cannot dispose of at their discretion in their agreement. The general rules of international law concerning treaties and third States (in other words, articles 34 to 36 of the 1969 Vienna Convention) quite naturally apply in this case. It must, of course, be recognized that the agreement between the predecessor State and the successor State concerning the passing of a State debt from one to the other is not in principle designed to be detrimental to the creditor third State, but rather to ensure the continuance of the debt incurred to that State.
transferred without the consent of the other party to the contract does not appear to be an institution recognized in international law. In international law the rule seems clear that an agreement by a party to a treaty to assign either its obligations or its rights under the treaty cannot bind any other party to the treaty without the latter's consent. Accordingly, a devolution agreement is in principle ineffective by itself to pass either treaty obligations or treaty rights of the predecessor to the successor State. It is an instrument which as a treaty, can be binding only as between the predecessor and the successor States and the direct legal effects of which are necessarily confined to them.

That devolution agreements, if valid, do constitute at any rate a general expression of the successor State's willingness to continue the predecessor State's treaties applicable to the territory would seem to be clear. The critical question is whether a devolution agreement constitutes something more, namely an offer to continue the predecessor State's treaties, which a third State, party to one of those treaties, may accept and by that acceptance alone bind the successor State to continue the treaties.

(9) A similar situation exists as to the effects, with regard to a creditor third State, of a unilateral declaration by the successor State that it assumes the debts of the predecessor State, however consented to by the latter. Does a unilateral declaration by the successor State that it assumes all or part of the debts of the predecessor State following a territorial change mean, ipso facto, a novation in the legal relationship previously established by treaty between the creditor third State and the debtor predecessor State? Such a declaration is unquestionably to the advantage of the predecessor State, and it would be surprising and unexpected if that State were to find some objection to it since it has the practical effect of easing its debt burden. It is, at least in principle, also to the advantage of the creditor third State, which might have feared that all or part of its debt-claim would be jeopardized by the territorial change. However, the creditor third State might have a political or material interest in refusing to agree to substitution of the debtor or to assignment of the debt. Moreover, under most national systems of law, the assignment of debts is, of course, generally impossible. The creditor State has a subjective right, which involves a large measure of intaintus personae. It may, in addition, have a major reason for refusing to agree to assignment of the debts—for example, if it considers that the successor State, by its unilateral declaration, has taken over too large (or too small) a share of the debts of the predecessor State, with the result that the declaration may jeopardize its interests in view of either the degree of solvency of one of the two States (the predecessor or the successor) or the nature of the relations which the third State has with each of them, or for any other reason. More simply still, the third State cannot feel itself automatically bound by the unilateral declaration of the successor State, since that declaration might be challenged by the predecessor State with regard to the amount of the debts which the successor State has unilaterally decided to assume.

(10) Having in mind the foregoing considerations relating to creditor third States, which are equally valid in cases where the creditors are not States, the Commis-

(...)

(11) Paragraph 2 envisages the situation where the predecessor State and the successor State or, as the case may be, the successor States themselves conclude an agreement specifically for the passing of State debts. It is evident that such an agreement has by itself no effect on the rights of creditors. To have such an effect, the consequences of such an agreement must be in accordance with the provisions of the present part. This is the rule contained in subparagraph (a). It should be stressed that subparagraph (a) deals only with the consequences of the agreement and not with the agreement itself, whose effect would be subject to the general rules of international law concerning treaties and third States: articles 34 and 36 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The effects of such an agreement can also be recognized if the creditor third State or international organization has accepted the agreement on the passing of debts from the predecessor to the successor States. In other words, succession of States does not, of itself, have the effect of automatically releasing the predecessor State from the State debt (or a fraction of it) assumed by the successor State or States unless the consent, express or tacit, of the creditor has been given. This is provided for in subparagraph (b). There may be cases where the creditors feel more secure by an agreement between a predecessor State and a successor State or between successor States concerning the passing of State debts because, for example, of the greater solvency of the successor State or States as compared with the predecessor State. It would therefore be to the advantage of
creditors, paragraph 2 is drafted in such a way as to preclude the invoking of the agreement in question against creditors unless one or another of the conditions set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) is fulfilled. At the present session the Commission completed the introductory sentence of paragraph 2 so that it not only refers to “a third State or an international organization” but also to other subjects of international law, since the rule applies equally to such subjects.

SECTION 2. PROVISIONS CONCERNING SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF SUCCESSION OF STATES

Commentary

In parts II (State property) and III (State archives) of the draft articles, the Commission decided to draft the provisions relating to each type of succession of States following the broad categories of succession which it had adopted for the draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties, yet introducing certain modifications to those categories in order to accommodate the characteristics and requirements proper to the topic of succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties. The Commission, therefore, established a typology consisting of the following five types of succession: (a) transfer of part of the territory of a State; (b) newly independent States; (c) union of States; (d) separation of part or parts of the territory of a State; and (e) dissolution of a State. In the present part also, the Commission has attempted to follow, in so far as appropriate, the typology of succession of States adopted in parts II and III. Thus the titles of section 2 and of the draft articles therein correspond to those of section 2 of parts II and III and of the draft articles contained therein.

Article 35. Transfer of part of the territory of a State

1. When part of the territory of a State is transferred by that State to another State, the passing of the State debt of the predecessor State to the successor State for the type of succession envisaged in article 35. In the following paragraphs, reference will be made to doctrinal views and to examples of State practice and judicial decisions concerning the fate of the general debt of a State as well as that of localized State debts.

(2) Commenting on the uncertainties of the doctrine regarding the general public debt contracted for the general needs of a dismembered State, one writer summed up the situation as follows:

... what conclusion is to be drawn with regard to the general public debt of the dismembered State? Opinions on this differ widely. There are several schools of thought. (1) The cession by a State of a fraction of its territory should have no effect on its public debt; the debt remains wholly its responsibility, for the dismembered State continues to exist and retains its individuality; it must therefore continue to be held responsible vis-à-vis its creditors. Moreover, the annexing State, being only an assignee in its private capacity, should not be held responsible for personal obligations contracted by its principal ... (2) The public debt of the dismembered State must be divided between that State and the territory which is annexed; the annexing State should not bear any portion of it. ... (3) The annexing State must take over part of the public debt of the dismembered State. There are two main grounds for this view, which is the most widely held. The public debt was contracted in the interest of the entire territory of the State; the portion which is now detached benefited just as did the rest; it is only fair that it should continue to bear the burden to some extent; but since the annexing State receives the profits from the ceded part, it is only fair that it should bear the costs. The State, whose entire resources are assigned to payment of its debt, must be relieved of a corresponding portion of that debt when it loses a portion of its territory and thus a part of its resources.\footnote{Fauchille, op. cit., p. 351.}

(3) The arguments in favour of the passing of part of the general debt can be divided into four groups. The first is the theory of the patrimonial State and of the territory encumbered in its entirety with debts. One author, for example, advocating the passing of a part of the general debt of the predecessor State to the successor State in proportion to the contributing capacity of the transferred territory, argued as follows:

Whatever territorial changes a State may undergo, State debts continue to be guaranteed by the entire public patrimony of the territory encumbered with the debt.\footnote{It is clear from the context that the author meant the entirety of the territory of the predecessor State prior to its amputation.} The legal basis for public credit lies precisely in the fact that public debts encumber the territory of the debtor State ...

... Seen from that standpoint, the principle of indivisibility\footnote{The author is referring here to the indivisibility of the Republic and of its territory.} proclaimed in the French constitutions of the great Revolution is very enlightening; it has also been proclaimed in a good number of other constitutions.

... These Government actions and their consequences, as well as other events, may adversely affect the finances and the capacity to pay of the debtor State...

All these are risks which must be borne by creditors, who cannot and could not restrict the Government’s ... right freely to dispose of [its] property and of the State’s finances ...

Nevertheless, creditors do have a legal guarantee in that their claims encumber the territory of the debtor State ...

...
The debt which encumbers the territory of a State is binding on any Government, old or new, that has jurisdiction over that territory. In case of a territorial change in the State, the debt is binding on all Governments of all parts of that territory.

The justification for such a principle is self-evident. When taking possession of assets, one cannot repudiate liabilities: *ubi emolumentum, ibi onus esse debet, res transit cum suo onere.* Therefore, with regard to State debts, the *emolumentum consists of the public patrimony within the limits of the encumbered territory.*

(4) In the foregoing passage, two arguments are intermingled. The first is debatable, so far as the principle is concerned. Since all parts of the territory of the State "guarantee", as it were, the debt that is contracted, the part which is detached will continue to do so, even if it is placed under another sovereignty; as a result of this, the successor State is responsible for a corresponding part of the general debt of the predecessor State. Such an argument is as valid as the theories of the patrimonial State may be valid. In addition, another argument casts an awkward shadow over the first; it is the reference to the benefit which the transferred territory may have derived from the loan, or to the justification for taking over liabilities because of the acquisition of assets. This argument may fully apply in the case of "local" or "localized" debts, where it is necessary to take into consideration the benefit derived from these debts by the transferred territory or to compare the assets with the liabilities. It has no relevance in the case in point, which involves a general State debt contracted for a nation's general needs, since these needs may be such that the transferred territory will not benefit—or will not benefit as much as other territories—from that general debt.

(5) A second argument is the theory of the profit derived from the loan by the transferred territory. One author, for instance, wrote:

The State which profits from the annexation must be responsible for the contributory share of the annexed territory in the public debt of the ceding State. It is only fair that the cessionary State should share in the debts from which the territory it is acquiring profited in the public patrimony within the limits of the encumbered territory.\(^{333}\)

Another author wrote that:

the State which contracts a debt, either through a loan or in any other way, does so for the general good of the nation; all parts of the territory profit as a result.\(^{334}\)

And he drew the same conclusion. Again, it has been said that:

these debts were contracted in the general interest and were used to effect improvements from which the annexed areas benefited in the past and will perhaps benefit again in the future. It is therefore fair ... that the State should be reimbursed for the part of the debt relating to the transferred province.\(^{335}\)

(6) In practice, this theory leads to an impasse; for in fact, since this is a general debt of the State contracted for the general needs of the entire territory, with no precise prior assignment to or location in any particular territory, the statement that such a loan profited a particular transferred territory leads to vagueness and uncertainty. It does not give an automatic and reliable criterion for the assumption by the successor State of a fair and easily-calculated share of the general debt of the predecessor State. In actual fact, this theory is an extension of the principle of succession to local debts, which, not being State debts, are outside the scope of the present draft, and to localized State debts, which will be considered below (paras. (22) et seq.). In addition, it may prove unfair in certain cases of territorial transfer, and this would destroy its own basis of equity and justice.

(7) A third argument purports to explain why part of the general debt is transferable, but in fact it explains only how this operation should be effected. For example, certain theories make the successor State responsible for part of the general debt of the predecessor State by referring flatly to the "contributory capacity" of the transferred territory. Such positions are diametrically opposed to the theory of benefit, so that they and it cancel each other out. The "contributory strength" of a transferred territory, calculated for example by reference to the fiscal resources and economic potential which it previously provided for the predecessor State, is a criterion which is at variance with the theory of the profit derived from the loan by the transferred territory. A territory already richly endowed by nature, which was attached to another State, may not have profited much from the loan but may, on the other hand, have contributed greatly by its fiscal resources to the servicing of the general State debt, within the framework of the former national solidarity. If, when the territory becomes attached to another State, that successor State is asked to assume a share of the predecessor State's national public debt, computed according to the financial resources which the territory provided up to that time, such a request would not be justified by the theory of profit. The criterion of the territory's financial capacity takes no account of the extent to which that territory may have profited from the loan.

(8) A fourth argument is the one based on considerations of justice and equity towards the predecessor State and of security for creditors. It has been argued that the transfer of a territory, particularly of a rich territory, results in a loss of resources for the diminished State. The predecessor State—and indeed the creditors—relied on those resources. It is claimed that it is only fair and equitable, as a consequence, to make the successor State assume part of the general debt of the predecessor State. But the problem is how this share should be computed; some authors refer to "contributory capacity", which is logical, given their premises (referring to the resources previously provided by the territory), while others consider the benefit which the territory has derived from the loan. Thus, the same overlapping considerations, always entangled and interlocked, are found in the works of various authors. It is particularly surprising to...
find the argument of justice and equity in the works of
authors of the nineteenth or early twentieth century, who
were living at a time when provinces were annexed
by conquest and by war. It is thus difficult to imagine
how the annexing State (which did not shrink from
the territorial amputation of its adversary or even the forced
imposition on the adversary of reparations or a war
tribute) could in any way be moved by considerations
of justice and equity to assume part of the general debt of
the State which it had geographically diminished. There is
a certain lack of realism in this theoretical construction.

(9) The arguments which deny that there is any legal
basis for the passing of the general State debt from
the predecessor to the successor State in the case of transfer
of part of the territory have been advanced on two dif-
ferent bases. The first is based on the sovereign nature
of the State. The sovereignty which the successor State
exercises over the detached territory is not a sovereignty
transferred by the predecessor State; the successor State
exercises its own sovereignty there. Where State suc-
cession is concerned, there is no transfer of sovereignty,
but a substitution of one sovereignty for another. In
other words, the successor State which is enlarged by a
portion of territory exercises its own sovereign rights
there and does not come into possession of those of the
predecessor State; it therefore does not assume the
obligations or part of the debts of the predecessor State.

(10) The second argument is derived from the nature
of the State debt. The authors who deny that a portion
of the national public debt (i.e. of a general State debt)
passes to the successor State consider that this is a per-
sonal debt of the State which contracted it. Thus, in
their view, on the occasion of the territorial change this
personal debt remains the responsibility of the territorially-diminished State, since that State retains its
political personality despite the territorial loss suffered.
For example, one author wrote:

... The dismembered or annexed State personally contracted the
debt. (We are considering here only national debts, and not local
debts ...); it gave a solemn undertaking to service the debt, come what
might. It is true that it was counting on the tax revenue to be derived
from the whole of the territory. In case of partial annexation, the
dismemberment reduces the resources with which it is expected to be
able to pay its debt. Legally, however, the obligation of the debtor
State cannot be affected by variations in the size of its resources.138

And he added a footnote stating:

In the case of partial annexation, most English and American
authors consider this principle to be absolute, so that they even declare
that the annexing State is not legally bound to assume any part of
the debt of the dismembered State.139

For example, one such author wrote:

The general debt of a State is a personal obligation ... With the
rights which have been contracted by the State as personal rights and
obligations, the new State has nothing to do. The old State is not ex-
tinct.140

(11) The practice of States on the question of the pass-
ing of general State debts with a transfer of part of the
territory of a predecessor State is equally divided.
Several cases can be cited where the successor State
assumed such debts.

(12) Under article 1 of the Franco-Sardinian Conven-
tion of 23 August 1860, France, which had gained Nice
and Savoy from the Kingdom of Sardinia, did assume
responsibility for a small part of the Sardinian debt.
In 1866, Italy accepted a part of the Pontifical debt pro-
portional to the population of the Papal States
(Romagna, The Marches, Umbria and Benevento)
which the Kingdom of Italy had annexed in 1860.
In 1881, Greece, having incorporated in its territory
Thessaly, which until then had belonged to Turkey, ac-
cepted a part of the Ottoman public debt corresponding
to the contributory capacity of the population of the
annexed province (art. 10 of the Treaty of 24 May 1881).

(13) The many territorial upheavals in Europe follow-
ing the First World War raised the problem of succes-
sion of States to public debts on a large scale, and at-
tempts to settle it were made in the Treaties of Versailles,
Saint-Germain-en-Laye and Trianon. In those treaties,
writes one author,

... political and economic considerations came ... into play. The
Allied Powers, who drafted the peace treaties practically on their own,
had no intention of entirely destroying the economic structure of the
vanquished countries and reducing them to a state of complete in-
solvency. This explains why the vanquished States were not left to
shoulder their debts alone, for they would have been incapable of
discharging them without the help of the successor States. But other

A change in the size of the territory cannot cause the disappearance
of the legal obligation regularly contracted by the competent public
authorities. The taxpayers of the dismembered State, despite the
reduction in its territorial size and in resources, remain bound by
the original obligation.” (Ibid., p. 70.)

Jèze must ultimately be classified among the authors who favour
conditional transferability of part of the national public debt of the
predecessor State, for he concludes with the following words:

“To sum up, in principle: (1) the annexing State must assume
part of the debt of the annexed State; (2) this share must be
calculated on the basis of the contributory strength of the annexed
territory; (3) by way of exception, if it is demonstrated in a certain
and bona fide manner that the annexed territory's resources for the
present and for the near future are not sufficient to service the portion
of the debt thus computed and chargeable to the annexing
State, the latter State may suspend or reduce the debt to the extent
strictly necessary to obtain the desirable financial stability.” (Ibid.,
p. 72.)

138 Jèze, “L'emprunt dans les rapports internationaux ...” (loc. cit.), p. 65. However, the same author writes in the same article:

“... The annexing State did not personally contract the debt of the annexed or dismembered State. It is logical and equitable that, as a result of the annexation, it should at most be obligated only proport. rem, because of the annexation ... What exactly is involved in the obligation proport. rem? It is the burden corresponding to the contributory strength of the inhabitants of the annexed territory.” (Ibid., p. 62.)

Jèze thus favours in this passage a contribution by the successor State with regard to the general debt of the predecessor State. However, he also states:

... present and future taxpayers in each portion of the territory of the dismembered State must continue to bear the total burden of the debt regardless of the political events which occur, even if the annexing State does not agree to assume part of the debt ...
factors were also taken into consideration, including the need to ensure preferential treatment for the allied creditors and the difficulty of arranging regular debt-service owing to the heavy burden of reparations.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the traditional differences in legal theory as to whether or not the transfer of public debts is obligatory caused a cleavage between the States concerned, entailing a radical opposition between the domestic judicial decisions of the dismembered States and those of the annexing States.  

A general principle of succession to German public debts was accordingly affirmed in article 254 of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919. According to this provision, the Powers to which German territory was ceded were to undertake to pay a portion—to be determined—of the debt of the German Empire and of the debt of the German State to which the ceded territory belonged, as they had stood on 1 August 1914. However, article 255 of the Treaty provided a number of exceptions to this principle. For example, in view of Germany’s earlier refusal to assume, in consideration of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, part of France’s general public debt, the Allied Powers decided, as demanded by France, to exempt France in return from any participation in the German public debt for the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine.

(14) One author cites a case of participation of the successor State in part of the general debt of its predecessor. However, that case is not consistent with contemporary international law, since the transfer of part of the territory was effected by force. The Third Reich, in its agreement of 4 October 1941 with Czechoslovakia, did assume an obligation of 10 billion Czechoslovak korunas as a participation in that country’s general debt (and also in the localized debt for the conquered Länder of Bohemia-Moravia and Silesia). Part of the 10 billion covered the consolidated internal debt of the State, the State’s short-term debt, its floating debt and the debts of government funds, such as the central social security fund, the electricity, water and pension funds (and all the debts of the former Czechoslovak armed forces, as of 15 March 1939, which were State debts and which the said author incorrectly included among the debts of the territories conquered by the Reich).

(15) On the other hand, there have often been cases where the successor State was exonerated from any portion of the general State debt of the predecessor State. Thus, in the “Peace Preliminaries between Austria, Prussia and Denmark”, signed at Vienna on 1 August 1864, article 3 provided that:

Debts contracted specifically on behalf either of the Kingdom of Denmark or of one of the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg shall remain the responsibility of each of those countries.  

(16) At a time when annexation by conquest was the general practice, Russia rejected any succession to part of the Turkish public debt for territories it had taken from the Ottoman Empire. Its plenipotentiaries drew a distinction between the transfer of part of territory by agreement, donation or exchange (which could perhaps give rise to the assumption of part of the general debt) and territorial transfer effected by conquest—as was acceptable at the time—which in no way created any right to relief from the debt burden of the predecessor State. Thus, at the meeting of the Congress of Berlin on 10 July 1878, the Turkish plenipotentiary, Karatheodori Pasha, proposed the following resolution: “Russia shall assume the part of the Ottoman public debt pertaining to the territories annexed to Russian territory in Asia.” It is said in the record of that meeting that:

Count Shuvalov replied that he believed he was justified in considering it generally recognized that, whereas debts in respect of territories that were detached by agreement, donation or exchange would be apportioned, that was not so in the case of conquest. Russia was the victor in Europe and in Asia. It did not have to pay anything for the territories and could in no way be held jointly responsible for the Turkish debt.

Prince Gorchakov categorically rejected Karatheodori Pasha’s request, and said that, in fact, he was astonished by it.

The President said that, in view of the opposition of the Russian plenipotentiaries, he could see no possibility of acceding to the Ottoman proposal.

(17) The Treaty of Frankfurt of 10 May 1871 between France and Prussia, whereby Alsace-Lorraine passed to Germany, was deliberately silent on the assumption by the successor State of part of the French general debt. Bismarck, who in addition had imposed on France, after its defeat at Sedan, the payment of war indemnities amounting to 5 billion francs, had categorically refused to assume a share of the French national public debt proportionate to the size of the territories detached from France. The cession of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871, free and clear of any contributory share

181 Rousseau, Droit international public (op. cit.), p. 442.
182 War debts were thus excluded. Art. 254 of the Treaty of Versailles (see footnote 342 above) read as follows:

“The Powers to which German territory is ceded shall, subject to the qualifications made in Article 255, undertake to pay:

“(1) A portion of the debt of the German Empire as it stood on August 1, 1914 ...

“(2) A portion of the debt as it stood on August 1, 1914, of the German State to which the ceded territory belonged ...”


The author refers to an irregular annexation and, moreover, considers the Czechoslovak case as falling within the category of “cession of part of the territory”; in fact, the case was more complex, involving disintegration of the State, not only through the joining of territories to Hungary and to the Reich, but also through the creation of States: the so-called “Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia” and Slovakia.

184 G. F. de Martens, ed., Nouveau Recueil général de traités (Gottingen, Dieterich, 1869), vol. XVII, pp. 470 et seq.
185 Protocol No. 17 of the Congress of Berlin for the Settlement of Affairs in the East (British and Foreign State Papers, 1877-1878 (London, Ridgway, 1885), vol. LIX, p. 862 and pp. 1052 et seq.). This was exactly the policy followed by the other European Powers in the case of conquest.

186 One must not be led astray by the fact that Bismarck affected to reduce the cost of war indemnities by first fixing them at 6 billion francs, since it did not correspond to an assumption of part of the general debt of France. This apparent concession by Bismarck was later used by von Arnim at the Brussels Conference, on 26 April 1871, as a pretext for ruling out any participation by Germany in France’s general public debt.
in France's public debt, had, as has been seen (see para. (13) above), a mirror effect in the subsequent retrocession to France of the same provinces, also free and clear of all public debts, under articles 55 and 255 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(18) When, under the Treaty of Ancón of 20 October 1883, Chile annexed the province of Tarapacá from Peru, it refused to assume responsibility for any part whatever of Peru's national public debt. However, after disputes had arisen between the two countries concerning the implementation of the Treaty, another treaty, signed by them at Lima on 3 June 1929, confirmed Chile's exemption from any part of Peru's general debt.167

(19) In 1905, no part of Russia's public debt was transferred to Japan with the southern part of the island of Sakhalin.

(20) Following the Second World War, the trend of State practice broke with the solutions adopted at the end of the First World War. Unlike the treaties of 1919, those concluded after 1945 generally excluded the successor States from any responsibility for a portion of the national public debt of the predecessor State. Thus, the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 10 February 1947 ruled out any passing of the debts of the predecessor State, for instance in the case of Trieste, except with regard to the holders of bonds for those debts issued in the ceded territory.168

(21) With regard to judicial precedent, the arbitral award most frequently cited is that rendered by E. Borel on 18 April 1925 in the case of the Ottoman public debt. Even though this involved a type of succession of States other than the transfer of part of the territory of one State to another—since the case related to the apportionment of the Ottoman public debt among States and territories detached from the Ottoman Empire (separation of one or more parts of territory of a State with or without the constitution of new States)—it is relevant here because of the general nature of the terms advisedly used by the arbitrator from Geneva. He took the view that there was no legal obligation for the transfer of part of the general debt of the predecessor State unless a treaty provision existed to that effect. In his award, he said:

In the view of the arbitrator, despite the existing precedents, one cannot say that the Power to which a territory is ceded is automatically responsible for a corresponding part of the public debt of the State to which the territory formerly belonged.169

He stated even more clearly, in the same decision:

One cannot consider that the principle that a State acquiring part of the territory of another State must at the same time take over a corresponding portion of the latter's public debts is established in positive international law. Such an obligation can derive only from a treaty in which it is assumed by the State in question, and exists only on the terms and to the extent stipulated therein.170

(22) Consideration has so far been focused on the general State debts of the predecessor State. What then is the situation as regards localized State debts, i.e. State debts contracted by the central Government on behalf of the entire State but intended particularly to meet the specific needs of a locality, so that the proceeds of the loan may have been used for a project in the transferred territory? At the outset it should be pointed out that, although localized State debts are often dealt with separately from general State debts, identifying such debts can prove to be difficult in practice. As has been stated:

... it is not always possible to establish precisely: (a) the intended purpose of each particular loan at the time when it is concluded; (b) how it is actually used; (c) the place to which the related expenditure should be attributed ...; (d) whether a particular expenditure did in fact benefit the territory in question.171

(23) Among the views of publicists, the most commonly—and perhaps most easily—accepted theory appears to be that a special State debt of benefit only to the ceded territory should be attributed to the transferred territory for whose benefit it was contracted. It would then pass with the transferred territory "by virtue of a kind of right of continuance (droit de suite)".172 However, a sufficiently clear distinction is not made between State debts contracted for the special benefit of a portion of territory and local debts proper, which are not contracted by the State. Yet the assertion that they follow the fate of the territory by virtue of a right of continuance, and that they remain charged to the transferred territory, implies that they were already charged to it before the territory was transferred, which is not the case for localized State debts, these being normally charged to the central State budget.

(24) Writers on the subject appear, generally speaking, to agree that the successor State should assume special debts of the predecessor State, as particularized and identified by some project carried out in the transferred territory. The debt will, of course, be attributable to the successor State and not to the transferred territory, which had never assumed it directly under the former legal order and to which there is no reason to attribute it under the new legal order. Moreover, it can be argued that if the transferred territory was previously responsi-

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167 However, deposits of guano situated in the province transferred to Chile had apparently served to guarantee Peru's public debt to foreign States such as France, Italy, the United Kingdom or the United States. Claims having been lodged against the successor State for continuance of the security and assumption of part of the general debt of Peru secured by that resource of the transferred territory, a Franco-Chilean arbitral tribunal found that the creditor States had acquired no guarantee, security or mortgage, since their rights resulted from private contracts concluded between Peru and certain nationals of those creditor States (arbitral award of Rapperswil, of 5 July 1901). See Felchenfeld, op. cit., pp. 321-329 and D. P. O'Connell, The Law of State Succession (Cambridge, University Press, 1956), pp. 167-170. In any event, the Treaty of Lima referred to above confirmed the exoneration of Chile as the successor State.

168 Annexes X and XIV of the Treaty (see footnote 342 above).


170 ibid., p. 571.


ble for the debt it could not be regarded with certainty as a State debt specially contracted by the central Government for the benefit or the needs of the territory concerned. Rather would it be a local debt contracted and assumed by the territorial district itself. That is a completely different case, which does not involve the question of a State debt and hence falls outside the scope of the present draft articles.

(25) The practice of States shows that, in general, the attribution of localized State debts to the successor State has nearly always been accepted. Thus, in 1735, the Emperor Charles VI borrowed the sum of one million crowns from some London financiers and merchants, securing the loan with the revenue of the Duchy of Silesia. Upon his death in 1740, Maria Theresa ceded the territory to Frederick II of Prussia, under the Treaties of Breslau and Berlin. Under the latter treaty, signed on 28 July 1742, Frederick II undertook to assume the sovereign debt (or State debt, as it would be called today) with which the province was encumbered as a result of the security arrangement.

(26) Two articles of the Treaty of Peace between Austria and France, signed at Campo Formio on 17 October 1797, presumably settled the question of the State debts contracted in the interests of the Belgian provinces or secured on them at the time when Austria ceded those territories to France:

Article IV. All debts which were secured, prior to the war, on the territory of the countries specified in the preceding articles, and which were contracted in accordance with the customary formalities, shall be assumed by the French Republic.

Article X. Debts secured on the territory of countries ceded, acquired or exchanged under this Treaty shall pass to the parties into whose possession the said countries come.

These two articles, like similar articles in other treaties, referred without further specification to "debts secured on the territory" of a province. This security arrangement may have been made either by the central authority in respect of State debts or by the provincial authority in respect of local debts. However, the context suggests that it was in fact a question of State debts, since the debts were challenged for the very reason that the provinces in question had not consented to them. France refused on that ground to assume the so-called "Austro-Belgian" State debt dating from the period of Austrian rule.

(27) As a result of this, France, Germany and Austria included in the Treaty of Lunéville of 9 February 1801 an article VIII reading as follows:

As in articles IV and X of the Treaty of Campo Formio, it is agreed that, in all countries ceded, acquired or exchanged under this Treaty, those into whose possession they come shall assume debts secured on the territory of the said countries; in view, however, of the difficulties which have arisen in this connection with regard to the interpretation of the said articles of the Treaty of Campo Formio, it is expressly agreed that the French Republic shall assume only debts resulting from loans formally authorized by the States of the ceded countries or from expenditure undertaken for the actual administration of the said countries. [The word "States" here refers not to a State entity, but to provincial bodies.]

(28) The Treaty of Peace between France and Prussia signed at Tilsit on 9 July 1807 made the successor State liable for debts contracted by the former sovereign for or in the ceded territories. Article 24 of the Treaty reads as follows:

Such undertakings, debts and obligations of whatsoever nature as His Majesty the King of Prussia may have entered into or contracted ... as owner of countries, territories, domains, property and revenue ceded or renounced by His Majesty under this Treaty shall be assumed by the new owners ... .

(29) Article IX of the Treaty of Peace of Pressburg of 26 December 1805 between Austria and France provided that His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria: shall remain free of any obligation in relation to any debts whatsoever which the House of Austria has contracted by reason of possession, and has secured on the territory of the countries which it renounces under this Treaty.

Similarly, article VIII of the Treaty signed at Fontainebleau on 11 November 1807 between France and Holland provided that:

Such undertakings, debts and obligations of whatsoever nature as His Majesty the King of Holland may have entered into or contracted as owner of the ceded cities and territories shall be assumed by France ... .

Article XIV of the Convention of 28 April 1811 between Prussia and Westphalia is worded like the article just cited.

(30) Article VIII of the Treaty of Lunéville of 9 February 1801 served as a model for article V of the Treaty of Paris between France and Wurtemburg of 20 May 1807, which stated:

Article VIII of the Treaty of Lunéville, concerning debts secured on the territory of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine, shall serve as a basis and rule in respect of the debts with which the possessions and countries included in the cession under article II of the present Treaty are encumbered.

The Convention of 14 November 1802 between the Batavian Republic and Prussia contains a similarly worded article IV. Again, article XI of the Territorial Convention concluded on 22 September 1815 between Prussia and Saxe-Weimar provided that "His Royal

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Highness shall assume [any debts] ... specially secured on the ceded districts”. 382

(31) Article 4 of the Treaty of 4 June 1815 between Denmark and Prussia provided as follows:

H.M. the King of Denmark undertakes to assume the obligations which H.M. the King of Prussia has contracted in respect of the Duchy of Lauenburg under articles IV, V and IX of the Treaty of 29 May 1815 between Prussia and His Britannic Majesty, King of Hanover ... 383

The Convention between France and the Allied Powers of 20 November 1815, whose 26 articles dealt exclusively with debt questions, required the successor State to assume debts which formed part of the French public debt (State debts), but originated as “debt specially secured ... by mortgages upon countries which have ceased to form part of France or, otherwise contracted by their internal administration, ...” (art. VI). 384

(32) Even though an irregular forced annexation of territory was involved, mention may be made of the assumption by the Third Reich, under the Agreement of 4 October 1941, of debts contracted by Czechoslovakia for the purpose of private railways in the Länder seized from it by the Reich. 385

Debts of this kind seem to be governmental in origin and local in purpose.

(33) After the Second World War, France, which had regained Tenda and Briga from Italy, agreed to assume part of the Italian debt only subject to the following four conditions: (a) that the debt was attributable to public works or civilian administrative services in the transferred territories; (b) that the debt was contracted before Italy’s entry into the war and was not intended for military purposes; (c) that the transferred territories had benefited from the debt; and (d) that the creditors resided in the transferred territories.

(34) Succession to special State debts which were used to meet the needs of a particular territory is more likely if the debts in question are backed by a special security arrangement. The predecessor State may have secured its special debt on tax revenue derived from the territory which it is losing or on property situated in the territory in question, such as forests, mines or railways. In both cases, succession to such debts is usually accepted.

(35) On rare occasions, however, the passing of localized debts has been refused. One such example is article 253 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided a number of exceptions to the general principle, laid down in article 254, of the passing of public debts of the predecessor State (see para. (13) above). Thus, in the case of all ceded territories other than Alsace-Lorraine, that portion of the debt of the German Empire or the German States which represented expenditure by them on property and possessions belonging to them and situated in the ceded territories was not assumed by the successor States. Obviously, political considerations played a role in this particular case.

(36) From the foregoing observations it may be concluded that, while there appears to exist a fairly well-established practice requiring the successor State to assume a localized State debt, no such consensus can be found with regard to general State debts. Although the refusal of the successor State to assume part of the general debt of the predecessor State seems to prevail in writings on the subject and in judicial and State practice, political considerations or considerations of expediency have admittedly played some part in such refusals. At the same time, those considerations appear to have weighed even more heavily in cases where the successor State ultimately assumed a portion of the general debt of the predecessor State, as occurred in the peace treaties ending the First World War. In any event, it must also be acknowledged that the bulk of the treaty precedents available consists largely of treaties terminating a state of war, and there is a strong presumption that that is not a context in which States express their free consent or are inclined to yield to the demands of justice, of equity, or even of law.

(37) Whatever the case, the refusal of the successor State to assume part of the national public debt of the predecessor State appears to have logic on its side, as one author remarks, although he agrees that this approach is hard for the ceding State, which is deprived of part of its property without being relieved of its debt, whereas the cessionary State is enriched or enlarged without a corresponding increase in its debt burden. 386

It is useless, however, to seek for the existence of an incontestable rule of international law to avoid this situation. Under the circumstances, the Commission proposes, in the absence of an agreement between the parties concerned, the introduction of the concept of equity as the key to the solution of problems relating to the passing of State debts. That concept has already been adopted by the Commission in parts II and III of the
(38) The rules enunciated in article 35 keep certain parallelisms with those of articles 13 and 25, relating to the passing of State property and of State archives respectively. Paragraph 1 thus provides for, and thereby attempts to encourage, settlement by agreement between the predecessor and successor States. Although it reads "the passing... is to be settled...", the paragraphs should not be interpreted as presuming that there is always such a passing. Paragraph 2 provides for the situation where no such agreement can be reached. It stipulates that "an equitable proportion" of the State debt of the predecessor State shall pass to the successor State. In order to determine what constitutes "an equitable proportion", all the relevant factors should be taken into account in each particular case. Such factors must include, among others, "the property, rights and interests" which pass to the successor State in relation to the State debt in question.

(39) Article 35 is drafted in such a way as to cover all types of State debts, whether general or localized. It may readily be seen that under paragraph 2 localized State debts would pass to the successor State in an equitable proportion, taking into account, inter alia, the "property, rights and interests" which pass to the successor State in relation to such localized State debts.

**Article 36. Newly Independent State**

1. When the successor State is a newly independent State, no State debt of the predecessor State shall pass to the newly independent State, unless an agreement between the newly independent State and the predecessor State provides otherwise in view of the link between the State debt of the predecessor State connected with its activity in the territory to which the succession of States relates and the property, rights and interests which pass to the newly independent State.

2. The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall not infringe the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources, nor shall its implementation endanger the fundamental economic equilibria of the newly independent State.

**Commentary**

(1) Article 36 concerns succession of States in respect of treaties and again in the present set of draft articles in connection with succession in respect of State property and State archives. It might be argued by some that decolonization is a thing of the past, belonging almost entirely to the history of international relations, and that consequently there is no need to include "newly independent State" in a typology of succession of States. In fact, decolonization is not yet fully completed. Important parts of the world are still dependent, even though some cover only a small area. And decolonization is far from complete from yet another point of view. If decolonization is taken to mean the end of a relationship based on political domination, it has reached a very advanced stage; but economic relations are vital, and are much less easily rid of the effects of colonization than political relations. Political independence may not be genuine independence, and, in reality, the economy of newly independent States may long remain particularly dependent on the former metropolitan country and firmly bound to it, even allowing for the fact that the economies of nearly all countries are interdependent. Hence it cannot be denied that draft articles on succession of States in respect of State debts may be useful, not only with respect to territories which are still dependent but also with respect to countries which have recently attained political independence, and even to countries which attained political independence much earlier. In fact, the debt problem, including the servicing of the debt, the progressive amortization of the principal and the payment of interest, all spread over several years, if not decades, is the most typical example of matters covered by succession which long survive political independence. Thus, the effects of problems connected with succession of States in respect of State debts continue to be felt for many decades and would appear more lasting than the effects of succession in respect of treaties, State property or State archives, in each of which cases the Commission nevertheless devoted one or more articles to decolonization.

(3) Before reviewing State practice and the views of jurists on the fate of State debts in the process of decolonization, it may be of historical interest to note the extent to which colonial Powers were willing, in cases of colonization which occurred during the last century and the early 1900s, to assume the debts of the territories colonized. State practice seems contradictory in this respect. In the cases of the annexation of Tahiti in 1880 (by internal law), Hawaii in 1898 (by internal law), and Korea in 1910 (by treaty), the States which annexed those territories assumed wholly or in part the debts of the territory concerned. In an opinion relating to the Joint Resolution of the United States Congress providing for the annexation of Hawaii, the United States Attorney-General stated that:

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*See paras. 76-85 above.*
of territory, the substituted sovereignty assumes the debts and obligations of the absorbed State or territory—it takes the burdens with the benefits.\(^{199}\)

In the case of the annexation of the Fiji Islands in 1874, it appears that the United Kingdom, after annexation, agreed voluntarily to undertake payment of certain debts contracted by the territory before annexation, as an "act of grace".\(^{391}\) The metropolitan Power did not recognize a legal duty to discharge the debts concerned. A similar position appears to have been taken on the annexation of Burma by the United Kingdom in 1886.\(^{392}\)

(4) In other cases, the colonial Powers refused to honour the debts of the territory concerned. In the 1895 treaty establishing the (second) French protectorate over Madagascar, article 6 stated that, *inter alia*,

The Government of the French Republic assumes no responsibility with respect to undertakings, debts or concessions contracted by the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar before the signing of the present Treaty.\(^{393}\)

Shortly after the signing of that treaty, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in the Chamber of Deputies that, as regards the debts contracted abroad by the Madagascar Government,

the French Government will, without having to guarantee them for our own account, follow strictly the rules of international law governing cases in which sovereignty over a territory is transferred as a result of military action.\(^{199}\)

According to one writer, while that declaration recognized the existence of rules of international law governing the treatment of debts of States that had lost their sovereignty, it also made clear that, according to the opinion of the French Government, there was no rule of international law which compelled an annexing State to guarantee or assume the debts of annexed States.\(^{394}\) The Annexation Act of 1896 by which Madagascar was declared a French colony was silent on the issue of succession to Malagasy debts. Colonial Powers also refused to honour debts of colonized territories on the grounds that the previously independent State retained a measure of legal personality. Such appears to have been the case with the protectorates established at the end of the nineteenth century in Tunisia, Annam, Tonkin and Cambodia.\(^{395}\) A further example may be mentioned, that of the annexation of the Congo by Belgium.\(^{396}\) In the 1907 treaty of cession, article 3 provided for the succession of Belgium in respect of all the liabilities and all the financial obligations of the "Congo Free State", as set forth in annex C. However, in article 1 of the Colonial Charter of 1908 it was stated that the Belgian Congo was an entity distinct from the metropolitan country, having separate laws, assets and liabilities, and that, consequently, the servicing of the Congolese debt was to remain the exclusive responsibility of the colony, unless otherwise provided by law.

**Early decolonization**

(5) In the case of the independence of thirteen British colonies in North America, the successor State, the United States of America, did not succeed to any of the debts of the British Government. Neither the Treaty of Versailles of 1783, by which Great Britain recognized the independence of those colonies, nor the constituent instruments of the United States (the Articles of Confederation of 1776 and 1777 and the Constitution of 1787) mention any payment of debts owed by the former metropolitan Power.\(^{397}\) This precedent was alluded to in the 1898 peace negotiations between Spain and the United States following the Spanish-American War. The Spanish delegation asserted that there were publicists who maintained that the thirteen colonies which had become independent had paid 15 million pounds to Great Britain for the extinguishment of colonial debts. The American delegation however, viewed the assertion as entirely erroneous, pointing out that the preliminary (1782) and definitive (1783) treaties of peace between the United States and Great Britain contained no stipulation of the kind referred to.\(^{199}\)

(6) A similar resolution of the fate of the State debts of the predecessor State occurred in South America upon the independence of Brazil from Portugal in the 1820s. During the negotiations in London in 1822, the Portuguese Government claimed that part of its national debt should be assumed by the new State. In a dispatch of 2 August 1824, the Brazilian plenipotentiaries informed their Government of the way in which they had opposed that claim, which they deemed inconsistent with the examples furnished by diplomatic history. The dispatch states:

Neither Holland nor Portugal itself, when they separated from the Spanish Crown, paid anything to the Court of Madrid in exchange for the recognition of their independence; recently the United States likewise paid no monetary compensation to Great Britain for similar recognition.\(^{400}\)

The treaty of Peace between Brazil and Portugal of 29 August 1825 which resulted from the negotiations in fact made no express reference to the transfer of part of the Portuguese State debt to Brazil. However, since there were reciprocal claims involving the two States, a separate instrument—an additional agreement of the


\(^{392}\) Ibid., p. 397. It appears that the British Government did not consider Upper Burma to be a "civilized country", and that, therefore, rules more favourable to the "succeeding Government" could be applied than in the case of the incorporation of a "civilized" State. (O'Connell, *State Succession ...* (op. cit.), pp. 358-360).


\(^{394}\) Ibid., p. 373, footnote 22.

\(^{395}\) Ibid., p. 373.

\(^{396}\) Ibid., pp. 369-371.

\(^{397}\) Ibid., pp. 375-376.

\(^{199}\) Ibid., pp. 35-34.

\(^{394}\) Ibid., p. 54, footnote 95.

same date—made Brazil responsible for the payment of 2 million pounds sterling as part of an arrangement designed to liquidate those reciprocal claims.

(7) With regard to the independence of the Spanish colonies in America, article VII of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed at Madrid on 28 December 1836 between Spain and newly independent Mexico reads as follows:

The Republic of Ecuador ... renounces voluntarily and spontaneously every debt contracted upon the credit of her territories, whether by the direct orders of the Spanish Government or by its authorities established in the territory* of Ecuador, provided that such debts are always registered in the account-books belonging to the treasuries of the ancient kingdom and presidency of Quito, or that it is shown through some other legal and equivalent means that they have been contracted within the said territory by the aforementioned Spanish Government and its authorities whilst they administered the now independent Ecuadorian Republic, until they entirely ceased governing it in the year 1822.*

(8) Article V of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Recognition signed at Madrid on 16 February 1840 between Ecuador and Spain in turn provided that:

The Republic of Ecuador ... renounces voluntarily and spontaneously every debt contracted upon the credit of her territories, whether by the direct orders of the Spanish Government or by its authorities established in the territory* of Ecuador, provided that such debts are always registered in the account-books belonging to the treasuries of the ancient kingdom and presidency of Quito, or that it is shown through some other legal and equivalent means that they have been contracted within the said territory by the aforementioned Spanish Government and its authorities whilst they administered the now independent Ecuadorian Republic, until they entirely ceased governing it in the year 1822.*

(9) A provision more or less similar to the one in the treaties mentioned above may be found in article V of the Treaty of Peace of 30 March 1845 between Spain and Venezuela, in which Venezuela recognized:

as a national debt ... the sum to which the debt owing by the treasury of the Spanish Government amounts, and which will be found entered in the ledgers and account books ... of the former Captaincy-General of Venezuela, or which may arise from any other fair and legitimate claims.*

Similar wording may be found in a number of treaties concluded between Spain and the former colonies.*

(10) The cases of decolonization of the former Spanish dependencies in America would seem to represent a departure from the earlier precedents set by the United States and Brazil. However, it may be noted that the departure was a limited one, not involving a succession to the national debt of the predecessor State, but rather to two types of debts: those contracted by the predecessor State for and on behalf of the dependent territory, and those contracted by an organ of the colony. As has been noted, the latter category of debts, considered as proper to the territory itself, are in any event excluded from the subject-matter of the present draft articles as they do not properly fall within the scope and definition of State debts of the predecessor State. In spite of the fact that overseas possessions were considered, under the colonial law of the time, to be a territorial extension of the metropolitan country, with which they formed a single territory, it did not occur to writers that any part of the national public debt of the metropolitan country should be imposed on those possessions. That was a natural solution, according to one author, because "the creditors [of the metropolitan country] could never reasonably assume that their debts would be paid out of the resources to be derived from such a financially autonomous territory." What was involved was not a participation of the former Spanish American colonies in the national debt of the metropolitan territory of Spain, but a take-over by those colonies of State debts, admittedly of Spain, but contracted by the metropolitan country on behalf and for the benefit of its overseas possessions. It must also

be pointed out that in the case of certain treaties there was a desire to achieve a "package deal" involving various reciprocal compensations rather than any real participation in the debts contracted by the predecessor State for and on behalf of the colony. Finally, it may be noted that, in most of the cases involving Spain and her former colonies, the debts assumed by the successor States were assumed by means of internal legislation, even before the conclusion of treaties with Spain, which often merely took note of the provisions of those internal laws. None of the treaties, however, speak of rules or principles of international law governing succession to State debts. Indeed, many of the treaty provisions indicate that what was involved was a "voluntary and spontaneous" decision on the part of the newly independent State.

(11) Mention should, however, be made of one Latin American case which appears to be at variance with the general practice of decolonization in that region as outlined in the preceding paragraph. This relates to the independence of Bolivia. A treaty of Recognition, Peace and Friendship, signed between Spain and Bolivia on 21 July 1847, provides in article V that:

The Republic of Bolivia ... has already spontaneously recognized, by the law of 11 November 1844, the debt contracted against its treasury, either by the direct orders of the Spanish Government, or by orders emanating from the established authorities of the latter in the territory of Upper Peru, now the Republic of Bolivia; and [recognizes] as consolidated debt of the Republic, in the same category as the most highly privileged debt, all the credits, of whatever description, for pensions, salaries, supplies, advances, freights, forced loans, deposits, contracts and every other debt, either arising from the war or prior thereto, which are a charge upon the aforesaid treasury, provided always that such credits proceed from the direct orders of the Spanish Government or of their established authorities in the provinces which now form the Republic of Bolivia ... .

(12) The Anglo-American precedent of 1783 and the Portuguese-Brazilian precedent of 1825 were followed by the Peace Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898, concluded at the end of the war between the United States and Spain. The charging of Spanish State debts to the budget of Cuba by Spain was contested. The assumption that charging a debt to the accounts of the Cuban Treasury meant that it was a debt contracted on behalf and for the benefit of the island was successfully challenged by the United States plenipotentiaries. The Treaty of 1898 freed Spain only from liability for debts proper to Cuba, that is, debts contracted after 24 February 1895 and the mortgage debts of the municipality of Havana. It did not allow succession to any portion of the Spanish State debt which Spain had charged to Cuba.

Decolonization since the Second World War

(13) An examination of cases of decolonization since the Second World War indicates little conformity in the practice of newly independent States. There are precedents in favour of the passing of State debts and precedents against, as well as cases of repudiation of such debts after they had been accepted. It is not the intention of the Commission to overburden this commentary by including a complete catalogue of all cases of decolonization since the Second World War. The cases mentioned below are not intended to represent an exhaustive survey of practice in the field, but are rather provided as illustrative examples.

(14) The independence of the Philippines was authorized by the Philippines Independence Act (otherwise known as the "Tydings-McDuffie Act") of the United States Congress, approved on 24 March 1934. By that Act, a distinction was made between the bonds issued before 1934 by the Philippines with the authorization of the United States Congress and other public debts. It provided that the United States declined all responsibility for those post-1934 debts of the archipelago. The inference has accordingly been drawn that the United States intended to maintain pre-1934 congressionally authorized debts. As regards these pre-1934 debts, by a law of 7 August 1939, the proceeds of Philippine export taxes were allocated to the United States Treasury for the establishment of a special fund for the amortization of the pre-1934 debts contracted by the Philippines with United States authorization. Under the 1934 and 1939 Acts, it was provided that the archipelago could not repudiate loans authorized by the predecessor State and that if, on the date of independence, the special fund should be insufficient for service of that authorized debt, the Philippines would make a payment to balance the account. Under both its Constitution (art. 17) and the Treaty of 4 July 1946 with the United States, the Philippines assumed all the debts and liabilities of the islands.

(15) The case of the independence of India and Pakistan is another example where the successor State accepted the debts of the predecessor State. It would be more correct to speak of successor States, and in fact this seems a two-stage succession as a result of partition, Pakistan succeeding to India, which succeeded to the United Kingdom. It has been explained that:

There was no direct repartition of the debts between the two Dominions. All financial obligations, including loans and guarantees, of the central Government of British India remained the responsibility of India. While India continued to be the sole debtor of the central debt, Pakistan's share of this debt, proportionate to the assets it received, became a debt to India.

It does not seem that many distinctions were made regarding the different categories of debt. Only one ap-
pears to have been made by the Committee of Experts set up to recommend the apportionment of assets and liabilities. This was the public debt, composed of permanent loans, treasury bills and special loans, as against the unfunded debt, which comprised savings bank deposits and bank deposits. These various obligations were assigned to India, but it is not indicated whether they were debts proper to the dependent territory, which would have devolved upon it in any event, or debts of the predecessor State, which would thus have been transferred to the successor State. The problem to which the Committee of Experts appears to have devoted most attention was that of establishing the modalities for apportioning the debt between India and Pakistan. An agreement of 1 December 1947 between the two States was to embody the practical consequences of this and determine the respective contributions. That division, however, has not been implemented, owing to differences between the two States as to the sums involved.

(16) The problems arising from the succession of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands were, as far as debts are concerned, reflected essentially in two instruments: the Round-Table Conference Agreement, signed at The Hague on 2 November 1949, and the Indonesian Decree of 15 February 1956, which repudiated the debt, Indonesia having denounced the 1949 agreements on 13 February 1956. The Financial and Economic Agreement (which is only one of the Conference agreements) specifies the debts which Indonesia agreed to assume. Article 25 distinguishes four series of debts: (a) a series of six consolidated loans; (b) debts to third countries; (c) debts to the Kingdom of the Netherlands; (d) Indonesia's internal debts.

(17) The last two categories of debts need not be taken into consideration here. Indonesia's debts to the Kingdom of the Netherlands were in fact debt-claims of the predecessor State, and thus do not come within the scope of the present commentary. The internal debt of Indonesia at the date of the transfer of sovereignty are also excluded by definition. However, it should be noted that this category was not precisely defined. The predecessor State later interpreted that provision as including debts which the successor State considered as "war debts" or "odious debts". It would appear that this was a factor in the denunciation and repudiation of the debt in 1956.

(18) The other two categories of debts to which the newly independent State succeeded involved: (a) consolidated debts of the Government of the Netherlands and the portion attributed to it in the consolidated national debt of the Netherlands consisting of a series of loans issued before the Second World War; (b) certain specific debts to third States.

(19) During the Round-Table Conference, Indonesia brought up issues relating to the degree of autonomy which its organs had possessed by comparison with those of the metropolitan country at the time when the loans were contracted. The Indonesian plenipotentiaries also, and in particular, referred to the problem of their assignment, and the utilization of and benefit derived from those loans by the territory. As in the other cases, it appears that the results of the negotiations at The Hague should be viewed as a whole and in the context of an overall arrangement. The negotiations had led to the creation of a "Netherlands-Indonesian Union", which was dissolved in 1954. Shortly afterwards, in 1956, Indonesia repudiated all of its colonial debts.

(20) On the accession of Libya to independence, the General Assembly of the United Nations resolved the problem of the succession of States, including the successions to debts, in resolution 388 (V) of 15 December 1950 entitled "Economic and financial provisions relating to Libya", article IV of which stated that "Libya shall be exempt from the payment of any portion of the Italian public debt".

(21) Guinea attained its independence in 1958, following its negative vote in the constitutional referendum of 28 September of the same year establishing the Fifth Republic of the French Community. One writer stated: "Rarely in the history of international relations has a succession of States begun so abruptly". The implementation of a monetary reform in Guinea led to that country's leaving the franc area. To that was added the fact that diplomatic relations between the former colonial Power and the newly independent State were severed for a long period. This situation was not conducive to the promotion of a swift solution of the problems of succession of States which arose some twenty years ago. However, it seems that a trend towards a settlement has emerged since the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two States in 1975. But apparently the problem of debts has not assumed a significant dimension in the relations between the two States; it seems to be reduced essentially to questions regarding civil and military pensions.

(22) Among other newly independent States which had formerly been French dependencies in Africa, the case

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412 Rousseau, Droit international public (op. cit.), pp. 451-452.
415 It has been maintained that these debts were contracted by the dependent territory on its own behalf and for its own account (Rousseau, Droit international public (op. cit.), p. 451; O'Connell, State Succession ... (op. cit.) p. 437). It appears, however, that the loans were contracted under Netherlands legislation; thus the argument could be made that the debts were contracted by the metropolitan Power for the account of the dependent territory.
416 This involved debts contracted under the Marshall Plan and to the United States in 1947, to Canada in 1945 and to Australia in 1949.
of Madagascar may be noted. Madagascar, like all former French overseas territories in general, had legal personality, implying a degree of financial autonomy. The island was thus able to subscribe loans and exercised that right on the occasion of five public loans, in 1897, 1900, 1905, 1931 and 1942. The decision in principle to issue a loan was made in Madagascar by the Governor-General, after hearing the views of various administrative organs and economic and financial delegations. If the process had stopped there and it had been possible for the public actually to subscribe to the loan, the debt would simply have been contracted within the framework of the financial autonomy of the dependent territory. The loan would then have had to be termed a "debt proper to the territory" and could not have been attributed to the predecessor State; consequently, it would not have been considered within the scope of the present commentary. It appears, however, that further decision had to be taken by the administering Power. The decision-making process, begun in Madagascar, was completed within the framework of the laws and regulations of the central Government of the administering Power. Approval could have been given either by a decree adopted in the Conseil d'Etat or by statute. In actual fact, all the Malagasy loans were the subject of legislative authorization by the metropolitan country. This authorization might be said to have constituted a substantial condition of the loan, a sine qua non, without which the issue of the loan would have been impossible. The power to enter into a genuine commitment in this regard lay only, it would seem, with the administering Power, and by so doing, it assumed an obligation which might be compared with the guarantees required by IBRD, which confer on the predecessor State the status of "primary obligor" and not of "surety merely" (see paras. (54) to (57) below).

(23) These debts were assumed by the Malagasy Republic, which, it appears, did not dispute them at the time. The negotiators of the Franco-Malagasy Agreement of 27 June 1960 on co-operation in monetary, economic and financial matters thus did not work out any special provisions for this succession. Later, following a change of regime, the Government of Madagascar, denounced the 1960 Agreement on 25 January 1973.

(24) The former Belgian Congo acceded to independence on 30 June 1960, in accordance with article 259 of the Belgian Act of 19 May 1960. Civil war erupted, and diplomatic relations between the two States were severed from 1960 to 1962. The problems of succession of States were not resolved until five years later, in two conventions dated 6 February 1965. The first related to "the settlement of questions relating to the public debt and portfolio of the Belgian Congo Colony". The second concerns the statutes of "the Belgo-Congolese Amortization and Administration Fund".

(25) The classification of debts was made in article 2 of the Convention for the settlement of questions relating to the public debt and portfolio of the Belgian Congo Colony, which distinguished three categories of debt: (1) "Debt expressed in Congolese francs and the debt expressed in foreign currencies held by public agencies of the Congo as at 30 June 1960 ..."; (2) "Debt expressed in foreign currencies and guaranteed by Belgium ..."; (3) "Debt expressed in foreign currencies and not guaranteed by Belgium (except the securities of such debt held by public agencies of the Congo) ...". This classification thus led ultimately to a distinction between the internal debt and the external debt.

(26) The internal debt should not engage our attention for long; not because it was "internal", but because it was held by public agencies of the Congo, or as one writer specifies, "three quarters" of it was. It was thus intermingled with the debts of local public authorities and hence cannot be regarded as a State debt of the predecessor State.

(27) The external debt was subdivided into guaranteed external debt and non-guaranteed external debt. The external debt guaranteed or assigned by Belgium extended to two categories of debt, which are set out in schedule 3 annexed to the above convention. The first concerns the Congolese debt in respect of which Belgium intervened only as guarantor. It was a debt denominated in foreign currencies (United States dollars, Swiss francs and other currencies). In this category, mention may be made of the loan agreements concluded between the Belgian Congo and the World Bank, which are referred to in article 4 of the Belgo-Congolese Agreement. The guarantee and liability of Belgium could naturally not extend, with regard to the IBRD loans, beyond "the amounts withdrawn by the Belgian Congo ... before 30 June 1960", i.e. before independence. When it gave its guarantee, it seemed that Belgium intended to act as primary obligor and not as surety merely. According to the actual provisions of the agreements with IBRD, the character of State debt of the predecessor State emerges even more clearly for the second category of debt guaranteed by Belgium.
(28) The second type of external debt was called "assigned" debt; it relates to "loans subscribed by Belgium, the proceeds of which were assigned to the Belgian Congo". This is a particularly striking illustration of a State debt of the predecessor State. Belgium was no longer a mere guarantor. The obligation fell directly on Belgium, and it was that country which was the debtor.

(29) The two types of debt, guaranteed and assigned, were to become the responsibility of Belgium. That is what is provided by article 4 of the Convention for the settlement of questions relating to the public debt, in the following terms:

1. Belgium shall assume sole liability in every respect for the part of the public debt listed in schedule 3, which is annexed to this Convention and which forms an integral part thereof. [The preceding paragraphs describe the contents of schedule 3.]

2. With regard to the Loan Agreements concluded between the Belgian Congo and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the part of the public debt referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall comprise only the amounts withdrawn by the Belgian Congo, under those Agreements, before 30 June 1960.95

(30) The external debt not guaranteed by Belgium, which was expressed in foreign currency in the case of the "Dillon loan" issued in the United States and in Belgian currency in the case of other loans, was owed, as one writer says, to "people who have been referred to as 'the holders of colonial bonds', 95 per cent of whom were Belgians".96 What would seem to have been involved was a kind of "colonial debt", which would be outside the scope of consideration of the present commentary. It might be relevant, however, according to another author's view, "that the financial autonomy of the Belgian Congo was purely formal in nature and that the administration of the colony was completely in the hands of the Belgian authorities".97 However, neither Belgium nor the Congo agreed to have that debt devolve upon it, and the two countries avoided the difficulty by setting up a special international agency to handle the debt. That is the significance of articles 5 to 7 of the Convention for the settlement of questions relating to the public debt, which established a Fund.98

(31) The establishment of the Fund, an "autonomous international public agency", and the arrangement for joint contributions to it implied two things:

(a) Neither State in any sense accepted the status of debtor. That is made clear by article 14 of the Convention:

The settlement of the public debt of the Belgian Congo, which is the subject of the foregoing provisions, constitutes a solution in which each of the High Contracting Parties reserves its legal position with regard to recognition of the public debt of the Belgian Congo.

(b) The two States nevertheless regarded the matter as having been finally settled. That is stated in the first paragraph of article 18 of the Convention:

The foregoing provisions being intended to constitute a final settlement of the problems to which they relate, the High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain in the future from any discussion and from any action or recourse whatever in connection either with the public debt or with the portfolio of the Belgian Congo. Each Party shall hold the other harmless, fully and irrevocably, for any administrative or other act performed by the latter Party in connection with the public debt and portfolio of the Belgian Congo before the date of the entry into force of this Convention.

(32) In the case of the independence of Algeria, article 18 of the "Declaration of Principles concerning Economic and Financial Co-operation", contained in the Evian Agreements,99 provided for the succession of the Algerian State to France's rights and obligations in Algeria. However, neither this declaration of principles nor the other declarations contained in the Evian Agreements referred specifically to public debts, much less to the various categories of such debts, so that authors have taken the view that the Agreements were silent on the matter.100

(33) Negotiations on public debts were conducted by the two countries from 1963 until the end of 1966. They resulted in a number of agreements, the most important of which was the agreement of 23 December 1966, which settled the financial differences between the two countries through the payment by Algeria to France of a lump sum of 400 million francs (40 billion old francs). Algeria does not seem to have succeeded to the "State debts of the predecessor State" by making the payment, since, if it had so succeeded, it would have paid the money not to the predecessor State (which would by definition have been the debtor), but to any third parties to which France owed money in connection with its previous activities in Algeria. What was involved was, rather, debts which might be termed "miscellaneous" debts, resulting from the take-over of all public services by the newly independent State, assumed by it as compensation for that take-over or in respect of the repurchase of certain property. Also included were ex post facto debts covering what the successor State had to pay to the predecessor State as a final settlement of the succession of States. Algeria was not assuming France's State debts (to third States) connected with its activities in Algeria.

(34) In the negotiations, Algeria argued that it had agreed to succeed to France's "obligations" only in
return for certain French commitments to independent Algeria. Under the aforementioned “Declaration of principles”, a French contribution to the economic and social development of Algeria and “Marketing facilities on French territory for Algerian surplus production” (wine) were to be the quid pro quo for the obligations assumed by Algeria under article 18 of the Declaration. The Algerian negotiators maintained that that “contractual” undertaking between Algeria and France could only be regarded as valid if two conditions were met: (a) that the respective obligations were properly balanced, and (b) that the financial situation inherited by Algeria was a sound one.

(35) Algeria also refused to assume debts representing loans which France had contracted during the war of independence for the purpose of carrying out economic projects in Algeria. The Algerian delegation argued that the projects had been undertaken in a particular political and military context in order to advance the interests of the French settlers and of the French presence in general and that they fell within the overall framework of France’s economic strategy, since nearly all of France’s investment in Algeria had been complementary in nature. The Algerians also argued that the departure of the French population during the months preceding independence had resulted in massive disinvestment and that Algeria could not pay for investments at a time when the necessary income had dried up and, in addition, a process of disinvestment had developed.

(36) The Algerian negotiators stated that a substantial part of the economic programme in Algeria had had the effect of incurring debts for that country while it still had dependent status. They argued that, during the seven-and-a-half years of war, the administering Power had for political reasons been over-generous in pledging Algeria’s backing for numerous loans, thus seriously compromising the Algerian treasury. Finally, the Algerian negotiators refused to assume certain debts they considered to be “odious debts” or “war debts”, which France had charged to Algeria.

(37) This brief account, which shows the extent of the controversy surrounding even the question how to refer to the debts (French State debts or debts proper to the dependent territory), gives an indication of the complexity of the Algerian-French financial dispute, which the negotiators finally settled at the end of 1966.

(38) As to the independence of British dependencies, it would appear that borrowings of British colonies were made by the colonial authorities and were charges on colonial revenues alone. The general practice appears to have been that, upon attaining independence, former British colonies succeeded to four categories of loans: loans under the Colonial Stock Acts; loans from IBRD; colonial welfare and development loans; and other raisings in the London and local stock market. It would therefore seem that such debts were considered to be debts proper to the dependent territory and hence might be outside the scope of the draft articles, in view of the definition of State debts as those of the predecessor State.

Financial situation of newly independent States

(39) International law cannot be codified or progressively developed in isolation from the political and economic context in which the world is living at present. The Commission believes that it must reflect the concerns and needs of the international community in the rules which it proposes to that community. For that reason, it is impossible to evolve a set of rules concerning State debts for which newly independent States are liable without to some extent taking into account the situation in which a number of these States are placed.

(40) Unfortunately, statistical data are not available to show exactly how much of the extensive debt problem of these countries is due to the fact of their having attained independence and assumed certain debts in connection with the succession of States, and how much to the loans which they have had to contract as sovereign States in an attempt to overcome their underdevelopment. Similarly, the relevant statistics covering all the developing countries cannot easily be broken down in order to individualize and illustrate the specific situation of the newly independent States since the Second World War. The figures given below relate to the external debt of the developing countries; they include the Latin American countries—i.e., countries decolonized long ago. Here the aim is not so much to calculate precisely the financial burden resulting from the assumption by the newly independent States of the debts of the predecessor States as to highlight a dramatic and widespread debt problem affecting the majority of the developing countries. This context and this situation impart particular and specific overtones to succession of States involving newly independent States that do not generally arise in connection with other types of succession.

(41) The increasingly burdensome debt problem of these countries has become a structural phenomenon whose profound effects were apparent long before the present international economic crisis. In 1960, the developing countries’s external public debt already amounted to several billion dollars. During the 1960s, the total indebtedness of the 80 developing countries...
studied by UNCTAD increased at an annual rate of 14 per cent, so that at the end of 1969 the external public debt of these 80 countries amounted to $59 billion.*** It was estimated that at the same date the total sums disbursed by those countries simply for servicing the public debt and repatriation of profits was $11 billion.**** At that time already, in certain developing countries the servicing of the public debt alone consumed over 20 per cent of their total export earnings. In its annual report for 1980, the World Bank estimated that by the end of 1979, the outstanding medium-term and long-term dispersed debt from public and private sources of developing countries would reach $376 billion.***** Service payments on that debt were estimated to amount to $69 million.

(42) This considerable increase in the external debt placed an unbearable burden on certain countries, particularly a number of developing countries which faced an alarming situation:

During the past years, a growing number of developing countries have experienced debt crises which warranted debt relief operations. Multilateral debt renegotiations were undertaken, often repeatedly, for Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru and Turkey. In addition, around a dozen developing countries were the subject of bilateral debt renegotiations. Debt crises have disruptive effects on the economies of developing countries and a disturbing influence on creditor/debtor relationships. Resource providers and recipients should therefore ensure that the international resource transfer is effected in such a way that it avoids debt difficulties of developing countries.***

(43) The considerable increase in inflation in the industrialized economies that began in 1973 was to have serious consequences for the developing countries, which depend heavily on those economies for their imports, and thus aggravated their external debt.

(44) The current deficit of these non-oil-exporting countries increased from $9.1 billion in 1973 to $27.5 billion in 1974 and $35 billion in 1976.*** These deficits resulted in a huge increase in the outstanding external debt of the developing countries and in the service payments on that debt in 1974 and 1975. A recent study by IMF reveals that the total outstanding guaranteed public debt of these countries increased from about $62 billion in 1973 to an estimated $95.6 billion in 1975—an increase of over 50 per cent.****

(45) In addition, while the developing countries' indebtedness was increasing, the relative value of official development assistance was declining, the volume of such transfers having remained far below the minimum of 1 per cent of GNP called for by the International Development Strategy. In addition to and simultaneously with this trend, there was a considerable increase in reverse transfers of resources in the form of repatriation of profits made by investors from developed countries in developing countries. The increase in the absolute value of resources transferred to the developing countries in fact conceals a worsening of the debt situation of those countries. It has been estimated that the total percentage of export earnings used for debt service was 29 per cent in 1977, compared with 9 per cent for 1965.

(46) Concern about the debt problem has been reflected in the proceedings of many international meetings, of which those mentioned in this and the following paragraphs may serve as illustrations. Arrangements agreeable to both developing countries and industrialized creditor States to remedy this dramatic situation have not been easy to reach. The debtor countries have indicated that, in their view, their indebtedness is such that, if it is not readjusted, it may cancel out any development effort.***

(47) The issue of cancellation of the debts of the former colonized countries has been raised by certain newly independent States.***** The General Assembly, by

*** At the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers from 5-9 September 1973, the problem was stated as follows:

“The adverse consequences for the current and future development of developing countries arising from the burden of external debt contracted on hard terms should be neutralized by appropriate international action ...”

“Appropriate measures should be taken to alleviate the heavy burden of debt servicing, including the method of rescheduling.” (Documents of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. “Action programme for economic co-operation”, section entitled “International monetary and financial system”, paras. 6-7 (A/9390, p. 92).)

***** Speaking at the sixth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, in his capacity as Chairman of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, the Head of State of Algeria declared:

“In this regard it would be highly desirable to examine the problem of the present indebtedness of the developing countries. In this examination, we should consider the cancellation of the debt in a great number of cases and, in other cases, refinancing on better terms as regards maturity dates, deferrals and rates of interest.” (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 2208th meeting, para. 136.)

At the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held at New Delhi, Mr. L. Négre, Minister of Finance of Mali, said at the 58th plenary meeting:

“Many countries could legitimately have contested the legal validity of debts contracted under the auspices of foreign powers ... the developing countries asked their creditors to show a greater spirit of equity and suggested that, during the present Conference, they might decree ... the cancellation of all debts contracted during the colonial period ...” (Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Second Session, vol. I (and Corr. 1 and 3 and Add. 1 and 2), Report and annexes (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.I.I.D.14), annex V, para. 7.)

(Concluded on next page)
resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, adopted the "Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order", which provided in section II, 2 that all efforts should be made to take, *inter alia*, the following measures:

(f) Appropriate urgent measures, including international action, should be taken to mitigate adverse consequences for the current and future development of developing countries arising from the burden of external debt contracted on hard terms;

(g) Debt renegotiation on a case-by-case basis with a view to concluding agreements on debt cancellation, moratorium, rescheduling or interest subsidization.

(48) Resolution 31/158, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 December 1976, concerning "Debt problems of developing countries", states:

The General Assembly,

*Convinced* that the situation facing the developing countries can be mitigated by decisive and urgent relief measures in respect of ... their official ... debts ...,

*Acknowledging* that, in the present circumstances, there are sufficient common elements in the debt-servicing difficulties faced by various developing countries to warrant the adoption of general measures relating to their existing debt,

*Recognizing* the especially difficult circumstances and debt burden of the most seriously affected, least developed, land-locked and island developing countries,

1. *Considers* that it is integral to the establishment of the new international economic order to give a new orientation to procedures of reorganization of debt owed to developed countries away from the past experience of a primarily commercial framework towards a developmental approach;

2. *Affirms* the urgency of reaching a general and effective solution to the debt problems of developing countries;

3. *Agrees* that future debt negotiations should be considered within the context of internationally agreed development targets, national development objectives and international financial co-operation, and debt reorganization of interested developing countries carried out in accordance with the objectives, procedures and institutions evolved for that purpose;

4. *Stresses* that all these measures should be considered and implemented in a manner not prejudicial to the credit-worthiness of any developing country;

5. *Urges* the International Conference on Economic Co-operation to reach an early agreement on the question of immediate and generalized debt relief of the official debts of the developing countries, in particular of the most seriously affected, least developed, land-locked and island developing countries, and on the reorganization of the entire system of debt renegotiations to give it a developmental rather than a commercial orientation;

... (49) The Conference on International Economic Co-operation (sometimes referred to as the "North-South Conference") did not reach final agreement on the issue of debt relief or reorganization. The General Assembly, on 19 December 1977, adopted resolution 32/187 entitled "Debt problems of developing countries", which reads, *inter alia*:

The General Assembly,

*... Concerned* that many developing countries are experiencing extreme difficulties in servicing their external debts and are unable to pursue or initiate important development projects, that the growth performance of the most seriously affected, least developed, land-locked and island developing countries during the first half of this decade has been extremely unsatisfactory and that their *per capita* incomes have hardly increased.

*Considering* that substantial debt-relief measures in favour of developing countries are essential and would result in a significant infusion of united resources urgently required by many developing countries,

... *Noting* that the Special Action Programme of $1 billion offered by the developed donor countries at the Conference on International Economic Co-operation will cover less than one third of the annual debt-service payments of the most seriously affected and the least developed countries, and that substantive action has yet to be taken by them to implement the Programme,

... *2. Calls upon* the Trade and Development Board at its ministerial session to reach satisfactory decisions on:

(a) Generalized debt relief by the developed countries on the official debt of developing countries, in particular of the most seriously affected, least developed, land-locked and island developing countries, in the context of the call for a substantial increase in net official development assistance flows to developing countries;

(b) Reorganization of the entire system of debt renegotiation to give it a developmental orientation so as to result in adequate, equitable and consistent debt reorganizations;

(c) The problems created by the inadequate access of the majority of developing countries to international capital markets, in particular the danger of the bunching of repayments caused by the short maturities of such loans;

3. *Welcomes* the steps taken by some developed countries to cancel official debts owed to them by certain developing countries and the decision to extend future official development assistance in favour of the most seriously affected and the least developed of the developing countries in the form of grants, and urges that this be followed by similar steps;

4. *Recommends* that additional financial resources should be committed by multilateral development finance institutions to the developing countries experiencing debt-servicing difficulties.

(50) In response to General Assembly resolution 32/187, the Trade and Development Board, at the third (ministerial) part of its ninth special session, adopted resolution 165 (S-IX) on "Debt and development problems of developing countries". That resolution states, *inter alia*:

The Trade and Development Board,

*... Noting* the pledge given by developed countries to respond promptly and constructively, in a multilateral framework, to individual requests from developing countries with debt-servicing difficulties, in particular the least developed and most seriously affected among these countries,

*Recognizing* the importance of features which could provide guidance in future operations relating to debt problems as a basis for dealing flexibly with individual cases,

*Recalling* further the commitments made internationally by developed donor countries to increase the volume and improve the quality of their official development assistance,

*Aware* that means to resolve these problems are one of the urgent tasks before the international community,

*Agrees* to the following decisions:

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(Footnote 450 continued.)

During an official visit to French-speaking Africa, the President of the French Republic, Georges Pompidou, decided to cancel a debt of about 1 billion francs owed by 14 African countries. That gesture, which was well received, does not fall within the scope of this draft, which is not concerned with the debt-claims of the predecessor State (which constitute State property of that State). See *Journal officiel de la Republique francaise*, *Lois et decrets* (Paris), vol. 106, No. 170 (20 July 1974), p. 7577.
A

1. Members of the Board considered a number of proposals made by developing countries and by developed market-economy countries.

2. The Board recognized that many poorer developing countries, particularly the least developed among them, face serious development problems and in some instances serious debt-service difficulties.

3. The Board notes with interest the suggestions made by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD with respect to an adjustment of terms of past bilateral official development assistance in order to bring them into line with the currently prevailing softer terms.

4. Developed donor countries will seek to adopt measures for such an adjustment of terms of past bilateral official development assistance, or other equivalent measures, as a means of improving the net flows of official development assistance in order to enhance the development efforts of those developing countries in the light of internationally agreed objectives and conclusions on aid.

5. Upon undertaking such measures, each developed donor country will determine the distribution and the net flows involved within the context of its own aid policy.

6. In such a way, the net flows of official development assistance in appropriate forms and on highly concessional terms should be improved for the recipients.

... 

B

8. In accordance with Conference resolution 94 (IV), the Board reviewed the intensive work carried on within UNCTAD and other international forums on the identification of those features of past situations which could provide guidance for future operations relating to debt problems of interested developing countries.

9. The Board notes with appreciation the contributions made by the Group of 77 and by some members of Group B.

10. Common to the varying approaches in this work are certain basic concepts which include, inter alia:

(a) International consideration of the debt problem of a developing country would be initiated only at the specific request of the debtor country concerned;

(b) Such consideration would take place in an appropriate multilateral framework consisting of the interested parties, and with the help as appropriate of relevant international institutions to ensure timely action, taking into account the nature of the problem, which may vary from acute balance-of-payments difficulties requiring immediate action to longer term situations relating to structural, financial and transfer-of-resources problems requiring appropriate longer term measures;

(c) International action, once agreed by the interested parties, would take due account of the country's economic and financial situation and performance, and of its development prospects and capabilities and of external factors, bearing in mind internationally agreed objectives for the development of developing countries;

(d) Debt reorganization would protect the interests of both debtors and creditors equitably in the context of international economic cooperation.

... 451

(51) On 5 December 1980, the General Assembly, by resolution 35/56, adopted the “International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade”. Included among the “Policy measures” in section III.D, regarding “Financial resources for development”, is the following:

111. Negotiations regarding internationally agreed features for future operations related to debt problems of interested developing countries should be brought to an early conclusion in the light of the general principles adopted by the Trade and Development Board in section B of its resolution 165 (S-IX) of 11 March 1978.

112. Governments should seek to adopt the following debt-relief actions or equivalent measures:

(a) Commitments undertaken in pursuance of section A of Trade and Development Board resolution 165 (S-IX) should be fully implemented as quickly as possible;

(b) Retroactive adjustment of terms should be continued in accordance with Trade and Development Board resolution 165 (S-IX), so that the improvement in current terms can be applied to outstanding official development assistance debt, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development should review the progress made in that regard.

Rule reflected in article 36

(52) It may, at this juncture, be helpful to recall the scope of Part IV of the draft articles and the provisions of article 31, defining “State debt”. As has been noted, 452 debts proper to the territory to which a succession of States relates and contracted by one of its territorial authorities are excluded from the scope of “State debt” in this draft, as they may not properly be considered to be the debts of the predecessor State. In adopting such an approach in the context of decolonization, the Commission is aware that not all problems relating to succession in respect of debts are settled for newly independent States by article 36. In fact, the bulk of the liabilities involved in the succession may not, in the case of decolonization, consist of State debts of the predecessor State. They may be debts said to be “proper to the dependent territory”, contracted under a very formal financial autonomy by the organs of colonization in the territory, which may constitute a considerable volume of liabilities. As has been seen, disputes have frequently arisen concerning the real nature of debts of this kind, which are at times considered by the newly independent State as “State debts” of the predecessor State which must remain the responsibility of the latter. The category of debts directly covered by article 36 is therefore that of debts contracted by the Government of the administering Power on behalf and for the account of the dependent territory. These are, properly speaking, the State debts of the predecessor State, the fate of which upon the emergence of a newly independent State is the subject-matter of the article.

(53) Also excluded are certain debts assumed by a successor State within the context of an agreement or arrangement providing for the independence of the formerly dependent territory. They include “miscellaneous debts” resulting from the takeover by the newly independent State of, for example, all public services. They do not appear to be debts of the predecessor State at the date of the succession of States, but rather correspond to what the successor State pays for the final settlement of the succession of States. Indeed, such debts may be said to represent “debt-claims” of the predecessor State against the successor State for the settlement of a dispute arising on the occasion of the suc-


452 See above, paras. (14) et seq. of the commentary to art. 31.
cession of States. Finally, as explained above, the Commission has left aside the question of drafting general provisions relating to “odious debts”.

(54) Further in regard to the scope of the present article, State practice concerning the emergence of newly independent States has shown the existence of another category of debts: those contracted by a dependent territory, but with the guarantee of the administering Power. This category includes, in particular, most loans contracted between dependent territories and IBRD. The latter required a particularly sound guarantee from the administering Power. In most, if not all, guarantee agreements concluded between IBRD and an administering Power for a dependent territory, there are two important articles, articles II and III:

Article II

Section 2.01. Without limitation or restriction upon any of the other covenants on its part in this Guarantee Agreement contained, the Guarantor hereby unconditionally guarantees, as primary obligor and not as surety merely, the due and punctual payment of the principal of, and the interest and other charges on, the Loan ... Section 2.02. Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that the borrower will not have sufficient funds to execute or to arrange the execution of the project in conformity with the Loan Agreement, the Guarantor, in consultation with the Bank and the borrower, will take the measures necessary to help the borrower to obtain the additional funds required.

Article III

Section 3.01. It is the mutual understanding of the Guarantor and the Bank that, except as otherwise herein provided, the Guarantor will not grant in favour of any external debt any preference or priority over the Loan ...

(55) In the case of a guaranteed debt, the guarantee furnished by the administering Power legally creates a specific obligation for which it is liable, and a correlative subjective right of the creditor. If the succession of States had the effect of extinguishing the guarantee altogether and thus relieving the predecessor State of one of its obligations, a right of the creditor would unjustifiably disappear. The problem is not, therefore, to determine what happens to the debt proper to the dependent territory—which, it appears, is in fact normally assumed by the newly independent State—but rather to ascertain what becomes of the element by which the debt is supported, furnished in the form of a guarantee by the administering Power. In other words, what is at issue is not succession to the debt proper to the dependent territory, but succession to the obligation of the predecessor State in respect of the territory’s debt.

(56) The practice followed by IBRD in this regard seems clear. The Bank turns first to the newly independent State, for it considers that the loan agreements signed by the dependent territory are not affected by a succession of States as long as the debtor remains identifiable. For the purposes of these loan agreements, IBRD seems to consider, as it were, that the succession of States has not changed the identity of the entity which existed before independence. However, the World Bank considers—and the predecessor State which has guaranteed the loan does not in any way deny—that the legal effects of the contract of guarantee continue to operate after the territory has become independent, so that the Bank can at any time turn to the predecessor State if the successor State defaults. The practice of the World Bank shows that the predecessor State cannot be relieved of its guarantee obligation as the principal debtor unless a new contract is concluded to this effect between IBRD, the successor State and the predecessor State, or between the first two for the purpose of relieving the predecessor State of all charges and obligations which it assumed by virtue of the guarantee given by it earlier.

(57) Bearing these considerations in mind, the Commission considers it sufficient to note that a succession of States does not as such effect a guarantee given by a predecessor State for a debt assumed by one of its formerly dependent territories.

(58) In the search for a general solution to the question of the fate of State debts of the predecessor State upon the emergence of a newly independent State, some writers have stressed the criterion of the utility or actual benefit which the loan afforded to the formerly dependent territory. While such a criterion may appear useful at first glance, it is clear that if established as the basic rule governing the matter at issue, it would be extremely difficult to apply in practice. During a regional symposium held at Accra by UNITAR in 1971, the question was raised in the following terms:

To justify the transfer of debts to a newly independent State, it was argued ... that, since in a majority of cases the metropolitan Power made separate fiscal arrangements for the colony, it would be possible to determine the nature and extent of such debts. One speaker argued that any debt contracted on behalf of a given colony was not necessarily used for the benefit of that colony. He suggested that perhaps the determining factor should be whether the particular debt was used for the benefit of the colony. Although this point was generally acceptable to several delegates, doubt was raised as regards how the utility theory would in practice be applied, i.e., who was to determine and in what

— Sanchez de Bustamante y Sirven, op. cit., pp. 279-280.
manner the amount of the debt which had actually been used on behalf of the colony.\footnote{Report of the United Nations Regional Symposium on International Law for Africa, 14-28 January 1971, Accra (Ghana), organized by UNITAR at the invitation of the Ghanaian Government, p. 9.}

(59) In the case of loans granted to the administering Power for the development of the dependent territory (criterion of intended use and allocation), the colonial context in which the development of the territory may have taken place as a result of these loans must be kept in mind. It is by no means certain that the investment in question did not primarily benefit a foreign colonial settlement or the metropolitan economy of the administering Power.\footnote{Ibid., p. 443. [Translation by the Secretariat.]} Even if the successor State retained some "trace" of the investment, in the form, for example, of public works infrastructures, such infrastructures might be obsolete or unusable in the context of decolonization, with the new orientation of the economy or the new planning priorities decided upon by the newly independent State.

(60) Another factor to be taken into account in the drafting of a general rule concerning the subject-matter of this article is the capacity of the newly independent State to pay the relevant debts of the predecessor State. This factor has arisen in State practice in connection with cases other than that of newly independent States. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, in the Russian Indemnity case\footnote{See Rousseau, Droit international public (op. cit.), pp. 442-447, 464-466, and Feilchenfeld, op. cit., pp. 458-461, 852-856.} of 1912, recognized that:

The defence of force majeure ... may be pleaded in public as well as in private international law: international law must adapt itself to political necessities.\footnote{\"Les défaiillances d'Etat\" (loc. cit.), p. 392.}

The treaties of peace concluded at the end of the First World War seem to indicate that, in the apportionment of predecessor State debts between various successor States, the financial capacity of the latter States, in the sense of future paying capacity (or contributing capacity), was in some cases taken into account.\footnote{Jèze, "Les défaillances d'Etat" (loc. cit.), p. 392.} One author quotes an example of State practice in 1932, in which the creditor State (the United States) declared in a note to the debtor State (the United Kingdom) that the principle of capacity to pay did not require that the foreign debtor should pay to the full limit of its present or future capacity, as no settlement which was oppressive and which delayed the recovery and progress of the foreign debtor was in accordance with the true interest of the creditor.\footnote{\"In the case of Poland that portion of the debt which, in the opinion of the Reparation Commission, is attributable to the measures taken by the German and Prussian Governments for the German colonization of Poland shall be excluded from the apportionment to be made under Article 254.\"}

(61) Transposed to the context of succession to debts in the case of newly independent States, these considerations relating to the financial capacity of the debtor are of great importance in the search for a basic rule governing such succession. The Commission is not unaware of the fact that cases of "State default" involve debts already recognized by and assigned to the debtor whereas, in the cases with which this article is concerned, the debt is not yet "assigned" to the successor State and the whole problem is first to decide whether the newly independent State must be made legally responsible for such a debt before deciding whether it can assume it financially. Nevertheless, the two questions must be linked if practical and just solutions are to be found for situations in which prevention is better than cure. It may be asked what purpose is served by affirming in a rule that certain debts are transferable to a newly independent State if its economic and financial difficulties are already known in advance to constitute a substantial impediment to the payment of such debts.\footnote{\"Reconstruction of their economies by several new States has raised questions of the continuity of financial and economic arrangements made by the former colonial Powers or by their territorial administrations.\" ILA, op. cit., p. 102.} Admittedly, taking into account explicitly in a draft article the "financial capacity" of a State would involve a somewhat vague phrase and might leave the way open for abuses. On the other hand, it is neither possible nor realistic to ignore the reasonable limits beyond which the assumption of debts would be destructive for the debtor and without result for the creditor.

(62) The above general considerations concerning the capacity to pay must be viewed in relation to the developments occurring in contemporary international relations concerning the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources, which constitutes a fundamental element in the right of peoples to self-determination.\footnote{See above, paras. (26) to (29) of the commentary to art. 14.} This principle, as it emerges from United Nations practice, is of substantial significance in the context of the financial capacity of newly independent States to succeed to State debts of the predecessor State which may have been linked to such resources (which may for example have been pledged as security for a debt). Thus the traditional issue of "capacity to pay" must be seen in its contemporary framework, taking into account the present financial situation of newly independent States as well as the implications of the paramount right of self-determination of the peoples and the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources.

(63) In attempting to draft a basic rule applicable to succession to State debts of the predecessor State by newly independent States, the Commission has approached its task by drawing inspiration from Article 55 of the United Nations Charter:

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
Stability and orderly relations between States, which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations, cannot be divorced from the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples or from the overall efforts of the present-day international community to promote conditions of economic and social progress and to provide solutions of international economic problems. Neither State practice nor the writings of jurists provide clear and consistent answers to the question of the fate of State debts of the former metropolitan Power. Thus, the Commission is aware that, in drawing up rules governing the subject-matter, it is inevitable that a measure of progressive development of the law should be involved. State practice shows conflicting principles, solutions based on compromise with no explicit recognition of any principles, and serious divergences of views, which continue to manifest themselves many years after the purported settlement of a succession of States. It is true, nevertheless, that in many cases the State debts of the predecessor metropolitan State have not passed to the newly independent State. The Commission cannot but recognize certain realities of present-day international life, in particular the severe burden of debt reflected in the financial situation of a number of newly independent States; nor can it ignore, in the drafting of legal rules governing succession to State debts in the context of decolonization, the legal implications of the fundamental right to self-determination of peoples and of the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources. The Commission considered the possibility of drafting a basic rule that would provide for the passing of such debts if the dependent territory actually benefited therefrom. But, as was indicated above (paras. (58) and (59)), that criterion taken alone seems difficult to apply in practice, and does not provide for stable and friendly solution of the problems. It should not be forgotten that the subject-matter at issue—the succession of a newly independent State to State debts of a metropolitan Power—takes place wholly within the context of decolonization, which imports special and unique considerations not found in other types of succession of States. The latter consideration also implies the necessity to avoid such general language as “equitable proportion”, which has proved appropriate in other types of succession but which would raise serious questions of interpretation and possible abuse in the context of decolonization.

The Commission, in the light of all the above considerations, decided to adopt as a basic rule the rule of the non-passing of the State debt of the predecessor State to the successor State. This rule is found in the first part of paragraph 1 of article 36, which states: “no State debt of the predecessor State shall pass to the newly independent State ...”. Having thus provided for the basic rule of non-passing, however, the Commission did not wish to foreclose the important possibility of an agreement on succession in respect of State debts being validly and freely concluded between the predecessor and successor States. The Commission was fully aware that newly independent States often need capital investment and that it should avoid formulating rules which might discourage States or financial international organizations from providing the necessary assistance. Thus, the second part of paragraph 1 of article 36 is intended to follow the spirit of other provisions of the draft which encourage the predecessor and successor States to settle the question of the passing of State debts by agreement between themselves. Of course, it must be emphasized that such agreements must be validly concluded, pursuant to the will freely expressed by both parties. To bring that consideration more sharply into focus, the second part of paragraph 1 has been drafted so as to spell out the necessary conditions under which such an agreement should be concluded. Thus, first, the State debt of the predecessor State must be “connected with its activity in the territory to which the succession of States relates.” The language generally follows that found in other articles of the draft, already adopted, concerning succession in respect of State property (see, in particular, arts. 13, 14, 16 and 17). Its purpose is clearly to exclude from consideration debts of the predecessor State having nothing to do with its activities as metropolitan Power in the dependent territory concerned. Secondly, the State debt of the predecessor State, connected with its activity in the territory concerned, must be linked with “the property, rights and interests which pass to the newly independent State”. If the successor State succeeds to certain property, rights and interests of the predecessor State, as provided for in article 14, it is only natural that an agreement on succession to State debts should take into account the corresponding obligations which may accompany such property, rights and interests. Thus, articles 14 and 36 are closely connected in that respect. While the use of the criterion of “actual benefit” has generally been avoided, it can be seen that certain elements of that criterion have been usefully reflected here: the passing of benefits may be settled by agreement in view of the passing of benefits (property, rights and interests) to which those debts are linked.

While the parties to the agreement envisaged in paragraph 1 may freely agree on the provisions to be included therein, the Commission thought it necessary to provide a safeguard clause to ensure that such provisions do not ignore the financial capacity of the newly independent State to succeed to such debts or infringe the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources. Such a safeguard, which is included in paragraph 2, is particularly necessary in the case of an agreement such as is mentioned in paragraph 1, that is, one concluded between a former metropolitan Power and one of its former dependencies. By paragraph 2, it is intended to underline once again that the agreement must be concluded by the two parties on an equal footing. Thus, agreements purporting to establish “special” or
“preferential” ties between the predecessor and successor States (often termed “devolution agreements”) which in fact impose on the newly independent States terms that are ruinous to their economies, cannot be considered as the type of agreement envisaged in paragraph 1. The article presupposes—and paragraph 2 is intended to reinforce that supposition—that the agreements are to be negotiated in full respect for the principles of political self-determination and economic independence. Hence the express reference to the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources and to the fundamental economic equilibria of the newly independent State.

The latter expression, “fundamental economic equilibria”, must be interpreted in a broad sense, covering all kinds of economic, financial (including indebtedness) and other factors which assure the fundamental equilibria of a newly independent State.

(66) The Commission would further recall certain decisions relating to other articles of the draft which bear upon article 36. The term “newly independent State” has already been defined in article 2, sub-paragraph 1 (e) of the draft. Like article 14, article 36 is intended to apply to cases in which the newly independent State is formed from two or more dependent territories. Likewise, the article applies to cases in which a dependent territory becomes part of the territory of a State other than the State which was responsible for its international relations.

The Commission has not thought it necessary to deal with the self-evident case of debts of the predecessor State owed to the dependent territory, which continue to be payable to the newly independent State after the date of the succession of States.

(67) When article 36 was adopted on first reading by the Commission at its twenty-ninth session, in 1977, certain members of the Commission were unable to support the text and expressed reservations and doubts thereon. One member expressed reservations on certain paragraphs of the commentary to the article as well.

That member also proposed at that time an alternative text for the article, which received a measure of support from some members. Concerning the question of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, that member expressed preference for the terminology found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

**Article 37. Uniting of States**

When two or more States unite and so form a successor State, the State debt of the predecessor States shall pass to the successor State.

**Commentary**

(1) Article 37, on the passing of the State debt in the case of uniting of States, corresponds to article 15 in part II, relating to succession in respect of State property, and to article 27 in part III, on succession in respect of State archives. It is not necessary, therefore to specify again the exact scope of the type of succession in question.

(2) When two or more States unite and so form one successor State, it seems logical for the latter to succeed to the debt of the former just as it succeeds to their property. *Res transit cum suo onere*, the basic rule, is laid down in the single paragraph constituting the article. This rule is generally accepted in legal theory. According to one writer, for instance, “when States merge to form a new State, their debts become the responsibility of that State.”

(3) In the practice of States, there seem to be only a few cases where the passing of the State debt upon a uniting of States was settled at the international level; questions relating to State debts have usually been regulated by the internal law of States. One example of an international arrangement is the union of Belgium and the Netherlands by the Act of 21 July 1814.

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**Footnotes**

464 In this connection, attention may be drawn to the fact that the word “disequilibria” is found in art. 60, subpara. 2 (b), of the Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 261, p. 191) and in art. 3, para. (g) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (*ibid.*), vol. 298, p. 16.

465 See para. 75 above.

466 The member concerned objected to the inclusion of paras. (39) to (50) of the 1977 commentary (see paras. (39) to (48) of the present commentary), particularly on the grounds that, in his view, they contained economic exposition and analysis which were not within the Commission’s sphere of competence, and that some aspects of that exposition and analysis were debatable. That member also considered it important to note that a number of States had dissented from elements of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order quoted in paras. (27) and (28) of the commentary to art. 14.

467 See above, paras. (1) and (2) of the commentary to art. 15.

468 General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, annex.

469 That text (A/CN.4/L. 257) reads as follows:

“Article 22. Newly independent States

1. No debt contracted by the predecessor State on behalf or for the account of a territory which has become a newly independent State shall pass to the newly independent State unless the debt relates to property, rights and interests of which the newly independent State is beneficiary and unless that passage of debt is in equitable proportion to the benefits that the newly independent State has derived or derives from the property, rights and interests in question.

2. Any agreement concluded between the predecessor and the newly independent State for the implementation of the principles contained in the preceding paragraph shall pay due regard to the newly independent State’s permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources in accordance with international law.”

This union shall be intimate and complete so that the two countries form but one single State, governed by the Constitution already established in Holland, which will be modified by agreement in accordance with the new circumstances.

In view of the "intimate and complete" nature of the union thus achieved, article VI of the Act quite naturally concluded that:

Since the burdens as well as the benefits are to be common, debts contracted up to the time of the union by the Dutch provinces on the one hand and by the Belgian provinces on the other, shall be borne by the General Treasury of the Netherlands.

The Act of 21 July 1814 was later annexed to the General Act of the Congress of Vienna, and the article VI cited was invoked on a number of occasions to provide guidance for the apportionment of the debts between Holland and Belgium.

(4) A second example that may be cited is the unification of Italy—a somewhat ambiguous example, however, because learned opinion differs in describing the manner in which unity was achieved. As one writer sums it up:

Some have regarded the Kingdom of Italy as an enlargement of the Kingdom of Sardinia, arguing that it was formed by means of successive annexations to the Kingdom of Sardinia; others have regarded it as a new subject of law created by the merger of all the former Italian States, including the Kingdom of Sardinia, which thus ceased to exist.

In a general way, the Kingdom of Italy acknowledged the debts of the formerly separate States and continued the practice that had already been instituted by the King of Sardinia. Thus, the Peace Treaty of Vienna of 3 October 1866, under which "His Majesty the Emperor of Austria [agrees] to the union of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom with the Kingdom of Italy" (art. III), included an article VI which provided as follows:

The Italian Government shall assume responsibility for:

(1) That part of Monte Lombardo-Veneto which was retained by Austria under the convention concluded at Milan in 1860 in application of article VII of the Treaty of Zurich;

(2) The additional debts contracted by Monte Lombardo-Veneto between 4 June 1859 and the date of conclusion of this Treaty;

(3) A sum of 35 million Austrian florins, in cash, representing the portion of the 1854 loan attributable to Venetia for the cost of non-transportable war materials...

(5) Certain treaties relating to the uniting of Central American States may also be mentioned. The Treaty of 15 June 1897 concluded by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador, the Republic of Central America, as well as the Covenant of Union of Central America of 19 January 1921 concluded by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras after the dissolution of the Republic of Central America, contained some provisions relating to the treatment of debts. Although those treaties were more directly concerned with the allocation of debts among the component parts of the united State, there is no doubt that in its international relations the new State as a whole assumed the debts that had been owed by the various predecessor States. The Treaty of 1897, according to which the union had "for its one object the maintenance in its international relations of a single entity" (art. III), provided that:

The pecuniary or other obligations contracted, or which may be contracted in the future, by any of the States are matters of individual responsibility. (art. XXXVII).

The 1921 Covenant stipulated that the Federal Government should administer the national finances, which should be distinct from those of the component States, and that the component States should "continue the administration of their present internal and external debts" (art. V, para. (m)). It then went on to provide that:

The Federal Government shall be under an obligation to see that the said administration is faithfully carried out, and that the revenues pledged thereto are earmarked for that purpose.

(6) As indicated above, it is usually through the internal laws of States that questions relating to State debts have been regulated. Such laws often provide for the internal allocation of the State debt and thus are not directly relevant to the present article. Some examples, however, may be mentioned, because they assume that the State debt of the predecessor State passes to the successor State; otherwise no question of its allocation among component parts would arise.

(7) The union of Austria and Hungary was based essentially on two instruments: the "[Austrian] Act concerning matters of common interest to all the countries of the Austrian Monarchy and the manner of dealing with them", of 21 December 1867, and the "Hungarian Act [No. 12] relating to matters of common interest to the countries of the Hungarian Crown and the other countries subject to the sovereignty of His Majesty and the manner of dealing with them", of 12 June 1867. The Austrian Act provided, in article 4, that

The contribution to the costs of the pre-existing public debt shall be determined by agreement between the two halves of the Empire.

The Hungarian Act No. 12 of 1867 contained the following:

**Article 53.** As regards public debts, Hungary, by virtue of its constitutional status, cannot, in strict law, be obliged to assume debts contracted without the legally expressed consent of the country.

**Article 54.** However, the present Diet has already declared "that, if a genuine constitutional regime is really applied as soon as possible in our country and also in His Majesty's other countries, it is

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475 The Treaty of Zurich of 10 November 1859, concluded between Austria and France, ceded Lombardy to France. The "new Government of Lombardy", under art. VII of the Treaty, was to assume three-fifths of the debt of Monte-Lombardo-Veneto (French text in Parry, op. cit., vol. 121, p. 148, and *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1858-1859 (London, Ridgway, 1867), vol. XLIX, p. 366).

476 English trans. in Parry, op. cit., vol. 185, pp. 239 et seq., and *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1899-1900 (London, Harrissom, 1903), vol. XCVI, pp. 234 et seq.).

477 Ibid., op. cit., et seq.

prepared, for considerations of equity and on political grounds, to go beyond its legitimate obligations and to do whatever shall be compatible with the independence and the constitutional rights of the country to the end that His Majesty's other countries, and Hungary with them, may not be ruined by the weight of the expenses accumulated under the regime of absolute power and that the untoward consequences of the tragic period which has just elapsed may be averted".

Article 55. For this reason, and for this reason alone, Hungary is prepared to assume a portion of the public debts and to do whatever shall be compatible with the independence and the constitutional rights of the country to the end that His Majesty's other countries, and Hungary with them, may not be ruined by the weight of the expenses accumulated under the regime of absolute power and that the untoward consequences of the tragic period which has just elapsed may be averted".

(8) The Constitution of the Federation of Malaya (1957) contained a long article 167 entitled "Rights, liabilities and obligations", which included the following provisions:

1. All rights, liabilities and obligations of Her Majesty in respect of the Federation, and the Government of the Federation or any public officer on behalf of the Government of the Federation, shall on and after Merdeka Day [the date of uniting] be the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Federation.
2. All rights, liabilities and obligations of Her Majesty in respect of the government of Malacca or the government of Penang, His Highness the Ruler in respect of the government of any State, and the government of any State, shall on and after Merdeka Day be the rights, liabilities and obligations of the respective States.

These provisions thus appear to indicate that each State entity was concerned only with the assets and liabilities of its particular sphere. "Rights, liabilities and obligations" were apportioned according to the division of spheres of competence established between the Federation and the member States. Debts contracted were thus the responsibility of the States in respect of matters which, as from the date of uniting, fell within their respective spheres of competence. Article 167 continued:

3. All rights, liabilities and obligations relating to any matter which was immediately before Merdeka Day the responsibility of the Government of a State but which on that date becomes the responsibility of the Federation, shall on that date devolve upon the Federation.
4. All rights, liabilities and obligations relating to any matter which was immediately before Merdeka Day the responsibility of the Government of a State but which on that date becomes the responsibility of the Federal Government, shall on that date devolve upon the Federation.

(9) The Federation of Malaya was succeeded by Malaysia in 1963. The Malaysia Bill, which was annexed to the Agreement relating to Malaysia and came into force on 16 September 1963, contained in its part IV, relating to transitional and temporary provisions, a section 76 entitled "Succession to rights, liabilities and obligations", which read, inter alia:

5. All rights, liabilities and obligations relating to any matter which was immediately before Merdeka Day the responsibility of the government of a Borneo State or of Singapore, but which on that day becomes the responsibility of the Federal Government, shall on that
day devolve upon the Federation, unless otherwise agreed between the Federal Government and the government of the State.
6. This section does not apply to any rights, liabilities or obligations in relation to which section 75 has effect, nor does it have effect to transfer any person from service under the State to service under the Federation or otherwise affect any rights, liabilities or obligations arising from such service or from any contract of employment; but, subject to that, in this section rights, liabilities and obligations include rights, liabilities and obligations arising from contract or otherwise.

7. In this section references to the government of a State include the government of the territories comprised therein before Malaysia Day.

Similar provisions may be noted in the individual Constitutions of the member States of the Federation. For example, article 50 of the Constitution of the State of Sabah (Rights, liabilities and obligations) stated:

2. All rights, liabilities and obligations of Her Majesty in respect of the government of the colony of North Borneo shall on the commencement of this Constitution become rights, liabilities and obligations of the State.

(10) The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Republic, of 5 March 1958," although not very explicit as regards succession to debts of the two predecessor States, Egypt and Syria, provided in article 29 that:

The Government may not contract any loans, or undertake any project which would be a burden on the State Treasury over one or more future years, except with the consent of the National Assembly.

This provision may be interpreted as giving the legislative authority of the United Arab Republic, to the exclusion of Syria and Egypt, sole power to contract loans. Furthermore, since article 70 provided for a single budget for the two regions, there may be grounds for agreeing with an eminent authority that "the United Arab Republic would seem to have been the only entity competent to service the debts of the two regions".

Article 38. Separation of part or parts of the territory of a State

1. When part or parts of the territory of a State separate from that State and form a State, and unless the predecessor State and the successor State otherwise agree, the State debt of the predecessor State shall pass to the successor State in an equitable proportion, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

2. Paragraph 1 applies when part of the territory of a State separates from that State and unites with another State.

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45 ibid., p. 110. See also the Constitution of the State of Sarawak, art. 48 (ibid., p. 134) and the Constitution of the State of Singapore, art. 104 (ibid., p. 176).
47 O'Connell, State Succession ... (op. cit.), p. 386. It may be noted that the arrears of contributions due to UNESCO from Egypt and Syria before their union came into being were treated as a liability of the United Arab Republic (Materials on Succession of States in respect of Matters other than Treaties (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.77.V.9), p. 545).
Article 39. Dissolution of a State

When a predecessor State dissolves and ceases to exist and the parts of its territory form two or more States, and unless the successor States otherwise agree, the State debt of the predecessor State shall pass to the successor States in equitable proportions, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

Commentary to articles 38 and 39

(1) The topics of succession of States covered by articles 38 and 39 correspond to those dealt with in articles 16 and 17 and 28 and 29, respectively in parts II and III; hence the use of similar introductory phrases in the corresponding articles to define their scope. Articles 38 and 39 both concern cases where a part or parts of the territory of a State separate from that State to form one or more individual States. They differ, however, in that, while under article 38 the predecessor State continues its existence, under article 39 it ceases to exist after the separation of parts of its territory. The latter case is referred to as “dissolution of a State” in articles 17, 29 and 39.443

(2) In establishing the rule for articles 38 and 39 the Commission believes that, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, the passing of the State debt in the two types of succession covered by these articles should be governed by a common basic rule, as are articles 16 and 17, relating to State property and articles 28 and 29 on State archives. It is on the basis of this assumption that State practice and legal doctrine will be examined in the following paragraphs.

(3) The practice of States offers few examples of separation of part or parts of the territory. Some cases may nevertheless be mentioned, one of them being the establishment of the Irish Free State. By the Treaty of 6 December 1921, Ireland obtained from the United Kingdom the status of a Dominion and became the Irish Free State. The Treaty apportioned debts between the predecessor State and the successor State on the following terms:

The Irish Free State shall assume liability for the service of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom as existing at the date hereof and towards the payment of war pensions as existing at that date in such proportion as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just claims on the part of Ireland by way of set off or counter-claim, the amount of such sums being determined in default of agreement by the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Empire.444

(4) Another example is the separation of Singapore, which, after joining the Federation of Malaya in 1963, withdrew from it and achieved independence in 1965. Article VIII of the Agreement relating to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia as an independent and sovereign State, signed at Kuala Lumpur on 7 August 1965, provides:

With regard to any agreement entered into between the Government of Singapore and any other country or corporate body which has been guaranteed by the Government of Malaysia, the Government of Singapore hereby undertakes to negotiate with such country or corporate body to enter into a fresh agreement releasing the Government of Malaysia of its liabilities and obligations under the said guarantee, and the Government of Singapore hereby undertakes to indemnify the Government of Malaysia fully for any liabilities, obligations or damage which it may suffer as a result of the said guarantee.445

(5) The two above-mentioned examples relate to cases where separation took place by agreement between the predecessor and successor States. However, it is far from certain that separation is always achieved by agreement. For example, the apportionment of State debts between Bangladesh and Pakistan does not seem to have been settled since the failure of the negotiations held at Dacca between 27 and 29 June 1974.446 This is one of the points that clearly distinguish cases of separation, covered by article 38, from cases of transfer of a part of a State’s territory, dealt with in article 39. The latter article, it should be recalled, concerns the transfer of relatively small or unimportant territories, effected by theoretically peaceful procedures and, in principle, by agreement between the ceding and beneficiary States.

(6) With regard to dissolution of a State, covered by article 39, the following historical precedents may be cited: the dissolution of Great Colombia (1829-1831), the dissolution of the Union of Norway and Sweden (1905), the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1919), the disappearance of the Federation of Mali (1960), the dissolution of the United Arab Republic (1961) and the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia-Nyasaland (1963). Some of these cases are considered below, with a view to establishing how the parties concerned attempted to settle the passing of State debts.

(7) Great Colombia, which was formed in 1821 by the union of New Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador, was not to be long-lived. Within about ten years, internal disputes had put an end to the union, whose dissolution was fully consummated in 1831.447 The successor States agreed to assume responsibility for the debts of the


The Constitution of Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act, 1965, also contains some provisions relating to “succession to liabilities and obligations”, including the following paragraph:

“9. All property, movable and immovable, and rights, liabilities and obligations which before Malaysia Day belonged to or were the responsibility of the Government of Singapore and which on that day or after became the property of or the responsibility of the Government of Malaysia shall on Singapore Day revert to and vest in or devolve upon and become once again the property of or the responsibility of Singapore.” (Ibid., p. 100.)

Union. New Granada and Ecuador first established the principle in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded at Pasto on 8 December 1832. Article VII of the Treaty provided:

It has been agreed, and is hereby agreed, in the most solemn manner, and under the Regulations of the Laws of both States, that New Granada and Ecuador shall pay such share of the Debts, Domestic and Foreign, as may proportionately belong to them as integral parts which they formed, of the Republic of Colombia, which Republic recognized the said debts in solidum. Moreover, each State agrees to answer for the amount of which it may have disposed belonging to the said Republic.  

Reference may also be made to the Convention of Bogota of 23 December 1834, concluded between New Granada and Venezuela, to which Ecuador subsequently acceded on 17 April 1857. These two instruments indicate that the successor States were to apportion the debts of Great Colombia among themselves in the following proportions: New Granada, 50 per cent; Venezuela, 28.5 per cent; Ecuador, 21.5 per cent.  

(8) The “Belgian-Dutch” question of 1830 had necessitated the intervention of the five Powers of the Holy Alliance, in the form of a conference that opened in London in 1830 and that culminated only in 1839, in the Treaty of London of 19 April of that year. During the nine years of negotiations, a number of documents had to be prepared before the claims regarding the debts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands could be settled.  

(9) One such document, the Twelfth Protocol of the London Conference, dated 27 January 1831, prepared by the five Powers, was the first to propose a fairly specific mode of settlement of the debts, which was to be included among the general principles to be applied in the draft treaty of London. The five Powers first sought to justify their intervention by asserting that “experience ... had only too often demonstrated to them the complete impossibility of the Parties directly concerned agreeing on such matters, if the benevolent solicitude of the five Courts did not facilitate agreement”. They cited the existence of relevant precedents that they had helped to establish and that “in the past led to decisions based on principles of those “bases” read as follows:

**Article X.** The debts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for which the Royal Treasury is at present liable, namely: (1) the outstanding debt on which interest is payable; (2) the deferred debt; (3) the various funds secured on State lands by special mortgages; shall be apportioned between Holland and Belgium in proportion to the average share of the direct, indirect and excise taxes of the Kingdom paid by each of the two countries during the years 1827, 1828 and 1829.

**Article XI.** Inasmuch as the average share in question makes Holland liable for 15.3/31 and Belgium liable for 16.3/31 of the aforesaid debts, it is understood that Belgium will continue to be liable for the payment of appropriate interest.**

These provisions were objected to by France, which considered that “His Majesty’s Government had not found their bases equitable enough to be acceptable”. The four courts to which the French communication was addressed replied that:

The principle established in Protocol No. 12, with regard to the debt, was as follows: When the Kingdom of the Netherlands was formed by the union of Holland with Belgium, the then existing debts of those two countries were merged by the Treaty of 1815 into a single whole and declared to be the national debt of the United Kingdom. It is therefore necessary and just that, when Holland and Belgium separate, each should resume responsibility for the debt for which it cannot therefore be changed in any case without the participation of the Contracting Powers.” One of the leading precedents relied upon by these five monarchies was apparently the above-mentioned Act of 21 July 1814 by which Belgium and the Netherlands had been united. Article VI of that Act provided that:

Since the burdens as well as the benefits are to be common, debts contracted up to the time of the union by the Dutch provinces on the one hand and by the Belgian provinces on the other shall be borne by the General Treasury of the Netherlands. From that provision the five Powers drew the conclusion of principle that, “upon the termination of the union, the community in question likewise should probably come to an end, and, as a further corollary of the principle, the debts which, under the system of the union, had been merged, might under the system of separation, be redivided.” Applying that principle in the case of the Netherlands, the five Powers concluded that “each country should first resume exclusively responsibility for the debts it owed before the union” and that Belgium should in addition assume “in fair proportion, the debts contracted since the date of the said union, and during the period of the union, by the General Treasury of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as they are shown in the budget of that Kingdom”. That conclusion was incorporated in the “Bases for establishing the separation of Belgium and Holland” annexed to the Twelfth Protocol. Articles X and XI of those “bases” read as follows:

**Article X.** The debts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for which the Royal Treasury is at present liable, namely: (1) the outstanding debt on which interest is payable; (2) the deferred debt; (3) the various funds secured on State lands by special mortgages: shall be apportioned between Holland and Belgium in proportion to the average share of the direct, indirect and excise taxes of the Kingdom paid by each of the two countries during the years 1827, 1828 and 1829.

**Article XI.** Inasmuch as the average share in question makes Holland liable for 15.3/31 and Belgium liable for 16.3/31 of the aforesaid debts, it is understood that Belgium will continue to be liable for the payment of appropriate interest.**
was responsible before their union, and that these debts which were united at the same time as the two countries, should likewise be separated.

Subsequent to the union, the United Kingdom has contracted an additional debt which, upon the separation of the United Kingdom, must be fairly apportioned between the two States; the Protocol does not, however, specify what exactly the fair proportion should be, and leaves this question to be settled later.¹¹¹

(10) The Netherlands proved particularly satisfied and its plenipotentiaries were authorized to indicate their full and complete acceptance of all the basic articles designed to establish the separation of Belgium and Holland, which basic provisions derived from the Eleventh and Twelfth London Protocols of 20 and 27 January 1831.¹²² The Belgian point of view was reflected in a report dated 15 March 1831 to the Regent by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which stated:

Protocols Nos. 12 and 13 dated 27 January ... have shown in the most obvious manner the partiality, no doubt involuntary, of some of the plenipotentiaries in the Conference. These Protocols, dealing with the fixing of the boundaries, the armistice and, above all, the apportionment of the debts, arrangements which would consummate the ruin of Belgium, were restored ... by a note of 22 February, the last act of the Diplomatic Committee.¹²³

Belgium thus rejected the provisions of the “Bases designed to establish the separation of Belgium and Holland”. More precisely, it made its acceptance dependent on the facilities to be accorded it by the Powers in the acquisition, against payment, of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

(11) The Twenty-fourth Protocol of the London Conference, dated 21 May 1831, clearly stated that “acceptance by the Belgian Congress of the bases for the separation of Belgium from Holland would be very largely facilitated if the five Courts consented to support Belgium in its wish to obtain against payment, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg”.¹²⁴ As its wish could not be satisfied, Belgium refused to agree to the debt apportionment proposals which had been made to it. The Powers thereupon took it upon themselves to devise another formula for the apportionment of the debts; that was the object of the Twenty-sixth Protocol, of the London Conference, dated 26 June 1831. The new protocol contained a draft treaty consisting of 18 articles, article XII of which stated:

The debts shall be apportioned in such a way that each of the two countries shall be liable for all the debts which originally, before the union, encumbered the territories composing them, and so that debts which were jointly contracted shall be divided up in a just proportion.¹²⁵

That was in fact only a reaffirmation, not specified in figures, of the principle of the apportionment of debts contained in the Twelfth Protocol. Unlike the latter, however, the new protocol did not specify the debts for which the parties were liable. This time it was the Kingdom of the Netherlands that rejected the proposals of the Conference,¹²⁶ and Belgium that agreed to them.¹²⁷

(12) Before the Conference adjourned on 1 October 1832, it made several unsuccessful proposals and counter-proposals.¹²⁸ Not until seven years later did the Belgian-Netherlands Treaty of 9 April 1839 devise a solution to the problem of the succession to debts arising out of the separation of Belgium and Holland.

¹¹¹ Idem (annex B): Reply of the plenipotentiaries of the four Courts to the plenipotentiary of France (ibid., p. 788).

¹²² Idem (annex B): Reply of the plenipotentiaries of the four Courts to the plenipotentiary of France (ibid., p. 788).

¹²³ Eleven Protocol of the London Conference, dated 20 January 1831, determining the boundaries of Holland (ibid., p. 759) and Twelfth Protocol, dated 27 January 1831 (ibid., p. 761).


¹²⁵ British and Foreign State Papers, 1830-1831 (op. cit.), vol. XVIII, p. 798.

(13) The Belgian-Dutch dispute concerning succession to the State debts of the Netherlands was finally settled by the Treaty of London of 19 April 1839, article XIII of the annex to which contained the following provisions:

1. As from 1 January 1839, Belgium shall, by reason of the apportionment of the public debts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, continue to be liable for a sum of 5 million Netherlands florins, in annuity bonds, the principal of which shall be transferred from the debit side of the Amsterdam ledger, or of the ledger of the General Treasury of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, to the debit side of the ledger of Belgium.

2. The principal transferred, and the annuity bonds entered on the debit side of the ledger of Belgium, in accordance with the preceding paragraph, up to a total of 5 million Netherlands florins, in annuity payments, shall be considered as part of the Belgian national debt; and Belgium undertakes not to allow, either now or in future, any distinction to be made between the portion of its public debt resulting from its union with Holland and any other existing or future Belgian national debt.

3. Belgium shall be discharged vis-à-vis Holland of any obligation resulting from the apportionment of the public debts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The five Powers of the Holy Alliance, under whose auspices the 1839 Treaty was signed, guaranteed its provisions in two conventions of the same date signed by them and by Belgium and Holland. It was stated in those instruments that the articles of the Belgian-Dutch Treaty "are deemed to have the same force and value as they would have if they had been included textually in the present instrument, and are consequently placed under the guarantee of Their Majesties".

(14) The dissolution of the Union of Norway and Sweden was effected by several conventions signed at Stockholm on 26 October 1905. The treatment of debts was decided by the Agreement of 23 March 1906 relating to the settlement of economic questions arising in connection with the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden, which is commonly interpreted to mean that each State continued to be liable for its debts. The Agreement provided:

Article 1. Norway shall pay to Sweden the share applicable to the first half of 1905 of the appropriations voted by Norway out of the common budget for the foreign relations of Sweden and Norway in respect of that year, into the Cabinet Fund, and also, out of the appropriations voted by Norway for contingent and unforeseen expenditures of the Cabinet Fund for the same year, the share attributable to Norway of the cost-of-living allowances paid to the agents and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Relations for the first half of 1905.

Article 2. Norway shall pay to Sweden the share applicable to the period 1 January-31 October 1905 of the appropriations voted by Norway out of the common budget for that year, into the Consulates Fund, and also the share attributable to Norway of the following expenditures incurred in 1904 and not accounted for in the appropriations for that year:

(a) the actual service expenditures of the consulates for the whole of 1904; and
(b) the office expenses actually attributed to the remunerated consulates, subject to production of documentary evidence, for the second half of 1904.

These provisions, the purpose of which was to make Norway assume its share of common budget expenditures, become clearer if it is remembered that, by a duplication of functions, the King of Sweden was also the King of Norway, and that the Swedish institutions were exclusively responsible for the diplomatic and consular representation of the Union. In this connection, it should be noted that the cause of the break between the two States was Norway's wish to have its own consular service. From the foregoing considerations, it may be inferred that the consequences of the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union were, first, the continued liability of each of the two States for its own debts and, secondly, an apportionment of the common debts between the two successor States.

(15) The Federation of which Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been members since 1953 was dissolved in 1963 by an Order in Council of the United Kingdom Government. The Order also apportioned the federal debt among the three territories in the following proportions: Southern Rhodesia, 52 per cent; Northern Rhodesia, 37 per cent; Nyasaland, 11 per cent. The apportionment was made on the basis of the share of the federal income allocated to each territory. This apportionment of the debts, as made by the United Kingdom Government's Order in Council, was challenged both as to its principle and as to its procedure. It was first pointed out that, "since the dissolution was an exercise of Britain's sovereign power, Britain should assume responsibility". This observation was all the more pertinent as the debts thus apportioned among the successor States by a British act of authority included debts contracted, under the administering Power's guarantee, with IBRD. This explains the statement by Northern Rhodesia that "it had at no time agreed to the allocation laid down in the Order, and had only reluctantly acquiesced in the settlement".

Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, later dropped its claim because of the aid granted to it by the United Kingdom Government, according to one writer.

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510 Art. II of the London Treaty of 19 April 1839, signed by the five Courts and the Netherlands (ibid., p. 991), and art. I of the London Treaty of the same date, signed by the five Courts and Belgium (ibid., p. 1001).
513 Thus Fauchille (op. cit., p. 389) writes: "After Sweden and Norway had dissolved their real union in 1905, a convention between the two countries, dated 23 March 1906, left each of them responsible for its personal debts."
(16) One of the cases considered above, the dissolution of Great Colombia, gave rise to two arbitral awards almost fifty years after the apportionment among the successor States of the debts of the predecessor State. These were the Sarah Campbell and W. Ackers-Cage cases,520 taken up by the Mixed Commission of Caracas set up between Great Britain and Venezuela under an agreement of 21 September 1868, in which two claimants—Alexander Campbell (later, his widow Sarah Campbell) and W. Ackers-Cage—sought to obtain from Venezuela payment of a debt owing to them by Great Colombia. Umpire G. Sturup, in his award of 1 October 1869, held that “the two claims should be paid by the Republic. However, since they both form part of the country’s external debt, it would be unjust to require that they be paid in full.”521

(17) Two authors who commented on this award considered that “the responsibility of Venezuela for the debts of the former Republic of Colombia, from which it had originated, was not and could not be contested” because, in their opinion (citing Bonfils and Fauchille), it could be regarded as a rule of international law that “where a State ceases to exist by breaking up or dividing into several new States, the new States should each bear, in an equitable proportion, a share of the debts of the original State as a whole”.522 Another author took the same view, adding pertinently that “the umpire Sturup simply took account of the resources of the successor State in imposing an equitable reduction of the amount of the claims”.523

(18) In connection with the dissolution of a State in general, the following rule has been suggested:

If a State ceases to exist by breaking up and dividing into several new States, each of the latter shall in equitable proportion assume responsibility for a share of the debts of the original State as a whole, and each of them shall also assume exclusive responsibility for the debts contracted in the exclusive interest of its territory.524

(19) A comparable formula is offered by an authority on the subject, article 49 of whose codification of international law provides that:

If a State should divide into two or more new States, none of which is to be considered as the continuation of the former State, that former State is deemed to have ceased to exist and the new States replace it with the status of new persons.525

He, too, recommends the equitable apportionment of the debts of the extinct predecessor State, citing as an example “the division of the Netherlands into two kingdoms: Holland and Belgium”, although he considers that “the former Netherlands was in a way continued by Holland particularly as regards the colonies”.526

(20) From the foregoing survey, two conclusions may be drawn that are worth noting in the context of articles 38 and 39. The first relates to the classification of the category of State succession exemplified by the precedents cited. In choosing historical examples of the practice of States with a view to their classification as cases of separation-secession and dissolution respectively, the Commission has mainly taken into account the fact that in a case of the first category the predecessor State survives the transfer of territory, whereas in a case of the second category it ceases to exist. In the first case, the problem of the apportionment of debts arises between a predecessor State and one or more successor States, whereas in the second it affects successor States inter se. Yet even this apparently very dependable criterion of the State’s disappearance or survival cannot ultimately provide sure guidance, for it raises, in particular, the thorny problems of the State’s continuity and identity.

(21) In the case of the disappearance of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, which the Commission has considered, not without some hesitation, as one of the examples of dissolution of a State, the predecessor State—the Belgian-Dutch monarchical entity—seems genuinely to have disappeared and to have been replaced by two new successor States, Belgium and Holland, each of which assumed responsibility for one half of the debts of the predecessor State. It might be said that it was actually the mode of settlement of the apportionment of the debts that confirmed the nature of the event that had occurred in the Dutch monarchy and made it possible to describe it as “dissolution of a State”. It is also possible, on the other hand, to regard the Netherlands example as a case of secession, and to hold, like one of the authors cited above, that “from a legal point of view, the independence of Belgium was nothing more than a secession of a province”.527 That approach might have proved seriously prejudicial to Holland’s interests had it been acted upon, precisely in so far as it was not apparently demonstrated that the secessionist province was legally bound to participate—let alone in equal proportion—in servicing the debt of the dismembered State. But that approach was not, in fact, adopted by the London Conference, or even by the parties themselves, least of all by Belgium. Both States regarded their separation as the dissolution of a union, and each claimed for itself the title of successor State to a predecessor State that had ceased to exist. That was the treatment adopted in the above-mentioned Treaty of London of 19 April 1839 concluded between the five Powers and the Netherlands, article III of which provided that:

The union which existed between Holland and Belgium, under the Treaty of Vienna of 31 May 1815, is recognized by His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, as being dissolved.528

520 Lapradelle and Politis, Recueil des arbitrages internationaux (op. cit.), vol. II, pp. 552-556.
521 Ibid., pp. 554-555.
522 Ibid., p. 555.
523 Rousseau, Droit international public (op. cit.), p. 431.
524 Fauchille, op. cit., p. 380.
526 Ibid.
527 Feilchenfeld, op. cit., p. 208.
528 British and Foreign State Papers, 1838-1839 (op. cit.), vol. XXVII, p. 992.