Text of the draft guidelines constituting
the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, with commentaries,
as provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission

This document reproduces the whole set of draft guidelines, with commentaries, as they appear in the reports of the International Law Commission from 1998 to 2010. The original numbering of each footnote in the relevant report is indicated in brackets at the beginning of the footnote, together with the year of the Commission’s report containing that footnote. Given its provisional character, this document reproduces with no change the cross-references as they appear in each Commission’s report. In case of difficulty in identifying the cross-references, the reader should consult the relevant report.

Reservations to treaties

Guide to Practice

Explanatory note

Some guidelines in the present Guide to Practice are accompanied by model clauses. The adoption of these model clauses may have advantages in specific circumstances. The user should refer to the commentaries for an assessment of the circumstances appropriate for the use of a particular model clause.

Commentary

(1) The Commission considered that it would be useful to place “explanatory notes” at the beginning of the Guide to Practice in order to provide information to users of the Guide on its structure and purpose. Other questions that might arise in future could also be included in these preliminary notes.

(2) The purpose of this first explanatory note is to define the function and the “instructions for use” of the model clauses that accompany some draft guidelines, in accordance with the decision taken by the Commission at its forty-seventh session.1

(3) These model clauses are intended mainly to give States and international organizations examples of provisions that it might be useful to include in the text of a treaty in order to avoid the

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uncertainties or drawbacks that might result, in a particular case, from silence about a specific problem relating to reservations to that treaty.

(4) Model clauses are alternative provisions from among which negotiators are invited to choose the one best reflecting their intentions, on the understanding that they may adapt them, as appropriate, to the objectives being sought. It is therefore essential to refer to the commentaries to these model clauses in determining whether the situation is one in which their inclusion in the treaty would be useful.

1. Definitions

1.1 Definition of reservations

“Reservation” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to that international organization.

Commentary

(1) The definition of reservations adopted by the Commission is none other than the composite text of the definitions contained in the Vienna Conventions of 1969, 1978 and 1986, to which no changes have been made.

(2) This method, which the Commission proposes to follow in principle in the other chapters of the Guide to Practice, is consistent with the position which it adopted in 19952 and confirmed in 1997,3 namely that there should be no change in the relevant provisions of the Vienna Conventions on the law of treaties. This approach met with general approval during the debate on the topic of reservations to treaties in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.

(3) Article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 gives the following definition of reservations:

"Reservation' means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State".

(4) This definition reproduces the text proposed by the Commission in 1996 in its final draft articles on the law of treaties, and did not give rise to lengthy discussion either within the Commission or during the Vienna Conference. The text of the definition was reproduced in the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties and the 1986 Vienna Convention on Treaties between States and International Organizations and gave rise to hardly any discussion.

(5) It should be noted, however, that article 2, paragraph (1) (j), of the 1978 Convention and article 2, paragraph (1) (d), of the 1986 Convention do not purely and simply reproduce the text of article 2, paragraph (1) (d), of the 1969 definition. Each of them includes a clarification made necessary by the respective purposes of the two instruments:

(a) The 1978 Convention specifies that a reservation can be made by a State "when making a notification of succession to a treaty";

(b) The 1986 Convention adds that an international organization can make a reservation when it expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty by an act of formal confirmation.

(6) It is these differences that made it necessary to establish for the purposes of the Guide to Practice a composite text, including the additions made in 1978 and 1986, rather than purely and simply to reproduce the 1969 text.

(7) This definition, embodied in judicial decisions and used in practice by States when making reservations themselves or reacting to reservations made by other contracting parties, has met with

3 [209, 1998] During the Commission's elaboration of the draft articles on this topic, a simplification of the definition was proposed in order to avoid a lengthy enumeration of the moments when a reservation may be made in accordance with the 1969 definition (see Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II, part I, p. 306). In 1981, however, the Commission reverted to a text based on the 1969 text (see Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II, part II, pp. 122 and 124).
4 [210, 1998] See, for example, the arbitral decision of 30 June 1977, Case concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XVIII, paras. 54-55, pp. 39-40 (the Court of Arbitration had taken note of the parties' agreement to consider that article 2, paragraph (1) (d), of the 1969 Convention, to which they were not parties, correctly defined the
general approval in the writings of jurists, even though some authors have criticized it on specific points and have suggested certain additions or amendments.\(^8\)

(8) This is also the position of the Commission, some members of which nevertheless drew attention to lacunae or ambiguities in the Vienna definition. It was stated, \textit{inter alia}, that:

(a) This definition combined elements that were purely definitional with others that were more closely identified with the legal regime of reservations, particularly with regard to the moment when a reservation may be formulated;

(b) Moreover, the enumeration of these moments, even when supplemented by the additions made in 1978 and 1986, remained incomplete and did not match the list of means of expression of consent to be bound contained in article 11 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions;

(c) The definition should be supplemented by a mention of the requirement that reservations must be made in writing; and

(d) It should be made clear that a reservation could - and in the view of one member could only - seek to limit the legal effect of the provisions in respect of which it is made.

(9) The Commission was of the view, however, that these objections did not constitute sufficient grounds to call into question the Vienna definition, which could and should be supplemented and clarified in the Guide to Practice, since that was precisely the purpose and \textit{raison d'être} of the Guide.

(10) Given that the definition used in the Guide to Practice is, from the outset, the one that stems from the Vienna Conventions, the commentary to article 2, paragraph (1) (d), of the Commission's draft article, which was reproduced in the Vienna Convention, retains all its relevance:

"The need for this definition arises from the fact that States, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty, not infrequently make declarations as to their understanding of some matter or as to their interpretation of a particular provision. Such a declaration may be a mere clarification of the State's position or it may amount to a reservation, according as it does or does not vary or exclude the application of the terms of the Treaty as adopted".\(^9\)
(11) This explanation brings out clearly the function of the definitions contained in this first part
of the Guide to Practice: the aim is to distinguish between reservations and other unilateral
statements made with respect to a treaty (the largest group of which is that of interpretative
declarations), since the two are subject to different legal regimes.

(12) One should also be aware of the limitations of an endeavour of this kind: however much care
is taken to define reservations and to distinguish them from other unilateral statements which have
certain elements in common with them, some degree of uncertainty inevitably remains. This is
inherent in the application of any definition, which is an exercise in interpretation that depends in
part upon the circumstances and context and inevitably brings into play the subjectivity of the
interpreter.

1.1.1 [1.1.4] Object of reservations

A reservation purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or
of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects in their application to the State
or to the international organization which formulates the reservation.

Commentary

(1) Taken literally, the Vienna definition appears to exclude from the general category of
reservations unilateral statements that concern not one specific provision or a number of provisions
of a treaty, but the entire text. The aim of draft guideline 1.1.1 is to take into account the
well-established practice of across-the-board reservations in the interpretation of this definition, a

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10 [213, 1998] The "provisional plan of the study" contained in the second report of the Special Rapporteur consists of six parts (I. Unity or diversity of the legal regime for reservations to multilateral treaties, a topic that was taken up in chapter II of the second report (A/CN.4/477); II. Definition of reservations; III. Formulation and withdrawal of reservations, acceptances and objections; IV. Effects of reservations, acceptances and objections; V. Fate of reservations, acceptances and objections in the case of succession of States; VI. The settlement of disputes linked to the regime for reservations) (A/CN.4/477, para. 37).

11 [87, 2010] The number between square brackets indicates the number of this guideline in the report of the Special Rapporteur or, as the case may be, the original number of a guideline in the report of the Special Rapporteur which has been merged with the final guideline.

12 [248, 1999] An initial commentary to this draft guideline was published in the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fiftieth session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/53/10), pp. 199-203; footnote 215 to that commentary read: “This draft guideline will be re-examined in the light of the discussion on interpretative declarations and could be reformulated if necessary”. At its fifty-first session, the Commission re-examined the draft guideline and amended its wording; the present commentary therefore replaces the one published in 1998. The original text read: “A reservation may relate to one or more provisions of a treaty or, more generally, to the way in which a State or an international organization intends to implement the treaty as a whole”.

simple reading of which would lead to an interpretation that was too restrictive and contrary to the reality.

(2) The wording used by the authors of the Vienna Conventions takes care to make it clear that the objective of the author of the reservation is to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty to which the reservation applies and not the provisions themselves. 14

(3) A criticism of the wording relates to the use of the expression “certain provisions”. It has been noted that this expression was justified “out of the very commendable desire to exclude reservations that are too general and imprecise15 and that end up annulling the binding character of the treaty”, a consideration regarding which it might be queried whether it “should be placed in article 2. In fact, it relates to the validity of reservations. However, it is not because a statement entails impermissible consequences that it should not be considered a reservation. Moreover, practice provides numerous examples of perfectly valid reservations that do not focus on specific provisions: they exclude the application of the treaty as a whole under certain well-defined circumstances”.16

(4) We should not confuse, on the one hand, a general reservation characterized by the lack of specificity and general nature of its content and, on the other, an across-the-board reservation concerning the way in which the State or the international organization that formulates it intends to apply the treaty as a whole, but which cannot necessarily be criticized for lack of precision, since it relates to a specific aspect of the treaty.

(5) Across-the-board reservations are a standard practice and, as such, have not raised particular objections. The same is true of reservations that exclude or limit the application of a treaty:

(a) To certain categories of persons;17
(b) Or of objects, especially vehicles; 18

14 [250, 1999] The wording of article 21, paragraph 1, of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions is more questionable, in that it defines the legal effects of reservations as amendments to the provisions to which they refer.
17 [253, 1999] See, for example, the United Kingdom's reservation concerning the application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to members of the armed forces and prisoners (Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General - status as at 31 December 1997, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.V.2, chap. IV.4, p. 130) or that of Guatemala concerning the application of the Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles of 4 June 1954 to natural persons only (ibid., chap. XI.A.8, p. 439).
(c) Or to certain situations; 19
(d) Or to certain territories; 20
(e) Or in certain specific circumstances; 21
(f) Or for special reasons relating to the international status of their author; 22
(g) Or to the author's national laws; 23
etc.

(6) Some of these reservations have given rise to objections on grounds of their general nature and lack of precision 24 and it may be that some of them are tainted by impermissibility for one of the reasons specified in article 19 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. But this impermissibility stems from the legal regime of the reservations and is a separate problem from that

18 [254, 1999] See, for example, Yugoslavia's reservation to the effect that the provisions of the Convention relating to the Unification of Certain Rules concerning Collisions in Inland Navigation shall not apply to vessels exclusively employed by the public authorities (ibid., chap. XIII, p. 635) or that of Germany to the effect that the Convention on the Registration of Inland Navigation Vessels of 25 January 1965 would not apply to vessels navigating on lakes and belonging to the German Federal Railways (ibid., chap. XII, p. 637).

19 [255, 1999] See, for example, the Argentine reservations to the 1982 Convention of the International Telecommunication Union with regard to the possible increase in its contribution and the possibility that the other parties would not observe their obligations under the Convention (reply by Argentina to the Commission's questionnaire on reservations); or the reservation of France on signature of the final proceedings of the Regional Administrative Conference for the Planning of Maritime Radiobeacons in the European Maritime Area in 1985, concerning the requirements for the adequate operation of the French maritime radio-navigation service using the multi-frequency phase metering system (reply by France to the questionnaire on reservations).


21 [257, 1999] See France's reservation to the General Act of Arbitration of 26 September 1928 to the effect that "in future [the said accession to the Act] shall not extend to disputes relating to any events that may occur in the course of a war in which the French Government is involved" (ibid., p. 1006). (Similar reservations were made by the United Kingdom and New Zealand.) See also the reservations of the majority of States parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, whereby that instrument would cease to be binding for the Government of the State making a reservation with regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies did not respect the prohibitions which were the object of the Protocol. Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, 4th ed., 1992, vol. I, pp. 11-21.

22 [258, 1999] See, for example, Austria's and Switzerland's reservations to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972, with regard to preserving their status of neutrality (Swiss reply to the questionnaire on reservations) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1015, p. 236) or Austria's similar reservation to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 10 December 1976 (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. XXVI, p. 878).

23 [259, 1999] See, for example, the reservations of the United States, Italy and Japan to the effect that those countries would apply the International Wheat Agreement of 14 March 1986 provisionally within the limitations of internal legislation (ibid., chap. XIX, p. 744) or the reservation of Canada to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women of 31 March 1953 “in respect of rights within the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces” (ibid., chap. XVI, p. 682).

of their definition. Furthermore, the inclusion of across-the-board reservations in the category of reservations constitutes an indispensable prerequisite to assessing their validity under the rules relating to the legal regime governing reservations; an impermissible reservation (a) is still a reservation and (b) cannot be declared impermissible unless it is a reservation.

(7) Another element that supports a non-literal interpretation of the Vienna definition relates to the fact that some treaties prohibit across-the-board reservations or certain categories of such reservations, in particular general reservations. Such a clause would be superfluous (and inexplicable) if unilateral statements designed to modify the legal effect of a treaty as a whole, at least with respect to certain specific aspects, did not constitute reservations.

(8) The abundance and coherence of the practice of across-the-board reservations (which are not always imprecise and general reservations) and the absence of objections in principle to this type of reservations indicate a practical need that it would be absurd to challenge in the name of abstract legal logic. Moreover, the interpretation of rules of law should not be static; article 31, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention invites the interpreter of treaty rules to take into account, “together with the context: ... (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”, and, as the International Court of Justice has underlined, a legal principle should be interpreted in the light of “the subsequent development of international law”. 26

(9) In order to remove any ambiguity and avoid any controversy, it consequently appears reasonable and useful to establish, in the Guide to Practice, the broad interpretation that States actually give to the apparently restrictive formula of the Vienna definition with regard to the expected effect of reservations.

(10) However, after completing the consideration of the draft guidelines on interpretative declarations and other unilateral declarations which States and international organizations formulate in respect of treaties or on the occasion of their conclusion, the Commission made a number of changes to draft guideline 1.1.1 [1.1.4] which it had initially adopted. 27

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25 [261, 1999] This is so in the case of article 64, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights or article XIX of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons.


Firstly, it seems that, owing to its general nature, the initial wording could lead to an absurd result by suggesting, without further explanation, that a reservation might relate to the treaty as a whole; that might even empty it of all substance. The addition of the words “of specific aspects” before the words “of the treaty as a whole” is designed to avoid that interpretation, which also would have been illogical.

Secondly, in order to dispel the concern expressed by a number of members of the Commission and avoid any confusion with declarations relating to the implementation of a treaty at the internal level, which is the subject of draft guideline 1.4.5 [1.2.6], or even with general statements of policy, defined in draft guideline 1.4.4 [1.2.5], the Commission decided not to include any reference in draft guideline 1.1.1 [1.1.4] to “the way in which the State or international organization intends to implement the treaty as a whole”. It confined itself to using the actual text of the Vienna definition, according to which, when it formulates a reservation, a State or international organization “purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to that organization”, specifying, however, that the same may also apply if the reservation relates to certain aspects of the treaty as a whole. In the view of the Commission, another advantage of this wording is that it highlights the objective pursued by the author of the reservation, which is at the heart of the definition of reservations adopted in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions and on which the draft guidelines relating to the definition of interpretative declarations and other unilateral declarations formulated with regard to a treaty are also based.

Thanks to this approach, the new wording of draft guideline 1.1.1 [1.1.4] no longer uses the verb “may” (“a reservation may relate...”), which might have suggested that, by definition, the across-the-board reservations covered by this provision were permissible. In fact, it goes without saying that such definitional precision in no way prejudices the permissibility (or impermissibility) of reservations: whether they relate to certain provisions of the treaty or to certain aspects of the treaty as a whole, they are subject to the substantive rules relating to the validity (or permissibility) of reservations. This clearly stems, moreover, from the inclusion of the draft in the first part of the Guide to Practice dealing exclusively with questions of definition and is expressly confirmed by draft guideline 1.6, reproduced below.

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28 [264, 1999] See draft guidelines 1.2, 1.2.1 [1.2.4], 1.3, 1.3.1 and 1.4.1 [1.1.5] to 1.4.5 [1.2.6] below.
Some members of the Commission pointed out, not without justification, that reservations could relate only to certain particular aspects of specific provisions, and that, in their view, is a third hypothesis to be added to reservations purporting “to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to that international organization”, a hypothesis directly covered by draft guideline 1.1, and those purporting “to exclude or modify the legal effect of specific aspects of the treaty as a whole”, i.e. the across-the-board reservations which are the subject of the present draft guideline. In the Commission's view, it is unquestionable that the authors of reservations frequently purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty only with respect to certain specific aspects, but this possibility is covered by the general definition of draft guideline 1.1 and, more specifically, by the word “modify”, which necessarily implies that the reservation relates only to certain aspects of the provisions in question.

1.1.2 Instances in which reservations may be formulated

Instances in which a reservation may be formulated under guideline 1.1 include all the means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty mentioned in article 11 of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 on the law of treaties.

Commentary

(1) The purpose of this draft guideline is to seek to remedy a flaw in the wording of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, namely that articles 2, paragraph 1 (d), on the one hand, and 11, on the other hand, are not formulated in the same terms, which might give rise to confusion.

(2) As indicated in the commentary to guideline 1.1, the inclusion in the Vienna definition of a list of the cases in which a reservation may be made has been criticized, *inter alia*, on the ground that the listing was incomplete and would have been more in place in the articles of the Conventions relating to the legal regime for reservations than in the article defining them.


(3) Illogical though it may appear in the abstract, the idea of including time limits on the possibility of making reservations in the definition of reservations itself has progressively gained ground,\(^{31}\) given the magnitude of the drawbacks in terms of stability of legal relations of a system which would allow parties to formulate a reservation at any moment. It is in fact the principle *pacta sunt servanda* itself which would be called into question, in that at any moment a party to a treaty could, by formulating a reservation, call its treaty obligations into question; in addition, this would excessively complicate the task of the depositary.

(4) The fact nonetheless remains that criticisms have been levelled at the restrictive listing in the Vienna Conventions of the moments at which formulation of a reservation can take place. On the one hand, it has been felt that it was incomplete, *inter alia*, in that it did not initially take into account the possibility of formulating a reservation on the occasion of a succession of States;\(^ {32}\) but the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States with respect to Treaties remedied this omission. Moreover, many authors have pointed out that, in some cases, reservations could validly be formulated at moments other than those provided for in the Vienna definition,\(^ {33}\) and in particular that a treaty may make express provision for the possibility of formulating a reservation at a moment other than the time of signature or of expression of consent to be bound by the treaty.\(^ {34}\)

(5) Express consideration of this possibility in the Guide to Practice does not, however, appear to be useful: it is indeed true that a treaty may provide for such an eventuality, but this is then a treaty rule, a *lex specialis* that constitutes a derogation from the general principles established by the Vienna Conventions, which are only intended to substitute for an absence of will, and present no impediment to derogations of this kind. The Guide to Practice with respect to reservations is of the same nature, and it does not appear appropriate to recall under each of its headings that States and international organizations may depart from it by including in the treaties that they conclude reservations clauses which institute special rules in that respect.


(6) On the other hand, even if one confines oneself to general international law it appears that the list of cases in which the formulation of a reservation can take place, as laid down in article 2, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions, does not cover all the means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty. Yet the spirit of this provision is indeed that a State may formulate (or confirm) a reservation when it expresses its consent, and that it can do so only at that moment. Too much importance must thus not be attached to the letter of this enumeration, which is incomplete and, moreover, does not correspond to that appearing in article 11 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions.35

(7) The Commission had moreover clearly perceived the problem when it discussed the draft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between international organizations, in that initially, on the proposal of its Special Rapporteur, Mr. Paul Reuter, it had simplified the definition of reservations and intended to say only that they could be made "by a State or by an international organization when signing or consenting ... to be bound by a treaty,"36 which was an implicit reference to article 11 of the future Convention. However, out of a concern to depart as little as possible from the 1969 text the Commission finally modelled its draft on it, thus abandoning the idea of a useful simplification.37

(8) The differences in wording between article 2, paragraph 1 (d), and article 11 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions lie in the omission from the former of these provisions of two possibilities contemplated in the latter: "exchange of instruments constituting a treaty" and "any other means if so agreed". As one member of the Commission pointed out, it is rather improbable that a general multilateral treaty could consist of an exchange of letters. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out; nor can the development of means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty other than those expressly listed in articles 2, paragraph 1 (d), and 11 of the Vienna Conventions. It is to avoid problems arising on these occasions that draft guideline 1.1.2 specifies that no particular importance should be attached to the difference in the wording of these two provisions.

(9) It should be noted that the purpose of this guideline is not to fill the gaps in the list that appears in the Vienna definition, particularly the omission of the possibility of reservations

36[236, 1998] Article 11 of the 1986 Vienna Convention reads as follows: "1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed. "2. The consent of an international organization to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, act of formal confirmation, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed."
formulated when notifying territorial application of a treaty; that is the purpose of draft guideline 1.1.4. More generally, the Commission intends to discuss the problems posed by the formulation of reservations in detail in chapter II of the Guide to Practice.

(10) At the suggestion of one of its members, the Commission wondered whether, just as by means of draft guideline 1.1.2 it had sought to harmonize the Vienna definition with article 11 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions, it should not also specify that the expression "notification of succession" appearing in article 2, paragraph 1 (g), of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties must be interpreted solely in the light of article 18 of that Convention. It seemed to the Commission, however, that it would be preferable to specify that in the part of the Guide to Practice dealing with succession of States in respect of reservations to treaties.

1.1.3 [1.1.8] Reservations having territorial scope

A unilateral statement by which a State purports to exclude the application of a treaty or some of its provisions to a territory to which that treaty would be applicable in the absence of such a statement constitutes a reservation.

Commentary

(1) As its title indicates, this draft guideline concerns unilateral statements by which a State purports to exclude the application of a treaty, in whole or in part, *ratione loci*: the State consents to the application of the treaty as a whole *ratione materiae* except in respect of one or more territories which, in one form or another, are under its jurisdiction.

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38 [239, 1998] For the commentary to this guideline, see *ibid.*, pp. 206–209.
39 [240, 1998] For obvious reasons, this situation generally does not apply to international organizations, although cases could arise in which an organization with territorial competence might formulate a reservation of this type.
In the past, such reservations consisted primarily of what were known as "colonial reservations", or statements by which the administering Powers announced their intention to apply or not to apply a treaty or certain provisions thereof to all or some of their colonies. Given the current marginal nature of the colonial phenomenon, the problem rarely arises in this form today. It may, however, be useful to determine the legal nature of such statements from the perspective of intertemporal law, with a view to evaluating their permissibility or determining their effect in respect of a treaty that remains in force even though the colonial situation that gave rise to such statements no longer exists.

The practice of formulating territorial reservations persists in the context of non-colonial situations, either because a State excludes the application of a treaty to all or part of its own territory or because it is competent, for some other reason, to enter into international commitments on behalf of the territory or territories in question, but does not intend to do so.

Although the point has been challenged, these unilateral statements constitute reservations within the meaning of the Vienna definition: when formulated on one of the occasions specified, they purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the entire treaty or of certain provisions thereof in their application to the author of the statement. In the absence of such a statement, the treaty would apply to the State's entire territory, pursuant to the provisions of article 29 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. Such statements are genuine reservations because they purport...
the partial exclusion or modification of the treaty's application, which constitutes the very essence of a reservation.

(5) Some members of the Commission expressed doubts on this score, arguing, for example, that a territorial reservation may be formulated only if it is expressly provided for in the treaty to which it relates. This is a very strict interpretation of article 29 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions, which calls for no explicit provision to this effect and admits the possibility of partial territorial application if it "appears" from the treaty or may otherwise be established. In any case, this objection concerns not the definition of reservations, but the conditions in which they are valid. Moreover, a unilateral statement provided for by a treaty is still a reservation even if it is expressly authorized by the treaty; this follows, for example, from article 19 (b) of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions, which envisages the possibility that treaties may provide that only specified reservations may be made. Conversely, if a treaty expressly envisages the possibility of territorial reservations, this does not mean, unless otherwise clearly indicated by the authors of the treaty, that other reservations are necessarily prohibited.46

(6) It was also stated that it would be difficult to place such territorial reservations under the general legal regime of reservations and, in particular, to formulate objections to them. This is true if such a reservation is explicitly or implicitly allowed by the treaty, which according to a majority of members of the Commission should be the case with respect to any territorial reservation.47 Thus, the impossibility of objecting to such a reservation arises not from its territorial nature but from its status as a reservation authorized by the treaty. In this respect, there is no distinction between territorial reservations and other types of authorized reservations.

(7) Lastly, while recognizing that such statements were genuine reservations when they purported to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty, other members questioned whether that was so in the case of statements purporting to totally exclude the treaty's application to a given territory. However, the Commission felt that there were no grounds for drawing a distinction between reservations ratione materiae and reservations ratione loci. Such a distinction follows neither explicitly nor implicitly from the Vienna definition.

established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.”

46[247, 1998] It may be noted, in this connection, that article 19 (b) concerns only treaties providing that "only specified reservations" may be made. This does not mean that a treaty could not provide for the possibility of formulating certain reservations without prohibiting other reservations.

47[248, 1998] This point could probably be addressed in a subsequent guideline of the Guide to Practice relating to article 19 (b)
It seems self-evident that a territorial reservation must be made, at the latest, by the time the State expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty, if it purports to totally exclude the application of the treaty to a given territory. On this point, there is no ground on which to differentiate the definition of territorial reservations from the general definition of reservations. This is not the case when the State having jurisdiction over the territory in question intends to exclude or modify only partially the treaty's application to this territory. In this case, the reservation may be made not only at the time of signature or of final expression of consent to be bound by the treaty, but also when the State extends the application of the treaty to this territory, which had not previously been subject to its provisions. This particular *ratione temporis* aspect of certain territorial reservations is addressed in draft guideline 1.1.4 [1.1.3].

1.1.4 [1.1.3] Reservations formulated when notifying territorial application

A unilateral statement by which a State purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty in relation to a territory in respect of which it makes a notification of the territorial application of the treaty constitutes a reservation.

Commentary

(1) Whereas draft guideline 1.1.3 [1.1.8] deals with the scope *ratione loci* of certain reservations, guideline 1.1.4 [1.1.3] deals with the time factor of the definition: the moment at which certain "territorial reservations" can be made.

(2) Generally speaking, a State makes such a reservation upon signing the treaty or when it expresses its definitive consent to be bound by it. This is in fact the only time at which a territorial reservation may be made if that reservation seeks to exclude the territory from the application of the treaty as a whole. That may not however be the case for reservations which seek to exclude or modify the legal effect of some provisions of the treaty in their application to a territory not previously covered by the treaty.

(3) The territorial application of a treaty may indeed vary across time either because a State decides to extend the application of a treaty to a territory under its jurisdiction which was not previously covered by the treaty, or because the territory came under its jurisdiction after the

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48 [249, 1998] See paragraph (8) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.3 [1.1.8] above.

49 [250, 1998] For example by withdrawing a territorial reservation (see draft guideline 1.1.3 [1.1.8] above).
entry into force of the treaty, or for any other reason not covered by the provisions concerning reservations to the treaty. In such cases, the State responsible for the territory's international relations may purely and simply extend the treaty to that territory, but it may also choose to do so only partially; in the latter case, upon notifying the depositary of the extension of the territorial application of the treaty, the State also includes in the notification any new reservations specific to that territory. There is no reason to attempt to prevent it from doing so: such a restriction would make it more difficult to extend the territorial application of the treaty and is quite unnecessary provided that the unilateral statement is made in accordance with the legal regime of reservations and is therefore permissible only if compatible with the purpose and objective of the treaty.

(4) Some examples of reservations made under such conditions are the reservations made by the United Kingdom on 19 March 1962 upon extending application of the Convention Relating to the status of Stateless Persons of 28 September 1954 to Fiji, and the State of Singapore and the West Indies and the reservation made by the Netherlands in extending the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 to Suriname on 29 July 1971.

(5) There are recent examples of reservations made upon notification of territorial application: on 27 April 1993, Portugal notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of its intention to extend to Macau application of the two 1966 International Covenants on human rights; that notification included reservations concerning the territory. On 14 October 1996, the United Kingdom notified the Secretary-General of its decision to apply the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979 to Hong Kong, with a certain number of reservations. Those reservations caused no reaction or objection on the part of the other Contracting Parties.

(6) It would therefore seem wise to make clear, as has in fact been suggested in the writings of jurists, that a unilateral statement made by a State in the context of notification of territorial application constitutes a reservation if it meets the relevant conditions set out by the Vienna definition thus supplemented. To so specify would not of course in any way prejudice issues related to the permissibility of such reservations.

1.1.5 [1.1.6] Statements purporting to limit the obligations of their author

A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization at the time when that State or that organization expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty by which its author purports to limit the obligations imposed on it by the treaty constitutes a reservation.

Commentary

(1) There is no doubt that the expression “to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty”, as contained in the “Vienna definition” used in draft guideline 1.1, refers to reservations which limit or restrict this effect and, at the same time, to the reserving State's obligations under the treaty “because 'restricting' is a way of 'modifying'”. Moreover, nearly all reservations are intended to limit the obligations which are in principle incumbent on the declarant under the treaty.

(2) This is in all probability why the amendments proposed during the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties for the addition of the words “limit” and “restrict” to the list of the legal effects intended by reservations were not adopted: they would not have added anything to the final text.

(3) The Commission nevertheless considers that the preparation of a Guide to Practice does not impose the same constraints as the drafting of a convention: such a guide can contain a statement of the obvious that would not belong in a treaty.

(4) However, draft guideline 1.1.5 [1.1.6] also serves a more basic purpose. In the Commission's view, its inclusion in the Guide to Practice, together with draft guidelines 1.1.6, 1.4.1 [1.1.5] and 1.4.2 [1.1.6], helps to shed light on a question that arises constantly in connection with reservations to treaties, i.e. whether there is any such thing as “extensive reservations”, of which there is no generally accepted definition, as may be noted from the outset.

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58 [269, 1999] For example, Ruda defines “extensive reservations” as “declarations or statements purporting to enlarge the obligations included in the treaty” and he includes “unilateral declarations whereby the State assumes obligations, without receiving anything in exchange, because the negotiations for the adoption of the treaty have already been closed” (“Reservations to Treaties”, Recueil des cours ..., 1975-III, vol. 146, p. 107); Horn makes a distinction between “commissive declarations”, by which the State making the declaration undertakes more than the treaty requires, and “extensive reservations proper”, whereby “a State will strive to impose wider obligations on the other parties, assuming correspondingly wider rights for itself” (Reservations and Interpretative
(5) The Commission does not intend to enter into a purely theoretical debate, which would be out of place in a Guide to Practice, and it has refrained from using that ambiguous term, but it notes that, when a State or an international organization formulates a unilateral statement by which it intends to limit the obligations the treaty would impose on it in the absence of such a statement, its intention at the same time is inevitably to increase its own rights at the expense of those that the other contracting parties would have under the treaty if the treaty was applied in its entirety; in other words, the obligations of the reserving State's partners are increased accordingly. To this extent, “limitative” reservations, i.e. the majority of reservations, may appear to be “extensive reservations”.

(6) A distinction should, however, be made between two types of statement which are related only in appearance:

Statements which, because they are designed to exempt their author from certain obligations under the treaty, restrict, by correlation, the rights of the other contracting parties; and

Statements designed to impose new obligations, not provided for by the treaty, on the other parties to it.

(7) Draft guideline 1.1.5 [1.1.6] relates only to statements in the first of these categories; those in the second are the subject of draft guideline 1.4.2 [1.1.6] and are not reservations within the meaning of the present Guide to Practice.

(8) Certain reservations by which a State or an international organization intends to limit its obligations under the treaty have sometimes been presented as “extensive reservations”. This is, for example, the case of the statement by which the German Democratic Republic indicated its intention to bear its share of the expenses of the Committee against Torture only so far as they arose from activities within its competence as recognized by the German Democratic Republic. It was questioned whether such a reservation was permissible, but it is not because it would have the consequence of increasing the financial burden on the other parties that it should not be described as a reservation or that it would, by its nature, differ from the usual “modifying” reservations.

Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. (note 266 above), p. 90); Mr. Imbert considers that “there are no 'extensive reservations'” (Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux, Paris, Pédone, 1979, p. 15); see also the discussion between two members of the Commission, Mr. Bowett and Mr. Tomuschat, in 1995 (A/CN.4/SR.2401, pp. 4 and 7).

(9) This seems to apply too in the case of another example of reservations described as “extensive” on the ground that “the reserving State simply widens its rights (and not its obligations), increasing by the same token the obligations of its partners”: 61 the reservations formulated by Poland and several socialist countries to article 9 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, under which “the rule expressed in article 9 [relating to the immunity of State vessels] applies to all ships owned or operated by a State” 62 would constitute “extensive reservations” because the reserving State simply widens its rights (and not its obligations), increasing by the same token the obligations of its partners. Once again, there is in fact nothing special about this: such a reservation “operates” like any limitative reservation; the State which formulates it modulates the rule laid down in the treaty so as to limit its treaty obligations. 63

(10) The fact is that the reserving State must not take the opportunity offered by the treaty to try, by means of a reservation, to acquire more rights than those to which it could claim to be entitled under general international law. In such a case, a unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization comes not within the category of reservations, as provided for in the draft guideline under consideration, but under that of unilateral statements purporting to add further elements to a treaty, which do not constitute reservations and are the subject of draft guideline 1.4.2 [1.1.6]. 64

(11) According to the definition of reservations itself, reservations cannot be described as such unless they are made “when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or

63 [274, 1999] The examples of “limitative reservations” of this kind are extremely numerous, since, in this case, the modulation of the effect of the treaty may be the result (i) of the substitution by the reserving State of provisions of its internal law for provisions contained in the treaty: “The Argentine Government states that the application of article 15, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights shall be subject to the principle laid down in article 18 of the Argentine Constitution” (“interpretative declaration” by Argentina concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. IV.4, p. 122); (ii) the substitution of obligations stemming from other international instruments for provisions of the treaty to which the reservation is attached: “Articles 19, 21 and 22 in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant shall be applied within the scope of article 16 of the Convention of 4 November 1950 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (reservation No. 1 by Germany to the same Covenant, ibid., p. 125); (iii) of a different formulation, devised for the occasion by the reserving State, regardless of any pre-existing rule: “Article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant shall be applied in such manner that it is for the court to decide whether an accused person held in custody has to appear in person at the hearing” (reservation No. 2 by Germany, idem).
64 [275, 1999] It may actually be difficult to tell the difference between the two, since everything depends on whether the State or the international organization intends, by its statement, to grant itself more rights than it has under general international law, and that depends on the interpretation both of the statement itself and of the customary rule to which the declarant is referring. Thus, in the example of the Polish statement given in paragraph (9) above, it must be regarded as a reservation if it is considered that there is a customary rule by virtue of which all State vessels, lato sensu, benefit from immunity; otherwise, it must be regarded as a statement purporting to add further elements to the treaty, within the meaning of draft guideline 1.4.2 [1.1.6] (a position on this matter does not have to be adopted for the purposes of the present Guide to Practice).
acceding to a treaty, or [by a State] when making a notification of succession to a treaty”. To the extent that unilateral statements purporting to limit the obligations of the State or the international organization formulating them are reservations, this temporal element (which, as the Commission has already stressed, was justified by practical, not logical, considerations), comes into play and they are obviously subject to this temporal limitation.

(12) Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion would probably also mean reproducing the entire list of cases in which a reservation may be formulated, as contained in draft guideline 1.1. However, the Commission considered that this would make the wording unnecessarily cumbersome and that a general reminder would be enough; this is the purpose of the expression “when that State expresses its consent to be bound”.

1.1.6 Statements purporting to discharge an obligation by equivalent means

A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization at the time when that State or that organization expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty, by which that State or that organization purports to discharge an obligation pursuant to the treaty in a manner different from but equivalent to that imposed by the treaty, constitutes a reservation.

Commentary

(1) The rather specific case dealt with in draft guideline 1.1.6 may be illustrated by the Japanese reservation to the Food Aid Convention, 1971. Under Article II of that treaty, the parties agreed to contribute as food aid to the developing countries wheat and other grains in the annual amounts specified. In the statement it made when signing, Japan reserved:

“the right to discharge its obligations under Article II by providing assistance in the form of rice, not excluding rice produced in non-member developing countries, or, if requested by recipient countries, in the form of agricultural materials”.

67 [278, 1999] This expression also refers back implicitly to draft guideline 1.1.2.
Such a statement does purport to modify the legal effect of some provisions of the treaty in their application to its author \(^{69}\) and it therefore comes within the framework of the definition of reservations.

It is probably hardly likely that it would take effect without the acceptance of the other parties (at least the recipients of the assistance, in the case of the Japanese reservation), but this is the case of reservations resulting from article 20 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.

The originality of the reservations referred to in this draft guideline lies in the expression “in a manner different from but equivalent to”. If the obligation assumed is less than that provided for by the treaty, the case is one covered by draft guideline 1.1.5 [1.1.6] (reservations purporting to limit the obligations of their author); if it is heavier, it is a statement purporting to undertake unilateral commitments, which are not reservations according to draft guideline 1.4.1 [1.1.5]. In accordance with the general principles of public international law, this equivalence can be assessed only by each contracting party insofar as it is concerned; where assessments differ, the parties must resort to a means of peaceful settlement.

The temporal element is, of course, essential in this case: if the “substitution” takes place after the entry into force of the treaty for its author, it will at best be a collateral agreement (if the other contracting parties accept it) and, at worst, a violation of the treaty. However, this is true for all unilateral statements formulated “late”.

1.1.7 [1.1.1] Reservations formulated jointly

The joint formulation of a reservation by several States or international organizations does not affect the unilateral nature of that reservation.

Commentary

One of the fundamental characteristics of reservations is that they are unilateral statements,\(^{70}\) and the majority of the Commission is convinced that this element of the Vienna definition is not subject to exceptions even if, formally, nothing prevents a number of States or international

\(^{69}\) On the understanding that, in the above-mentioned example, things are slightly less clear because Article II does not strictly limit the grains to be supplied to wheat, but, for the sake of argument, it may be assumed that it does.

\(^{70}\) Although in the past some authors have had a “contractual” conception of reservations (cf. Charles Rousseau, Principes généraux de droit international public (Paris, Pédone, 1944), vol. 1, p. 290; see also the definition proposed by James L. Brierly in 1950, IALC Yearbook ... 1950, vol. 2, pp. 238-239, para. 84). The adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention silenced the controversies over this point.
organizations from formulating a reservation jointly, that is to say in a single instrument addressed to the depositary of a multilateral treaty in the name of a number of parties.

(2) The practice of concerted reservations is well established: it is accepted current practice for States sharing common or similar traditions, interests or ideologies to act in concert with a view to formulating identical or similar reservations to a treaty. That was often done by the eastern European States which pledged allegiance to socialism,71 the Nordic countries,72 and the States members of the Council of Europe or the European communities.73 But each of these reservations was nonetheless formulated individually by each of the States concerned, and this thus poses no problem in relation to the Vienna definition.

(3) Nevertheless, during the discussion of the draft which was to become article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Convention, one member of the Commission pointed out that a reservation could be not only concerted, but also joint.74 At the time, this remark elicited no response, and in practice, it does not appear that States have to date had recourse to joint reservations.75 The possibility of such reservations cannot however be excluded. It is all the more probable in that, though there are no joint reservations, there are nowadays fairly frequent cases of:

(a) Joint objections to reservations entered by other parties,76

(b) Joint interpretative declarations which it is moreover not always easy to distinguish from reservations stricto sensu.77

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71 [257, 1998] See, for example, the reservations by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to section 30 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946; some of these reservations have been withdrawn since 1989 (cf. Multilateral Treaties ..., pp. 40 and 41).
72 [258, 1998] See, for example, the reservations of Finland and Sweden to articles 35 and 58 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 (cf. ibid., chap. III.6, pp. 72 and 73) and those of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden to article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 (ibid., pp. 123, 124 and 127).
73 [259, 1998] See, for example, the reservations by Austria (No. 5), Belgium (No. 1), France (No. 6) and Germany (No. 1) to the same 1996 Covenant (ibid., pp. 121-124) and the "declarations" by all the States members of the European Community, made in that capacity, to the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (ibid., pp. 904-905).
75 [261, 1998] The reservations formulated by an international organization are attributable to it, not to its member States; thus they cannot be termed "joint reservations".
76 [262, 1998] Thus, the European Community and its (then) nine member States objected, by means of a single instrument, to the "declarations" made by Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic with respect to article 52, paragraph 3, of the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets, of 4 November 1975, which envisaged the possibility of customs or economic unions becoming Contracting Parties (see Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. XI.A-16, p. 449).
77 [263, 1998] See the declarations made by the European Economic Community and its member States, or by the latter alone, with respect, for example, to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 9 May 1992 (ibid., chap. XXVII.7, p. 940), the Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992 (ibid., chap. XXVII.8, p. 944) and the Agreement of 4 August 1995 on straddling fish stocks (ibid., chap. XXI.7, pp. 856-857).
That the problem may arise in the future thus cannot be ruled out, and the Commission felt that it would be wise to anticipate that possibility in the Guide to Practice.

The Commission felt that there could be nothing against the joint formulation of a reservation by a number of States or international organizations: it is hard to see what could prevent them from doing together what they can without any doubt do separately and in the same terms. This flexibility is all the more necessary in that, with the proliferation of common markets and of customs and economic unions, the precedents constituted by the joint objections and interpretative declarations referred to above will in all probability recur with respect to reservations, given that such institutions often share competence with their member States, and it would be highly artificial to require the latter to act separately from the institution to which they belong. Moreover, in theoretical terms such a practice would certainly not be contrary to the practice of the Vienna definition: a single act on the part of a number of States can be regarded as unilateral if its addressee or addressees are not parties to it.

In practical terms, such joint reservations will also possess the great advantage of simplifying the task of the depositary - which would be able to address the text of the jointly formulated reservation to the other parties without having to increase the number of notifications - and of those other parties, which could if they wished react to it by means of a single instrument.

The Commission considered the advisability of going further and envisaging the possibility of collective reservations, by which a group of States or international organizations would undertake not only to formulate the reservation jointly, but also to withdraw or modify it exclusively as a group. This would also imply that the other parties would have to accept it or object to it uniformly. Although this course was advocated by one member, it seemed to present more difficulties than advantages:

(a) In practical terms, it would constitute an obstacle to the withdrawal of reservations, which is often considered a "necessary evil", by making the withdrawal of a joint reservation contingent upon the agreement of all the States or international organizations which formulated it;

(b) In theoretical terms, it would imply that a group of parties could impose upon the others the rules on reservations agreed upon by them, which is hardly compatible with the principle of

[264, 1998] This is a case of what may be termed "multi-partite unilateral acts"; on this point, see the first report by Mr. V. Rodriguez-Cedeño on unilateral acts of States (A/CN.4/486, paras. 79 and 133).
privity to treaties; in other words, it might happen that a number of States or international organizations would agree to consider that the reservation jointly formulated by them might be withdrawn or modified only jointly, but such an agreement would be *res inter alios acta* with regard to the other Contracting Parties to the treaty to which the reservation related.

(8) These are the reasons for which the Commission, while envisaging the possibility of jointly formulated reservations, decided to specify that such reservations were nonetheless subject to the general regime of reservations, governed largely by their "unilateral" nature, which cannot be affected by such joint formulation.

(9) Moreover, it should be specified that the coordinating conjunction "or" used in draft guideline 1.1.7 [1.1.1]80 in no way excludes the possibility of reservations formulated jointly by one or more States and by one or more international organizations, and should be understood to mean "and/or". Nevertheless, the Commission considered that this formulation would make the text too cumbersome.

1.1.8 Reservations made under exclusionary clauses

A unilateral statement made by a State or an international organization when that State or organization expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty, in accordance with a clause expressly authorizing the parties or some of them to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to those parties, constitutes a reservation.

Commentary

(1) According to a widely accepted definition, an exclusionary or opting-[or contracting-]out clause is a treaty provision by which a State will be bound by rules contained in the treaty unless it expresses its intent not to be bound, within a certain period of time, by some of those provisions.81

(2) Such exclusionary clauses (opting or contracting out) are quite common. Samples can be found in the conventions adopted under the auspices of The Hague Conference on Private International Law,82 the Council of Europe,83 the ILO84 and in various other

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80 [266, 1998] "... by several States or international organizations ..."
conventions. Among the latter, one may cite by way of example article 14, paragraph 1, of the London Convention of 2 November 1973 for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships:

“A State may, at the time of signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the present Convention declare that it does not accept any one or all of Annexes III, IV and V (hereinafter referred to as ‘Optional Annexes’) of the present Convention. Subject to the above, Parties to the Convention shall be bound by any Annex in its entirety”.85

(3) The question whether or not statements made in application of such exclusionary clauses are reservations is controversial. The strongest argument that they are not clearly derives from the ILO’s consistent strong opposition to such an assimilation, even though that organization regularly resorts to the opting-out procedure. In its reply to the Commission’s questionnaire, the ILO wrote:

“It has been the consistent and long-established practice of the ILO not to accept for registration instruments of ratification of international labour Conventions when accompanied with reservations. As has been written, “this basic proposition of refusing to recognize any reservations is as old as ILO itself” (see W.P. Gormley, ‘The Modification of Multilateral Conventions by Means of Negotiated Reservations and Other Alternatives: A Comparative Study of the ILO and Council of Europe’, Fordham Law Review, 1970, p. 65). The practice is not based on any explicit legal provision of the Constitution, the Conference Standing

82 [197, 2000] Cf. article 8, first subparagraph, of the Convention of 15 June 1955 relating to the settlement of conflicts between the law of nationality and the law of domicile: “Each Contracting State, when signing or ratifying the present Convention or acceding thereto, may declare that it excludes the application of this Convention to disputes between laws relating to certain matters”; see also article 9 of The Hague Convention of 1 June 1956 concerning the recognition of the legal personality of foreign companies, associations and foundations.

83 [198, 2000] Cf. article 34, paragraph 1, of the European Convention for the peaceful settlement of disputes of 29 April 1957: “On depositing its instrument of ratification, any one of the High Contracting Parties may declare that it will not be bound by: (a) Chapter III relating to arbitration; or (b) Chapters II and III relating to conciliation and arbitration”; see also article 7, paragraph 1, of the Council of Europe Convention on reduction of cases of multiple nationality and military obligations in cases of multiple nationality of 6 May 1963: (“Each Contracting Party shall apply the provisions of Chapters I and II. It is however understood that each Contracting Party may declare, at the time of ratification, acceptance or accession, that it will apply the provisions of Chapter II only. In this case the provisions of Chapter I shall not be applicable in relation to that Party”); and article 25, first subparagraph, of the European Convention on Nationality of 6 November 1997: (“Each State may declare, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, that it will exclude Chapter VII from the application of this Convention”), etc. For other examples, see Sia Spiliopoulo Åkermark, “Reservation clauses in treaties concluded within the Council of Europe”, ICLQ, 1999, pp. 504-505.

84 [199, 2000] Cf. article 2 of International Labour Convention No. 63 of 1938, concerning statistics of wages and hours of work: “1. Any Member which ratifies this Convention may, by a declaration appended to its ratification, exclude from its acceptance of the Convention: (a) any one of Parts II, III or IV; or (b) Parts II and IV; or (c) Parts III and IV”.
Orders, or the international labour Conventions, but finds its logical foundation in the specificity of labour Conventions and the tripartite structure of the Organization. Reference is usually made to two Memoranda as being the primary sources for such firm principle: first, the 1927 Memorandum submitted by the ILO Director to the Council of the League of Nations on the Admissibility of Reservations to General Conventions, and second, the 1951 Written Statement of the International Labour Organization in the context of the ICJ proceedings concerning the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

“In his Memorandum to the Committee of Experts for the Codification of International Law, the ILO Director-General wrote with respect to labour Conventions:

‘these agreements are not drawn up by the Contracting States in accordance with their own ideas: they are not the work of plenipotentiaries, but of a conference which has a peculiar legal character and includes non-government representatives. Reservations would still be inadmissible, even if all the States interested accepted them; for the rights which the treaties have conferred on non-governmental interests in regard to the adoption of international labour Conventions would be overruled if the consent of the Governments alone could suffice to modify the substance and detract from the effect of the Conventions’ (see League of Nations, Official Journal, 1927, at p. [882]).

“In the same vein, the ILO Memorandum, submitted to the ICJ in 1951, read in part:

‘international labour conventions are adopted and enter into force by a procedure which differs in important respects from the procedure applicable to other international instruments. The special features of this procedure have always been regarded as making international labour conventions intrinsically incapable of being ratified subject to any reservation. It has been the consistent view of the International Labour Organization, since its establishment, that reservations are not admissible. This view is based upon and supported by the consistent practice of the International Labour Organization and by the practice of the League of Nations during the period from 1920-1946 when the League was responsible for the registration of

85 [200, 2000] The provisions which follow are cited by way of example and in no way exhaust the list of exclusionary clauses of conventions adopted in these forums. For other examples, see, in general, P.H. Imbert, Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux, Pedone, Paris, 1979, pp. 171-172.
ratifications of international labour conventions’ (see *ICJ Pleadings, 1951*, at pp. 217, 227-228).

“Wilfred Jenks, Legal Adviser of the ILO, addressing in 1968 the United Nations Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, stated the following:

‘reservations to international labour Conventions are incompatible with the object and purpose of these Conventions. The procedural arrangements concerning reservations are entirely inapplicable to the ILO by reason of its tripartite character as an organization in which, in the language of our Constitution, “representatives of employers and workers” enjoy “equal status with those of governments”. Great flexibility is of course necessary in the application of certain international labour Conventions to widely varying circumstances, but the provisions regarded by the collective judgement of the International Labour Conference as wise and necessary for this purpose are embodied in the terms of the Conventions and, if they prove inadequate for the purpose, are subject to revision by the Conference at any time in accordance with its regular procedures. Any other approach would destroy the international labour code as a code of common standards’.

“In brief, with relation to international labour Conventions, a member State of the ILO must choose between ratifying without reservations and not ratifying. Consistent with this practice, the Office has on several occasions declined proffered ratifications which would have been subject to reservations (for instance, in the 1920s, the Governments of Poland, India and Cuba were advised that contemplated ratifications subject to reservations were not permissible; see *Official Bulletin*, vol. II, p. 18, and vol. IV, pp. 290-297). Similarly, the Organization refused recognition of reservations proposed by Peru in 1936. In more recent years, the Office refused to register the ratification of Convention No. 151 by Belize as containing two true reservations (1989). In each instance, the reservation was either withdrawn or the State was unable to ratify the Convention.

“It is interesting to note that, in the early years of the Organization, the view was taken that ratification of a labour Convention might well be made subject to the specific condition that it would only become operative if and when certain other States would have also ratified the same Convention (see International Labour Conference, 3rd session, 1921, at p. 220). In the words of the ILO Director-General in his 1927 Memorandum to the Council of the League of Nations,
‘these ratifications do not really contain any reservation, but merely a condition which
suspends their effect; when they do come into force, their effect is quite normal and
unrestricted. Such conditional ratifications are valid, and must not be confused with
ratifications subject to reservation which modify the actual substance of conventions adopted
by the International Labour Conference’ (for examples of ratifications subject to suspensive
conditions, see Written Statement of the ILO in *Genocide Case, ICJ Pleadings, 1951*, at pp.
264-265).

There is no record of recent examples of such a practice. In principle, all instruments of
ratification take effect 12 months after they have been registered by the Director-General.

“Notwithstanding the prohibition of formulating reservations, ILO member States are
entitled, and, at times, even required, to attach declarations - optional and compulsory
accordingly. A compulsory declaration may define the scope of the obligations accepted or
give other essential specifications. In some other cases a declaration is needed only where the
ratifying State wishes to make use of permitted exclusions, exceptions or modifications. In
sum, compulsory and optional declarations relate to limitations authorized by the Convention
itself, and thus do not amount to reservations in the legal sense. As the Written Statement of
the ILO in the *Genocide Case* read, ‘they are therefore a part of the terms of the convention as
approved by the Conference when adopting the convention and both from a legal and from a
practical point of view are in no way comparable to reservations’ (see *ICJ Pleadings, 1951*, at
p. 234). Yet for some, these flexibility devices have ‘for all practical purposes the same
operational effect as reservations’ (see Gormley, op. cit., *supra*, at p. 75).”

(4) In the Commission’s view, this reasoning reflects a respectable tradition, but is somewhat less
than convincing:

− In the first place, while international labour conventions are obviously adopted under very
specific circumstances, they are nevertheless treaties between States, and the participation of
non-governmental representatives in their adoption does not modify their legal nature;

− Secondly, the possibility that the International Labour Conference might revise a convention
that proved to be inadequate proves nothing about the legal nature of unilateral statements
made in application of an exclusionary clause: the revised convention could not be imposed

86 [201, 2000] Reply to the questionnaire, pp. 3-5.
against their will on States that had made such statements when becoming parties to the original convention, and it matters little in such cases whether or not those statements were reservations;

− Lastly, and most importantly, the position traditionally taken by ILO reflects a restrictive view of the concept of reservations which is not reflected in the Vienna Conventions and the present Guide to Practice.

(5) In fact, the Vienna Conventions do not preclude the making of reservations, not on the basis of an authorization implicit in the general international law of treaties, as codified in articles 19 to 23 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions, but on the basis of specific treaty provisions. This is quite clear from article 19 (b) of the Conventions, which concerns treaties that provide “that only specified reservations … may be made”, or article 20, paragraph 1, which stipulates that “a reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance …”.

(6) The fact that a unilateral statement purporting to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects in their application to its author is specifically provided for by a treaty is not sufficient to characterize such a statement as either being or not being a reservation. This is precisely the object of “reservation clauses” that can be defined as “treaty provisions […] setting] limits within which States should [88] formulate reservations and even the content of such reservations”.

(7) In fact, exclusionary clauses are clearly related to reservation clauses, and the resulting unilateral statements are related to the “specified” reservations “expressly authorized” by a treaty, including international labour conventions. They are indeed unilateral statements made at the time consent to be bound is expressed and purporting to exclude the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty as they apply to the State or the international organization making the statement, all of which corresponds exactly to the definition of reservations, and, at first glance at least, it would seem that they are not and need not be subject to a separate legal regime.

87 [202, 2000] Cf. draft guidelines 1.1 and 1.1.1.
88 [203, 2000] It would be more accurate to use the word “may”.
90 [205, 2000] At the same time, there is little doubt that a practice accepted as law has developed in the ILO. Under this practice, any unilateral statement seeking to limit the application of the provisions of international labour conventions that is not explicitly stipulated is inadmissible. This is also clearly the case with regard to the conventions adopted by The Hague Conference of Private International Law (see Georges A.L. Droz, “Les réserves et les facultés dans les Conventions de La Haye de droit international privé”, RCDIP 1969, pp. 388-392). However, this is an altogether different question from that of defining reservations.
(8) Except for the absence of the word “reservations”, there appears to be little difference
between the aforementioned exclusionary clauses and what are indisputably reservation clauses,
such as article 16 of The Hague Convention of 14 March 1970 on celebration and recognition of
the validity of marriages, article 33 of the Convention concluded on 18 March 1978 in the context
of The Hague Conference on Private International Law, on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or
commercial matters and article 35, entitled “Reservations”, of the Lugano Convention of the
Council of Europe of 21 June 1993, on civil liability for damages resulting from activities
dangerous to the environment. It is thus apparent that, in both their form and their effects, the
statements made when expressing consent to be bound under exclusionary clauses are in every way
comparable to reservations when provision is made for the latter, with restrictions, by reservation
clauses.

(9) Some members of the Commission questioned whether the fact that a State party cannot
object to a statement made under such an exclusionary clause does not rule out the classification of
such a statement as a reservation. This is no doubt true of every reservation formulated under a
reservation clause: once a reservation is expressly provided for in a treaty, the contracting States
know what to expect; they have accepted in advance the reservation or reservations concerned in
the treaty itself. It thus appears that the rules in article 20 on both acceptance of reservations and
objections to them do not apply to reservations expressly provided for, including opting-out clauses
or exclusionary provisions. This is, moreover, not a problem of definition, but one of legal
regime.

(10) Other members asked whether the classification of statements made under an opting-out
clause as reservations was compatible with article 19 (b) of the Vienna Conventions, according to

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91 [206, 2000] With regard to statements made in application of an exclusionary clause, but following its author’s expression of
consent to be bound, see para. (18) of the commentary below.
93 [208, 2000] “A Contracting State may reserve the right to exclude the application of Chapter I” (art. 28 provides for the possibility
of “reservations”).
94 [209, 2010] “A State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, exclude, in whole or in part, the application of the
provisions of paragraph 2 of article 4 and of Chapter II. No other reservation shall be permitted.”
95 [210, 2000] “Any signatory may declare, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or
approval, that it reserves the right: ‘(c) not to apply article 18’”.
96 [211, 2000] See W. Paul Gormley, “The Modification of Multilateral Conventions by Means of ‘Negotiated Reservations’ and
98 [213, 2000] Conversely, States may “object” to some statements (for example, statements of non-recognition), but that does not
make such statements reservations.
which a reservation cannot be formulated if the treaty provides that “only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made”. However, article 19 (b) does not say that all other reservations are prohibited if some are expressly provided for; it does say that other reservations are prohibited if the treaty provides that only specified reservations may be made.

(11) In reality, exclusionary clauses take the form of “negotiated reservations”, as the term is currently (and erroneously) accepted in the context of The Hague Conference on Private International Law and further developed in the context of the Council of Europe.99 “Strictly speaking, this means that it is the reservation - and not only the right to make one - that is the subject of the negotiations.”100 These, then, are not “reservations” at all in the proper sense of the term, but reservation clauses that impose limits and are precisely defined when the treaty is negotiated.

(12) It is true that, in some conventions (at least those of the Council of Europe), exclusionary and reservation clauses are present at the same time.101 This is probably more a reflection of terminological vagueness, than of a deliberate distinction.102 And it is striking that, in its reply to the Commission’s questionnaire, the ILO should mention among the problems encountered in the areas of reservations those relating to article 34 of the European Convention for the peaceful settlement of disputes, since the word “reservation” does not even appear in this standard exclusionary clause.103

(13) The case covered in draft guideline 1.1.8 is the same as that dealt with in article 17, paragraph 1, of the 1969 and 1978 Vienna Conventions:

100 [215, 2000] Pierre-Henri Imbert, op. cit., p. 196. The term is used in the Council of Europe in a broader sense, seeking to cover the “procedure intended to enumerate either in the body of the Convention itself or in an annex the limits of the options available to States in formulating a reservation” (Héribert Golsong, op. cit., p. 228 (emphasis added); see also Sia Spiliopoulo Åkermark, op. cit., p. 498 and also pp. 489-490).
101 [216, 2000] See arts. 7 (note 198 above) and 8 of the Council of European Convention of 1968 on reduction of cases of multiple nationality and the examples given by Sia Spiliopoulo Åkermark, op. cit., p. 506, note 121.
102 [217, 2000] Moreover, the fact that certain multilateral conventions prohibit any reservations while allowing some statements which may be equated with exclusionary clauses (see art. 124 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998) is not in itself decisive; it too is no doubt more the result of terminological vagueness than of an intentional choice aimed at achieving specific legal effects.
“Without prejudice to articles 19 to 23, the consent of a State [or of an international organization] to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty so permits …”.

(14) This provision, which was adopted without change by the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference,\(^{104}\) is contained in part II, section 1 (Conclusion of treaties), and creates a link with articles 19 to 23 dealing specifically with reservations. It is explained by the International Law Commission as follows in its final report of 1966 on the draft articles on the law of treaties:

“Some treaties expressly authorize States to consent to a part or parts only of the treaty or to exclude certain parts, and then, of course, partial ratification, acceptance, approval or accession is admissible. But in the absence of such a provision, the established rule is that the ratification, accession etc. must relate to the treaty as a whole. Although it may be admissible to formulate reservations to selected provisions of the treaty under the rule stated in article 16 [19 in the text of the Convention], it is inadmissible to subscribe only to selected parts of the treaty. Accordingly, paragraph 1 of the article lays down that, without prejudice to the provisions of articles 16 to 20 [19 to 23] regarding reservations to multilateral treaties, an expression of consent by a State to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty or the other contracting States authorize such a partial consent.”\(^{105}\)

(15) The expression “without prejudice to articles 19 to 23” in article 17 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions implies that, in some cases, options amount to reservations.\(^{106}\) Conversely, it would appear that this provision is drafted so as not to imply that all clauses that offer parties a choice between various provisions of a treaty are reservations.

(16) This is certainly true of statements made under an optional clause or a clause providing for a choice between the provisions of a treaty, as indicated in guidelines 1.4.6 and 1.4.7. But it might also be asked whether it is not also true of certain statements made under certain exclusionary clauses, which, while having the same or similar effects as reservations, are not reservations in the strict sense of the term, as defined in the Vienna Conventions and the Guide to Practice.


(17) It so happens that some treaties allow the parties to exclude, by means of a unilateral statement, the legal effect of certain of the treaty’s provisions in their application to the author of the statement, not (or not only) at the time of expression of consent to be bound, but after the treaty enters into force for them. For example:

- Article 82 of the International Labour Convention on minimum standards authorizes a member State that has ratified the Convention to denounce, 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention, either the entire Convention or one or more of Parts II to X;
- Article 22 of The Hague Convention of 1 June 1970 on the recognition of divorces and legal separations authorizes contracting States, “from time to time, [to] declare that certain categories of persons having their nationality need not be considered their nationals for the purposes of this Convention”;\footnote{222, 2000} Concerning the circumstances under which this provision was adopted, see Georges A.L. Droz, op. cit., pp. 414-415. This, typically, is a “negotiated reservation” in the sense referred to in para. (11) of the commentary.
- Article 30 of The Hague Convention of 1 August 1989 on successions stipulates that: “A State Party to this Convention may denounce it, or only Chapter III of the Convention, by a notification in writing addressed to the depositary;”\footnote{223, 2000} Significantly, article 22, already cited, of the Convention on the recognition of divorces and legal separations, of the 1970 Hague Conference, is omitted from the list of reservation clauses given in article 25.
- Article X of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services of 4 July 1996 authorizes a member State to modify or withdraw any commitment in its schedule of specific commitments, subject to certain conditions, at any time after three years from the date on which that commitment entered into force.

(18) Unilateral statements made under provisions of this type are certainly not reservations.\footnote{223, 2000} In this respect, the fact that they are formulated (or may be formulated) at a time other than the time of consent to be bound is perhaps not in itself absolutely decisive insofar as nothing prevents negotiators from departing from the provisions of the Vienna Conventions, which are merely residual in nature. Nevertheless, statements made under these exclusionary clauses after the entry into force of the treaty are very different from reservations in that they do not place conditions on the accession of the State or the international organization which makes them. Reservations are an element of the conclusion and entry into force of a treaty, as is demonstrated by the inclusion of articles 19 to 23 of the Vienna Conventions in part II, relating to the conclusion and entry into force
of treaties. They are partial acceptances of the provisions of the treaty to which they relate; and that is why it seems logical to consider statements made at the time of expressing consent to be bound as being reservations. On the other hand, statements made after the treaty has been in force for a certain period of time in respect of their author are partial denunciations which, in their spirit, are much more closely related to part V of the Vienna Conventions concerning invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties. They may also be linked to article 44, paragraph 1, which does not exclude the right of a party to withdraw partially from a treaty if the treaty so provides.

(19) Such statements are expressly excluded from the scope of draft guideline 1.1.8 by the words “when that State or organization expresses its consent to be bound”, which draw on draft guideline 1.1.2 relating to “Cases in which a reservation may be formulated”.

1.2 Definition of interpretative declarations

“Interpretative declaration” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions.

Commentary

(1) Notwithstanding the apparent silence of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on this phenomenon, States have always felt that they could attach to their expression of consent to be bound by multilateral treaty declarations whereby they indicate the spirit in which they agree to be bound; these declarations do not, however, seek to modify or exclude the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty and thus do not constitute reservations, but interpretative declarations.\(^{109}\)

\(^{109}\) [281, 1999] The long-standing practice of such declarations had been in existence since multilateral treaties themselves first appeared. Generally speaking, it dates back to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which brought together “in a general instrument” all treaties concluded in the wake of Napoleon's defeat. With this initial appearance of the multilateral format came both a reservation and an interpretative declaration. The latter came from Great Britain, which, when the instruments of ratification were exchanged, declared that article VIII of the Treaty of Alliance concluded with Austria, Prussia and Russia, which invited France to join the Alliance, must be “understood as binding the Contracting Parties ... to a common effort against the power of Napoleon Bonaparte ..., but is not to be understood as binding His Britannic Majesty to prosecute the War, with a view of imposing upon France any particular Government”. Today, interpretative declarations are very frequent, as shown by the replies of States and, to a lesser extent, of international organizations to the Commission's questionnaire on reservations.
It is often difficult to distinguish between such unilateral declarations and, on the one hand, reservations as defined in draft guideline 1.1 and, on the other hand, other types of unilateral declarations which are made in respect of a treaty, often on the occasion of the expression of consent by its authors to be bound, but which are neither reservations nor interpretative declarations and the main points of which are listed in section 1.4 of the present Guide to Practice. This distinction is of great practical importance, however, because it affects the legal regime applicable to each of these declarations.

For a long time, reservations and interpretative declarations were not clearly distinguished in State practice or in doctrine. In the latter case, the dominant view simply grouped them together and authors who made a distinction generally found themselves embarrassed by it.

A number of elements help to blur the necessary distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations:

- The terminology is hesitant;
- The practice of States and international organizations is uncertain; and
- The declarants' objectives are not always unambiguous.

The terminological uncertainty is underscored by the definition of reservations itself, since, according to the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, a reservation is “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named ...”. This “negative precision” eschews any nominalism to focus attention on the actual content of declarations and on the effect they seek to produce, but—and here is the reverse side of the coin—this decision to give precedence to substance over form runs the risk, in the best of cases, of encouraging States not to pay attention to the name they give to their declarations, thereby sowing confusion or unfortunate ambiguity; in the worst cases, it allows them to play with names to create uncertainty as to the real nature of their intentions. By giving the name of “declarations” to
instruments that are obviously and unquestionably real reservations, they hope not to arouse the vigilance of the other States parties while attaining the same objectives; conversely, to give greater weight to declarations that clearly have no legal effect on the provisions of a treaty, they label them “reservations”, even though under the terms of the Vienna definition they are not.

(6) Instruments having the same objective can be called “reservations” by one State party and “interpretative declarations” by another. Sometimes, instruments having the same objective can be called “reservations” by some States, “interpretations” by others and nothing at all by still others. In some cases, a State will employ various expressions that make it difficult to tell whether they are being used to formulate reservations or interpretative declarations and whether they have different meanings or scope. Thus, the same words can, in the view of the very State employing them, cover a range of legal realities. It sometimes happens that, faced with an instrument entitled “declaration”, the other parties to the treaty view it in different ways and treat it either as such or as a “reservation” or, conversely, that objections to a “reservation” refer to it as a “declaration”; and, at the limit of this terminological confusion, there are even occasions when

because the treaty does not allow for reservations proper or because it looks ‘nicer’ with an interpretative declaration than a real reservation:

114 [286, 1999] For example, France and Monaco have used identical terms to spell out the way in which they interpret article 4 of the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, yet Monaco submitted this interpretation as a reservation, while France formally announced that its intention was merely to “place on record its interpretation” of that provision (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. IV.2, pp. 104, 106 and 115, note 15). Poland and Syria have also declared in the same terms that they do not consider themselves bound by the provisions of article 1, paragraph 1, of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, but the former expressly called this statement a “reservation”, while the latter labelled it a “declaration” (ibid., chap. XVIII.7, p. 765).


116 [288, 1999] That was the case of France, for example, when it acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

“The Government of the Republic considers that ...”;
“The Government of the Republic enters a reservation concerning ...”;
“The Government of the Republic declares that ...”;
“The Government of the Republic interprets ...”;

with all of these formulas appearing under the heading “Declarations and reservations” (example given by Rosario Sapienza, Dichiarazioni interpretative unilaterali e trattati internazionali, op. cit. (note 283 above), pp. 154-155; complete text in Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General - Status as at 31 December 1997, chap. IV.4, p. 124.

117 [289, 1999] In accepting the IMCO Statute, Cambodia twice used the word “declares” to explain the scope of its acceptance. In response to a request for clarification from the United Kingdom, Norway and Greece, Cambodia explained that the first part of its declaration was “a political declaration” but that the second part was a reservation (ibid., chap. XII.1, p. 612 and p. 631, note 10).

118 [290, 1999] For example, while several of the “Eastern bloc” countries identified their statements of opposition to article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (which deals with size of missions) as “reservations”, the countries that objected to those statements sometimes called them “reservations” (Germany and the United Republic of Tanzania) and sometimes “declarations” (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand and the United Kingdom) (ibid., chap. III.3, pp. 56-63).
States make interpretative declarations by means of a specific reference to the provisions of a convention on reservations.  

(7) The confusion is worsened by the fact that, while in French one encounters few terms other than “réserves” and “déclarations”, English terminology is much more varied, since certain English-speaking States, particularly the United States of America, use not only “reservation” and “(interpretative) declaration”, but also “statement”, “understanding”, “proviso”, “interpretation”, “explanation” and so forth. The advantage of this variety of terms, although not based on strict distinctions, is that it shows that all unilateral declarations formulated in respect or on the occasion of a treaty are not necessarily either reservations or interpretative declarations; draft guidelines at 1.4 to 1.4.5 [1.2.6] describe these other types of unilateral declarations, which, in the view of the Commission, should be excluded from the scope of this Guide to Practice because, prima facie, they do not come under the law of treaties.

(8) It goes without saying that the elements listed above are not in themselves likely to facilitate the search for an independent criterion for distinguishing between reservations and interpretative declarations. It should be possible to seek it empirically, however, by starting, as one generally does, with the definition of reservations in order to extract, by means of comparison, the

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119 [291, 1999] Such was the case of a “declaration” made by Malta with regard to article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights which referred to article 42 of that instrument (example cited by William Schabas, commentary on article 64 in Louis-Edmond Pettiti, Emmanuel Decaux and Pierre-Henri Imberg (dirs.), La Convention européenne des Droits de l'homme - Commentaire article par article (Paris, Économica, 1995), p. 926).

120 [292, 1999] This would seem to hold true in general for all the romance languages: in Spanish, the distinction is made between "reserva" and "declaración (interpretativa)", in Italian between "riserva" and "dichiarazione (interpretativa)", in Portuguese between "reserva" and "declaração (interpretativa)", in Romanian between “rezervă” and “declarație (interpretativ)”. The same holds true for Arabic, German and Greek.

121 [293, 1999] Marjorie M. Whiteman describes United States practice this way: “The term 'understanding' is often used to designate a statement when it is not intended to modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty in its international operation but is intended merely to clarify or explain or to deal with some matter incidental to the operation of the treaty in a manner other than a substantive reservation ... The terms 'declaration' and 'statement' are used most often when it is considered essential or desirable to give matters of policy or principle, without an intention of derogating from the substantive rights or obligations stipulated in the treaty.” (Digest of International Law (Washington, D.C., 1970), vol. 14, pp. 137-138); see also the letter dated 27 May 1980 from Mr. Arthur W. Rovine, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaties in the United States Department of State, to Mr. Ronald F. Stowe, Chairman of the Air and Space Law Committee of the International Law Section of the American Bar Association, reproduced in Marian Nash Leich, ed., Digest of United States Practice in International Law (Washington, D.C., Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, 1980), pp. 397-398. These various names can have a legal impact on some domestic legislation; they seem not to in the area of international law, and it is not certain that the distinctions are categorical, even at the internal level. Thus during the debate in the United States Senate on the Convention relating to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), when the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee asked what the difference between a “declaration” and an “understanding” was, the Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs replied: “Actually the difference between a declaration and an understanding, I think, is very subtle, and I am not sure that it amounts to anything” (quoted by Marjorie M. Whiteman, op. cit., p. 192). As the Special Rapporteur understands it, in Chinese, Russian and the Slavic languages in general, it is possible to draw distinctions between several types of “interpretative” declarations.

definition of interpretative declarations. At the same time, this also makes it possible to distinguish both interpretative declarations and reservations from other unilateral declarations that fall into neither of these categories.

(9) That was the position of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, third Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, who, in his first report in 1956, defined interpretative declarations negatively in contrast with reservations, stating that the term “reservation”

“does not include mere statements as to how the State concerned proposes to implement the treaty, or declarations of understanding or interpretation, unless these imply a variation on the substantive terms or effect of the treaty”. 123

However, that was a “negative”, “hollow” definition, which clearly showed that reservations and interpretative declarations were distinct legal instruments, but did not positively define what was meant by “interpretative declaration”. Furthermore, the formulation eventually used, which, it may be assumed, probably related to the “conditional interpretative declarations” defined in draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4] below, was lacking in precision, to say the least.

(10) This second shortcoming was corrected in part by Sir Humphrey Waldock, who, in his first report, submitted in 1962, removed some of the ambiguity brought about by the end of the definition proposed by his predecessor, but once again proposed a purely negative definition:

“an explanatory statement or statement of intention or of understanding as to the meaning of the treaty, which does not amount to a variation in the legal effect of the treaty, does not constitute a reservation”. 124

(11) In the view of the Commission, this procedure makes it possible to know what an interpretative declaration is not; it is of little use in defining what it is, a question in which the International Law Commission lost interest during the drafting of the Vienna Convention. 125

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125 [297, 1999] However, the commentary to draft article 2, paragraph 1 (d), points out that the declaration which is a mere “clarification of the State's position” ... does not “amount to a reservation” (ILC, Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 206). Moreover, in its comments on the draft articles on the law of treaties adopted on first reading, Japan attempted to bridge that gap by noting “that not infrequently a difficulty arises in practice of determining whether a statement is in the nature of a reservation or of an interpretative declaration” and by suggesting that “a new provision should be inserted [...] in order to overcome this difficulty” (Sir Humphrey Waldock, fourth report on the law of treaties, ILC, Yearbook ... 1964, vol. II, pp. 46-47). However, the Japanese position confined itself to making provision for the insertion of a paragraph to draft article 18 (which becomes article 19): “2. A reservation, in order to qualify as such under the provisions of the present articles, must be formulated in writing, and expressly stated as a reservation” (comments transmitted by a note verbale of 4 February 1964, A/CN.4/175, p. 78; cf. also pp. 70-71); here again, this was not a “positive” definition of interpretative declarations, and the insertion proposed was more a matter for the legal regime of reservations.
Yet it is important to determine “positively” whether or not a unilateral declaration made in respect of a treaty constitutes an interpretative declaration because, firstly, it gives rise to specific legal consequences which the Commission will set out to describe in part IV of the Guide to Practice and, secondly, these consequences come under the law of treaties, unlike other categories of unilateral declarations, which are defined below in section 1.4.

(12) An empirical observation of practice helps to determine in a reasonably precise manner how interpretative declarations are similar to reservations and how they differ and to arrive at a positive definition of the former.

(13) There seems to be no point in dwelling on the fact that an interpretative declaration is most certainly a unilateral declaration in the same way as a reservation. It is in fact this point in common which is at the origin of the entire difficulty of drawing a distinction: they look the same; in form, virtually nothing distinguishes them.

(14) The second point in common between reservations and interpretative declarations has to do with the irrelevance of the phrasing or name chosen by their author. This element, which automatically stems, a fortiori, from the very definition of reservations, is confirmed by the practice of States and international organizations, which, faced with unilateral declarations submitted as interpretative declarations by their authors, do not hesitate to object to them by expressly considering them to be reservations. Similarly, nearly all the writers who have

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126 [298, 1999] On the possibility of jointly formulating interpretive declarations, see draft guideline 1.2.2 [1.2.1] and the commentary thereto.


128 [300, 1999] The question in fact arises whether, unlike reservations, interpretative declarations can be formulated orally; as the definition of reservations does not expressly mention their written form, the Commission considers it preferable, for the sake of symmetry, to refrain at this stage from proposing a guideline for the Guide to Practice along those lines. It reserves the right to do so in the following chapter of the Guide to Practice relating to the formulation of reservations and interpretative declarations.

129 [301, 1999] According to one member of the Commission, the expression “phrasing or name” is inappropriate and should be replaced by “title or designation [or formulation]”; while not being insensitive to that proposal, the Commission nevertheless considered that it would be preferable to confine itself to the terminology used in the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties; see also the commentary to draft guideline 1.3.2 [1.2.2], paragraph (12).


131 [303, 1999] There are countless examples of this phenomenon. To mention only a few that relate to recent conventions, there are: The objection of the Netherlands to Algeria's interpretative declaration concerning paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. IV.3, p. 117). The reactions of many States to the declaration by the Philippines in respect of the 1982 Montego Bay Convention (ibid., chap. XXI.6, pp. 824-826). The objection of Mexico, which considered that the third declaration, formally called interpretative, of the United States of America to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 20 December 1988 constituted “a modification of the Convention contrary to the objective of the latter” (ibid., chap. VI.19, p. 314). The reaction of
recently looked into this fine distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations give numerous examples of unilateral declarations which are presented as interpretative declarations by the States formulating them, but which they themselves regard as reservations, and vice versa. 

(15) It follows that, like reservations, interpretative declarations are unilateral statements formulated by a State or an international organization, it being unnecessary to be concerned about how they are phrased or named by the declarant. 

The two instruments are, however, very different in terms of the objective pursued by the declarant.

(16) According to the definition of reservations, they aim “to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application” to their author or to certain specific aspects of the treaty as a whole. 

As their name indicates, interpretative declarations have a different objective: they are aimed at interpreting the treaty as a whole or certain of its provisions.

(17) This can –and must – constitute the central element of their definition, yet it poses difficult problems nonetheless, the first of which is determining what is meant by “interpretation”, a highly complex concept, the elucidation of which would far exceed the scope of the present draft.

Germany to a declaration by which the Tunisian Government indicated that it would not adopt, in implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, “any legislative or statutory decision that conflicts with the Tunisian Constitution” (ibid., chap. IV.11, p. 221). It also happens that “reacting” States contemplate both solutions and express their reactions in accordance with whether the text is a reservation or an interpretative declaration, again regardless of the term used by the author to designate it. Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America reacted to an interpretative declaration by Yugoslavia concerning the 1971 Seabed Treaty by considering it first as an actual interpretative declaration (which they rejected) and then as a reservation (which they considered to be late and inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty) (example cited by Luigi Migliorino, “Declarations and Reservations to the 1971 Seabed Treaty”, I.Y.B.I.L. 1985, p. 110. In the same spirit, Germany and the Netherlands objected to declarations made by the countries of Eastern Europe with regard to “the definition of piracy as given in the Convention insofar as the said declarations are to be qualified as reservations” (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. XXI.2, pp. 790 and 791). Likewise, several States questioned the real nature of the (late) “declarations” by Egypt concerning the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (see in particular the reaction of Finland: “Without taking any stand on the content of the declarations, which appear to be reservations in nature ...”, ibid., chap. XXXVII.3, p. 931); see also paragraph (6) supra. 

Judges and arbitrators also do not hesitate to question the true nature of unilateral declarations formulated by a State in respect of a treaty and, as appropriate, to call it something else; see the examples given below in the commentary to draft guideline 1.3.2 [1.2.2].

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133 [305, 1999] This does not mean that the phrasing or name chosen has no impact whatsoever on the distinction. As may be seen from draft guideline 1.3.2 [1.2.2], they may indicate the purported legal effect.


(18) Suffice it to say, in a phrase often recalled by the International Court of Justice, that the expression “to construe” (“interprétation” in French) must be understood as meaning to give a precise definition of the meaning and scope of a binding legal instrument, in this case a treaty. What is essential is that interpreting is not revising. While reservations ultimately modify, if not the text of the treaty, at least the legal effect of its provisions, interpretative declarations are in principle limited to clarifying the meaning and the scope that the author State or international organization attributes to the treaty or to certain of its provisions. Since this paraphrases the commonly accepted definition of the “interpretation”, the Commission considered that it would be tautological to include the term “to interpret” in the body of draft guideline 1.2.

(19) In conformity with an extremely widespread practice, the interpretation, which is the subject of such declarations, may relate either to certain provisions of a treaty or to the treaty as a whole. The gap in the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on that point, which led the Commission to adopt draft guideline 1.1.1 [1.1.4] on “across the board” reservations in order to take account of the practice actually followed by States and international organizations, was thus remedied by the wording adopted for draft guideline 1.2 and made it unnecessary for the Guide to Practice to include a provision equivalent to draft guideline 1.1.1 [1.1.4].

(20) According to some members of the Commission, the expression “the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to the treaty” introduces an unduly subjective element into the definition of interpretative declarations, although most members consider that any unilateral interpretation is imbued with subjectivity. Moreover, in accordance with the very spirit of the definition of reservations, they may be distinguished from other unilateral declarations made with regard to a treaty by the legal effect aimed at by the declarant, i.e. by its intention (inevitably subjective).


139 [311, 1999] Among a great many examples, see the interpretative declaration of Thailand concerning the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. IV.8, p. 177) or that of New Zealand to the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military and Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ibid., chap. XXVI.1, p. 878); see also above, the declaration by the United Kingdom cited in note 281.

140 [312, 1999] An agreement on interpretation constitutes an authentic (supposedly “objective”) interpretation of the treaty (see draft guideline 1.5.3 [1.2.8]), but this relates to the legal regime of interpretative declarations, not to their definition.
There is no reason to depart from the spirit of this definition as far as interpretative declarations are concerned.

(21) The Commission has also questioned whether the temporal element which is present in the definition of reservations 141 should be included in the definition of interpretative declarations but has determined that the practical considerations which were based on the concern to avoid abuses and which led the framers of the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions to adopt that solution 142 do not arise with the same force in respect of interpretative declarations, at least those which the declarant formulates without making the proposed interpretation a condition for its participation. 143

(22) In addition, it is doubtful whether such temporal limitations are justified with respect to interpretative declarations. It is not without relevance that the rules relating to reservations and those devoted to the interpretation of treaties appear in separate parts of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions: the former in Part II, relating to the conclusion and entry into force of treaties, and the latter in Part III, where they are side by side with the provisions relating to the observance and application of treaties. 144

(23) This is to say that interpretative declarations formulated unilaterally by States or international organizations concerning the meaning or scope of the provisions of a treaty are and can be only some of the elements of the interpretation of such provisions. They coexist with other simultaneous, prior or subsequent interpretations which may be made by other contracting parties or third bodies entitled to give an interpretation that is authentic and binding on the parties.

(24) Thus, even if an instrument made by a party “in connection with the conclusion of a treaty” can, under certain conditions, be considered for the purposes of interpreting the treaty to be part of the “context”, as expressly provided in article 31, paragraph 2 (b), of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna

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141 [313, 1999] “Reservation’ means a unilateral statement ... made by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty ...” (draft guideline 1.1, emphasis added).
143 [315, 1999] See draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4] and the commentary thereto.
144 [316, 1999] In fact, there is no gap between the formation and the application of international law or between interpretation and application: “La mise en oeuvre de règles supposent leur interprétation préalable. Elle peut être explicite ou implicite, et dans ce cas se confond avec les mesures d'interprétation” (“The implementation of rules implies that they have already been interpreted. Implementation may be explicit or implicit, in which case it may become confused with measures of interpretation”), (Serge Sur in Jean Combacu and Serge Sur, Droit international public (Paris, Montchrestien, 1997), p. 163). Some have even gone so far as to affirm that “La règle de droit, dès l'instant de sa creation jusqu'au moment de son application aux cas singuliers est une affaire d'interprétation” (“the rule of law, from the moment of its creation to the moments of its application to individual cases, is a matter of interpretation”) (A.J. Arnaud, “Le médium et le savant - signification politique de l'interprétation juridique”, Archives de
Conventions, this does not imply any exclusivity *ratione temporis*. Moreover, paragraph 3 of article 31 expressly invites the interpreter to take “into account, together with the context”, any subsequent agreement between the parties and any subsequent practice followed. Such subsequent agreements or practices may be supported by interpretative declarations that may be formulated at any time in the life of the treaty: at its conclusion, at the time a State or international organization expresses its final consent to be bound, or at the time of application of the treaty. 145

(25) This was the position taken by Sir Humphrey Waldock in his fourth report on the law of treaties, in which he pointed out that a declaration could have been made

“during the negotiations, or at the time of signature, ratification, etc., or later, in the course of the 'subsequent practice’”. 146

(26) Independently of these general considerations, to confine the formulation of interpretative declarations to a limited period of time, as the definition of reservations does, would have the serious drawback of being inconsistent with practice. Even if it is quite often at the moment they express their consent to be bound that States and international organizations formulate such declarations, that is not always the case.

(27) It is indeed striking to note that States tend to get around the *ratione temporis* limitation of the right to formulate reservations by submitting them, occasionally out of time, as interpretative declarations. This was the case, for example, of the “declaration” made by Yugoslavia in respect of the 1971 Treaty on the Denuclearization of the Seabed 147 or of the declaration made by Egypt regarding the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 148 In these two cases, the “declarations” elicited protests on the part of the other contracting parties, who were motivated by the fact that the declarations were actually reservations and, in the second case, the fact that article 26 of the Basel Convention (which prohibits reservations) authorizes States to formulate declarations, within certain limits, only “when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, ... confirming or acceding to this Convention”. One can

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145 [317, 1999] This last possibility was recognized by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950 concerning the International Status of South-West Africa: “Interpretations placed upon legal instruments by the parties to them, though not conclusive as to their meaning, have considerable probative value when they contain recognition by a party of its own obligations under an instrument” (I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 135-136); in fact, the Court based itself on declarations made by South Africa in 1946 and 1947 on the interpretation of its mandate over South-West Africa, an agreement that had been concluded in 1920.


147 [319, 1999] See note 303 above.
conclude *a contrario* that, if true interpretative declarations had been involved (and if the Basel Convention had not set any time limits), the declarations could have been formulated at a time other than the moment of signature or consent to be bound.

(28) This is in fact quite normal in practice. It should be pointed out, as Professor Greig does, that, when they formulate objections to reservations or react to interpretative declarations formulated by other contracting parties, States or international organizations often go on to propose their own interpretation of the treaty's provisions. 149 There is no *prima facie* reason not to consider such “counter-proposals” as veritable interpretative declarations, at least when they seek to clarify the meaning and scope of the treaty in the eyes of the declarant; however, they are by definition formulated after the time at which the formulation of a reservation is possible.

(29) Under these circumstances, in the opinion of a majority of the members of the Commission, it would hardly seem possible to include in a general definition of interpretative declarations a specification of the time at which such a declaration is to be made.

(30) The Commission wishes to make it clear, however, that the fact that draft guideline 1.2 is silent about the moment at which an interpretative declaration may be made, out of concern not to limit unduly the freedom of action of States and international organizations and not to go against a well-established practice, should not be seen as encouragement to formulate such declarations at inappropriate times. Even though “simple” interpretative declarations 150 are not binding on the other contracting parties, such an attitude could lead to abuse and create difficulties. By way of a remedy, it might be expedient for the parties to a treaty to try to avoid anarchical interpretative declarations by specifying in a limitative manner when such declarations may be made, as is the case in the 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea, 151 and the 1989 Basel

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149 [321, 1999] In this connection, see D.W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, Australian Yb. I.L. 1995, pp. 24 and 42-45. See the example cited by this author (p. 43) of the reactions of the Netherlands to the reservations of Bahrain and Qatar to article 27, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the “counter-interpretation” of articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty made by the United States of America in reaction to point 8 of the Italian declaration concerning that treaty (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1078, pp. 417-418).
150 [322, 1999] As opposed to conditional interpretative declarations, which are the subject of draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4].
151 [323, 1999] Article 310: “Article 309 [which excludes reservations] does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that State” (emphasis added).
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.\textsuperscript{152}

(31) The silence of draft guideline 1.2 on the moment when an interpretative declaration may be formulated should not lead one to conclude, however, that an interpretative declaration may in all cases be formulated at any time:

(a) For one thing, this might be formally prohibited by the treaty itself;\textsuperscript{153}

(b) Furthermore, it would seem to be out of the question that a State or international organization could formulate a \emph{conditional} interpretative declaration\textsuperscript{154} at any time in the life of the treaty: such laxity would cast an unacceptable doubt on the reality and scope of the treaty obligations;

(c) And, lastly, even simple interpretative declarations can be invoked and modified at any time only to the extent that they have not been expressly accepted by the other parties to the treaty or that an estoppel has not been raised against them.

(32) These are questions that will have to be clarified in chapter II of the Guide to Practice, on the formulation of reservations and interpretative declarations.

(33) It goes without saying that this definition in no way prejudges the validity or the effect of such declarations and that the same precautions taken with respect to reservations must be applied to interpretative declarations: the proposed definition is without prejudice to the permissibility and the effects of such declarations from the standpoint of the rules applicable to them. The Commission extended the draft guideline that it provisionally adopted in 1998\textsuperscript{155} along these lines, so that this important caveat covers not only reservations, but also interpretative declarations and, more generally, all unilateral statements made in respect of a treaty.\textsuperscript{156}

(34) In the light of this comment, the definition in draft guideline 1.2 has, in the Commission's view, the dual advantage of making it possible to distinguish clearly between interpretative

\textsuperscript{152} [324, 1999] Article 26: “1. No reservation or exception may be made to this Convention. Paragraph 1 of this Article does not preclude a State or political and/or economic integration organization, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, formally confirming or acceding to this Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effects of the provisions of the Convention in their application to that State” (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{153} [325, 1999] See the examples given in notes 323 and 324 above.

\textsuperscript{154} [326, 1999] See draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4] and the commentary thereto.


\textsuperscript{156} [328, 1999] See draft guideline 1.6 and the commentary thereto.
declarations and reservations, on the one hand, and, on the other, between interpretative declarations and other unilateral statements made in respect of a treaty, while being sufficiently general to encompass different categories of interpretative declarations; \(^{157}\) in particular, it encompasses both conditional and simple interpretative declarations, the distinction between which is covered in draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4].

1.2.1 [1.2.4] Conditional interpretative declarations

A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or international organization subjects its consent to be bound by the treaty to a specific interpretation of the treaty or of certain provisions thereof, shall constitute a conditional interpretative declaration.

Commentary

(1) In accordance with the definition given in draft guideline 1.2, interpretative declarations can be seen as “offers” of interpretation, governed by the fundamental principle of good faith, but lacking any inherent authentic or binding character. However, their authors frequently endeavour to broaden their scope, so that they come closer to being a reservation without actually becoming one. This is what happens when a State or international organization does not merely propose an interpretation, but makes its interpretation a condition of its consent to be bound by the treaty.

(2) The members of the Commission have unanimously recognized the existence of such a practice, which was not systematized in the legal doctrine until relatively recently, \(^{158}\) while continuing to explore the exact legal nature of such unilateral statements.

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\(^{157}\) [329, 1999] On ways of applying this distinction, see draft guidelines 1.3 to 1.3.3 [1.2.3].

\(^{158}\) [330, 1999] The distinction between these two types of interpretative declaration was clearly and authoritatively drawn by Professor D.M. McRae in an important article published in 1978. Exploring the effect of interpretative declarations, he noted that “two situations have to be considered. The first is where a State attaches to its instrument of acceptance a statement that simply purports to offer an interpretation of the treaty or part of it. This may be called a 'simple interpretative declaration' [They are referred to as 'mere declaratory statements' by Detter, Essays on the Law of Treaties, 1967, pp. 51-52]. The second situation is where a State makes its ratification of or accession to a treaty subject to, or on condition of, a particular interpretation of the whole or part of the treaty. This may be called a 'qualified interpretative declaration'. In the first situation the State has simply indicated its view of the interpretation of the treaty, which may or may not be the one that will be accepted in any arbitral or judicial proceedings. In offering this interpretation the State has not ruled out subsequent interpretative proceedings nor has it ruled out the possibility that its interpretation will be rejected. [...] If, on the other hand, the declaring State wishes to assert its interpretation regardless of what a subsequent tribunal might include, that is, the State when making the declaration has ruled out the possibility of a subsequent inconsistent interpretation of the treaty, a different result should follow. This is a 'qualified interpretative declaration'. The State is making its acceptance of the treaty subject to or conditional upon acquiescence in its interpretation”. (D.M. McRae, “The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations”, B.Y.B.L.I. 1978, pp. 160-161). The expression “qualified interpretative declaration” has little
(3) It is not uncommon for a State, when formulating a declaration, to state expressly that its interpretation constitutes the *sine qua non* to which its consent to be bound is subordinate. For example, France attached to its signature\(^{159}\) of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco a four-point interpretative declaration, stipulating:

“In the event that the interpretative declaration thus made by the French Government should be contested wholly or in part by one or more Contracting Parties to the Treaty or to Protocol II, these instruments shall be null and void in relations between the French Republic and the contesting State or States”.

The conditional nature of the French declaration here is indisputable.

(4) Although it is drafted less categorically, the same can surely be said of the “understanding” recorded by the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:

“The main objective [of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran] for submitting these declarations is the avoidance of eventual future interpretation of the following articles in a manner incompatible with the original intention and previous positions or in disharmony with national laws and regulations ...”\(^{160}\)

(5) In other cases, the conditional nature of the declaration can be deduced from its drafting. For example, its categorical wording leaves little doubt that the interpretative declaration made by Israel upon signing the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages of 17 December 1979 should be considered a conditional interpretative declaration:

“It is the understanding of Israel that the Convention implements the principle that hostage taking is prohibited in all circumstances and that any person committing such an act shall be either prosecuted or extradited pursuant to article 8 of this Convention or the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or their Additional Protocols, without any exception whatsoever.”\(^{161}\)

\(^{159}\) [331, 1999] The declaration was confirmed upon ratification on 22 March 1974; see the United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 936, p. 419.


\(^{161}\) [332, 1999] Ibid., chap. XVIII.5, p. 727.

meaning in French. This distinction has been used by a number of authors; for example, see Iain Cameron and Frank Horn, “Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights: The Belilos Case”, G.Y.B.L.L. 1990, p. 77 or Rosario Sapienza, Dichiarazioni interpretative unilaterali e trattati internazionali, op. cit. (note 283 above), pp. 205-206.
(6) The same holds true for the interpretative declaration made by Turkey in respect of the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques:

“In the opinion of the Turkish Government the terms 'widespread', 'long-lasting' and 'severe effects' contained in the Convention need to be clearly defined. So long as this clarification is not made the Government of Turkey will be compelled to interpret itself the terms in question and consequently it reserves the right to do so as and when required.” 162

(7) Conversely, a declaration such as the one made by the United States of America when signing the 1988 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution is clearly a simple interpretative declaration:

“The Government of the United States of America understands that nations will have the flexibility to meet the overall requirements of the protocol through the most effective means.” 163

(8) It is in fact only rarely that the conditional nature of an interpretative declaration is so clearly apparent from the wording used. 164 In such situations the distinction between “simple” and “conditional” interpretative declarations poses problems similar to those posed by the distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations, and these problems must be solved in accordance with the same principles. 165

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162 [333, 1999] Ibid., chap. XXVI.1, p. 878.
163 [335, 1999] Ibid., chap. XXVII.1, p. 903.
164 [336, 1999] Most often, the declaring State or international organization simply says that it “considers that ...” (“considère que ...”) (for examples (of which there are a great many), see the declarations made by Brazil when signing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (ibid., chap. XXI.6, p. 804), the third declaration made by the European Community when signing the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (ibid., chap. XXVII.4, p. 927), or those made by Bulgaria to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (ibid., chap. III.6, p. 71) or to the 1974 Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (ibid., chap. XII.6, p. 641), “estime que ...” (see the declaration made by Sweden concerning the Convention establishing the International Maritime Organization (ibid., chap. XII.1, p. 614)), or “declares that ...” (see the second and third declarations made by France concerning the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ibid., chap. IV.3, p. 112) or that made by the United Kingdom when signing the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (ibid., chap. XXVII.3, p. 923)), or that it “interprets” a particular provision in a particular way (see the declarations made by Algeria or Belgium in respect of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ibid., chap. IV.3, pp. 111 and 112), the declaration made by Ireland in respect of article 31 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (ibid., chap. V.3, p. 250) or the first declaration made by France when signing the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (ibid., chap. XXVII.8, p. 938)), or that, “according to its interpretation”, a particular provision has a certain meaning (see the declarations by the Netherlands concerning the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980 (ibid., chap. XXVI.2, p. 885) or those made by Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu in respect of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (ibid., chap. XXVII.7, pp. 933-934)) or that it “understands that ...” (see the declarations made by Brazil when ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (ibid., chap. XXI.6, p. 804)).
165 [337, 1999] See draft guideline 1.3.1.
Moreover, it is not uncommon for the true nature of interpretative declarations to become clear when they are contested by other contracting parties. This is demonstrated by some famous examples, such as the declaration that India attached to its instrument of ratification of the constituent instrument of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization or Cambodia's declaration with regard to the same Convention. These precedents confirm that there is a discrepancy between some declarations, in which the State or international organization formulating them does no more than explain its interpretation of the treaty, and others in which the authors seek to impose their interpretation on the other contracting parties.

This discrepancy is of great practical significance. Unlike reservations, simple interpretative declarations place no conditions on the expression by a State or international organization of its consent to be bound; they simply attempt to anticipate any dispute that may arise concerning the interpretation of the treaty. The declarant “sets a date”, in a sense; it gives notice that, should a dispute arise, its interpretation will be such, but it does not make that point a condition for its participation in the treaty. Conversely, conditional declarations are closer to reservations in that

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“...When the Secretary-General notified IMCO of the instrument of ratification of India subject to the declaration, it was suggested that in view of the condition which was 'in the nature of a reservation' the matter should be put before the IMCO Assembly. The Assembly resolved to have the declaration circulated to all IMCO members but until the matter had been decided, India was to participate in IMCO without vote. France and the Federal Republic of Germany lodged objections against the declaration made by India, France on the ground that India was asserting a unilateral right to interpret the Convention and Germany on the ground that India might in the future take measures that would be contrary to the Convention.

“In resolution 1452 (XIV) adopted on 7 December 1959, the General Assembly of the United Nations, noting the statement made on behalf of India at the 614th meeting of the Sixth Committee (Legal) explaining that the Indian declaration on IMCO was a declaration of policy and that it did not constitute a reservation, expressed the hope 'that, in the light of the above-mentioned statement of India an appropriate solution may be reached in the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization at an early date to regularize the position of India'.” (India's reply to the International Law Commission questionnaire on reservations to treaties.)


167 [339, 1998] The text appears in Multilateral Treaties, chap. XII.1, pp. 612-613. Several Governments stated “that they assumed that it was a declaration of policy and did not constitute a reservation; and that it had no legal effect with regard to the interpretation of the Convention”. Accordingly, “[i]n a communication addressed to the Secretary-General on 31 January 1962, the Government of Cambodia stated that ‘... the Royal Government agrees that the first part of the declaration which it made at the time of the acceptance of the Convention is of a political nature. It therefore has no legal effect regarding the interpretation of the Convention. The statements contained in the second part of the declaration?, on the other hand, constitute a reservation to the Convention by the Royal Government of Cambodia’” (ibid., note 10). With regard to this episode, see in particular D.M. McRae, “The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations; B.Y.B.I.L. 1978, pp. 165-166; Rosario Sapienza, Dichiarazioni interpretative unilaterali e trattati internazionali, op. cit. (note 283 above), pp. 177-178.
they seek to produce a legal effect on the provisions of the treaty, which the State or international organization accepts only on condition that the provisions are interpreted in a specific way.

(11) This being the case, some members of the Commission wondered whether conditional interpretative declarations should not be treated purely and simply as reservations. Although there is support for this position in doctrine, the Commission does not believe that these two categories of unilateral statement are identical: even when it is conditional, an interpretative declaration does not constitute a reservation in that it does not try “to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application” to the State or organization formulating it, but to impose a specific interpretation on those provisions. Even if the distinction is not always obvious, there is an enormous difference between application and interpretation. “The mere fact that a ratification is conditional does not necessarily mean that the condition needs to be treated as a reservation.”

(12) This is in fact the direction taken in jurisprudence:

In the Belilos case, the European Court of Human Rights considered the validity of Switzerland’s interpretative declaration from the standpoint of the rules applicable to reservations, yet without assimilating one to the other; Likewise, in a text that is admittedly rather obscure, the Arbitral Tribunal that settled the dispute between France and the United Kingdom concerning the continental shelf in the Mer d’Iroise case analysed the third reservation by France concerning article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention “as a particular condition posed by the French Republic for its acceptance of the delimitation system provided for in article 6”, adding: “To judge by its terms, this condition would seem to go beyond a simple interpretation”. This would seem to establish a contrario that it could have been a conditional interpretative declaration and not a reservation in the strict sense of the term.

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170 [342, 1999] Although it did not formally reclassify Switzerland as a reservation, the Court examined “the validity of the interpretative declaration in question, as in the case of a reservation” (Judgement of 21 May 1988, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A., vol. 132, para. 49, p. 21). In the Temeltasch case, the European Commission of Human Rights was less cautious: completely (and intentionally) adhering to Professor McRae's position (note 85 above), it “assimilated” the notions of conditional interpretative declarations and reservations (decision of 5 May 1982, Decisions and Reports, April 1983, pp. 130-131).
(13) The fact remains that, even if it cannot be entirely “assimilated” to a reservation, a conditional interpretative declaration does come quite close, for as Paul Reuter has written: “[l’]essence de la ‘réserve' est de poser une condition: l'État ne s'engage qu'à la condition que certains effets juridiques du traité ne lui soient pas appliqués, que ce soit par l'exclusion ou la modification d'une règle ou par l'interprétation de celle-ci” (“the essence of 'reservations' is to stipulate a condition: the State will commit itself only on condition that certain legal effects of the treaty are not applied to it, either by excluding or modifying a rule or by interpreting it”).

(14) Consequently, it seems highly probable that the legal regime of conditional interpretative declarations would be infinitely closer to that of reservations, especially with regard to the anticipated reactions of the other contracting parties to the treaty, than would the rules applicable to simple interpretative declarations, which essentially fall under the “general rule of interpretation” codified in article 31 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. Nevertheless, as this chapter of the Guide to Practice is devoted exclusively to defining reservations and, by way of contrast, interpretative declarations, it is not the place in which to dwell at length on the consequences of the distinction between the two types of interpretative declaration.

(15) In view of the foreseeable consequences of the distinction and its practical importance, it should be included in the Guide to Practice. However, bearing in mind the striking degree to which reservations overlap with conditional interpretative declarations, the Commission considered the advisability of including in the definition of conditional interpretative declarations the *ratione temporis* element, which is an integral part of the definition of reservations.

(16) Despite the hesitations of some members, the Commission thought that, while the element unquestionably had no place in the definition of simple interpretative declarations, it was certainly indispensable for conditional interpretative declarations, for reasons comparable to those which have necessitated its inclusion regarding reservations: such declarations, by definition,

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173 [345, 1999] See draft guideline 1.2 and paragraphs 21 to 32 of the commentary thereto.
constitute conditions for the declarant's participation in the treaty. Consequently, in order to prevent, insofar as possible, disputes among the parties, as to the reality and scope of their commitment under the treaty, strict rules should be followed with regard to the moment at which such declarations may be formulated, rules which seem inherent in the very definition of the declarations.

(17) At the suggestion of some members, the Commission considered whether, instead of reproducing the long list of moments at which a reservation (and, by extension, a conditional interpretative declaration) may be formulated, as in draft guideline 1.1, it might not be simpler and more elegant to use a general phrase such as “at the moment of expression of consent to be bound”. It does not seem possible to adopt this solution, however, since interpretative declarations, like reservations, may be formulated at the time of signature, even in the case of treaties in solemn form.  

(18) The Commission further considers that the provisions in draft guideline 1.1.2 concerning “instances in which a reservation may be formulated” could also be transposed to the formulation of conditional interpretative declarations.

1.2.2 [1.2.1] Interpretative declarations formulated jointly

The joint formulation of an interpretative declaration by several States or international organizations does not affect the unilateral nature of that interpretative declaration.

Commentary

(1) Like reservations, interpretative declarations, whether simple or conditional, may be formulated jointly by two or more States or international organizations. Draft guideline 1.1.7 [1.1.1], which acknowledges this possibility in respect of reservations, nonetheless appears to be an element of progressive development of international law, since there is no clear precedent in this

174 [346, 1999] Probably provided that, in such situations, the reservation or conditional interpretative declaration is confirmed at the time of expression of definitive consent to be bound. The Commission intends to examine this matter in greater depth in chapter II of the Guide to Practice, relating to the formulation of reservations and interpretative declarations.
regard. The same is not true with regard to interpretative declarations, the joint formulation of which comes under the heading of *lex lata*.

(2) Indeed, as in the case of reservations, it is not uncommon for several States to consult one another before formulating identical or quite similar declarations. This was the case, for example, with several interpretative declarations formulated by the “Eastern bloc” countries prior to 1990, with those made by the Nordic countries in respect of several conventions, or with the declarations made by 13 States members of the European Community when signing the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and confirmed upon ratification, which stated:

“As a Member State of the European Community, [each State] will implement the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in accordance with its obligations arising from the rules of the Treaties establishing the European Communities to the extent that such rules are applicable.”

(3) At the same time, and contrary to what has occurred thus far in reservations, there have also been truly joint declarations, formulated in a single instrument, by “the European Community and its Member States” or by the latter alone. This occurred in the case of:

(a) Examination of the possibility of accepting annex C.1 of the 1976 Protocol to the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials;

(b) Implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 9 May 1992;

(c) Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992;

(d) Implementation of the Agreement of 4 August 1995 on Straddling Fish Stocks.

177 [348, 1999] See the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.7 [1.1.1], ibid., para. 3, pp. 211-212.

178 [348, 1999] See, for example, the declarations by Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine concerning articles 48 and 50 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Cuba formulated an express reservation; the wording of Viet Nam’s declaration is ambiguous) (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. III.3, pp. 56-58) or those of Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine concerning article VII of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (ibid., chap. XVI.1, pp. 682-683).

179 [351, 1999] See, for example, the declarations by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden concerning article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (ibid., chap. III.6, pp. 72-74).

180 [352, 1999] Ibid., chapter XXVI.3, pp. 890-892.


182 [354, 1999] Ibid., chapter XXVII.7, p. 933.

183 [355, 1999] Ibid., chapter XXVII.8, p. 937.

(4) These are real precedents which justify *a fortiori* the adoption of a draft guideline on interpretative declarations similar to draft guideline 1.1.7 [1.1.1] on reservations.

(5) As is the case with reservations, it must be understood, first, that this possibility of joint formulation of interpretative declarations cannot undermine the legal regime applicable to such declarations, governed largely by “unilateralism”\textsuperscript{185} and, second, that the conjunction “or” used in draft guideline 1.2.2 [1.2.1]\textsuperscript{186} does not exclude the possibility that interpretative declarations may be formulated jointly by one or more States and by one or more international organizations, and should be understood to mean “and/or”. Nevertheless, the Commission considered that this formulation would make the text too cumbersome.\textsuperscript{187}

(6) The similarity between the wording of draft guidelines 1.1.7 [1.1.1] and 1.2.2 [1.2.1] does not mean that the same legal regime is applicable to interpretative declarations formulated jointly, on the one hand, and to reservations formulated jointly, on the other. In particular, the fact that the former may be formulated orally while the latter may not,\textsuperscript{188} could have an effect on that regime. This problem relates to the substance of the applicable law and not to the definition of interpretative declarations, however.

(7) The Commission also considered whether there might be reason to envisage the possibility of all of the contracting parties formulating an interpretative declaration jointly, and whether in such a situation the proposed interpretation would not lose the character of a unilateral act and become a genuinely collective act. The Commission concluded that this is not the case: the word “several” in draft guideline 1.2.2 [1.2.1] precludes such a possibility, which in any case is covered by article 31, paragraphs 2 (a) and 3 (a), of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions concerning collateral agreements relating to the interpretation or application of the treaty.

### 1.3 Distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations

The character of a unilateral statement as a reservation or an interpretative declaration is determined by the legal effect it purports to produce.


\textsuperscript{186} [358, 1999] “... by several States or international organizations ...”


\textsuperscript{188} [360, 1999] See the commentary to draft guideline 1.2, note 300.
Commentary

(1) A comparison of draft guidelines 1.1 and 1.2 shows that interpretative declarations are distinguished from reservations principally by the objective pursued by the author State or international organization: in formulating a reservation, the State or organization purports to exclude or modify the legal effect upon itself of certain provisions of a treaty (or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain aspects); in making an interpretative declaration, it intends to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by it to a treaty or to certain of its provisions.

(2) In other words,

The character of a unilateral statement as a reservation depends on the question whether its object is to exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the treaty in their application to the author State or international organization; and

The character of a unilateral statement as an interpretative declaration depends on the question whether its object is to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions.

(3) This is confirmed in the jurisprudence. For example, in the Belilos case, “[l]ike the Commission and the Government, the [European] Court [of Human Rights] recognizes that it is necessary to ascertain the original intention of those who drafted the declaration”. ¹⁸⁹ Likewise, in the Mer d’Iroise case, the Franco-British Arbitral Tribunal held that, in order to determine the nature of the reservations and declarations made by France regarding the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, “[t]he question [was] one of the respective intentions of the French Republic and the United Kingdom in regard to their legal relations under the Convention ...”. ¹⁹⁰

(4) This distinction is fairly clear as to its principle, yet it is not easily put into practice, particularly since States and international organizations seldom explain their intentions, even taking pains at times to disguise them, and since the terminology used does not constitute an adequate criterion for distinguishing them. The objective of this section of the Guide to Practice is to

provide some information regarding the substantive rules\textsuperscript{191} that should be applied in order to
distinguish between reservations and interpretative declarations.

(5) These guidelines may be transposed, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, to the equally important distinction
between simple interpretative declarations and conditional interpretative declarations which, as
demonstrated by draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4], is also based on the intention of the declarant. In
both cases, the declarant seeks to interpret the treaty, but in the first case it does not make its
interpretation a condition for participation in the treaty, whereas in the second case, its
interpretation cannot be dissociated from the expression of its consent to be bound.

1.3.1 Method of implementation of the distinction between reservations and
interpretative declarations

To determine whether a unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international
organization in respect of a treaty is a reservation or an interpretative declaration, it is
appropriate to interpret the statement in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to its terms, in light of the treaty to which it refers. Due regard shall be given to the
intention of the State or the international organization concerned at the time the statement was
formulated.

Commentary

(1) The object of this draft guideline is to indicate the \textit{method} that should be employed to
determine whether a unilateral statement is a reservation or an interpretative declaration. This
question is of considerable importance when, in keeping with the definition of such instruments,\textsuperscript{192}
all “nominalism” is excluded.

(2) As made clear by draft guideline 1.3, the decisive criterion for drawing the distinction is the
legal effect that the State or international organization making the unilateral statement purports to
produce. Hence, there can be doubt that the declarant's intention when formulating it should be
established. Did the declarant purport to exclude or modify the legal effect upon it of certain
provisions of the treaty (or of the treaty as a whole in respect of certain aspects) or did it intend to

\textsuperscript{191} [363, 1999] The rules of procedure concerning the formulation of reservations and interpretative declarations will be the subject of draft guidelines in chapter II of the Guide to Practice.

\textsuperscript{192} [365, 1999] See draft guidelines 1.1 and 1.2, which expressly define them independently of their phrasing or name. The fact remains, however, that the latter are of no utility in drawing the distinction (see infra, draft guideline 1.3.2 [1.2.2]).
specify or clarify the meaning or scope it attributes to the treaty or certain of its provisions? In the first case it is a reservation; in the second, it is an interpretative declaration.

(3) It was asked whether, in the doctrine, in order to answer these questions, it was appropriate to apply a “subjective test” (what did the declarant want to say?) or “objective” or “material” test (what did the declarant do?) In the Commission's view, it is a spurious alternative. The expression “purports to”, which appears in the definition both of reservations and of interpretative declarations, simply means that the legal effect sought by the author cannot be achieved for various reasons (wrongfulness, objections by other contracting parties); but this does not in any way mean that the subjective test alone is applicable: only an analysis of the potential –and objective – effects of the statement can determine the purpose sought. In determining the legal nature of a statement formulated in connection with a treaty, the decisive criterion lies in the effective result that implementing the statement has (or would have). If it modifies or excludes the legal effect of the treaty or certain of its provisions, it is a reservation “however phrased or named”; if the statement simply clarifies the meaning or scope that its author attributes to the treaty or certain of its provisions, it is an interpretative declaration.

(4) The point of departure should be the principle that the purpose sought is reflected in the text of the statement. It is therefore a quite conventional problem of interpretation that can be resolved by means of the normal rules of interpretation in international law. “Discerning the real substance of the often complex statements made by States upon ratification of, or accession to, a multilateral treaty is a matter of construction and must be solved through the ordinary rules of interpretation.”

(5) Some international courts have not hesitated to apply the general rules of interpretation of treaties to reservations, and this seems all the more reasonable in that, unlike other unilateral statements formulated in connection with a treaty, they are indissociable from the treaty to which they apply. However, in the Commission's view, while the rules provide useful indications, they cannot be purely and simply transposed to reservations and interpretative declarations because

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of their special nature. The rules applicable to treaty instruments cannot be applied to unilateral instruments without some care.

(6) This was pointed out recently by the International Court of Justice in connection with optional declarations of acceptance of its compulsory jurisdiction:

“The regime relating to the interpretation of declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute is not identical with that established for the interpretation of treaties by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (…) The Court observes that the provisions of that Convention may only apply analogously to the extent compatible with the *sui generis* character of the unilateral acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.*

(7) The Commission is aware that the statements in question are of a different nature from those of reservations and unilateral declarations. Formulated unilaterally in connection with a treaty text, they nonetheless have important common features and it would seem necessary to take account of the Court's warning in interpreting unilateral statements made by a State or an international organization in connection with a treaty with a view to determining its legal nature. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Commission did not purely and simply refer to the “General rule of interpretation” and the “Supplementary means of interpretation” set out in articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.

(8) This remark notwithstanding the fact remains that these provisions constitute useful guidelines and, in particular, like a treaty, a unilateral statement relating to the provisions of a treaty:

“… must be interpreted by examining its text in accordance with the ordinary meaning which must be attributed to the terms in which it has been formulated within the general context of the treaty (…). This approach must be followed except when the resultant interpretation would leave the meaning ambiguous or obscure or would lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. (…)

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“Thus without excluding the possibility that supplementary means of interpretation might, in exceptional circumstances, be resorted to, the interpretation of reservations must be guided by the primacy of the text.”  

(9) Even though doctrine has barely contemplated the problem from this standpoint, jurisprudence is unanimous in considering that priority must be given to the actual text of the declaration:

“This condition [imposed by the third French reservation to article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf], according to its terms, appears to go beyond a mere interpretation ... the Court, ... accordingly, concludes that this 'reservation' is to be considered a 'reservation' rather than an 'interpretative declaration’;

“In the instant case, the Commission will interpret the intention of the respondent Government by taking account both of the actual terms of the above-mentioned interpretative declaration and the travaux préparatoires which preceded Switzerland's ratification of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights].

“The Commission considers that the terms used, taken by themselves, already show an intention by the Government to prevent ... [...]

“In the light of the terms used in Switzerland's interpretative declaration ... and the above-mentioned travaux préparatoires taken as a whole, the Commission accepts the respondent Government's submission that it intended to give this interpretative declaration the effect of a formal reservation;

“In order to establish the legal character of such a declaration, one must look behind the title given to it and seek to determine the substantive content”;

197 [369, 1999] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion of 8 September 1983, OC-3/83 Restrictions to the death penalty (articles 4 (2) and (4) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, paras. 63-64, pp. 84-85.


201 [373, 1999] European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 29 April 1988, Belilos case, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, vol. 132, para. 42, p. 24. In the same case, the Commission reached a different conclusion, also basing itself “both on the wording of the declaration and on the preparatory work (ibid., para. 41, p. 21); the Commission, more clearly than
“If the statement displays a clear intent on the part of the State party to exclude or modify the legal effect of a specific provision of a treaty, it must be regarded as a binding reservation, even if the statement is phrased as a declaration. In the present case, the statement entered by the French Government upon accession to the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] is clear: it seeks to exclude the application of article 27 to France and emphasizes this exclusion semantically with the words: ‘is not applicable’”. 202

(10) More rarely, international courts which have had to rule on problems of this type, to supplement their reasoning, have based themselves on the preparatory work of the unilateral declarations under consideration. In the Belilos case, for example, the European Court of Human Rights, after admitting that “the wording of the original French text” of the Swiss declaration, “though not altogether clear, can be understood as constituting a reservation, 203 “[l]ike the Commission and the Government, ... recognizes that it is necessary to ascertain the original intention of those who drafted the declaration” and, in order to do so, takes into account the preparatory work on the declaration, 204 as the Commission had done in the same case and in the Temeltasch case. 205

(11) In the Commission's view, some caution is required in this regard. As has been noted, “[s]ince a reservation is a unilateral act by the party making it, evidence from that party's internal sources regarding the preparation of the reservation is admissible to show its intention in making the reservation”. 206 Still, in the everyday life of the law it would appear difficult to recommend that the preparatory work be consulted regularly in order to determine the nature of a unilateral

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204 [376, 1999] Ibid., para. 48, p. 23.


declaration relating to a treaty: it is not always made public, and in any case it would be difficult to require foreign Governments to consult it.

(12) This is the reason why draft guideline 1.3.1 does not reproduce the text of article 32 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions and, without alluding directly to the preparatory work, merely calls for account to be taken of “the intention of the State or the international organization concerned at the time the statement was formulated”. This wording draws directly on that used by the International Court of Justice in the Case concerning Fisheries jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)

Jurisdiction of the Court:

“The Court will ... interpret the relevant words of a declaration, including a reservation contained therein, in a natural and responsible way, having due regard to the intention of the State concerned at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court”.

(13) Draft guideline 1.3.1 also specifies that, for the purpose of determining the legal nature of a statement formulated in respect of a treaty, it shall be interpreted “in the light of the treaty to which it refers”. This constitutes, in the circumstances, the principal element of the “context” mentioned in the general rule of interpretation set out in article 31 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions: whereas a reservation or an interpretive declaration constitutes a unilateral instrument, separate from the treaty to which it relates, it is still closely tied to it and cannot be interpreted in isolation.

(14) The method indicated in draft guideline 1.3.1 can be transposed to the distinction between simple interpretative declarations and conditional interpretative declarations. In this case, too, it is the intention of the State or international organization making the declaration that has to be determined, and this should be done above all by interpreting it in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms.

1.3.2 [1.2.2] Phrasing and name

The phrasing or name given to a unilateral statement provides an indication of the purported legal effect. This is the case in particular when a State or an international organization

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207 [379, 1999] In the Belilos case, the representative of the Swiss Government referred to the internal debates within the Government, but took cover behind their confidential nature (see Iain Cameron and Frank Horn, “Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights: The Belilos Case”, G.Y.B.L.L., 1990, p. 84).

formulates several unilateral statements in respect of a single treaty and designates some of them as reservations and others as interpretative declarations.

**Commentary**

(1) The general rule making it possible to determine whether a unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization in respect of a treaty is a reservation or an interpretative declaration is set out in draft guideline 1.3.1. Draft guidelines 1.3.2 [1.2.2] and 1.3.3 [1.2.3] supplement this general rule by taking into consideration certain specific, frequently encountered situations which may facilitate the determination.

(2) As made clear by draft guidelines 1.3 and 1.3.2 [1.2.2], it is not the phrasing or name of a unilateral statement formulated in respect of a treaty that determines its legal nature, but the legal effect it purports to produce. In fact, the result of the definition of reservations, given by the Vienna Conventions of 1969, 1978 and 1986 and reproduced in draft guideline 1.1, and of the definition of interpretative declarations found in draft guideline 1.2 is that:

   On the one hand, the character of both is imparted by the objective pursued by the author: excluding or modifying the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to its author in the first instance, and specifying or clarifying the meaning attributed by the declarant to the treaty or to certain of its provisions, in the second instance;

   And, on the other, the second point that reservations and interpretative declarations have in common has to do with the non-relevance of the phrasing or name given them by the author.\(^\text{210}\)

(3) This indifference to the terminology chosen by the State or international organization formulating the statement has been criticized by some authors who believe that it would be appropriate to “take States at their word” and to consider as reservations those unilateral declarations which have been so titled or worded by their authors, and as interpretative declarations those which they have proclaimed to be such.\(^\text{211}\) This position has the dual merit of simplicity (an

\(^{209}\) [381, 1999] In this regard, see the above-mentioned advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, para. 8, note 124.

\(^{210}\) [382, 1999] In both cases, this results from the formulation “however phrased or named”.

\(^{211}\) [383, 1999] See, for example, the analysis of the declaration made by France when signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1973 and the analysis thereof by Hector Gros Espiell (“La signature du Traité de Tlatelolco par la Chine et la France”, A.F.D.I. 1973, p. 141. However, the author also bases himself on other parameters). This was also the position taken by Japan in 1964 in its observations on the draft articles on the law of treaties adopted by the Commission on first reading (see the commentary to draft guideline 1.2, footnote 52).
interpretative declaration is whatever States declare is one) and of conferring “morality” on the practice followed in the matter by preventing States from “playing around” with the names they give to the declarations they make with a view to side-stepping the rules governing reservations or misleading their partners. 212

(4) In the opinion of the Commission, however, this position runs up against two nullifying objections:

Firstly, it is incompatible with the Vienna definition itself: if a unilateral declaration can be a reservation “however phrased or named”, this of necessity means that simple “declarations” (even those expressly qualified as interpretative by their author) may constitute true reservations, but it also and necessarily implies that terminology is not an absolute criterion that can be used in defining interpretative declarations; and

Secondly, it runs counter to the practice of States, jurisprudence and the position of most doctrine. 213

(5) It must in particular be noted that judges, international arbitrators and bodies monitoring the implementation of human rights treaties refrain from any nominalism and do not stop at the appellation of the unilateral statements accompanying States' consent to be bound, but endeavour to discover the true intention as it emerges from the substance of the declaration, or even the context in which it has been made.

(6) For example, the arbitral tribunal responsible for deciding the Franco-British dispute about the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Mer d'Iroise carefully examined the argument of the United Kingdom that the third French reservation to article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf was, in reality, a simple interpretative declaration. 214 Similarly, in the Temeltasch case, the European Commission of Human Rights, relying on article 2, paragraph 1 (d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, agreed

“On this point with the majority of legal writers and considers that where a State makes a declaration, presenting it as a condition of its consent to be bound by the Convention and

212 [384, 1999] See the commentary to draft guideline 1.2, para. (5).
213 [385, 1999] See, ibid., paras. 4 to 8.
intending it to exclude or alter the legal effect of some of its provisions, such a declaration, *whatever it is called*, must be assimilated to a reservation ...” 215

This position was also taken by the European Court of Human Rights in the *Belilos* case: Switzerland accompanied its instrument ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights by a unilateral statement which it entitled “interpretative declaration”. The Court nevertheless considered it to be a true reservation.

“Like the Commission and the Government, the Court recognizes that it is necessary to ascertain the original intention of those who drafted the declaration [...].

“In order to establish the legal character of such a declaration, one must look behind the title given to it and seek to determine the substantive content.” 216

The Human Rights Committee took the same line in its decision of 8 November 1989 in the case of *T.K. v. France*: on the basis of article 2, paragraph 1 (d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it decided that a communication concerning France's failure to respect article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was inadmissible because the French Government, on acceding to the Covenant, had declared that “in the light of article 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic, [...] article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned”. The Committee observed:

“in this respect that it is not the formal designation but the effect the statement purports to have that determines its nature”. 217


“An examination of the notification of 4 January 1982 shows that the Government of the Republic of France was engaged in two tasks: listing certain reservations and entering certain interpretative declarations. Thus in relation to articles 4 (1), 9, 14 and 19, it uses the phrase 'enters a reservation'. In other paragraphs it declares how terms of the Covenant are in its view to be understood in relation to the French Constitution, French legislation or obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. To note, by reference to article 2 (1) (d) of the Vienna Convention, that it does not matter how a reservation is phrased or named, cannot serve to turn these interpretative declarations into reservations. Their content is clearly that of declarations. Further, the French notification shows that deliberately different language was selected to serve different legal purposes. There is no reason to suppose that the contrasting use, in different paragraphs, of the phrase 'reservation' and 'declaration' was not entirely deliberate, with its legal
Nevertheless, this indifference to nominalism is not as radical as it might appear at first sight, since, in the Belilos case, the European Commission of Human Rights had maintained that

“if a State made both reservations and interpretative declarations at the same time, the latter could only exceptionally be equated with the former”. 218

From these observations the following conclusion may be drawn: while the phrasing and name of a unilateral declaration do not constitute part of the definition of an interpretative declaration any more than they do of the definition of a reservation, they nonetheless form an element of appraisal which must be taken into consideration and which can be viewed as being of particular (although not necessarily vital) significance when a State formulates both reservations and interpretative declarations in respect of a single treaty at the same time.

This observation is consistent with the more general doctrinal position that “there is a potential for inequity in this aspect ['however phrased or named'] of the definition”: “Under the Vienna Convention, the disadvantages of determining that a statement is a reservation are [...] imposed over the other parties to the treaty. [...] It would be unfortunate in such circumstances if the words “however phrased or named” were given an overriding effect. In exceptional circumstances it might be possible for a party to rely upon an estoppel against a State which attempts to argue that its statement is a reservation. [...] While this is a matter of interpretation rather than the application of equitable principles, it is in keeping with notions of fairness and good faith which underlie the treaty relations of States”. 219

Without reopening the debate on the principle posed by the Vienna Convention with regard to the definition of reservations, a principle which extends to the definition of interpretative declarations, 220 it would seem legitimate, then, to spell out in the Guide to Practice the extent to which it is possible to remain indifferent to the nominalism implied by the expression “however named or phrased”. This is the purpose of draft guideline 1.3.2, which acknowledges that the name


218 [390, 1999] Cf. the Decision of the Court in this case, 21 May 1988, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, vol. 132, para. 41, p. 21. For its part, the Court observed that one of the things that made it difficult to reach a decision in the case was the fact that “the Swiss Government have made both 'reservations' and 'interpretative declarations' in the same instrument of ratification”, although the Court did not draw any particular conclusion from that observation (ibid., para. 49, p. 24). See also the individual opinion of Mrs. Higgins in the T. K. v. France case before the Human Rights Committee (see above, footnote 389).


a declaring State gives to its declaration is nevertheless an indication of what it is, although it does not constitute an irrebuttable presumption.

(11) This indication, while still rebuttable, is reinforced when a State simultaneously formulates reservations and interpretative declarations and designates them respectively as such, as the last phrase of draft guideline 1.3.2 emphasizes.

(12) A member of the Commission questioned the validity of the expression “phrasing or name” and proposed that it be replaced by “title or name” or “title or wording”. Although aware of the ambiguity of this terminology, the Commission considers it better to keep it, since it is embodied in the Vienna Conventions of 1969, 1978 and 1986.

**1.3.3 [1.2.3] Formulation of a unilateral statement when a reservation is prohibited**

When a treaty prohibits reservations to all or certain of its provisions, a unilateral statement formulated in respect thereof by a State or an international organization shall be presumed not to constitute a reservation except when it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects in their application to its author.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft guideline 1.3.3 [1.2.3] has been worded in the same spirit as the preceding guideline and its purpose is to make it easier to say whether a unilateral statement formulated in respect of a treaty should be classified as a reservation or as an interpretative declaration when the treaty prohibits reservations of a general nature, \(^{221}\) or to certain of its provisions. \(^{222}\)

(2) It seems to the Commission that, in such situations, statements made in respect of provisions to which any reservation is prohibited must be deemed to constitute interpretative declarations. “This would comply with the presumption that a State would intend to perform an act permitted, rather than one prohibited, by a treaty and protect the State from the possibility that the impermissible reservation would have the effect of invalidating the entire act of acceptance of the

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\(^{221}\) [393, 1999] As, for example, in the case of article 309 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

\(^{222}\) [394, 1999] As, for example, in the case of article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf which deals with reservations to articles 1 to 3. See the arbitral decision of 30 June 1977, Case concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XVIII, paras. 38-39, pp. 161; see also the individual opinion of Herbert W. Briggs, ibid., p. 262.
treaty to which the declaration was attached.” 223 In a more general context, this presumption of permissibility is consonant with the “well-established general principle of law that bad faith is not presumed”. 224

(3) It goes without saying, however, that the presumption referred to in draft guideline 1.3.3 [1.2.3] is not irrebuttable and that if the statement actually purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the treaty and not simply to interpret them, then it must be considered to be a reservation and the consequence of article 19 (a) (b) of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 is that such a reservation is impermissible and must be treated as such. 225 This is consistent with the principle of the irrelevance, in principle, of the phrasing or name of unilateral statements formulated in respect of a treaty, as embodied in the definition of reservations and interpretative declarations. 226

(4) It is apparent from both the title of the draft guideline and its wording that the guideline's purpose is not to determine whether unilateral declarations formulated in the circumstances in question constitute interpretative declarations or unilateral statements other than reservations or interpretative declarations as defined in section 1.4 of the present chapter of the Guide to Practice. Its sole aim is to draw attention to the principle that there can be no presumption that a declaration made in respect of treaty provisions to which a reservation is prohibited is a reservation.

(5) If this is not the case, it is for the interpreter of the declaration in question, which may be either an interpretative declaration or a declaration under section 1.4, to classify it positively on the basis of draft guidelines 1.2 and 1.4.1 [1.1.5] to 1.4.5 [1.2.6].

1.4 Unilateral statements other than reservations and interpretative declarations

Unilateral statements formulated in relation to a treaty which are not reservations nor interpretative declarations are outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice.

Commentary

225 [397, 1999] Nevertheless, some members of the Commission reserved their position with regard to this consequence and consider that it is premature to adopt a stance on this point.
Draft guideline 1.4 may be regarded as a “general exclusionary clause” purporting to limit the scope of the Guide to Practice to reservations, on the one hand, and to interpretative declarations *stricto sensu* (whether “simple” or “conditional” 227), to the exclusion of other unilateral statements of any kind which are formulated in relation to a treaty, but which generally do not have as close a relationship with the treaty.

As practice indicates, States and international organizations often take the opportunity, when signing or expressing their final consent to be bound by a treaty, to make statements which relate to the treaty, but do not seek to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain of its provisions (or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain aspects) in their application to their author, or to interpret the treaty, and which are accordingly neither reservations nor interpretative declarations.

The United Nations publication “*Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General*” contains numerous examples of such statements, concerning the legal nature of which the Secretary-General takes no position. 228 Rather he simply notes that they have been made and leaves their legal definition – extremely important, as it determines the legal regime applicable to them – to the user.

This publication reproduces only those unilateral statements which are formulated when signing or expressing final consent to be bound by, ratifying, etc., a treaty deposited with the Secretary-General, but which are in fact neither reservations nor interpretative declarations. This is obviously because these are the only statements communicated to the Secretary-General, but there is no doubt that this fact is of major practical importance: statements made in the above circumstances raise the most problems as far as distinguishing them from reservations or conditional interpretative declarations is concerned, as, by definition, they may be formulated only “when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty.” 229

However, although it is true that in practice most of these statements are made at the time of signature or of expression of consent to be bound by the treaty, it is nevertheless possible for them

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227 [399, 1999] On this distinction, see draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4].
228 [400, 1999] As attested by the wording of the heading introducing these instruments: “Declarations [no other indication] and Reservations”.
229 [401, 1999] See draft guidelines 1.1 and 1.2.1 [1.2.4]. On the other hand, “simple” interpretative declarations may, in the Commission's opinion, be formulated at any time; see draft guideline 1.2 and paragraphs (21) to (32) of the commentary thereto.
to be made at a different time, even after the entry into force of the treaty for their author. However, it would not be useful for the Commission to take a firm position on this point, as the purpose of draft guideline 1.4 is precisely to exclude such statements from the scope of the Guide to Practice.

(6) Similarly, and for the same reason, although it might seem *prima facie* that such unilateral statements fall within the general category of unilateral acts of States, which the Commission is also currently studying, the Commission does not intend to take any decision regarding the legal regime applicable to them. It has simply endeavoured, in each of the draft guidelines in this section of the Guide to Practice, to provide, in as legally neutral a manner as possible, a definition of these different categories of unilateral statement which is sufficient to help distinguish them from reservations and interpretative declarations.

(7) Unilateral statements formulated by States or international organizations in respect of or in relation to a treaty are so numerous and so diverse that it is probably futile to try to make an exhaustive listing of them, and this section of the Guide to Practice does not attempt to do so. It simply tries to present the main categories of such statements which might be confused with reservations or interpretative declarations. The classification contained in the draft guidelines below is, accordingly, merely illustrative.

1.4.1 [1.1.5] Statements purporting to undertake unilateral commitments

A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization in relation to a treaty whereby its author purports to undertake obligations going beyond those imposed on it by the treaty constitutes a unilateral commitment which is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice.

Commentary

(1) A well-known example of an “extensive” reservation which was given by Brierly in his first report on the law of treaties, is provided by the statement which South Africa made when it

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230 [402, 1999] See, for example, paragraph (8) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.4.4 [1.2.5]; but the same remark might undoubtedly be made about other draft guidelines in this section of the Guide to Practice.

231 [403, 1999] Some members of the Commission have taken a firm position to this effect, while others have been more cautious.

232 [404, 1999] The Commission will complete its presentation of these categories of unilateral statement made in relation to a treaty when it concludes its consideration of the Special Rapporteur's fourth report, at which time it will need to take a decision on the legal nature of unilateral statements relating to the implementation of a treaty at the international level.

233 [405, 1999] On this controversial concept, see above, paragraphs 4 et seq. of the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.5 [1.1.6].
signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948: “As the article reserved against stipulates that the agreement 'shall not apply' as between parties which have not concluded tariff negotiations with each other and which do not consent to its application, the effect of the reservation is to enlarge rather than restrict the obligations of South Africa”. 234 Manfred Lachs also relied on that example in asserting the existence of cases “where a reservation, instead of restricting, extended the obligations assumed by the party” in question. 235

(2) The South African statement gave rise to considerable controversy, 236 but can hardly be regarded as a reservation, if analysed against the definition of reservations given in the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions: this kind of statement cannot have the effect of modifying the legal effect of the treaty or of some of its provisions: they are undertakings which, though admittedly entered into at the time of expression of consent to be bound by the treaty, have no effect on that treaty, and could have been formulated at any time without resulting in a modification of their legal effects. In other words, it may be considered that, 237 whereas reservations are “non-autonomous unilateral acts”, 238 such statements impose autonomous obligations on their authors and constitute unilateral legal acts which are subject to the legal rules applicable to that type of instrument, 239 and not to the regime of reservations.

(3) Obviously, it does not follow from this finding that such statements cannot be made. In accordance with the well-known dictum of the International Court of Justice:

“It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. ... When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the

236 [408, 1999] James Brierly, in keeping with his general definition of reservations, regarded it as a “proposal of reservation”, since it involved an “offer” made to the other parties which they had to accept for it to become a valid reservation (ILC, Yearbook ... 1950, vol. II, p. 239); Lachs regarded it purely and simply as an example of an extensive reservation (ILC, Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 651st meeting, 25 May 1962, p. 142); Mr. Horn saw it as a mere declaration of intent without any legal significance (Frank Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. (note 266 above), p. 89); and Professor Imbert considered that “the statement of the South African Union could only have the effect of increasing the obligations of that State. Accordingly, it did not constitute a reservation, which would necessarily restrict the obligations under the treaty” (Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux, op. cit. (note 252 above), p. 15).
237 [409, 1999] Some members of the Commission do not consider this to be an inevitable conclusion.
declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations is binding.” 240

(4) But these statements are not reservations in that they are independent of the instrument constituted by the treaty, particularly because they can undoubtedly be formulated at any time, although the risk of confusing them with reservations arises only when they are formulated at the moment of the expression of the consent to be bound.

(5) The Commission did not wish to raise the question of the legal regime applicable to statements of this type, which does not come within the purview of “reservations to treaties”. 241 However, as in the case of the statements covered in the following draft guidelines (1.4.2 [1.1.6] to 1.4.5 [1.2.6]), it deemed it useful to go beyond a mere negative observation that they are neither reservations or interpretative declarations. Defining them as “unilateral commitments”, an expression which is deliberately rather neutral from the legal point of view and which should be read in conjunction with the phrase “purports to undertake obligations”, is an attempt to suggest such a positive definition.

(6) This qualification is sufficient to distinguish them from certain statements whereby States reserve the right to apply their national law on the ground that it goes further than the obligations under the treaty. 242 In doing so, the author of the declaration claims to be making a mere observation; if accurate, it is an item of information having no particular legal scope; if not, the declaration may be treated as a reservation; 243 but, in any event, it does not give rise to rights for the other States parties. 244

239 [411, 1999] In this connection, see J.M. Ruda, “Reservations to treaties”, Recueil des cours ... 1975-III, vol. 146, p. 147.
241 [413, 1999] See draft guideline 1.4 and the commentary thereto.
242 [414, 1999] For example, when ratifying the Convention of 13 July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, Thailand pointed out that, “as its narcotic drugs law goes beyond the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the present Convention on certain points, the Thai Government reserves the right to apply its existing law” (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General - status as at 31 December 1997, United Nations, New York, 1998, Sales No. E.98.V.2, chap. VI.8, p. 275; in the same connection see the declaration by Mexico, ibid.).
243 [415, 1999] Whose permissibility is no doubt open to question.
244 [416, 1999] See in this connection the explanations given by F. Horn (Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. (note 266 above), p. 89) on comparable reservations to the 1931 Drugs Convention.
1.4.2 [1.1.6] Unilateral statements purporting to add further elements to a treaty

A unilateral statement whereby a State or an international organization purports to add further elements to a treaty constitutes a proposal to modify the content of the treaty which is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice.

Commentary

(1) The Commission considers it self-evident that a State or an international organization cannot, by a unilateral statement, impose on the other contracting parties to a treaty any obligations which do not arise either under the treaty or under general international law. In other words, when a State or an international organization formulates a reservation, it may seek to increase its rights under the treaty and/or diminish those of its partners under the treaty, but it cannot “legislate” via reservations and the Vienna definition of reservations followed in draft guideline 1.1 precludes this risk by stipulating that the author of the reservation must seek “to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty” and not “of certain rules of general international law”.

(2) On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent a party to a treaty from proposing an extension of the scope or purpose of the treaty to its partners. In the Commission’s view, this is how the statement whereby the Government of Israel made known its wish to add the Shield of David to the Red Cross emblems recognized by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 may be seen. Such a statement actually seeks not to exclude or modify the effect of the provisions of the treaties in question (which in fact remain unchanged), but to add a provision to those treaties.

(3) This is the case covered by draft guideline 1.4.2 [1.1.6]. While relatively uncommon, it does nevertheless occur. Apart from the example of the statement by Israel concerning the Shield of David, one can think of cases of unilateral statements which are submitted as reservations, but which, instead of limiting themselves to excluding (negatively) the legal effect of certain treaty

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245 [417, 1999] A reservation may have the effect of limiting the rights of the other contracting parties under the treaty and of “returning” them to the situation (and obligations) arising under general international law (on this point, see paras. (5) and (10) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.5 [1.1.6]).


247 [419, 1999] Turkey had proceeded in the same way to have the Red Crescent accepted among the Red Cross emblems under The Hague Conventions.
provisions, actually seek to increase (positively) the obligations of other contracting parties as compared with those which arise for them under general international law.\(^{(248)}\)

(4) Since they are neither reservations nor interpretative declarations within the meaning of the present Guide to Practice, such unilateral statements fall outside its scope\(^{(249)}\) and the Commission does not intend to take a position either on their permissibility or on their legal regime.

### 1.4.3 [1.1.7] Statements of non-recognition

A unilateral statement by which a State indicates that its participation in a treaty does not imply recognition of an entity which it does not recognize constitutes a statement of non-recognition which is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice even if it purports to exclude the application of the treaty between the declaring State and the non-recognized entity.

**Commentary**

(1) States frequently accompany the expression of their consent to be bound by a treaty with a statement in which they indicate that such consent does not imply recognition of one or more of the other contracting parties or, in a more limited way, of certain situations, generally territorial, relating to one or more of the other parties. Such statements are often called “reservations relating to non-recognition”; this is a convenient but misleading heading that covers some very diverse situations.

(2) The term in fact applies to two types of statements which have the common feature of specifying that the State formulating them does not recognize another entity that is (or wishes to become) a party to the treaty, but which seek to produce very different legal effects: in some cases, the author of the statement is simply taking a “precautionary step” by pointing out, in accordance with a well-established practice, that its participation in a treaty to which an entity that it does not recognize as a State is a party does not amount to recognition; in other cases, the State making the statement expressly excludes the application of the treaty between itself and the non-recognized entity.

\(^{248}\) [420, 1999] This would be the case with the “reservations” of the socialist countries to article 9 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas mentioned in the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.5 [1.1.6] (paras. (9) and (10) and note 275), considering that the scope given by those countries to State vessels on the high seas went further than that recognized by the applicable customary rules.

\(^{249}\) [421, 1999] See draft guideline 1.4 and the commentary thereto.
(3) In this regard, we may, for example, compare the reactions of Australia and Germany to the accession of certain States to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. While repeating its non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Viet Nam and the People’s Republic of China, Australia nevertheless “notes their acceptance of the provisions of the Conventions and their intention to apply the said provisions”. Germany, however, excludes any treaty relations with South Viet Nam:

“... the Federal Government does not recognize the Provisional Revolutionary Government as a body empowered to represent a State and [...] accordingly is not able to consider the Provisional Revolutionary Government as a Party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949”.

(4) In the first case, there can be no doubt that the statements in question are not reservations. They add nothing to existing law, since it is generally accepted that participation in the same multilateral treaty does not signify mutual recognition, even implicit. Even if that were not the case, it would still not mean that the statements were reservations: these unilateral statements do not purport to have an effect on the treaty or its provisions.

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250 [422, 1999] See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims - Reservations, declarations and communications made at the time of or in connection with ratification, accession or succession (DOM/JUR/91/1719-CRV/1), p. 13; see also, for example, the statement of the Syrian Arab Republic at the time of signature of the Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD): “It is understood that the ratification of this Agreement by the Syrian Arab Republic does not mean in any way recognition of Israel by the Syrian Arab Republic” (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. X.8, p. 415) or the Syrian Arab Republic’s first, albeit slightly more ambiguous, statement in respect of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (ibid., chap. III.3, p. 58): “The Syrian Arab Republic does not recognize Israel and will not enter into dealings with it”. The statement made by Argentina on acceding to the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28 September 1954 is not in the least ambiguous: “The application of this Convention in territories whose sovereignty is the subject of discussion between two or more States, irrespective of whether they are parties to the Convention, cannot be construed as an alteration, renunciation or relinquishment of the position previously maintained by each of them” (ibid., chap. V.3, p. 248); this is an example of non-recognition of a situation (see also Spain’s statements concerning the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea in respect of Gibraltar, ibid., chaps. XXI.1, p. 783, XXI.2, p. 789, XXI.3, p. 793 and XXI.4, p. 795).

251 [423, 1999] CRC document DOM/JUR/91/1719-CRV/1, p. 6. See also the statement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on signing the Agreement establishing IFAD: “The participation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Agreement shall in no way imply recognition of Israel and shall not lead to entry into dealings with Israel under this Agreement” (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. X.8, p. 403; see also the statements of Iraq and Kuwait, couched in similar terms, ibid., pp. 414-415.  

252 [424, 1999] They may be seen as general statements of policy within the meaning of draft guideline 1.4.4 [1.2.5]. In the Commission’s view, draft guideline 1.4.3 [1.1.7] is rendered no less indispensible by the existence of the other category of statements of non-recognition: those whereby the declaring State seeks to exclude the application of the treaty as a whole in its relations with the non-recognized entity.


254 [426, 1999] That is, if participation in the same multilateral treaty did imply mutual recognition.
Categorizing a unilateral statement whereby a State expressly excludes the application of the treaty between itself and the entity it does not recognize is an infinitely more delicate matter. Unlike “precautionary” statements, a statement of this type clearly seeks to have (and does have) a legal effect on the application of the treaty, which is entirely excluded, but only in the relations between the declaring State and the non-recognized entity. Now, the definition of reservations does not preclude a reservation from having an effect *ratione personae* and, moreover, in accordance with the provisions of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Convention of 1969, through an objection, accompanied by a clearly worded refusal to be bound by the treaty with respect to the reserving State, an objecting State can prevent the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the reserving State; there seems to be no *prima facie* reason why this could not be accomplished through a reservation as well.

However, according to most legal writers, “[i]t is questionable whether a statement on this subject, even when designated as a reservation, constitutes a reservation as generally understood since it does not purport, in the usual circumstances, to amend or modify any substantive provision of the treaty”.  

Although some members of the Commission were of the contrary view, there are several reasons for not categorizing a statement of non-recognition as a reservation, even if it purports to exclude the application of the treaty in the relations between the State formulating it and the non-recognized entity. These reasons, in the opinion of most members of the Commission, are both practical and theoretical.

In practice, it seems to be actually very difficult, if not impossible, to apply the reservations regime to statements of non-recognition:

Objections to such statements are hardly likely to be made and would, in any event, be incapable of having any real effect;

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It would hardly be reasonable to conclude that such statements are prohibited under article 19 (a) and (b) of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions if the treaty in question prohibits, or permits only certain types of, reservations; and

It must be acknowledged that recognizing them as reservations would hardly be compatible with the letter of the Vienna definition since the cases in which such statements may be made cannot be limited to those covered by article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1969 Convention. 257

(9) Moreover, from a more theoretical point of view, statements of this kind, unlike reservations, do not concern the legal effect of the treaty itself or its provisions, but rather the capacity of the non-recognized entity to be bound by the treaty. 258

(10) Such statements are also not interpretative declarations since their aim is not to interpret the treaty, but to exclude its application in the relations between two parties thereto.

(11) The Commission intentionally avoided to specify the nature of the non-recognized entity. Be it a State, a Government or any other entity (for example a national liberation movement), the problem is posed in identical terms. Mutatis mutandis, the same is true regarding statements of non-recognition of certain situations (notably territorial ones). In particular, in all these cases, we find each of the two categories of statements of non-recognition referred to above: 259 “precautionary statements” 260 and “statements of exclusion”. 261

(12) The problem appears to be a very marginal one insofar as international organizations are concerned; it could, however, arise in the case of some international integration organizations such as the European Union. In that event, there would be no reason not to extend the solution adopted

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257 [429, 1999] This latter argument, however, is not conclusive since, as shown by draft guideline 1.1.2 adopted by the Commission (see also the commentary to this provision in the report of the Commission on the work of its fiftieth session, A/53/10, para. 540) and the discussion on reservations made at the time of State succession (see ibid., para. 224), the list of cases where a reservation may be made that appears in article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Convention is not exhaustive.


259 [431, 1999] See paragraphs (2) and (3) above.

260 [432, 1999] Cf. the statement by Cameroon concerning the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 5 August 1963: “Under no circumstances could the signing by the Federal Republic of Cameroon have the effect of entailing recognition by Cameroon of Governments or regimes which, prior to such signing, had not yet been recognized by the Federal Republic of Cameroon according to the normal traditional procedures established by international law”. Similarly, see the statement by Benin in connection with the same treaty (Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, Fifth Edition, 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.IX.3, p. 40)) or the one by the Republic of Korea when it signed the Convention on Biological Weapons (ibid., p. 176).

261 [433, 1999] Cf. the statement by the United States concerning its participation in the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, signed in Geneva on 13 July 1931, which “does not involve any contractual obligation on the part of the United States of America to a country represented by a regime or entity which the Government of the United States of America does not recognize as the government of that
for statements by States, *mutatis mutandis*, to statements which international organizations might be required to formulate. The Commission nevertheless feels that this possibility is too hypothetical at present to warrant making reference to it in the body of the Guide to Practice.

(13) In adopting draft guideline 1.4.3 [1.1.7], the Commission was guided by the fundamental consideration that the central problem here is that of non-recognition and that it is peripheral to the right to enter reservations. The Commission felt that it was essential to mention this particular category of statements, which play a major role in contemporary international relations; but, as for all unilateral statements which are neither reservations nor interpretative declarations, it focused on what it saw as strictly necessary to make a distinction between them and it has refrained from “spilling over” into issues relating to the recognition of States in general and the effects of non-recognition.

1.4.4 [1.2.5] General statements of policy

A unilateral statement formulated by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization expresses its views on a treaty or on the subject matter covered by the treaty, without purporting to produce a legal effect on the treaty, constitutes a general statement of policy which is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice.

Commentary

(1) It frequently happens that, on the occasion of the signing of a treaty or the expression of its definitive consent to be bound, a State expresses its opinion, positive or negative, with regard to the treaty and even sets forth improvements that it feels ought to be made, as well as ways of making them, without purporting to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects in their application between it and the other contracting parties, or to interpret it. Hence, these are neither reservations nor interpretative declarations, but simple general statements of policy formulated in relation to the treaty or relating to the area which it covers.

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country until such country has a Government recognized by the Government of the United States of America” (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. VI.8, p. 274).
(2) Declarations by several States regarding the Convention of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons afford some notable examples. These are simple observations regarding the treaty which reaffirm or supplement some of the positions taken during its negotiation, but which have no effect on its application.

(3) This is also the case when a State makes a declaration in which it calls on all or some other States to become parties to a treaty or to implement it effectively.

(4) The same is true when a State takes the opportunity afforded by its signature of a treaty or its expression of consent to be bound by it to recall certain aspects of its policy with regard to the subject area of the treaty, as China did when it signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty adopted...
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 September 1996 or the Holy See when it became a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

(5) In the same spirit, some declarations made in the instruments of ratification of the 1971 Seabed Treaty, notably those of Canada and India, concerning types of weapons other than nuclear weapons, do not purport to modify the rights and obligations ensuing from the Treaty or to interpret it; as was noted, “Their main purpose is to avoid that the Treaty prejudice the positions of States making a declaration with respect to certain issues of the law of the sea on which States have different positions and views”.

(6) What these diverse declarations have in common is that the treaty in respect of which they are made is simply a pretext, and they bear no legal relationship to it: they could have been made under any circumstances, they have no effect on its implementation, nor do they seek to. They are thus neither reservations nor interpretative declarations. What is more, in the view of most of the members of the Commission, they are not even governed by the law of treaties, which in turn offers no help in assessing their validity (which is dependent on other rules of international law, both general and specialized), and this justifies that, like the other categories of unilateral declarations defined in section 1.4 of the Guide to Practice, they are excluded from the latter's scope.

(7) Although there does not seem to be any example of declarations of this type being formulated by an international organization, there is nothing to prevent that situation from changing in the future and there is no reason for it not to. It therefore seems warranted not to exclude this possibility by elaborating a draft guideline that is confined solely to States.

(8) Likewise, although it is clear that the risks of confusion between the unilateral declarations covered by this draft and reservations and interpretative declarations cannot arise unless they are formulated on the occasion of the signing of or the expression of consent to be bound by the treaty, general statements of policy may be made at any time, even when they express the views of their
author on the subject of the treaty or the area covered by it. It therefore does not seem desirable to introduce a temporal element in their definition.

(9) Lastly, it should be stressed that these declarations differ from other categories of unilateral declarations referred to in section 1.4 in that, unlike those relating to draft guidelines 1.4.1 [1.1.5], 1.4.2 [1.1.6] and 1.4.3 [1.1.7], they do not purport to produce a legal effect on the treaty or its implementation. Nevertheless, in contrast with declarations relating to the implementation of the treaty at the internal level, defined by draft guideline 1.4.5 [1.2.6], they are addressed to the other contracting parties or, more generally, are clearly situated at the international level.

1.4.5 [1.2.6] Statements concerning modalities of implementation of a treaty at the internal level

A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization whereby that State or that organization indicates the manner in which it intends to implement a treaty at the internal level, without purporting as such to affect its rights and obligations towards the other Contracting Parties, constitutes an informative statement which is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice.

Commentary

(1) A somewhat different situation from those described in draft guideline 1.4.4 [1.2.5] above relates to what one might call “informative declarations”, whereby the formulating State informs its partners, for example, of the internal authorities that will be responsible for implementing the treaty, regardless of how it will discharge its obligations or how it will exercise its rights under the treaty.

(2) The practice of this type of unilateral declaration seems particularly developed in the United States, where three categories have been noted: “Statements initiated by the Senate may authorize the President to issue more concrete instructions for the implementation of the treaty obligations on the internal level or by means of agreements of a special kind with the other parties or they may let certain measures of implementation pend later authorization by Congress”. 269

(3) Thus, authorization to ratify the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was given by the United States Senate,

“subject to the interpretation and understanding which is hereby made a part and condition of the resolution of ratification, that (1) any amendment to the Statute shall be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, as in the case of the Statute itself, and (2) the United States will not remain a member of the Agency in the event of an amendment to the Statute being adopted to which the Senate by a formal vote shall refuse its advice and consent”.  

(4) This declaration was attached to the United States instrument of ratification (the State party called it an “interpretation and understanding”), with the following explanation:

“The Government of the United States of America considers that the above statement of interpretation and understanding pertains only to United States constitutional procedures and is of a purely domestic character”.  

(5) As widespread as this practice is on the part of the United States, the latter is not the only country to use it. For example, in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Greece declared that it:

“secures all the rights and assumes all the obligations deriving from the Convention” and that

“[It] shall determine when and how it shall exercise these rights, according to its national strategy. This shall not imply that Greece renounces these rights in any way”.  

(6) Occasionally, however, the distinction between an informative declaration and an interpretative declaration may be unclear, as Sweden notes in its reply to the Commission's questionnaire on reservations:  “It should be noted that some of the declarations referred to include purely informative as well as interpretative elements. Only the latter are being dealt with here, although the distinction may sometimes be vague”. By way of example, Sweden, explaining the reasons for the declaration attached to its instrument of ratification of the 1980 European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, stated: “The reason for the declaration [...] was not only to provide information on which Swedish authorities and bodies would fall within the scope of the Convention, but also to convey that its application would be confined to those indicated; e.g. to exclude other bodies such as parishes

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which under Swedish law are local public entities”. Here one can probably say that this is really a
reservation by means of which the author seeks to exclude the application of the treaty to certain
types of institution to which it might otherwise apply. At the very least, it might be a true
interpretative declaration explaining how Sweden understands the treaty.

(7) But this is not the case with purely informative declarations, which, like those of the
United States cited earlier, cannot have any international effect and concern only relations
between Congress and the President. The problem arose in connection with a declaration of this
type made by the United States in respect of a treaty concluded with Canada in 1950 on the subject
of the Niagara River. The Senate would only authorize ratification through a “reservation” that
specifically identified the competent national authorities for the American side; this reservation
was transmitted to Canada, which accepted it, stating that it did so “because its provisions relate
only to the internal application of the treaty within the United States and do not affect Canada's
rights or obligations under the treaty”. Following an internal dispute, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeal ruled, in a judgment dated 20 June 1957, that the “reservation” had not modified
the treaty in any way and that, since it related only to the expression of purely domestic concerns, it
did not constitute a true reservation in the sense of international law. This reasoning is further
upheld by the fact that the declaration did not purport to produce any effect at the international
level.

(8) For the same reasons, it would be difficult to call such a unilateral declaration “an
interpretative declaration”: it does not interpret one or more of the provisions of the treaty, but is
directed only at the internal modalities of its implementation. It can also be seen from
United States practice that such declarations are not systematically attached to the instrument by

\[\text{[446, 1999] Paragraphs (2) to (6).}\]
\[\text{[450, 1999] The fact that the “Niagara reservation” was formulated in the context of a bilateral treaty does not weaken this reasoning; quite the contrary: while a “reservation” to a bilateral treaty can be viewed as an offer to renegotiate (see draft guideline 1.5.1), which, in this case, Canada accepted, it is quite significant that the Court of Appeals held that it had no international scope. It would in fact be difficult to see how Canada could have “objected” to a declaration that did not concern it.}\]
which the country expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty, and this clearly demonstrates that they are exclusively domestic in scope.

(9) Accordingly, it would appear that declarations which simply give indications of the manner in which the State which formulates them will implement the treaty at the internal level are not interpretative declarations, even though, unlike the declarations covered by draft guideline 1.4.4 [1.2.5], they are directly linked to the treaty.

(10) The above comments may also apply to certain unilateral declarations formulated by an international organization in relation to a treaty. Thus, the European Community made the following declaration when signing the Convention of 25 February 1991 on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context: “It is understood that the Community Member States, in their mutual relations, will apply the Convention in accordance with the Community’s internal rules, including those of the EURATOM Treaty, and without prejudice to appropriate amendments being made to those rules”. 280

(11) The Commission considers that the expression “at the internal level” is not excessive as regards unilateral declarations of this type formulated by international organizations, there no longer being any doubt as to the existence of an “internal” law peculiar to each international organization. 281

(12) The expression “as such” inserted in draft guideline 1.4.5 [1.2.6] is intended to draw attention to the fact that States and international organizations which formulate unilateral declarations do not have the objective of affecting the rights and obligations of the declarant in relation to the other contracting parties, but that it cannot be excluded that those declarations may have such effects, in particular through estoppel or, more generally, owing to the application of the principle of good faith. Moreover, according to some members, unilateral declarations made in respect of the manner in which their authors will implement their obligations under the treaty at the internal level may constitute genuine reservations (especially in the field of human rights). If that is the case, they


must clearly be treated as such; but that is true of all the unilateral declarations listed in this section of the Guide to Practice. 282

(13) Furthermore, the Commission is aware that the parties to a treaty may also—and often do—formulate unilateral declarations concerning the implementation of a treaty not at the internal level, but at the international level (announcements of financial contributions necessary to the implementation of the treaty, acceptance of an optional clause, etc.). The Commission intends to include additional material on this topic in the Guide to Practice after analysing the chapter on “Alternatives to reservations” in the Special Rapporteur's fourth report.

1.4.6 [1.4.6, 1.4.7] Unilateral statements made under an optional clause

A unilateral statement made by a State or by an international organization, in accordance with a clause in a treaty expressly authorizing the parties to accept an obligation that is not otherwise imposed by the treaty, is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice.

A restriction or condition contained in such statement does not constitute a reservation within the meaning of the present Guide to Practice.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 1.4.6 deals jointly with unilateral statements made under an optional clause in a treaty and with the restrictions or conditions that frequently accompany such statements and are commonly characterized as “reservations”, although this procedure differs in many respects from reservations as defined by the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions and by the present Guide to Practice.

(2) The unilateral statements referred to in the first paragraph of draft guideline 1.4.6 may seem similar to those mentioned in draft guideline 1.1.8, i.e. those made under an exclusionary clause. In both cases, the treaty expressly provides for such statements, which the parties are free to make in order to modify the obligations imposed on them by the treaty. However, they are also very


282 [454, 1999] According to the members who expressed this concern, if a unilateral declaration corresponds both to the definition of reservations given in draft guideline 1.1 and to that of statements concerning modalities of implementation of a treaty at the internal level given in draft guideline 1.4.5 [1.2.6], there would be no way to take a decision in favour of one qualification or the other, since the two provisions have the same legal value. According to the majority of the members, guideline 1.4.5 [1.2.6] is drafted in such a way that this possibility can arise only if reference is made to the explanations concerning the expression “purports to” given above in paragraphs (3) and (4) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.3.1.
different in nature: while statements made under an exclusionary clause (or an opting-out or contracting-out clause) purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty as they apply to the parties who have made them and must therefore be viewed as genuine reservations, those made under optional clauses have the effect of increasing the declarant’s obligations beyond what is normally expected of the parties under the treaty and do not affect its entry into force in their case.

(3) The purpose of optional clauses or opting-in [or contracting-in] clauses, which may be defined as provisions stipulating that the parties to a treaty may accept obligations which, in the absence of explicit acceptance, would not be automatically applicable to them, is not to reduce, but to increase, the obligations arising from the treaty for the author of the unilateral statement.283

(4) The most famous optional clause is certainly Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,284 but there are many others; such clauses are either drawn up on the same model and result in the acceptance of the competence of a certain mode of settlement of disputes or of monitoring by an organ created by the treaty, as envisaged in article 41, paragraph 1, of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,285 or are exclusively prescriptive in nature, as in the case, for example, of article 25 of the Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to maintenance obligations.286

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283 [224, 2000] According to Michel Virally, these are clauses “to which the parties accede only through special acceptance as distinct from accession to the treaty as a whole” (“Des moyens utilisés dans la pratique pour limiter l’effet obligatoire des traités”, in Université catholique de Louvain, quatrième colloque du Département des Droits de l’Homme, Les clauses échappatoires en matière d’instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme, Bruylant, Brussels, 1982, p. 13).

284 [225, 2000] “The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. The interpretation of a treaty; b. Any question of international law; c. The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.”

285 [226, 2000] “A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the [Human Rights] Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant …”; see also the former articles 25 (acceptance of the right to address individual petitions to the Commission) and 46 (acceptance of inter-State declarations) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (these articles have been modified, to provide for automatic compulsory jurisdiction, by articles 33 and 34 of Protocol No. 11 of 11 May 1994) or article 45, paragraph 1, of the American Convention on Human Rights: “Any State Party may, when it deposits its instrument of ratification of or adherence to this Convention, or at any later time, declare that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive and examine communications in which a State Party alleges that another State Party has committed a violation of a human right set forth in this Convention.”

286 [227, 2000] “Any Contracting State may, at any time, declare that the provisions of this Convention will be extended, in relation to other States making a declaration under this article, to an official deed (“acte authentique”) drawn up by or before an authority or public official and directly enforceable in the State of origin insofar as these provisions can be applied to such deeds”; see also articles 16 and 17, paragraph 2, of the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial
(5) Despite some academic opinions to the contrary, in reality, statements made under such clauses have little in common, at the technical level, with reservations, apart from the (important) fact that they both purport to modify the application of the effects of the treaty and it is quite clear that “opt-out clauses seem to be much closer to reservations than opt-in clauses”. Indeed, not only can

(a) Statements made under optional clauses be formulated, in most cases, at any time, but also,

(b) Optional clauses “start from a presumption that parties are not bound by anything other than what they have explicitly chosen”, while exclusionary clauses, like the mechanism for reservations, start from the opposite assumption; and

(c) Statements made under optional clauses purport not to “exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of [a] treaty in their application” to their author or to limit the obligations imposed on [the author] by the treaty, but, instead, to increase them, while the mere entry into force of the treaty for the author does not have this effect.

(6) Here again, to a certain degree, the complex problems of “extensive reservations” arise. However, draft guideline 1.4.1 adopted by the Commission in 1999 states that:

“A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization in relation to a treaty whereby its author purports to undertake obligations going beyond those imposed on it by the treaty constitutes a unilateral commitment which is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice.”

matters, or article 15 of the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, or article 4, paragraphs 2 and 4, of ILO Convention No. 118 of 1962 concerning Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security (see also the examples given in the memorandum from the ILO to the ICJ in 1951, in ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Pleadings, oral arguments, documents, p. 232, or again article 4, paragraph 2 (g), of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 9 May 1992.


288 [229, 2000] See draft guideline 1.4.5.


(7) The only difference between the statements envisaged in this draft guideline and those under consideration here is that the former are formulated on the sole initiative of the author, while the latter are made under a treaty.

(8) Given the great differences between them, a confusion between reservations, on the one hand, and statements made under an optional clause, on the other, need hardly be feared, so that the Commission wondered whether it was necessary to include a guideline in the Guide to Practice in order to distinguish between them. A majority of its members considered the inclusion of such a distinction useful: even if statements based on optional clauses are obviously technically very different from reservations, with which statements made under exclusionary clauses may (and must) be equated, such statements are nevertheless the counterpart of statements made under exclusionary clauses and their general objective is too similar for them to be ignored, particularly since they are often presented jointly.

(9) If the treaty so provides or, given the silence of the treaty, if it is not contrary to the object and purpose of the provision in question, there is nothing to prevent such a statement, in turn, from being accompanied by restrictions aimed at limiting the legal effect of the obligation thereby accepted. This is the case with the reservations frequently made by States when they accept jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

(10) While no purpose would be served by deciding whether a distinction needs to be drawn between “reservations” and “conditions”, it is sufficient to state that:

“There is a characteristic difference between these reservations and the type of reservation to multilateral treaties encountered in the law of treaties. … Since the whole transaction of


294 [235, 2000] In the Loizidou v. Turkey case, the European Court of Human Rights held that “having regard to the object and purpose of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights]”, the consequences of restrictions on its competence “for the enforcement of the Convention and the achievement of its aims would be so far-reaching that a power to this effect should have been expressly provided for. However, no such provision exists in either article 25 or article 46” (on these provisions, see above, note 226) (judgment of 23 March 1995, para. 75, R.U.D.H. 1995, p. 139).

295 [236, 2000] Although the Statute is silent on the possibility of optional declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, being accompanied by reservations other than the condition of reciprocity, this power, which is well established in practice and was confirmed by committee IV/I of the San Francisco Conference (cf. UNCIO, vol. 13, p. 39), is quite clear. Cf. Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, vol. II. Jurisdiction, pp. 767-769; see also the dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui attached to the judgement of the ICJ of 4 December 1998 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain v. Canada), para. 42, and the judgment of 21 June 2000 in the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 case (Pakistan v. India), paras. 37-38.

296 [237, 2000] Shabtai Rosenne makes a distinction between these two concepts (ibid., pp. 768-769).
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction is ex definitione unilateral and individualized and devoid of any multilateral element or element of negotiation, the function of reservations in a declaration cannot be to exclude or vary the legal effect of some existing provision in relation to the State making the declaration. Their function, together with that of the declaration itself, is to define the terms on which that State unilaterally accepts the compulsory jurisdiction - to indicate the disputes which are included within that acceptance, in the language of the Right of Passage (Merits) case.”

(11) These observations are consistent with the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and, in particular, its recent judgment of 4 December 1998 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case between Spain and Canada:

“Conditions or reservations thus do not by their terms derogate from a wider acceptance already given. Rather, they operate to define the parameters of the State’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. (…) All elements in a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute which, read together, comprise the acceptance by the declarant State of the Court’s jurisdiction are to be interpreted as a unity…”

(12) The same goes for the reservations which States attach to statements made under other optional clauses, such as those resulting from acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under article 17 of the General Act of Arbitration, in respect of which the Court has stressed “the close and necessary link that always exists between a jurisdictional clause and reservations to it”.

(13) It is therefore impossible simply to equate reservations appearing in the unilateral statements by which a State or an international organization accepts a provision of a treaty under an optional clause with reservations to a multilateral treaty. It is undoubtedly true that their ultimate objective is to limit the legal effect of the provision which the author of the statement thereby recognizes as being applicable to it. However, the reservation in question cannot be separated from the statement and does not, in itself, constitute a unilateral statement.

298 [239, 2000] Para. 44. See also para. 47: “Therefore, declarations and reservations are to be read as a whole”.
In view of the great theoretical and practical importance of the distinction, it seems necessary to supplement draft guideline 1.4.6 by specifying that the conditions and restrictions which accompany statements made under an optional clause do not constitute reservations within the meaning of the Guide to Practice any more than such statements themselves do.

1.4.7 [1.4.8] Unilateral statements providing for a choice between the provisions of a treaty

A unilateral statement made by a State or an international organization, in accordance with a clause in a treaty that expressly requires the parties to choose between two or more provisions of the treaty, is outside the scope of the present Guide to Practice.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 1.4.7 is part of a whole which also includes draft guidelines 1.1.8 and 1.4.6 and their common feature is that they relate to unilateral statements made under express provisions of a treaty enabling States to modify their obligations under the treaty, either by limiting those obligations on the basis of an exclusionary clause (draft guideline 1.1.8) or by accepting particular obligations under an optional clause (draft guideline 1.4.6). However, draft guideline 1.4.7 relates to the separate case in which the treaty requires States to choose between certain of its provisions, on the understanding, as shown by the examples given below, that the expression “two or more provisions of the treaty” is taken to cover not only articles and subparagraphs, but also chapters, sections and parts of a treaty, and even annexes forming an integral part of that treaty.

(2) This case is expressly dealt with in article 17, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. While paragraph 1 concerns the partial exclusion of the provisions of a treaty under an exclusionary clause, paragraph 2 relates to the intellectually different case in which the treaty contains a clause allowing a choice between several of its provisions:

“The consent of a State [or an international organization] to be bound by a treaty which permits a choice between differing provisions is effective only if it is made clear to which of the provisions the consent relates”.

(3) The commentary to this provision, reproduced without change by the Vienna Conference, is concise, but sufficiently clear about the case covered:

“Paragraph 2 takes account of a practice which is not very common but which is sometimes found, for example, in the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and in some international labour conventions. The treaty offers each State a choice between differing provisions of the treaty”.

(4) As has been noted, however, it is not accurate (or, at all events, not very accurate) to say that such a practice is, today, not very common. It is actually fairly widespread, at least in the apparently rather vague sense given to it by the Commission in 1966, but this includes two different hypotheses which do not fully overlap.

(5) The first is illustrated, for example, by the statements made under the 1928 General Act for Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration, article 38, paragraph 1, of which provides:

“Accessions to the present General Act may extend:

A. Either to all the provisions of the Act (chapters I, II, III and IV);

B. Or to those provisions only which relate to conciliation and judicial settlement (chapters I and II), together with the general provisions dealing with these procedures (Chapter IV)”.

The same is true of several ILO conventions, in which this technique, often used subsequently, was introduced by Convention No. 102 of 1952 concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security, article 2 of which provides:

“Each Member for which this Convention is in force -

(a) shall comply with -

(i) Part I;

(ii) at least three of Parts II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX and X;

(iii) the relevant provisions of Parts XI, XII and XIII; and

(iv) Part XIV”.


304 [245, 2000] The revised General Act of 1949 adds a third possibility: “C. Or to those provisions only which relate to Conciliation (Chapter I), together with the general provisions concerning that procedure (Chapter IV)”.

Along the same lines, mention may be made of the European Social Charter, of 18 October 1961, article 20, paragraph 1, of which provides for a partially optional system of acceptance.\textsuperscript{306}

“Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes:

(a) To consider part I of this Charter as a declaration of the aims which it will pursue by all appropriate means, as stated in the introductory paragraph of that part;

(b) To consider itself bound by at least five of the following articles of part II of this Charter: articles 1, 5, 6, 12, 13, 16 and 19;

(c) [...] to consider itself bound by such a number of articles or numbered paragraphs of part II of the Charter as it may select, provided that the total number of articles or numbered paragraphs by which it is bound is not less than 10 articles or 45 numbered paragraphs”.\textsuperscript{307}

(6) Such provisions should not be equated with the optional clauses referred to in draft guideline 1.4.6, from which they are clearly very different: the statements which they invite the parties to formulate are not optional, but binding, and condition the entry into force of the treaty for them\textsuperscript{308} and they have to be made at the time of giving consent to be bound by the treaty.

(7) Similarly, these statements cannot be completely equated with those made in application of an exclusionary clause.\textsuperscript{309} Clearly, they end up by excluding the application of provisions which do not appear in them. They do so indirectly, however, through partial acceptance,\textsuperscript{310} and not by excluding the legal effect of those provisions, but because of the silence of the author of the statement in respect of them.

(8) The same is true of statements made under the second category of treaty clauses which, even more clearly, offer a choice between the provisions of a treaty because they oblige the parties to choose a given provision (or a given set of provisions) or, alternatively, another provision (or another set of provisions). This is no longer a question of choosing among the provisions of a


\textsuperscript{307} [248, 2000] This complex system was used again in article A, paragraph 1, of the revised Social Charter on 3 May 1996. See also articles 2 and 3 of the 1964 European Code of Social Security and article 2 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of 5 November 1992: “1. Each Party undertakes to apply the provisions of part II to all the regional or minority languages spoken within its territory and which comply with the definition in article 1. 2. In respect of each language specified at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval, in accordance with article 3, each Party undertakes to apply a minimum of thirty-five paragraphs or subparagraphs chosen from among the provisions of part III of the Charter, including at least three chosen from each of the articles 8 and 12 and one from each of the articles 9, 10, 11 and 13.”

\textsuperscript{308} [249, 2000] This may be seen from the rest of the wording of article 17, para. 2, cited above (para. (2)) of the Vienna Conventions.

\textsuperscript{309} [250, 2000] See draft guideline 1.1.8.
treaty, but of choosing \textit{between them}, on the understanding that, in contrast to the previous case, there can be no accumulation,\footnote{251, 2000} and the acceptance of a treaty is not partial (even if the obligations deriving from it may be more or less binding depending on the option selected).

(9) These “alternative clauses” are less common than those analysed above. They do exist, however, as demonstrated by, for example, article 2 of ILO Convention No. 96 (revised) of 1949 concerning Fee-Charging Employment Agencies:\footnote{252, 2000}

\begin{quote}
\textquote{1. Each Member ratifying this Convention shall indicate in its instrument of ratification whether it accepts the provisions of part II of the Convention, providing for the progressive abolition of fee-charging employment agencies conducted with a view to profit and the regulation of other agencies, or the provisions of part III, providing for the regulation of fee-charging employment agencies including agencies conducted with a view to profit.}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textquote{2. Any Member accepting the provisions of part III of the Convention may subsequently notify the Director General that it accepts the provisions of part II; as from the date of the registration of such notification by the Director General, the provisions of part III of the Convention shall cease to be applicable to the Members in question and the provisions of part II shall apply to it.}\footnote{253, 2000}
\end{quote}

(10) As has been observed, “[o]ptional commitments ought to be distinguished from authorized reservations, although they in many respects resemble such reservations”.\footnote{254, 2000} Moreover, the silence of article 17, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions, which differs greatly from the reference in paragraph 1 to articles 19 to 23 on reservations,\footnote{255, 2000} constitutes, in contrast with unilateral statements made under an exclusionary clause, an indication of the clear dividing line between reservations and these alternative commitments.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\footnote{251, 2000} P.H. Imbert, op. cit., p. 170.
\item\footnote{252, 2000} Article 287 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is midway between the two approaches: States must choose one or more binding procedures for the settlement of disputes leading to binding decisions, failing which the arbitral procedure provided for in annex VII applies. But there may be an accumulation of different procedures.
\item\footnote{253, 2000} Pierre-Henri Imbert stresses that this is the best example of the type of clause allowing States to make a choice in the restrictive sense (op. cit., p. 172); see also Frank Horn, \textit{Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties}, Swedish Institute of International Law, Studies in International Law, No. 5, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1988, p. 134.
\item\footnote{254, 2000} See also section 1 of article XIV of the IMF Statutes (amended in 1976), whereby: “Each member shall notify the Fund whether it intends to avail itself of the transitional arrangements in section 2 of this article [Exchange restrictions], or whether it is prepared to accept the obligations of article VIII, sections 2, 3 and 4 [General obligations of member States]. A member availing itself of the transitional arrangements shall notify the Fund as soon thereafter as it is prepared to accept these obligations”.\footnote{255, 2000} F. Horn, ibid., p. 133.
\item\footnote{256, 2000} Cf. paras. (13) to (15) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.8.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
(11) In the two forms which they may take, these statements are clearly alternatives to reservations in that they constitute procedures which modify the application of a treaty on the basis of the preferences of the parties (even if these preferences are strongly indicated in the treaty). In addition, like reservations, they take the form of unilateral statements made at the time of signature or of the expression of consent to be bound (even if they may subsequently be modified, but, under certain conditions, reservations may be modified, too). And the fact that they have to be provided for in the treaty to which they apply does not constitute a factor differentiating them from reservations, since reservations may also be provided for in a restrictive way by a reservation clause.

(12) There are striking differences between these statements and reservations, however, because, unlike reservations, these statements are the condition sine qua non of the participation of the author of the statement in the treaty. Moreover, although they exclude the application of certain provisions of the treaty in respect of the State or international organization making the statement, this exclusion relates to the treaty itself and is inseparable from the entry into force of other provisions of the treaty in respect of the author of the same statement.

1.5 Unilateral statements in respect of bilateral treaties

Commentary

(1) The above draft guidelines seek to delimit as closely as possible the definition of reservations to multilateral treaties that and of other unilateral statements which are formulated in connection with a treaty and with which they may be compared, or even confused, including interpretative declarations. The Commission questioned whether it was possible to transpose these individual definitions to unilateral statements formulated in respect of bilateral treaties or at the time of their signature or of the expression of the final consent of the parties to be bound. This is the subject matter of section 1.5 of the Guide to Practice.

(2) Strictly speaking, it would have been logical to include the individual definitions which appear in the draft guidelines hereafter respectively in section 1.4, insofar as draft guideline 1.5.1 [1.1.9] is concerned (since the Commission considers that so-called “reservations” to bilateral

\[257, 2000\] This is the reason why draft guideline 1.4.7 states that a treaty must expressly require the parties to choose between two or more provisions of the treaty; if the choice is optional, an exclusionary clause within the meaning of draft guideline 1.1.8 is what is involved.
treaties do not correspond to the definition of reservations within the meaning of the present Guide to Practice), and in section 1.2, insofar as draft guidelines 1.5.2 [1.2.7] and 1.5.3 [1.2.8] are concerned (since they deal with genuine interpretative declarations). Given its particular nature, however, the Commission felt that the Guide would better serve its practical purpose if the draft guidelines devoted more specifically to unilateral statements formulated in respect of bilateral treaties were to be grouped in one separate section.

(3) The Commission considers, moreover, that the draft guidelines on unilateral statements other than reservations and interpretative declarations, grouped in section 1.4, could be applied, where necessary, to those dealing with bilateral treaties. 317

1.5.1 [1.1.9] “Reservations” to bilateral treaties

A unilateral statement, however phrased or named, formulated by a State or an international organization after initiailling or signature but prior to entry into force of a bilateral treaty, by which that State or that organization purports to obtain from the other party a modification of the provisions of the treaty to which it is subjecting the expression of its final consent to be bound, does not constitute a reservation within the meaning of the present Guide to Practice.

Commentary

(1) The 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions are silent on the subject of reservations to bilateral treaties: neither article 2, paragraph 1 (d), which defines reservations, nor articles 19 to 23, 318 which set out their legal regime, raise or exclude expressly the possibility of such reservations. And the 1978 Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties explicitly contemplates only reservations to multilateral treaties.

(2) While at the outset of its work on reservations the Commission was divided with regard to reservations only to multilateral treaties, 319 in 1956, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice stressed, in his initial

317 [455, 1999] It being understood that transposition is not always possible. In particular, draft guideline 1.4.3, concerning statements of non-recognition, is not relevant to bilateral treaties.

318 [456, 1999] At best, one can say that article 20, paragraph 1, and article 21, paragraph 2, are directed at “the other contracting States [and contracting organizations]” or “the other parties to the treaty”, both in the plural, and that article 20, paragraph 2, deals separately with treaties in whose negotiation a limited number of States or international organizations have participated, which is exactly what happens when a treaty involves only two parties. However, this argument does not in itself provide sufficient justification to say that the Conventions acknowledge the existence of reservations to bilateral treaties: the phrase “limited number of ... negotiating States” may mean “two or more States”, but it can also be interpreted as indicating only those multilateral treaties that bind a small number of States.
report, the particular features of the regime of reservations to treaties with limited participation, a category in which he expressly included bilateral agreements. Likewise, in his first report, in 1962, Sir Humphrey Waldock did not exclude the case of reservations to bilateral treaties, but treated it separately.

(3) However, this reference to bilateral treaties disappeared from the draft text after Sir Humphrey's proposals were considered. The introductory paragraph to the commentary on draft articles 16 and 17 (future articles 19 and 20 of the 1969 Convention) contained in the Commission's 1962 report and included in its final report in 1966 explains this as follows:

“A reservation to a bilateral treaty presents no problem, because it amounts to a new proposal reopening the negotiations between the two States concerning the terms of the treaty. If they arrive at an agreement - either adopting or rejecting the reservation - the treaty will be concluded; if not, it will fall to the ground.”

Following a suggestion by the United States, the Commission had furthermore expressly entitled the section of the draft articles on reservations as “Reservations to multilateral treaties”.

(4) It is hardly possible, however, to draw any conclusion from this in view of the positions taken during the Vienna Conference and the decision of that Conference to revert to the heading “Reservations” for part II, section 2, of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties. It should in

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319 [457, 1999] As early as 1950, the Commission stated that “the application ... in detail” of the principle that a reservation could become effective only with the consent of the parties “to the great variety of situations which may arise in the making of multilateral treaties was felt to require further consideration” (Report of the International Law Commission covering its second session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/1316), para. 164, emphasis added). The study requested of the Commission in General Assembly resolution 478 (V) was supposed to (and did) focus exclusively on “the question of reservations to multilateral conventions”.

320 [458, 1999] The Commission also asked the question whether the particular features of “reservations” to bilateral treaties did not characterize rather the unilateral statements made with respect to “plurilateral” (or “multiple-party bilateral”) treaties, such as, for example, the peace treaties concluded at the end of the First and Second World Wars. These have the appearance of multilateral treaties, but may in fact be regarded as bilateral treaties. It is doubtful whether the distinction, although interesting from the theoretical point of view, affects the scope of draft guideline 1.5.1: either the treaty will be considered to have two actual parties (despite the number of those contracting), and that situation is covered by draft guideline 1.5.1, or the statement is made by one constituent of the “multiple party” and is a conventional reservation within the meaning of draft guideline 1.1.

321 [459, 1999] See draft article 38 (“Reservations to bilateral treaties and other treaties with limited participation”) which he proposed: “In the case of bilateral treaties, or plurilateral treaties made between a limited number of States for purposes specially interesting those States, no reservations may be made, unless the treaty in terms so permits, or all the other negotiating States expressly so agree” (Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, p. 115).

322 [460, 1999] See draft article 18, paragraph 4 (a): “In the case of a bilateral treaty, the consent of the other negotiating State to the reservation shall automatically establish the reservation as a term of the treaty between the two States” (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 61).


particular be noted that the Conference's Drafting Committee approved a Hungarian proposal to delete the reference to multilateral treaties from the title of the section on reservations in order not to prejudge the issue of reservations to bilateral treaties.

(5) However, after that decision, the question occasioned an exchange of views between the President of the Conference, Mr. Roberto Ago, and the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. Mustapha K. Yasseen, which indicates that the Conference had not, in fact, taken a firm position as to the existence and legal regime of possible reservations to bilateral treaties.

(6) The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations sheds no new light on the question. However, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties tends to confirm the general impression gathered from a review of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions that the legal regime of reservations provided for in those Conventions (to which article 20, paragraph 3, of
the 1978 Convention refers) is applicable solely to multilateral treaties and not to bilateral treaties. Indeed, article 20, the only provision of that instrument to deal with reservations, is included in section 2 of part III, 330 which deals with multilateral treaties, 331 and expressly stipulates that it is applicable “when a newly independent State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty by a notification of succession”, the notification of succession being generally admitted in respect of open multilateral treaties.

(7) Here again, however, the only conclusion one can draw is that the Vienna regime is not applicable to reservations to bilateral treaties, including in cases of succession of States. This does not mean, however, that the concept of “reservations” to bilateral treaties is inconceivable or non-existent.

(8) It is nevertheless the case that in practice some States do not hesitate to make unilateral statements, which they call “reservations” with respect to bilateral treaties, while others declare themselves hostile to them.

(9) This is a practice which has been in existence for a long time, 332 widely used by the United States of America 333 and, less frequently, by other States in their relations with the United States. 334 The fact remains that, of all the States which replied to the International Law

330 [468, 1999] Which concerns only “newly independent States”.
331 [469, 1999] Section 3 deals with “bilateral treaties”.
332 [470, 1999] The oldest example of a “reservation” to a bilateral treaty goes back to the resolution of 24 June 1795, in which the United States Senate authorized ratification of the Jay Treaty of 19 November 1794, “on condition that there be added to the said treaty an article, whereby it shall be agreed to suspend the operation of so much of the 12th article as respects the trade which his said Majesty thereby consents may be carried on, between the United States and his islands in the West Indies, in the manner, and on the terms and conditions therein specified” (quoted by William W. Bishop, Jr., Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international, 1961-II, vol. 103, pp. 260-261; Bishop even cites a precedent that goes back to the Articles of Confederation: in 1778, the United States Congress demanded and obtained renegotiation of the Treaty of Commerce with France of 6 February 1778 (ibid., note 13)).
333 [471, 1999] In 1929, Marjorie Owen estimated somewhere between 66 and 87 bilateral treaties had been subject to a “reservation” by the United States after the Senate had imposed a condition on their ratification (“Reservations to multilateral treaties”, Yale Law Journal, 1928-1929, p. 1091). More recently, Kevin Kennedy compiled detailed statistics covering the period from 1795 to 1990. These data show that the United States Senate made its advice and consent to ratify conditional for 115 bilateral treaties during that period, a figure that includes interpretative declarations, which account for 15 per cent on average of all bilateral treaties to which the United States has become a party in just under two centuries (Kevin C. Kennedy, “Conditional approval of treaties by the U.S. Senate”, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Journal, October 1996, p. 98). The same statistics show that this practice of “amendments” or “reservations” involves all categories of agreement and is particularly frequent in the area of extradition, friendship, commerce and navigation treaties (“FCN treaties”, and even peace treaties (see ibid., pp. 99-103 and 112-116)). In its response to the questionnaire on reservations, the United States of America confirmed that this practice remains important where the country's bilateral treaties are concerned. The United States attached to its response a list of 13 bilateral treaties that were accepted with reservations between 1975 and 1985. Such was the case, for example, of the Treaties concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal of 7 September 1977, the Special Agreement under which Canada and the United States agreed to submit their dispute on the delimitation of maritime zones in the Gulf of Maine area to the International Court of Justice, and the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom of 25 June 1985.
Commission questionnaire on reservations, only the United States gave an affirmative to question 1.4, all the others answered in the negative. Some of them simply said that they do not formulate reservations to bilateral treaties, but others indicated their concerns about that practice.

(10) Another important feature of the practice of States in this area is the fact that, in all cases where the United States or its partners have entered “reservations” (often called “amendments”) to bilateral treaties, they have endeavoured in all cases to renegotiate the treaty in question and to obtain the other Party's acceptance of the modification which is the subject of the “reservation”.


The question read: “Has the State formulated reservations to bilateral treaties?”.

Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holy See, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, Monaco, Panama, Peru, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

See Germany's position: “The Federal Republic has not formulated reservations to bilateral treaties. It shares the commonly held view that a State seeking to attach a reservation to a bilateral treaty would in effect refuse acceptance of that treaty as drafted. This would constitute an offer for a differently formulated treaty incorporating the content of the reservation and would thus result in the reopening of negotiations.” The replies from Italy and the United Kingdom were very similar. However, the United Kingdom added: “The United Kingdom does not itself seek to make reservations a condition of acceptance of a bilateral treaty. If Parliament were (exceptionally) to refuse to enact the legislation necessary to enable the United Kingdom to give effect to a bilateral treaty, the United Kingdom authorities would normally seek to renegotiate the treaty in an endeavour to overcome the difficulties.”

Kevin C. Kennedy has identified 12 different categories of conditions set by the United States Senate for ratification of treaties (bilateral and multilateral), but notes that four of these account for 90 per cent of all cases: “understandings”, “reservations”, “amendments” and “declarations”. However, the relative share of each varies over time, as the following table shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of condition</th>
<th>1845-1895</th>
<th>1896-1945</th>
<th>1946-1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amendments</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declarations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understandings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the Department of State noted in its instructions to the American Ambassador in Madrid following Spain's refusal to accept an “amendment” to a 1904 extradition treaty which the Senate had adopted, “[t]he action of the Senate consists in advising an amendment which, if accepted by the other party, is consented to in advance. In other words, the Senate advises that the President negotiate with the foreign Government with a view to obtaining its acceptance of the advised amendment.” (Quoted by Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. V (Washington, D.C., United States Printing Office, 1943), p. 115.)
If agreement is obtained, the treaty enters into force with the modification in question; if not, the ratification process is discontinued and the treaty does not enter into force.

(11) In the Commission's opinion, the following conclusions may be drawn from this review:

1. With the exception of the United States of America, States seldom formulate reservations to bilateral treaties, although exceptions do exist (but these apparently occur only in the context of bilateral treaty relations with the United States); and

2. This practice, which may elicit constitutional objections in some countries, does not do so at the international level, if only because the States concluding treaties with the United States of America, having on occasion rejected reservations proposed by that country, have never raised any objections of principle and have even, in some cases, submitted their own “counter-reservations” of a similar nature.

(12) As indicated by the practice described above, despite some obvious points in common with reservations to multilateral treaties, “reservations” to bilateral treaties are different in one key respect: their intended and their actual effects.

(13) There is no doubt that reservations to bilateral treaties are formulated unilaterally by States (and, a priori, nothing prevents an international organization from doing the same) once the negotiations have ended and they bear different names that may reflect real differences in domestic law, but not in international law. From these different standpoints, they meet the first three criteria set out in the Vienna definition, reproduced in draft guideline 1.1.

(14) The Commission has found that a “reservation” to a bilateral treaty may be made at any time after the negotiations have ended, once a signature has been put to the final agreed text, but before the treaty enters into force, as such statements are aimed at modifying its text.

\(^{340}\) \([478, 1999]\) In some cases, the other contracting Party makes “Counter-offers” which are also incorporated into the treaty. For example, Napoleon accepted a modification made by the Senate to the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1800 between the United States and France, but then attached his own condition to it, which the Senate accepted (see Marjorie Owen, “Reservations to Multilateral Treaties”, Yale Law Journal, 1928-1929, pp. 1090-1091, or William W. Bishop, Jr., “Reservation to Treaties”, Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international 1960-II, vol. 103, pp. 267-268).

\(^{341}\) \([479, 1999]\) See, for example, the United Kingdom's rejection of amendments to an 1803 convention concerning the border between Canada and the United States and an 1824 convention for suppression of the African slave trade which the United States had requested (see William W. Bishop, Jr., “Reservations to Treaties”; Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international 1961-II, vol. 103, p. 266) or the United Kingdom's refusal to accept the United States reservations to the treaty of 20 December 1900 dealing with the Panama Canal, which was consequently renegotiated and led to the signing of a new agreement, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 28 November 1902. See Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. V (Washington, D.C., United States Printing Office, 1943, pp. 113-114). An even more complicated case concerns ratification of the Convention of Friendship, Reciprocal Establishments, Commerce and Extradition between the United States of America and Switzerland of 25 November 1850, which was the subject of a request for amendments, first by the United States Senate, then by Switzerland, and then again by
(15) But this is precisely the feature which distinguishes such “reservations” to bilateral treaties from reservations to multilateral treaties. There is no doubt that, with a “reservation”, one of the contracting parties to a bilateral treaty intends to modify the legal effect of the provisions of the original treaty. But while a reservation does not affect the provisions of the instrument in the case of a multilateral treaty, a “reservation” to a bilateral treaty seeks to modify it: if the reservation produces the effects sought by its author, it is not the “legal effect” of the provisions in question that will be modified or excluded “in their application” to the author; it is the provisions themselves that will be modified. A reservation to a multilateral treaty has a subjective effect: if it is accepted, the legal effect of the provisions in question is modified vis-à-vis the State or the international organization that formulated it. A reservation to a bilateral treaty has an objective effect: if it is accepted by the other State, it is the treaty itself that is amended.

(16) Similarly, there is no doubt that a reservation to a multilateral treaty produces effects only if it is accepted, in one way or another, expressly or implicitly, by at least one of the other contracting States or international organizations. The same is true for a reservation to a bilateral treaty: the co-contracting State or international organization must accept the “reservation”, or else the treaty will not enter into force. Thus the difference does not have to do with the need for acceptance, which is present in both cases, in order for the reservation to produce its effects, but with the consequences of acceptance:

In the case of a multilateral treaty, an objection does not prevent the instrument from entering into force, even, at times, between the objecting State or international organization and the author of the reservation, and its provisions remain intact;

In the case of a bilateral treaty, the absence of acceptance by the co-contracting State or international organization prevents the entry into force of the treaty; acceptance involves its modification.

(17) Thus a “reservation” to a bilateral treaty appears to be a proposal to amend the treaty in question or an offer to renegotiate it. This analysis corresponds to the prevailing views in

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342 [480, 1999] Article 20 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions states that a reservation can have been accepted in advance by all the signatory States and be expressly authorized by the treaty (para. 1), or it can be expressly accepted (paras. 2, 3 and 4), or it can be “considered to have been accepted” if no objection is raised within 12 months (para. 5).

Moreover, saying that acceptance of a “reservation” to a bilateral treaty is equivalent to amending the treaty does not make the reservation an amendment: it is simply a unilateral proposal to amend, prior to the treaty's entry into force, while the amendment itself is treaty-based, is the result of an agreement between the parties and is incorporated into the negotiated text, even if it can be contained in one or more separate instruments.

(18) As the Solicitor for the Department of State noted in a memorandum dated 18 April 1921:

“The action of the Senate when it undertakes to make so-called ‘reservations' to a treaty is evidently the same in effect as when it makes so-called ‘amendments', whenever such reservations and amendments in any substantial way affect the terms of the treaty. The so-called reservations which the Senate has been making from time to time are really not reservations as that term has generally been understood in international practice up to recent times.”

(19) This is also the view of the Commission, which believes that unilateral statements by which a State (or an international organization) purports to obtain a modification of a treaty whose final text has been agreed on by the negotiators does not constitute a reservation in the usual meaning of the term in a treaty framework, as has been confirmed by the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.

(20) Although most of the members of the Commission consider such a statement to constitute an offer to renegotiate the treaty, which, if accepted by the other party, becomes an amendment to the treaty, it does not appear essential for this to be stated in the Guide to Practice, since, as the different categories of unilateral statement mentioned in section 1.4 above are neither reservations


in the usual meaning of the term nor interpretative statements, they do not fall within the scope of the treaty. 348

1.5.2 [1.2.7] Interpretative declarations in respect of bilateral treaties

Guidelines 1.2 and 1.2.1 are applicable to interpretative declarations in respect of multilateral as well as bilateral treaties.

Commentary

(1) The silence of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties extends a fortiori to interpretative declarations made in respect of bilateral treaties: the Conventions do not mention interpretative declarations in general 349 and are quite cautious insofar as the rules applicable to bilateral treaties are concerned. 350 Such declarations are nonetheless common and, unlike “reservations” to the same treaties, 351 they correspond in all respects to the definition of interpretative declarations adopted for draft guideline 1.2.

(2) Almost as old as the practice of “reservations” to bilateral treaties, 352 the practice of interpretative declarations in respect of such treaties is less geographically limited 353 and does not seem to give rise to objections where principles are concerned. As for the present situation, of the 22 States that answered question 3.3 354 of the Commission’s questionnaire on reservations, four said that they had formulated interpretative declarations in respect of bilateral treaties; and one international organization, the International Labour Organization (ILO), wrote that it had done so in one situation, while noting that the statement was in reality a “corrigendum”, “made in order not to delay signature”. However incomplete, these results are nevertheless significant: while only the United States claimed to make “reservations” to bilateral treaties, 355 it is joined here by Panama,

348 [486, 1999] See draft guideline 1.4 and the commentary thereto.
349 [487, 1999] See paragraph (1) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.2.
350 [488, 1999] See paragraph (1) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.5.1 [1.1.9].
351 [489, 1999] See draft guideline 1.5.1 [1.1.9] and the commentary thereto.
353 [491, 1999] See the commentary to draft guideline 1.5.1 [1.1.9], paragraphs (9) to (11). However, as with “reservations” to bilateral treaties, the largest number of examples can be found in the practice of the United States of America; in just the period covered by that country’s reply to the questionnaire on reservations (1975-1995), it mentions 28 bilateral treaties to which it attached interpretative declarations upon expressing its consent to be bound.
354 [492, 1999] “Has the State attached any interpretative declarations to the expression of its consent to be bound by bilateral treaties?”
355 [493, 1999] See the commentary to draft guideline 1.5.1 [1.1.9], paragraph (9).
Slovakia and the United Kingdom and by one international organization; 356 and while several States criticized the very principle of “reservations” to bilateral treaties, 357 none of them showed any hesitation concerning the formulation of interpretative declarations in respect of such treaties. 358

(3) The extent and consistency of the practice of interpretative declarations in respect of bilateral treaties leave little doubt as to how this institution is viewed in international law: it is clearly a “general practice accepted as law”.

(4) Whereas the word “reservation” certainly does not have the same meaning when it is applied to a unilateral statement made in respect of a bilateral treaty as it does when it concerns a multilateral instrument, the same is not true in the case of interpretative declarations: in both cases, they are unilateral statements, however named or phrased, made “by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions”. 359 Thus, draft guideline 1.2, which provides this definition, may be considered to be applicable to declarations which interpret bilateral as well as multilateral treaties.

(5) On one point, however, the practice of interpretative declarations in respect of bilateral treaties seems to differ somewhat from the common practice for multilateral treaties. Indeed, it appears from what has been written that “in the case of a bilateral treaty it is the invariable practice, prior to the making of arrangements for the exchange of ratifications and sometimes even prior to ratification of the treaty, for the government making the statement or declaration to notify the other government thereof in order that the latter may have an opportunity to accept, reject, or otherwise express its views with respect thereto”. 360 And, once approved, the declaration becomes part of the treaty:

“... where one of the parties to a treaty, at the time of its ratification annexes a written declaration explaining ambiguous language in the instrument [...], and when the treaty is

356 [494, 1999] In addition, Sweden said: “It may have happened, although very rarely, that Sweden has made interpretative declarations, properly speaking, with regard to bilateral treaties. [...] Declarations of a purely informative nature of course exist”.
357 [495, 1999] See the commentary to draft guideline 1.5.1 [1.1.9], note 240.
358 [496, 1999] The United Kingdom criticizes the United States understanding on the matter of the Treaty concerning the Cayman Islands relating to Mutual Legal Assistance; but what the Government of the United Kingdom seems to be rejecting here is the possibility of modifying a bilateral treaty under the guise of interpretation (by means of “understandings” which are really “reservations”).
359 [497, 1999] Cf. draft guideline 1.2.
afterwards ratified by the other party with the declaration attached to it, and their ratifications duly exchanged - the declaration thus annexed is part of the treaty and as binding and obligatory as if it were inserted in the body of the instrument. The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the whole instrument, as it stood when the ratifications were exchanged.”

(6) It is difficult to argue with this reasoning, which leads one to ask whether interpretative declarations which are made in respect of bilateral treaties, just like “reservations” to such treaties, must necessarily be accepted by the other party. In reality, this does not seem to be the case: in (virtually?) all cases, interpretative declarations made in respect of bilateral treaties have been accepted because the formulating State requested it, but one can easily imagine that it might not make such a request. Indeed, the logic which leads one to distinguish between interpretative declarations which are conditional and those which are not would seem to be easily transposed to the case of bilateral treaties: everything depends on the author’s intention. It may be the condition sine qua non of the author’s consent to the treaty, in which case it is a conditional interpretative declaration, identical in nature to those made in respect of multilateral treaties and consistent with the definition proposed in draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4]. But it may also be simply intended to inform the partner of the meaning and scope which the author attributes to the provisions of the treaty without, however, seeking to impose that interpretation on the partner, and in this case it is a “simple interpretative declaration”, which, like those made in respect of multilateral treaties, can actually be made at any time.

(7) Accordingly, the Commission felt that it was not necessary to adopt specific draft guidelines on interpretative declarations in respect of bilateral treaties, since these fall under the same definition as interpretative declarations in respect of multilateral treaties, whether it be their general definition, as given in draft guideline 1.2, or the distinction between simple and conditional interpretative declarations which follows from draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4]. It therefore seems to be sufficient to take note of this in the Guide to Practice.

362 [500, 1999] See paragraphs (16) to (20) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.5.1 [1.1.9].
363 [501, 1999] See draft guideline 1.2.1 [1.2.4] and the commentary thereto.
364 [502, 1999] See draft guideline 1.2 and paragraphs (21) to (30) of the commentary thereto.
(8) On the other hand, draft guideline 1.2.2 [1.2.1], concerning interpretative declarations formulated jointly, is not, of course, relevant in the case of bilateral treaties.

(9) As regards section 1.3 of this chapter of the Guide to Practice, concerning the distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations, it is difficult to see how, if the term “reservations” in respect of bilateral treaties does not correspond to the definition of reservations given in draft guideline 1.1, it would be applicable to the latter. At best, it may be thought that the principles set forth therein can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to distinguish interpretative declarations from other unilateral statements made in respect of bilateral treaties.

1.5.3 [1.2.8] Legal effect of acceptance of an interpretative declaration made in respect of a bilateral treaty by the other party

The interpretation resulting from an interpretative declaration made in respect of a bilateral treaty by a State or an international organization party to the treaty and accepted by the other party constitutes the authentic interpretation of that treaty.

Commentary

(1) Although acceptance of an interpretative declaration formulated by a State in respect of a bilateral treaty is not inherent in such a declaration,³⁶⁵ it might be asked whether acceptance modifies the legal nature of the interpretative declaration.

(2) In the Commission's opinion, the reply to this question is affirmative: when an interpretative declaration made in respect of a bilateral treaty is accepted by the other party,³⁶⁶ it becomes an integral part of the treaty and constitutes the authentic interpretation thereof. As the Permanent Court of International Justice noted, “the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it”.³⁶⁷ Yet in the case of a bilateral treaty this power belongs to both parties. Accordingly, if they agree on an interpretation, that interpretation prevails and itself takes on the nature of a treaty, regardless of its form,³⁶⁸ exactly as “reservations” to bilateral treaties do once they have been accepted by the co-contracting State or international organization.³⁶⁹ It becomes an agreement collateral to the treaty.

³⁶⁵ [503, 1999] See paragraphs (5) and (6) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.5.2 [1.2.7].
³⁶⁶ [504, 1999] And one can imagine that this would be the case even when an interpretative declaration is not conditional.
³⁶⁸ [506, 1999] Exchange of letters, protocol, simple oral agreement, etc.
³⁶⁹ [507, 1999] See draft guideline 1.5.1 [1.1.9] and paragraphs (15) to (19) of the commentary thereto.
which forms part of its context in the sense of paragraphs 2 and 3 (a) of article 31 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions; as such, it must be taken into consideration in interpreting the treaty.  

And this analysis is consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court in the Doe case.

(3) While it is aware that considering this phenomenon in the first part of the Guide to Practice exceeds the scope of that part, which is devoted to the definition, and not the legal regime, of reservations and interpretative declarations, the Commission has seen fit to mention it in a draft guideline. It does not in fact intend to return to the highly specific question of “reservations” and interpretative declarations in respect of bilateral treaties: in the first case, because they are not reservations, in the second, because interpretative declarations to bilateral treaties have no distinguishing feature with respect to interpretative declarations to multilateral treaties, except precisely the one covered in draft guideline 1.5.2 [1.2.7]. For purely practical reasons, therefore, it seems appropriate to make that clear at this stage.

1.6 Scope of definitions

The definitions of unilateral statements included in the present chapter of the Guide to Practice are without prejudice to the validity and effects of such statements under the rules applicable to them.

Commentary

(1) This draft guideline was provisionally adopted by the Commission at its fiftieth session, in 1998, in a form which referred only to reservations. The related draft commentary indicated that its title and placement in the Guide to Practice would be determined at a later stage and that the Commission would consider the possibility of referring under a single caveat to both reservations and interpretative declarations, which, in the view of some members, posed identical problems.

At its fifty-first session, the plenary Commission adopted this approach, deeming it necessary to

370 [508, 1999] Article 31 of the 1969 Convention reads: “2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.”

371 [509, 1999] See commentary to draft guideline 1.5.2 [1.2.7], note 254.


clarify and specify the scope of the entire set of draft guidelines relating to the definition of all unilateral statements which are envisaged, in order to make their particular object clear.

(2) As originally worded, draft guideline 1.6 read:

“The definitions of unilateral statements included in the present chapter of the Guide to Practice are without prejudice to the permissibility and effects of such statements under the rules applicable to them.”

At the fifty-seventh session, however, some members argued that the word “permissibility” was not appropriate: in international law, an internationally wrongful act entailed its author’s responsibility, and that was plainly not the case of the formulation of reservations that did not fulfill the conditions relating to form or substance that the Vienna Conventions imposed on reservations. At its fifty-eighth session, the Commission decided to replace “permissibility” by “validity”, a term the majority of members considered more neutral. The commentary to draft guideline 1.6 was amended accordingly.

(3) Defining is not the same as regulating. As “a precise statement of the essential nature of a thing”, the sole function of a definition is to determine the general category in which a given statement should be classified. However, this classification does not in any way prejudice the validity of the statements in question: a reservation may or may not be permissible, but it remains a reservation if it corresponds to the definition established. A contrario, it is not a reservation if it does not meet the criteria set forth in these draft guidelines but this does not necessarily mean that such statements are valid (or invalid) from the standpoint of other rules of international law. The same is true of interpretative declarations, which might conceivably not be valid either because they would alter the nature of the treaty or because they were not formulated at the required time, etc.

(4) Furthermore, the exact determination of the nature of a statement is a precondition for the application of a particular legal regime, in the first place, for the assessment of its validity. It is

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377 [897, 2006] This problem may very likely arise in connection with conditional interpretative declarations (see draft guideline 1.2.1).
378 [898, 2006] The same may obviously be said about unilateral statements which are neither reservations nor interpretative declarations, referred to in section 1.4.
only once a particular instrument has been defined as a reservation (or an interpretative declaration, either simple or conditional) that it can be decided whether it is valid, that its legal scope can be evaluated and that its effect can be determined. However, this validity and these effects are not otherwise affected by the definition, which requires only that the relevant rules be applied.

(5) For example, the fact that draft guideline 1.1.2 indicates that a reservation “may be formulated” in all the cases referred to in draft guideline 1.1 and in article 11 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions does not mean that such a reservation is necessarily valid; its validity depends upon whether it meets the conditions stipulated in the law on reservations to treaties and, in particular, those stipulated in article 19 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. Similarly, the Commission’s confirmation of the well-established practice of “across-the-board” reservations in draft guideline 1.1.1 [1.1.4] is in no way meant to constitute a decision on the validity of such a reservation in a specific case, which would depend on its contents and context; the sole purpose of the draft is to show that a unilateral statement of such a nature is indeed a reservation and as such subject to the legal regime governing reservations.

(6) The “rules applicable” referred to in draft guideline 1.6 are, first of all, the relevant rules in the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions and, in general, the customary rules applicable to reservations and to interpretative declarations, which this Guide to Practice is intended to codify and develop progressively in accordance with the Commission’s mandate, and those relating to other unilateral statements which States and international organizations may formulate in respect of treaties, but which are not covered in the Guide to Practice.

(7) More generally, all the draft guidelines adopted thus far are interdependent and cannot be read and understood in isolation from one another.

1.7 Alternatives to reservations and interpretative declarations

Commentary

(1) Reservations are not the only procedure enabling the parties to a treaty to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty or of certain particular aspects of the treaty as a whole. Accordingly, it seems useful to link the consideration of the definition of reservations to that of other procedures, which, while not constituting reservations, are, like them, designed to enable and do indeed enable States to modify obligations under treaties to which they are parties; this is a question of alternatives to reservations and recourse to such procedures may probably
make it possible, in specific cases, to overcome some problems linked to reservations. In the Commission’s view, these procedures, far from constituting invitations to States to make a treaty less effective, as some members seemed to fear, would instead help to make recourse to reservations less “necessary” or frequent by offering more flexible treaty techniques.

(2) Moreover, some members of the Commission considered that certain of these alternatives differed profoundly from reservations in that they constituted, not unilateral statements, but clauses in the treaty itself, and that, accordingly, they related more to the process of drafting a treaty than to its application. It seemed clear, however, that, as they produce effects almost identical to those produced by reservations, these techniques deserve to be mentioned in the chapter of the Guide to Practice devoted to the definition of reservations, if only so as to identify more clearly the key elements of the concept, distinguish them from reservations and, where applicable, draw appropriate conclusions with regard to the legal regime of reservations.

(3) The same problem arises, mutatis mutandis, with regard to interpretative declarations whose objective may be achieved by other means.

(4) Some of these alternative procedures are the subject of draft guidelines in section 1.4 of the Guide to Practice. However, these deal only with “unilateral statements formulated in relation to a treaty which are not reservations nor interpretative declarations“, excluding other techniques for modifying the provisions of a treaty or their interpretation. Given the practical nature of the Guide it has undertaken to draft, the Commission considered that it might be useful to devote a short section of the instrument to the range of procedures constituting alternatives to reservations and interpretative declarations, to serve as a reminder to users and, in particular, to the negotiators of treaties of the wide range of possibilities available to them for that purpose.

1.7.1 [1.7.1, 1.7.2, 1.7.3, 1.7.4] Alternatives to reservations

In order to achieve results comparable to those effected by reservations, States or international organizations may also have recourse to alternative procedures, such as:

- The insertion in the treaty of restrictive clauses purporting to limit its scope or application

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• The conclusion of an agreement, under a specific provision of a treaty, by which two or more States or international organizations purport to exclude or modify the legal effects of certain provisions of the treaty as between themselves

Commentary

(1) The formulation of reservations constitutes a means for States (and to some extent, for international organizations) partially to preserve their freedom of action while accepting in principle to limit that freedom by becoming bound by a treaty. This “concern of each Government with preserving its capacity to reject or adopt [and adapt] the law (a minimal, defensive concern)”\textsuperscript{380} is particularly present in two situations: where the treaty in question deals with especially sensitive matters or contains exceptionally onerous obligations\textsuperscript{381} or where it binds States whose situations are very different and whose needs are not necessarily met by a uniform set of rules.

(2) It is this type of consideration which led the authors of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to state in article 19, paragraph 3:

“In framing any Convention or Recommendation of general application the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organization, or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different and shall suggest the modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the case of such countries.”\textsuperscript{382}

According to the ILO, which bases its refusal to permit reservations to the international labour conventions on this article:\textsuperscript{383}

“This would suggest that the object of the framers of the Treaty of Peace, in imposing on the Conference this obligation to give preliminary consideration to the special circumstances of each country, was to prevent States from pleading, after the adoption of a convention, a special situation which had not been submitted to the Conference’s judgement.”\textsuperscript{384}


\textsuperscript{381}[260, 2000] Such is the case, for example, of the charters of “integrating” international organizations (cf. the Treaties establishing the European Communities; see also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).

\textsuperscript{382}[261, 2000] This provision reproduces the provisions of article 405 of the Treaty of Versailles.

\textsuperscript{383}[262, 2000] See the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.8, paragraph 3.

As in the case of reservations, but by a different procedure, the aim is:
“to protect the integrity of the essential object and purpose of the treaty while simultaneously
allowing the maximum number of States to become parties, though they are unable to assume
full obligations.”

(3) The quest to reconcile these two goals is the aim both of reservations in the strict sense and of
the alternative procedures that are the subject of draft guideline 1.7.1. Reservations are one of the
means intended to bring about this reconciliation. But they are far from “the only procedure which
makes it possible to vary the content of a treaty in its application to the parties” without
undermining its purpose and object. Many other procedures are used to give treaties the flexibility
necessitated by the diversity of situations of the States or international organizations seeking to be
bound, it being understood that the word “may” in the text of draft guideline 1.7.1 must not be
interpreted as implying any value judgement as to the use of one or the other technique, but must be
understood as being purely descriptive.

(4) The common feature of these procedures, which makes them alternatives to reservations, is
that, like the latter, they purport “to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty” or “of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects” in their
application to certain parties. But there the similarities end and drawing up a list of them proves
difficult, “for the imagination of legal scholars and diplomats in this area has proved to be
unlimited”. In addition, on the one hand, some treaties combine several of these procedures with

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387 [266, 2000] Some authors have endeavoured to reduce all these procedures to one: see, inter alia, Georges Droz, who contrasts “reservations” and “options” (“Les réserves et les facultés dans les Conventions de La Haye de droit international privé”, R.C.D.I.P. 1969, p. 383). On the other hand, Ferenc Majoros believes that “the set of ‘options’ is merely an amorphous group of provisions which afford various options” (“Le régime de réciprocité de la Convention de Vienne et les réserves dans les Conventions de La Haye”, J.D.I., 1974, p. 88 (italics in original).


each other and with reservations and, on the other hand, it is not always easy to differentiate them clearly from one another.\footnote{[270, 2000] Ibid., p. 17.}

(5) There are many ways of grouping them, by techniques used (treaty or unilateral), by the object pursued (extension or restriction of obligations under the treaty) or by the reciprocal or non-reciprocal nature of their effects. They may also be distinguished according to whether the modification of the legal effects of the provisions of a treaty is provided for in the treaty itself or results from exogenous elements.

(6) In the first of these two categories, mention can be made of the following:


- Escape clauses, “which have as their purpose to suspend the application of general obligations in specific cases”,\footnote{[272, 2000] M. Virally, ibid., p. 12.} and among which mention can be made of saving and derogations clauses;\footnote{[273, 2000] Escape clauses permit a Contracting Party temporarily not to meet certain treaty requirements owing to the difficulties it is encountering in fulfilling them as a result of special circumstances, whereas waivers, which produce the same effect, must be authorized by the other Contracting Parties or by an organ responsible for monitoring treaty implementation. A comparison of article XIX, paragraph 1, and article XXV, paragraph 5, of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade shows the difference clearly. The first article reads: “If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Contracting Party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that Contracting Party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like products, the Contracting Party shall be free, in respect of such products, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession”. This is an escape clause (this option has been regulated but not abolished by the 1994 GATT Agreement on Safeguards (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994)). On the other hand, the general provision laid down in article XXV, paragraph 5 (entitled “Joint Action by the Contracting Parties”), is a waiver: “In exceptional circumstance not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the Contracting Parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a Contracting Party by this Agreement; provided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half of the Contracting Parties” (see also article VIII, section 2 (a), of the IMF Agreement).}

- Opting-[or contracting-]in clauses, which have been defined as “those to which the parties accede only through a special acceptance procedure, separate from accession to the treaty as a whole”\footnote{[274, 2000] Michel Virally, op. cit., p. 13.}.\footnote{[274, 2000] Michel Virally, op. cit., p. 13.}
Opting-[or contracting-]out clauses, “under which a State will be bound by rules adopted by majority vote even if it does not express its intent not to be bound within a certain period of time”;396 or

Those which offer the parties a choice among several provisions; or again,

Reservation clauses, which enable the contracting parties to formulate reservations, subject to certain conditions and restrictions, as appropriate.

(7) In the second category,397 which includes all procedures that, although not expressly envisaged therein, enable the parties to modify the effect of the provisions of the treaty, are the following:

- Reservations again, where their formulation is not provided for or regulated by the instrument to which they apply;
- Suspension of the treaty,398 whose causes are enumerated and codified in part V of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986, particularly the application of the principles *rebus sic stantibus*399 and *non adimpleti contractus*;400
- Amendments to the treaty, where they do not automatically bind all the parties thereto;401 or
- Protocols or agreements having as their purpose (or effect) to supplement or modify a multilateral treaty only between certain parties,402 including in the framework of “bilateralization”403

(8) This list by no means claims to be exhaustive: as emphasized above,404 negotiators display seemingly limitless ingenuity which precludes any pretensions to exhaustiveness. Consequently, draft guideline 1.7.1 is restricted to mentioning two procedures which are not mentioned elsewhere and are sometimes characterized as “reservation”, although they do not by any means meet the definition contained in draft guideline 1.1.


397 [276, 2000] Among the latter modification techniques, the first two are unilateral, but derive from the general international law of treaties, while the last two derive from the joint initiative of the parties to the treaty, or some of them, following its adoption.

398 [277, 2000] Termination of the treaty is a different matter; it puts an end to the treaty relations.

399 [278, 2000] Cf. article 62 of the Vienna Conventions.

400 [279, 2000] Cf. article 60 of the Vienna Conventions.

401 [280, 2000] Cf. article 40, paragraph 4, and article 30, paragraph 4, of the Vienna Conventions.


(9) Other “alternatives to reservations”, which take the form of unilateral statements made in accordance with a treaty, are the subject of draft guidelines appearing in section 1.4 of the Guide to Practice. This applies to statements made under:

− an optional clause, sometimes accompanied by conditions or restrictions (draft guideline 1.4.6), or

− a clause providing for a choice between several provisions or groups of provisions (draft guideline 1.4.7).

(10) There are other alternative procedures which so obviously do not belong in the category of reservations that it does not seem useful to mention them specifically in the Guide to Practice. This is true, for example, of notifications of the suspension of a treaty. These too are unilateral statements, as reservations are, and, like reservations, they may purport to exclude the legal effects of certain provisions of the treaty, if separable, in their application to the author of the notification, but only on a temporary basis. Governed by article 65, paragraph 1, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, their purpose is to release the parties “between which the operation of the treaty is suspended from the obligation to perform the treaty in their mutual relations during the period of the suspension” and they are clearly different from reservations, not so much by the temporary nature of the exclusion of the operation of the treaty as by the timing of their occurrence, which is necessarily subsequent to the entry into force of the treaty in respect of the

404 See para. (4) of the commentary.


406 “A party which, under the provisions of the present Convention, invokes either a defect in its consent to be bound by a treaty or a ground for impeaching the validity of a treaty, terminating it, withdrawing from it, or suspending its operation must notify the other parties of its claim. The notification shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken with respect to the treaty and the reasons therefor.”

407 Article 72 of the Vienna Conventions.

408 Certain reservations can be made only for a specific period; thus, Frank Horn offers the example of ratification by the United States of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Extradition, with the reservation that certain provisions thereof should not be applicable to the United States “... until subsequently ratified in accordance with the Constitution of the United States” (Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, Swedish Institute of International Law, Studies in International Law, No. 5, Tobias Michael Carel Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1988, p. 100). And certain reservation clauses even impose such a provisional nature (cf. article 25, paragraph 1, of the 1967 European Convention on the adoption of children and article 14, paragraph 2, of the 1975 European Convention on the legal status of children born out of wedlock, whose wording is identical: “A reservation shall be valid for five years from the entry into force of this Convention for the Contracting Party concerned. It may be renewed for successive periods of five years by means of a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe before the expiration of each period”; or article 20 of The Hague Divorce Convention of 1 June 1970, which authorizes Contracting States which do not provide for divorce to reserve the right not to recognize a divorce, but whose paragraph 2 states: “This reservation shall have effect only so long as the law of the State utilizing it does not provide for divorce”).
author of the statement. Furthermore, the Vienna Conventions make such statements subject to a legal regime that differs clearly from the reservations regime.\footnote{288, 2000} (11) The same applies when the suspension of the effect of the provisions of a treaty is the result of a notification made not, as in the case referred to above, under the rules of the general international law of treaties, but on the basis of specific provisions in the treaty itself.\footnote{289, 2000} The identical approach taken when applying this method and that of reservations is noteworthy: “Both approaches appear to show little concern for the integrity of an international agreement, since they prefer a more universal application thereof. The option of formulating reservations is an element that is likely to promote more widespread acceptance of international treaties. Similarly, the fact that it is possible to release oneself or be released for a given period of time from one’s international obligations is such as to encourage a hesitant State to enter finally into a commitment that offers it a number of advantages. There, however, the similarity between the two procedures ends.”\footnote{290, 2000} In fact, in the case of a reservation, the partners of the reserving State or international organization are informed at the outset of the limits on the commitment of that State or organization, whereas, in the case of a declaration under an escape clause, the aim is to remedy unforeseeable difficulties arising from the application of the treaty.\footnote{291, 2000} Since there is no likelihood of serious confusion between such notifications and reservations, it is not essential to include a draft guideline relating to the former in the Guide to Practice. (12) The situation is different with regard to two other procedures which may also be considered alternatives to reservations, in the sense that they purport (or may purport) to modify the effects of a treaty in respect of specific features of the situation of the parties: restrictive clauses and agreements whereby two or more States or international organizations purport, under a specific provision of a treaty, to exclude or modify the legal effects of certain provisions of the treaty as between themselves. (13) It would seem that everything but their purpose differentiates these procedures from reservations. They are purely conventional techniques which take the form not of unilateral statements, but of one or more agreements between the parties to a treaty or between some of them.

Where restrictive clauses in the treaty, amendments that enter into force only for certain parties to the treaty or “bilateralization” procedures are concerned, however, problems may arise if only because certain legal positions have been adopted which, in a most questionable manner, characterize such procedures as “reservations”. This is why the majority of the members of the Commission considered it useful to refer to them explicitly in draft guideline 1.7.1.

(14) There are countless restrictive clauses purporting to limit the purpose of obligations resulting from the treaty by introducing exceptions and limits and they are to be found in treaties on a wide range of subjects, such as the settlement of disputes,\textsuperscript{413} the safeguarding of human rights,\textsuperscript{414} protection of the environment,\textsuperscript{415} trade\textsuperscript{416} and the law of armed conflicts.\textsuperscript{417} Although such provisions are similar to reservations in their object,\textsuperscript{418} the two procedures operate differently: in the case of restrictive clauses, there is a general exclusion arising out of the treaty itself; in the case of reservations, it is merely a possibility available to the States parties, permitted under the treaty, but becoming effective only if a unilateral statement is made at the time of accession.\textsuperscript{419}

\textsuperscript{[292, 2000]} In addition to article 27 of the above-mentioned 1957 European Convention, see, for example, article 1 of the Franco-British Arbitration Agreement of 14 October 1903, which has served as a model for a great number of subsequent treaties: “Differences which may arise of a legal nature, or relating to the interpretation of Treaties existing between the two Contracting Parties, and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the Convention of 29 July 1899, provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the two Contracting States, and do not concern the interests of third Parties.”

\textsuperscript{[293, 2000]} Cf. the “clawback clauses” referred to above in note 14. For example (again, there are innumerable examples), article 4 of the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only insofar as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”


\textsuperscript{[295, 2000]} Cf. article XII (“Restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments”), article XIV (“Exceptions to the rule of non-discrimination”), article XX (“General exceptions”) or article XXI (“Security exceptions”) of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

\textsuperscript{[296, 2000]} Cf. article 5 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (“Derogations”).

\textsuperscript{[297, 2000]} Prof. Pierre-Henri Imbert gives two examples that highlight this fundamental difference, by comparing article 39 of the revised General Act of Arbitration of 28 April 1949 with article 27 of the European Convention of 29 April 1957 for the peaceful settlement of disputes (Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux, Pedone, Paris, 1979, p. 10); under article 39, paragraph 2, of the General Act, reservations that are exhaustively enumerated and “must be indicated at the time of accession … may be such as to exclude from the procedure described in the present act: (a) Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accession either of the Party making the reservation or of any other Party with whom the said Party may have a dispute; (b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States”. Meanwhile, article 27 of the 1957 Convention reads: “The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to: (a) Disputes relating to facts or situations prior to the entry into force of this Convention as between the Parties to the dispute; (b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States.” Article 39 of the 1949 General Act of Arbitration is a reservation clause; article 27 of the 1957 Convention is a restrictive clause. There are striking similarities: in both cases, the aim is to exclude identical types of disputes from methods of settlement provided for by the treaty in question.

\textsuperscript{[298, 2000]} In the preceding example, therefore, it is not entirely accurate to assert, as P.H. Imbert does, that “in practice, article 27 of the European Convention produces the same result as a reservation in respect of the General Act” (ibid., p. 10). This is true
At first glance, there would appear to be no likelihood of confusion between such restrictive clauses and reservations. However, not only is language usage deceptive and are “such terms as ‘public order reservations’, ‘military imperatives reservations’, or ‘sole competence reservations’ frequently encountered”, but authors, including the most distinguished among them, have caused an unwarranted degree of confusion. For example, in an often quoted passage from the dissenting opinion that he appended to the Judgment of the International Court of Justice rendered on 1 July 1952 in the Ambatielos (Preliminary objection) case, Judge Zoričić stated the following:

“A reservation is a provision agreed upon between the parties to a treaty with a view to restricting the application of one or more of its clauses or to clarifying their meaning.”

Draft guideline 1.7.1 refers to restrictive clauses both as a warning against this frequent confusion and as an indication that they are a possible alternative to reservations within the meaning of the Guide to Practice.

The reference to agreements, under a specific provision of a treaty, by which two or more States or international organizations purport to exclude or modify the legal effects of certain provisions of the treaty as between themselves is made for the same reasons.

It would not appear to be necessary to dwell on another treaty procedure that would make for flexibility in the application of a treaty: amendments (and additional protocols) that enter into effect only as between certain parties to a treaty, but it does seem necessary to consider certain

only of the reserving State’s relations with other parties to the General Act and not of such other parties’ relations among themselves, to which the treaty applies in its entirety.

Pierre-Henri Imbert, ibid., p. 10. For an example of a “public order reservation”, see the first paragraph of article 6 of the Havana Convention of 20 February 1928 regarding the Status of Aliens in the respective Territories of the Contracting Parties: “For reasons of public order or safety, States may expel foreigners domiciled, resident, or merely in transit through their territory.” For an example of a “sole competence reservation”, see article 3, paragraph 11, of the United Nations Convention of 20 December 1988 against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: “Nothing contained in this article [on ‘offences and sanctions’] shall affect the principle that the description of the offences to which it refers and of legal defences thereto is reserved to the domestic law of a party and that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in conformity with that law.”

Cf. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points” in The British Year Book of International Law 1957, pp. 272-273; however, although he quotes this definition with apparent approval, this distinguished author departs from it considerably in his commentary.


This procedure, which is provided for in article 40, paragraphs 4 and 5 (and article 30, paragraph 4), and article 41 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, is applied as a matter of routine. Even if, in terms of its general approach and as regards some aspects of its legal regime (respect for the fundamental characteristics of the treaty, though it does not contain a reference to its “object and purpose”), it is similar to procedures that characterize reservations, it is nonetheless very different in many respects: The flexibility it achieves is not the product of a unilateral statement by a State, but of agreement between two or more parties to the initial treaty; Such agreement may be reached at any stage, generally following the treaty’s entry into effect for its parties, which is not so in the case of reservations that must be formulated at the time of the expression of consent to be bound, at the latest; and It is not a question here of excluding or modifying the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application, but in fact of modifying the provisions in question themselves; Moreover, whereas reservations can only limit their author’s treaty obligations
specific agreements which are concluded between two or more States parties to basic treaties, which purport to produce the same effects as reservations and in connection with which reference has been made to the “bilateralization” of “reservations”.

(19) The bilateralization regime has been described as permitting “contracting States, while being parties to a multilateral convention, to choose the partners with which they will proceed to implement the regime provided for”. It can be traced back to article XXXV, paragraph 1, of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The general approach involved in this procedure is not comparable with the approach on which the reservations method is based; it allows a State to exclude, by means of its silence or by means of a specific declaration, the application of a treaty as a whole in its relations with one or more other States and not to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain aspects. It is more comparable with statements of non-recognition, where such statements purport to exclude the application of a treaty between a declaring State and the non-recognized entity.

(20) However, the same is not true when bilateralization involves an agreement to derogate from a treaty concluded among certain parties in application of treaty provisions expressly authorizing this, as can be seen in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted on 1 February 1971 within the framework of The Hague Conference on Private International Law: or make provision for equivalent ways of implementing a treaty, amendments and protocols can have the effect of both extending and limiting the obligations of States and international organizations parties to a treaty. Since there is no fear of confusion in the case of reservations, no clarification is called for and it would appear unnecessary to devote a specific guideline in the Guide to Practice to drawing a distinction which is already quite clear.


425 [304, 2000] “This Agreement, or alternatively Article II of this Agreement, shall not apply as between any contracting party and any other contracting party if (a) the two contracting parties have not entered into tariff negotiations with each other, and (b) either of the contracting parties, at the time either becomes a contracting party, does not consent to such application”. See Pierre-Henri Imbert, Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux, Paris, Pedone, 1979, p. 199. The practice of “lateral agreements” (cf. Dominique Carreau and Patrick Juillard, Droit international économique, Paris, Libraire générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1998, pp. 54-56 and 127) has accentuated this bilateralization. See also article XIII of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or certain conventions adopted at The Hague Conference on Private International Law: for example, article 13, paragraph 4, of the Companies Convention of 1 June 1956, article 12 of the Legalization Convention of 5 October 1961, article 31 of the Maintenance-enforcement Convention of 2 October 1973, article 42 of the Administration of Estates Convention of 2 October 1973, article 44, paragraph 3, of The Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Cooperation in respect of Intercountry Adoption, article 58, paragraph 3, of The Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 concerning competence, applicable law, recognition, execution and cooperation in matters relating to parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children, article 54, paragraph 3, of the Convention of 2 October 1999 on the international protection of adults or article 37 of the European Convention of 16 May 1972 on State Immunity, adopted in the context of the Council of Europe: “3. ... if a State having already acceded to the Convention notifies the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of its objection to the accession of another non-member State, before the entry into force of this accession, the Convention shall not apply to the relations between these two States”.

Conference on Private International Law. It was, in fact, during the elaboration of this Convention that the doctrine of “bilateralization of reservations” was elaborated.

(21) However, in response to a Belgian proposal, the 1971 Enforcement Convention goes further than these traditional bilateralization methods. Not only does article 21 of this instrument make the Convention’s entry into effect with respect to relations between two States subject to the conclusion of a supplementary agreement, but it also permits the two States to modify their commitment inter se within the precise limits set in article 23:

“In the Supplementary Agreements referred to in article 21 the Contracting States may agree:
...

This is followed by a list of 23 possible ways of modifying the Convention, whose purposes, as summarized in the explanatory report of C.N. Fragistas, are:

1. To clarify a number of technical expressions used by the Convention whose meaning may vary from one country to another (art. 23 of the Convention, items No. 1, 2, 6 and 12);
2. To include within the scope of the Convention matters that do not fall within its scope (art. 23 of the Convention, items Nos. 3, 4 and 22);
3. To apply the Convention in cases where its normal requirements have not been met (art. 23 of the Convention, items Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13);
4. To exclude the application of the Convention in respect of matters normally covered by it (art. 23 of the Convention, item No. 5);
5. To declare a number of provisions inapplicable (art. 23 of the Convention, item No. 20);
6. To make a number of optional provisions of the Convention mandatory (art. 23 of the Convention, items Nos. 8 bis and 20);

427 [306, 2000] “Decisions rendered in a Contracting State shall not be recognized or enforced in another Contracting State in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Articles unless the two States, being Parties to this Convention, have concluded a Supplementary Agreement to this effect.”
428 [307, 2000] The initial Belgian proposal did not envisage this modification possibility, which was established subsequently as the discussions progressed (Cf. P. Jenard, “Une technique originale: La bilatéralisation de conventions multilatérales”, Belgian Review of International Law 1966, pp. 392-393).
7. To regulate issues not settled by the Convention or adapt a number of formalities required by it to domestic legislation (art. 23 of the Convention, items Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19)**. Undoubtedly, many of these alternatives “simply permit States to define words or to make provision for procedures”**, however, a number of them restrict the effect of the Convention and have effects very comparable to those of reservations, which they nevertheless are not.**

(22) The 1971 Enforcement Convention is not the only treaty that makes use of this procedure of pairing a basic convention and a supplementary agreement, thus permitting the introduction to the convention of alternative contents, even though the convention is a typical example and probably a more refined product. Reference may also be made, *inter alia*, to:**

Article 20 of The Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the service of judicial documents, which permits contracting States to “agree to dispense with” a number of provisions;**

Article 34 of the Convention of 14 June 1974 on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods;**

Articles 26, 56 and 58 of the European Convention of 14 December 1972 on social security, which with similar wording states:

“The application [of certain provisions] as between two or more Contracting Parties shall be subject to the conclusion between those Parties of bilateral or multilateral agreements which may also contain appropriate special arrangements”;**

or, for more recent examples:

Article 39, paragraph 2, of The Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption:

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433 [312, 2000] But the application of this provision does not depend on the free choice of partner; see P.H. Imbert, ibid.; also see Georges A.L. Droz, “Les réserves et les facultés dans les Conventions de La Haye de droit international privé”, *Revue critique de droit international privé* 1969, pp. 390-391. In fact, this procedure bears a resemblance to amendments between certain parties to the basic convention alone.
434 [313, 2000] The same remark applies to this provision.
“Any Contracting State may enter into agreements with one or more other Contracting States, with a view to improving the application of the Convention in their mutual relations. These agreements may derogate only from the provisions of Articles 14 to 16 and 18 to 21. The States which have concluded such an agreement shall transmit a copy to the depositary of the Convention”,

or article 5 (Voluntary extension) of the Helsinki Convention of 17 March 1992 on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents:

“Parties concerned should, at the initiative of any of them, enter into discussions on whether to treat an activity not covered by Annex I as a hazardous activity ... Where the parties concerned so agree, this Convention, or any part thereof, shall apply to the activity in question as if it were a hazardous activity”.

(23) These options, which permit parties concluding a supplementary agreement to exclude the application of certain provisions of the basic treaty or not to apply certain provisions thereof, either as a general rule or in particular circumstances, do indeed purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects, in their application to the two parties bound by the agreement. However, and this is a fundamental difference from reservations strictly speaking, such exclusions or modifications are not the product of a unilateral statement, which constitutes an essential element of the definition of reservations, but, rather, an agreement between two of the parties to the basic treaty that does not affect the other contracting parties to the treaty. “The system leads to the elaboration of two instruments: a multilateral convention, on the one hand, and a supplementary agreement, on the other, which, although based on the multilateral convention, nevertheless has an independent existence”. The supplementary agreement is, so to speak, an instrument that is not a prerequisite for the entry into force of the treaty, but for ensuring that the treaty has effects on relations between the two parties concluding the agreement, since its effects will otherwise be diminished (and it is in

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435 [314, 2000] Once again, one cannot truly speak of bilateralization in a strict sense since this provision does not call for the choice of a partner. Also see article 52 of the draft Hague convention of 19 October 1996 concerning competence, applicable law, recognition, execution and cooperation in matters relating to parental responsibility and measures relating to protection of children, or article 49 of The Hague Convention of 2 October 1999 on international protection of adults.

436 [315, 2000] Cf. draft guideline 1.1: “‘Reservation’ means a unilateral statement ...”.

this respect that its similarity to the reservations procedure is particularly obvious) or increased. However, its treaty nature precludes any equation with reservations.

(24) It is such agreements, which have the same object as reservations and which are described, frequently, but misleadingly, as “bilateralized reservations”, that are the subject of the second subparagraph of draft guideline 1.7.1.

1.7.2 [1.7.5] Alternatives to interpretative declarations

In order to specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or certain of its provisions, States or international organizations may also have recourse to procedures other than interpretative declarations, such as:

- The insertion in the treaty of provisions purporting to interpret the same treaty
- The conclusion of a supplementary agreement to the same end

Commentary

(1) Just as reservations are not the only means at the disposal of contracting parties for modifying the application of the provisions of a treaty, interpretative declarations are not the only procedure by which States and international organizations can specify or clarify their meaning or scope. Leaving aside the third-party interpretation mechanisms provided for in the treaty, the variety of such alternative procedures in the area of interpretation is nonetheless not as great. As an indication two procedures of this type can be mentioned.

(2) In the first place, it is very often the case that the treaty itself specifies the interpretation to be given to its own provisions. Such is the primary purpose of the clauses containing the definition of the terms used in the treaty. Moreover, it is very common for a treaty to provide instructions on

439 [318, 2000] Cf., among countless examples, article 2 of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 or article XXX of the Statutes of the International Monetary Fund.
how to interpret the obligations imposed on the parties either in the body of the treaty itself or in a separate instrument.

(3) Second, the parties, or some of them, may conclude an agreement for the purposes of interpreting a treaty previously concluded between them. This possibility is expressly envisaged in article 31, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986, which requires to take into account, together with the context:

“(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”.

(4) Moreover, it may happen that the interpretation is “bilateralized”. Such is the case where a multilateral convention relegates to bilateral agreements the task of clarifying the meaning or scope of certain provisions. Thus, article 23 of the Hague Conference Convention of 1971 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in civil and commercial matters provides that contracting States shall have the option of concluding supplementary agreements in order, inter alia:

1. To clarify the meaning of the expression ‘civil and commercial matters’, to determine the courts whose decisions shall be recognized and enforced under this Convention, to define the expression ‘social security’ and to define the expression ‘habitual residence’;

2. To clarify the meaning of the term ‘law’ in States with more than one legal system;

(5) It therefore seems desirable to include in the Guide to Practice a provision on alternatives to interpretative declarations, if only for the sake of symmetry with draft guideline 1.7.1 on alternatives to reservations. On the other hand, it does not appear necessary to devote a separate

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440 [319, 2000] Cf., here again, among countless examples, article 13, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, ...”.


442 [321, 2000] Where all the parties to the interpretative agreement are also parties to the original treaty, the interpretation is authentic (see the final commentary of the International Law Commission on article 27, para. 3 (a), of the draft articles on the law of treaties, which became article 30, para. 3 (a), of the Vienna Convention of 1969: Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 241, para. 14); cf., with regard to bilateral treaties, draft guideline 1.5.3.

443 [322, 2000] One member of the Commission nevertheless expressed doubt about whether such an agreement should be equated with those dealt with in article 31.

444 [323, 2000] On the “bilateralization” of reservations, see draft guideline 1.7.4 and paragraphs (18) to (23) of the commentary.

445 [324, 2000] On this provision, see paragraph (20) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.7.1.
draft guideline to the enumeration of alternatives to conditional interpretative declarations: the alternative procedures listed above are treaty-based and require the agreement of the contracting parties. It matters little, therefore, whether or not the agreed interpretation constitutes the sine qua non of their consent to be bound.

2. Procedure

2.1 Form and notification of reservations

2.1.1 Written form

A reservation must be formulated in writing.

Commentary

(1) Under article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, a reservation “must be formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”. Draft guideline 2.1.1 covers the first of these requirements; the second is dealt with in draft guideline 2.1.5.

(2) Although it is not included in the actual definition of a reservation and the word “statement”, which is included, refers to both oral and written statements, the need for a reservation to be in writing was never called into question during the travaux préparatoires for the Vienna Conventions. The Commission’s final commentary on what was then the first paragraph of draft article 18 and was to become, without any change in this regard, article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1969 Vienna Convention, presents it as self-evident that a reservation must be in writing.

(3) That was the opinion expressed in 1950 by J.L. Brierly, who, in his first report, suggested the following wording for article 10, paragraph 2:

446 [325, 2000] See draft guideline 1.2.1.


“Unless the contrary is indicated in a treaty, the text of a proposed reservation thereto must be
authenticated together with the text or texts of that treaty or otherwise formally communicated
in the same manner as an instrument or copy of an instrument of acceptance of that treaty.”\textsuperscript{449}

(4) This suggestion elicited no objections (except to the word “authenticated”) during the
discussions in 1950,\textsuperscript{450} but the question of the form that reservations should take was not
considered again until the first report by Fitzmaurice in 1956; under draft article 37, paragraph 2,
which he proposed and which is the direct precursor of current article 23, paragraph 2,
“Reservations must be formally framed and proposed in writing, or recorded in some form in
the minutes of a meeting or conference ….”\textsuperscript{451}

(5) In 1962, following the first report by Sir Humphrey Waldock,\textsuperscript{452} the Commission elaborated
on this theme:

“Reservations, which must be in writing, may be formulated:

(v) Upon the occasion of the adoption of the text of the treaty, either on the face of the treaty
itself or in the final act of the conference at which the treaty was adopted, or in some other
instrument drawn up in connection with the adoption of the treaty;

(vi) Upon signing the treaty at a subsequent date; or

(vii) Upon the occasion of the exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, accession,
acceptance or approval, either in the instrument itself or in a procès-verbal or other
instrument accompanying it.”\textsuperscript{453}

This provision was hardly discussed by the members of the Commission.\textsuperscript{454}

(6) In conformity with the position of two Governments,\textsuperscript{455} which had suggested “some
simplification of the procedural provisions”,\textsuperscript{456} Sir Humphrey Waldock made a far more restrained
drafting proposal on second reading, namely:

\textsuperscript{449} [97, 2002] First report on the law of treaties, Yearbook ... 1950, vol. II, p. 239.
\textsuperscript{452} [100, 2002] Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{453} [101, 2002] Draft article 18, para. 2 (a), ibid., p. 176; for the commentary on this provision, see ibid., p. 180; see also the
commentary to draft guideline 2.2.1, Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-third session, A/56/10, paras. (4) and (5),
p. 466.
\textsuperscript{454} [102, 2002] See the summary records of the 651st to 656th meetings (25 May-4 June 1962), Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I,
pp. 155-195. See the fifth report, ibid., para. 237; however, see paragraph (8) below.
\textsuperscript{455} [103, 2002] Denmark and Sweden (cf. the fourth report on the law of treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Yearbook ... 1965,
vol. II, pp. 46 and 47).
\textsuperscript{456} [104, 2002] Ibid., p. 53, para. 13.
“A reservation must be in writing. If put forward subsequently to the adoption of the text of the treaty, it must be notified to the depositary or, where there is no depositary, to the other interested States.”

This draft is the direct source of article 23, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions.

(7) While the wording was changed, neither the Commission nor the Vienna Conference of 1968-1969 ever called into question the need for reservations to be formulated in writing. And neither Paul Reuter, Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between two or more international organizations, nor the participants in the Vienna Conference of 1986 added clarifications or suggested any changes in this regard. The travaux préparatoires thus show remarkable unanimity in this respect.

(8) This is easily explained. It has been written that: “Reservations are formal statements. Although their formulation in writing is not embraced by the term of the definition, it would according to article 23 (1) of the Vienna Convention seem to be an absolute requirement. It is less common nowadays that the various acts of consenting to a treaty occur simultaneously, therefore it is not possible for an orally presented reservation to come to the knowledge of all contracting parties. In the era of differentiated treaty-making procedures it becomes essential for reservations to be put down in writing in order to be registered and notified by the depository, so that all interested States would become aware of them. A reservation not notified cannot be acted upon. Other States would not be able to expressly accept or object to such reservations.”

(9) Nonetheless, during the 1962 discussions, Sir Humphrey Waldock, replying to a question raised by Mr. Tabibi, did not totally exclude the idea of “oral reservations”. He thought, however, that the question “belonged rather to the question of reservations at the time of the adoption of the

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treaty, which was dealt with in paragraph 2 (a) (i)," and that, in any case, the requirement of a formal confirmation “should go a long way towards disposing of the difficulty”.461

(10) Ultimately, it hardly matters how reservations are formulated at the outset, if they must be formally confirmed at the moment of the definitive expression of consent to be bound. That is undoubtedly how article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions should be interpreted in the light of the travaux préparatoires: a reservation need be in writing only when formulated definitively, namely:

− When signing a treaty where the treaty makes express provision for this or if signing is tantamount to definitive expression of consent to be bound (agreement in simplified form);463 and
− In all other cases, where the State or international organization expresses its definitive consent to be bound.464

(11) The Commission is nevertheless of the opinion that the question whether a reservation may initially be formulated orally can be left open. As Sir Humphrey Waldock so rightly pointed out,465 the answer has no practical impact: a contracting party can in any event formulate a reservation up to the date of its expression of consent to be bound; thus, even if its initial oral statement could not be regarded as a true reservation, the “confirmation” made in due course would serve as a formulation.

2.1.2 Form of formal confirmation

Formal confirmation of a reservation must be made in writing.

Commentary

(1) Article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on “Procedure regarding reservations” does not expressly require reservations to be confirmed in writing. However, this

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provision, which is reproduced in draft guideline 2.2.1,\(^{466}\) does require that a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State [or international organization] when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. The word “formally” must without any doubt be understood as meaning that this formality must be completed in writing.

(2) This interpretation is also in conformity with the travaux préparatoires for article 23: specifically because the confirmation must be made in writing, the Commission and its Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties took the view that the question whether a reservation may initially be formulated orally could be left open.\(^{467}\)

(3) The requirement of a written confirmation of a reservation is also a matter of common sense: a reservation could not be notified with any certainty to the other States and international organizations concerned, in accordance with the provisions of article 23, paragraph 1, if there were no formal text. This is, moreover, in keeping with a consistent practice to which there is, to the Commission’s knowledge, no exception.

(4) It should, however, be pointed out that draft guideline 2.1.2 does not take a position on the question whether the formal confirmation of a reservation is always necessary. This is decided by draft guidelines 2.2.1 to 2.2.3, which show that there are cases that do not lend themselves to such a confirmation.\(^{468}\)

### 2.1.3 Formulation of a reservation at the international level

1. Subject to the customary practices in international organizations which are depositaries of treaties, a person is considered as representing a State or an international organization for the purpose of formulating a reservation if:

(a) That person produces appropriate full powers for the purposes of adopting or authenticating the text of the treaty with regard to which the reservation is formulated or expressing the consent of the State or organization to be bound by the treaty; or

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\(^{467}\) [115, 2002] See the commentary to draft guideline 2.1.1, paras. (8) and (10).

(b) It appears from practice or other circumstances that it was the intention of the States and international organizations concerned to consider that person as competent for such purposes without having to produce full powers.

2. By virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing a State for the purpose of formulating a reservation at the international level:

(a) Heads of State, heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs;

(b) Representatives accredited by States to an international conference for the purpose of formulating a reservation to a treaty adopted at that conference;

(c) Representatives accredited by States to an international organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of formulating a reservation to a treaty adopted by that organization or body;

(d) Heads of permanent missions to an international organization, for the purpose of formulating a reservation to a treaty between the accrediting States and that organization.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft guideline 2.1.3 defines the persons and organs which are authorized, by virtue of their functions, to formulate a reservation on behalf of a State or an international organization. Its text is based closely on that of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations.469

(2) The two Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 contain no explanation in this regard. In his first report on the law of treaties in 1962, however, Sir Humphrey Waldock proposed a draft article which read:

“Reservations shall be formulated in writing either:

(i) On the face of the treaty itself and normally in the form of an adjunct to the signature of the representative of the reserving State;

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469 [117 2002] Article 7 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is drafted in much the same way, but, unlike the present Guide to Practice, it relates only to treaties between States.
(ii) In a Final Act of a conference, protocol, *procès-verbal* or other instrument related to the treaty and executed by a duly authorized representative of the reserving State;

(iii) In the instrument by which the reserving State ratifies, accedes to or accepts the treaty, or in a *procès-verbal* or other instrument accompanying the instrument of ratification, accession or acceptance and drawn up by the competent authority of the reserving State”.470

(3) As Sweden noted, with regard to the corresponding article adopted by the Commission on first reading,471 such “procedural rules … would fit better into a code of recommended practices”,472 which is precisely the function of the Guide to Practice. The Commission has nevertheless concluded that it is not useful to include all of these clarifications in the Guide: the long list of instruments in which reservations may appear does not add much, particularly since the list is not restrictive, as is indicated by the reference in two places to an instrument other than those expressly mentioned.

(4) Clarification is needed only with regard to the author of the instrument in question. The 1962 text is nevertheless not entirely satisfactory in this regard. The reservation must probably be formulated by “a representative of the reserving State” or by “the competent authority of the reserving State”.473 The question is, however, whether there are rules of general international law to determine in a restrictive manner which authority or authorities are competent to formulate a reservation at the international level or whether this determination is left to the domestic law of each State.

(5) In the opinion of the Commission, the answer to this question may be deduced both from the general framework of the Vienna Conventions and from the practice of States and international organizations in this area.

(6) By definition, a reservation has the purpose of modifying the legal effect of the provisions of a treaty in the relations between the parties; although it appears in an instrument other than the treaty, the reservation is therefore part of the corpus of the treaty and has a direct influence on the respective obligations of the parties. It leaves intact the *instrumentum* (or *instrumenta*) which

470 [118, 2002] Draft article 17, para. 3 (a), *Yearbook ... 1962*, vol. II, p. 60. In his commentary Waldock restricts himself to saying that this provision “does not appear to require comment” (ibid., p. 66).

471 [119, 2002] Draft article 18, para. 2 (a), ibid., p. 176.


473 [121, 2002] See paragraph (2) above.
constitute the treaty, but it directly affects the *negotium*. In this situation, it seems logical and inevitable that reservations should be formulated under the same conditions as the consent of the State or international organization to be bound. And this is not an area in which international law is based entirely on domestic laws.

(7) Article 7 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions contains precise and detailed provisions on this point which undoubtedly reflect positive law on the subject. In the words of the 1986 Convention:

“1. A person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty if:

(a) That person produces appropriate full powers; or

(b) It appears from practice or from other circumstances that it was the intention of the States and international organizations concerned to consider that person as representing the State for such purposes without having to produce full powers.

“2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their State:

(a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty (...);

(b) Representatives accredited by States to an international conference, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty (...);

(c) Representatives accredited by States to an international organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty in that organization or organ;

(d) Heads of permanent missions to an international organization, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting States and that organization.

“3. A person is considered as representing an international organization for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, or expressing the consent of that organization to be bound by a treaty if:

(a) That person produces appropriate full powers; or
(b) It appears from the circumstances that it was the intention of the States and international organizations concerned to consider that person as representing the organization for such purposes, in accordance with the rules of the organization, without having to produce full powers.”

(8) Mutatis mutandis, these rules, for the reasons indicated above, may certainly be transposed to the competence to formulate reservations, on the understanding, of course, that the formulation of reservations by a person who cannot “be considered (...) as authorized to represent a State or an international organization for that purpose is without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by that State or that organization”.474

(9) Moreover, these restrictions on the competence to formulate reservations at the international level have been broadly confirmed in practice.

(10) In an aide-memoire of 1 July 1976, the United Nations Legal Counsel said:

“A reservation must be formulated in writing (article 23, paragraph 1, of the [1969 Vienna] Convention), and both reservations and withdrawals of reservations must emanate from one of the three authorities (Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs) competent to bind the State internationally.”475

(11) Similarly, the *Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties* prepared by the Treaty Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs confines itself to noting that “the reservation must be included in the instrument or annexed to it and must emanate from one of the three qualified authorities” and to referring to general developments concerning the “deposit of binding instruments”476 Likewise, according to this document, “Reservations made at the time of signature must be authorized by the full powers granted to the signatory by one of the three qualified authorities or the signatory must be one of these authorities”.477

(12) These rules seem to be strictly applied; all the instruments of ratification (or equivalents) of treaties containing reservations for which the Secretary-General is depositary are signed by one of the “three authorities” or, if they are signed by the permanent representative, the latter has attached

476 [124, 2002] ST/LEG/8, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.V.15, p. 49, para. 161; this passage refers to paras. 121 and 122, ibid., p. 36.
477 [125, 2002] Ibid., p. 62, para. 208; refers to chapter VI of the *Summary* (“Full powers and signatures”).
full powers emanating from one of these authorities. Moreover, where this is not the case, the permanent representative is requested, informally but firmly, to make this correction.\(^{478}\)

(13) The Commission nevertheless questioned whether this practice, which transposes to reservations the rules contained in article 7 of the Vienna Conventions, referred to above,\(^{479}\) is not excessively rigid. It may be considered, for example, whether it would be legitimate to accept that the accredited representative of a State to an international organization which is the depositary of the treaty to which the State that he represents wishes to make a reservation should be authorized to make that reservation. The issue is particularly relevant because this practice is accepted in international organizations other than the United Nations.

(14) Thus, it seems, for example, that the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe accept reservations recorded in letters from permanent representatives.\(^{480}\)

(15) We might also consider that the rules applying to States should be transposed more fully to international organizations than they are in article 7, paragraph 2, of the 1986 Vienna Convention and, in particular, that the head of the secretariat of an international organization or its accredited representatives to a State or another organization should be regarded as having competence ipso facto to bind the organization.

(16) It may legitimately be considered that the recognition of such limited extensions to competence for the purpose of formulating reservations would constitute a limited but welcome progressive development. The Commission, supported by a large majority of States, has nevertheless consistently been careful not to change the relevant provisions of the 1969, 1978 and

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\(^{478}\) [126, 2002] This is confirmed, by analogy, by the procedural incident between India and Pakistan that came before the International Court of Justice in the recent Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 case. Oral pleadings revealed that in an initial communication dated 3 October 1973, the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations gave notification of that country’s intent to succeed British India as a party to the General Act of Arbitration of 1928. In a note dated 31 January 1974, the Secretary-General requested that such notification should be made “in the form prescribed”, in other words, that it should be transmitted by one of the three authorities mentioned above; this notification took the form of a new communication (formulated in different terms than that of the preceding year), dated 30 May 1974 and signed this time by the Pakistani Prime Minister (see the pleadings by Sir Elihu Lauterpacht on behalf of Pakistan, 5 April 2000, CR/2000/3, and by A. Pellet on behalf of India, 6 April 2000, CR/2000/4). While this episode concerned a notification of succession and not the formulation of reservations, it testifies to the great vigilance with which the Secretary-General applies the rules set forth above (para. (11)) with regard to the general expression by States of their consent to be bound by a treaty.

\(^{479}\) [127, 2002] Paragraph (7).

1986 Vienna Conventions. However, even if the provisions of article 7 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions do not expressly deal with competence to formulate reservations, they are nonetheless rightfully regarded as transposable to this case.

(17) By way of a compromise between these two requirements, the Commission adopted a sufficiently flexible draft guideline which, while referring to the rules in article 7, maintains the less rigid practice followed by international organizations other than the United Nations as depositaries. The need for flexibility is reflected in the inclusion, at the beginning of draft guideline 2.1.3, of the expression “Subject to the customary practices in international organizations which are depositaries of treaties.” This expression should, incidentally, be understood as applying both to the case where the international organization itself is the depositary and to the more usual case where this function is exercised by the organization’s most senior official, the Secretary-General or the Director-General.

(18) It should also be noted that the expression “for the purposes of adopting or authenticating the text of the treaty”, as contained in draft guideline 2.1.3, paragraph 1 (a), covers signature, since the two (alternative or joint) functions of signature are precisely the authentication of the text of the treaty (see art. 10 of the Vienna Conventions) and the expression of consent to be bound by the treaty (art. 12).

2.1.4 [2.1.3 bis, 2.1.4] Absence of consequences at the international level of the violation of internal rules regarding the formulation of reservations

The determination of the competent authority and the procedure to be followed at the internal level for formulating a reservation is a matter for the internal law of each State or relevant rules of each international organization.

A State or an international organization may not invoke the fact that a reservation has been formulated in violation of a provision of the internal law of that State or the rules of that

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482 [130, 2002] See paragraph (6) above.
483 [131, 2002] See paragraph (14) above. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is also a special case in this regard, but in a different sense and for different reasons, since reservations to texts equivalent to treaties adopted by that body “can be formulated only by delegations, namely, during conferences” (reply by ITU to the Commission’s questionnaire on reservations - emphasis in text).
organization regarding competence and the procedure for formulating reservations as invalidating the reservation.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 2.1.3 relates to the formulation of reservations at the international level, while draft guideline 2.1.4 deals with their formulation in the internal legal system of States and international organizations.

(2) It is self-evident that the international phase of formulating reservations is only the tip of the iceberg; as is true of the entire procedure whereby a State or an international organization expresses its consent to be bound, it is the outcome of an internal process that may be quite complex. Like the ratification procedure (or the acceptance, approval or accession procedure), from which it is indissociable, the formulation of reservations is a kind of “internal parenthesis” within an overwhelmingly international process. 484

(3) As Paul Reuter has noted, “national constitutional practices with regard to reservations and objections change from one country to the next”. 485 It may be noted, for example, that, of the 23 States which replied to the Commission’s questionnaire on reservations to treaties and whose answers to questions 1.7, 1.7.1, 1.7.2, 1.8, 1.8.1 and 1.8.2 486 are utilizable, competence to formulate a reservation belongs to: the executive branch alone in six cases, 487 the Parliament alone in five cases, 488 and it is shared between them in 12 cases.

(4) In this last hypothesis, there are various modalities for collaboration between the executive branch and the Parliament. In some cases, the Parliament is merely kept informed of intended

486 [134, 2002] Question 1.7: “At the internal level, which authority or authorities decide(s) that the State will formulate a reservation: The Head of State? The Government or a government body? The Parliament?”; question 1.7.1: “If it is not always the same authority which has competence to decide that a reservation will be formulated, on what criteria is this based?”; question 1.7.2: “If the decision is taken by the Executive, is the Parliament: Informed of the decision? A priori or a posteriori? Invited to discuss the text of the intended reservation(s)?”; question 1.8: “Is it possible for a national judicial body to oppose or insist on the formulation of certain reservations?”; question 1.8.1: “If so, which authority and how is it seized of the matter?”; question 1.8.2: “What reason(s) can it invoke in taking such a decision?”.
487 [135, 2002] Bolivia (the Parliament can suggest reservations), Colombia (for certain treaties), Croatia (the Parliament can oppose a proposed reservation, which would imply that it is consulted), Denmark, the Holy See and Malaysia. See also the States mentioned in footnotes 137 to 140 below.
488 [136, 2002] Colombia (for certain treaties), Estonia, Slovenia, San Marino, Switzerland (but the proposal is generally made by the Federal Council), unless the Federal Council has its own competence.
reservations - although not always systematically. In others, it must approve all reservations before their formulation or, where only certain treaties are submitted to the Parliament, only those which relate to those treaties. Moreover, a judicial body may be called upon to intervene in the internal procedure for formulating reservations.

(5) It is interesting to note that the procedure for formulating reservations does not necessarily follow the one generally required for the expression of the State’s consent to be bound. Thus, in France, it is only recently that the custom was established of transmitting to the Parliament the text of reservations which the President of the Republic or the Government intends to attach to the ratification of treaties or the approval of agreements, even where such instruments must be submitted to the Parliament under article 53 of the 1958 Constitution.

(6) The diversity which characterizes the competence to formulate reservations and the procedure to be followed for that purpose among States seems to be mirrored among international organizations. Only two of them answered questions 3.7, 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 of the questionnaire on reservations: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) states that such competence belongs to the Conference, while the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), while emphasizing the lack of real practice, believes that if a reservation were formulated on its behalf, it would be formulated by the Secretary-General as an administrative matter and, as the case may be, by the Assembly or the Council in their respective areas of competence, with the stipulation that it would be “appropriate” for the Assembly to be informed of the reservations formulated by the Council or by the Secretary-General.

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489 [137, 2002] Kuwait since 1994 (consultation of an ad hoc commission); New Zealand “until recently” (system provisionally established).
490 [138, 2002] France (if the rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Assemblies so request and as a mere “courtesy”), Israel, Japan (if the treaty does not contain a reservation clause), Sweden (the “outlines” of reservations are transmitted to Parliament, never their exact text).
491 [139, 2002] Argentina and Mexico.
492 [140, 2002] Finland, Republic of Korea, Slovakia and Spain.
493 [141, 2002] Colombia, Finland and Malaysia.
495 [143, 2002] This is explained by the fact that international organizations are parties to treaties much more rarely than States and that, where they are parties, they generally do not formulate reservations. The sole exception concerns the European Community which, regrettably, have not replied to the questionnaire to date.
496 [144, 2002] Question 3.7: “At the internal level, which organ(s) decide(s) that the organization will formulate a reservation: The chief executive officer? The general assembly? Another organ?”; question 3.7.1: “If it is not always the same organ that has competence to decide that a reservation will be formulated, on what criteria is this competence based?”; question 3.7.2: “If the decision is taken by the chief executive officer, is the general assembly: Informed of the decision? A priori or a posteriori? Invited to discuss the text of the intended reservation(s)?”.
497 [145, 2002] Cf. articles 49 and 50 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, which established ICAO.
(7) In the view of the Commission, the only conclusion that can be drawn from these observations is that international law does not impose any specific rule with regard to the internal procedure for formulating reservations. This, to be frank, seems so obvious that some members of the Commission questioned whether it was worthwhile to stipulate it expressly in a draft guideline. Accordingly to the viewpoint that prevailed, however, it should be expressly stated in the light of the pragmatic character of the Guide to Practice. This is the object of the first paragraph of draft guideline 2.1.4.

(8) However, the freedom of States and international organizations to determine the authority competent to decide that a reservation will be formulated and the procedure to be followed in formulating it raises problems similar to those arising from the same freedom the parties to a treaty have with respect to the internal procedure for ratification: what happens if the internal rules are not followed?

(9) In the 1986 Vienna Convention, article 46 on the “provisions of internal law of a State and rules of an international organization regarding competence to conclude treaties” provides that:

   “1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.

   2. An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance.

   3. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State or any international organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the normal practice of States and, where appropriate, of international organizations and in good faith.”

(10) In the absence of practice, it is difficult to take a categorical position on the transposition of these rules to the formulation of reservations. Some elements argue in its favour: as discussed above, the formulation of reservations cannot be dissociated from the procedure for expressing

\[146, 2002\] Para. (2).
definitive consent to be bound; it occurs or must be confirmed at the moment of expression of consent to be bound and, in almost all cases, emanates from the same authority. These arguments are, however, not decisive. Whereas the internal rules on competence to conclude treaties are laid down in the constitution, at least in broad outline, that is not the case for the formulation of reservations, which derives from practice, and practice not necessarily in line with that followed when expressing consent to be bound.

(11) It is therefore unlikely that a violation of internal provisions can be “manifest” in the sense of article 46 of the Vienna Conventions cited above and one must fall back on international rules such as those set forth in draft guideline 2.1.3. The conclusion to be drawn is that a State or an international organization should not be allowed to claim that a violation of the provisions of internal law or of the rules of the organization has invalidated a reservation that it has formulated, if such formulation was the act of an authority competent at the international level.

(12) Since this conclusion differs from the rules applicable to “defective ratification” as set forth in article 46, it seems essential to state it expressly in a draft guideline. This is the object of the second paragraph of draft guideline 2.1.4.

(13) Some members of the Commission pointed out that this provision is superfluous because the author of the reservation can always withdraw it “at any time”. However, since it is far from having been established that such withdrawal may have a retroactive effect, the question of the validity of a reservation formulated in violation of the relevant rules of internal law may arise in practice, thereby justifying the inclusion of the rule stated in the second paragraph of draft guideline 2.1.4.

2.1.5 Communication of reservations

A reservation must be communicated in writing to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty.

A reservation to a treaty in force which is the constituent instrument of an international organization or to a treaty which creates an organ that has the capacity to accept a reservation must also be communicated to such organization or organ.

Commentary

(1) Once it has been formulated, the reservation must be made known to the other States or international organizations concerned. Such publicity is essential for enabling them to react, either through an acceptance or through an objection. Article 23 of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 specifies the recipients of reservations formulated by a State or an international organization, but is silent on the procedure to be followed in effecting such notification. The object of draft guidelines 2.1.5 to 2.1.8 is to fill that gap, with draft guideline 2.1.5 referring more specifically to its recipients.

(2) Under article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, a reservation must be communicated “to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”. In addition, article 20, paragraph 3, which stipulates that a reservation to a constituent instrument requires “the acceptance of the competent organ” of the organization in order to produce effects, implies that the reservation must be communicated to the organization in question, as is stated in the second paragraph of draft guideline 2.1.5.

(3) The first group of recipients (contracting States and contracting organizations) does not pose any particular problem. These terms are defined in article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of the 1986 Convention as meaning, respectively:

   (i) a State, or
   (ii) an international organization,

   which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force.”

(4) Much more problematic, in contrast, are the definition and, still more, the determination in each specific case of the “other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”. As has been noted, “[n]ot all treaties are wholly clear as to which other States may become parties”.

500 [148, 2002] See also article 2, para. 1 (f), of the 1969 Convention and article 2, para. 1 (k), of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, which define the term “contracting State” in the same way.

(5) In his 1951 report on reservations to multilateral treaties, Brierly suggested the following provision:

“The following classes of States shall be entitled to be consulted as to any reservations formulated after the signature of this convention (or after this convention has become open to signature or accession):

“(a) States entitled to become parties to the convention,
“(b) States having signed or ratified the convention,
“(c) States having ratified or acceded to the convention.”

(6) In conformity with these recommendations, the Commission suggested that, “in the absence of contrary provisions in any multilateral convention (...) [t]he depositary of a multilateral convention should, upon receipt of each reservation, communicate it to all States which are or which are entitled to become parties to the convention”.

(7) More vaguely, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, in his first report in 1953 proposed in three of the four alternative versions of draft article 9 on reservations a provision stating that “[t]he text of the reservations received shall be communicated by the depositary authority to all the interested States”. But he does not comment on this phrase, which is reproduced in the first report by G.G. Fitzmaurice in 1956, who clarifies it as follows in draft article 39: these are “all the States which have taken part in the negotiation and drawing up of the treaty or which, by giving their signature, ratification, accession or acceptance, have manifested their interest in it”.

(8) Conversely, in 1962, Sir Humphrey Waldock reverted to the 1951 formulation and proposed that any reservation formulated “by a State signing, ratifying, acceding to, or accepting a treaty subsequently to the meeting or conference at which it was adopted shall be communicated to all States which had been parties to it”.

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503 [151, 2002] Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its third session 16 May-27 July 1951, A/1858, p. 8, para. 34 (see Yearbook ... 1951, vol. II, p. 130). This point was not extensively discussed; see, however, the statements by Hudson and Spiropoulos, the latter of whom considered that communication to States not parties to the Treaty was not an obligation under positive law (105th meeting, 18 June 1951, Yearbook ... 1951, vol. I, p. 198).
504 [152, 2002] Yearbook ... 1953, vol. II, p. 92, alternatives B, C and D; oddly enough; this requirement does not appear in alternative A (acceptance of reservations by a two thirds majority, ibid., p. 91).
506 [154, 2002] Draft article 37, Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, p. 115: they “must be brought to the knowledge of the other interested States ...”.
507 [155, 2002] Ibid.
508 [156, 2002] See paragraphs (5) and (6) above.
all other States which are, or are entitled to become, parties ...”. 509 This was also the formula adopted by the Commission after the Drafting Committee had considered it and made minor drafting changes. 510 While States had not expressed any objections in this regard in their comments on the draft articles adopted on first reading, Sir Humphrey Waldock, with no explanations, proposed in 1965 to revert to the phrase “other States concerned”, 511 which the Commission replaced by “contracting States” 512 on the ground that the notion of “States concerned” 513 was “very vague”, finally adopting, in 1966, the requirement of communication “to the other States entitled to become parties to the treaty”, 514 a phrase which was “regarded as more appropriate to describe the recipients of the type of communications in question”. 515

(9) At the Vienna Conference, Mr. McKinnon pointed out, on behalf of the delegation of Canada, that that wording “might create difficulties for a depositary, as there was no criterion for deciding which were those States. It would therefore be preferable to substitute the phrase ‘negotiating States and contracting States’ as proposed in his delegation’s amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.158)”. 516 Although this common-sense proposal was submitted to the Drafting Committee, 517 the latter preferred an amendment submitted by Spain, 518 which appears in the final text of article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1969 Convention and which was reproduced in the 1986 text unchanged except for the addition of international organizations. 519

509 [157, 2002] First report on the law of treaties, Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 60. Not without reason, Waldock believed that it was unnecessary to notify the other States which took part in the negotiations of a reservation formulated “when signing a treaty at a meeting or conference of the negotiating States” if it appeared at the end of the treaty itself or in the final act of the conference (ibid.).

510 [158, 2002] Draft article 18, para. 3; see ibid., p. 176. In its commentary, the Commission considered that this phrase was equivalent to “other interested States” (ibid., p. 180).


512 [160, 2002] Ibid., p. 162.


518 [166, 2002] Ibid., document A/CONF.39/C.1/L.149, para. 192 (i); for the text adopted, see ibid., para. 196.

519 [167, 2002] See paragraph (2) above.
(10) Not only is the phrase adopted obscure, but the *travaux préparatoires* for the 1969 Convention do little to clarify it. The same is true of subparagraphs (b) and (e) of article 77, paragraph 1, which, while not referring expressly to reservations, provide that the depositary is responsible for transmitting “to the parties and to the States entitled to become parties to the treaty” copies of the texts of the treaty and informing them of “notifications and communications relating to the treaty”; however, the *travaux préparatoires* for these provisions shed no light on this phrase, on which the Commission’s members have never focused their attention.

(11) This was not the case during the preparation of the 1986 Convention. Whereas the Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between two or more international organizations had, in his fourth and fifth reports, merely adapted without comment the text of article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1969 Convention, several members of the Commission expressed particular concern during the discussion of the draft in 1977 regarding the problems posed by the determination of “international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”. However, following a contentious debate, it was decided merely to transpose the 1969 formulation.

(12) It is certainly regrettable that the limitations proposed by Canada in 1968 and by Ushakov in 1977 regarding the recipients of communications relating to reservations were not adopted (in the second case, probably out of a debatable concern with not deviating from the 1969 wording and not making any distinction between the rights of States and those of international organizations); such limitations would have obviated practical difficulties for depositaries without significantly

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520 [168, 2002] Under article 77, para. 1 (f), the depositary is also responsible for “informing the States entitled to become parties to the treaty when the number of signatures or of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession required for the entry into force of the treaty has been received or deposited”.

521 [169, 2002] On the origin of these provisions, see, in particular, the 1951 report by J.L. Brierly, *Yearbook ... 1951*, vol. II, p. 27, and the conclusions of the Commission, ibid., p. 130, para. 34 (i); article 17, para. 4 (c), and article 27, para. 6 (c), of the draft proposed by Waldo in 1962, *Yearbook ... 1962*, vol. II, pp. 66 and 82-83, and article 29, para. 5, of the draft adopted by the Commission on first reading, ibid., p. 185; and draft article 72 adopted definitively by the Commission in 1966, *Yearbook ... 1966*, vol. II, p. 269.


523 [171, 2002] For example, Ushakov observed that: “In the case of treaties of a universal character concluded between States and international organizations, such communications would thus have to be made to all existing States. For the same category of treaties and also treaties concluded between international organizations only, it would, however, be more difficult to determine what international organizations were ‘entitled to become parties’. If 10 international organizations were parties to a treaty, to what other international organizations would the communications have to be sent?” (*Yearbook ... 1977*, vol. 1, 1434th meeting, 6 June 1977, p. 101, para. 42).

calling into question the “useful” publicity of reservations among truly interested States and international organizations.  

(13) There is obviously no problem when the treaty itself determines clearly which States or international organizations are entitled to become parties, at least in the case of “closed” treaties; treaties concluded under the auspices of a regional international organization such as the Council of Europe, OAS or OAU often fall into this category. Things are much more complicated when it comes to treaties that do not indicate clearly which States are entitled to become parties to them or “open” treaties containing the words “any State” or when it is established that participants in the negotiations were agreed that later accessions would be possible. This is obviously the case most particularly when depositary functions are assumed by a State which not only has no diplomatic relations with some States, but also does not recognize as States certain entities which proclaim themselves to be States.

(14) The 1997 Summary of the practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties devotes an entire chapter to describing the difficulties encountered by the Secretary-General in determining the “States and international organizations which may become parties”, difficulties which legal theorists have largely underscored. However, States which replied on this point to the Commission’s questionnaire on reservations to treaties do not mention any particular difficulties in this area, but this can probably be explained by the fact that the

525 [173, 2002] It is interesting to note that, while the specialized agencies of the United Nations are not, and are not entitled to become, “parties” to the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, they do receive communications relating to the reservations formulated by some States with regard to its provisions. See, in particular, the Summary of the practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties (ST/LEG/8, New York, 1997) Sales No. F.94.V.15, pp. 60-61, paras. 199-203.

526 [174, 2002] See, for instance, article K, para. 1, of the 3 May 1996 version of the European Social Charter: “This Charter shall be open for signature by the members of the Council of Europe”; or article 32, para. 1, of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999.

527 [175, 2002] See, for example, article XXI of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption also of 29 March 1996.

528 [176, 2002] See also, for instance, article 12, para. 1, of the Lusaka Agreement of 8 September 1994 on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora.

529 [177, 2002] See, for instance, article XIII of the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid: “The present Convention is open for signature by all States...”; or article 84, para. 1, of the Vienna Convention of 1986: “The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State, by Namibia (...) and by any international organization which has the capacity to conclude treaties.” See also article 305 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which opens the Convention for signature by not only “all States”, but also Namibia (before its independence) and self-governing States and territories.


531 [179, 2002] Cf. article 74 of the Vienna Conventions.

problem is not specific to reservations and more generally concerns depositary functions. That is also why the Commission saw no merit in proposing the adoption of one or more draft guidelines on this point.

(15) By contrast, it is certainly necessary to reproduce in the Guide to Practice the rule set forth in article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions (taking the latter in its broadest formulation), no matter how problematic and arguable the provision may be.

(16) The Commission also wished to specify that, just as reservations must be formulated and confirmed in writing, so too must they be communicated in writing to the other States or international organizations concerned, as the only means of enabling the recipients to react to them in full knowledge of the facts. This latter requirement is only implicit in the Vienna Convention, but it is clear from the context, since article 23, paragraph 1, is the provision which requires that reservations be formulated in writing and which uses a very concise formula to link that condition to the requirement that reservations be communicated. Besides, when there is no depositary, the formulation and communication of reservations necessarily go hand in hand. Moreover, practice confines itself to communications in written form.

(17) The second paragraph of draft guideline 2.1.5 concerns the particular case of reservations to constituent instruments of international organizations.

(18) Article 23 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions concerning the “Procedure regarding reservations” does not deal with this particular case. The general rule set forth in paragraph 1 of the article must, however, be clarified and expanded in this respect.

(19) According to article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions:

“When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.”

Now, that organ can take a decision only if the organization is aware of the reservation, which must therefore be communicated to it.


534 [182, 2002] See draft guidelines 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.

535 [183, 2002] See draft guideline 2.1.6 (i).

536 [184, 2002] Cf. the “depositary notifications” of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
This problem was overlooked by the first three Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties and taken up only by Sir Humphrey Waldock in his first report in 1962. He proposed a long draft article 17 on the “Power to formulate and withdraw reservations”, paragraph 5 of which provided that:

“However, in any case where a reservation is formulated to an instrument which is the constituent instrument of an international organization and the reservation is not one specifically authorized by such instrument, it shall be communicated to the Head of the secretariat of the organization concerned in order that the question of its admissibility may be brought before the competent organ of such organization.”

Waldock indicated that this clarification was motivated by “a point to which attention is drawn in paragraph 81 of the Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General (ST/LEG/7), where it is stated:

‘If the agreement should be a constitution establishing an international organization, the practice followed by the Secretary-General and the discussions in the Sixth Committee show that the reservation would be submitted to the competent organ of the organization before the State concerned was counted among the parties. The organization alone would be competent to interpret its constitution and to determine the compatibility of any reservation with its provisions.’”

This provision disappeared from the draft after its consideration by the Drafting Committee, probably because the latter’s members felt that the adoption of an express stipulation that the decision on the effect of a reservation to a constituent instrument must be taken by “the competent organ of the organization in question” made that clarification superfluous. The question does not appear to have been raised again subsequently.

It is not surprising that Sir Humphrey Waldock asked the question in 1962: three years earlier, the problem had arisen critically in connection with a reservation by India to the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). The Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depositary of the Convention, transmitted to IMCO the text of the

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Indian reservation, which had been made that same day on the opening of the first session of the IMCO Assembly. He suggested that the IMCO secretariat should refer the question to the IMCO Assembly for a decision. When this referral was contested, the Secretary-General, in a well-argued report, maintained that “this procedure conformed (1) to the terms of the IMCO Convention; (2) to the precedents in depositary practice where an organ or body was in a position to pass upon a reservation; and (3) to the views on this specific situation expressed by the General Assembly during its previous debates on reservations to multilateral conventions”.541

(24) The Secretary-General stated, inter alia, that, “in previous cases where reservations had been made to multilateral conventions which were in force and which either were constitutions of organizations or which otherwise created deliberative organs, the Secretary-General has invariably treated the matter as one for reference to the body having the authority to interpret the convention in question”.542 He cited as examples the communication to the World Health Assembly of the reservation formulated in 1948 by the United States of America to the Constitution of the World Health Organization543 and the communication the following year of reservations made by the Union of South Africa and by Southern Rhodesia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the GATT Contracting Parties.544 In the 1997 Summary of practice, the Secretary-General gives another example of his consistent practice in this regard: “when Germany and the United Kingdom accepted the Agreement establishing the African Development Bank of 17 May 1979, as amended, they made reservations which had not been contemplated in the Agreement. The Secretary-General, as depositary, duly communicated the reservations to the Bank and accepted the deposit of the instruments only after the Bank had informed him that it had accepted the reservations”.545

(25) In view of the principle set forth in article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions and of the practice normally followed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Commission

542 [190, 2002] Ibid., para. 21.
considered it useful to set forth in a draft guideline the obligation to communicate reservations to the constituent instrument of an international organization to the organization in question.

(26) It nevertheless asked three questions in relation to the precise scope of this rule, the principle of which does not appear to be in doubt:

(1) Should the draft guideline include the clarification (which was included in the 1962 Waldock draft\textsuperscript{546}) that the reservation must be communicated to the head of the secretariat of the organization concerned?

(2) Should it state that the same rule applies when the treaty is not, strictly speaking, the constituent instrument of an international organization, but creates a “deliberative organ” that may take a position on whether or not the reservation is valid, as the Secretary-General had done in his 1959 \textit{Summary of practice}\textsuperscript{547}?

(3) Does the communication of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization to the latter organization remove the obligation also to communicate the text of the reservation to interested States and international organizations?

(27) On the first question, the Commission considered that such a clarification is not necessary: even if, generally speaking, the communication will be addressed to the head of the secretariat, this may not always be the case because of the particular structure of a given organization. In the case of the European Community, for example, the collegial nature of the Commission might raise some problems. Moreover, such a clarification has hardly any concrete value: what matters is that the organization in question should be duly alerted to the problem.

(28) On the question whether the same rule should apply to “deliberative organs” created by a treaty which nonetheless are not international organizations in the strict sense of the term, it is very likely that, in 1959, the drafters of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations had GATT in mind - especially since one of the examples cited related to that organization.\textsuperscript{548} The problem no longer arises in that connection, since GATT has been replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The fact remains, however, that certain treaties, especially in the field of disarmament or environmental protection, create deliberative bodies having a secretariat which

\textsuperscript{546} See paragraph (20) above.\textsuperscript{\[194, 2002\]}

\textsuperscript{547} See paragraph (24) above.\textsuperscript{\[195, 2002\]}

\textsuperscript{548} See ibid.\textsuperscript{\[196, 2002\]}
have sometimes been denied the status of an international organization.\textsuperscript{549} The Commission does not intend to take a position on the matter; it considers, however, that it would be useful to allude to this hypothesis in the Guide to Practice. It would seem justifiable to apply this same rule to reservations to constituent instruments \textit{stricto sensu} and to reservations to treaties creating oversight bodies that assist in the application of the treaty whose status as international organizations might be subject to challenge.

(29) Nevertheless, most members of the Commission considered that, in order to classify this type of body, the expression “deliberative organs”, which had its supporters, was not the most appropriate and that, in order to avoid any type of confusion, it was preferable to refer to “organs that have the capacity to accept a reservation”.

(30) The reply to the last question mentioned above\textsuperscript{550} is the trickiest. It is also the one that has the greatest practical significance, for a reply in the affirmative would impose a heavier burden on the depositary than a negative one. Moreover, the practice of the Secretary-General - which does not appear to be wholly consistent\textsuperscript{551} - seems to tend rather in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{552} The Commission nevertheless believes that a reservation to a constituent instrument should be communicated not only to the organization concerned, but also to all other contracting States and organizations and to those entitled to become members thereof.

(31) Two arguments are advanced in support of this position. The first is that it is by no means evident that an organization’s acceptance of the reservation precludes member States (and international organizations) from objecting to it; the Commission proposes to decide on the matter after it undertakes an in-depth study of whether or not it is possible to object to a reservation that is expressly provided for in a treaty. Secondly, there is a good practical argument to support this

\textsuperscript{549} See, for example, Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, “ Autonomous institutional arrangements in multilateral agreements: a little-noticed phenomenon in international law”. American Journal of International Law, 2000, No. 4, pp. 623-659; some authors also argue that the International Criminal Court is not, strictly speaking, an international organization.

\textsuperscript{550} Para. (26).

\textsuperscript{551} For an earlier example in which it appears that the Secretary-General communicated the reservation of the United States of America to the Constitution of the World Health Organization both to interested States and to the organization concerned, see Oscar Schachter, “Development of international law through the legal opinions of the United Nations Secretariat”, \textit{British Yearbook of International Law}, 1948, p. 125. See also the \textit{Summary of the practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties}; ST/LEG/8, New York, 1997, Sales No. E.94.V.15, p. 51, para. 170.

\textsuperscript{552} In at least one case, however, the State author of a unilateral declaration (which was tantamount to a reservation) - in this case, the United Kingdom - directly consulted the signatories to an agreement establishing an international organization, the Kingston Agreement of 18 October 1969 establishing the Caribbean Development Bank, about the declaration (cf. \textit{Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, status as at 31 December 2000}, vol. I, p. 482, note 8). The author of the reservation may also take the initiative to consult the international organization concerned (cf. the French reservation to the Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcast Development, Kuala Lumpur, 12 August 1977 - ibid., vol. II, p. 298, note 3).
affirmative reply: even if the reservation is communicated to the organization itself, it is in fact its own member States (or international organizations) that will decide. It is therefore important for them to be aware of the reservation. A two-step procedure is a waste of time.

(32) It goes without saying that the obligation to communicate the text of reservations to a constituent instrument to the international organization concerned arises only if the organization exists, in other words, if the treaty is in force. This appears so evident that some members of the Commission questioned whether it was necessary to clarify it in the draft directive. However, it appeared that this clarification was necessary, since, without it, it would be difficult to understand the end of the second paragraph of draft guideline 2.1.5 (it is impossible to communicate a reservation to an international organization or to an organ that does not yet exist).

(33) The question may nevertheless arise as to whether such reservations should not also be communicated before the effective creation of the organization to the “preparatory committees” (or whatever name they may be given) that are often established to prepare for the prompt and effective entry into force of the constituent instrument. Even if, in many cases, an affirmative reply again appears necessary, it would be difficult to generalize, since everything depends on the exact mandate that the conference that adopted the treaty gives to the preparatory committee. Moreover, the reference to “organs that have the capacity to accept a reservation” seems to cover this possibility.

2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8] Procedure for communication of reservations

Unless otherwise provided in the treaty or agreed by the contracting States and international contracting organizations, a communication relating to a reservation to a treaty shall be transmitted:

(i) If there is no depositary, directly by the author of the reservation to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty; or

(ii) If there is a depositary, to the latter, which shall notify the States and international organizations for which it is intended as soon as possible.

553 [201, 2002] In practice, when the constituent instrument is not in force, the Secretary-General of the United Nations proceeds as he would in respect of any other treaty.
A communication relating to a reservation shall be considered as having been made with regard to a State or an international organization only upon receipt by that State or organization.

Where a communication relating to a reservation to a treaty is made by electronic mail or by facsimile, it must be confirmed by diplomatic note or depositary notification. In such a case the communication is considered as having been made at the date of the electronic mail or the facsimile.

**Commentary**

(1) As in the two that follow, guideline 2.1.6 seeks to clarify aspects of the procedure to be followed in communicating the text of a treaty reservation to the addressees of the communication that are specified in guideline 2.1.5. It covers two different but closely linked aspects:

- The author of the communication; and
- The practical modalities of the communication.

(2) Article 23 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions is silent as to the person responsible for such communication. In most cases, this will be the depositary, as shown by the provisions of article 79 of the 1986 Convention, which generally apply to all notifications and communications concerning treaties. The provisions of that article also give some information on the modalities for the communication.

(3) On prior occasions when the topic of reservations to treaties was considered, the Commission or its special rapporteurs planned to stipulate expressly that it was the duty of the depositary to communicate the text of formulated reservations to interested States. Thus, in 1951, for example, the Commission believed that “the depositary of a multilateral convention should, upon receipt of each reservation, communicate it to all States which are or which are entitled to become parties to the convention”. Likewise, in his fourth report in 1965, Waldock proposed that a reservation “shall be notified to the depositary or, where there is no depositary, to the other interested States”.

(4) In the end, this formula was not adopted by the Commission, which, noting that the drafts previously adopted “contained a number of articles in which reference was made to

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communications or notifications to be made directly to the States concerned, or if there was a depositary, to the latter”, came to the conclusion that “it would allow a considerable simplification to be effected in the texts of the various articles if a general article were to be introduced covering notifications and communications”.557

(5) That is the object of draft article 73 of 1966, now article 78 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which was reproduced, without change except for the addition of international organizations, in article 79 of the 1986 Convention:

“Notifications and communications

Except as the treaty or the present Convention otherwise provide, any notification or communication to be made by any State or any international organization under the present Convention shall:

(a) If there is no depositary, be transmitted direct to the States and organizations for which it is intended, or if there is a depositary, to the latter;

(b) Be considered as having been made by the State or organization in question only upon its receipt by the State or organization to which it was transmitted or, as the case may be, upon its receipt by the depositary;

(c) If transmitted to a depositary, be considered as received by the State or organization for which it was intended only when the latter State or organization has been informed by the depositary in accordance with article 78, paragraph 1 (e).”

(6) Article 79 is indissociable from this latter provision, under which:

“1. The functions of a depositary, unless otherwise provided in the treaty or agreed by the contracting States and contracting organizations or, as the case may be, by the contracting organizations, comprise in particular:

...”

(e) Informing the parties and the States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty of acts, notifications and communications relating to the treaty.”

(7) It may be noted in passing that the expression “the parties and the States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”, which is used in this paragraph, is not the exact equivalent of the formula used in article 23, paragraph 1, which refers to “contracting States

and contracting organizations”. The difference has no practical consequences, since the contracting States and contracting international organizations are quite obviously entitled to become parties to the treaty and indeed become so simply by virtue of the treaty’s entry into force, in accordance with the definition of the terms given in article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of the 1986 Vienna Convention; it poses a problem, however, with regard to the wording of the guideline to be included in the Guide to Practice.

(8) Without doubt, the provisions of article 78, paragraph 1 (e), and article 79 of the 1986 Vienna Convention should be reproduced in the Guide to Practice and adapted to the special case of reservations; otherwise, the Guide would not fulfil its pragmatic purpose of making available to users a full set of guidelines enabling them to determine what conduct to adopt whenever they are faced with a question relating to reservations. But the Commission wondered whether, in preparing this guideline, the wording of these two provisions should be reproduced, or that of article 23, paragraph 1. It seemed logical to adopt the terminology used in the latter so as to avoid any ambiguity and conflict - even purely superficial - between the various guidelines of the Guide to Practice.

(9) Moreover, there can be no doubt that communications relating to reservations - especially those concerning the actual text of reservations formulated by a State or an international organization - are communications “relating to the treaty” within the meaning of article 78, paragraph 1 (e), referred to above.\footnote{[327, 2008] See paragraph (6) above.} Furthermore, in its 1966 draft, the Commission expressly entrusted the depositary with the task of “examining whether a signature, an instrument or a reservation is in conformity with the provisions of the treaty and of the present articles”.\footnote{[328, 2008] Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 269, draft article 72, para. 1 (d) (italics added). On the substance of this provision, see the commentary to guideline 2.1.7 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10), pp. 115-123).} This expression was replaced in Vienna with a broader one - “the signature or any instrument, notification or communication relating to the treaty”\footnote{[329, 2008] Art. 77, para. 1 (d). The new formula is derived from an amendment proposed by the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was adopted by the Committee of the Whole by 32 votes to 24, with 27 abstentions (Official Records of the United Nations, Yearbook of International Law, 1986, vol. II, p. 269).} - which cannot, however, be construed as excluding reservations from the scope of the provision.

(10) In addition, as indicated in the Commission’s commentary to draft article 73 (now article 79 of the 1986 Convention), the rule laid down in subparagraph (a) of this provision “relates
essentially to notifications and communications relating to the ‘life’ of the treaty - acts establishing consent, *reservations*, objections, notices regarding invalidity, termination, etc.”.

(11) In essence, there is no doubt that both article 78, paragraph 1 (e), and article 79 (a) reflect current practice. They warrant no special comment, except for the observation that, even in cases where there is a depositary, the State which is the author of the reservation may directly inform the other States or international organizations concerned of the text of the reservation. Thus, the United Kingdom, for example, informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depositary of the Agreement of 18 October 1969 establishing the Caribbean Development Bank, that it had consulted all the signatories to that agreement with regard to an aspect of the declaration (constituting a reservation) which it had attached to its instrument of ratification (and which was subsequently accepted by the Board of Governors of the Bank and then withdrawn by the United Kingdom). Likewise, France submitted to the Board of Governors of the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development a reservation which it had formulated to the agreement establishing that organization, for which the Secretary-General is also depositary.

(12) There seem to be no objections to this practice, provided that the depositary is not thereby released from his own obligations. It is, however, a source of confusion and uncertainty in the sense that the depositary could rely on States formulating reservations to perform the function expressly conferred on him by article 78, paragraph 1 (e), and the final phrase of article 79 (a) of the 1986 Vienna Convention. For this reason, the Commission considered that such a practice should not be encouraged and refrained from proposing a guideline enshrining it.

(13) In its 1966 commentary, the Commission dwelt on the importance of the task entrusted to the depositary in draft article 73, paragraph 1 (e) (now article 77, paragraph 1 (e), of the 1969 Vienna

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[561] See *ibid.* with regard to draft article 73 (a) (which became article 78 of the 1969 Convention and article 79 of the 1986 Convention).


[565] See Art. 77, para. 1 (e), and art. 78 (a), respectively, of the 1969 Convention. In the aforesaid case of the French reservation to the Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, it seems that the Secretary-General confined himself to taking note of the absence of objections from the organization’s Governing Council (see *Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. II, p. 439, note 4 (chap. XXV.3)). The Secretary-General’s passivity in this instance is subject to criticism.
and stressed “the obvious desirability of the prompt performance of this function by a depositary.”

This is an important issue, which is linked to subparagraphs (b) and (c) of article 78. The reservation produces effects only as from the date on which the communication relating thereto is received by the States and organizations for which it is intended, and not as from the date of its formulation. In truth, it matters little whether the communication is made directly by the author of the reservation; he will have no one but himself to blame if it is transmitted late to its recipients. On the other hand, if there is a depositary, it is essential for the latter to display promptness; otherwise, the depositary could stall both the effect of the reservation and the opportunity for the other States and international organizations concerned to react to it.

(14) In practice, at the current stage of modern means of communication, depositaries, at any event in the case of international organizations, perform their tasks with great speed. Whereas in the 1980s the period between the receipt of reservations and communicating them varied from one to two and even three months, it is apparent from the information supplied to the Commission by the Treaty Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs that:

1. The time period between receipt of a formality by the Treaty Section and its communication to the parties to a treaty is approximately 24 hours unless a translation is required or a legal issue is involved. If a translation is required, in all cases, it is requested by the Treaty Section on an urgent basis. If the legal issue is complex or involves communications with parties outside the control of the United Nations, then there may be some delay; however, this is highly unusual. It should be noted that, in all but a few cases, formalities are communicated to the relevant parties within 24 hours.

2. Depositary notifications are communicated to permanent missions and relevant organizations by both regular mail and electronic mail, within 24 hours of processing (see LA 41 TR/221). Additionally, effective January 2001, depositary notifications can be viewed on the United Nations Treaty Collection on the Internet at: http://untreaty.un.org (depositary notifications on the Internet are for information purposes only and are not considered to be
formal notifications by the depositary). Depositary notifications with bulky attachments, for example those relating to chapter 11 (b) 16, are sent by facsimile.\footnote{340, 2008} For its part, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has indicated that the time period between the communication of a reservation to a treaty for which the organization is depositary and its transmittal to the States concerned is generally from one to two weeks. Communications, which are translated into the three official languages of the organization (English, Spanish and French), are always transmitted by regular mail.

(16) The practice of the Council of Europe has been described to the Commission by the Secretariat of the Council as follows:

“\[The usual period is two to three weeks (notifications are grouped and sent out approximately every two weeks). In some cases, delays occur owing to voluminous declarations/reservations or appendices (descriptions or extracts of domestic law and practices) that must be checked and translated into the other official language (the Council of Europe requires that all notifications be made in one of the official languages or be at least accompanied by a translation into one of these languages. The translation into the other official language is provided by the Treaty Office). Urgent notifications that have immediate effect (e.g., derogations under article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights) are carried out within a couple of days.\]

\[Unless they prefer notifications to be sent directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (currently 11 out of 43 member States), the original notifications are sent out in writing to the permanent representations in Strasbourg, which in turn forward them to their capitals. Non-member States that have no diplomatic mission (consulate) in Strasbourg are notified via a diplomatic mission in Paris or Brussels or directly. The increase in member States and

\footnote{340, 2008} These are communications relating to the Agreement of 20 March 1958 concerning the Adoption of Uniform Technical Prescriptions for Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment and Parts which can be fitted and/or be used on Wheeled Vehicles and the Conditions for Reciprocal Recognition of Approvals Granted on the Basis of These Prescriptions (see Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. I, p. 683).

\footnote{341, 2008} The Treaty Section has also advised: “3. Please note that the depositary practice has been changed in cases where the treaty action is a modification to an existing reservation and where a reservation has been formulated by a party subsequent to establishing its consent to be bound. A party to the relevant treaty now has 12 months within which to inform the depositary that it objects to the modification or that it does not wish to consider the reservation made subsequent to ratification, acceptance, approval, etc. The time period for this 12 months is calculated by the depositary on the basis of the date of issue of the depositary notification [see LA 41 TR/221 (23-1)].” See also Palitha T.B. Kohona, “Some notable developments in the practice of the UN Secretary-General as depository of multilateral treaties: reservations and declarations”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 99 (2005), pp. 433-450, and “Reservations: discussion of recent developments in the practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as depository of multilateral treaties”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 33 (2005), pp. 415-450.
notifications over the last 10 years has prompted one simplification: since 1999, each notification is no longer signed individually by the Director-General of Legal Affairs (acting for the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe), but notifications are grouped and only each cover letter is signed individually. There have not been any complaints against this procedure.

Since our new web site (http://conventions.coe.int) became operational in January 2000, all information relating to formalities is immediately made available on the web site. The texts of reservations or declarations are put on the web site the day they are officially notified. Publication on the web site is, however, not considered to constitute an official notification.”

(17) Lastly, it is apparent from information from the Organization of American States (OAS) that:

“Member States are notified of any new signatures and ratifications to inter-American treaties through the OAS Newspaper, which circulates every day. In a more formal way, we notify every three months through a procès-verbal sent to the permanent missions to OAS or after meetings where there are a significant number of new signatures and ratifications such as, for example, the General Assembly.

The formal notifications, which also include the bilateral agreements signed between the General Secretariat and other parties, are done in Spanish and English.”

(18) It did not seem necessary to the Commission for these very helpful clarifications to be reproduced in full in the Guide to Practice. It nonetheless seemed useful to give in guideline 2.1.6 some information in the form of general recommendations intended both for the depositary (where there is one) and for the authors of reservations (where there is no depositary). This combines the text of article 78, paragraph 1 (e), and article 79 of the 1986 Vienna Convention and adapts it to the special problems posed by the communication of reservations.

(19) The chapeau of the guideline reproduces the relevant parts that are common to the chapeaux of articles 78 and 79 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, with some simplification: the wording decided upon at Vienna to introduce article 78 (“the contracting States and contracting organizations or, as the case may be, by the contracting organizations ...”) appears to be unnecessarily cumbersome and contains little additional information. Moreover, as was mentioned.

573 [342, 2008] Art. 77, para. 1 (c), and art. 79 of the 1969 Convention.
above, the text of guideline 2.1.6 reproduces, with one small difference, the formulation used in article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1986 Convention (“to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”), in preference to that used in article 78, paragraph 1 (e) (“the parties and the States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”). While the latter formulation is probably more elegant and has the same meaning, it departs from the terminology used in the section of the Vienna Conventions relating to reservations. Nevertheless, it did not seem useful to burden the text by using the article 23 expression twice in subparagraphs (i) and (ii). Incidentally, this purely drafting improvement involves no change in the Vienna text: the expression “the States and organizations for which it is intended” (ii) refers to the “contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties” (i). This is also true of the addition of the adjective “international”, which the Commission inserted before the noun “organizations” in the chapeau of the first paragraph in order to avoid any ambiguity and to compensate for the lack, in the Guide to Practice, of a definition of the term “contracting organization” (whereas such a definition does appear in article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of the 1986 Vienna Convention); some members of the Commission, however, regretted this departure from the wording of the Vienna Convention, which they considered unnecessary; obviously, this clarification applies to the guideline as a whole. Similarly, the subdivision of the draft’s first paragraph into two separate subparagraphs probably makes it more readily understandable, without changing the meaning.

(20) As to the time periods for the transmittal of the reservation to the States or international organizations for which it is intended, the Commission did not think it possible to establish a rigid period of time. The expression “as soon as possible” in subparagraph (ii) seems enough to draw the attention of the addressees to the need to proceed rapidly. On the other hand, such an indication is not required in subparagraph (i): it is for the author of the reservation to assume his responsibilities in this regard.

(21) In keeping with guidelines 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, which point out that the formulation and confirmation of reservations must be done in writing, the last paragraph of guideline 2.1.6 specifies that communication to the States and international organizations for which they are intended must

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574 [343, 2008] Paragraphs (7) and (8).

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be formal. While some members of the Commission may have expressed doubts about the need for this stipulation, it seemed useful in view of the frequent practice among depositaries of using modern means of communication - electronic mail or fax - which are less reliable than traditional methods. For this reason, a majority of the members of the Commission considered that any communication concerning reservations should be confirmed in a diplomatic note (in cases where the author is a State) or in a depositary notification (where it is from an international organization\(^{576}\)). While some members held an opposite view, the Commission took the view that, in this case, the time period should start as from the time the electronic mail or facsimile is sent. This would help prevent disputes as to the date of receipt of the confirmation and would not give rise to practical problems, since, according to the indications given to the Commission, the written confirmation is usually done at the same time the electronic mail or facsimile is sent or very shortly thereafter, at least by depositary international organizations. These clarifications are given in the third paragraph of guideline 2.1.6.

(22) It seemed neither useful nor possible to be specific about the language or languages in which such communications must be transmitted, since the practices of depositaries vary.\(^{577}\) Similarly, the Commission took the view that it was wise to follow practice on the question of the organ to which, specifically, the communication should be addressed.\(^{578}\)

(23) On the other hand, the second paragraph of guideline 2.1.6 reproduces the rule set out in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of article 79 of the 1986 Vienna Convention.\(^{579}\) However, it seemed possible to simplify the wording without drawing a distinction between cases in which the reservation is communicated directly by the author and instances in which it is done by the depositary. In both cases, it is the receipt of the communication by the State or international organization for which it is intended that is decisive. It is, for example, from the date of receipt that the period within which an objection may be formulated is counted.\(^{580}\) It should be noted that the

\(^{575}\) [344, 2008] See paragraph (13) above.

\(^{576}\) [345, 2008] A depositary notification has become the usual means by which depositary international organizations or heads of secretariat make communications relating to treaties. The usual diplomatic notes could nonetheless be used by an international organization in the case of a communication addressed to non-member States of the organization that do not have observer status.

\(^{577}\) [346, 2008] Where the depositary is a State, it generally seems to transmit communications of this type in its official language(s); an international organization may use all its official languages (IMO) or one or two working languages (United Nations).

\(^{578}\) [347, 2008] Ministries of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic missions to the depositary State(s), permanent missions to the depositary organization.

\(^{579}\) [348, 2008] See paragraph (5) above.

\(^{580}\) [349, 2008] Regarding objections, see guideline 2.6.13 below.
date of effect of the notification may differ from one State or international organization to another depending on the date of receipt.

2.1.7 Functions of depositaries

The depositary shall examine whether a reservation to a treaty formulated by a State or an international organization is in due and proper form and, if need be, bring the matter to the attention of the State or international organization concerned.

In the event of any difference appearing between a State or an international organization and the depositary as to the performance of the latter’s functions, the depositary shall bring the question to the attention of:

(a) The signatory States and organizations and the contracting States and contracting organizations; or

(b) Where appropriate, the competent organ of the international organization concerned.

Commentary

(1) The section on reservations in the Vienna Conventions on the law of treaties makes no mention of the role of the depositary. This silence is explained by the decision, adopted belatedly during the elaboration of the 1969 Convention, to subsume the provisions relating to the communication of reservations within the general provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention relating to depositaries. Consequently, however, it is self evident that the provisions of articles 77 and 78 of the 1986 Convention are fully applicable to reservations insofar as they are relevant to them. Draft guideline 2.1.7 performs this transposition.

(2) Under article 78, paragraph 1 (e), of the 1986 Convention, the depositary is responsible for “informing the parties and the States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty of acts, notifications and communications relating to the treaty”. This rule,

combined with the one in article 79 (a), is reproduced in draft guideline 2.1.6. This same draft implies also that the depositary receives and keeps custody of reservations;\textsuperscript{583} it therefore seems unnecessary to mention this expressly.

(3) It goes without saying that the general provisions of article 77, paragraph 2, relating to the international character of the functions of depositaries and their obligation to act impartially apply to reservations as to any other field.\textsuperscript{584} In this general form, these principles do not specifically concern the functions of depositaries in relation to reservations and, accordingly, there seems to be no need to reproduce them as such in the Guide to Practice. But these provisions should be placed in the context of those in article 78, paragraph 2:

“...the signatory States and organizations and the contracting States and contracting organizations; or

(b) where appropriate, the competent organ of the international organization concerned.”

(4) These substantial limitations on the functions of depositaries were enshrined as a result of problems that arose with regard to certain reservations; hence, it appears all the more essential to recall these provisions in the Guide to Practice, adapting them to the special case of reservations.

(5) The problem is posed in different terms when the depositary is a State that is itself a party to the treaty or when it is “an international organization or the chief administrative officer of the organization”.\textsuperscript{585} In the first case, “if the other parties found themselves in disagreement with the depositary on this question - a situation which, to our knowledge, has never materialized - they would not be in a position to insist that he follow a course of conduct different from the one he believed that he should adopt”.\textsuperscript{586} In contrast, in the second case, the political organs of the organization (composed of States not necessarily parties to the treaty) can give instructions to the

\textsuperscript{583} [230, 2002] See article 78, paragraph 1 (c): “… the functions of a depositary (…) comprise (…): (c) receiving any signatures to the treaty and receiving and keeping custody of any instruments, notifications and communications relating to it”.

\textsuperscript{584} [231, 2002] “The functions of the depositary of a treaty are international in character and the depositary is under an obligation to act impartially in their performance. In particular, the fact that a treaty has not entered into force between certain of the parties or that a difference has appeared between a State or an international organization and a depositary with regard to the performance of the latter’s functions shall not affect that obligation.”

\textsuperscript{585} [232, 2002] Article 77, paragraph 1, of the 1986 Vienna Convention.
depositary. It is in this context that problems arose and their solution has consistently tended towards a strict limitation on the depositary’s power of judgement, culminating finally in the rules laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention and reproduced in the 1986 Convention.

(6) As early as 1927, as a result of the difficulties created by the reservations to which Austria intended to subject its deferred signature of the International Opium Convention of 19 February 1925, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution endorsing the conclusions of a Committee of Experts\(^\text{587}\) and giving instructions to the Secretary-General of the League on what conduct to adopt.\(^\text{588}\)

(7) But it is in the context of the United Nations that the most serious problems have arisen, as can be seen from the main stages in the evolution of the role of the Secretary-General as depositary in respect of reservations:\(^\text{589}\)

− Initially, the Secretary-General “seemed to determine alone ... his own rules of conduct in the matter”\(^\text{590}\) and subjected the admissibility of reservations to the unanimous acceptance of the contracting parties or the international organization whose constituent instrument was involved;\(^\text{591}\)

− Following the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1951 on *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*,\(^\text{592}\) the General Assembly adopted its first resolution calling on the Secretary-General in respect of future conventions:

\[\text{“(i) To continue to act as depositary in connection with the deposit of documents containing reservations or objections, without passing upon the legal effect of such documents; and} \]

\[\text{586} \quad \text{[233, 2002] Jacques Dehaussy, “Le dépositaire de traités”, RGDIP 1952, p. 515.} \]
\[\text{587} \quad \text{[234, 2002] See the report of the Committee, composed of Mr. Fromageot, Mr. MacNair and Mr. Diéna, in JOSdN 1927, p. 881.} \]
\[\text{588} \quad \text{[235, 2002] Resolution of 17 June 1927. See also resolution XXIX of the Eighth Conference of American States (Lima 1938), which established the rules to be followed by the Pan American Union with regard to reservations.} \]
\[\text{590} \quad \text{[237, 2002] Jacques Dehaussy, “Le dépositaire de traités”, RGDIP 1952, p. 514.} \]
\[\text{591} \quad \text{[238, 2002] See the Summary of the practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties, ST/LEG/8, New York, 1997, Sales No. E.94.V.15, pp. 50-51, paras. 168-171.} \]
\[\text{592} \quad \text{[239, 2002] I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15.} \]
(ii) To communicate the text of such documents relating to reservations or objections to all States concerned, leaving it to each State to draw legal consequences from such communications.\footnote{Resolution 598 (VI) of 12 January 1952, para. 3 (b).}

These guidelines were extended to all treaties for which the Secretary-General assumes depositary functions under resolution 1452 B (XIV) of 7 December 1959, adopted as a result of the problems related to the reservations formulated by India to the constituent instrument of the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).\footnote{See the commentary to draft guideline 2.1.5, paras. (23) and (24).}

(8) This is the practice followed since then by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, apparently, by all international organizations (or the heads of the secretariats of international organizations) with regard to reservations where the treaty in question does not contain a reservations clause.\footnote{See Summary of the practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties, ST/LEG/8, New York, 1997, Sales No. E.94.V.15, pp. 60-61, paras. 177-188.} And this is the practice that the International Law Commission drew on in formulating the rules to be applied by the depositary in this area.

(9) It should also be noted that, once again, the formulation adopted tended towards an ever greater limitation on the depositary's powers:

- In the draft adopted on first reading in 1962, paragraph 5 of draft article 29 on “the functions of a depositary” provided that:
  “On a reservation having been formulated, the depositary shall have the duty:
  (a) To examine whether the formulation of the reservation is in conformity with the provisions of the treaty and of the present articles relating to the formulation of reservations, and, if need be, to communicate on the point with the State which formulated the reservations;
  (b) To communicate the text of any reservation and any notifications of its acceptance or objection to the interested States as prescribed in articles 18 and 19”;\footnote{Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 205.}

- The draft adopted on second reading in 1966 further provided that the functions of the depositary comprised:
“Examining whether a signature, an instrument or a reservation is in conformity with the provisions of the treaty and of the present articles and, if need be, bringing the matter to the attention of the State in question”;

The commentary on this provision dwelt, however, on the strict limits on the depositary’s examining power:

“Paragraph 1 (d) recognizes that a depositary has a certain duty to examine whether signatures, instruments and reservations are in conformity with any applicable provisions of the treaty or of the present articles, and if necessary to bring the matter to the attention of the State in question. That is, however, the limit of the depositary’s duty in this connexion. It is no part of the functions to adjudicate on the validity of an instrument or reservation. If an instrument or reservation appears to be irregular, the proper course of a depositary is to draw the attention of the reserving State to the matter and, if the latter does not concur with the depositary, to communicate the reservation to the other interested States and bring the question of the apparent irregularity to their attention ...”;

During the Vienna Conference, an amendment proposed by the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic further attenuated the provision in question: even if the disappearance of any express reference to reservations certainly does not prevent the rule laid down in article 77, paragraph 1 (d), from applying to these instruments, the fact remains that the depositary’s power is limited henceforth to examining the form of reservations, his function being that of:

“Examining whether the signature or any instrument, notification or communication relating to the treaty is in due and proper form and, if need be, bringing the matter to the attention of the States in question.”

(10) In this way, the principle of the depositary as “letter box” was enshrined. As T.O. Elias has written: “It is essential to emphasize that it is no part of the depositary’s function to assume the role of interpreter or judge in any dispute regarding the nature or character of a party’s reservation.

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598 [245, 2002] Ibid., pp. 293-294, para. (4) of the commentary.
vis-à-vis the other parties to a treaty, or to pronounce a treaty as having come into force when that is challenged by one or more of the parties to the treaty in question.\footnote{249, 2002} (11) Opinions are divided as to the advantages or disadvantages of this diminution of the depositary’s competencies with regard to reservations. Of course, as the International Court of Justice emphasized in its 1951 opinion, “the task of the [depositary] would be simplified and would be confined to receiving reservations and objections and notifying them”.\footnote{250, 2002} “The effect of this, it is suggested, is to transfer the undoubted subjectivities of the United Nations system from the shoulders of the depositary to those of the individual States concerned, in their quality of parties to that treaty, and in that quality alone. This may be regarded as a positive innovation, or perhaps clarification of the modern law of treaties, especially of reservations to multilateral treaties, and is likely to reduce or at least limit the ‘dispute’ element of unacceptable reservations.”\footnote{251, 2002} (12) Conversely, we may also see in the practice followed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and embodied, indeed “solidified”, in the 1969 Vienna Convention, “an unnecessarily complex system”\footnote{252, 2002} insofar as the depositary is no longer able to impose the least amount of coherence and unity in the interpretation and implementation of reservations.\footnote{253, 2002} (13) The fact remains that distrust of the depositary, as reflected in the provisions analysed above of the relevant articles of the Vienna Conventions, is too deeply entrenched, both in minds and in practice, for there to be any consideration of revising the rules adopted in 1969 and perpetuated in 1986. In the Commission’s view, there is little choice but to reproduce them verbatim\footnote{254, 2002} in the Guide to Practice, combining the relevant provisions of article 78, paragraphs 1 (d) and 2, of the 1986 Vienna Convention in a single guideline and applying them only to the functions of depositaries with regard to reservations.

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\footnote{249, 2002} The Modern Law of Treaties, Oceana Publications/Sijthoff, Dobbs Ferry/Leiden, 1974, p. 213. \\
\footnote{250, 2002} I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 27; and it may be considered that: “It is that passage which has established the theoretical basis for the subsequent actions by the General Assembly and the International Law Commission. For it is in that sentence that the essentially administrative features of the function [of the depositary] are emphasized and any possible political (and that means decisive) role is depressed to the greatest extent” (Shabtai Rosenne, “The Depositary of International Treaties”, American Journal of International Law 1967, p. 931). \\
\footnote{252, 2002} Pierre-Henri Imbert, op. cit., p. 534; the author applies the term only to the practice of the Secretary-General and seems to consider that the Vienna Convention simplifies the context of the problem. \\
\footnote{253, 2002} The depositary can, however, play a not insignificant role in the “reservations dialogue” in reconciling opposing points of view, where appropriate. See also Henry Han, “The UN Secretary-General’s treaty depositary function: legal implications”, BJIIL 1988, pp. 570-571; the author here dwells on the importance of the role that the depositary can play, but the article pre-dates the Vienna Conference. \\
\footnote{254, 2002} See, however, draft guideline 2.1.8.
\end{flushleft}
(14) The first paragraph of the draft guideline is based on the text of the first part of article 78, paragraph 1 (d), with express and exclusive reference to the approach that the depositary is to take to reservations. The second paragraph reproduces the text of paragraph 2 of the same article while limiting the situation envisaged to that sole function (and not to the functions of the depositary in general, as article 78 does).

2.1.8 [2.1.7 bis] Procedure in case of manifestly impermissible reservations

Where, in the opinion of the depositary, a reservation is manifestly impermissible, the depositary shall draw the attention of the author of the reservation to what, in the depositary’s view, constitutes the grounds for the impermissibility of the reservation.

If the author of the reservation maintains the reservation, the depositary shall communicate the text of the reservation to the signatory States and international organizations and to the contracting States and international organizations and, where appropriate, the competent organ of the international organization concerned, indicating the nature of legal problems raised by the reservation.

Commentary
(1) During the discussion of draft guideline 2.1.7, some members of the Commission considered that purely and simply applying the rules it established in the case of a reservation that was manifestly “invalid” gave rise to certain difficulties. In particular, they stressed that there was no reason to provide for a detailed examination of the formal validity of the reservation by the depositary, as the first paragraph of draft guideline 2.1.7 did, while precluding him from reacting in the case of a reservation that was manifestly impermissible from a substantive viewpoint (in particular, when the conditions specified in article 19 of the Vienna Conventions were not met).
(2) However, allowing him to intervene in the latter case would constitute a progressive development of international law, which, it had to be acknowledged, departed from the spirit in which the provisions of the Vienna Conventions on the functions of depositaries had been drawn up. That is why, during its fifty-third session, the Commission considered it useful to consult member States in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly about whether the depositary could

608 [899, 2006] See the commentary to draft guideline 2.1.7, paras. (9) and (10).
or should “refuse to communicate to States and international organizations concerned a reservation that is manifestly inadmissible, particularly when it is prohibited by a provision of a treaty”. 609

(3) The nuanced responses given to this question by the delegations to the Sixth Committee inspired the wording of draft guideline 2.1.8. Generally speaking, States expressed a preference for the strict alignment of the Guide to Practice with the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention concerning the role of the depositary, in particular article 77 thereof. Some of the delegations that spoke stressed that the depositary must demonstrate impartiality and neutrality in the exercise of his functions and should therefore limit himself to transmitting to the parties the reservations that were formulated. However, a number of representatives to the Sixth Committee expressed the view that, when a reservation was manifestly not valid, it was incumbent upon the depositary to refuse to communicate it or at least to first inform the author of the reservation of his position and, if the author maintained the reservation, to communicate it and draw the attention of the other parties to the problem.

(4) Most members of the Commission supported this intermediate solution. They considered that it was not possible to allow any type of censure by the depositary, but that it would be inappropriate to oblige him to communicate the text of a manifestly invalid reservation to the contracting or signatory States and international organizations without previously having drawn the attention of the reserving State or international organization to the defects that, in his opinion, affected it. Nevertheless, it was to be understood that, if the author of the reservation maintained it, the normal procedure would resume and the reservation should be transmitted, with an indication of the nature of the legal problems in question. In point of fact, this amounts to bringing the procedure to be followed in the case of a reservation that is not manifestly valid in terms of substance into line with the procedure to be followed in the case of reservations that present problems of form. According to draft guideline 2.1.7, should there be a difference of opinion regarding such problems, the depositary “shall bring the question to the attention of: (a) [t]he signatory States and organizations and the contracting States and contracting organizations; or (b) [w]here appropriate, the competent organ of the international organization concerned”.

(5) According to some members of the Commission, this procedure should be followed only if the “invalidity” invoked by the depositary is based on subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 19 of the

1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions (a reservation prohibited by the treaty, or not provided for in a treaty that authorizes only certain specific reservations). Other members consider that the only real problem is that of the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty (subparagraph (c) of article 19). The majority considered that this procedure applied to all the subparagraphs and therefore the Commission did not consider it justified to distinguish among the different types of invalidity listed in article 19.

(6) Similarly, despite the contrary opinion of some of its members, the Commission did not consider it useful to confine the exchange of opinions between the author of the reservation and the depositary implied by draft guideline 2.1.7 within strict time limits. The draft does not diverge from draft guideline 2.1.6 (ii), under which the depositary must act “as soon as possible”. And, in any case, the reserving State or international organization must advise whether or not it is willing to discuss the matter with the depositary. If it is not, the procedure must follow its course and the reservation must be communicated to the other contracting parties or signatories.

(7) Although the Commission initially used the word “impermissible” to characterize reservations covered by the provisions of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions, some members pointed out that the word was not appropriate in that case: in international law, an internationally wrongful act entails its author’s responsibility, but this is plainly not the case with reservations which are contrary to the provisions of the treaty to which they relate or incompatible with its object and purpose or which do not respect the stipulations as to form or time limits laid down by the Vienna Conventions. At its fifty-eighth session, the Commission therefore decided to replace the words “permissible”, “impermissible”, “permissibility” and “impermissibility” by “valid”, invalid”, “validity” and “invalidity”, and to amend this commentary accordingly.

2.1.9 Statement of reasons

A reservation should to the extent possible indicate the reasons why it is being made.

Commentary

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611 [902, 2006] Cf. draft article 1 of the draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts annexed to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001.
612 [903, 2006] The text of and commentary to draft guideline 1.6 [1.4] have been similarly amended.
The Commission’s work on the law of treaties and the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions in no way stipulate that a State or international organization which formulates a reservation must give its reasons for doing so and explain why it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects. Thus, giving reasons is not an additional condition for validity under the Vienna regime.

However, some conventional instruments require States to give reasons for their reservations and to explain why they are formulating them. A particularly clear example is article 57 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states:

“1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this article.
2. Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.”

Under this regime, which is unquestionably lex specialis with respect to general international law, indication of the law on which the reservation is based is a genuine condition for the validity of any reservation to the European Convention. In the famous Belilos case, the European Court of Human Rights decided that article 57 (former article 64), paragraph 2, establishes “not a purely formal requirement but a condition of substance”. In the Court’s view, the required reasons or explanations “provide a guarantee - in particular for the other Contracting Parties and the Convention institutions - that a reservation does not go beyond the provisions expressly excluded by the State concerned”. The penalty for failure to meet this requirement to give reasons (or to explain) is the invalidity of the reservation.

Under general international law, such a drastic consequence certainly does not follow automatically from a failure to give reasons, but the justification for and usefulness of giving reasons for reservations, stressed by the European Court in 1988, are applicable to all treaties and all reservations. It is on this basis that the Commission deemed it useful to encourage giving

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614 [351, 2008] Ibid.
reasons without making it a legal obligation to do so, an obligation which, in any case, would have been incompatible with the legal character of the Guide to Practice. The non-binding formulation of the guideline, reflected in the use of the conditional, makes it clear that this formality, while desirable, is in no way a legal obligation.

(4) Giving reasons (which is thus optional) is not an additional requirement that would make it more difficult to formulate reservations; it is a useful way for both the author of the reservation and the other concerned States, international organizations or monitoring bodies to fulfil their responsibilities effectively. It gives the author of the reservation an opportunity not only to explain and clarify the reasons why the reservation was formulated - including (but not exclusively) by indicating impediments under domestic law that may make implementation of the provision on which the reservation is based difficult or impossible - but also to provide information that will be useful in assessing the validity of the reservation. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the author of a reservation is also responsible for assessing its validity.

(5) The reasons and explanations given by the author of a reservation also facilitate the work of the bodies with competence to assess the reservation’s validity, including other concerned States or international organizations, dispute settlement bodies responsible for interpreting or implementing the treaty and treaty monitoring bodies. Giving reasons, then, is also one of the ways in which States and international organizations making a reservation can cooperate with the other contracting parties and the monitoring bodies so that the validity of the reservation can be assessed.616

(6) Giving and explaining the reasons which, in the author’s view, made it necessary to formulate the reservation also helps to establish a fruitful reservations dialogue among the author of the reservation, the contracting States and international organizations and the monitoring body, if any. This is beneficial not only for the States or international organizations which are called upon to comment on the reservation by accepting or objecting to it, but also for the author of the reservation, which, by giving reasons, can help allay any concerns that its partners may have regarding the validity of its reservation and steer the reservations dialogue towards greater mutual understanding.

615 [352, 2008] Ibid., para. 60.
616 [353, 2008] The Commission stressed this obligation to cooperate with monitoring bodies in its 1997 preliminary conclusions on reservations to normative multilateral treaties, including human rights treaties, paragraph 9 of which states: “The Commission calls upon States to cooperate with monitoring bodies ...” (Yearbook ... 1997, vol. II, Part Two, p. 58). This obligation to cooperate was
In practice, reasons are more likely to be given for objections than for reservations. There are, however, examples in State practice of cases in which States and international organizations have made a point of giving their reasons for formulating a particular reservation. Sometimes, they do so purely for reasons of convenience, in which case their explanations are of no particular use in assessing the value of the reservation except perhaps insofar as they establish that it is motivated by such considerations of convenience. But often, the explanations that accompany reservations shed considerable light on the reasons for their formulation. For example, Barbados justified its reservation to article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by practical problems of implementation:

“The Government of Barbados states that it reserves the right not to apply in full, the guarantee of free legal assistance in accordance with paragraph 3 (d) of article 14 of the Covenant, since, while accepting the principles contained in the same paragraph, the problems of implementation are such that full application cannot be guaranteed at present.”

In another example (among the many precedents), the Congo formulated a reservation to article 11 of the Covenant, accompanying it with a long explanation:

“The Government of the People’s Republic of Congo declares that it does not consider itself bound by the provisions of article 11 […]

Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is quite incompatible with articles 386 et seq. of the Congolese Code of Civil, Commercial, Administrative and Financial Procedure, derived from Act 51/83 of 21 April 1983. Under those provisions, in matters of private law, decisions or orders emanating from conciliation proceedings may be enforced through imprisonment for debt when other means of enforcement have failed, when the amount due exceeds 20,000 CFA francs and when the debtor, between 18 and 60 years of age, makes himself insolvent in bad faith.”

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617 This is true of France’s reservation to the European Agreement supplementing the Convention on Road Signs and Signals: “With regard to article 23, paragraph 3 bis (b), of the Agreement on Road Signs and Signals, France intends to retain the possibility of using lights placed on the side opposite to the direction of traffic, so as to be in a position to convey meanings different from those conveyed by the lights placed on the side appropriate to the direction of traffic” (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. I, p. 907 (chap. XI-B.24)).

618 Ibid., p. 181 (chap. IV.4). See also the Gambia’s reservation (ibid., p. 188).

619 Ibid., pp. 181-182 (chap. IV.4).
(8) In the light of the obvious advantages of giving reasons for reservations and the role this practice plays in the reservations dialogue, the Commission chose not to stipulate in guideline 2.1.9 that reasons should accompany the reservation and be an integral part thereof - as is generally the case for reasons for objections - but this is no doubt desirable, even though there is nothing to prevent a State or international organization from stating the reasons for its reservation *ex post facto*.

(9) Furthermore, although it seems wise to encourage the giving of reasons, this practice must not, in the Commission’s view, become a convenient smokescreen used to justify the formulation of general or vague reservations. According to guideline 3.1.7 (Vague, general reservations), “[a] reservation worded in vague, general language which does not allow its scope to be determined is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”. Giving reasons cannot obviate the need for the reservation to be formulated in terms that make it possible to assess its validity. Even without reasons, a reservation must be self-sufficient as a basis for assessment of its validity; the reasons can only facilitate this assessment.

(10) Likewise, the fact that reasons may be given for a reservation at any time cannot be used by authors to modify or widen the scope of a reservation made previously. This is stipulated in guidelines 2.3.4 (Subsequent exclusion or modification of the legal effect of a treaty by means other than reservations) and 2.3.5 (Widening of the scope of a reservation).

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620 [357, 2008] See guideline 2.6.10 and the commentary thereto below. It is in any case extremely difficult to distinguish the reservation from the reasons for its formulation if they both appear in the same instrument.

621 [358, 2008] Nevertheless, there are cases in which the clarification resulting from the reasons given for the reservation might make it possible to consider a “dubious” reservation to be valid. For example, Belize accompanied its reservation to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances with the following explanation: “Article 8 of the Convention requires the parties to give consideration to the possibility of transferring to one another proceedings for criminal prosecution of certain offences where such transfer is considered to be in the interests of a proper administration of justice. The courts of Belize have no extra-territorial jurisdiction, with the result that they will have no jurisdiction to prosecute offences committed abroad unless such offences are committed partly within and partly without the jurisdiction, by a person who is within the jurisdiction. Moreover, under the Constitution of Belize, the control of public prosecutions is vested in the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is an independent functionary and not under Government control. Accordingly, Belize will be able to implement article 8 of the Convention only to a limited extent insofar as its Constitution and the law allows.” (*Multilateral Treaties ...,* vol. I, p. 477 (chap. VI.19)). Without such an explanation, Belize’s reservation might have been considered “vague or general” and might thus have fallen within the scope of guideline 3.1.7. Accompanied by this explanation, it appears much more defensible.
2.2 Confirmation of reservations

2.2.1 Formal confirmation of reservations formulated when signing a treaty

If formulated when signing a treaty subject to ratification, act of formal confirmation, acceptance or approval, a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State or international organization when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 2.2.1 reproduces the exact wording of the text of article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations. As the Commission indicated in the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.622 it is consistent with the aim of the Guide to Practice to bring together in a single document all of the recommended rules and practices in respect of reservations. The text of article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1986 Convention is identical to the corresponding provision of the 1969 Convention, except that it refers to the procedure to be followed when an international organization is a party to a treaty. Because it is more complete, the 1986 wording was preferred to the 1969 wording.

This provision originated in the proposal made by Sir Humphrey Waldock in his first report on the law of treaties for the inclusion of a provision (draft article 17, para. 3 (b)) based on the principle that "the reservation will be presumed to have lapsed unless some indication is given in the instrument of ratification that it is maintained".623 The Special Rapporteur did not conceal that "[c] clearly, different opinions may be held as to what exactly is the existing rule on the point, if indeed any rule exists at all"624 and mentioned, in particular, article 14(d)625 of the Harvard draft, which posited the contrary assumption.626 The principle of the obligation to confirm a reservation formulated when signing was stated in article 18, paragraph 2, of the Commission's draft articles on the

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625 [1089, 2001] Waldock was citing article 15 (d) by mistake.
626 [1090, 2001] If a state has made a reservation when signing a treaty, its later ratification will give effect to the treaty in the relations of that State with other States which have become or may become parties to the treaty"; the Harvard draft is reproduced in Yearbook ... 1950, vol. II, pp. 243-244.
law of treaties, which were adopted without much discussion in 1962\textsuperscript{627} and which related generally to reservations formulated before the adoption of the text.

(2) The 1962 commentary gives a concise explanation of the raison d'être of the rule adopted by the Commission: "A statement of reservation is sometimes made during the negotiation and duly recorded in the proces-verbaux. Such embryo reservations have sometimes been relied upon afterwards as amounting to formal reservations. It seems essential, however, that the State concerned should formally reiterate the statement in some manner in order that its intention actually to formulate a reservation should be clear."\textsuperscript{628}

(6) On second reading, the wording of the draft provisions on the procedure in respect of reservations was considerably simplified at the urging of some Governments, which considered that many of them "would fit better into a code of recommended practices".\textsuperscript{629} The new provision, which was adopted on the basis of the proposals by the Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock,\textsuperscript{630} differs from the current text of article 23, paragraph 2, only by the inclusion of a reference to reservations formulated "on the occasion of the adoption of the text",\textsuperscript{631} which was deleted at the Vienna Conference under circumstances that have been described as "mysterious".\textsuperscript{632} The commentary to this provision reproduces the 1962 text\textsuperscript{633} almost verbatim and adds:

"Paragraph 2 concerns reservations made at a later stage [after negotiation]: on the occasion of the adoption of the text or upon signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Here again the Commission considered it essential that, when definitely committing itself to be bound, the State should leave no doubt as to its final standpoint in regard to the reservation. The paragraph accordingly requires the State formally to confirm the reservation if it desires to maintain it. At the same time, it provides that in these cases the reservation shall be

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item [627] See the summary records of the 651st-656th meetings (25 May–4 June 1962), Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, pp. 139-179.
  \item [628] Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 180
  \item [629] Comments by Sweden, ibid., vol. II, p. 47.
  \item [630] Ibid., pp. 53-54.
  \item [631] "if formulated on the occasion of the adoption of the text or upon signing the treaty ..." (Yearbook ... 1966, vol. H, p. 208).
  \item [632] In paragraph 2, the phrase 'on the occasion of the adoption of the text' mysteriously disappeared from the Commission's text when it was finally approved by the Conference"(J.M. Ruda, "Reservations to Treaties", RCADI1975-III, vol. 146, p. 195).
  \item [633] See para. (5) of the commentary to this guideline.
\end{itemize}
considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation, a point which is of importance for the operation of paragraph 5 of article 17 [20 in the text of the Convention].

(7) The rule in article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 Convention was reproduced in the 1986 Convention with only the drafting changes made necessary by the inclusion of international organizations and the introduction of the concept of "formal confirmation" (with the risks of confusion which this implies between that concept and the concept of the formal confirmation of the reservation in article 23). The 1986 Vienna Conference adopted the ILC text without changing the French text.

(8) While there can be hardly any doubt that, at the time of its adoption, article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 Convention related more to progressive development than to codification in the strict sense, it may be considered that the obligation formally to confirm reservations formulated when treaties in solemn form are signed has become part of positive law. Crystallized by the 1969 Convention and confirmed in 1986, the rule is followed in practice (but not systematically) and seems to satisfy an opinio necessitates juris, which allows a customary value to be assigned to it.

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636 [1100, 2001] See the discussions on this subject at the 1434th meeting on 6 June 1977, Yearbook ... 1977, vol. I, pp. 101-103. The Commission is aware of these risks, but did not believe that it should amend terminology that is now widely accepted.
638 [1102, 2001] The Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. Al-Khasawneh, stated that a correction had been made to the English text (replacing "by a treaty" with "by the treaty" - fifth plenary meeting, 18 March 1986, records of the Conference, p. 15, para. 63).
640 [1104, 2001] Thus, the practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations does not draw all the necessary inferences from the 1976 note by the Legal Counsel (see footnote 1105 below), since the former includes in the valuable publication entitled Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General reservations formulated when the treaty was signed, whether or not they were confirmed subsequently, even on the assumption that the State formulated other reservations when expressing its definitive consent to be bound; see, for example, United Nations, Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 1999, vol. I, p. 487, reservations by Turkey to the Customs Convention on Containers of 2 December 1972, and pp. 334-346: reservations by Iran and Peru to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 20 December 1988; such practice probably reflects a purely mechanical approach to the role of the depositary and does not involve any value judgement about the validity or nature of the declarations in question.
641 [1105, 2001] See, for example, the aide-memoire of the United Nations Legal Counsel describing the "practice of the Secretary-General in his capacity as depositary of multilateral treaties regarding ... reservations and objections to reservations relating to treaties not containing provisions in that respect", which relied on article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 Vienna Convention in concluding that: "If formulated at the time of signature subject to ratification, the reservation has only a declaratory effect, having the same legal value as the signature itself. It must be confirmed at the time of ratification; otherwise, it is deemed to have been withdrawn" (United Nations Juridical Yearbook, 1976, p. 219); the Council of Europe changed its practice in this regard in 1980 (cf. Frank Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, loc. cit., and Jorg Polakiewicz, Treaty-Making in the Council of Europe, Publications du Conseil de l'Europe, 1999, p. 96) and, in their answers to the Commission's questionnaire on
(9) In legal writings, the rule laid down in article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions now appears to have met with general approval, even if that was not always true in the past. In any case, whatever arguments might be advanced against it, they would not be of such a nature as to call into question the clear-cut rule which is contained in the Vienna Conventions and which the Commission has decided to follow in principle, except in the event of an overwhelming objection.

(10) Although the principle embodied in that provision met with general approval, the Commission asked three questions about:

   The effect of State succession on the implementation of that principle;
   The incomplete list of cases in which a reservation when signing must be confirmed; and, above all,
   Whether reference should be made to the "embryo reservations" constituted by some statements made before the signing of the text of the treaty.

(11) It was, for example, asked whether the wording of article 23, paragraph 2, should not be supplemented to take account of the possibility afforded to a successor State to formulate a reservation when it makes a notification of succession in accordance with draft guideline 11, which thus rounds out the definition of reservations contained in article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1986 Convention. In the Commission's opinion, the answer is not very simple. At first glance, the successor State can either confirm or invalidate an existing reservation made by the predecessor State or formulate a new reservation when it makes a notification of succession; in neither of these two cases is the successor State thus led to confirm a reservation when signing. Nevertheless, under article 18, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the 1978 Convention, a newly independent State may, under certain conditions, establish, through a notification of succession, its capacity as a contracting State or party to a multilateral treaty which was not in force on the date of the State's succession and to which the predecessor State

reservations to treaties, the States which indicated that they usually confirmed reservations formulated when the treaty was signed at the time of ratification or accession.

644 [1108, 2001] See para (5) of the commentary to this draft guideline.
646 [1110, 2001] Cf. article 20, para. 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.
647 [1111, 2001] Cf. article 20, para. 2.
was itself a contracting State. Under article 2 (f) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and article 2 (k) of the 1986 Convention, however, "contracting State' means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force" - and not merely a signature. It follows, conversely, that there can be no "succession to the signing" of a treaty (subject to ratification or an equivalent procedure) and that the concept of notification of succession should not be introduced into draft guideline 2.1.1.

(12) The Commission also questioned whether it should take account, in the preparation of this draft, of draft guideline 1.1.2 ("Cases in which a reservation may be formulated"). The problem does not arise with regard to the designation of the moment when the confirmation should take place, since the formula contained in article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions is equivalent to the one adopted by the Commission in draft guideline 1.1.2 ("when expressing its consent to be bound"). It might be thought, however, that the number of cases to which article 23, paragraph 2, seems to limit the possibility of subordinating definitive consent to be bound (ratification, act of formal confirmation, acceptance or approval) is too small and does not correspond to the one in article 11.

(13) However, although some of its members did not so agree, the Commission considered that such a concern is excessive; the differences in wording between article 11 and article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions lie in the omission from the latter of two possibilities contemplated in the former: "exchange of instruments constituting a treaty" and "any other means if so agreed". The probability that a State or an international organization would subordinate the expression of its definitive consent to be bound by a multilateral treaty subject to reservations to one of these modalities is sufficiently low that it

648 [1112, 2001] See draft guideline 2.2.2.
649 [1113, 2001] The publication Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General - Status as at 31 December 1999 does, however, mention, in the footnotes and without special comment, reservations formulated when signing by a predecessor State and apparently not formally confirmed by the successor State or States; see, for example, Czechoslovakia's reservations to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, noted in connection with the Czech Republic and Slovakia (vol. II, ST/LEG/SER.E/18 (vol. IT), Sales No. E.OO.V.2, pp. 239-240, note 4).
650 [1114, 2001] According to Claude Pilloud, "it seems that it should be recognized that, in applying the rule provided for in article 23, paragraph 2, by analogy to reservations expressed when signing, States which have made a declaration of continuity" to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 "should, if they had meant to endorse the reservations expressed [by the predecessor State], so state expressly in their declaration of continuity" ("Les reserves aux Conventions de Geneve de 1949", Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge, March-April 1976, p. 135). It is doubtful whether such an analogy can be made: the matter will be considered by the Commission when it carries out a more systematic study of the problems relating to succession to reservations.
651 [1115, 2001] The cases in which a reservation may be formulated contained in guideline 1.1 include all the means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty referred to in article 11 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/53/10), p. 203.
652 [1116, 2001] For a similar comment concerning the comparison of article 2, para. 1 (d), and article 11, see the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.2, in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/53/10), pp. 205-206, para. (8).
does not seem useful to overburden the wording of draft guideline 2.2.1 or to include a draft guideline equivalent to draft guideline 1.1.2 in chapter 2 of the Guide to Practice.

(14) Thirdly, several members of the Commission considered that account should be taken of the possible case where a reservation is formulated not at the time of signing the treaty, but before that. In their opinion, nothing prevents a State or an international organization from indicating formally to its partners the "reservations" which it has regarding the adopted text at the authentication stage\textsuperscript{653} or, for that matter, at any previous stage of negotiations.\textsuperscript{654}

(15) The Commission had, moreover, considered that possibility in draft article 19 (which became article 23 of the 1969 Convention), of which paragraph 2, as contained in the final text of the draft articles adopted in 1966, provided that: "If formulated on the occasion of the adoption of the text... a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case, the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation".\textsuperscript{655} Commenting on this provision, the Commission stated that "statements of reservations are made in practice at various stages in the conclusion of the treaty" and explained the reasons why it considered it necessary to confirm reservations on signing when expressing consent to be bound,\textsuperscript{656} adding that:

"Accordingly, a statement during the negotiations expressing a reservation is not, as such, recognized in article 16 [now article 19] as a method of formulating a reservation and equally receives no mention in the present article."\textsuperscript{657}

(16) As indicated above,\textsuperscript{658} the reference to the adoption of the text disappeared from the text of article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 Vienna Convention in "mysterious" circumstances during the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference, probably out of concern for consistency with the wording of the chapeau of article 19.

\textsuperscript{653} [1117, 2001] In addition to signing, moreover, article 10 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions mentions initallying and signing ad referendum as methods of authenticating the text of a treaty. On authentication "as a distinct part of the treaty-making process", see the commentary to article 9 of the Commission's draft articles on the law of treaties (which became article 10 at the Vienna Conference), Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 212.

\textsuperscript{654} [1118, 2001] See, in this connection, Japan's reservation to article 2 of the Food Aid Convention of 14 April 1971, which was negotiated by that State during the negotiation of the text, announced at the time of signing and formulated at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification with the depositary, the Government of the United States, on 12 May 1972.


\textsuperscript{656} [1120, 2001] See para. (5) of the commentary to this draft guideline.


\textsuperscript{658} [1122, 2001] See para. (6) of the commentary to this draft guideline.
However, a majority of members objected to the adoption of a draft guideline along those lines for fear of encouraging a growing number of statements which were intended to limit the scope of the text of the treaty, were formulated before the adoption of its text and were thus not in keeping with the definition of reservations.

2.2.2 [2.2.3] Instances of non-requirement of confirmation of reservations formulated when signing a treaty

A reservation formulated when signing a treaty does not require subsequent confirmation when a State or an international organization expresses by its signature the consent to be bound by the treaty.

Commentary

(1) The solution which was adopted for draft guideline 2.2.1 and which is faithful to the Vienna text obviously implies that the rule thus codified applies only to treaties in formal form, those that do not enter into force solely by being signed. With regard to treaties not requiring any post-signing formalities in order to enter into force and which are referred to as "agreements in simplified form", however, it is self-evident that, if formulated when the treaty is signed, a reservation becomes effective immediately without any formal confirmation being necessary or even conceivable.

(2) The Commission is not aware, however, of any clear-cut example of a reservation made at the time when a multilateral agreement in simplified form was signed. This eventuality certainly cannot be ruled out, however, if only because there are "mixed treaties", which can, if the parties so choose, enter into force solely upon signature or following ratification and which are subject to reservations or contain reservation clauses.

(3) In fact, this rule derives, a contrario, from the text of article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and


660 [1124, 2001] While the procedure involving agreements in simplified form is more commonly used for concluding bilateral rather than multilateral treaties, it is not at all unknown in the second case and major multilateral agreements may be cited which have entered into force solely by being signed. This is true, for example, of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (at least in terms of the entry into force of the bulk of its provisions following the signing of the Protocol of Provisional Application), the Geneva Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos of 23 July 1962 and the Agreement establishing a Food and Fertilizer Technology Centre for the Asian and Pacific Region of 11 June 1969.

661 [1125, 2001] Cf. article XIX of the Agreement of 20 August 1971 concerning the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat); see also the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances (art. 32), the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences of 6 April 1974 and the 1999 International Convention on Arrest of Ships (art. 12, para. 2).
1986 Vienna Conventions reproduced in draft guideline 2.2.1. In view of the practical nature of the Guide to Practice, however, the Commission found that it would not be superfluous to clarify this expressly in draft guideline 2.2.2.

(4) Although some members of the Commission would have preferred the term "agreements in simplified form", which is commonly used in French writings, it seemed referable not to use this term which was not used in the 1969 Vienna Convention. It may also be asked whether a reservation to a treaty provisionally entering into force or provisionally implemented pending its ratification—662—and hypothetically formulated when signing—must be confirmed at the time of its author's expression of definitive consent to be bound by the treaty. The Commission took the view that that was a different case than the one covered by draft guideline 2.2.2 and that there was no reason for a solution departing from the principle laid down in draft guideline 2.2.1. Accordingly, a separate draft guideline does not appear to be necessary.

2.2.3 [2.2.4] Reservations formulated upon signature when a treaty expressly so provides

A reservation formulated when signing a treaty, where the treaty expressly provides that a State or an international organization may make such a reservation at that time, does not require formal confirmation by the reserving State or international organization when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty …663

Commentary

(1) Alongside the case provided for by draft guideline 1.2.1, there is another hypothetical case in which the confirmation of a reservation formulated when signing appears to be superfluous, namely, where the treaty itself provides expressly for such a possibility without requiring confirmation. For example, article 8, paragraph 1, of the 1963 Council of Europe Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality provides that:

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663 [131, 2010] Section 2.3 proposed by the Special Rapporteur deals with the late formulation of reservations.
"Any Contracting Party may, when signing this Convention or depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession, declare that it avails itself of one or more of the reservations provided for in the Annex to the present Convention."\(^6\)

(2) In a case of this kind, it seems that practice consists of not requiring a party which formulates a reservation when signing to confirm it when expressing definitive consent to be bound. Thus, France made a reservation when it signed the 1963 Convention and did not subsequently confirm it.\(^6\) Similarly, Hungary and Poland did not confirm their reservation to article 20 of the 1984 Convention against Torture, article 28, paragraph 1, of which provides that such a reservation may be made when signing. Luxembourg also did not confirm the reservation it made to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and Ecuador did not confirm its reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, of 17 December 1973.\(^6\) It is true that other States\(^6\) nonetheless confirmed their reservation at the time of ratification.

(3) The members of the Commission had different opinions about this uncertain practice, although all agreed that a position should be adopted on this point in the Guide to Practice.

(4) Some members took the view that, in cases of this kind, the general rule laid down in article 23, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions should not be excluded because the reservation clauses in question, which mechanically reproduce the provisions of article 11, would then not actually have any particular scope.

(5) In the opinion of the majority of the members of the Commission, however, the rule embodied in article 23, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions, which, like all their provisions, was only dispositive in nature, should be applicable only where a treaty was silent; otherwise, the provisions relating to the possibility of reservations when signing would serve no useful purpose. In


\(^{6}\) Council of Europe, European Committee on Legal Cooperation (CCJ), CCJ Conventions and reservations to those Conventions, Note by the Secretariat, CCJ (99) 36, Strasbourg, 30 March 1999, p. 11; the same applied to Belgium's reservations to the 1988 Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Tax Matters (ibid., p. 55).

\(^{6}\) Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General..., vol. I, p. 224 and p. 214; ibid., vol. I, p. 265; and vol. II, p. 115. The Hungarian reservation was subsequently withdrawn.

\(^{6}\) Belarus, Bulgaria (reservation subsequently withdrawn), Czechoslovakia (reservation subsequently withdrawn by the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine (reservation subsequently withdrawn); see ibid., pp. 212-214.
their view, the uncertainties of practice may be explained by the fact that, if a formal confirmation in a case of this kind is not essential, it is also not ruled out: reservations made when signing a convention expressly authorizing reservations on signing are sufficient in and of themselves, it being understood, however, that nothing prevents reserving States from confirming them, even though nothing compels them to do so.

(6) Accordingly, the Commission endorsed the "minimum" practice, something that seems logical, since the treaty expressly provides for reservations when signing. According to the majority opinion, if this principle was not recognized, many unconfirmed reservations formulated when signing would have to be deemed without effect, even where the States which formulated them did so on the basis of the text of the treaty itself.

2.3 Late reservations

(1) Chapter 2, section 3, of the Guide to Practice is devoted to the particularly sensitive issue of what are commonly called "late reservations". The Commission has preferred to speak of the "late formulation of a reservation", however, in order clearly to indicate that what is meant is not a new or separate category of reservations, but, rather, declarations which are presented as reservations, but which are not in keeping with the time periods during which they may, in principle, be considered as such, since the moments at which reservations may be formulated are specified in the definition of reservations itself.

(2) In practice, however, it is not uncommon for a State to try to formulate a reservation at a different moment from those provided for by the Vienna definition and this possibility, which may have some definite advantages, has not been totally ruled out by practice. After the expression of its consent to be bound, a State cannot, by means of the interpretation of a reservation shirk certain obligations established by a treaty. This principle is not to be sanctioned lightly and that the primary objective of this section of the Guide to Practice is to indicate the rigorous

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668 [1131, 2001] And such "precautionary confirmations" are quite common (see, for example, the reservations by Belarus, Brazil (which nevertheless confirmed only two of its three initial reservations), Hungary, Poland, Turkey and Ukraine to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, ibid., vol. I, pp. 327-329).
669 [1132, 2001] Cf. articles 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, article 2, paragraph 1 (j), of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties and draft guideline 1.1 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/53/10), p. 196): "Reservation' means a unilateral statement [...] made by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty [...]”; see also draft guideline 1.1.2, ibid., p. 203.
conditions to which it is subject. Draft guideline 2.3.1 states the rule that the late formulation of a reservation is, in principle, excluded and the draft guidelines that follow it stipulate the basic conditions to which any exception to this principle is subject: the absence of objections within a 12-month period by all the other parties without exception (draft guidelines 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). In addition, draft guideline 2.3.4 is designed to prevent the exclusion of the principle of the late formulation of reservations from being circumvented by means other than reservations.

2.3.1 Late formulation of a reservation

Unless the treaty provides otherwise, a State or an international organization may not formulate a reservation to a treaty after expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty except if none of the other Contracting Parties objects to the late formulation of the reservation.

Commentary

(1) Unless otherwise provided by a treaty, something which is always possible, the expression of definitive consent to be bound constitutes, for the contracting parties, the last (and in view of the requirement concerning formal confirmation of reservations formulated during negotiations and when signing, only) time when a reservation may be formulated. This rule, which is unanimously recognized in legal writings and which arose from the very definition of reservations and is also implied by the "chapeau" of article 19 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, is widely observed in practice. It was regarded as forming part of positive law by

670 [1133, 2001] To the Commission's knowledge, there has to date been no example of the late formulation of a reservation by an international organization.
671 [1134, 2001] Some reservation clauses specify, for example, that "reservations to one or more of the provisions of this Convention may be made at any time prior to ratification of or accession to this Convention ..." (Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy) or "at the latest at the moment of ratification or at adhesion, each State may make the reserves contemplated in articles ..." (Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning the protection of infants; these examples are quoted by P. H. Imbert, Les reserves aux traits multilateraux, Paris, Pedone, 1979, pp. 163-164); see also the examples given in para. (3) of this commentary.
672 [1135, 2001] It has been stated particularly forcefully by Giorgio Gaja: "the latest moment in which a State may make a reservation is when it expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty" ("Unruly Treaty Reservations", in Le droit international a l'heure de sa codification - Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto Ago, Milan, Giuffre, 1987, vol. I, p.310).
673 [1136, 2001] See footnote 1132, above.
674 [1137, 2001] "A State [or an international organization] may, when signing, ratifying, [formally confirming], accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation ...".
675 [1138, 2001] Moreover, this explains why States sometimes try to get round the prohibition on formulating reservations after the entry into force of a treaty by calling unilateral statements "interpretative declarations", which actually match the definition of reservations (see para. (27) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.2 ("Definition of interpretative declarations"), Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/54/10), p. 236).
the International Court of Justice in its Judgment of 20 December 1988 in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions case:

"... Article LV of the Pact of Bogota enables the parties to make reservations to that instrument which 'shall, with respect to the State that makes them, apply to all signatory States on the basis of reciprocity'. In the absence of special procedural provisions, those reservations may, in accordance with the rules of general international law on the point as codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, be made only at the time of signature or ratification of the pact or at the time of adhesion to that instrument."676

(2) According to some members of the Commission it was questionable whether this kind of declaration was compatible with the definition of reservation under draft guideline 1.1. Nevertheless, the principle that a reservation may not be formulated after expression of consent to be bound "is not absolute. It applies only if the contracting States do not authorize by agreement the formulation, in one form or another, of new reservations"677 or restrict still further the moments at which a reservation is possible.

(3) Although the possibility of late formulation of a reservation "has never been contemplated, either in the context of the International Law Commission or during the Vienna Conference",678 it is relatively frequent.679 Thus, for example:

Article 29 of the Convention of 23 July 1912 on the Unification of the Law relating to Bills of Exchange provided that:

"The State which desires to avail itself of the reservations in Article 1, paragraph 2, or in Article 22, paragraph 1, must specify the reservation in its instrument of ratification or adhesion ..."

"The contracting State which hereafter desires to avail itself of the reservations above mentioned, must notify its intention in writing to the Government of the Netherlands."

679 [1142, 2001] In addition, see also those examples given by P.H. Imbert in Les reserves aux traites multilateraux, Paris, Pedone, 1979, pp. 164-165.
680 [1143, 2001] In fact, what is meant here is not reservations, but reservation clauses.
681 [1144, 2001] See also article 1, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Convention of 7 June 1930 Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes and article 1, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Convention of 19 March 1931 providing a Uniform Law
Likewise, under article XXVI of the 1955 Hague Protocol to amend the Convention for the Unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929. 682

"No reservation may be made to this Protocol except that a State may at any time declare by a notification addressed to the Government of the People's Republic of Poland that the Convention as amended by this Protocol shall not apply to the carriage of persons, cargo and baggage for its military authorities on aircraft, registered in that State, the whole capacity of which has been reserved by or on behalf of such authorities"; Article 38 of the Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 concerning the International Administration of the Estates of Deceased Persons provides that: "A Contracting State desiring to exercise one or more of the options envisaged in Article 4, the second paragraph of Article 6, the second and third paragraphs of Article 30 and Article 31, shall notify this to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, either at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession or subsequently". 683

Under article 30, paragraph 3, of the Convention of 25 January 1988 on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Tax Matters (Council of Europe):

"After the entry into force of the Convention in respect of a Party, that Party may make one or more of the reservations listed in paragraph 1 which it did not make at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval. Such reservations shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of receipt of the reservation by one of the Depositaries". 684

Similarly, article 10, paragraph 1, of the International Convention on Arrest of Ships of 12 March 1999 provides that:

for Cheques: "... the reservations referred to in Articles ... may, however, be made after ratification or accession, provided that they are notified to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations ..."; "Each of the High Contracting Parties may, in urgent cases, make use of the reservations contained in Articles ... even after ratification or accession ...". 682


683 [1146, 2001] See also article 26 of the Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes: "A Contracting State having at the date of the entry into force of the Convention for that State a complex system of national allegiance may specify from time to time by declaration how a reference to its national law shall be construed for the purposes of the Convention". This provision may refer to an interpretative declaration rather than to a reservation.

684 [1147, 2001] This convention entered into force on 1 April 1995; it seems that no State party has exercised the option envisaged in this provision. See also article 5 of the 1978 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, "[a]ny Contracting Party which is bound by the provisions of both chapters I and II may at any time declare by means of a
"Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, or accession, or at any time thereafter, reserve the right to exclude the application of this Convention to any or all of the following:...".

(4) This is not especially problematic in itself and is in conformity with the idea that the Vienna rules are only of a residual nature (as the guidelines in the Guide to Practice will be, and with all the more reason). However, since what is involved is a derogation from a rule now accepted as customary and enshrined in the Vienna Conventions, it seems necessary that such a derogation should be expressly provided for in the treaty. The Commission wanted to clarify this principle in the text of draft guideline 2.3.1 although this was not legally indispensable in order to emphasize the exceptional character that the late formulation of reservations should have.

(5) It is true that the European Commission on Human Rights was flexible in this respect, having appeared to rule that a State party to the Rome Convention could invoke the amendment of national legislation covered by an earlier reservation to modify, at the same time, the scope of that reservation without violating the time limit placed on the option of formulating reservations by article 64 of the Convention. The scope of this precedent is not clear, however, and it may be that the Commission took this position because, in reality, the amendment of its legislation did not in fact result in an additional limitation on the obligations of the State concerned.

(6) Whatever the case, the requirement that there should be a clause expressly authorizing the formulation of a reservation after expression of consent to be bound seems all the more crucial given that it was necessary, for particularly pressing practical reasons, which the Commission set out in its commentary to draft guideline 1.1.2, to include a time limit in the definition of reservations itself: "The idea of including time limits on the possibility of making reservations in the definition of reservations itself has progressively gained ground, given the magnitude of the drawbacks in terms of stability of legal relations of a system which would allow parties to formulate a reservation at any moment. It is in fact the principle pacta sunt servanda itself which would be called into question, in that at any moment a party to a treaty notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that it will only be bound by one or the other of chapters I and II. Such notification shall take effect six months after the date of the receipt of such notification".

could, by formulating a reservation, call its treaty obligations into question; in addition, this would excessively complicate the task of the depositary.\textsuperscript{687} Because the late formulation of reservations should be avoided as much as possible, the words "Unless the treaty provides otherwise" at the beginning of draft guideline 2.3.1 should be interpreted narrowly.

(7) This basic requirement of an express provision is not, however, the only exception to the rule that a reservation must, in principle, be made not later than the moment at which consent to be bound is expressed.

(8) It emerges from current practice that the other contracting parties may unanimously accept a late reservation and this consent (which may be tacit) can be seen as a collateral agreement extending ratione temporis the option of formulating reservations - if not reservations to the treaty concerned in general, then at least the reservation or reservations in question.

(9) This possibility has been seen as translating the principle that "the parties are the ultimate guardians of a treaty and may be prepared to countenance unusual procedures to deal with particular problems".\textsuperscript{688} In any event, as has been pointed out, "[t]he solution must be understood as dictated by pragmatic considerations. A party remains always\textsuperscript{689} at liberty to accede anew to the same treaty, this time by proposing certain reservations. As the result will remain the same whichever of these two alternatives one might choose, it seemed simply more expedient to settle for the more rapid procedure ...".\textsuperscript{690}

(10) Initially, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in keeping with his great caution in this area since the 1950s, had held to the position that "[i]n accordance with established international practice to which the Secretary-General conforms in his capacity as depositary, a reservation may be formulated only at the time of signature, ratification or accession" and, as a result, he had taken the view that a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which did not make any reservations at the time of ratification was not

\textsuperscript{686} [1149, 2001] In case 1731/62, the Commission took the view that "the reservation made by Austria on 3 September 1958 ... covers the law of 5 July 1962, the result of which was not to enlarge a posteriori the field removed from the control of the Commission", Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights No. 7, p. 202 - italics added.


\textsuperscript{689} [1152, 2001] The author is referring to a specific treaty: the Convention of 19 March 1931 providing a Uniform Law for Cheques (see para. (10) of the commentary to this draft guideline), in which article VIII expressly provides for the option of denunciation; but the practice also applies in the case of treaties that do not include a withdrawal clause (see para. (12) of the commentary to this draft guideline).
entitled to make any later. Two years later, however, he softened his position considerably in a letter to the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of France, which was considering the possibility of denouncing the Convention of 1931 providing a Uniform Law for Cheques with a view to reaccessing to it with new reservations. Taking as a basis "the general principle that the parties to an international agreement may, by unanimous decision, amend the provisions of an agreement or take such measures as they deem appropriate with respect to the application or interpretation of that agreement", the Legal Counsel states:

"Consequently, it would appear that your Government could address to the Secretary-General, over the signature of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a letter communicating the proposed reservation together with an indication of the date, if any, on which it is decided that it should take effect. The proposed reservation would be communicated to the States concerned (States parties, Contracting States and signatory States) by the Secretary-General and, in the absence of any objection by States parties within 90 days from the date of that communication (the period traditionally set, according to the practice of the Secretary-General, for the purpose of tacit acceptance and corresponding, in the present case, to the period specified in the third paragraph of article I of the [1931] Convention for acceptance of the reservations referred to in articles 9, 22, 27 and 30 of annex II), the reservation would be considered to take effect on the date indicated." (11) That is what happened: the French Government addressed to the Secretary-General, on 7 February 1979, a letter drafted in accordance with this information; the Secretary-General circulated this letter on 10 February and "[s]ince no objections by the Contracting States were received within 90 days from the date of circulation of this communication ... the reservation was deemed accepted and took effect on 11 May 1979". (12) Since then, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appears to have adhered continuously to this practice in the performance of his functions as depositary. It was

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695 [1157, 2001] Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General..., vol. II, p. 422, note 4; curiously, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany expressly stated, on 20 February 1980, that it "raise[d] no objections thereto".
696 [1158, 2001] In addition to the examples given by Giorgio Gaja, "Unruly Treaty Reservations", in *Le droit international a l'heure de sa codification - Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto Ago*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1987, vol. I, p. 311, see, for instance, Belgium's reservation
formalized in a legal opinion of the Secretariat of 19 June 1984 to the effect that "the parties to a treaty may always decide, unanimously, at any time, to accept a reservation in the absence of, or even contrary to, specific provisions in the treaty" and irrespective of whether the treaty contains express provisions as to when reservations may be formulated.\footnote{[1159, 2001] Letter to a governmental official of a Member State, United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1984, p. 183; the italics are contained in the original text.}

(13) This practice is not limited to the treaties of which the Secretary-General is the depositary. In the above-mentioned 1978 legal opinion,\footnote{[1160, 2001] Para. (10) of the commentary to this draft guideline} the Legal Counsel of the United Nations referred to a precedent involving a late reservation to the Customs Convention of 6 October 1960 on the Temporary Importation of Packings, which was deposited with the Secretary-General of the Customs Cooperation Council and article 20 of which "provides that any Contracting Party may, at the time of signing and ratifying the Convention, declare that it does not consider itself bound by article 2 of the Convention. Switzerland, which had ratified the Convention on 30 April 1963, made a reservation on 21 December 1965 which was submitted by the depositary to the States concerned and, in the absence of any objection, was considered accepted with retroactive effect to 31 July 1963".\footnote{[1161, 2001] Letter to the Permanent Mission of a Member State to the United Nations, 14 September 1978, United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1978, pp. 199-200.}

(14) Several States parties to the 1978 Protocol to the International Convention of 1973 for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which entered into force on 2 October 1983, have widened the scope of their earlier reservations\footnote{[1162, 2001] France (ratification 25 September 1981; amendment 11 August 1982: IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions as at 31 December 1999, p. 77).} or added new ones after expressing their consent


to be bound. Likewise, late reservations to certain conventions of the Council of Europe have been formulated without any objection being raised.

(15) As these examples show, it is not out of the question that late reservations should be deemed to have been legitimately made, in the absence of any objection by the other contracting parties consulted by the depositary. But they also show that the cases involved have almost always been fairly borderline ones: either the delay in communicating the reservation was minimal or the notification occurred after ratification, but before the entry into force of the treaty for the reserving State, or else the planned reservation was duly published in the official publications, but "forgotten" at the time of the deposit of the instrument of notification, something which can, at a pinch, be regarded as "rectification of a material error".

(16) A pamphlet published by the Council of Europe emphasizes the exceptional nature of the derogations permitted within that organization from the agreed rules on formulating reservations: "Accepting the belated formulation of reservations may create a dangerous precedent which could be invoked by other States in order to formulate new reservations or to widen the scope of existing ones. Such practice would jeopardize legal certainty and impair the uniform implementation of European treaties." For the same reasons, some authors are reluctant to acknowledge the existence of such a derogation from the principle of the limitation ratione temporis of
the possibility of formulating reservations.704

(17) These are also the considerations that led the members of the Commission to consider that particular caution should be shown in sanctioning a practice which ought to remain exceptional and narrowly circumscribed. For that reason, the Commission decided to give a negative formulation to the rule contained in draft guideline 2.3.1: the principle is, and must remain, that the late formulation of a reservation is not lawful; it may become so, in the most exceptional cases, only if none of the other Contracting Parties objects705

(18) Yet it is a fact that "[a]ll the instances of practice here recalled point to the existence of a rule that allows States to make reservations even after they have expressed their consent to be bound by a treaty, provided that the other contracting States acquiesce to the making of reservations at that stage."706 In fact, it is difficult to imagine what might prevent all the contracting States from agreeing to such a derogation, whether this agreement is seen as an amendment to the treaty or as the mark of the "collectivization" of control over the permissibility of reservations.707

(19) It is this requirement of unanimity, be it passive or tacit,708 that makes the exception to the principle acceptable and limits the risk of abuse. It is an indissociable element of this derogation, observable in current practice and consistent with the role of "guardian" of the treaty that States parties may collectively assume.709 But this requirement is not meaningful, nor does it fulfil its objectives, unless a single objection renders the reservation impossible. Failing this, the very principle established in the first phrase of article 19 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions would be reduced to nothing: any State could add a new reservation to its acceptance of a treaty at any time because there would always be one other contracting State that would not object to such a reservation and the situation would revert to that in which States or international organizations find

705 [1168, 2001] On the problems to which the word "object" gives rise, see para. (23) of the commentary to this draft guideline.
707 [1170, 2001] This "control" must, of course, be exercised in conjunction with the "organs of control", where they exist. In the ChrysostomosLoizidou cases, control by States over the permissibility ratione temporis of reservations introduced by Turkey by means of an optional statement accepting individual petitions) was superseded by the organs of the European Convention on Human Rights (see paras. (5) and (6)) of the commentary to draft guideline 2.3.4.
708 [1171, 2001] Draft guidelines 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 explain the terms and conditions concerning the acceptance of the late formulation of a reservation.
709 [1172, 2001] See para. (9) of the commentary to this draft guideline.
themselves at the time of becoming parties, when they enjoy broad scope for formulating reservations, subject only to the limits set in articles 19 and 20.

(20) The caution demonstrated in practice and the clarifications provided on several occasions by the Secretary-General, together with doctrinal considerations and concerns relating to the maintenance of legal certainty, justify, in this particular instance, the strict application of the rule of unanimity, it being understood that, contrary to the traditional rules applicable to all reservations (except in Latin America), this unanimity concerns the acceptance of (or at least the absence of any objection to) late reservations. It is without effect, however, on the participation of the reserving State (or international organization) in the treaty itself: in the event of an objection, it remains bound, in accordance with the initial expression of its consent; and it can opt out (with a view to reaccessing subsequently and formulating anew the rejected reservations) only in conformity with either the provisions of the treaty itself or the general rules codified in articles 54 to 64 of the Vienna Conventions.

(21) The question also arises whether a distinction should not be made between, on the one hand, objections in principle to the formulation of late reservations and, on the other hand, traditional objections, such as those that can be made to reservations pursuant to article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. This distinction appears to be necessary, for it is hard to see why co-contracting States or international organizations should not have a choice between all or nothing, that is to say, either accepting both the reservation itself and its lateness or preventing the State or organization which formulated it from doing so, whereas they may have reasons that are acceptable to their partners. Furthermore, in the absence of such a distinction, States and international organizations which are not parties when the late reservation is formulated, but which become parties subsequently through accession or other means would be confronted with a fait accompli. Paradoxically, they could not object to a late reservation, whereas they are permitted to do so under article 20, paragraph 5,710 relating to reservations formulated when the reserving State expresses its consent to be bound.\textsuperscript{711}

(22) The unanimous consent of the other contracting parties should therefore be regarded as

\textsuperscript{710}[1173, 2001] "... a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State or an international organization if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of 12 months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later "(italics added).

\textsuperscript{711}[1174, 2001] It would be equally paradoxical to allow States or international organizations which become parties to the treaty after the reservation is entered to object to it under article 20, paragraph 4 (b), whereas the original parties cannot do so.
necessary for the late formulation of reservations. On the other hand, the normal rules regarding acceptance of and objections to reservations, as codified in articles 20 to 23 of the Vienna Conventions, should be applicable with regard to the actual content of late reservations, to which the other parties should be able to object "as usual", a point to which the Commission intends to return in the section of the Guide to Practice on objections to reservations.

(23) In view of this possibility, which cannot be ruled out, at least intellectually (even if it does not seem to have been used in practice to date\textsuperscript{712}, some members of the Commission wondered whether it was appropriate to use the word "objects" in draft guideline 2.3.1 to refer to the opposition of a State not to the planned reservation, but to its very formulation.\textsuperscript{713} Nevertheless, most members took the view that it was inadvisable to introduce the distinction formally, since in practice the two operations are indistinguishable.

2.3.2 Acceptance of late formulation of a reservation

Unless the treaty provides otherwise or the well-established practice followed by the depositary differs, late formulation of a reservation shall be deemed to have been accepted by a Contracting Party if it has made no objections to such formulation after the expiry of the 12-month period following the date on which notification was received.

Commentary

(1) The purpose of draft guideline 2.3.2 is to clarify and supplement the last part of draft guideline 2.3.1 which rules out any possibility of the late formulation of a reservation "except if none of the other contracting Parties objects to the late formulation of the reservation".

(2) Some members of the Commission who were concerned to restrict the practice of the late formulation of reservations as far as possible believed that such a practice should require express acceptance.

(3) According to the dominant opinion, it appeared, however, that, just as reservations formulated within the set periods may be accepted tacitly,\textsuperscript{714} it should likewise be possible for late

\textsuperscript{712} [1175, 2001] Some late reservations have, however, been expressly accepted (for an example, see footnote 1157 above).

\textsuperscript{713} [1176, 2001] In that case, the words "except if none of the other contracting Parties objects to the late formulation of the reservation" at the end of the draft guideline could have been replaced by the words "... if none of the other contracting Parties is opposed to the late formulation of their reservation".

\textsuperscript{714} [1177, 2001] Cf. article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions (in the 1986 text): "unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State or an international organization if it shall have raised no objection to the
reservations to be accepted in that manner (whether their late formulation or their content is at issue) and for the same reasons. It seems fairly clear that to require an express unanimous consent would rob of any substance the (at least incipient) rule that late reservations are possible under certain conditions (which must be strict), for, in practice, the express acceptance of reservations at any time is rare indeed. In fact, requiring such acceptance would be tantamount to ruling out any possibility of the late formulation of a reservation. It is hardly conceivable that all the contracting States to a universal treaty would expressly accept such a request within a reasonable period of time.

(4) Moreover, that would call into question the practice followed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by the secretaries-general of the Customs Cooperation Council (World Customs Organizations (WCO)), the International Maritime Organization (EMO) and the Council of Europe, all of whom considered that certain reservations which had been formulated late, had entered into force in the absence of objections from the other contracting parties.

(5) It remains to be determined, however, how much time the other contracting parties have to oppose the late formulation of a reservation. There are two conflicting sets of considerations in this regard. On the one hand, it must be left to the other contracting States to examine the planned reservation and respond to it; on the other, a long period of time extends the period of uncertainty about the fate of the reservation (and therefore of contractual relations) correspondingly.

(6) Practice in this respect is ambiguous. It seems that the secretaries-general of IMO, the Council of Europe and WCO proceeded in an empirical manner and did not set any specific periods when they consulted the other contracting parties. That was not true for the Secretary General of the United Nations.

(7) In the first place, when the Secretary-General's current practice was inaugurated in the 1970s, the parties were given a period of 90 days in which "to object" to a late reservation, where appropriate. Nevertheless, the choice of this period seems to have been somewhat circumstantial: it happens to have coincided with the period provided for in the relevant provisions of the 1931

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715 [1178, 2001] See paras. (10) to (14) of the commentary to draft guideline 2.3.1.

716 [1179, 2001] It would appear, however, that the Secretary-General of IMO considers that, in the absence of a response within one month following notification, the reservation becomes effective (cf. footnote 1163 above and IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs
Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in connection with Cheques, to which France wanted to make a new reservation.\textsuperscript{717} That notwithstanding, the 90-day period was adopted whenever a State availed itself thereafter of the opportunity to formulate a new reservation, or modify an existing one, after the entry into force with respect to that State of a new treaty of which the Secretary-General was the depositary.\textsuperscript{718}

(8) In practice, however, this 90-day period proved to be too short; owing to the delays in transmission of the communication by the Office of the Legal Counsel to States, the latter had very little time in which to examine these notifications and respond to them, whereas such communications are likely to raise "complex questions of law" for the parties to a treaty, requiring "consultations among them, in deciding what, if any, action should be taken in respect of such a communication".\textsuperscript{719} It is significant, moreover, that, in the few situations in which parties took action, such actions were formulated well after the 90-day period that had theoretically been set for them.\textsuperscript{720} For this reason, following a note verbale from Portugal reporting, on behalf of the European Union, on difficulties linked to the 90-day period, the Secretary-General announced, in a circular addressed to all Member States, a change in the practice in that area. From then on, "if a State which had already expressed its consent to be bound by a treaty formulated a reservation to that treaty, the other parties would have a period of 12 months after the Secretary-General had circulated the reservation to inform him that they wished to object to it".\textsuperscript{721}

(9) In taking this decision, which will also apply to the amendment of an existing reservation, "the Secretary-General [was] guided by article 20, paragraph 5, of the [Vienna] Convention, which indicates a period of 12 months to be appropriate for Governments to analyse and assess a reservation that has been formulated by another State and to decide upon what action, if any, should be taken in respect of it".\textsuperscript{722}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[717] See paras. (10) and (11) of the commentary to draft guideline 2.3.1.
\item[718] Ibid., para. (12).
\item[719] Memorandum from the United Nations Legal Counsel addressed to the Permanent Representatives of States Members of the United Nations, 4 April 2000 (LA 41 TR/221 (23-1)).
\item[720] Cf. the response by Germany to the French reservation to the 1931 Convention on Cheques, issued one year following the date of the French communication (see footnote 157 in the commentary to draft guideline 2.3.1.)
\item[721] See footnote 1182 above
\item[722] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
(10) Some members of the Commission expressed some concerns about the length of that period, which has the drawback that, during the 12 months following notification by the Secretary-General,723 total uncertainty prevails as to the fate of the reservation that has been formulated and, if a single State objects to it at the last minute, that is sufficient to consider it as not having been made. These members then wondered whether an intermediate solution (six months, for example) would not have been wiser. Nevertheless, taking into account the provisions of article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions and the recent announcement of the Secretary-General of his intentions, the Commission considered that it made more sense to bring its own position - which, in any event, has to do with progressive development and not with codification in the strict sense - into line with those intentions.

(11) Likewise, in view of the different practices followed by other international organizations acting as depositaries,724 the Commission took the view that it would be wise to reserve the possibility for a depositary to maintain its usual practice, provided that it has not elicited any particular objections. In practice, that is of little concern save to international depositary organizations; some members of the Commission nevertheless thought that it was inadvisable to rule out such a possibility a priori when the depositary was a State or Government.

(12) The wording of draft guideline 2.3.2, which tries not to call into question the practice actually followed, while at the same time guiding it, is based on the provisions of article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1986 Vienna Convention,725 but adapts them to the specific case of the late formulation of reservations.

2.3.3 Objection to late formulation of a reservation

If a Contracting Party to a treaty objects to late formulation of a reservation, the treaty shall enter into or remain in force in respect of the reserving State or international organization without the reservation being established.

Commentary

723 [1186, 2001] In other words, not the communication from the State announcing its intention to formulate a late reservation. This may seem debatable, for the fate of the reservation depends on how fast the depositary acts.

724 [1187, 2001] See para. (6) of the commentary to this draft guideline.

725 [1188, 2001] "... unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State or an international organization if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of 12 months after it was notified of the reservation ...".
(1) Draft guideline 2.3.3 draws the consequences of an objection made by a contracting State or international organization to the late formulation of a reservation: it follows from draft guideline 2.3.1 that such a reservation is in principle impossible and that a single "objection" is sufficient to prevent it from producing any effect. That is what is necessarily implied by the expression "except if none of the other contracting Parties objects".

(2) Given the strict interpretation the Commission intends to give to this rule, it seemed useful to explain its consequences, i.e. that conventional relations remain unaffected by the declaration made by the State or the international organization which is its author and that this declaration may not be considered a reservation, which is the meaning of the expression: "without the reservation being established ...", borrowed from article 21, paragraph 1, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.

(3) On the other hand, the objection, which its author does not have to justify, produces its full effects when lodged within the 12-month period indicated in draft guideline 2.3.2. This is why the Commission uses the word "objects", as opposed to "formulates", for an intended reservation.

(4) The Commission is aware of the fact that, by including this provision in the section of the Guide to Practice relating to the late formulation of reservations, it seems to be departing from the rule it established that it would deal in chapter 2 of the Guide only with questions of procedure, to the exclusion of the effects which irregularities marring that procedure might produce. However, it seems to the Commission that this apparent breach of the rule is justified by the fact that, in the present case, an objection not only prevents the declaration of the author of the intended reservation from producing effects, but also creates an obstacle to it being deemed a reservation.

(5) It is therefore advisable not to equate the "objections" in question here with those which are the subject of articles 20 to 23 of the Vienna Conventions: while these prevent a genuine reservation from producing all its effects in the relations between its author and the State or international organization which is objecting to it, an "objection" to the late formulation of a reservation "destroys" the latter as a reservation. It was to avoid such confusion that some

726 [1189, 2001] See commentary to draft guideline 2.3.1, especially paras. (6), (16) and (17).
727 [1190, 2001] A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and23 ...".
members of the Commission wanted to use different terminology in draft guidelines 2.3.1 to 2.3.3.728 However, a majority of members considered such a distinction pointless.729

(6) The Commission also debated the particular procedures which should be followed for objecting to the late formulation of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization. According to article 20, paragraph 3, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions: "When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization." Applying as it does to reservations formulated "in time", this rule applies a fortiori when the formulation is late. This appears to be so obvious that it is not deemed useful to state it formally in a draft guideline, on the understanding that the principle established in this provision will be taken up in the relevant section of the Guide to Practice.

2.3.4 Subsequent exclusion or modification of the legal effect of a treaty by means other than reservations

A Contracting Party to a treaty may not exclude or modify the legal effect of provisions of the treaty by:

(a) Interpretation of a reservation made earlier; or

(b) A unilateral statement made subsequently under an optional clause.

Commentary

(1) The Commission intends to expand on and clarify the consequences of the principle stated in draft guideline 2.3.1 when it considers problems relating to effects and the permissibility of reservations (since the fundamental questions are clearly how to determine the consequences produced, on the one hand, by the late formulation of a reservation and, on the other hand, by its possible entry into force when it has not given rise to any objection). It nevertheless seemed to the Commission that the exclusion in principle of "late reservations" should be made even stricter by the adoption of draft guideline 2.3.4, the purpose of which is to indicate that a party to a treaty may not get round this prohibition by means which have the same purpose as reservations, but do not meet the definition of

728 [1191, 2001] See paras. (21) to (23) to the commentary to draft guideline 2.3.1 and especially footnote 1176.
729 [1192, 2001] Ibid., para. (23).
reservations. Otherwise, the "chapeau" of article 19 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions\textsuperscript{730} would be deprived of any specific scope.

(2) To this end, draft guideline 2.3.4 targets two means in particular: the (extensive) interpretation of reservations made earlier, on the one hand, and statements made under an optional clause appearing in a treaty, on the other. The selection of these two means of "circumvention" may be explained by the fact that they have both been used in practice and that this use has given rise to jurisprudence that is accepted as authoritative. One cannot, however, rule out the possibility that States or international organizations might have recourse in the future to other means of getting round the principle stated by draft guideline 2.3.1; it goes without saying that the reasoning which justifies the express prohibitions enunciated in draft guideline 2.3.4 should therefore be applied \textit{mutatis mutandis}.

(3) The principle that a reservation may not be formulated after the expression of definitive consent to be bound appeared to be sufficiently established at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for the Court to consider, in its advisory opinion of 8 September 1983 concerning \textit{Restrictions to the death penalty}, that, once made,\textsuperscript{731} a reservation "escapes" from its author and may not be interpreted outside the context of the treaty itself. The Court adds the following:

"A contrary approach might ultimately lead to the conclusion that the State is the sole arbiter of the extent of its international obligations on all matters to which its reservation related, including even all such matters which the State might subsequently declare that it intended the reservation to cover.

"The latter result cannot be squared with the Vienna Convention, which provides that a reservation can be made only when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty (Vienna Convention, art. 19)."\textsuperscript{732}

\textsuperscript{730} [1193, 2001] For the text of this provision, see footnote 1137 in the commentary to draft guideline 2.3.1. The Commission has not considered it necessary formally to reproduce in the Guide to Practice the rule enunciated in this provision: that would overlap with the definition set out in draft guidelines 1.1 and 1.1.2.

\textsuperscript{731} [1194, 2001] The word "made" is probably more appropriate here than "formulated", since the Inter-American Court of Human Rights considers (perhaps questionably) that "a reservation becomes an integral part of the treaty", which is conceivable only if it is "in effect".

In the same way, following the Belilos case, the Swiss Government initially revised its 1974 "interpretative declaration", which the Strasbourg Court regarded as an impermissible reservation, by adding a number of clarifications to its new "declaration". The permissibility of this new declaration, which was criticized by the relevant doctrine, was challenged before the Federal Court, which, in its decision Elisabeth B. v. Council of State of Thurgau Canton of 17 December 1992, declared the declaration invalid on the ground that it was a new reservation that was incompatible with article 64, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights. Mutatis mutandis, the limit on the formulation of reservations imposed by article 64 of the Rome Convention is similar to the limit resulting from article 19 of the Vienna Conventions, and the judgement of the Swiss Federal Court should certainly be regarded as a reaffirmation of the prohibition in principle on reservations formulated following the definitive expression of consent to be bound, but it goes further and establishes the impossibility of formulating a new reservation in the guise of an interpretation of an existing reservation.

The decision of the European Commission on Human Rights in the Chrysostomos et al. case leads to the same conclusion, but provides an additional lesson. In the case in question, the Commission believed that it followed from the "clear wording" of article 64, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights "that a High Contracting Party may not, in subsequent recognition of the individual right of appeal, make a major change in its obligations arising from the Convention for the purposes of procedures under article 25". Here again, the decision of the European Commission may be interpreted as a confirmation of the rule resulting from the introductory wording of the provision in question, with the important clarification that a State

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733 [1196, 2001] European Court of Human Rights, judgement of 29 April 1988, Series A, No. 132
734 [1197, 2001] See Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Reservations and declarations, European Treaty Series (ETS), No. 5.
736 [1199, 2001] The European Court of Human Rights would have declared the 1974 "declaration" as a whole invalid: "the interpretative declaration concerning article 6, paragraph 1, European Court of Human Rights, formulated by the Federal Council at the time of ratification could therefore not have a full effect in either the field of criminal law or in that of civil law. As a result, the 1988 interpretative declaration cannot be regarded as a restriction, a new formulation or a clarification of the reservation that existed previously. Rather, it represents a reservation formulated subsequently" (Journal des Tribunaux, 1995, p. 536; German text in EuGRZ 1993, p. 72).
737 [1200, 2001] "Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing an instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article".
may not circumvent the prohibition on reservations following ratification by adding to a declaration made under an opting-in clause (which does not in itself constitute a reservation)\textsuperscript{739} conditions or limitations with effects identical to those of a reservation, at least in cases where the optional clause in question does not make any corresponding provision.

(6) Although, in the \textit{Loizidou} judgement of 23 March 1995, the Court was not as precise, the following passage can be regarded as a reaffirmation of the position in question:

"The Court further notes that article 64 of the Convention enables States to enter reservations when signing the Convention or when depositing their instruments of ratification. The power to make reservations under article 64 is, however, a limited one, being confined to particular provisions of the Convention ..",\textsuperscript{740}

(7) The decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the Swiss Federal Court reaffirm the stringency of the rule set out at the beginning of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties and in draft guideline 2.3.1 and draw very direct and specific consequences therefrom, as is made explicit in draft guideline 2.3.4.

(8) Paragraph (b) of this draft guideline refers implicitly to draft guideline 1.4.6 and, less directly, to draft guideline 1.4.7 relating to unilateral statements made under an optional clause and providing for a choice between the provisions of a treaty, which the Commission has clearly excluded from the scope of the Guide to Practice. However, the purpose of draft guideline 2.3.4 is not to regulate these procedures as such, but to act as a reminder that they cannot be used to circumvent the rules relating to reservations themselves.

(9) Some members of the Commission expressed doubts on the inclusion of this guideline because it used terms that lacked exactitude.

\textbf{2.3.5 Widening of the scope of a reservation}

The modification of an existing reservation for the purpose of widening its scope shall be subject to the rules applicable to the late formulation of a reservation. However, if an objection is made to that modification, the initial reservation remains unchanged.

Commentary

(1) The question of the modification of reservations should be posed in connection with the questions of the withdrawal and late formulation of reservations. Insofar as a modification is intended to lessen the scope of a reservation, what is involved is a partial withdrawal of the initial reservation, which poses no problem in principle, being subject to the general rules concerning withdrawals; the provisions of draft guidelines 2.5.10 and 2.5.11 apply. However, if the effect of the modification is to widen an existing reservation, it would seem logical to start from the notion that what is involved is the late formulation of a reservation and to apply to it the rules which are applicable in this regard and which are stated in draft guidelines 2.3.1 to 2.3.3.

(2) This is the reasoning forming the basis for draft guideline 2.3.5, which refers to the rules on the late formulation of reservations and also makes it clear that, if a State makes an “objection” to the widening of the reservation, the initial reservation applies.

(3) These assumptions were contested by a minority of the members of the Commission, who took the view that these rules run counter to the Convention on the Law of Treaties and it risked unduly weakening the treaty rights of States. In addition, the established practice of the Council of Europe seems to be to prohibit any “widening” modification.

(4) Within the Council framework, “[t]here have been instances where States have approached the Secretariat requesting information as to whether and how existing reservations could be modified. In its replies the Secretariat has always stressed that modifications which would result in an extension of the scope of existing reservations are not acceptable. Here the same reasoning applies as in the case of belated reservations … Allowing such modifications would create a dangerous precedent which would jeopardize legal certainty and impair the uniform implementation of European treaties”.

(5) The same author questions whether a State may denounce a treaty to which it has made reservations in order to ratify it subsequently with widened reservations. He feels that such a

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742 [584, 2004] For the text of these provisions and the commentaries thereto, see ibid., Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), pp. 477-495.
procedure may constitute an abuse of rights, while admittedly basing his arguments on grounds specific to the Council of Europe conventions.744

(6) The majority of the members of the Commission nevertheless considered that a regional practice (which is, moreover, absolutely not settled745) should not be transposed to the universal level and that, as far as the widening of existing reservations is concerned, it would not be logical to apply rules that differ from those applicable to the late formulation of reservations.

(7) If, after expressing its consent, together with a reservation, a State or an international organization wishes to “widen” the reservation, in other words, to modify in its favour the legal effect of the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation refers, such provisions will be fully applicable, for the same reasons:

- It is essential not to encourage the late formulation of limitations on the application of the treaty;

- On the other hand, there may be legitimate reasons why a State or an international organization would wish to modify an earlier reservation and, in some cases, it may be possible for the author of the reservation to denounce the treaty in order to ratify it again with a “widened reservation”;

- It is always possible for the parties to a treaty to modify it at any time by unanimous agreement;746 it follows that they may also, by unanimous agreement, authorize a party to modify, again at any time, the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects in their application to that party; and

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744 [586, 2004] Ibid. One can interpret in this sense the Swiss Federal Court decision of 17 December 1992 in the case of Elisabeth B. v. Council of State of Thurgau Canton (Journal des Tribunaux, vol. I: Droit Fédéral, 1995, pp. 523-537); see the seventh report on reservations to treaties, A/CN.4/526/Add.3, paras. 199-200. On the same point, see J.-F. Flauss, “Le contentieux de la validité des réserves à la CEDH devant le Tribunal fédéral suisse: Requiem pour la déclaration interprétative relative à l’art. 6, § 1”, R.U.D.H. 1993, p. 303. In this regard, it may be noted that, on 26 May 1998, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Optional Protocol and ratified it again the same day with a new reservation (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 2003, ST/LEG/SER.E/22, vol. I, chap. IV.5, p. 222, note 3). After several objections and a decision by the Human Rights Committee dated 31 December 1999 (Communication No. 845/1999, CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 - see the fifth report on reservations to treaties, A/CN.4/508, para. 12), Trinidad and Tobago again denounced the Protocol on 27 March 2000 (Multilateral Treaties ..., ibid.). What was involved, however, was not the modification of an existing reservation, but the formulation of an entirely new reservation.


• The requirement of the *unanimous* consent of the other parties to the widening of the scope of the reservation seems to constitute an adequate safeguard against abuses.

(8) At least at the universal level, moreover, the justified reluctance not to encourage the States parties to a treaty to widen the scope of their reservations after the expression of their consent to be bound has not prevented practice in respect of the widening of reservations from being based on practice in respect of the late formulation of reservations,\(^\text{747}\) and this is entirely a matter of common sense.

(9) Depositaries treat “widening modifications” in the same way as late reservations. When they receive such a request by one of the parties, they consult all the other parties and accept the new wording of the reservation only if none of the parties opposes it by the deadline for replies.

(10) For example, when Finland acceded to the 1993 Protocol on Road Markings, additional to the European Agreement supplementing the Convention on Road Signs and Signals of 1968, on 1 April 1985, it formulated a reservation to a technical provision of the instrument.\(^\text{748}\) Ten years later, on 5 September 1995, Finland declared that its reservation also applied to a situation other than that originally mentioned: \(^\text{749}\)

“In keeping with the practice followed in similar cases, the Secretary-General proposed to receive the modification in question for deposit in the absence of any objection on the part of any of the Contracting States, either to the deposit itself or to the procedure envisaged. None of the Contracting Parties to the Protocol having notified the Secretary-General of an objection within a period of 90 days from the date of its circulation (on 20 December 1995), the said modification was accepted for deposit upon the expiration of the above-stipulated 90-day period, that is, on 19 March 1996.”\(^\text{750}\)

\(^{747}\) [589, 2004] G. Gaja gives the example of the “correction” by France on 11 August 1982 of the reservation formulated in its instrument of approval of the 1978 Protocol to the International Convention of 1973 for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which it deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization on 25 September 1981 (“Unruly Treaty Reservations”, *Le droit international à l’heure de sa codification - Études en l’honneur de Roberto Ago*, Giuffrè, Milan, 1987, vol. I, pp. 311-312). This is a somewhat unusual case, since, at the time of the “correction”, the MARPOL Protocol had not yet entered into force with respect to France; in this instance, the depositary does not appear to have made acceptance of the new wording dependent on the unanimous agreement of the other parties, some of which did in fact object to the substance of the modified reservation (see *Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions as at 31 December 2002*, J/2387, p. 81).

\(^{748}\) [590, 2004] In its original reservation with respect to para. 6 of the annex, Finland reserved “the right to use yellow colour for the continuous line between the opposite directions of traffic” (*Multilateral Treaties…*, vol. I, XI.B.25, p. 830).

\(^{749}\) [591, 2004] “… the reservation made by Finland also applies to the barrier line” (ibid., pp. 830-831).

\(^{750}\) [592, 2004] Ibid., note 586.
The procedure followed by the Secretary-General is the same as the one currently followed in the case of late formulation of reservations.\footnote{593, 2004}{592}

(11) As another example, the Government of Maldives notified the United Nations Secretary-General on 29 January 1999 that it wished to modify the reservations it had formulated upon acceding to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1993. Germany, which had objected to the original reservations, also opposed their modification, arguing, among other things, that:

“… reservations to treaties can only be made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty (article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). After a State has bound itself to a treaty under international law, it can no longer submit new reservations or extend or add to old reservations. It is only possible to totally or partially withdraw original reservations, something unfortunately not done by the Government of the Republic of the Maldives with its modification.”\footnote{593, 2004}

(12) However, just as it had not objected to the formulation of the original reservation by Maldives by opposing its entry into force as between the two States, so Germany did not formally oppose the modification as such. This reinforces the doubts of some members of the Commission as to whether the term “objection” should be used to refer to the opposition of States to late modification of reservations. A State might well find the modification procedure acceptable while objecting to the content of the modified reservation.\footnote{594, 2004} Since, however, contrary to the opinion of the majority of its members, the Commission decided to retain the word “objection” to refer to the opposition of States to late formulation of reservations in draft guidelines 2.3.2 and 2.3.3,\footnote{595, 2004} it considered that the same terminology should be used here.

\footnote{593, 2004}{See the commentary to draft guideline 2.3.1 (“Late formulation of a reservation”), Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), paras. (11) and (13), pp. 484-485.}

\footnote{594, 2004}{It should be noted that, at present, the period would be 12 months, not 90 days (see draft guideline 2.3.2 (“Acceptance of late formulation of a reservation”), ibid., p. 489 and, in particular, paras. (5) to (10) of the commentary, ibid., pp. 490-493.}

\footnote{595, 2004}{Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. I, chap. IV.8, notes 35, 42, p. 237. For Germany’s original objection, see p. 248. Finland also objected to the modified Maldivian reservation, ibid., p. 245. The German and Finnish objections were made more than 90 days after the notification of the modification, the deadline set at that time by the Secretary-General.}

\footnote{596, 2004}{See para. (23) of the commentary to draft guideline 2.3.1, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), p. 489.}

\footnote{597, 2004}{See the text of these draft guidelines, ibid., p. 463.}
Draft guideline 2.3.5 refers implicitly to draft guidelines 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 on the late formulation of reservations. It did not seem necessary to say so expressly in the text because these guidelines immediately precede it in the Guide to Practice.

It should, however, be noted that the transposition of the rules applicable to the late formulation of reservations, as contained in draft guideline 2.3.3, to the widening of an existing reservation cannot be unconditional. In both cases, the existing situation remains the same in the event of an “objection” by any of the contracting parties, but this situation is different: prior to the late formulation of a reservation, the treaty applied in its entirety as between the contracting parties to the extent that no other reservations were made; in the case of the late widening of the scope of a reservation, however, the reservation was already established and produced the effects recognized by the Vienna Conventions. This is the difference of situation covered by the second sentence of draft guideline 2.3.5, which provides that, in this second case, the initial reservation remains unchanged in the event of an “objection” to the widening of its scope.

The Commission did not consider it necessary for a draft guideline to define the “widening of the scope of a reservation” because its meaning is so obvious. Bearing in mind the definition of a reservation contained in draft guidelines 1.1 and 1.1.1, it is clear that this term applies to any modification designed to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty or of the treaty as a whole in respect of certain specific aspects in their application to the reserving State or international organization, in a broader manner than the initial reservation.

2.4 Procedure for interpretative declarations

Commentary

In view of the lack of any provision on interpretative declarations in the Vienna Conventions and the scarcity or relative uncertainty of practice with regard to such declarations, they cannot be considered in isolation. We can only proceed by analogy with (or in contrast to) reservations, taking great care, of course, to distinguish conditional interpretative declarations from those that are not conditional.756

2.4.0 Form of interpretative declarations

An interpretative declaration should preferably be formulated in writing.

Commentary
(1) There would be no justification for requiring a State or an international organization to follow a given procedure for giving, in a particular form, its interpretation of a convention to which it is a party or a signatory or to which it intends to become a party. Consequently, the formal validity of an interpretative declaration is in no way linked to observance of a specific form or procedure.\textsuperscript{757} The rules on the form and communication of reservations cannot therefore be purely and simply transposed to simple interpretative declarations, which may be formulated orally; it would therefore be paradoxical to insist that they be formally communicated to other interested States or international organizations.

(2) Nevertheless, while there is no legal obligation in that regard, it seems appropriate to ensure, to the extent possible, that interpretative declarations are publicized widely. If no such communication exercise is undertaken, the author of the declaration runs the risk that the latter will not have the desired effect. Indeed, the influence of a declaration in practice depends to a great extent on its dissemination.

(3) Without discussing, at this stage,\textsuperscript{758} the legal implications of these declarations for the interpretation and application of the treaty in question, it goes without saying that such unilateral statements are likely to play a role in the life of the treaty; this is their raison d’être and the purpose for which they are formulated by States and international organizations. The International Court of Justice has highlighted the importance of these statements in practice:


\textsuperscript{758} [527, 2009] See Part IV, sect. 2, of the Guide to Practice below.
“Interpretations placed upon legal instruments by the parties to them, though not conclusive as to their meaning, have considerable probative value when they contain recognition by a party of its own obligations under an instrument.”759

Rosario Sapienza has also underlined the importance and the role of interpretative declarations and of reactions to them, as they:

“... forniranno utile contributo anche alla soluzione [of a dispute]. E ancor più le dichiarazioni aiuteranno l’interprete quando controversia non si dia, ma semplice problema interpretativo.”760

[“... will contribute usefully to the settlement [of a dispute]. Statements will be still more useful to the interpreter when there is no dispute, but only a problem of interpretation.”].

In her study, *Einseitige Interpretationserklärungen zu multilateralen Verträgen* (“Unilateral Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties”), Monika Heymann has rightly stressed:

“Dabei ist allerdings zu beachten, dass einer schriftlich fixierten einfachen Interpretationserklärung eine größere Bedeutung dadurch zu kommen kann, dass die übrigen Vertragsparteien sie eher zur Kenntnis nehmen und ihr im Streitfall eine höhere Beweisfunktion zukommt.”761

[“In that regard, it should be noted that a simple written interpretative declaration can take on greater importance because the other contracting parties take note of it and, in the event of a dispute, it has greater probative value.”]

(4) Moreover, in practice, States and international organizations endeavour to give their interpretative declarations the desired publicity. They transmit them to the depositary, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in turn, disseminates the text of such declarations762 and

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publishes them in *Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General*.\(^{763}\) Clearly, this communication procedure, which ensures wide publicity, requires that declarations be made in writing.

(5) This requirement, however, is merely a practicality born of the need for efficacy. As the Commission has pointed out above,\(^{764}\) there is no legal obligation in this regard. This is why, unlike guideline 2.1.1 on the written form of reservations,\(^{765}\) guideline 2.4.0 takes the form of a simple recommendation, like the guidelines adopted in relation to, for example, the statement of reasons for reservations\(^{766}\) and for objections to reservations.\(^{767}\) The use of the auxiliary “should” and the inclusion of the word “preferably” reflect the desirable but voluntary nature of use of the written form.\(^{768}\)

### 2.4.1 Formulation of interpretative declarations

An interpretative declaration must be formulated by a person who is considered as representing a State or an international organization for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or expressing the consent of the State or international organization to be bound by a treaty.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft guideline 2.4.1 transposes and adapts to interpretative declarations, as defined by draft guidelines 1.2,\(^{769}\) the provisions of draft guideline 2.1.3 on the formulation of reservations.

(2) It goes without saying that these declarations can only produce effects, whatever their nature, if they emanate from an authority competent to engage the State or the international organization at the international level. And since the declaration purports to produce effects in relation to a treaty,

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\(^{763}\) [532, 2009] To give just one example, while article 319 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not explicitly require its depositary to communicate interpretative declarations made under article 311 of the Convention, the Secretary-General publishes them systematically in chapter XXI.6 of *Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General* (http://treaties.un.org).

\(^{764}\) [533, 2009] Para. (1) of this commentary.

\(^{765}\) [534, 2009] For text of guideline 2.1.1, see sect. C.1 above.


\(^{768}\) [537, 2009] This is why, whereas guideline 2.1.1, on the form of reservations, is entitled “Written form”, guideline 2.4.0 is entitled simply “Form of interpretative declarations”.

it would seem appropriate to limit the option of formulating it to the authorities competent to engage the State or the organization through a treaty.

(3) With regard to the form of interpretative declarations, however, a very different problem arises than with regard to reservations; the former are declarations purporting to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions, without subjecting its consent to be bound to that interpretation. Except in the case of conditional interpretative declarations, which are dealt with in draft guideline 2.4.3, the author of the declaration is taking a position,770 but is not attempting to make it binding on the other contracting parties. Hence it is not essential for such declarations to be in writing, as it is in the case of reservations (draft guideline 2.1.1) or conditional interpretative declarations (draft guideline 2.4.3). It is certainly preferable that they should be known to the other parties, but ignorance of them would not necessarily void them of all legal consequences. Moreover, the oral formulation of such declarations is not uncommon and has not kept judges or international arbitrators from recognizing that they have certain effects.771

(4) Consequently, there is no need for a draft guideline on the form that simple interpretative declarations may take, since the form is unimportant. The silence of the Guide to Practice on that point should make this sufficiently clear.

(5) Also, there seems to be no reason to transpose the rules governing the communication of reservations to simple interpretative declarations, which may be formulated orally; it would therefore be paradoxical to insist that they be formally communicated to other interested States or international organizations. By refraining from such communication, the author of the declaration runs the risk that the declaration may not have the intended effect, but this is a different problem altogether. There is no reason to transpose the corresponding parts of the provisions of draft guidelines 2.1.5 to 2.1.8 on the communication of reservations and it does not seem necessary to include a clarification of this point in the Guide to Practice.


Formulation of an interpretative declaration at the internal level

The determination of the competent authority and the procedure to be followed at the internal level for formulating an interpretative declaration is a matter for the internal law of each State or relevant rules of each international organization.

A State or an international organization may not invoke the fact that an interpretative declaration has been formulated in violation of a provision of the internal law of that State or the rules of that organization regarding competence and the procedure for formulating interpretative declarations as invalidating the declaration.]

Commentary

(1) In the Commission’s opinion, the formulation of interpretative declarations at the internal level calls for the same comments as in the case of reservations. In this regard, national rules and practices are extremely diverse. This becomes clear from the replies of States to the Commission’s questionnaire on reservations to treaties. Of the 22 States that replied to questions 3.5 and 3.5.1,772

- In seven cases, only the executive branch is competent to formulate a declaration;773
- In one case, only the Parliament has such competence;774 and
- In 14 cases, competence is shared between the two,775 and the modalities for collaboration between them are as diverse as they are with regard to reservations.

In general, the executive branch probably plays a more distinct role than it does in the case of reservations.

(2) It follows a fortiori that the determination of competence to formulate interpretative declarations and the procedure to be followed in that regard is purely a matter for internal law and that a State or an international organization would not be entitled to invoke a violation of internal law as invalidating the legal effect that its declarations might produce - especially since it appears that, in general, there is greater reliance on practice than on formal written rules.

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772 [262, 2002] Question 3.5: “At the internal level, what authority or authorities take(s) the decision to make such interpretative declarations?”; question 3.5.1: “Is the Parliament involved in the formulation of these declarations?” This list of States is not identical to the list of States that responded to similar questions on reservations.

773 [263, 2002] Chile, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia and the Holy See.


775 [265, 2002] Argentina, Bolivia, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Mexico, Panama, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States of America.
It is therefore appropriate to transpose to interpretative declarations, whether they are conditional or not, the provisions of draft guideline 2.4.2 on the formulation of reservations at the internal level, without it being necessary to make a distinction between conditional interpretative declarations and other interpretative declarations.

### 2.4.3 Time at which an interpretative declaration may be formulated

Without prejudice to the provisions of guidelines 1.2.1, 2.4.6 [2.4.7] and 2.4.7 [2.4.8], an interpretative declaration may be formulated at any time.

#### Commentary

1. As a result a contrario of guideline 1.2, which defines interpretative declarations independently of any time element, a "simple" interpretative declaration (as opposed to a conditional interpretative declaration) may, unlike a reservation, be formulated at any time. It is therefore enough to refer to the Commission's commentaries to that provision, and draft guideline 1.4.3 follows specifically therefrom. This option is, however, not absolute and involves three exceptions.

2. The first relates to the relatively frequent case of treaties providing expressly that interpretative declarations to them can be formulated only at a specified time or times, as in the case, for example, of article 310 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is clear that, in a case of this kind, the contracting parties may make interpretative declarations such as those referred to in the relevant provision only at the time or times restrictively indicated in the treaty.

3. The Commission questioned whether this exception, which actually seems quite obvious, should be mentioned in draft guideline 2.4.3, but it found that it was not necessary to be so specific: the Guide to Practice is intended to be exclusively residual in nature and it goes without saying that the provisions of a treaty must be applicable as a matter of priority if they are

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777 [1205, 2001] Ibid., pp. 234-239, paras. (21) to (32) of the commentary.
778 [1206, 2001] Article 309 [excluding reservations] does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and its regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effects of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that State." Also see, for example, article 26, paragraph 2, of the Basel Convention of 22 March 1989 on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and article 43 of the New York Agreement of 4 August 1995 on Straddling Fish Stocks.
contrary to the guidelines contained in the Guide.\footnote{1207, 2001} It seemed advisable, however, to provide for the very specific case of the late formulation of an interpretative declaration when a treaty provision expressly limits the option of formulating such a reservation ratione temporis. This case is covered by draft guideline 2.4.6, to which draft guideline 2.4.3 refers.

(4) The existence of an express treaty provision limiting the option of formulating interpretative declarations is not the only instance in which a State or an international organization is prevented ratione temporis from formulating an interpretative declaration. The same applies in cases where the State or organization has already formulated an interpretation which its partners have taken as a basis or were entitled to take as a basis (estoppel). In such a case, the author of the initial declaration is prevented from modifying it. This hypothesis will be considered in connection with the draft guidelines relating to the modification of reservations and interpretative declarations.\footnote{1208, 2001} (31) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.2, Official Records of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 10 (A/54/10), p. 239.

(5) The third exception relates to conditional interpretative declarations, which, unlike simple interpretative declarations, cannot be formulated at any time, as stated in draft guideline 1.2.1 on the definition of such instruments,\footnote{1209, 2001} to which draft guideline 2.4.3 expressly refers.

(6) It also provides for the case covered by draft guideline 2.4.7 relating to the late formulation of a conditional interpretative declaration.

(7) Lastly, it appeared to be obvious that only an existing instrument could be interpreted and that it was therefore not necessary to specify that a declaration could be made only after the text of the treaty had been finally adopted.

### 2.4.3 bis Communication of interpretative declarations

The communication of written interpretative declarations should be made, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, in accordance with the procedure established in guidelines 2.1.5, 2.1.6 and 2.1.7.

\footnote{1207, 2001}{The Commission nevertheless departed from this principle in a few cases when it decided to place the emphasis on the exceptional and derogative nature of the guidelines it was proposing (see, for example, guideline 2.3.1 and para. (6) of the commentary thereto, above).}

\footnote{1208, 2001}{See also para. (31) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.2, Official Records of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 10 (A/54/10), p. 239.}

\footnote{1209, 2001}{A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty ... shall constitute a conditional interpretative declaration" (ibid., p. 240 (italics added); see paras. (15) to (18) of the commentary to this draft guideline, ibid., pp. 248-249).}
Commentary

(1) The considerations that led the Commission to adopt guideline 2.4.0, recommending that States and international organizations should preferably formulate their interpretative declarations in writing, apply equally to the dissemination of such declarations, which need to be in written form to be publicized.

(2) Here too, it seemed to the Commission that it is in the interests of both the author of the interpretative declaration and the other contracting parties that the declaration should be disseminated as widely as possible. If the authors of interpretative declarations wish their position to be taken into account in the application of the treaty - particularly if there is any dispute - it is undoubtedly in their interest to have their position communicated to the other States and international organizations concerned. Moreover, only a procedure of this type seems to give the other contracting parties an opportunity to react to an interpretative declaration.

(3) The communication procedure could draw upon the procedure applicable to other types of declaration in respect of a treaty, such as the procedure for the communication of reservations, as set out in guidelines 2.1.5 to 2.1.7, it being understood that only a recommendation is being made, since, unlike reservations, interpretative declarations are not required to be made in writing.

(4) Some members of the Commission believe that the depositary should be able to initiate a consultation procedure in cases where an interpretative declaration is manifestly impermissible, in which case guideline 2.1.8 should also be mentioned in guideline 2.4.3 bis. Since, on the one hand, guideline 2.1.8 - which in any case concerns the progressive development of international law - has met with criticism and, on the other, an interpretative declaration can only be considered in exceptional cases, this suggestion has been rejected.

782 [539, 2009] See paras. (1)-(5) above, of the commentary to guideline 2.4.0.
783 [540, 2009] For texts of guidelines 2.1.5 to 2.1.7, see sect. C.1 above.
784 [541, 2009] See guideline 2.4.0 and the commentary thereto above.
785 [542, 2009] For text of guideline 2.1.8, see sect. C.1 above.
(5) Similarly, and notwithstanding the position expressed by some members of the Commission, statements of reasons for interpretative declarations do not appear to correspond to the practice of States and international organizations or, in essence, to meet a need. In formulating interpretative declarations, States and international organizations generally wish to set forth their position concerning the meaning of one of the treaty’s provisions or of a concept used in the text of the treaty and, in general, they explain the reasons for this position. It is hardly necessary, or even possible, to provide explanations for these explanations. Some members thought that the meaning of interpretative declarations was often ambiguous and that, therefore, statements of reasons would clarify it. The majority view nevertheless was that a recommendation to this effect, even in the form of a simple recommendation, was not needed.\(^787\)

**2.4.4 [2.4.5] Non-requirement of confirmation of interpretative declarations made when signing a treaty**

An interpretative declaration made when signing a treaty does not require subsequent confirmation when a State or an international organization expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty.

**Commentary**

(1) The rule that it is not necessary to confirm interpretative declarations made when signing a treaty in fact derives inevitably from the principle embodied in draft guideline 2.4.3. Since interpretative declarations may be made at any time, save in exceptional cases, it would be illogical and paradoxical to require that they should be confirmed when a State or an international organization expressed its final consent to be bound by the treaty.

(2) In this connection, there is a marked contrast between the rules applicable to reservations\(^788\) and those relating to interpretative declarations, since the principle is the exact opposite: reservations formulated when signing a treaty must in principle be confirmed, but interpretative declarations do not have to be.

(3) In the light of the very broad wording of draft guideline 2.4.4, the transposition to interpretative declarations of the principle established in draft guideline 2.2.2,\(^789\) according to

\(^{787}[544, 2009]\) Reactions to interpretative declarations are a different matter - see guideline 2.9.6 below.

\(^{788}[1210, 2001]\) See draft guideline 2.2.1 and the commentary thereto.

\(^{789}[1211, 2001]\) See the commentary to this draft guideline
which it is not necessary to confirm a reservation formulated when signing a treaty not subject to ratification (agreement in simplified form), would be pointless: the principle stated in draft guideline 2.4.4 is applicable to all categories of treaties, whether they enter into force solely as a result of their signature or are subject to ratification, approval, acceptance, formal confirmation or accession.

(4) In practice, the opposition between the rules applicable to reservations, on the one hand, and to interpretative declarations, on the other, is nonetheless not as clear-cut as it may seem:

First, nothing prevents a State or an international organization which has made a declaration when signing from confirming it when expressing its final consent to be bound;
Secondly, the principle stated in draft guideline 2.4.4 is not applicable to conditional interpretative declarations, as clearly stated in draft guideline 2.4.5.

[2.4.5 [2.4.4] Formal confirmation of conditional interpretative declarations formulated when signing a treaty

If a conditional interpretative declaration is formulated when signing a treaty subject to ratification, act of formal confirmation, acceptance or approval, it must be formally confirmed by the declaring State or international organization when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the interpretative declaration shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation.]790

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 2.4.5 makes an important exception to the principle set out in draft guideline 2.4.4 whereby an interpretative declaration formulated when signing the treaty does not need to be confirmed by the author. This rule cannot apply to conditional interpretative declarations.

(2) In the case of the latter, the Commission noted in the commentary to draft guideline 1.2 that, if the conditional interpretative declaration had been formulated at the time of signature of the treaty, it should "Probably" be "confirmed at the time of the expression of definitive consent

790 [145, 2010] The guidelines on conditional interpretative declarations have been placed in square brackets, pending a final determination by the Commission on whether the legal regime of such declarations entirely follows that of reservations. As this appears to be the case, these guidelines will be replaced by a single provision equating these declarations with reservations.
to be bound".791 There would appear to be no logical reason for a different solution as between reservations and conditional interpretative declarations, to which the other Parties must be in a position to react where necessary.

(3) It will be noted that in practice States wishing to make their participation in a treaty subject to a specified interpretation of the treaty generally confirm their interpretation at the time of expression of definitive consent to be bound, when it has been formulated at the time of signature or at any earlier point in the negotiations.792

(4) As a departure from the principle set out in draft guideline 2.4.4 for "simple" interpretative declarations, the rules concerning formal confirmation of reservations formulated on signature, contained in draft guideline 2.2.1, should therefore be transposed to conditional interpretative declarations.

2.4.6 [2.4.7] Late formulation of an interpretative declaration

Where a treaty provides that an interpretative declaration may be made only at specified times, a State or an international organization may not formulate an interpretative declaration concerning that treaty subsequently except if none of the other Contracting Parties objects to the late formulation of the interpretative declaration.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 2.4.6 is the counterpart, for interpretative declarations, of draft guideline 2.3.1, relating to reservations.

(2) Despite the principle enunciated in draft guideline 2.4.3, whereby interpretative declarations may be made at any time after the adoption of the text of the treaty, interpretative declarations, like reservations, may be late. This is obviously true for conditional interpretations, which, like reservations themselves, can be formulated (or confirmed) only at the time of the
expression of definitive consent to be bound, as specified in draft guidelines 1.2.1\textsuperscript{793} and 2.4.5.\textsuperscript{794} But this may also be so in the case of simple interpretative declarations, particularly when the treaty itself establishes the period within which they may be made.\textsuperscript{795} The object of draft guideline 2.4.6 is to cover this situation, which is expressly allowed for in draft guideline 2.4.3.

(3) The Commission wishes to emphasize that this is not an academic question. For example, the Egyptian Government had in 1993 ratified the Basel Convention of 22 March 1989 on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal without attaching any particular declarations to its instrument of ratification, but on 31 January 1995 it formulated declarations interpreting certain provisions of the treaty,\textsuperscript{796} which limited such a possibility solely to the time of expression by a party of its consent to be bound.\textsuperscript{797} Since certain Parties to the Convention contested the admissibility of the Egyptian declarations, either because, in their view, the declarations were really reservations (prohibited by article 26, paragraph 1) or because they were late,\textsuperscript{798} the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the depositary of the Basel Convention, "in keeping with the depositary practice followed in similar cases, ... proposed to receive the declarations in question for deposit in the absence of any objection on the part of any of the Contracting States, either to the deposit itself or to the procedure envisaged, within a period of 90 days from the date of their circulation".\textsuperscript{799} Subsequently, in view of the objections received from certain contracting States,\textsuperscript{800} he "[took] the view that he [was] not in a position to accept these declarations [formulated by Egypt] for deposit"\textsuperscript{801} and declined to include them in the section entitled "Declarations and Reservations" and reproduce them only in the section entitled "Notes", accompanied by the objections concerning them.

\textsuperscript{794} [1215, 2001] See above.
\textsuperscript{795} [1216, 2001] See, paras. (2) and (3) of the commentary to draft guideline 2.4.3.
\textsuperscript{797} [1218, 2001] Under article 26, paragraph 2, of the Convention, a State may, within certain limits, formulate such declarations, but only "when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or formally confirming or acceding to this Convention".
\textsuperscript{798} [1219, 2001] See the observations by the United Kingdom, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands or Sweden {Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General - Status as at 30 April 1995, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.V.5, pp. 897-898 - the 2000 edition of this publication is incomprehensible).
\textsuperscript{799} [1220, 2001] Ibid., p. 897.
\textsuperscript{800} [1221, 2001] Ibid., para. 328.
\textsuperscript{801} [1222, 2001] Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General - Status as at 30 April 1995 ..., p. 897.
(4) It will be inferred from this example, which was not protested by any of the States parties to the Basel Convention that, in the particular, but not exceptional, case in which a treaty specifies the times at which interpretative declarations may be made, the same rules should be followed as those set out in draft guideline 2.3.1. The commentaries to that provision are therefore transposable, *mutatis mutandis*, to draft guideline 2.4.6.

(5) It is self-evident that the approaches laid down in draft guidelines 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 can also be transposed to acceptances of interpretative declarations formulated late and objections to such formulation. Nevertheless, the Commission considered that it was not useful to overburden the Guide to Practice by including express draft guidelines in this respect.

2.4.7 [2.4.2, 2.4.9] Formulation and communication of conditional interpretative declarations

A conditional interpretative declaration must be formulated in writing. Formal confirmation of a conditional interpretative declaration must also be made in writing.

A conditional interpretative declaration must be communicated in writing to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty.

A conditional interpretative declaration regarding a treaty in force which is the constituent instrument of an international organization or a treaty which creates an organ that has the capacity to accept a reservation must also be communicated to such organization or organ.

Commentary

(1) In the case of conditional interpretative declarations, there are, *prima facie*, few reasons for departing from the rules on form and procedure applicable to the formulation of reservations: even by definition, the State or international organization which formulates them subjects its consent to be bound to a specific interpretation. The reasons which dictate that reservations should be formulated in writing and authenticated by a person who has the authority to engage the State or the international organization are therefore equally valid in this instance: since they are indissociably linked to the consent of their author to be bound, they must be known to their

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802 [1223, 2001] See above.
partners, by whom they may be challenged because they are intended to have effects on the treaty relationship. The procedure for formulating them should therefore be brought into line with that for reservations.

(2) Draft guidelines 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 should therefore be transposed purely and simply with regard to the formulation of conditional interpretative declarations:

- They must be formulated in writing; and
- The same is true if the interpretative declaration must be formally confirmed in the conditions provided for in draft guideline 2.4.5.

This is set forth in the first two paragraphs of draft guideline 2.4.7.

(3) However, as all interpretative declarations must be formulated by a competent authority in order to engage the State, it has not seemed useful to repeat this specifically in the case of conditional declarations. The same is true with regard to their formulation at the internal level.

(4) Attention should nevertheless be drawn to the specificity of conditional interpretative declarations in respect of their communication to other interested States and international organizations. In this regard, the reasons which justify the transposition of the rules relating to the formulation of reservations to the formulation of such declarations are particularly compelling: at issue are, inevitably, formal declarations which, by definition, establish the conditions for their author’s expression of consent to be bound by the treaty and to which other interested States and international organizations must have an opportunity to react. The last two paragraphs of draft guideline 2.4.7 are, consequently, modelled on the text of draft guideline 2.1.5, although the Commission has not considered it necessary to reproduce in detail the provisions of draft guidelines 2.1.6 to 2.1.8, the elements of which are, however, transposable mutatis mutandis to conditional interpretative declarations.

(5) The Commission reserves the option of reconsidering whether all the draft guidelines on conditional interpretative declarations, including draft guideline 2.4.7, should, in the light of the legal system applicable to them, be retained in the Guide to Practice. If it turns out that this system is substantially similar to that for reservations, all these draft guidelines will be replaced by a single provision equating these declarations with reservations. Pending its final decision in this regard,

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803 [266, 2002] Cf. draft guideline 1.2.1.
804 [267, 2002] See draft guideline 2.4.1.
805 [268, 2002] See draft guideline 2.4.2.
the Commission has adopted draft guideline 2.4.7 provisionally and has placed it between square brackets.

[2.4.8  Late formulation of a conditional interpretative declaration

A State or an international organization may not formulate a conditional interpretative declaration concerning a treaty after expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty except if none of the other Contracting Parties objects to the late formulation of the conditional interpretative declaration.]

Commentary
(1) The considerations which led the Commission to adopt draft guideline 2.4.6 apply in all respects to draft guideline 2.4.7.

(2) It follows from draft guideline 1.2.1 that, like a reservation, a conditional interpretative declaration is "A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty .. .". Any conditional interpretative declaration not made at any of these times is therefore late and can be envisaged only if all the contracting parties consent, at least tacitly, to do so.

(3) The commentaries to draft guidelines 2.3.1 and 2.4.6 can therefore be fully transposed to draft guideline 2.4.7.

2.4.9 Modification of an interpretative declaration

Unless the treaty provides that an interpretative declaration may be made or modified only at specified times, an interpretative declaration may be modified at any time.

Commentary
(1) According to the definition given in draft guideline 1.2, “simple” interpretative declarations are merely clarifications of the meaning or scope of the provisions of the treaty. They may be

806 [1224, 2001] See paras. (15) to (18) of the commentary to draft guideline 1.2.1 in General Assembly, Official Records, Supplement No. 10 (A/54/10), pp. 248-249.
made at any time\textsuperscript{807} (unless the treaty otherwise provides\textsuperscript{808}) and are not subject to the requirement of confirmation.\textsuperscript{809} There is thus nothing to prevent them from being modified at any time in the absence of a treaty provision stating that the interpretation must be given at a specified time, as indicated in draft guideline 2.4.9, the text of which is a combination of the texts of draft guidelines 2.4.3 (“Time at which an interpretative declaration may be formulated”) and 2.4.6 (“Late formulation of an interpretative declaration”).

(2) It follows that a “simple” interpretative declaration may be modified at any time, subject to provisions to the contrary contained in the treaty itself, which may limit the possibility of making such declarations in time, or in the case which is fairly unlikely, but which cannot be ruled out in principle, where the treaty expressly limits the possibility of modifying interpretative declarations.

(3) There are few clear examples illustrating this draft guideline. Mention may be made, however, of the modification by Mexico, in 1987, of the declaration concerning article 16 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 17 December 1979, made upon accession in 1987.\textsuperscript{810}

(4) The modification by a State of unilateral statements made under an optional clause\textsuperscript{811} or providing for a choice between the provisions of a treaty\textsuperscript{812} also comes to mind; but such statements are “outside the scope of the … Guide to Practice”.\textsuperscript{813} Also, on 7 March 2002, Bulgaria amended a declaration made upon signature and confirmed upon deposit of its instrument of ratification (in 1994) of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959,\textsuperscript{814} however, strictly speaking, it might be considered that this was more a case of interpreting a reservation than modifying an interpretative declaration.\textsuperscript{815}

\textsuperscript{807} Cf. draft guideline 2.4.3.
\textsuperscript{808} Cf. draft guideline 2.4.6.
\textsuperscript{809} Cf. draft guideline 2.4.4.
\textsuperscript{810} See Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. II, chap. XVIII.5, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{811} See, for example, the modification by Australia and New Zealand of the declarations made under art. 24, para. 2 (ii), of the Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank upon ratification of that Agreement (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. I, chap. X.4, pp. 509-511).
\textsuperscript{812} Cf. draft guideline 2.4.6 and 2.4.7.
\textsuperscript{813} See also ibid.: the modification, in 1988, of the Swiss “interpretative declaration” of 1974 concerning art. 6, para. 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights following the Belilos judgment of 29 April 1988. However, the Court had classed this “declaration” as a reservation and Switzerland simply withdrew its declaration retroactively following the decision of the Swiss Federal Court of 17 December 1992 in the case of Elisabeth B. v. Council of State of Thurgau Canton (see footnote 586, supra).
(5) For all that, and despite the paucity of convincing examples, draft guideline 2.4.9 seems to flow logically from the very definition of interpretative declarations.
(6) It is obvious that, if a treaty provides that an interpretative declaration can be made only at specified times, it follows a fortiori that such a declaration cannot be modified at other times. In the case where the treaty limits the possibility of making or modifying an interpretative declaration in time, the rules applicable to the late formulation of such a declaration, as stated in draft guideline 2.4.6, should be applicable mutatis mutandis if, notwithstanding that limitation, a State or an international organization intended to modify an earlier interpretative declaration: such a modification would be possible only in the absence of an objection by any one of the other contracting parties.

[2.4.10 Limitation and widening of the scope of a conditional interpretative declaration]

The limitation and the widening of the scope of a conditional interpretative declaration are governed by the rules respectively applicable to the partial withdrawal and the widening of the scope of reservations.

Commentary
(1) Unlike the modification of “simple” interpretative declarations, the modification of conditional interpretative declarations cannot be done at will: such declarations can, in principle, be formulated (or confirmed) only at the time of the expression by the State or the international organization of its consent to be bound and any late formulation is excluded “except if none of the other contracting parties objects”. Any modification is thus similar to a late formulation that can be “established” only if it does not encounter the opposition of any one of the other contracting parties. This is what is stated in draft guideline 2.4.10.
(2) Although it may be difficult in some cases to determine whether the purpose of a modification is to limit or widen the scope of a conditional interpretative declaration, the majority of the members of the Commission were of the opinion that there was no reason to depart in this regard from the rules relating to the modification of reservations and that reference should therefore

816 [607, 2004] Cf. draft guidelines 1.2.1 and 2.4.5.
be made to the rules applicable respectively to the partial withdrawal\textsuperscript{818} and to the widening of the scope of reservations.\textsuperscript{819}

(3) In this second case, the applicable rules are thus also the same as the ones contained in draft guideline 2.4.8 on the “Late formulation of a conditional interpretative declaration”, which reads:

“A State or an international organization may not formulate a conditional interpretative declaration concerning a treaty after expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty except if none of the other contracting parties objects to the late formulation of the conditional interpretative declaration”.\textsuperscript{820}

(4) The Commission is aware of the fact that it is also possible that a party to the treaty might decide not to make an interpretative declaration a condition of its participation in the treaty while maintaining it “simply” as an interpretation. This is, however, an academic question of which there does not appear to be any example.\textsuperscript{821} There is accordingly probably no need to devote a draft guideline to this case, particularly as this would, in reality, amount to the withdrawal of the declaration in question as a conditional interpretative declaration and would thus be a case of a simple withdrawal to which the rules contained in draft guideline 2.5.13 would apply, with the result that this could be done at any time.

2.5 Withdrawal and modification of reservations and interpretative declarations

2.5.1 Withdrawal of reservations

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the consent of a State or of an international organization which has accepted the reservation is not required for its withdrawal.

\textsuperscript{818} See draft guidelines 2.5.10 and 2.5.11.

\textsuperscript{819} See draft guideline 2.3.5.

\textsuperscript{820} For the commentary to this draft guideline, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), pp. 505-506.

\textsuperscript{821} There are, however, examples of statements specifying that earlier interpretative declarations do not constitute reservations. See, for example, the “communication received subsequently” (the date is not given) by which the Government of France indicated that the first paragraph of the “declaration” made upon ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 7 March 1966 “did not purport to limit the obligations under the Convention in respect of the French Government, but only to record the latter’s interpretation of article 4 of the Convention” (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. I, chap. IV.2, p. 137, note 19). See also, for example, the statements by Indonesia and Malaysia concerning the declarations which accompanied their ratifications of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization of 6 March 1948, ibid., vol. II, chap. XII.1, p. 6, notes 14 and 16, or India’s position with respect to the same Convention (see ibid., p. 5, note 13; see also O. Schachter, “The question of treaty reservations at the 1959 General Assembly”, 54 A.J.I.L. (1960), pp. 372-379).
Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 2.5.1 reproduces the text of article 22, paragraph 1, of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, which is itself based on that of article 22, paragraph 1, of the 1969 Vienna Convention, with the addition of international organizations. These provisions were hardly discussed during the travaux préparatoires.

(2) The question of the withdrawal of reservations did not attract the attention of Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties until fairly recently and even then only to a limited degree. J.L. Brierly and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht were preoccupied with admissibility of reservation and did not devote a single draft article to the question of the criterion for the withdrawal of reservations. It was not until 1956 that, in his first report, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice proposed the following wording for draft article 40, paragraph 3:

A reservation, though admitted, may be withdrawn by formal notice at any time. If this occurs, the previously reserving State becomes automatically bound to comply fully with the provision of the treaty to which the reservation related and is equally entitled to claim compliance with the provision by the other parties.

(3) The draft was not discussed by the Commission, but, in his first report, Sir Humphrey Waldock returned to the concept in a draft article 17, entitled “Power to formulate and withdraw reservations”, which posited the principle of the “absolute right of a State to withdraw a reservation unilaterally, even when the reservation has been accepted by other States”.

A State which has formulated a reservation is free to withdraw it unilaterally, either in whole or in part, at any time, whether the reservation has been accepted or rejected by the other States concerned. Withdrawal of the reservation shall be effected by written

822 [298, 2003] The furthest Lauterpacht went was to draw attention to some proposals made in April 1954 to the Commission on Human Rights on the subject of reservations to the “Covenant of Human Rights”, expressly providing for the possibility of withdrawing a reservation simply by notifying the Secretary-General of the United Nations (second report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/87, para. 7; Yearbook ... 1954, vol. II, pp. 131-132).
notification to the depositary of instruments relating to the treaty and, failing any such
depositary, to every State which is or is entitled to become a party to the treaty.\textsuperscript{826}

This proposal was not discussed in plenary, but the Drafting Committee, while retaining
the spirit of the provision, made extensive changes not only to the wording, but even to the
substance: the new draft article 19, which dealt exclusively with “The withdrawal of
reservations”, no longer mentioned the notification procedure, but included a paragraph 2
relating to the effect of the withdrawal.\textsuperscript{827} This draft was adopted with the addition of a
provision in the first paragraph specifying when the withdrawal took legal effect.\textsuperscript{828}
According to draft article 22 on first reading:

1. A reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the consent of the State which has
accepted the reservation is not required for its withdrawal. Such withdrawal takes effect
when notice of it has been received by the other States concerned.
2. Upon withdrawal of the reservation, the provisions of article 21 cease to apply.\textsuperscript{829}

(4) Only three States reacted to draft article 22,\textsuperscript{830} which was consequently revised by the Special
Rapporteur. He proposed that:\textsuperscript{831}

The provision should take the form of a residual rule;
It should be specified that notification of a withdrawal should be made by the depositary, if
there was one; A period of grace should be allowed before the withdrawal became
operative.\textsuperscript{832}

(5) During the consideration of these proposals, two members of the Commission maintained
that, where a reservation formulated by a State was accepted by another State, an agreement existed
between those two States.\textsuperscript{833} This proposition received little support and the majority favoured the

\textsuperscript{826} [302, 2003] Paragraph 6 of draft article 17, ibid., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{828} [304, 2003] Ibid., paras. 69-71 and 667th meeting, 25 June 1962, p. 253, paras. 73-75.
document A/CN.4/177 and Add.1 and 2. Israel considered that notification should be through the channel of the depositary, while
the United States of America welcomed the “provision that the withdrawal of the reservation ‘takes effect when notice of it has been
received by the other States concerned’”, the comment by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland related to the
effective date of the withdrawal; see commentary to draft guideline 2.5.8, para. (4), below. For the text of the comments by the three
States, see Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, pp. 351 (United States), 295 (Israel, para. 14) and 344 (United Kingdom).
\textsuperscript{831} [307, 2003] For the text of the draft article proposed by Waldock, see ibid., p. 56, or Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 800th meeting, 11
June 1965, p. 174, para. 43.
\textsuperscript{832} [308, 2003] On this point, see commentary to draft guideline 2.5.8, para. (4).
\textsuperscript{833} [309, 2003] See the comments by Verdross and (less clearly) Amado, 800th meeting, 11 June 1965, p. 175, para. 49, and p. 176,
para. 60.
notion, expressed by Bartoš, that “normally, a treaty was concluded in order to be applied in full; reservations constituted an exception which was merely tolerated”. Following this discussion, the Drafting Committee effectively reverted, in a different formulation, to the two concepts in paragraph 1 of the 1962 text. The new text was the one eventually adopted and it became the final version of draft article 20 (“Withdrawal of reservations”):

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for its withdrawal.
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal becomes operative only when notice of it has been received by the other contracting States.

(6) The commentary to the provision was, apart from a few clarifications, a repetition of that of 1962. The Commission expressed the view that the parties to the treaty “ought to be presumed to wish a reserving State to abandon its reservation, unless a restriction on the withdrawal of reservations has been inserted in the treaty”.

(7) At the Vienna Conference, the text of this draft article (which had by now become article 22 of the Convention) was incorporated unchanged, although several amendments of detail had been proposed. However, on the proposal of Hungary, two important additions were adopted:

First, it was decided to bring the procedure relating to the withdrawal of objections to reservations into line with that relating to the withdrawal of reservations themselves; and,

Secondly, a paragraph 4 was added to article 23 specifying that the withdrawal of reservations (and of objections) should be made in writing.

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834 [310, 2003] Ibid., p. 175, para. 50.
837 [313, 2003] Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 209, document A/6309/Rev.1; drafted along the same lines, the corresponding text was article 22 of the 1965 draft (Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 162, document A/6009).
842 [318, 2003] On this amendment, see the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.2, para. (2).
Basing himself on the principle that “there is no reason to put international organizations in a situation different from that of States in the matter of reservations”, Paul Reuter, in his fourth report on the question of treaties concluded between States and international organizations or between two or more international organizations, restricted himself to submitting “draft articles which extend the rules embodied in articles 19 to 23 of the 1969 Convention to agreements to which international organizations are parties”, subject only to “minor drafting changes”.\footnote{319, 2003} So it proved with article 22, in which the Special Rapporteur restricted himself to adding a reference to international organizations, and article 23, paragraph 4, which he reproduced in its entirety.\footnote{320, 2003} These proposals were adopted by the Commission without amendment\footnote{321, 2003} and retained on second reading.\footnote{322, 2003} The 1986 Vienna Conference did not bring about any fundamental change.\footnote{323, 2003}

It appears from the provisions thus adopted that the withdrawal of a reservation is a unilateral act. This puts an end to the once deeply debated theoretical question of the legal nature of withdrawal: is it a unilateral decision or a conventional act?\footnote{324, 2003} Article 22, paragraph 1, of the two Vienna Conventions rightly opts for the first of these positions. As the International Law Commission stated in the commentary to the draft articles adopted on first reading:\footnote{325, 2003}

“It has sometimes been contended that when a reservation has been accepted by another State it may not be withdrawn without the latter’s consent, as the acceptance of the reservation establishes a regime between the two States which cannot be changed without the agreement of both. The Commission, however, considers that the preferable rule is that the
reserving State should in all cases be authorized, if it is willing to do so, to bring its position into full conformity with the provisions of the treaty as adopted.\textsuperscript{850}

(10) This is still the Commission’s view. By definition, a reservation is a unilateral\textsuperscript{851} act, even though States or international organizations may, by agreement, reach results comparable to those produced by reservations,\textsuperscript{852} but the decision to opt for a reservation, by contrast, rightly implies a resort to unilateral action.

(11) It could perhaps be argued that, in accordance with article 20 of the Vienna Conventions, a reservation which is made by a State or an international organization and is not expressly provided for by the treaty is effective only for the parties which have accepted it, if only implicitly. On the one hand, however, such acceptance does not alter the nature of the reservation - it gives effect to it, but the reservation is still a distinct unilateral act - and, on the other hand and above all, such an argument involves extremely formalistic reasoning that takes no account of the benefit of limiting the number and the scope of reservations in order to preserve the integrity of the treaty. As has been rightly observed,\textsuperscript{853} the signatories to a multilateral treaty expect, in principle, that it will be accepted as a whole and there is at least a presumption that, if a necessary evil, reservations are regretted by the other parties. It is worth pointing out, moreover, that the withdrawal of reservations, while sometimes regulated,\textsuperscript{854} is never forbidden under a treaty.\textsuperscript{855}

(12) Furthermore, to the best of the Commission’s knowledge, the unilateral withdrawal of reservations has never given rise to any particular difficulty and none of the States or international organizations which replied to the Commission’s questionnaire on reservations\textsuperscript{856} has noted any problem in that regard. The recognition of such a right of withdrawal is also in accordance with the letter or the spirit of treaty clauses expressly relating to the withdrawal of reservations, which are either worded in terms similar to those in article 22, paragraph 1,\textsuperscript{857} or aim to encourage withdrawal.

\textsuperscript{851}[327, 2003] Cf. art. 2, para. 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions and draft guideline 1.1 of the Guide to Practice.
\textsuperscript{852}[328, 2003] Cf. draft guideline 1.7.1 [1.7.1, 1.7.2, 1.7.3, 1.7.4].
\textsuperscript{853}[329, 2003] See para. (5) above.
\textsuperscript{854}[330, 2003] See the commentary to draft guidelines 2.5.7 [2.5.7, 2.5.8] and 2.5.8 [2.5.9].
\textsuperscript{856}[332, 2003] See particularly, in the questionnaire addressed to States, questions 1.6, 1.6.1, 1.6.2 and 1.6.2.1 relating to withdrawal of reservations.
\textsuperscript{857}[333, 2003] See the examples given by P.H. Imbert, supra, note 324, p. 287, note 19, or by F. Horn, supra, note 324, p. 437, note 1. See also, for example, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, of 28 July 1951, art. 42, para. 2; the Convention on the Continental Shelf, of 29 April 1958, art. 12, para. 1; the European Convention on Establishment, of 13 December 1955, art. 26, para. 3; or the 1962 model clause of the Council of Europe, which appears in “Models of final clauses”, given in a Memorandum of the Secretariat (CM (62) 148, 13 July 1962, pp. 6 and 10).
by urging States to withdraw them “as soon as circumstances permit”. In the same spirit, international organizations and the human rights treaty monitoring bodies constantly issue recommendations urging States to withdraw reservations that they made when ratifying or acceding to treaties.

(13) Such objectives also justify the fact that the withdrawal of a reservation may take place “at any time”, which could even mean before the entry into force of a treaty by a State which withdraws a previous reservation, although the Special Rapporteur knows of no case in which this has occurred.

(14) The now customary nature of the rules contained in article 22, paragraph 1, and 23, paragraph 4, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions and reproduced in draft guideline 2.5.1 seems not to be in question and is in line with current practice.

(15) The wording chosen does not call for any particular criticism, although some fault could be found with the first phrase (“Unless the treaty provides otherwise…”), which some members of the Commission have suggested should be deleted. This explanatory phrase, which appeared in the Commission’s final draft, but not in that of 1962, was added by the Special Rapporteur,

\[\text{[334, 2003]}\]
See, for example, the European Patent Convention (Munich Convention) of 5 October 1973, art. 167, para. 4, and other examples cited by P.H. Imbert, supra, note 324, p. 287, note 20, or by F. Horn, supra, note 324, p. 437, note 2.

\[\text{[335, 2003]}\]
See the examples cited in the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.3, infra, note 369.

\[\text{[336, 2003]}\]
One favoured occasion for the withdrawal of reservations is at the time of the succession of States, for on that date the newly independent State can express its intention of not maintaining the reservations of the predecessor State (cf. the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, art. 20, para. 1). This situation will be examined during the general consideration of the fate of reservations and interpretative declarations in the case of succession of States.

\[\text{[337, 2003]}\]
This eventuality is expressly provided for by the final clauses of the Convention concerning Customs Facilities for Touring, its Additional Protocol and the Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles, all of 4 June 1954 (para. 5); see Yearbook ..., vol. II, p. 105, document A/5687, Part Two, annex II, para. 2. There are a considerable number of cases in which a State has made a reservation on signing a treaty, but subsequently renounced it because of representations made either by other signatories or by the depositary (cf. the examples given by F. Horn, supra, note 324, pp. 345-346); but these are not strictly speaking withdrawals: see commentary to draft guideline 2.5.2, paras. (7) and (8).

\[\text{[338, 2003]}\]
On the other hand, several cases of withdrawal of a reservation fairly soon after it had been made can be cited. See, for example, Estonia’s reply to question 1.6.2.1 of the Commission’s questionnaire: the restrictions on its acceptance of annexes III-V of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973 (MARPOL Convention) (as modified by its Protocol of 1978), to which it had acceded on 2 December 1991, were lifted on 28 July 1992, when Estonia was considered to be in a position to observe the conditions laid down in these instruments. The United Kingdom states that it withdrew, retrospectively from the date of ratification and three months after formulating it, a reservation to the 1959 Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank.

\[\text{[339, 2003]}\]

\[\text{[340, 2003]}\]
Cf. the Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, prepared by the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 1997, ST/LEG/8, Sales No. E.94.V.15, p. 64, para. 216. The few States which made any comment on this subject in their replies to the questionnaire on reservations (question 1.6.2.1) said that any withdrawals of reservations had followed a change in their domestic law (Colombia, Denmark, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) or a reassessment of their interests (Israel). On reasons for withdrawal, see Jean-François Flauss, “Note sur le retrait par la France des réserves aux traités internationaux”, AFDI, 1986, pp. 860-861.

\[\text{[341, 2003]}\]
See paras. (3) and (5) above.
Sir Humphrey Waldock, following comments by Governments\textsuperscript{866} and endorsed by the Drafting Committee at the seventeenth session in 1965.\textsuperscript{867} It goes without saying that most of the provisions of the Vienna Conventions and all the rules of a procedural nature contained in them are of a residual, voluntary nature and must be understood to apply “unless the treaty otherwise provides”. The same must therefore be true, a fortiori, of the Guide to Practice. The explanatory phrase that introduces article 22, paragraph 1, may seem superfluous, but most members of the Commission take the view that this is not sufficient cause for modifying the wording chosen in 1969 and retained in 1986.

(16) This phrase, with its reference to treaty provisions, seems to suggest that model clauses should be included in the Guide to Practice. The issue is, however, less to do with procedure as such so much as with the effect of a withdrawal; the allusion to any conflict with treaty provisions is really just a muted echo of the concerns raised by some members of the Commission and some Governments about the difficulties that might arise from the sudden withdrawal of a reservation.\textsuperscript{868} To meet those concerns, it might be wise to incorporate limitations on the right to withdraw reservations at any time in a specific provision of the treaty.\textsuperscript{869}

\subsection*{2.5.2 Form of withdrawal}

The withdrawal of a reservation must be formulated in writing.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) The draft guideline reproduces the wording of article 23, paragraph 4, which is worded in the same way in both the 1969 and the 1986 Vienna Conventions.

(2) Whereas draft article 17, paragraph 7, adopted on first reading by the Commission in 1962 required that the withdrawal of a reservation should be effected “by written notification”,\textsuperscript{870} the 1966 draft was silent regarding the form of withdrawal. Several States made proposals to restore the requirement of written withdrawal\textsuperscript{871} with a view to bringing the provision “into line with

\textsuperscript{867} [343, 2003] Ibid., 814th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 272, para. 22.
\textsuperscript{868} [344, 2003] See the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.8, para. (4).
\textsuperscript{869} [345, 2003] See the model clauses proposed by the Commission following draft guideline 2.5.8.
\textsuperscript{870} [346, 2003] Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 75, document A/CN.4/144, p. 69; see the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.1, para. (5).
article 18 [23 in the definitive text of the Convention], where it was stated that a reservation, an
express acceptance of a reservation and an objection to a reservation must be formulated in
writing. 872 Although K. Yasseen considered that “an unnecessary additional condition [was
thereby introduced] into a procedure which should be facilitated as much as possible”, 873 the
principle was unanimously adopted 874 and it was decided to include this provision not in article 20
itself, but in article 23, which dealt with “Procedure regarding reservations” in general and was, as
a result of the inclusion of this new paragraph 4, placed at the end of the section. 875

(3) Although Yasseen had been right, at the 1969 Conference, to emphasize that the withdrawal
procedure “should be facilitated as much as possible”, 876 the burden imposed on a State by the
requirement of written withdrawal should not be exaggerated. Moreover, although the rule of
parallelism of forms is not an absolute principle in international law, 877 it would be incongruous if a
reservation, about which there can surely be no doubt that it should be in writing, 878 could be
withdrawn simply through an oral statement. It would result in considerable uncertainty for the
other Contracting Parties, which would have received the written text of the reservation, but would
not necessarily have been made aware of its withdrawal. 879

(4) The Commission has nevertheless considered whether the withdrawal of a reservation may
not be implicit, arising from circumstances other than formal withdrawal.

(5) Certainly, as J.M. Ruda points out, “the withdrawal of a reservation … is not to be
presumed”. 880 Yet the question still arises as to whether certain acts or conduct on the part of a
State or an international organization should not be characterized as the withdrawal of a
reservation.

(6) It is, for example, certainly the case that the conclusion between the same parties of a
subsequent treaty containing provisions identical to those to which one of the parties had made a
reservation, whereas it did not do so in connection with the second treaty, has, in practice, the same

874 [350, 2003] Ibid., para. 41.
875 [351, 2003] Ibid., 29th meeting, 19 May 1969, p. 159, paras. 10-13. See José Maria Ruda, “Reservations to Treaties”, RCADI
877 [353, 2003] See the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.4, para. (6).
879 [355, 2003] In this connection, see J.M. Ruda, supra, note 351, pp. 195-196.
effect as a withdrawal of the initial reservation.\textsuperscript{881} The fact remains that it is a separate instrument
and that a State which made a reservation to the first treaty is bound by the second and not the first.
If, for example, a third State, by acceding to the second treaty, acceded also to the first, the impact
of the reservation would be fully felt in that State’s relations with the reserving State.

(7) Likewise, the non-confirmation of a reservation upon signature, when a State expresses its
consent to be bound,\textsuperscript{882} cannot be interpreted as being a withdrawal of the reservation, which may
well have been “formulated” but, for lack of formal confirmation, has not been “made” or
“established”.\textsuperscript{883} The reserving State has simply renounced it after the time for reflection has
elapsed between the date of signing and the date of ratification, act of formal confirmation,
acceptance or approval.

(8) The reasoning has been disputed, basically on the grounds that the reservation exists even
before it has been confirmed: it has to be taken into account when assessing the extent of the
obligations incumbent on the signatory State (or international organization) under article 18 of the
Conventions on the Law of Treaties; and, under article 23, paragraph 3, “an express acceptance or
an objection does not need to be renewed if made before confirmation of the reservation”.\textsuperscript{884}
Nevertheless, as the same writer says: “Where a reservation is not renewed [confirmed], whether
expressly or not, no change occurs, either for the reserving State itself or in its relations with the
other parties, since until that time the State was not bound by the treaty. Conversely, if the
reservation is withdrawn after the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession, the
obligations of the reserving State are increased by virtue of the reservation and it may be bound for
the first time by the treaty with parties which had objected to its reservation. A withdrawal thus
affects the application of the treaty, whereas non-confirmation has no effect at all, from this point

\textsuperscript{880} [356, 2003] Ibid., p. 196.
\textsuperscript{881} [357, 2003] In this connection, see Jean-François Flauss, supra, note 340 at pp. 857-858, but see also F. Tiberghien, La protection
\textsuperscript{882} [358, 2003] Cf. the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, art. 23, para. 2, and draft guideline 2.2.1 and the commentary to it in the
report of the Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session,
\textsuperscript{883} [359, 2003] Non-confirmation is, however, sometimes (wrongly) called “withdrawal”; cf. Multilateral Treaties deposited with the
Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December 2000 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.V.5, vol. I, p. 376, footnote 16),
relating to the non-confirmation by the Indonesian Government of reservations formulated when it signed the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 1961.
of view." The effects of non-confirmation and of withdrawal are thus too different for it to be possible to class the two institutions together.

(9) It would even seem impossible to consider that an expired reservation has been withdrawn. It sometimes happens that a clause in a treaty places a limit on the period of validity of reservations. But expiration is the consequence of the juridical event constituted by the lapse of a fixed period of time, whereas withdrawal is a unilateral juridical act expressing the will of its author.

(10) The same applies when, as sometimes occurs, the reservation itself sets a time limit to its validity. Thus, in its reply to the questionnaire on reservations, Estonia stated that it had limited its reservation to the European Convention on Human Rights to one year, since “one year is considered to be a sufficient period to amend the laws in question”. In this case, the reservation ceases to be in force not because it has been withdrawn, but because of the time limit set by the text of the reservation itself.

(11) What have been termed “forgotten reservations” must also be mentioned. A reservation is “forgotten”, in particular, when it forms part of a provision of domestic law which has subsequently been amended by a new text that renders it obsolete. This situation, which is not uncommon, although a full assessment is difficult, and which is probably usually the result of negligence by the relevant authorities or insufficient consultation between the relevant services, has its drawbacks.

885 [361, 2003] Ibid., footnote omitted.
886 [362, 2003] See for example, art. 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Invention of 1963, which provides for the possibility of non-renewable reservations to some of its provisions for maximum periods of 5 or 10 years, while an annex to the European Convention on Civil Liability for Damage caused by Motor Vehicles of 1973 allows Belgium to make a reservation for a three-year period starting at the entry into force of the Convention. See also the examples given by Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, “Reservation Clauses in Treaties Concluded within the Council of Europe”, ICLQ, 1999, pp. 499-500, or P.H. Imbert, supra, note 324, p. 287, note 21; also art. 124 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998, which sets a seven-year time limit on the possibility of non-acceptance of the Court’s competence in respect of war crimes. Other Council of Europe conventions such as the Conventions on the Adoption of Children, of 24 April 1967, and the Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock, of 15 October 1975 likewise authorize only temporary, but renewable reservations; as a result of difficulties with the implementation of these provisions (cf. Jörg Polakiewicz, Treaty-Making in the Council of Europe, 1999, pp. 101-102), the new reservation clauses in Council of Europe conventions state that failure to renew a reservation would cause it to lapse (see the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999, art. 38, para. 2).
887 [363, 2003] Replies to questions 1.6 and 1.6.1.
888 [364, 2003] See also the example given by Jörg Polakiewicz, supra, note 362, pp. 102-104. It can also happen that a State, when formulating a reservation, indicates that it will withdraw it as soon as possible (cf. the reservation by Malta to arts. 13, 15 and 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Multilateral Treaties ..., supra, note 359, p. 234; see also the reservations by Barbados to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ibid., vol. I, p. 162).
890 [366, 2003] See J.F. Flauss, supra, note 340, p. 861; see pp. 861-862, the examples concerning France given by this author.
Indeed, it can lead to legal chaos, particularly in States with a tradition of legal monism.\textsuperscript{891} Moreover, since domestic laws are “merely facts” from the standpoint of international law,\textsuperscript{892} whether the legal system of the State in question is monist or dualist, an unwithdrawn reservation, having been made at the international level, will continue, in principle, to be fully effective and the reserving State will continue to avail itself of the reservation with regard to the other parties, although such an attitude could be questionable in terms of the principle of good faith.

\textsuperscript{(12)} According to most members of the Commission, these examples, taken together, show that the withdrawal of a reservation may never be implicit: a withdrawal occurs only if the author of the reservation declares formally and in writing, in accordance with the rule embodied in article 23, paragraph 4, of the Vienna Conventions and reproduced in draft guideline 2.5.2, that he intends to revoke it. While sharing that viewpoint, some members of the Commission nevertheless considered that the expression by a State or an international organization of its intention to withdraw a reservation entailed immediate legal consequences, mirroring the obligations incumbent upon a State signatory to a treaty under article 18 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.

\textbf{2.5.3 Periodic review of the usefulness of reservations}

States or international organizations which have made one or more reservations to a treaty should undertake a periodic review of such reservations and consider withdrawing those which no longer serve their purpose.

In such a review, States and international organizations should devote special attention to the aim of preserving the integrity of multilateral treaties and, where relevant, give consideration to the usefulness of retaining the reservations, in particular in relation to developments in their internal law since the reservations were formulated.

\textbf{Commentary}

\textsuperscript{891} \textsuperscript{[367, 2003]} In these States, judges are expected to apply duly ratified treaties (although not reservations) and these generally take precedence over domestic laws, even if the latter were adopted later. Cf. art. 55 of the French Constitution of 1958 and the many constitutional provisions which either use the same wording or are inspired by it in French-speaking African countries. The paradoxical situation can thus arise that, in a State that has aligned its internal legislation with a treaty, it is nonetheless the treaty as ratified (and thus stripped of the provision or provisions to which reservations were made) which prevails, unless the reservation is formally withdrawn. The problem is less acute in States with a dualist system: international treaties are not applied as such, although, in all cases, national judges will apply the most recent \textit{domestic} law.

(1) The treaty monitoring bodies, particularly but not exclusively in the field of human rights, are calling increasingly frequently on States to reconsider their reservations and, if possible, to withdraw them. These appeals are often relayed by the general policy-making bodies of international organizations such as the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Draft guideline 2.5.3 reflects these concerns.

(2) The Commission is aware that such a provision would have no place in a draft convention, since it could not be of much normative value. The Guide to Practice, however, does not aim to be a convention; it is, rather, a “code of recommended practices”. It would therefore not be out of place to draw its users’ attention to the drawbacks of these “forgotten”, obsolete or superfluous reservations and the benefits of reconsidering them periodically with a view to withdrawing them totally or partially.

(3) It goes without saying that it is no more than a recommendation, as emphasized by the use of the conditional tense in draft guideline 2.5.3 and of the word “consider” in the first paragraph and the words “where relevant” in the second, and that the parties to a treaty that have accompanied their consent to be bound by reservations remain absolutely free to withdraw their reservations or not. This is why the Commission has not thought it necessary to determine precisely the frequency with which reservations should be reconsidered.

(4) Similarly, in the second paragraph, the elements to be taken into consideration are cited merely by way of example, as shown by the use of the words “in particular”. The reference to the integrity of multilateral treaties is an allusion to the drawbacks of reservations, that may undermine the unity of the treaty regime. The reference to careful consideration of internal law and developments in it since the reservations were formulated may be explained by the fact that the divergence from the treaty provisions of the provisions in force in the State party is often used to justify the formulation of a reservation. Domestic provisions are not immutable, however (and

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894 [370, 2003] This expression was used by Sweden in its comments on the Commission’s 1962 draft on the law of treaties; see the fourth report of Sir Humphrey Waldock, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 49.

895 [371, 2003] In this connection, see the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.2, paras. (9)-(11).
participation in a treaty should in fact be an incentive to modify them), so that it may happen - and often does - that a reservation becomes obsolete because internal law has been brought into line with treaty requirements.

(5) While endorsing draft guideline 2.5.3, some members of the Commission indicated that the words “internal law” were suitable for States, but not for international organizations. In this connection, it may be noted that article 46 of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations contains “Provisions of internal law of a State and rules of an international organization regarding competence to conclude treaties”. The Commission nevertheless considered that the words “rules of an international organization” were not very widely used and were imprecise, owing to the lack of any definition of them. Moreover, the phrase “internal law of an international organization” is commonly used as a way of referring to the “proper law” of international organizations.

2.5.4 [2.5.5] Formulation of the withdrawal of a reservation at the international level

1. Subject to the usual practices in international organizations which are depositaries of treaties, a person is competent to withdraw a reservation made on behalf of a State or an international organization if:

   (a) That person produces appropriate full powers for the purposes of that withdrawal; or

   (b) It appears from practice or other circumstances that it was the intention of the States and international organizations concerned to consider that person as competent for such purposes without having to produce full powers.

2. By virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are competent to withdraw a reservation at the international level on behalf of a State:

   (a) Heads of State, heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs;

(b) Representatives accredited by States to an international organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of withdrawing a reservation to a treaty adopted by that organization or body;

(c) Heads of permanent missions to an international organization, for the purpose of withdrawing a reservation to a treaty between the accrediting States and that organization.

Commentary

(1) The two Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986, while reticent on the procedure for the formulation of reservations, are entirely silent as to the procedure for their withdrawal. The aim of draft guideline 2.5.4 is to repair that omission.

(2) The question has not, however, been completely overlooked by several of the Commission’s Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties. Thus, in 1956, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice proposed a provision under which the withdrawal of a reservation would be the subject of “formal notice”, but did not specify who should notify whom or how notice should be given. Later, in 1962, Sir Humphrey Waldock, in his first report, went into more detail in draft article 17, paragraph 6, the adoption of which he recommended:

“… Withdrawal of the reservation shall be effected by written notification to the depositary of instruments relating to the treaty and, failing any such depositary, to every State which is or is entitled to become a party to the treaty.”

(3) Although the proposal was not discussed in plenary, the Drafting Committee simply deleted it and it was not restored by the Commission. During the brief discussion of the Drafting Committee’s draft, however, Waldock pointed out that “[n]otification of the withdrawal of a reservation would normally be made through a depositary”. This approach was approved by Israel, the only State to provide comments on the draft adopted on first reading on that topic and the Special Rapporteur proposed an amendment to the draft whereby the withdrawal “becomes operative when notice of it has been received by the other States concerned from the depositary”.

901 [377, 2003] See commentary to draft guideline 2.5.1, para. (2).
902 [378, 2003] Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 61; see also draft guideline 2.5.1, para. (3). The Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties did not accompany this part of his draft with any commentary (ibid., p. 66).
904 [380, 2003] Ibid., para. 71.
906 [382, 2003] Ibid., p. 56; italics added. See the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.1, supra, note 306.
(4) During the discussion in the Commission, Wallock explained that the omission of a reference to the depositary on first reading had been due solely to “inadvertence”\(^{907}\) and his suggestion for remedying it was not disputed in principle. Mr. Rosenne, however, believed that it was “not as clear as it appeared”\(^{908}\) and suggested the adoption of a single text grouping together all notifications made by the depositary.\(^{909}\) Although the Drafting Committee did not immediately adopt this idea, this probably explains why its draft again omitted any reference to the depositary,\(^{910}\) who is also not mentioned in the Commission’s final draft\(^{911}\) or in the text of the Convention itself.\(^{912}\)

(5) To rectify the omissions in the Vienna Conventions regarding the procedure for the withdrawal of reservations, the Commission might contemplate transposing the rules relating to the formulation of reservations. This is not, however, self-evident.

(6) On the one hand, it is by no means clear that the rule of parallelism of forms has been accepted in international law. In its commentary in 1966 on draft article 51 on the law of treaties relating to the termination of or withdrawal from a treaty by consent of the parties, the Commission concluded that “this theory reflects the constitutional practice of particular States and not a rule of international law. In its opinion, international law does not accept the theory of the ‘acte contraire’”\(^{913}\). As Paul Reuter pointed out, however, the Commission “is really taking exception only to the formalist conception of international agreements: it feels that what one conceptual act has established, another can undo, even if the second takes a different form from the first. In fact, the Commission is really accepting a non-formalist conception of the theory of the acte contraire”\(^{914}\). This nuanced position surely can and should be applied to the issue of reservations: it is not essential that the procedure followed in withdrawing a reservation should be identical with that used for formulating it, particularly since a withdrawal is generally welcome.

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\(^{908}\) [384, 2003] Ibid., p. 176, para. 65.

\(^{909}\) [385, 2003] See ibid., 803rd meeting, 16 June 1965, pp. 197-199, paras. 30-56; for the text of the proposal, see *Yearbook ... 1965*, vol. II, p. 73.


\(^{911}\) [387, 2003] Art. 20, para. 2; see the text of this provision in the commentary on draft guideline 2.5.1, para. (5).


\(^{913}\) [389, 2003] Para. (3) of the commentary to draft article 51, *Yearbook ... 1966*, vol. II, p. 249; see also the commentary to art. 35, ibid., pp. 232-233.

should, however, leave all the Contracting Parties in no doubt as to the will of the State or the international organization which takes that step to renounce its reservation. It therefore seems reasonable to proceed on the basis of the idea that the procedure for withdrawing reservations should be modelled on the procedure for formulating them, although that may involve some adjustment and fine-tuning where appropriate.

(7) On the other hand, it has to be said that the Vienna Conventions contain few rules specifically relating to the procedure for formulating reservations, apart from article 23, paragraph 1, which merely states that they must be “communicated to the contracting States [and contracting organizations] and other States [and other international organizations] entitled to become parties to the treaty”.915

(8) Since there is no treaty provision directly concerning the procedure for withdrawing reservations and in view of the inadequacy even of those relating to the formulation of reservations, the Commission considered draft guidelines 2.1.3 to 2.1.8 [2.1.7 bis] relating to the communication of reservations in the light of the current practice and the (rare) discussions of theory and discussed the possibility and the appropriateness of transposing them to the withdrawal of reservations.

(9) With regard to the formulation of reservations proper, draft guideline 2.1.3916 is taken directly from article 7 of the Vienna Conventions entitled “Full powers”. There seems no reason why these rules should not also apply to the withdrawal of reservations. The grounds on which they are justified in relation to the formulation of reservations917 apply also to withdrawal: the reservation has altered the respective obligations of the reserving State and the other Contracting Parties and

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915 [391, 2003] Draft guideline 2.1.5, para. 1, reproduces this provision, while para. 2 details the procedure to be followed when the reservation relates to the constituent instrument of an international organization.

916 [392, 2003] “1. Subject to the customary practices in international organizations which are depositaries of treaties, a person is considered as respecting a State or an international organization for the purpose of formulating a reservation if: (a) That person produces appropriate full powers for the purposes of adopting or authenticating the text of the treaty with regard to which the reservation is formulated or expressing the consent of the State or organization to be bound by the treaty; or (b) It appears from practice or other circumstances that it was the intention of the States and international organizations concerned to consider that person as competent for such purposes without having to produce full powers. 2. By virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing a State for the purpose of formulating a reservation at the international level: (a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs; (b) Representatives accredited by States to an international conference for the purpose of formulating a reservation to a treaty adopted at that conference; (c) Representatives accredited by States to an international organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of formulating a reservation to a treaty adopted by that organization or body; (d) Heads of permanent missions to an international organization, for the purpose of formulating a reservation to a treaty between the accrediting States and that organization.”

should therefore be issued by the same individuals or bodies with competence to bind the State or international organization at the international level. This must therefore apply a fortiori to its withdrawal, which puts the seal on the reserving State’s commitment.

(10) The United Nations Secretariat firmly adopted that position in a letter dated 11 July 1974 to the Legal Adviser of the Permanent Mission of a Member State who had inquired about the “form in which the notifications of withdrawal” of some reservations made in respect of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women of 31 March 1953 and the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages of 10 December 1962 should be made. After noting that the Vienna Convention makes no reference to the subject and recalling the definition of “full powers” given in article 2, paragraph 1 (c), the author of the letter adds:

“Clearly the withdrawal of a reservation constitutes an important transaction and one of those for which the production of full powers should certainly be contemplated. It would appear only logical to apply to a notification of withdrawal of reservations the same standard as to the formulation of reservations since the withdrawal would entail as much change in the application of the treaty concerned as the original reservations.”

And in conclusion:

“Our views, therefore, are that the withdrawal of reservations should in principle be notified to the Secretary-General either by the Head of State or Government or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, or by an official authorized by one of those authorities. While such a high level of procedure may prove somewhat burdensome, the fundamental safeguard which it provides to all concerned in regard to the validity of the notification more than makes up for the resulting inconvenience.”

(11) Firm though this conclusion is, the words “in principle”, which appear in italics in the text of the Secretariat’s legal advice, testify to a certain unease. This is explained by the fact that, as the writer of the letter acknowledges,

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919 [395, 2003] “[The Vienna Convention] defines ‘full powers’ as ‘a document emanating from the competent authority of a State designating a person or persons to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty’.”
920 [396, 2003] Original italics. A memorandum by the Secretariat dated 1 July 1976 confirms this conclusion: “A reservation must be formulated in writing (art. 23, para. 1, of the [Vienna] Convention), and both reservations and withdrawals of reservations must emanate from one of the three authorities (Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs) competent to bind the State internationally (art. 7 of the Convention)” (United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1976, p. 211 - italics added).
"On several occasions, there has been a tendency in the Secretary-General’s depositary practice, with a view to a broader application of treaties, to receive in deposit withdrawals of reservations made in the form of notes verbales or letters from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations. It was considered that the Permanent Representative, duly accredited with the United Nations and acting upon instructions from his Government, by virtue of his functions and without having to produce full powers, had been authorized to do so."

(12) This raises a question that the Commission has already considered in relation to the formulation of reservations: would it not be legitimate to assume that the representative of a State to an international organization that is the depositary of a treaty (or the ambassador of a State accredited to a depositary State) has been recognized as being competent to give notice of reservations? And the question arises with all the more force in relation to the withdrawal of reservations, since there may be a hope of facilitating such a step, which would have the effect of making the treaty more fully applicable and thus be instrumental in preserving, or re-establishing, its integrity.

(13) After thorough consideration, however, the Commission did not adopt this progressive development, since it was anxious to depart as little as possible from the provisions of article 7 of the Vienna Conventions. On the one hand, it would be strange to depart, without a compelling reason, from the principle of the acte contraire, so long as it is understood that a “non-formalist conception” of it is advisable. That means, in this case, that any of the authorities competent to formulate a reservation on behalf of a State may also withdraw it and the withdrawal need not necessarily be issued by the same body as the one which formulated the reservation. On the other hand, while it is true that there may well be a desire to facilitate the withdrawal of reservations, it is also the case that withdrawal resembles more closely than the formulation of reservations the expression of consent to be bound by a treaty. This constitutes a further argument for not departing from the rules contained in article 7 of the Vienna Conventions.

(14) Moreover, it seems that the United Nations Secretary-General has since adopted a harder line and no longer accepts notification or withdrawal of reservations from permanent representatives.

921 [397, 2003] United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1974, pp. 190-191. This is confirmed by the memorandum of 1 July 1976: “On this point, the Secretary-General’s practice in some cases has been to accept the withdrawal of reservations simply by notification from the representative of the State concerned to the United Nations”, United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1976, p. 211, note 121.

922 [398, 2003] See commentary to draft guideline 2.1.3, supra, note 393, paras. (13) to (17).

accredited to the Organization.\textsuperscript{925} And, in the latest edition of the \textit{Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties}, the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs states: "Withdrawal must be made in writing and under the signature of one of the three recognized authorities, since such withdrawal shall normally result, in substance, in a modification of the scope of the application of the treaty."\textsuperscript{926} There is no mention of any possible exceptions.

(15) The Secretary-General of the United Nations is not, however, the only depositary of multilateral treaties and the practice followed by other depositaries in this regard could usefully be considered. Unfortunately, the replies by States to the questionnaire on reservations give no information of any practical benefit in that direction. On the other hand, publications of the Council of Europe indicate that it accepts the formulation\textsuperscript{927} and withdrawal\textsuperscript{928} of reservations by letters from the permanent representatives of the Council.

(16) It would be regrettable if such practices, which are perfectly acceptable and do not seem to give rise to any particular difficulties, were to be called into question by the inclusion of over-rigid rules in the Guide to Practice. That pitfall is avoided in the text adopted for draft guideline 2.5.4 [2.5.5], which transposes to the withdrawal of reservations the wording of guideline 2.1.3 and takes care to maintain the “customary practices in international organizations which are depositaries of treaties”.

(17) Even apart from the replacement of the word “formulate” by the word “withdraw”, however, the transposition is not entirely word for word:

Since the withdrawal procedure is, by definition, distinct both from that used in adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty and from the expression of consent to be bound and may take place many years later, it is necessary that the person applying the procedure should produce specific full powers (para. 1 (a));

\textsuperscript{924} See Paul Reuter’s phrase, ibid.
\textsuperscript{925} Jean-François Flauss mentions, however, a case in which a reservation by France (to art. 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, of 1 March 1980) was withdrawn on 22 March 1984 by the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations ("Note sur le retrait par la France des réserves aux traités internationaux", \textit{AFDI}, 1986, p. 860).
\textsuperscript{926} Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, prepared by the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 1997, ST/LEG/7, Sales No. E.94.V.15, p. 64, para. 216.
\textsuperscript{927} See the commentary to draft guideline 2.1.3, supra, note 393, para. (14).
\textsuperscript{928} Cf. European Committee on Legal Cooperation (CDCJ), \textit{CDCJ Conventions and reservations to those Conventions}, Note by the Secretariat drafted by the Directorate-General of Legal Affairs, CDCJ (99) 36, 30 March 1999.
For the same reason, paragraph 2 (b) of draft guideline 2.1.3 cannot apply to the withdrawal of reservations: when a State or an international organization comes to withdraw a reservation, the international conference which adopted the text is obviously no longer in session.

2.5.5 [2.5.5 bis, 2.5.5 ter] Absence of consequences at the international level of the violation of internal rules regarding the withdrawal of reservations

The determination of the competent body and the procedure to be followed for withdrawing a reservation at the internal level is a matter for the internal law of each State or the relevant rules of each international organization.

A State or an international organization may not invoke the fact that a reservation has been withdrawn in violation of a provision of the internal law of that State or the rules of that organization regarding competence and the procedure for the withdrawal of reservations as invalidating the withdrawal.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 2.5.5 [2.5.5 bis, 2.5.5 ter] is, in relation to the withdrawal of reservations, the equivalent of draft guideline 2.1.4 [2.1.3 bis, 2.1.4] relating to the “Absence of consequences at the international level of the violation of internal rules regarding the formulation of reservations”.929

(2) The competent authority to formulate the withdrawal of a reservation at the international level is not necessarily the same as the one with competence to decide the issue at the internal level. Here, too, mutatis mutandis,930 the problem is the same as that relating to the formulation of reservations.931

(3) The replies by States and international organizations to the questionnaire on reservations do not give any utilizable information regarding competence to decide on the withdrawal of a reservation at the internal level. Legal theory, however, provides certain indications in that

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929 [405, 2003] “The determination of the competent body and the procedure to be followed for formulating a reservation at the internal level is a matter for the internal law of each State or the relevant rules of each international organization. A State or an international organization may not invoke the fact that a reservation has been formulated in violation of a provision of the internal law of that State or the rules of that organization regarding competence and the procedure for formulating reservations as invalidating the reservation.”

930 [406, 2003] A reservation “removed” from the treaty; its withdrawal serves as the culmination of its acceptance.

respect. A more exhaustive study would very probably reveal the same diversity in relation to internal competence to withdraw reservations as has been noted with regard to their formulation. There seems to be no reason, therefore, why the wording of draft guidelines 2.1.4 [2.1.3 bis, 2.1.4] should not be transposed to the withdrawal of reservations.

(4) It would, in particular, seem essential to indicate in the Guide to Practice whether and to what extent a State can claim that a reservation is not valid because it violates the rules of its internal law; this situation could very well arise in practice, although the Commission does not know of any specific example.

(5) As the Commission indicated in relation to the formulation of reservations, there might be a case for applying to reservations the “defective ratification” rule of article 46 of the Vienna Conventions, and still more to the withdrawal of reservations, given that the process of ratification or accession is thereby completed. Whether the formulation of reservations or, still more, their withdrawal is involved, the relevant rules are seldom spelled out in formal texts of a constitutional or even a legislative nature.

(6) The Commission wondered whether it would not be more elegant simply to refer the reader to draft guideline 2.1.4 [2.1.3 bis, 2.1.4] of which draft guideline 2.5.5 [2.5.5 bis, 2.5.5 ter] is a word-for-word transposition, with the simple replacement of the words “formulation” and “formulate” by the words “withdrawal” and “withdraw”. Contrary to the position with regard to draft guideline 2.5.6, the Commission decided that it would be preferable, in this case, to opt for the reproduction of draft guideline 2.1.4 [2.1.3 bis, 2.1.4]: draft guideline 2.5.5 [2.5.5 bis, 2.5.5 ter] is inextricably linked with draft guideline 2.5.4 [2.5.5], for which a simple reference is impossible. It seems preferable to proceed in the same manner in both cases.

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932 [408, 2003] See, for example, Giorgio Gaja, “Modalità singolari per la revoca di una reserva”, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 1989, pp. 905-907, or Luigi Migliorino, supra, note 331 at pp. 332-333, in relation to the withdrawal of a reservation by Italy to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or, for France, Jean-François Flauss, supra, note 340 at p. 863.

933 [409, 2003] See the commentary to draft guideline 2.1.4, supra, note 407, paras. (3)-(6).

934 [410, 2003] Ibid., para. (10).

935 [411, 2003] These uncertainties also explain the hesitation of the few authors who have tackled the question (see supra, note 408).

936 [412, 2003] See commentary to draft guideline 2.5.4 [2.5.5], para. (17).
2.5.6 Communication of withdrawal of a reservation

The procedure for communicating the withdrawal of a reservation follows the rules applicable to the communication of reservations contained in guidelines 2.1.5, 2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8] and 2.1.7.

Commentary

(1) As the Commission noted elsewhere,\(^937\) the Vienna Conventions are completely silent as to the procedure for the communication of withdrawal of reservations. Article 22, paragraph 3 (a), undoubtedly implies that the contracting States and international organizations should be notified of a withdrawal, but it does not specify either who should make this notification or the procedure to be followed. Draft guideline 2.5.6 serves to fill that gap.

(2) To that end, the Commission used the same method as for the formulation of the withdrawal \textit{stricto sensu} \(^938\) and considered whether it might not be possible and appropriate to transpose draft guidelines 2.1.5 to 2.1.7 it had adopted on the communication of reservations themselves.

(3) The first remark that must be made is that, although the Vienna Conventions do not specify the procedure to be followed for withdrawing a reservation, the \textit{travaux préparatoires} of the 1969 Convention show that those who drafted the law of treaties were in no doubt about the fact that:

\begin{itemize}
\item Notification of withdrawal must be made by the depositary, if there is one; and
\item The recipients of the notification must be “every State which is or is entitled to become a party to the treaty” and “interested States”\(^939\).
\end{itemize}

(4) It is only because, at least partly at the instigation of Mr. Rosenne, it was decided to group together all the rules relating to depositaries and notification, which constitute articles 76 to 78 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,\(^940\) that these proposals were abandoned.\(^941\) They are, however, entirely consistent with draft guidelines 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8].\(^942\)
(5) This approach is endorsed by the legal theory on the topic, meagre though it is, and is also in line with current practice. Thus,

− Both the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe observe the same procedure on withdrawal as on the communication of reservations: they are the recipients of withdrawals of reservations made by States or international organizations to treaties of which they are depositaries and they communicate them to all the Contracting Parties and the States and international organizations entitled to become parties;

− Moreover, where treaty provisions expressly relate to the procedure to be followed in respect of withdrawal of reservations, they generally follow the model used for the formulation of reservations, in line with the rules given in draft guidelines 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8], in that they specify that the depositary must be notified of a withdrawal and even that he should communicate it to the Contracting Parties or, more broadly, to “every State” entitled to become party or to “every State”, without specifying further.  

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States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty; or (ii) If there is a depositary, to the latter, which shall notify the States and organizations for which it is intended as soon as possible. Where a communication relating to a reservation to a treaty is made by electronic mail, or by facsimile, it must be confirmed by diplomatic note or depositary notification."


945 [421, 2003] See European Committee on Legal Cooperation (CDCJ), *Conventions and Reservations to those Conventions*, note by the Secretariat drafted by the Directorate-General of Legal Affairs, CDCJ (1999) (see the withdrawal of reservations by Germany and Italy to the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in cases of Multiple Nationality of 1963, pp. 11 and 12).

946 [422, 2003] See, for example, the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, of 19 May 1956, art. 48, para. 2; the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, as amended, of 1 August 1988, art. 40, para. 2; the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of member States of the European Union, art. 15, para. 2; or the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, art. 43, para. 1.

947 [423, 2003] See, for example, the European Agreement on Road Markings of 13 December 1957, arts. 15, para. 2, and 17 (b), or the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, of 26 October 1961, arts. 18 and 34 (c).

As for the depositary, there is no reason to give him a role different from the extremely limited one assigned to him for the formulation of reservations in draft guidelines 2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8] and 2.1.7, \textsuperscript{494} which are a combination of article 77, paragraph 1, and article 78, paragraphs 1 (d) and 2, of the 1986 Vienna Convention\textsuperscript{495} and are in conformity with the principles on which the relevant Vienna rules are based: \textsuperscript{496}

- Under article 78, paragraph 1 (e), the depositary is given the function of “informing the Parties and the States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty of acts, notifications and communications relating to the treaty”; notifications relating to reservations and their withdrawal are covered by this provision, which appears in modified form in draft guideline 2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8] (ii);

- The first paragraph of draft guideline 2.1.7 is based on the provision contained in article 78, paragraph 1 (d), under which the depositary should examine whether “notification or communication relating to the treaty is in due and proper form and, if need be, [bring] the matter to the attention of the State or international organization in question”; this, too, applies equally well to the formulation of reservations and to their withdrawal (which could cause a problem with regard to, for example, the person making the communication), \textsuperscript{497}

- The second paragraph of the same draft guideline carries through the logic of the “letter-box depositary” theory endorsed by the Vienna Conventions in cases where a difference arises. It reproduces word for word the text of article 78, paragraph 2, of the 1986 Convention and, again, there seems no need to make a distinction between formulation and withdrawal.

\textsuperscript{494} See the text of draft guideline 2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8] supra, note 418. Draft guideline 2.1.7 (“Functions of depositaries”): “The depositary shall examine whether a reservation to a treaty formulated by a State or an international organization is in due and proper form and, if need be, bring the matter to the attention of the State or international organization concerned. In the event of any difference appearing between a State or an international organization and the depositary as to the performance of the latter’s functions, the depositary shall bring the question to the attention of (a) the signatory States and organizations and the contracting States and contracting organizations; or (b) Where appropriate, the competent organ of the international organization concerned.”

\textsuperscript{495} These correspond to arts. 77 and 78 of the 1969 Convention.

\textsuperscript{496} See the commentary to draft guidelines 2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8] and 2.1.7, in Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-fourth session (2002), \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10)}, pp. 102-123.

\textsuperscript{497} See the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.4 [2.5.5], paras. (10) and (11).
(7) Since the rules contained in draft guidelines 2.1.5 to 2.1.7 are in every respect transposable to the withdrawal of reservations, should they be merely referred to or reproduced in their entirety? In relation to the formulation of reservations, the Commission preferred to reproduce and adapt draft guidelines 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 [2.1.3 bis, 2.1.4] in draft guidelines 2.5.4 [2.5.5] and 2.5.5 [2.5.5 bis, 2.5.5 ter]. That position was, however, primarily dictated by the consideration that simply transposing the rules governing competence to formulate a reservation to competence to withdraw it was impossible.\footnote{429, 2003} The same does not apply to the communication of withdrawal of reservations or the role of the depositary in that regard: the text of draft guidelines 2.1.5, 2.1.6 [2.1.6, 2.1.8] and 2.1.7 fits perfectly, with the simple replacement of the word “formulation” by the word “withdrawal”. The use of a reference has fewer disadvantages and, although several members did not agree, the Commission considered that it was enough merely to refer to those provisions.

**2.5.7 [2.5.7, 2.5.8] Effect of withdrawal of a reservation**

The withdrawal of a reservation entails the application as a whole of the provisions on which the reservation had been made in the relations between the State or international organization which withdraws the reservation and all the other parties, whether they had accepted the reservation or objected to it.

The withdrawal of a reservation entails the entry into force of the treaty in the relations between the State or international organization which withdraws the reservation and a State or international organization which had objected to the reservation and opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State or international organization by reason of that reservation.

**Commentary**

(1) In the abstract, it is not very logical to insert draft guidelines relating to the effect of the withdrawal of a reservation in a chapter of the Guide to Practice dealing with the procedure for reservations, particularly since it is scarcely possible to dissociate the effect of the withdrawal from that of the reservation itself: the one cancels out the other. After some hesitation, however, the Special Rapporteur has decided to do so, for two reasons:

\footnote{429, 2003} See the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.4 [2.5.5], para. (17), and the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.5 [2.5.5 bis, 2.5.5 ter] para. (6).
In the first place, article 22 of the Vienna Conventions links the rules governing the form and procedure\(^{954}\) of a withdrawal closely with the question of its effect; and

In the second place, the effect of a withdrawal may be viewed as being autonomous, thus precluding the need to go into the infinitely more complex effect of the reservation itself.

(2) Article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions is concerned with the effect of the withdrawal of a reservation only in relation to the particular question of the time at which the withdrawal “becomes operative”. During the travaux préparatoires of the 1969 Convention, however, the Commission occasionally considered the more substantial question of how it would be operative.

(3) In his first report on the law of treaties, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice proposed a provision that, where a reservation is withdrawn, the previously reserving State becomes automatically bound to comply fully with the provision of the treaty to which the reservation related and is equally entitled to claim compliance with that provision by the other parties.\(^{955}\) Draft article 22, paragraph 2, adopted by the Commission on first reading in 1962, provided that “upon withdrawal of a reservation, the provisions of article 21 [relating to the application of reservations] cease to apply”;\(^{956}\) this sentence disappeared from the Commission’s final draft.\(^{957}\) In plenary, Sir Humphrey Waldock suggested that the Drafting Committee could discuss a further question, namely, “the possibility that the effect of the withdrawal of a reservation might be that the treaty entered into force in the relations between two States between which it had not previously been in force”;\(^{958}\) and, during the Vienna Conference, several amendments were made aiming to re-establish a provision to that effect in the text of the Convention.\(^{959}\)

\(^{954}\) [430, 2003] Admittedly, only to the extent that para. 3 (a) refers to the “notice” of a withdrawal.


\(^{957}\) [433, 2003] It was discarded on second reading following consideration by the Drafting Committee of the new draft article proposed by Sir Humphrey Waldock, who retained it in part (cf. commentary to draft guideline 2.5.8), without offering any comment (cf. Yearbook … 1965, vol. I, 814th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 272, para. 22).

\(^{958}\) [434, 2003] Ibid., 800th meeting, 14 June 1965, p. 178, para. 86; in that context, see S. Rosenne, ibid., para. 87.

(4) The Conference Drafting Committee rejected the proposed amendments, on the grounds that they were superfluous and that the effect of the withdrawal of a reservation was self-evident. This is only partially true.

(5) There can be no doubt that “the effect of withdrawal of a reservation is obviously to restore the original text of the treaty”. A distinction should, however, be made between three possible situations.

(6) In the relations between the reserving and the accepting State (or international organization) (art. 20, para. 4, of the Vienna Conventions), the reservation ceases to be operational (art. 21, para. 1): “In a situation of this kind, the withdrawal of a reservation will have the effect of re-establishing the original content of the treaty in the relations between the reserving and the accepting State. The withdrawal of the reservation produces the situation that would have existed if the reservation had not been made.”

Migliorino gives the example of the withdrawal by Hungary, in 1989, of its reservation to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, article 48, paragraph 2, of which provides for the competence of the International Court of Justice; there had been no objection to this reservation and, as a result of the withdrawal, the Court’s competence to interpret and apply the Convention was established from the effective date of the withdrawal.

(7) The same applies to the relations between the State (or international organization) which withdraws a reservation and a State (or international organization) which has objected to, but not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State. In this situation, under article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions, the provisions to which the reservation related did not apply in the relations between the two parties: “In a situation of this kind, the

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962 [438, 2003] Luigi Migliorino, supra, note 331 at p. 325; in that connection, see R. Szafarz, supra, note 339 at p. 314.


The withdrawal of a reservation has the effect of extending, in the relations between the reserving and the objecting State, the application of the treaty to the provisions covered by the reservation.\textsuperscript{965}

(8) The most radical effect of the withdrawal of a reservation occurs where the objecting State or international organization had opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State or organization. In that situation, the treaty enters into force\textsuperscript{966} on the date on which the withdrawal takes effect. “For a State ... which had previously expressed a maximum-effect objection, the withdrawal of the reservation will mean the establishment of full treaty relations with the reserving State.”\textsuperscript{967}

(9) In other words, the withdrawal of a reservation entails the application of the treaty in its entirety (so long as there are no other reservations, of course) in the relations between the State or international organization which withdraws the reservation and all the other Contracting Parties, whether they had accepted or objected to the reservation, although, in the second case, if the objecting State or international organization had opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State or international organization, the treaty enters into force from the effective date of the withdrawal.

(10) In the latter case, treaty relations between the reserving State or international organization and the objecting State or international organization are established even where other reservations remain, since the opposition of the State or international organization to the entry into force of the treaty was due to the objection to the withdrawn reservation. The other reservations become operational, in accordance with the provisions of article 21 of the Vienna Conventions, as from the entry into force of the treaty in the relations between the two parties.

(11) It should also be noted that the wording of the first paragraph of the draft guideline follows that of the Vienna Conventions, in particular, article 2, paragraph 1 (d), and article 23, which assume that a reservation refers to treaty provisions (in the plural). It goes without saying that the reservation can be made to only one provision or, in the case of an “across-the-board” reservation,

\textsuperscript{965} [441, 2003] Ibid., pp. 326-327; the author gives the example of the withdrawal by Portugal, in 1972, of its reservation to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, art. 37, para. 2, which gave rise to several objections by States which did not, nevertheless, oppose the entry into force of the Convention between them and Portugal (see Multilateral Treaties ..., supra, note 439, p. 112, footnote 18).

\textsuperscript{966} [442, 2003] See art. 24 of the Vienna Conventions, especially para. 3.

\textsuperscript{967} [443, 2003] R. Szafrz, supra, note 339, pp. 315 and 316; in that connection, see José Maria Ruda, “Reservations to Treaties”, RCADI, 1975-III, vol. 146, p. 202; D. Bowett, supra, note 437, p. 87, and L. Migliorino, supra, note 331, pp. 328-329. The latter gives the example of the withdrawal by Hungary, in 1989, of its reservation to the 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 66 (see Multilateral
to “the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects”. The first paragraph of draft guideline 2.5.7 [2.5.9, 2.5.8] covers both of these cases.

### 2.5.8 [2.5.9] Effective date of withdrawal of a reservation

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal of a reservation becomes operative in relation to a contracting State or a contracting organization only when notice of it has been received by that State or that organization.

### Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 2.5.8 [2.5.4] reproduces the text of the “chapeau” and of article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations.

(2) This provision, which reproduces the 1969 text with the sole addition of the reference to international organizations, was not specifically discussed during the travaux préparatoires of the 1986 Convention or at the Vienna Conference of 1968-1969, which did no more than clarify the text adopted on second reading by the Commission. Its adoption had, however, given rise to some discussion in the Commission in 1962 and 1965.

(3) Whereas Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice had, in his first report, in 1956, planned to spell out the effects of the withdrawal of a reservation, Sir Humphrey Waldock expressed no such intention in his first report, in 1962. It was, however, during the Commission’s discussions in that year...
that, for the first time, a provision was included, at the request of Bartoš, in draft article 22 on the withdrawal of reservations, that such withdrawal “takes effect when notice of it has been received by the other States concerned”.974

(4) Following the adoption of this provision on first reading, three States reacted:975 the United States of America, which welcomed it; and Israel and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which were concerned about the difficulties that might be encountered by other States parties as a result of the suddenness of the effect of a withdrawal. Their arguments led the Special Rapporteur to propose the addition to draft article 22 of a paragraph (c) involving a complicated formula whereby the withdrawal became operative as soon as the other States had received notice of it, but they were given three months’ grace to make any necessary changes.976 In this way, Sir Humphrey intended to give the other parties the opportunity to take the “requisite legislative or administrative action …, where necessary”, so that their internal law could be brought into line with the situation arising out of the withdrawal of the reservation.977

(5) As well as criticizing the overcomplicated formulation of the solution proposed by the Special Rapporteur, the members of the Commission were divided on the principle of the provision. Ruda, supported by Briggs, said that there was no reason to allow a period of grace in the case of withdrawal of reservations when no such provision existed in the case of the entry into force of a treaty as a result of the consent given by a State to be bound.978 Other members, however, including Tunkin and Waldock himself, pointed out, with some reason, that the two situations were different: where ratification was concerned, “a State could obtain all the time it required by the simple process of delaying ratification until it had made the necessary adjustments to its municipal law”; in the case of the withdrawal of a reservation, by contrast, “the change in the situation did not depend on the will of the other State concerned, but on the will of the reserving State which decided” to withdraw it.979

974 [450, 2003] Ibid., para. (5).
976 [452, 2003] “(c) On the date when the withdrawal becomes operative, article 21 ceases to apply, provided that, during a period of three months after that date a party may not be considered as having infringed the provision to which the reservation relates by reason only of its having failed to effect any necessary changes in its internal law or administrative practice.”
978 [454, 2003] Ibid., p. 176, para. 59 (Ruda), and p. 177, para. 76 (Briggs).
979 [455, 2003] Ibid., p. 176, paras. 68 and 69 (Tunkin); see also p. 175, para. 54 (Tsuruoka), and p. 177, paras. 78-80 (Waldock).
(6) The Commission considered, however, that “such a clause would unduly complicate the situation and that, in practice, any difficulty that might arise would be obviated during the consultations in which the States concerned would undoubtedly engage”. The Commission nevertheless showed some hesitation in once again stipulating that the date on which the withdrawal became operative was that on which the other Contracting Parties had been notified, because, in its final commentary, after explaining that it had concluded that to formulate as a general rule the granting of a short period of time within which States could “adapt their internal law to the new situation [resulting from the withdrawal of the reservation] would be going too far”, the Commission “felt that the matter should be left to be regulated by a specific provision in the treaty. It also considered that, even in the absence of such a provision, if a State required a short interval of time in which to bring its internal law into conformity with the situation resulting from the withdrawal of the reservation, good faith would debar the reserving State from complaining of the difficulty which its own reservation had occasioned”.

(7) This raises another problem: by proceeding in this manner, the Commission surreptitiously reintroduced in the commentary the exception that Waldock had tried to incorporate in the text itself of what became article 22 of the Convention. Not only was such a manner of proceeding questionable, but the reference to the principle of good faith did not provide any clear guidance.

(8) In the Commission’s view the question is nevertheless whether the Guide to Practice should include the clarification contained in the commentary of 1965: it makes sense to be more specific in this code of recommended practices than in general conventions on the law of treaties. In this case, however, there are some serious objections to such inclusion: the “rule” set out in the commentary manifestly contradicts that appearing in the Convention and its inclusion in the Guide would therefore depart from that rule. That would be acceptable only if it was felt to meet a clear need, but this is not the case here. In 1965, Sir Humphrey Waldock had “heard of no actual difficulty arising in the application of a treaty from a State’s withdrawal of its reservation”.

982 [458, 2003] As the [International] Court [of Justice] has observed, the “principle of good faith is one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations”, Nuclear Tests, I.C.J. Reports, 1974, p. 268, para. 46; p. 473, para. 49; “it is not in itself a source of obligation where none would otherwise exist”, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1988, p. 105, para. 94.
would still seem to be the case 38 years later. It does not therefore appear necessary or advisable to contradict or relax the rule stated in article 22, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions.

(9) It is nonetheless true that, in certain cases, the effect of the withdrawal of a reservation immediately after notification is given might give rise to difficulty. The 1965 commentary itself, however, gives the correct answer to the problem: in such a case, “the matter should ... be regulated by a specific provision of the treaty”. In other words, whenever a treaty relates to an issue, such as personal status or certain aspects of private international law, with regard to which it might be thought that the unexpected withdrawal of a reservation could cause the other parties difficulty because they had not adjusted their internal legislation, a clause should be included in the treaty specifying the period of time required to deal with the situation created by the withdrawal.

(10) This is, moreover, what happens in practice. A considerable number of treaties set a time limit longer than that given, in accordance with general law, in article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions, for the withdrawal of a reservation to take effect. This time limit generally ranges from one to three months, starting, in most cases, from the notification of the withdrawal to the depositary rather than to the other contracting States. Conversely, the treaty may set a shorter period than that contained in the Vienna Conventions. Thus, under the European Convention on Transfrontier Television, of 5 May 1989, article 32, paragraph 3,

Any contracting State which has made a reservation under paragraph 1 may wholly or partly withdraw it by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. The withdrawal shall take effect on the date of receipt of such notification by the Secretary-General.

and not on the date of receipt by the other Contracting Parties of the notification by the depositary. And sometimes a treaty provides that it is for the State which withdraws its reservation to specify the effective date of the withdrawal.

985 [456, 2003] See the examples, given by Pierre-Henri Imbert, supra, note 324 at p. 390, or Frank Horn, supra, note 324 at p. 438. See also, for example, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, of 11 April 1980, art. 94, para. 4 (six months), the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention), of 23 June 1979, art. XIV. para. 2 (90 days from the transmission of the withdrawal to the parties by the depositary), or the Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, adopted 1 August 1989 by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, art. 24, para. 3 (three months after notification of the withdrawal).
986 [457, 2003] Italics added. Council of Europe conventions containing clauses on the withdrawal of reservations generally follow this formula: cf. the 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, art. 8, para. 2; the 1977 European Agreement on the Transmission of Applications for Legal Aid, art. 13, para. 2; or the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, art. 29, para. 3.
(11) The purpose of these express clauses is to overcome the disadvantages of the principle established in article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions, which is not above criticism. Apart from the problems considered above arising, in some cases, from the fact that a withdrawal takes effect on receipt of its notification by the other parties, it has been pointed out that the paragraph does not "really resolve the question of the time factor" (ne résout pas vraiment la question du facteur temps), although, thanks to the specific provision introduced at the Vienna Conference in 1969, the partners of a State or international organization which withdraws a reservation know exactly on what date the withdrawal has taken effect in their respect, the withdrawing State or international organization itself remains in uncertainty, for the notification may be received at completely different times by the other parties. This has the unfortunate effect of leaving the author of the withdrawal uncertain as to the date on which its new obligations will become operational. Short of amending the text of article 22, paragraph 3 (a), itself, however, there is no way of overcoming this difficulty, which seems too insignificant in practice to justify "revising" the Vienna text.

(12) It should, however, be noted in this connection that the Vienna text departs from ordinary law: normally, an action under a treaty takes effect from the date of its notification to the depositary. That is what articles 16 (b), 24, paragraph 3, and 78 (b) of the 1969 Convention provide. And that is how the International Court of Justice ruled concerning optional declarations of acceptance of its compulsory jurisdiction, following a line of reasoning that may, by analogy, be applied to the law of treaties. The exception established by the provisions of article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions is explained by the concern to avoid a situation in which the other Contracting Parties to a treaty to which a State withdraws its reservation find

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987 [458, 2003] Cf. the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Kyoto Convention (Revised)) of 18 May 1973, art. 12, para. 2: "... Any Contracting Party which has entered reservations may withdraw them, in whole or in part, at any time by notification to the depositary specifying the date on which such withdrawal takes effect."
988 [459, 2003] Paras. (4) to (9).
991 [462, 2003] In this connection, see the comments by Briggs, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 800th meeting, 14 June 1965, p. 177, para. 75, and 814th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 273, para. 25.
994 [470, 2003] "By the deposit of its Declaration of Acceptance with the Secretary-General, the accepting State becomes a Party to the system of the Optional Clause in relation to the other declarant States, with all the rights and obligations deriving from article 36. (...) For it is on that very day that the consensual bond, which is the basis of the Optional Clause, comes into being between the States concerned." Judgment of 26 November 1957, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections), I.C.J.
themselves held responsible for not having observed the treaty provisions with regard to that State, even though they were unaware of the withdrawal.995 This concern must be commended.

(13) The Commission has sometimes criticized the inclusion of the phrase “unless the treaty otherwise provides”996 in some provisions of the Vienna Conventions. In some circumstances, however, it is valuable in that it draws attention to the advisability of possibly incorporating specific reservation clauses in the actual treaty in order to obviate the disadvantages connected with the application of the general rule or the ambiguity resulting from silence.997 That is certainly the case with regard to the time at which the withdrawal of a reservation became operative, which it is certainly preferable to specify whenever the application of the principle set forth in article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions and also contained in draft guideline 2.5.8 [2.5.9] might give rise to difficulties, either because the relative suddenness with which the withdrawal takes effect might put the other parties in an awkward position or, on the contrary, because there is a desire to neutralize the length of time elapsing before notification of withdrawal is received by them.

(14) In order to assist the negotiators of treaties where this kind of problem arises, the Commission has decided to include in the Guide to Practice model clauses on which they could base themselves, if necessary. The scope of these model clauses and the “instructions for use” are clarified in an “Explanatory note” at the beginning of the Guide to Practice.

Model clauses

A. Deferment of the effective date of the withdrawal of a reservation

A Contracting Party which has made a reservation to this treaty may withdraw it by means of notification addressed to [the depositary]. The withdrawal shall take effect on the expiration of a period of ... [months] [days] after the date of receipt of the notification by [the depositary].

Commentary


996 [472, 2003] See, for example, the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.1, para. (15).

997 [473, 2003] See, for example, draft guidelines 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
(a) The purpose of model clause A is to extend the period of time required for the effective date of the withdrawal of a reservation and is recommended especially in cases when the other Contracting Parties might have to bring their own internal law into line with the new situation created by the withdrawal.998

(b) Although negotiators are obviously free to modify as they wish the length of time needed for the withdrawal of the reservation to take effect, it would seem desirable that, in the model clause proposed by the Commission, the period should be calculated as dating from receipt of notification of the withdrawal by the depositary rather than by the other Contracting Parties, as article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions provides. In the first place, the effective date established in that paragraph, which should certainly be retained in draft guideline 2.5.8 [2.5.9], is deficient in several respects.999 In the second place, in cases such as this, the parties are in possession of all the information indicating the probable time scale of communication of the withdrawal to the other States or international organizations concerned; they can thus set the effective date accordingly.

B. Earlier effective date of withdrawal of a reservation

A Contracting Party which has made a reservation to this treaty may withdraw it by means of a notification addressed to [the depositary]. The withdrawal shall take effect on the date of receipt of such notification by [the depositary].

Commentary

(a) Model clause B is designed to cover the opposite situation to the one dealt with in model A, since situations may arise in which the parties agree that they prefer a shorter time scale than that resulting from the application of the principle embodied in article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions and also contained in draft guideline 2.5.8 [2.5.9]. They may wish to avoid the slowness and uncertainty linked to the requirement that the other Contracting Parties must have received notification of withdrawal. This is especially when there would be no need to modify internal law as a consequence of the withdrawal of reservation by another State or organization.

998 [474, 2003] See para. (4) of the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.8.
999 [475, 2003] See the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.8 [2.5.9].
(b) There is no reason against this, so long as the treaty in question contains a provision derogating from the general principle contained in article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions and shortening the period required for the withdrawal to take effect. The inclusion in the treaty of a provision reproducing the text of model clause B, whose wording is taken from article 32, paragraph 3, of the 1989 European Convention on Transfrontier Television,\(^{1000}\) would achieve that objective.

C. Freedom to set the effective date of withdrawal of a reservation

A Contracting Party which has made a reservation to this treaty may withdraw it by means of a notification addressed to [the depositary]. The withdrawal shall take effect on the date set by that State in the notification addressed to [the depositary].

Commentary

(a) The Contracting Parties may also wish to leave it to the discretion of the reserving State or international organization to determine the date on which the withdrawal would take effect. Model clause C, whose wording follows that of article 12, paragraph 2, of the 1973 Kyoto Convention (Revised),\(^{1001}\) applies to this situation.

(b) The insertion of such a clause in a treaty is pointless in the cases covered by draft guideline 2.5.9 and is of no real significance unless the intention is to permit the author of the reservation to give immediate effect to the withdrawal of the reservation or, in any event, to ensure that it becomes operative more rapidly than is provided for in article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions. The purposes of model clause C are therefore similar to those of model clause B.

2.5.9 [2.5.10] Cases in which a reserving State or international organization may unilaterally set the effective date of withdrawal of a reservation

The withdrawal of a reservation takes effect on the date set by the withdrawing State or international organization where:

\(^{1000}\) See the complete text in para. (10) of the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.8.

\(^{1001}\) See the text of the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.8, supra, note 463.
(a) That date is later than the date on which the other contracting States or international organizations received notification of it; or

(b) The withdrawal does not add to the rights of the withdrawing State or international organization, in relation to the other contracting States or international organizations.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 2.5.9 [2.5.10] specifies the cases in which article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions does not apply, not because there is an exemption to it, but because it is not designed for that purpose. Regardless of the situations in which an express clause of the treaty rules out the application of the principle embodied in this provision, this applies in the two above-mentioned cases, where the author of the reservation can unilaterally set the effective date of its withdrawal.

(2) The first subparagraph of draft guideline 2.5.9 [2.5.10] considers the possibility of a reserving State or international organization setting that date at a time later than that resulting from the application of article 22, paragraph 3 (a). This does not raise any particular difficulties: the period provided for therein is intended to enable the other parties not to be caught unawares and to be fully informed of the scope of their commitments in relation to the State (or international organization) renouncing its reservation. From such time as that information is effective and available, therefore, there is no reason why the reserving party should not set the effective date of the withdrawal of its reservation as it wishes, since, in any case, it could have deferred the date by notifying the depositary of the withdrawal at a later time.

(3) Paragraph (a) of draft guideline 2.5.9 [2.5.10] deliberately uses the plural (“the other contracting States or international organizations”) where article 22, paragraph 3 (a), uses the singular (“that State or that organization”). For the withdrawal to take effect on the date specified by the withdrawing State, it is essential that all the other Contracting Parties should have received notification, otherwise neither the spirit nor the raison d’être of article 22, paragraph 3 (a), would have been respected.

(4) Subparagraph (b) concerns cases in which the date set by the author of the reservation is prior to the receipt of notification by the other Contracting Parties. In that situation, only the withdrawing State or international organization (and, where relevant, the depositary) knows that the
reservation has been withdrawn. This applies all the more where the withdrawal is assumed to be retroactive, as sometimes occurs.1002

(5) In the absence of a specific treaty provision, an intention expressed unilaterally by the reserving State cannot, in theory, prevail over the clear provisions of article 22, paragraph 3 (a), if the other Contracting Parties object. The Commission believes, however, that it is not worth making an exception of the category of treaties establishing “integral obligations”, especially in the field of human rights; in such a situation, there can be no objection - quite the contrary - to the fact that the withdrawal takes immediate, even retroactive effect, if the State making the original reservation so wishes, since the legislation of other States is, by definition, not affected.1003 In practice, this is the kind of situation in which retroactive withdrawals have occurred.1004

(6) The Commission debated whether it was preferable to view the question from the angle of the withdrawing State or that of the other parties, in which case subparagraph (b) would have been worded “… the withdrawal does not add to the obligations of the other contracting States or international organizations”. After lengthy discussion, the Commission agreed that there were two sides of the same coin and opted for the first solution, which seemed to be more consistent with the active role of the State that decides to withdraw its reservation.

(7) In the English text, the term “auteur du retrait” is translated by “withdrawing State or international organization”. It goes without saying that this refers not to a State or an international organization which withdraws from a treaty, but to one which withdraws its reservation.

2.5.10 [2.5.11] Partial withdrawal of a reservation

The partial withdrawal of a reservation limits the legal effect of the reservation and achieves a more complete application of the provisions of the treaty, or of the treaty as a whole, to the withdrawing State or international organization.

The partial withdrawal of a reservation is subject to the same formal and procedural rules as a total withdrawal and takes effect on the same conditions.


1003 [479, 2003] In this connection, see P.H. Imbert, supra, note 324 at pp. 290-291.

Commentary

(1) In accordance with the prevailing doctrine, “[s]ince a reservation can be withdrawn, it may in certain circumstances be possible to modify or even replace a reservation, provided the result is to limit its effect”.1005 While this principle is formulated in prudent terms, it is hardly questionable and can be stated more categorically: nothing prevents the modification of a reservation if the modification reduces the scope of the reservation and amounts to a partial withdrawal. This is the point of departure of draft guideline 2.5.10.

(2) Clearly, this does not raise the slightest problem when such a modification is expressly provided for by the treaty. While this is relatively rare, there are reservation clauses to this effect. Thus, for example, article 23, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Inland Waterway (CVN) of 6 February 1976 provides that:

The declaration provided for in paragraph 1 of this article may be made, withdrawn or modified at any later date; in such case, the declaration, withdrawal or modification shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after receipt of the notice by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(3) In addition, reservation clauses expressly contemplating the total or partial withdrawal of reservations are to be found more frequently. For example, article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, of 20 February 1957, provides that:

Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of the present article may at any time withdraw the reservation, in whole or in part, after it has been accepted, by a notification to this effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received.1006

The same applies to article 17, paragraph 2, of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, of 4 November 1998, which reads as follows:

Any State which has made a reservation ... may wholly or partly withdraw it by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. The

1006 [482, 2003] See also, for example, article 50, paragraph 4, of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended in 1975: “A State which has made reservations may at any time by notification in writing withdraw all or part of its reservations.”
withdrawal shall take effect on the date of receipt of such notification by the Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{1007}

In addition, under article 15, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of States members of the European Union, of 26 May 1997:

“Any Member State which has entered a reservation may withdraw it at any time in whole or in part by notifying the depositary. Withdrawal shall take effect on the date on which the depositary receives the notification.”

(4) The fact that partial or total withdrawal are mentioned simultaneously in numerous treaty clauses highlights the close relationship between them. This relationship, confirmed in practice, is, however, sometimes contested in the literature.

(5) During the preparation of the draft articles on the law of treaties by the International Law Commission, Sir Humphrey Waldock suggested the adoption of a draft article placing the total and partial withdrawal of reservations on an equal footing.\textsuperscript{1008} Following the consideration of this draft by the Drafting Committee, it returned to the plenary stripped of any reference to the possibility of withdrawing a reservation “in part”,\textsuperscript{1009} although no reason for this modification can be inferred from the summaries of the discussions. The most plausible explanation is that this seemed to be self-evident - “he who can do more can do less” - and the word “withdrawal” should very likely be interpreted, given the somewhat surprising silence of the commentary, as meaning “total or partial withdrawal”.

(6) The fact remains that this is not entirely self-evident and that practice and the literature\textsuperscript{1010} appear to be somewhat undecided. In practice, one can cite a number of reservations to Conventions concluded within the framework of the Council of Europe which were modified

\textsuperscript{1007} [483, 2003] See also, for example, article 13, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 1977: “Any State may wholly or partly withdraw a reservation it has made in accordance with the foregoing paragraph by means of a declaration addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe which shall become effective as from the date of its receipt.” For other examples of conventions concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe and containing a comparable clause, see the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.2, supra, note 362.

\textsuperscript{1008} [484, 2003] Cf. draft article 17, para. 6, in Sir Humphrey’s first report, Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 69, para. 69.

\textsuperscript{1009} [485, 2003] Ibid., p. 201; on the changes made by the Drafting Committee to the draft prepared by the Special Rapporteur, see the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.1, para. (3).

without arousing opposition. For its part, the European Commission of Human Rights “showed a certain flexibility” as to the time requirement set out in article 64 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

As internal law is subject to modification from time to time, the Commission considered that a modification of the law protected by the reservation, even if it entails a modification of the reservation, does not undermine the time requirement of article 64. According to the Commission, despite the explicit terms of article 64, ... to the extent that a law then in force in its territory is not in conformity ... the reservation signed by Austria on 3 September 1958 (1958-1959) (2 Annuaire 88-91) covers ... the law of 5 July 1962, which did not have the result of enlarging, a posteriori, the area removed from the control of the Commission.

(7) This latter clarification is essential and undoubtedly provides the key to this jurisprudence: it is because the new law does not enlarge the scope of the reservation that the Commission considered that it was covered by the law. Technically, what is at issue is not a modification of the reservation itself, but the effect of the modification of the internal law; nevertheless, it seems legitimate to make the same argument. Moreover, in some cases, States formally modified their reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights (in the sense of diminishing their scope) without protest from the other Contracting Parties.

(8) The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights can be interpreted in the same way, in the sense that, while the Strasbourg Court refuses to extend to new, more restrictive laws the benefit of a reservation made upon ratification, it proceeds differently if, following ratification,

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1011 [487, 2003] Jörg Polakiewicz, supra, note 362 at p. 95; admittedly, it seems to be more a matter of “statements concerning modalities of implementation of a treaty at the internal level” within the meaning of draft guideline 1.4.5 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/54/10), pp. 284-289) than of reservations as such.
1012 [488, 2003] Article 57 since the entry into force of Protocol II: “1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article. 2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.”
1014 [490, 2003] Cf. the partially dissenting opinion of Judge Valticos in the Chorherr c. Autriche case: “If the law is modified, the divergence to which the reservation refers could probably, if we are not strict, be maintained in the new text, but it could not, of course, be strengthened” (judgement of 25 August 1993, series A, No. 266-B, p. 40).
the law “goes no farther than a law in force on the date of the said reservation”.\footnote{[492, 2003]} The outcome of the Belilos case is, however, likely to raise doubts in this regard.

(9) Following the position taken by the Strasbourg Court concerning the follow-up to its finding that the Swiss “declaration” made in 1974, relating to article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights, was invalid,\footnote{[493, 2003]} Switzerland not without hesitation,\footnote{[494, 2003]} first modified its “declaration” - equated by the Court with a reservation, at least insofar as the applicable rules are concerned - so as to render it compatible with the judgment of 29 April 1988.\footnote{[495, 2003]} The “interpretative declaration” thus modified was notified by Switzerland to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, the depositary of the Convention, and to the Committee of Ministers “acting as a monitoring body for the enforcement of judgements of the Court”.\footnote{[496, 2003]} These notifications do not seem to have given rise to disputes or raised difficulties on the part of the Convention bodies or other States parties.\footnote{[497, 2003]} However, the situation in the Swiss courts was different. In a decision dated 17 December 1992, Elisabeth B. v. Council of State of Thurgau Canton, the Swiss Federal Court decided, with regard to the grounds for the Belilos decision, that it was the entire “interpretative declaration” of 1974 which was invalid and thus that there was no validly formulated reservation to be amended 12 years later; if anything, it would have been a new reservation, which was incompatible with the ratione temporis condition for the formulation of reservations established in article 64 of the Rome Convention\footnote{[498, 2003]} and in article 19 of the 1969
Vienna Convention.\footnote{499, 2003} On 29 August 2000, Switzerland officially withdrew its “interpretative declaration” concerning article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.\footnote{500, 2003}

(10) Despite appearances, however, it cannot be inferred from this important decision that the fact that a treaty body with a regulatory function (human rights or other) invalidates a reservation prohibits any change in the challenged reservation:

The Swiss Federal Court’s position is based on the idea that, in this case, the 1974 “declaration” was invalid in its entirety (even if it had not been explicitly invalidated by the European Court of Human Rights); and, above all:

In that same decision, the Court stated that:

“While the 1988 declaration merely constitutes an explanation of and restriction on the 1974 reservation, there is no reason why this procedure should not be followed. While neither article 64 of the European Convention on Human Rights nor the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (RS 0.111) explicitly settles this issue, it would appear that, as a rule, the reformulation of an existing reservation should be possible if its purpose is to attenuate an existing reservation. This procedure does not limit the relevant State’s commitment vis-à-vis other States; rather, it increases it in accordance with the Convention.”\footnote{501, 2003}

(11) This is an excellent presentation of both the applicable law and its basic underlying premise: there is no valid reason for preventing a State from limiting the scope of a previous reservation by withdrawing it, if only in part; the treaty’s integrity is better ensured thereby and it is not impossible that, as a consequence, some of the other parties may withdraw objections that they had made to the initial reservation.\footnote{502, 2003} Furthermore, as has been pointed out, without this option, the equality between parties would be disrupted (at least in cases where a treaty monitoring body exists): “States which have long been parties to the Convention might consider themselves to be subject to unequal treatment by comparison with States which ratified the Convention [more recently] and, a fortiori, with future Contracting Parties”\footnote{503, 2003} that would have the advantage of knowing the treaty body’s position regarding the validity of reservations comparable to the one that they might be planning to formulate and of being able to modify it accordingly.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[1023]\cite{499, 2003} Extensive portions of the Federal Court’s decision are cited in French translation in the Journal des Tribunaux, vol. I: Droit fédéral, 1995, p. 537. The relevant passages are to be found in paragraph 7 of the decision (pp. 533-537).
\item[1025]\cite{501, 2003} See the decision mentioned in supra, note 499, p. 535.
\item[1026]\cite{502, 2003} See Frank Horn, supra, note 324 at p. 223.
\end{itemize}
Moreover, it was such considerations\textsuperscript{1028} which led the Commission to state in its preliminary conclusions of 1997 that, in taking action on the inadmissibility of a reservation, the State may, for example, modify its reservation so as to eliminate the inadmissibility;\textsuperscript{1029} obviously, this is possible only if it has the option of modifying the reservation by partially withdrawing it.

In practice, partial withdrawals, while not very frequent, are far from non-existent; however, there are not many withdrawals of reservations in general. In 1988, Frank Horn noted that, of 1,522 reservations or interpretative declarations made in respect of treaties of which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is the depositary, “47 have been withdrawn completely or partly ...\textsuperscript{1030} In the majority of cases, i.e., 30 statements, the withdrawals have been partial. Of these, six have experienced successive withdrawals leading in only two cases to a complete withdrawal”.\textsuperscript{1031} This trend, while not precipitous, has continued in recent years as demonstrated by the following examples:

− On 11 November 1988, Sweden partially withdrew its reservation to article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance of 20 June 1956;\textsuperscript{1032}

− On two occasions, in 1986 and 1995, Sweden also withdrew, in whole or in part, some of its reservations to the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations of 26 October 1961;\textsuperscript{1033} and

− On 5 July 1995, following several objections, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya modified the general reservation that it had made upon acceding to the Convention on the Elimination of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1027} [503, 2003] Flauss, supra, note 496, p. 299.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1028} [504, 2003] See Yearbook ... 1997, vol. II, Part Two, paras. 55-56; document A/52/10, paras. 86 and 141-144.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1029} [505, 2003] See the preliminary conclusions, Yearbook ... 1997, vol. II, Part Two, para. 10.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1030} [506, 2003] Of these 47 withdrawals, 11 occurred during a succession of States. There is no question that a successor State may withdraw reservations made by its predecessor, in whole or in part (cf. art. 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties); however, as the Commission has decided (cf. Yearbook ... 1995, vol. II, Part Two, para. 477 and Yearbook ... 1997, vol. II, Part Two, para. 221) all problems concerning reservations related to the succession of States will be studied in fine and will be the subject of a separate chapter of the Guide to Practice.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1031} [507, 2003] Supra, note 324 at p. 226. These figures are an interesting indication, but should be viewed with caution.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1032} [508, 2003] Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December 2000, vol. II, chap. XX.1, footnote 9; see also Sweden’s 1996 “reformulation” of one of its reservations to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its simultaneous withdrawal of several other reservations (ibid., vol. I, footnote 23) and the partial, then total (in 1963 and 1980, respectively) withdrawal of a Swiss reservation to that Convention.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1033} [509, 2003] Ibid., vol. II, chap. XIV.3, footnote 7; see also Finland’s modification of 10 February 1994 reducing the scope of a reservation to the same Convention (ibid., footnote 5).}
All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979, making it more specific.\footnote{510, 2003} In all these cases, which provide only a few examples, the Secretary-General, as depository of the conventions in question, took note of the modification without any comment whatsoever.

(14) The Secretary-General’s practice is not absolutely consistent, however, and, in some cases, even those involving modifications which apparently reduce the scope of the reservations in question, he proceeds as in the case of late formulation of reservations\footnote{511, 2003} and confines himself, “in keeping with the ... practice followed in similar cases”, to receiving “the declarations in question for deposit in the absence of any objection on the part of any of the contracting States, either to the deposit itself or to the procedure envisaged”.\footnote{512, 2003} This practice is defended in the following words in the Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties: “when States have wished to substitute new reservations for initial reservations made at the time of deposit ... this has amounted to a withdrawal of the initial reservations - which raised no difficulty - and the making of (new) reservations”.\footnote{513, 2003} This position seems to be confirmed by a memorandum dated 4 April 2000 from the United Nations Legal Counsel, which describes “the practice followed by the Secretary-General as depository in respect of communications from States which seek to modify their existing reservations to multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General or which may be understood to seek to do so” and extends the length of time during which parties may object from 90 days to 12 months.\footnote{514, 2003}

(15) Not only is this position contrary to what appears to be the accepted practice when the proposed modification limits the scope of the modified reservation; it is more qualified than initially appears. The note verbale of 4 April 2000 must be read together with the Legal Counsel’s reply, of the same date, to a note verbale from Portugal reporting, on behalf of the European Union,
problems associated with the 90-day time period. That note makes a distinction between “a modification of an existing reservation” and “a partial withdrawal thereof”. In the case of the second type of communication, “the Legal Counsel shares the concerns expressed by the Permanent Representative that it is highly desirable that, as far as possible, communications which are no more than partial withdrawals of reservations should not be subjected to the procedure that is appropriate for modifications of reservations”.

(16) The question is thus merely one of wording: the Secretary-General refers to withdrawals which enlarge the scope of reservations as “modifications” and to those which reduce that scope as “partial withdrawals”; the latter are not (or should not be, although this is not always translated into practice) subject to the cumbersome procedure required for the late formulation of reservations. To require a one-year time period before the limitation of a reservation can produce effects, subjecting it to the risk of a “veto” by a single other party, would obviously be counterproductive and in violation of the principle that, to the extent possible, the treaty’s integrity should be preserved.

(17) Despite some elements of uncertainty, the result of the foregoing considerations is that the modification of a reservation whose effect is to reduce its scope must be subject to the same legal regime as a total withdrawal. In order to avoid any ambiguity, especially in view of the terminology used by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, it is better to refer here to a “partial withdrawal”.

(18) The second paragraph of draft guideline 2.5.10 [2.5.11] takes account of the alignment of the rules on partial withdrawal of reservations with those that apply in the case of a total withdrawal. Therefore, it implicitly refers to draft guidelines 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.5 [2.5.5 bis, 2.5.5 ter] 2.5.6 and 2.5.8 [2.5.9], which fully apply to partial withdrawals. The same is not true, however, regarding draft guideline 2.5.7, on the effect of a total withdrawal.

(19) To avoid any confusion, the Commission also deemed it useful to set out in the first paragraph the definition of what constitutes a partial withdrawal. The definition draws on the actual definition of reservations that stems from article 2 (d) of the 1969 and

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1039 [515, 2003] Cf. draft guidelines 2.3.1 to 2.3.3, ibid., pp. 462-495.
1040 [516, 2003] See above, paras. (14) to (16).
1041 [517, 2003] See draft guideline 2.5.11 and para. (1) of the commentary.
1986 Vienna Conventions and on draft guidelines 1.1 and 1.1.1 [1.1.4] (to which the phrase “achieve a more complete application … of the treaty as a whole” refers).

(20) It is not, however, aligned with that guideline: whereas a reservation is defined “subjectively” by the objective pursued by the author (as reflected by the expression “purports to …” in those provisions), partial withdrawal is defined “objectively” by the effects that it produces. The explanation for the difference lies in the fact that, while a reservation produces an effect only if it is accepted (expressly or implicitly),\textsuperscript{1042} withdrawal, whether total or partial, produces its effects and “the consent of a State or international organization which has accepted the reservation is not required”\textsuperscript{1043} nor indeed is any additional formality. This effect is mentioned in the first paragraph of draft guideline 2.5.10 [2.5.11] (partial withdrawal “limits the legal effect of the reservation and ensures more completely the application of the provisions of the treaty, or the treaty as a whole”) and explained in draft guideline 2.5.11 [2.5.12]

\[2.5.11 \text{[2.5.12]} \text{ Effect of a partial withdrawal of a reservation}\]

The partial withdrawal of a reservation modifies the legal effect of the reservation to the extent of the new formulation of the reservation. Any objection made to the reservation continues to have effect as long as its author does not withdraw it, insofar as the objection does not apply exclusively to that part of the reservation which has been withdrawn.

No objection may be made to the reservation resulting from the partial withdrawal, unless that partial withdrawal has a discriminatory effect.

**Commentary**

(1) While the form and procedure of a partial withdrawal must definitely be aligned with those of a pure and simple withdrawal,\textsuperscript{1044} the problem also arises of whether the provisions of draft guideline 2.5.7 [2.5.7, 2.5.8] (“Effect of withdrawal of a reservation”) can be transposed to partial withdrawals. In fact, there can be no hesitation: a partial withdrawal of a partial reservation cannot be compared to that of a total withdrawal nor can it be held that “the partial withdrawal of a reservation entails the application as a whole of the provisions to which the reservation related in the relations between the State or international organization which partially withdraws the...

\textsuperscript{1042} [518, 2003] See art. 20 of the Vienna Conventions.

\textsuperscript{1043} [519, 2003] See draft guideline 2.5.1.
reservation and all the other parties, whether they had accepted or objected to the reservation”. Of course, the treaty may be implemented more fully in the relations between the reserving State or international organization and the other Contracting Parties, but not “as a whole” since, hypothetically, the reservation (in a more limited form, admittedly) remains.

(2) However, while partial withdrawal of a reservation does not constitute a new reservation, it nonetheless leads to modification of the previous text. Thus, as the first sentence of draft guideline 2.5.11 [2.5.12] specifies, the legal effect of the reservation is modified “to the extent of the new formulation of the reservation”. This wording is based on the terminology used in article 21 of the Vienna Conventions without entering into a substantive discussion of the effects of reservations and objections thereto.

(3) Another specific problem arises in the case of partial withdrawal. In the case of total withdrawal, the effect is to deprive of consequences the objections that had been made to the reservation as initially formulated, even if those objections had been accompanied by opposition to the entry into force of the treaty with the reserving State or international organization. There is no reason for this to be true in the case of a partial withdrawal. Admittedly, States or international organizations that had made objections would be well advised to reconsider them and withdraw them if the motive or motives that gave rise to them were eliminated by the modification of the reservation and they may certainly proceed to withdraw them, but they cannot be required to do so and they may perfectly well maintain their objections if they deem it appropriate, on the understanding that the objection has been expressly justified by the part of the reservation that has been withdrawn. In the latter case, the objection disappears, which is what is meant by the phrase “to the extent that the objection does not apply exclusively to the part of the reservation which has been withdrawn”. Two questions nonetheless arise in this connection.

(4) The first is to know whether the authors of an objection not of this nature must formally confirm it or whether it must be understood to apply to the reservation in its new formulation. In

\[1044\] See above, the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.10 [2.5.11], para. (18).
\[1045\] Cf. draft guideline 2.5.7.
\[1046\] See the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.10 [2.5.11], para. (15).
\[1047\] Cf. article 21, para. 1: “A reservation established with regard to any party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23:
\[1048\] Cf. the first paragraph of draft guideline 2.5.7 [2.5.7, 2.5.8] (“… whether they had accepted the reservation or objected to it”).
\[1049\] Cf. the second paragraph of draft guideline 2.5.8 [2.5.9].
the light of practice, there is scarcely any doubt that this assumption of continuity is essential and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depositary, seems to consider that the continuity of the objection goes without saying. \[1051\] This seems fairly reasonable, for the partial withdrawal does not eliminate the initial reservation and does not constitute a new reservation; a priori, the objections that were made to it rightly continue to apply as long as their authors do not withdraw them. The second sentence of the first paragraph of draft guideline 2.5.11 [2.5.12] draws the necessary consequences.

5) The second question that arises is whether partial withdrawal of the reservation can, conversely, constitute a new opportunity to object to the reservation resulting from the partial withdrawal. Since it is not a new reservation, but an attenuated form of the existing reservation, reformulated so as to bring the reserving State’s commitments more fully into line with those provided for in the treaty, there might seem, prima facie, very doubtful that the other Contracting Parties can object to the new formulation: \[1052\] if they have adapted to the initial reservation, it is difficult to see how they can go against the new one, which, in theory, has attenuated effects. In principle, therefore, a State cannot object to a partial withdrawal any more than it can object to a pure and simple withdrawal.

6) In the Commission’s view, there is nonetheless an exception to this principle. While there seems to be no example, a partial withdrawal might have a discriminatory effect. Such would be the case if, for instance, a State or an international organization renounced a previous reservation except vis-à-vis certain parties or categories of parties or certain categories of beneficiaries to the exclusion of others. In those cases, it would seem necessary for those parties to be able to object to the reservation even though they had not objected to the initial reservation when it applied to all of the Contracting Parties together. The second paragraph of draft guideline 2.5.11 [2.5.12] sets out both the principle that it is impossible to object to a reservation in the event of a partial withdrawal and the exception when the withdrawal is discriminatory.

\[1050\] See the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.10 [2.5.11], para. (11) and supra, note 502.

\[1051\] The objections of Denmark, Finland, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway or Sweden to the reservation formulated by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (see the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.10 [2.5.11], supra, note 510 were not modified following the reformulation of the reservation and are still listed in Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, Status at 31 December 2000 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.V.5), vol. I, chap. IV.8, pp. 245-250.

\[1052\] Whereas they can certainly remove their initial objections, which, like reservations themselves, can be withdrawn at any time (see art. 22, para. 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions); see the commentary to draft guideline 2.5.10 [2.5.11], para. (11).
2.5.12 Withdrawal of an interpretative declaration

An interpretative declaration may be withdrawn at any time by the authorities competent for that purpose, following the same procedure applicable to its formulation.

Commentary

(1) It follows from draft guideline 2.4.3 that, except where a treaty provides otherwise, a “simple” interpretative declaration “may be formulated at any time”. It may, of course, be inferred therefrom that such a declaration may also be withdrawn at any time without any special procedure. It would, moreover, be paradoxical if the possibility of the withdrawal of an interpretative declaration was more limited than that of the withdrawal of a reservation, which could be done “at any time”.1054

(2) While States seldom withdraw their interpretative declarations, this does happen occasionally. On 1 March 1990, for instance, the Government of Italy notified the Secretary-General that “it had decided to withdraw the declaration by which the provisions of articles 17 and 18 [of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951] were recognized by it as recommendations only”.1055 Likewise, “on 20 April 2001, the Government of Finland informed the Secretary-General [of the United Nations] that it had decided to withdraw its declaration in respect of article 7, paragraph 2, made upon ratification” of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (ratified by that country in 19771056).

(3) This practice is compatible with the very informal nature of interpretative declarations.

(4) The withdrawal of an interpretative declaration must nevertheless be based on the few procedures provided for in draft guidelines 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 with regard to the authorities which are competent to formulate such a declaration (and which are the same as those which may represent a State or an international organization for the adoption or authentication of the text of the

1053 [613, 2004] Cf. draft guideline 2.4.6.
1055 [615, 2004] *Multilateral Treaties ...*, vol. I, chap. V.2, pp. 347, note 23. Doubts remain concerning the nature of this declaration. There are also withdrawals of “statements of non-recognition” (cf., for example, the withdrawal of the Egyptian declarations in respect of Israel concerning the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination or the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, following the Camp David Agreement in 1980, ibid., chap. IV.2, p. 136, note 18, or chap. VI.15, p. 406, note 18), but such statements are “outside the scope of the ... Guide to Practice” (draft guideline 1.4.3).
1056 [616, 2004] Ibid., vol. II, chap. XXIII.1, p. 328, note 13. The declaration concerned the respective powers of the President of the Republic, the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to conclude treaties. See also the withdrawal by New Zealand of a declaration made upon ratification of the Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank (ibid., vol. I, chap. X.4, p. 512, note 9).
treaty or for expressing their consent to be bound). The wording used in draft guideline 2.5.12 implicitly refers to those provisions.

2.5.13 Withdrawal of a conditional interpretative declaration

The withdrawal of a conditional interpretative declaration is governed by the rules applying to the withdrawal of reservations.

Commentary
(1) Unlike simple interpretative declarations, conditional interpretative declarations are governed insofar as their formulation is concerned by the legal regime of reservations: they must be formulated when the State or international organization expresses its consent to be bound, except if none of the other contracting Parties objects to their late formulation.

(2) It follows inevitably that the rules applicable to the withdrawal of conditional interpretative declarations are necessarily identical to those applying reservations in this regard, and this can only strengthen the position that it is unnecessary to devote specific draft guidelines to such declarations. The Commission nevertheless believes that it would be premature to take a final decision in this regard as long as this “hunch” has not been verified in respect of the rules relating to the validity of both reservations and conditional interpretative declarations.

(3) Until a definite position has been taken on this problem of principle, the rules to which draft guideline 2.5.13 implicitly refers are those contained in draft guidelines 2.5.1 to 2.5.9.

2.6 Formulation of objections

2.6.1 Definition of objections to reservations

“Objection” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international organization in response to a reservation to a treaty formulated by another State or international organization, whereby the former State or organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effects of the reservation, or to exclude the application of the treaty as a whole, in relations with the reserving State or organization.

Commentary

(1) The aim of draft guideline 2.6.1 is to provide a generic definition applicable to all the categories of objections to reservations provided for in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. For this purpose, the Commission has taken as a model the definition of reservations provided in article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions and reproduced in guideline 1.1 of the Guide to Practice, adapting it to objections.

(2) This definition contains five elements:

- The first concerns the nature of the act (“a unilateral statement”);
- The second concerns its name (“however phrased or named”);
- The third concerns its author (“made by a State or an international organization”);
- The fourth concerns when it should be made (when expressing consent to be bound\textsuperscript{1058});
- The fifth concerns its content or object, defined in relation to the objective pursued by the author of the reservation (“whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or international organization”\textsuperscript{1059}).

(3) However, the Commission considered that the definition of objections should not necessarily include all these elements, some of which are specific to reservations and some of which deserve to be further clarified for the purposes of the definition of objections.

(4) It appeared, in particular, that it would be better not to mention the moment when an objection can be formulated; the matter is not clearly resolved in the Vienna Conventions, and it would be preferable to examine it separately and seek to respond to it in a separate draft guideline.\textsuperscript{1060}

(5) Conversely, two of the elements in the definition of reservations should certainly be reproduced in the definition of objections, which, like reservations, are unilateral.

\textsuperscript{1058} See also draft guideline 1.1.2.
\textsuperscript{1059} See also draft guideline 1.1.1.
\textsuperscript{1060} The Commission proposes to examine this question at its next session.
statements whose wording or designation is unimportant if their object makes it possible to characterize them as objections.

(6) With regard to the first element, the provisions of the Vienna Conventions leave not the slightest doubt: an objection emanates from a State or an international organization and can be withdrawn at any time. However, this does not resolve the very sensitive question of which categories of States or international organizations can formulate an objection.

(7) At this stage, the Commission does not consider it necessary to include in the definition the detail found in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Convention of 1986, which refers to a “contracting State” and a “contracting international organization”. There are two reasons for this:

– On the one hand, article 20, paragraph 4 (b), settles the question of whether an objection has effects on the entry into force of the treaty between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection; however, it leaves open the question of whether it is possible for a State or an international organization that is not a contracting party in the meaning of article 2 (f) of the Convention to make an objection; the possibility that such a State or organization might formulate an objection cannot be ruled out, it being understood that the objection would not produce the effect provided for in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), until the State or organization has become a “contracting party”. Moreover, article 21, paragraph 3, does not reproduce this detail and refers only to “a State or an international organization objecting to a reservation”, without further elaboration; this aspect deserves to be studied separately;

– On the other hand, the definition of reservations itself gives no information about the status of a State or an international organization that is empowered to formulate a reservation; it would not seem helpful to make the definition of objections more cumbersome by proceeding differently.

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1061 [311, 2005] Cf. article 20, para. 4 (b), article 21, para. 3, and article 22, paras. 2 and 3 (b). On this subject, see: Roberto Baratta, *Gli effetti delle riserve ai trattati* (Milan, Giuffrè, 1999), p. 341, or Renata Szafarz, “Reservations to multilateral treaties”, *5 Polish Yearbook of International Law* 1970, p. 313. It does not follow, however, that, like a reservation, an objection cannot be formulated jointly by several States or international organizations. This possibility will be considered at a later date.

1062 [312, 2005] Article 20, para. 4 (b), of the Vienna Convention of 1969 speaks only of the “contracting State”.

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With regard to the second element, it is sufficient to recall that the law of treaties, as enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Convention, is wholly permeated by the notion that the intentions of States take precedence over the terminology which they use to express them. This is apparent from the definition given in the Convention of the term “treaty”, which “means an international agreement ... whatever its particular designation”. Likewise, a reservation is defined therein as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named”, and the Commission used the same term to define interpretative declarations. The same should apply to objections: here again, it is the intention which counts. The question remains, however, as to what this intention is: this problem is at the heart of definition proposed in draft guideline 2.6.1.

At first sight, the word “objection” has nothing mysterious about it. In its common meaning, it designates a “reason which one opposes to a statement in order to counter it”. From a legal perspective, it means, according to the Dictionnaire de droit international public, the “opposition expressed by a subject of law to an act or a claim by another subject of law in order to prevent its entry into force or its opposability to the first subject”. The same work defines “objection to a reservation” as follows: “Expression of rejection by a State of a reservation to a treaty formulated by another State, where the aim of the reservation is to oppose the applicability between the two States of the provision or provisions covered by the reservation, or, if such is the intention stated by the author of the objection, to prevent the entry into force of the treaty as between those two States”.

This latter clarification has its basis in article 21, paragraph 3, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, which envisages that the author of the objection may indicate whether it opposes the entry into force of the treaty between it and the author of the reservation. This possibility is reflected in the last phrase of the definition in draft guideline 2.6.1, according to which, in making

1063 [313, 2005] The appropriateness of describing a single word as a “term” may be questionable, but as this terminological inflection is enshrined in custom it does not seem advisable to question it.
1064 [314, 2005] Article 2, para. 1 (a). See also, for example, the Judgment of 1 July 1994 of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports, 1994, p. 112 at p. 120, para. 3: “... international agreements may take a number of forms and be given a diversity of names”.
1069 [319, 2005] Ibid., p. 764. It need hardly be stated that this definition applies also to an objection formulated by an international organization.
an objection, the author may seek to “exclude the application of the treaty as a whole, in relations with the reserving State or organization”. In such a case, the intention of the author of the unilateral statement to object to the reservation is in no doubt.

(11) This might not be true of all categories of reactions to a reservation, which might show misgivings on the part of their authors without amounting to an objection as such.

(12) As the court of arbitration which settled the dispute between France and the United Kingdom concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Mer d’Iroise case stated in its decision of 30 June 1977:

“Whether any such reaction amounts to a mere comment, a mere reserving of position, a rejection merely of the particular reservation or a wholesale rejection of any mutual relations with the reserving State under the treaty consequently depends on the intention of the State concerned.”

In this case, the court did not expressly take a position on the nature of the United Kingdom’s “reaction”, but it “acted as if it were an objection”, namely, by applying the rule laid down in article 21, paragraph 3, of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which, however, was not in force between the parties.

(13) The award has been criticized in that regard, but it appears indisputable that the wording of the British statement in question clearly reflects the intention of the United Kingdom to object to the French reservation. The statement reads as follows:

“The Government of the United Kingdom are unable to accept reservation (b).”

The refusal to accept a reservation is precisely the purpose of an objection in the full sense of the word in its ordinary meaning.

(14) As the French-British court of arbitration noted, it can happen that a reaction to a reservation, even if critical of it, does not constitute an objection in the sense of articles 20 to 23 of the Vienna Conventions. The reaction may simply consist of observations, in which a State or an international organization announces its (restrictive) interpretation of the reservation or the conditions under

1072 [322, 2005] Ibid.
which it considers it to be valid. For example, “in 1979, the United Kingdom, Germany and France reacted to the reservation made by Portugal to the protection of property rights contained in Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights]. By making this reservation, Portugal intended to exclude the sweeping expropriation and nationalization measures, which had been adopted in the wake of the Carnations Revolution, from any challenge before the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. The reacting States did not formally object to the reservation made by Portugal, but rather made declarations to the effect that it could not affect the general principles of international law which required the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in respect of the expropriation of foreign property. Following constitutional and legislative amendments, Portugal withdrew this reservation in 1987”.

(15) The following examples can be interpreted in the same way:

- The communications whereby a number of States indicated that they did not regard “the statements[1075] concerning paragraph (1) of article 11 [of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations] made by the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People’s Republic as modifying any rights or obligations under that paragraph”[1076], the communications could be seen as interpretations of the statements in question (or of the provision to which they relate) rather than as true objections, particularly in contrast with other statements formally presented as objections;[1077]

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1075 [325, 2005] These statements, in which the parties concerned explained that they consider “that any difference of opinion regarding the size of a diplomatic mission should be settled by agreement between the sending State and the receiving State”, they expressly termed “reservations” (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 2004, ST/LEG/SER.E/23, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.V.3 (hereinafter Multilateral Treaties ...)), vol. I, chap. III.3, pp. 90-92.
1076 [326, 2005] Ibid., p. 93 (Australia); see also pp. 93-94 (Canada), p. 94 (Denmark), p. 94 (France), p. 95 (Malta), p. 96 (New Zealand) and p. 97 (Thailand, United Kingdom).
1077 [327, 2005] Ibid., statements by Greece (p. 95), Luxembourg (p. 95) and the Netherlands (pp. 95-96), or the United Republic of Tanzania (p. 97) or the more ambiguous statement by Belgium (p. 93). See also, for example, the last paragraph of the communication of the United Kingdom concerning the reservations and declarations accompanying the instrument of ratification deposited by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (ibid., vol. II, chap. XXIII.1, p. 360) or the reaction of Norway to the corrective “declaration” of France dated 11 August 1982 regarding the 1978 Protocol to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) (a declaration that clearly appears to be a reservation and to which Sweden and Italy had objected as such) stating that it considered it to be a declaration and not a reservation (Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions, J/7772, p. 81, note 1).
The communication of the United States of America regarding the first reservation of Colombia to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 20 December 1988, in which the United States Government says that it understands the reservation “to exempt Colombia from the obligations imposed by article 3, paragraphs 6 and 9, and article 6 of the Convention only insofar as compliance with such obligations would prevent Colombia from abiding by article 35 of its Political Constitution (regarding the extradition of Colombian nationals by birth), to the extent that the reservation is intended to apply other than to the extradition of Colombian nationals by birth, the Government of the United States objects to the reservation”, this is an example of a “conditional acceptance” rather than an objection strictly speaking; or

The communications of the United Kingdom, Norway and Greece concerning the declaration of Cambodia on the Convention on the International Maritime Organization.

(16) Such “quasi-objections” have tended to proliferate in recent years with the growth of the practice of the “reservations dialogue”. What the dialogue entails is that States (for the most part European States) inform the reserving State of the reasons why they think the reservation should be withdrawn, clarified or modified. Such communications may be true objections, but they may - and often do - open a dialogue that might indeed lead to an objection, although it might also result in the modification or withdrawal of the reservation. The reaction of Finland to the reservations made by Malaysia on its accession to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 clearly falls into the first category and undoubtedly constitutes an objection:

“In its present formulation the reservation is clearly incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and therefore inadmissible under article 51, paragraph 2, of the [said Convention]. Therefore the Government of Finland objects to such reservation. The Government of Finland further notes that the reservation made by the Government of Malaysia is devoid of legal effect.”

1080 [330, 2005] Ibid., vol. I, chap. IV.II, pp. 318 - italics added. The full text of this objection reads as follows:
“The reservation made by Malaysia covers several central provisions of the [said Convention]. The broad nature of the said reservation leaves open to what extent Malaysia commits itself to the Convention and to the fulfilment of its obligations under the
(17) Whether or not the reaction of Austria to the same reservations, a reaction also thoroughly reasoned and directed toward the same purpose, can be considered an objection is more debatable; Austria’s statement of 18 June 1996 contains no language expressive of a definitive rejection of the reservations of Malaysia and suggests instead a waiting stance:

“Under article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is reflected in article 51 of the [Convention on the Rights of the Child], a reservation, in order to be admissible under international law, has to be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty concerned. A reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty if it intends to derogate from provisions the implementation of which is essential to fulfilling its object and purpose.

“The Government of Austria has examined the reservation made by Malaysia to the [Convention]. Given the general character of these reservations a final assessment as to its admissibility under international law cannot be made without further clarification.

“Until the scope of the legal effects of this reservation is sufficiently specified by Malaysia, the Republic of Austria considers these reservations as not affecting any provision the implementation of which is essential to fulfilling the object and purpose of the [Convention].

“Austria, however, objects to the admissibility of the reservations in question if the application of this reservation negatively affects the compliance of Malaysia … with its obligations under the [Convention] essential for the fulfilment of its object and purpose.

“Austria could not consider the reservation made by Malaysia … as admissible under the regime of article 51 of the [Convention] and article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties unless Malaysia …, by providing additional information or through subsequent Convention. In the view of the Government of Finland reservations of such comprehensive nature may contribute to undermining the basis of international human rights treaties. “The Government of Finland also recalls that the said reservation is subject to the general principle of the observance of the treaties according to which a party may not invoke its internal law, much less its national policies, as justification for its failure to perform its treaty obligations. It is in the common interest of the States that contracting parties to international treaties are prepared to undertake the necessary legislative changes in order to fulfil the object and purpose of the treaty. Moreover, the internal legislation as well as the national policies are also subject to changes which might further expand the unknown effects of the reservation. “In its present formulation the reservation is clearly incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and therefore inadmissible under article 51, paragraph 2, of the [said Convention]. Therefore the Government of Finland objects to such reservation. The Government of Finland further notes that the reservation made by the Government of Malaysia is devoid of legal effect. “The Government of Finland recommends the Government of Malaysia to reconsider its reservation to the [said Convention].” For even clearer objections to the reservations of Malaysia, see the statements of Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden and the communications of Belgium and Denmark (ibid., pp. 317-322). Malaysia subsequently withdrew part of its reservations (see ibid., note 27).
practice, ensure[s] that the reservations are compatible with the provisions essential for the implementation of the object and purpose of the [Convention]."1081

Here again, rather than a straightforward objection, the statement can be considered a conditional acceptance (or conditional objection) with a clear intent (to induce the reserving State to withdraw or modify its reservation) but with uncertain legal status and effects, if only because the conditions for accepting or rejecting the reservation are not susceptible to an objective analysis and no particular time limit is set.

(18) Such statements pose problems comparable to those raised by communications in which a State or an international organization “reserves its position” regarding the validity of a reservation made by another party, particularly with regard to its validity ratione temporis. For example, there is some doubt as to the scope of the statement of the Netherlands to the effect that the Government of the Netherlands “reserves all rights regarding the reservations made by the Government of Venezuela on ratifying [the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone] in respect of article 12 and article 24, paragraphs 2 and 3”.1082 The same could be said of the statement of the United Kingdom to the effect that it was “not however able to take a position on [the] purported reservations [of the Republic of Korea to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] in the absence of a sufficient indication of their intended effect, in accordance with the terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the practice of the Parties to the Covenant. Pending receipt of such indication, the Government of the United Kingdom reserve their rights under the Covenant in their entirety”.1083 Similarly, the nature of the reactions of several States1084 to the limitations that Turkey had set on its acceptance of the right of individual petition under former article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe is not easy to determine. These States, using a number of different formulas, communicated to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe that they

1083 [333, 2005] Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. I, chap. IV.4, p. 192. See also the communication of the Netherlands concerning the Australian reservations to article 10 of the Covenant (ibid., p. 189); on the other hand, the reaction of the Netherlands to the Australian reservations to articles 2 and 50 of the Covenant has more the appearance of an interpretation of the reservations in question (ibid., p. 189).
reserved their position pending a decision by the competent organs of the Convention, explaining that “the absence of a formal and official reaction on the merits of the problem should not … be interpreted as a tacit recognition … of the Turkish Government’s reservations”. It is hard to see these as objections; rather, they are notifications of provisional “non-acceptance” associated with a waiting stance. In contrast, an objection involves taking a formal position seeking to prevent the reservation from having the effects intended by its author.

(19) It does not follow that reactions, of the type as those mentioned above, which the other parties to the treaty may have with respect to the reservations formulated by a State or an international organization, are prohibited or even that they produce no legal effects. However, such reactions are not objections within the meaning of the Vienna Conventions and their effects relate to the interpretation of the treaty or the unilateral acts constituted by the reservations, or else they form part of the “reservations dialogue” that the other parties to the treaty try to start up with the author of the reservation. These uncertainties clearly illustrate the value of using precise and unambiguous terminology in the description of reactions to a reservation, in the wording and in the definition of the scope which the author of an objection intends to give to it.

(20) As to the first point - the description of the reaction - the most prudent solution is certainly to use the noun “objection” or the verb “object”. Such other terms as “opposition/oppose”, “rejection/reject”, and “refusal/refuse” must also, however, be regarded as signifying objection. Unless a special context demands otherwise, the same is true of expressions like “the Government of … does not accept the reservation …” or “the reservation formulated by … is

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1084 [334, 2005] Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden. Such limitations do not constitute reservations within the meaning of the Guide to Practice (cf. the second paragraph of draft guideline 1.4.6), but the example (given by Polakiewicz, supra, note 324, p. 107) is nonetheless striking by analogy.


1086 [336, 2005] Commentary to the present guideline, paras. (13)-(17).

1087 [337, 2005] See in this respect the “Model response clauses to reservations” appended to Recommendation No. R (99) 13 adopted on 18 May 1999 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It should be noted that all the alternative wordings proposed in that document expressly utilize the word “objection”. On the disadvantages of vague and imprecise objections, see Horn, supra, note 332, pp. 184-185; see also pp. 191-197 and 221-222.

1088 [338, 2005] See also the objection of Finland to the reservation by Malaysia to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, para. (16) above.

1089 [339, 2005] See, for example, the objection of Guatemala to the reservations of Cuba to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (Multilateral Treaties …, vol. I, chap. III.3, p. 95).

impermissible/unacceptable/inadmissible”. Such is also the case when a State or an international organization, without drawing any express inference, states that a reservation is “prohibited by the treaty”, “entirely void” or simply “incompatible with the object and purpose” of the treaty, which is extremely frequent. In these last cases, this conclusion is the only one possible given the provisions of article 19 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions: in such cases, a reservation cannot be formulated and, when a contracting party expressly indicates that this is the situation, it would be inconceivable that it would not object to the reservation.

(21) The fact remains that in some cases States intend their objections to produce effects other than those expressly provided for in article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions. The question that then arises is whether, strictly speaking, these can be called objections.

(22) This provision envisages only two possibilities:

- Either “the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the reserving State or organization and the objecting State or organization to the extent of the reservation”, which is the “minimum” effect of an objection;

- Or, if the State or international organization formulating an objection to a reservation clearly states that such is its intention, in accordance with the provisions of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), the treaty does not enter into force between itself and the reserving State or organization; this is generally known as the “maximum” effect of an objection.

(23) However, there is in practice an intermediate stage between the “minimum” and “maximum” effects of the objection, as envisaged by this provision, since there are situations in which a State wishes to enter into treaty relations with the author of the reservation while at the same time

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1091 [341, 2005] See, for example, the reaction of Japan to reservations made to the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. II, chap. XXI.2, p. 275) or that of Germany to the Guatemalan reservation to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (ibid., vol. I, chap. V.2, pp. 368-369).
1093 [343, 2005] See, for example, the reactions of the European Community to the declarations of Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic regarding the TIR Convention of 1975 (ibid., vol. I, chap. XI A.16, p. 598).
considering that the effect of the objection should go beyond what is provided for in article 21, paragraph 3.\textsuperscript{1096}

(24) Similarly, the objecting State may intend to produce what is described as a “super-maximum” effect,\textsuperscript{1097} consisting in the determination not only that the reservation objected to is not valid but also that, as a result, the treaty as a whole applies ipso facto in the relations between the two States. This was the case, for example, with Sweden’s objection of 27 November 2002 to the reservation which Qatar made when acceding to the Optional Protocol of 25 May 2000 to the Convention on the Rights of the Child:

“This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between Qatar and Sweden. The Convention enters into force in its entirety between the two States, without Qatar benefiting from its reservation.”\textsuperscript{1098}

(25) The Commission is aware that the validity of such objections has been questioned.\textsuperscript{1099} However, it sees no need to take a position on this point for the purpose of defining objections: the fact is that the authors intend their objection to produce such effects, intermediate or “super-maximum” effect, and this is all that matters at this stage. Just as the definition of reservations does not prejudge their validity,\textsuperscript{1100} so, in stating in draft guideline 2.6.1 that, by objecting, the “State or organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effects of the reservation”, the Commission has endeavoured to take a completely neutral position with regard to the validity of the effects that the author of the objection intends its objection to produce. This is a matter to be taken up in the consideration of the effects of objections.

\textsuperscript{1096} See, for example, Canada’s objection to Syria’s reservation to the 1969 Vienna Convention: “... Canada does not consider itself in treaty relations with the Syrian Arab Republic in respect of those provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the compulsory conciliation procedures set out in the annex to that Convention are applicable” (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. II, chap. XXIII.1, p. 356). For other examples and for a discussion of the permissibility of this practice, see below. See also Richard W. Edwards, Jr., “Reservations to Treaties”, 10 Michigan Journal of International Law, 1989, p. 400.


\textsuperscript{1098} Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. I, chap. IV.11.C, p. 348; see also Norway’s objection of 30 December 2002 (ibid., p. 348).

\textsuperscript{1099} The argument for their validity can be based on the position adopted by the organs of the European Convention on Human Rights and general comment No. 24 of the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 11 November 1994), but is hardly compatible with paragraph 10 of the preliminary conclusions of the International Law Commission on reservations to normative multilateral treaties including human rights, adopted in 1997 (see Yearbook ... 1997, vol. II, Part Two, p. 57, para. 157) or with the principle par in parem non habet jurisdictionem. “To attribute such an effect to the rejection of the reservations is not easy to reconcile with the principle of mutuality of consent in the conclusion of treaties” (arbitral award of 30 June 1977 in the Mer d’Iroise case, U.N.R.I.A.A., vol. XVIII, p. 42, para. 60).
(26) This being so, despite the contrary opinion of some writers, 1101 no rule of international law requires a State or an international organization to state its reasons for an objection to a reservation. Except where a specific reservation is expressly authorized by a treaty, 1102 the other contracting parties are always free to reject it and even not to enter into treaty relations with its author. A statement drafted as follows:

“The Government … intends to formulate an objection to the reservation made by …” 1103 is as valid and legally sound as a statement setting forth a lengthy argument. 1104 There is, however, a recent but unmistakable tendency to specify and explain the reasons justifying the objection in the eyes of the author, and the Commission envisages adopting a guideline that encourages States to do so.

(27) The Commission should also point out that it is aware that the word “made”, in the third clause of the proposed definition (“a unilateral statement ... made by a State or an international organization”) is open to discussion: taken literally, it might be understood as meaning that the objection produces effects per se without any other condition having to be met; yet objections, like reservations, must be permissible. The word “made” was chosen for reasons of symmetry, because it appears in the definition of reservations. On the other hand, it seemed preferable to the Commission to indicate that the objection was made “in response to a reservation to a treaty formulated by another State or international organization”, as a reservation only produces effects if it is “established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23”. 1105

1100 [350, 2005] Cf. draft guideline 1.6 (“Scope of definitions”): “The definitions of unilateral statements included in the present chapter of the Guide to Practice are without prejudice to the permissibility and effects of such statements under the rules applicable to them” (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/54/10), pp. 308-310).

1101 [351, 2005] Liesbeth Lijnzaad (Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties - Ratify and Ruin?, Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994, p. 45) cites in this respect R. Kühner, Vorbehalte zu multilateralen völkerrechtlichen Vertrage (Berlin: 1986), p. 183 and Szafarz, supra, note 311, p. 309; where the last-mentioned author is concerned, this does not, however, appear to be her true position. Practice demonstrates that States do not feel bound to state the reasons on which their objections are based; see, inter alia, Horn, supra, note 332, p. 131 and pp. 209-219.

1102 [352, 2005] See in this respect the arbitral award of 30 June 1977 in the Mer d’Iroise case: “Only if the Article had authorised the making of specific reservations could parties to the Convention be understood as having accepted a particular reservation in advance” (U.N.R.I.A.A., vol. XVIII, p. 32, para. 39). Pierre-Henri Imbert even thinks that an expressly authorized reservation can be objected to (Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux (Paris: Pedone, 1979), pp. 151-152).

1103 [353, 2005] Among the many examples, see the statement by Australia concerning the reservation of Mexico to the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 (Multilateral Treaties …, vol. II, chap. XXI.2, p. 274) and those by Belgium, Finland, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom with respect to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966 (ibid., vol. I, chap. IV.2, pp. 144-149).

1104 [354, 2005] For an example, see supra, note 330 above.

2.6.2 Definition of objections to the late formulation or widening of the scope of a reservation

“Objection” may also mean a unilateral statement whereby a State or an international organization opposes the late formulation of a reservation or the widening of the scope of a reservation.

Commentary

(1) Under draft guidelines 2.3.1 to 2.3.3, the contracting parties may also “object” not only to the reservation itself but also to the late formulation of a reservation.

(2) In its commentary on draft guideline 2.3.1, the Commission wondered whether it was appropriate to use the word “objects” to reflect the second hypothesis and noted that, given the possibility for a State to accept the late formulation of a reservation but object to its content, some members “wondered whether it was appropriate to use the word ‘objects’ in draft guideline 2.3.1 to refer to the opposition of a State not to the planned reservation, but to its late formulation. Nevertheless, most members took the view that it was inadvisable to introduce the distinction formally, since in practice the two operations are indistinguishable”.

(3) However, while it is true that there appears to be no precedent in which a State or an international organization, without objecting to the late formulation of a reservation, nevertheless objected to it, this hypothesis cannot be excluded. Guideline 2.6.2 draws attention to this distinction.

(4) The members of the Commission who had expressed their opposition to the inclusion of the practice of the late formulation of reservations in the Guide to Practice reiterated their opposition to its inclusion.

2.6.3 Freedom to formulate objections

A State or international organization may formulate an objection to a reservation irrespective of the permissibility of the reservation.

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1107 [357, 2005] Ibid., p. 478, para. (2) of the commentary on draft guideline 2.3.1.
Commentary

(1) It is now well established that a State or an international organization may make an objection to a reservation formulated by another State or another international organization, irrespective of the question of the permissibility of the reservation.\footnote{300, 2010} Although that freedom is quite extensive,\footnote{301, 2010} it is not unlimited. It therefore seems preferable to speak of a “freedom” rather than a “right”\footnote{302, 2010} because this entitlement flows from the general freedom of States to conclude treaties. For the same reason, the Commission has preferred, despite some contrary opinions, to speak of a “freedom to formulate” rather than a “freedom to make” objections.\footnote{303, 2010}

(2) Subject to those reservations, the travaux préparatoires of the 1969 Vienna Convention leave no doubt as to the discretionary nature of the formulation of objections but are not very enlightening on the question of who may formulate them.\footnote{304, 2010}

(3) In its 1951 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice made an analogy between the permissibility of objections and that of reservations. It considered that:

“The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State

\footnote{300, 2010} As indicated in the commentary to guideline 2.6.1 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/60/10), pp. 200–201, para. (25)), this section leaves aside the possible impact of the invalidity of a reservation on the effects of its acceptance or any objection to it. That matter is addressed in section 5 of Part 4 of the Guide to Practice concerning the effects of acceptances of and objections to invalid reservations.

\footnote{301, 2010} See paras. (6) to (10) below.

\footnote{302, 2010} Similarly with regard to reservations, see the commentary to draft guideline 3.1 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10, pp. 328 ff, paras. (2) ff)). In his first report on the law of treaties, however, Waldock mentioned “the right [of any State] to object” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1962, vol. II, p. 62). After a lengthy discussion in the Commission on the question of the connection between objections and the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty (Yearbook ..., 1962, vol. I, 651st–656th meetings, pp. 139–179; see also para. (4) below), this requirement, which was included in draft article 19, paragraph 1 (a), as proposed by the Special Rapporteur, completely disappeared in the text of draft article 18 proposed by the Drafting Committee, which combined draft articles 18 and 19. In this respect, the Special Rapporteur noted that his two drafts “had been considerably reduced in length without, however, leaving out anything of substance” (ibid., vol. I, 663rd meeting, p. 223, para. 36). Neither during the debates nor in the later texts submitted to or adopted by the Commission, was the question of the “right” to make objections revisited.

\footnote{303, 2010} To be specific, there are two cases in which an objection may be formulated but does not produce its effects, the first being where the treaty itself has yet to enter into force, which goes without saying, and the second where the objecting State or international organization intends to become a party but has not yet expressed its definitive consent to be bound; see the eleventh report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/574), para. 83.

in the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation.”\textsuperscript{1113}

(4) Draft article 20, paragraph 2 (b), adopted on first reading by the Commission in 1962 after heated debate,\textsuperscript{1114} endorsed that position and established a link between the objection and the incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty, which seemed to be the \textit{sine qua non} for permissibility in both cases. The provision stated:

“An objection to a reservation by a State which considers it to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and the reserving State, unless a contrary intention shall have been expressed by the objecting State.”\textsuperscript{1115}

(5) In response to the comments made by the Australian, Danish and United States Governments,\textsuperscript{1116} however, the Special Rapporteur reverted to the position taken by the Commission on first reading, omitting the reference to the criterion of compatibility from his proposed draft article 19, paragraph 3 (b).\textsuperscript{1117} The opposing opinion was nonetheless supported once more by Waldock in the Commission’s debates,\textsuperscript{1118} but that did not prevent the Drafting Committee from once again leaving out any reference to the compatibility criterion – without, however, providing any explanation.\textsuperscript{1119} In accordance with that position, paragraph 4 (b) of draft article 19, adopted on second reading in 1965, merely provided that “an objection by another contracting State to a reservation precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is expressed by the objecting State”\textsuperscript{1120}.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item[1114] [306, 2010] The criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty played a large part in the early debates on reservations (Yearbook … 1962, vol. I, 651st–656th meetings). One of the leading advocates of the link between this criterion and reactions to a reservation was Mr. Rosenne, who based his arguments on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (see footnote 305 above) (Yearbook … 1962, vol. I, 651st meeting, para. 79).
\item[1117] [309, 2010] Ibid., p. 52, para. 10.
\item[1118] [310, 2010] Yearbook … 1965, vol. I, 799th meeting, para. 65. See also Mr. Tsuruoka, \textit{ibid.}, para. 69. For an opposing view, see Mr. Tunkin, \textit{ibid.}, para. 37.
\end{thebibliography}
Despite the doubts voiced by a number of delegations, the Vienna Conference of 1968–1969 made no further reference to the lack of a connection between objections and the criteria of a reservation’s permissibility. In response to a question raised by the Canadian representative, however, the Expert Consultant, Sir Humphrey Waldock, was particularly clear in his support for the position adopted by the Commission:

“The second question was, where a reservation had not been expressly authorized, and at the same time was not one prohibited under article 16, paragraph (c), could a contracting State lodge an objection other than that of incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty? The answer was surely Yes. Each contracting State remained completely free to decide for itself, in accordance with its own interests, whether or not it would accept the reservation.”

On this point, the Vienna regime deviates from the solution adopted by the International Court of Justice in its 1951 advisory opinion, which, in this regard, is certainly outdated and no longer corresponds to current positive law. A State or an international organization has the right to formulate an objection both to a reservation that does not meet the criteria for permissibility and to a reservation that it deems to be unacceptable “in accordance with its own interests”, even if it is permissible. In other words, States and international organizations are free to object for any reason whatsoever and that reason may or may not have to do with the impermissibility of the reservation.
This solution is based on the principle of consent, which underlies the reservations regime and indeed all treaty law, as the Court recalled in its 1951 advisory opinion:

“It is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent, and that consequently no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto.”

A State (or an international organization) is, therefore, never bound by treaty obligations against its will. A State that formulates a reservation is simply proposing a modification of the treaty relations envisaged by the treaty. Conversely, no State is obliged to accept those modifications – except for those resulting from reservations expressly authorized by the treaty, provided, of course, that they are not contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. Limiting the right to formulate objections to reservations that are contrary to one of the criteria for permissibility established in article 19 would not only violate the sovereign right to accept or refuse treaty obligations; it would also have the effect of establishing an actual right to make reservations. Such a right, which definitely does not exist in an absolute sense, would contravene the very principle of the sovereign equality of States, since it would allow the reserving State (or international organization) to impose its will unilaterally on the other contracting parties. In practice, this would render the mechanism of acceptances and objections meaningless.

1126 [318, 2010] Opinion cited in footnote 305 above, p. 21. The dissenting judges also stressed this principle in their joint opinion: “The consent of the parties is the basis of treaty obligations. The law governing reservations is only a particular application of this fundamental principle, whether the consent of the parties to a reservation is given in advance of the proposal of the reservation or at the same time or later.” (ibid., pp. 31–32). See also the famous dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the S.S. “Lotus”: “The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these coexisting independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.” ( Judgment of 7 September 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 18). See also A/CN.4/477/Add.1, paras. 97 and 99.

1127 [319, 2010] This clearly does not mean that States are not bound by legal obligations emanating from other sources.


(10) It is therefore indisputable that States and international organizations have discretionary freedom to formulate objections to reservations. That is clear from guideline 2.6.1, which defines “objection” in terms of the intent of its author, irrespective of the purpose or permissibility of the reservation to which the objection relates. It follows that the author may exercise that freedom regardless of the permissibility of the reservation; in other words, it may make an objection for any reason, perhaps simply for political reasons or reasons of expediency, without being obliged to explain its reasons\footnote{In this regard, however, see guideline 2.6.10 and the commentary thereto (\textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10} (A/63/10), pp. 203–206).} – provided, of course, that the objection itself is not contrary to one of the criteria for permissibility.\footnote{See guideline 3.4.2 and the commentary thereto in sect. C.2 below.}

(11) However, “discretionary” does not mean “arbitrary”\footnote{See, in particular, Stevan Jovanovic, \textit{Restriction des compétences discrétionnaires des États en droit international} (Paris: Pedone, 1988), p. 88 ff; pp. 90–93; see also Judgement No. 191 of the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal in the case of \textit{Ballo v. UNESCO}.} and, even though this freedom undoubtedly stems from the power of a party to exercise its own judgement, it is not absolute. Above all, it must be exercised within the limits arising from the procedural and formal constraints that are developed and set out in detail in the guidelines that follow in this section of the Guide to Practice. Thus, for example, it should be emphasized at the outset that a State or international organization that has accepted a reservation no longer has the option of subsequently formulating an objection to the same reservation. This rule derives implicitly from the presumption of acceptance of reservations established in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, a presumption spelled out in guideline 2.8.1, which concerns the procedure for acceptances. Moreover, guideline 2.8.12 expressly enunciates the final nature of acceptance.\footnote{For the text of that guideline and the commentary thereto, see \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10} (A/64/10), pp. 200–202).}

(12) The absence of a link between the permissibility of a reservation and the objection does not, however, fully resolve the question of the permissibility of an objection. It goes without saying that the freedom to formulate an objection must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Guide to Practice – a point so self-evident that the Commission did not think it was worthwhile to mention it in the text of guideline 2.6.3.

(13) The wording retained also leaves open the question of whether the permissibility of an objection may be challenged on the grounds that it is contrary to a norm of \textit{jus cogens} or another
general principle of international law, such as the principle of good faith or the principle of non-discrimination. Some Commission members are of the view that it could, whereas others consider the hypothesis inconceivable, since an objection merely purports to neutralize the effects of a reservation and thus, in the case of an objection “with maximum effect” (envisaged in article 20, paragraph 4 (b) of the Vienna Conventions), to prevent the treaty from entering into force as between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation, or, in the case of a simple objection, to prevent the application of the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates as between the States or international organizations in question – the implication being, in both cases, that general international law would then apply.

2.6.4 Freedom to oppose the entry into force of the treaty vis-à-vis the author of the reservation

A State or international organization that formulates an objection to a reservation may oppose the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the author of the reservation.

Commentary

(1) The freedom to make objections irrespective of the permissibility (or impermissibility) of the reservation, as set out in guideline 2.6.3, also encompasses the freedom to oppose the entry into force of the treaty as between the reserving State or international organization, on the one hand, and the author of the objection, on the other. This follows from article 20, paragraph 4 (b), and article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions, which specify the effects of an objection.

(2) Arriving at those provisions, in particular article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the 1969 Convention, proved difficult. The Commission’s early special rapporteurs, staunch supporters of the system of unanimity, had little interest in objections, the effects of which were, in their view, purely mechanical:1137 it seemed self-evident to them that an objection prevented the reserving State from becoming a party to the treaty.1138 Even though he came to support a more flexible system, Sir Humphrey Waldock still adhered to that view in 1962, as was demonstrated by the draft article 19, paragraph 4 (c), presented in his first report on the law of treaties, which stated that “the objections

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shall preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and the reserving States”.  

(3) The members of the Commission, including the Special Rapporteur, were, however, inclined to abandon that categorical approach in favour of a simple presumption in order to bring the wording of this provision more into line with the 1951 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which stated:

“As no State can be bound by a reservation to which it has not consented, it necessarily follows that each State objecting to it will or will not, on the basis of its individual appraisal within the limits of the criterion of the object and purpose stated above, consider the reserving State to be a party to the Convention.”

(4) Strictly aligning themselves with this position, the members of the Commission introduced a simple presumption in favour of the non-entry into force of the treaty as between the reserving State and the objecting State and at the same time, at that early stage, limited the possibility of opposing the treaty’s entry into force to cases where the reservation was contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. Draft article 20, paragraph 2 (b), adopted on first reading, therefore provided as follows:

“As an objection to a reservation by a State which considers it to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and the reserving State, unless a contrary intention shall have been expressed by the objecting State.”

(5) Once the possibility of making an objection is no longer linked to the criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty, the freedom of the objecting State to oppose the treaty’s entry into force in its relations with the reserving State becomes unconditional. The objecting State may, therefore, exclude all treaty relations between itself and the reserving

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1140 [332, 2010] See, in particular, Mr. Tunkin (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 653rd meeting, p. 156, para. 26, and 654th meeting, pp. 161–162, para. 11), Mr. Rosenne (ibid., 653rd meeting, pp. 156–157, para. 30), Mr. Jiménez de Aréchaga (ibid., p. 18, para. 48), Mr. de Luna (ibid., p. 160, para. 66) and Mr. Yasseen (ibid., 654th meeting, p. 161, para. 6).
1141 [333, 2010] Ibid., 654th meeting, pp. 162 and 163, paras. 17 and 29.
1143 [335, 2010] See the commentary to guideline 2.6.3, para. (4), above.
State for any reason. The wording ultimately retained by the Commission went so far as to make this effect automatic: an objection (whatever the reason) precluded the entry into force of the treaty, unless the State concerned expressed its contrary intention. During the Vienna Conference, the thrust of that presumption was reversed, not without heated debate, in favour of the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting State and the reserving State.

(6) As open to criticism as this new approach may seem, the fact remains that the objecting State is still free to oppose the entry into force of the treaty in its relations with the reserving State. The reversal of the presumption simply requires the objecting State to make an express declaration to that effect, even though it remains completely free regarding its reasons for making such a declaration.

(7) In practice, States have been curiously eager to declare expressly that their objections do not prevent the treaty from entering into force vis-à-vis the reserving State, even though, by virtue of the presumption contained in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions, that would automatically be the case with regard to an objection to a permissible reservation. Nor is this practice linked to the reason for the objection, since States make objections “with minimum effect” (specifically stating that the treaty will enter into force in their relations with the reserving State) even to reservations that they deem incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

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1145 [337, 2010] On this point, see the explanation given in paras. (5) to (7) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.3 above.


1147 [339, 2010] The question had already been raised during the discussion of the draft articles adopted on first reading by the members of the International Law Commission and by the Czechoslovak and Romanian delegations in the Sixth Committee (Sir Humphrey Waldock, fourth report (A/CN.4/177), footnote 308 above, pp. 48–49). The idea of reversing the presumption had been advocated by a number of Commission members (Mr. Tunkin (Yearbook … 1965, vol. I, 799th meeting, para. 39) and Mr. Lachs (ibid., 813th meeting, para. 62)). Nonetheless, the proposals made in this regard by Czechoslovakia (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.85, in United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2), footnote 313 above, p. 135), Syria (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.94, ibid.) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.115, ibid., p. 133) were rejected by the Conference in 1968 (Summary records (A/CONF.39/11), footnote 313 above, Twenty-fifth meeting, paras. 35 ff.). It was only in 1969 that a new Soviet amendment in this regard (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, footnote 313 above, pp. 265–266) was finally adopted by 49 votes to 21, with 30 abstentions (United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official records, Second Session, Vienna, 9 April–22 May 1969, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole (A/CONF.39/11/Add.1), Tenth plenary meeting, para. 79).

1148 [340, 2010] Concerning invalid reservations, see guidelines 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.

1149 [341, 2010] See Belgium’s objections to the Egyptian and Cambodian reservations to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (available from http://treaties.un.org/), chap. III.3) or the objections of Germany to several reservations to the same Convention (ibid.). It is, however, interesting to note that, even though Germany considered all the reservations in question as “incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Convention”, the German Government declared for only some objections that they did not prevent the entry into force of the treaty as between Germany and
There are, however, some examples of objections in which States specifically declare that their objection does prevent the treaty from entering into force in their relations with the reserving State. Such cases, though rare, show that States can and do make such objections when they see fit.

(8) It follows that the freedom to make an objection for any reason whatsoever also implies that the objecting State or international organization is free to oppose the entry into force of the treaty in its relations with the reserving State or organization. The author of the objection thus has considerable latitude in specifying the effect of its objection on the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the author of the reservation. In any case, in order to oppose the entry into force of the treaty in its relations with the author of the reservation, the author of the objection need only accompany its objection with an expression of that intention, pursuant to guideline 2.6.8, without having to state the reasons for its decision. The limitations on that freedom are explained in the part of the Guide to Practice that deals with the effects of reservations.

the phenomenon is not, however, limited to human rights treaties: see, for example, the objections of Austria, France, Germany and Italy to Viet Nam’s reservation to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (ibid., chap. VI.19) or the objections of the States members of the Council of Europe to the reservations to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997 (ibid., chap. XVIII.9) or to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 (ibid.).

1150 [342, 2010] See, for example, the objections of China and the Netherlands to the reservations formulated by a number of socialist States to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. IV.1), the objections of Israel, Italy and the United Kingdom to the reservations formulated by Burundi to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents of 1973 (ibid., chap. XVIII.7), the objections of France and Italy to the United States reservation to the Agreement on the International Carriage of Perishable Foodstuffs and on the Special Equipment to be used for such Carriage (ibid., chap. XI.B.22) or the objections of the United Kingdom to the Syrian and Vietnamese reservations and the objections of New Zealand to the Syrian reservation to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (ibid., chap. XXIII.1).

1151 [343, 2010] This is not to imply that maximum-effect objections accompanied by the declaration provided for in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), are a type of objection that is disappearing, as is suggested by Rosa Riquelme Cortado (Las Reservas a los Tratados: Lagunas y Ambigüedades del Régimen de Viena (Universidad de Murcia, 2004), p. 283). It has been argued that the thrust of the presumption retained at the Vienna Conference (in favour of the entry into force of the treaty) and political considerations may explain the reluctance of States to resort to maximum-effect objections (see Catherine Redgwell, “Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multilateral Treaties”, British Yearbook of International Law, 1993, p. 267). See, however, the explanations provided by States to the question posed by the Commission on this point, (Eleventh report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/574), paras. 33 to 38, in particular paragraph 37).

1152 [344, 2010] See also guideline 4.3.4 and the commentary thereto in sect. C.2 below.


1154 [346, 2010] See in particular guidelines 3.4.2 and 4.3.6 and the commentary thereto in sect. C.2 below.
As was explained in relation to guideline 2.6.3, the Commission considered it unnecessary in guideline 2.6.4 to state the self-evident proviso that the freedom of the author of the objection to oppose the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the author of the reservation must be exercised in accordance with the conditions of form and procedure set out elsewhere in the Guide to Practice.

**2.6.5 Author**

An objection to a reservation may be formulated by:

(i) Any contracting State and any contracting international organization; and

(ii) Any State and any international organization that is entitled to become a party to the treaty in which case such a declaration does not produce any legal effect until the State or the international organization has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty.

**Commentary**

(1) Guideline 2.6.1 on the definition of objections to reservations does not resolve the question of which States or international organizations have the freedom to make or formulate objections to a reservation made by another State or another international organization. That is the purpose of guideline 2.6.5.

(2) The Vienna Conventions provide some guidance on the question of the possible authors of an objection. Article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the 1986 Convention refers to “an objection by a contracting State or by a contracting organization to a reservation ...”. It is clear from this that contracting States and contracting international organizations within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of the 1986 Vienna Convention are without any doubt possible authors of an objection to a reservation. This hypothesis is covered by subparagraph (i) of guideline 2.6.5.

(3) The Commission has been divided, however, over the question of whether States or international organizations that are entitled to become parties to a treaty may also formulate objections. According to one viewpoint, these States and international organizations do not have the same rights as contracting States and international organizations and therefore cannot formulate

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1155 [347, 2010] See the commentary to guideline 2.6.3, para. (12), above.
objections as such. It was argued that the fact that the Vienna Convention makes no reference to the subject should not be interpreted as granting this category of States and international organizations the right to formulate objections, and that it would follow from article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions that only contracting parties may formulate objections. It was further argued that, as a consequence, declarations formulated by States and international organizations, which are so far merely entitled to become a party to the treaty, should not be qualified as objections. According to this same opinion, allowing for such a possibility might create a practical problem since, in the case of an open treaty, the parties to such a treaty might not have been made aware of certain objections.

(4) Nevertheless, according to the majority view, the provisions of article 20, paragraphs 4 (b) and 5, of the Vienna Conventions, make no exclusion of any kind; on the contrary, they allow States and international organizations that are entitled to become parties to the treaty to formulate objections within the definition contained in guideline 2.6.1. Article 20, paragraph 4 (b), simply determines the possible effects of an objection raised by a contracting State or by a contracting organization; however, the fact that paragraph 4 does not specify the effects of objections formulated by States other than contracting States or by organizations other than contracting organizations in no way means that such other States or organizations may not formulate objections. The limitation on the possible authors of an objection that article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions might seem to imply is not found in article 21, paragraph 3, on the effects of the objection on the application of the treaty in cases where the author of the objection has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State. Moreover, as article 23, paragraph 1, clearly states, reservations, express acceptances and objections must be communicated not only to the contracting States and contracting international organizations but also to “other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”. Such a notification has meaning only if these other States and international organizations can in fact react to the reservation by way of an express acceptance or an objection. Lastly, and most importantly, this position appeared to the Commission to be the only one that was compatible with

1158 [361, 2008] See also article 77, paragraphs 1 (e) and (f), of the Vienna Conventions, regarding the function of the depositary with regard to “States and international organizations entitled to become parties ...”.

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the letter and spirit of guideline 2.6.1, which defines objections to reservations not in terms of the effects they produce but in terms of those that objecting States or international organizations intend for them to produce.\footnote{[362, 2008]} (5) This point of view is confirmed by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In the operative part of its opinion, the Court clearly established that States that are entitled to become parties to the Convention can formulate objections:

“THE COURT IS OF OPINION, ...

(a) that an objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not yet ratified the Convention can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question 1 only upon ratification. Until that moment it merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual attitude of the signatory State;

(b) that an objection to a reservation made by a State which is entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so, is without legal effect.”\footnote{[363, 2008]}

(6) In State practice, non-contracting States often formulate objections to reservations. For instance, Haiti objected to the reservations formulated by Bahrain to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations at a time when it had not even signed the Convention\footnote{[364, 2008]}, Similarly, the United States of America formulated two objections to the reservations made by the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties even though it was not - and is not - a contracting State to this Convention.\footnote{[365, 2008]} Likewise, in the following examples, the objecting States were, at the time they formulated their objections, mere signatories to the treaty (which they later ratified):

\footnote{[362, 2008]} The definition of the term “reservation”, as set out in article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions, and reproduced in guideline 1.1, is formulated in the same manner: it concerns declarations that are intended to produce certain effects (but that do not necessarily do so).

\footnote{[363, 2008]} I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 30, para. III (despite the wording of subparagraph (b), some members of the Commission are of the view that the Court was referring here only to signatory States). The same position was also taken by H. Waldock in his first report on the law of treaties. Draft article 19, which is devoted entirely to objections and their effects, provided that “any State which is or is entitled to become a party to a treaty shall have the right to object…” (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 70 (italics added)). However, it is noted that this language was left out of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in relation to objections.


– Objection of Luxembourg to the reservations made by the Soviet Union, the Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;\textsuperscript{1163} and

– Objections of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to reservations made by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian SSR, Romania, the USSR, Iran and Tunisia to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone\textsuperscript{1164} and to those made by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Iran to the Convention on the High Seas.\textsuperscript{1165}

(7) In the practice of the Secretary-General as depositary, such objections formulated by States or international organizations that are entitled to become parties to the treaty are conveyed by means of “communications”\textsuperscript{1166} and not “depositary notifications”; however, what is “communicated” are unquestionably objections in the sense of guideline 2.6.1.

(8) According to the majority position, then, it seems entirely possible that States and international organizations that are entitled to become parties to the treaty may formulate objections in the sense of the definition contained in guideline 2.6.1 even though they have not expressed their consent to be bound by the treaty. This possibility is established in subparagraph (ii) of guideline 2.6.5.

(9) In reality, it would seem not only possible but also wise for States or international organizations that intend to become parties but have not yet expressed their definitive consent to be bound to express their opposition to a reservation and to make their views known on the reservation in question. As the Court noted in its advisory opinion of 1951, such an objection “merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual attitude of the signatory State”.\textsuperscript{1167} Such notification may also prove useful both for the reserving State or organization and, in certain circumstances, for the treaty monitoring bodies.


\textsuperscript{1166} [369, 2008] \textit{Summary of practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties} (ST/LEG/8, New York, 1997), para. 214.

In any event, there is no doubt that an objection formulated by a State or organization that has not yet expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty does not immediately produce the legal effects intended by its author. This is evidenced also by the operative part of the advisory opinion of 1951, which states that such an objection “can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question I only upon ratification” by the State or the organization that formulated it. The potential legal effect of an objection formulated by a State or an international organization prior to becoming a party to the treaty is realized only upon ratification, accession or approval of the treaty (if it is a treaty in solemn form) or signature (in the case of an executive agreement). This does not preclude qualifying such statements as objections; however, they are “conditional” or “conditioned” in the sense that their legal effects are subordinate to a specific act: the expression of definitive consent to be bound.

2.6.6 Joint formulation

The joint formulation of an objection by several States or international organizations does not affect the unilateral character of that objection.

Commentary

(1) Even though, according to the definition contained in guideline 2.6.1, an objection is a unilateral statement, it is perfectly possible for a number of States and/or a number of international organizations to formulate an objection collectively and jointly. Practice in this area is not highly developed; it is not, however, non-existent.

(2) In the context of regional organizations, and in particular the Council of Europe, member States strive, to the extent possible, to coordinate and harmonize their reactions and objections to reservations. Even though these States continue to formulate objections individually, they coordinate not only on the appropriateness but also on the wording of objections. Technically, however, these objections remain unilateral declarations on the part of each author State.

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1168 [371, 2008] Ibid.
1170 [373, 2008] See, for example, the objections of certain States members of the Council of Europe to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997 (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. II, pp. 138-146 (chap. XVIII.9)) or to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 (ibid., pp. 175-192, chap. XVIII.11).
(3) Yet it is also possible to cite cases in which States and international organizations have formulated objections in a truly joint fashion. For example, the European Community and its (at that time) nine member States objected, via a single instrument, to the “declarations” made by Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic regarding article 52, paragraph 3, of the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets of 4 November 1975, which offers customs unions and economic unions the possibility of becoming contracting parties.1171 The European Community has also formulated a number of objections “on behalf of the European Economic Community and of its member States”.1172

(4) It seemed to the Commission that there was no fault to be found with the joint formulation of an objection by several States or international organizations: it is difficult to imagine what might prevent them from doing jointly what they can doubtless do individually and under the same terms. Such flexibility is all the more desirable in that, given the growing number of common markets and customs and economic unions, precedents consisting of the objections or joint interpretative declarations cited above are likely to increase, as these institutions often exercise shared competence with their member States. Consequently, it would be quite unnatural to require that the latter should act separately from the institutions to which they belong. Thus, from a technical standpoint there is nothing to prevent the joint formulation of an objection. However, this in no way affects the unilateral nature of the objection.

(5) The wording of guideline 2.6.6 is modelled on that of guidelines 1.1.7 (Reservations formulated jointly) and 1.2.2 (Interpretative declarations formulated jointly). Nevertheless, in the English text, after the adjective “unilateral”, the word “character” was preferred over the word “nature”. This change offers the advantage of aligning the English text with the French version but will make it necessary to harmonize the three draft guidelines during the second reading.

2.6.7 Written form

An objection must be formulated in writing.

1172 [375, 2008] See, for example, the objection to the declaration made by the Soviet Union in respect of the Wheat Trade Convention of 1986 (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 1987 (ST/LEG/SER.E/6), chap. XIX.26) and the identical objection to the declaration made by the Soviet Union in respect of the Tropical Timber Agreement of 1983 (ibid., chap. XIX.28). In the same vein, see the practice followed at the Council of Europe since 2002 with respect to reservations to counter-terrorism conventions (para. (2) above).
Commentary

(1) Pursuant to article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, an objection to a reservation “must be formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”.

(2) As is the case for reservations, the requirement that an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing was never called into question but was presented as self-evident in the debates in the Commission and at the Vienna Conferences. In his first report, H. Waldock, the first special rapporteur to draft provisions on objections already provided in paragraph 2 (a) of draft article 19 that “an objection to a reservation shall be formulated in writing ...”, without making this formal requirement the subject of commentary. While the procedural guidelines were comprehensively revised by the Special Rapporteur in light of the comments of two Governments suggesting that “some simplification of the procedural provisions” was desirable, the requirement of a written formulation for an objection to a reservation was always explicitly stipulated:

- In article 19, paragraph 5, adopted on first reading (1962): “An objection to a reservation shall be formulated in writing ...” and “shall be communicated”;

- In article 20, paragraph 5, proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report (1965): “An objection to a reservation must be in writing”;

- In article 20, paragraph 1, adopted on second reading (1965): “A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation and an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing and communicated to the other States entitled to become parties to the treaty”.

1173 See guideline 2.1.1 (Written form) and commentary, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10), para. 103.


1175 Ibid., p. 78, para. (22) of the commentary on draft article 19, which refers the reader to the commentary to draft article 17 (ibid., p. 75, para. (11)).

1176 These were the Governments of Sweden and Denmark. See H. Waldock, fourth report (A/CN.4/177), Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, pp. 48-49 and 56, para. 13.


The written form was not called into question at the Vienna Conference in 1968 and 1969 either. On the contrary, all proposed amendments to the procedure in question retained the requirement that an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing.\(^\text{1180}\)

(3) That objections must be in written form is well established. Notification, another procedural requirement applicable to objections (by virtue of article 23, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions), requires a written document; oral communication alone cannot be filed or registered with the depositary of the treaty or communicated to other interested States. Furthermore, considerations of legal security justify and call for the written form. One must not forget that an objection has significant legal effects on the opposability of a reservation, the applicability of the provisions of a treaty as between the reserving State and the objecting State (article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions) and the entry into force of the treaty (art. 20, para. 4). In addition, an objection reverses the presumption of acceptance arising from article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, and written form is an important means of proving whether a State did indeed express an objection to a reservation during the period of time prescribed by this provision or whether, by default, it must be considered as having accepted the reservation.

(4) Guideline 2.6.7 therefore confines itself to reproducing the requirement of written form for the objections referred to in the first part of article 23, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, and parallels guideline 2.1.1 relating to the written form of reservations.

### 2.6.8 Expression of intention to preclude the entry into force of the treaty

When a State or international organization making an objection to a reservation intends to preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the reserving State or international organization, it shall definitely express its intention before the treaty would otherwise enter into force between them.

**Commentary**

(1) As article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions shows, a State or an international organization objecting to a reservation may oppose the entry into force of a treaty as between itself

and the author of the reservation. In order for this to be so, according to the same provision, that intent must still be “definitely expressed by the objecting State or organization”. Following the reversal of the presumption regarding the effects of the objection on the entry into force of the treaty as between the reserving State and the objecting State decided at the 1969 Vienna Conference, a clear and unequivocal statement is necessary in order to preclude the entry into force of the treaty in relations between the two States. This is how article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions, on which the text of guideline 2.6.8 is largely based, should be understood.

(2) The objection of the Netherlands to the reservations to article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide certainly meets the requirement of definite expression; it states that “the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands ... does not deem any State which has made or will make such reservation a party to the Convention”. France also very clearly expressed such an intention regarding the reservation of the United States of America to the Agreement on the International Carriage of Perishable Foodstuffs and on the Special Equipment to be used for such Carriage (ATP), by declaring that it would not “be bound by the ATP Agreement in its relations with the United States of America”. Similarly, the United Kingdom stated in its objection to the reservation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that it did “not accept the entry into force of the Convention as between the United Kingdom and Syria”.

(3) On the other hand, the mere fact that the reason for the objection is that the reservation is considered incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty is not sufficient to exclude the entry into force of the treaty between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation. Practice is indisputable in this regard, since States quite frequently base their objections on such

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1182 [385, 2008] See R. Baratta, Gli effetti delle riserve ai trattati (Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1999), p. 352. The author states: “There is no doubt that in order for the expected consequence of the rule regarding a qualified objection to be produced, the author must state its intention to that effect.” See, however, paragraph 6 below.


1184 [387, 2008] Ibid., vol. I, p. 899 (chap. XI.B.22). See also the objection of Italy (ibid.).

1185 [388, 2008] Ibid., vol. II, p. 416 (chap. XXIII.1). See also the objection of the United Kingdom to the reservation of Viet Nam (ibid., p. 417).
incompatibility, all the while clarifying that the finding does not prevent the treaty from entering into force as between them and the author of the reservation.\footnote{389, 2008 Among many examples, see the objections of several States members of the Council of Europe to the reservation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism on the basis of the incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden); Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. II, pp. 175-192 (chap. XVIII.11)). In every case it is stated that the objection does not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between the objecting State and the Syrian Arab Republic. See also Belgium’s objections to the Egyptian, Cambodian and Moroccan reservations to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (ibid., vol. I, p. 94 (chap. III.3)) or the objections of Germany to several reservations concerning the same Convention (ibid., pp. 95-96). It is, however, interesting to note that even though Germany considers all the reservations in question to be “incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Convention”, the German Government stated for only some objections that they did not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between Germany and the reserving States; it did not take a position on the other cases. Many examples can be found in the objections to the reservations formulated to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular the objections that were raised to the United States reservation to article 6 of the Covenant by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (ibid., pp. 191-200 (chap. IV.4)). All these States considered the reservation to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, but nonetheless did not oppose its entry into force in their relations with the United States. Only Germany remained silent regarding the entry into force of the Covenant, despite its objection to the reservation (ibid.). The phenomenon is not, however, limited to human rights treaties. See, for example, the objections made by Austria, France, Germany and Italy to Viet Nam’s reservation to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (ibid., pp. 482-483 (chap. V.19)) or the objections made by the States members of the Council of Europe to the reservations to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997 (ibid., vol. II, pp. 138-146 (chap. XVIII.9)) or to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 (ibid., p. 124 (chap. XVIII.7)).}

(4) Neither the Vienna Conventions nor the travaux préparatoires thereto gives any useful indication regarding the time at which the objecting State or international organization must clearly express its intention to oppose the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the reserving State. It is nevertheless possible to proceed by deduction. According to the presumption of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions, whereby an objection does not preclude the entry into force of a treaty in treaty relations between an objecting State or international organization and the reserving State or international organization unless the contrary is expressly stated, an objection that is not accompanied by such a declaration results in the treaty entering into force, subject to article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions concerning the effect of a reservation on relations between the two parties. If the objecting State or international organization expressed a different intention in a subsequent declaration, it would undermine its legal security.

(5) However, this is the case only if the treaty actually enters into force in relations between the two States or international organizations concerned. It may also happen that although the author of the objection has not ruled out this possibility at the time of formulating the objection, the treaty does not enter into force immediately, for other reasons.\footnote{187} In such a case the Commission considered that there was no reason to prohibit the author of the objection from expressing the intention to preclude the entry into force of the treaty at a later date; such a solution is particularly
necessary in situations where a long period of time may elapse between the formulation of the initial objection and the expression of consent to be bound by the treaty by the reserving State or international organization or by the author of the objection. Accordingly, while excluding the possibility that a declaration “maximizing” the scope of the objection can be made after the entry into force of the treaty between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection, the Commission made it clear that the intention to preclude the entry into force of the treaty must be expressed “before the treaty would otherwise enter into force” between them, without making expression of the will to oppose the entry into force of the treaty in all cases at the time the objection is formulated a prerequisite.

(6) Nevertheless, expression of the intention to preclude the entry into force of a treaty by the author of the objection or the absence thereof does not in any way prejudge the question of whether the treaty actually enters into force between the reserving State or international organization and the State or international organization that made an objection. This question concerns the combined legal effects of a reservation and the reactions it has prompted, and is to some extent separate from that of the intention of the States or international organizations concerned.

2.6.9 Procedure for the formulation of objections

Guidelines 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6 and 2.1.7 are applicable mutatis mutandis to objections.

Commentary

(1) The procedural rules concerning the formulation of objections are not notably different from those that apply to the formulation of reservations. This is, perhaps, the reason why the International Law Commission apparently did not pay very much attention to these issues during the travaux préparatoires for the 1969 Vienna Convention.

(2) This lack of interest can easily be explained in the case of the special rapporteurs who advocated the traditional system of unanimity, namely Brierly, Lauterpacht and Fitzmaurice. While it was only logical, in their view, that an acceptance, which is at the heart of the traditional system of unanimity, should be provided with a legal framework, particularly where its temporal

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1187 [390, 2008] Insufficient number of ratifications or accessions, additional time provided under the provisions of the treaty itself.
1188 [391, 2008] Even though Lauterpacht’s proposals de lege ferenda envisaged objections, the Special Rapporteur did not consider it necessary to set out the procedure that should be followed when formulating them. See the alternative drafts of article 9, H. Lauterpacht, [First] Report on the law of treaties, (A/CN.4/63), Yearbook ... 1953, vol. II, pp. 91-92.
aspect was concerned, an objection, which they saw simply as a refusal of acceptance that prevented unanimity from taking place and, consequently, the reserving State from becoming a party to the instrument, did not seem to warrant specific consideration.

(3) H. Waldock’s first report, which introduced the “flexible” system in which objections play a role that is, if not more important, then at least more ambiguous, contained an entire draft article on procedural issues relating to the formulation of objections.\footnote{392, 2008} Despite the very detailed nature of this provision, the report limits itself to a very brief commentary, indicating that “the provisions of this article are for the most part a reflex of provisions contained in [the articles on the power to formulate and withdraw reservations (art. 17) and on consent to reservations and its effects (art. 18)] and do not therefore need further explanation.”\footnote{393, 2008}

(4) After major reworking of the draft articles on acceptance and objection initially proposed by the Special Rapporteur,\footnote{394, 2008} only draft article 18, paragraph 5, presented by the Drafting Committee in 1962 deals with the formulation and the notification of an objection,\footnote{395, 2008} a provision which, in the

\begin{quote}
[392, 2008] This draft article 19 contained the following provision:

“2. (a) An objection to a reservation shall be formulated in writing by the competent authority of the objecting State or by a representative of the State duly authorized for that purpose.

(b) The objection shall be communicated to the reserving State and to all other States which are or are entitled to become parties to the treaty, in accordance with the procedure, if any, prescribed in the treaty for such communications.

(c) If no procedure has been prescribed in the treaty but the treaty designates a depositary of the instruments relating to the treaty, then the lodging of the objection shall be communicated to the depositary whose duty it shall be:

(i) To transmit the text of the objection to the reserving State and to all other States which are or are entitled to become parties to the treaty; and

(ii) To draw the attention of the reserving State and the other States concerned to any provisions in the treaty relating to objections to reservations.

3. (a) In the case of a plurilateral or multilateral treaty, an objection to a reservation shall not be effective unless it has been lodged before the expiry of twelve calendar months from the date when the reservation was formally communicated to the objecting State; provided that, in the case of a multilateral treaty, an objection by a State which at the time of such communication was not a party to the treaty shall nevertheless be effective if subsequently lodged when the State executes the act or acts necessary to enable it to become a party to the treaty.

(b) In the case of a plurilateral treaty, an objection by a State which has not yet become a party to the treaty, either actual or presumptive, shall:

(i) Cease to have effect, if the objecting State shall not itself have executed a definitive act of participation in the treaty within a period of twelve months from the date when the objection was lodged;

(ii) Be of no effect, if the treaty is in force and four years have already elapsed since the adoption of its text.

…”

\end{quote}
view of the Commission, “do[es] not appear to require comment”.

That lack of interest continued into 1965, when the draft received its second reading. And even though objections found a place in the new draft article 20 devoted entirely to questions of procedure, the Special Rapporteur still did not consider it appropriate to comment further on those provisions.

(5) The desirability of parallel procedural rules for the formulation, notification and communication of reservations, on the one hand, and of objections, on the other, was stressed throughout the debate in the Commission and was finally reflected in article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which sets forth the procedure for formulating an express acceptance of or an objection to a reservation. In 1965, Mr. Castrén rightly observed:

“Paragraph 5 [of draft article 20, which, considerably shortened and simplified, was the source for article 23, paragraph 1] laid down word for word precisely the same procedural rules for objections to a reservation as those applicable under paragraph 1 to the proposal and notification of reservations. Preferably, therefore, the two paragraphs should be amalgamated or else paragraph 5 should say simply that the provisions of paragraph 1 applied also to objections to a reservation.”

(6) Therefore, it may be wise simply to take note, within the framework of the Guide to Practice, of this procedural parallelism between the formulation of reservations and the formulation of objections. It is particularly important to note that the requirement of a marked formalism that is a consequence of these similarities between the procedure for the formulation of objections and the procedure for the formulation of reservations is justified by the highly significant effects that an objection may have on the reservation and its application as well as on the entry into force and the application of the treaty itself.

(7) This is particularly true of the rules regarding the authorities competent to formulate reservations at the international level and the consequences (or the absence of consequences) of the violation of internal rules regarding the formulation of reservations, the rules regarding the notification and communication of reservations and the rules regarding the functions of the depositary in this area. These rules would seem to be transposable mutatis mutandis to the formulation of objections. Rather than reproducing guidelines 2.1.3 (Formulation of a reservation at

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the international level), 1197 2.1.4 (Absence of consequences at the international level of the violation of internal rules regarding the formulation of reservations), 1198 2.1.5 (Communication of reservations), 1199 2.1.6 (Procedure for communication of reservations) 1200 and 2.1.7 (Functions of depositaries) 1201 by simply replacing “reservation” with “objection” in the text of the guidelines, the Commission considered it prudent to make a general reference in the texts of these guidelines 1202 which apply mutatis mutandis to objections.

2.6.10  Statement of reasons

An objection should to the extent possible indicate the reasons why it is being made.

Commentary

(1) Neither of the Vienna Conventions contains a provision requiring States to give the reasons for their objection to a reservation. Furthermore, notwithstanding the link initially established between an objection, on the one hand, and the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty, on the other hand, H. Waldock never at any point envisaged requiring a statement of the reasons for an objection. This is regrettable.

(2) Under the Vienna Convention regime, the freedom to object to a reservation is very broad, and a State or international organization may object to a reservation for any reason whatsoever, irrespective of the validity of the reservation: “No State can be bound by contractual obligations it does not consider suitable.” 1203 Furthermore, during discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, several States indicated that quite often the reasons a State has for formulating an objection are purely political. 1204 Since this is the case, stating reasons risks uselessly

1196 [399, 2008] See article 20, paragraph 4 (b), and article 23, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions.
1198 [401, 2008] Ibid., pp. 75-79.
1199 [402, 2008] Ibid., pp. 79-83.
1200 [403, 2008] For text and commentary of guideline 2.1.6, see above present report.
1202 [405, 2008] The Commission proceeded in the same manner in guidelines 1.5.2 (referred to guidelines 1.2 and 1.2.1), 2.4.3 (referred to guidelines 1.2.1, 2.4.6 and 2.4.7) and, even more obviously, in 2.5.6 (referred to guidelines 2.1.5, 2.1.6 and 2.1.7).
1204 [407, 2008] See, for example, the statement of the United States representative in the Sixth Committee during the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly: “Practice demonstrated that States and international organizations objected to reservations for a variety of reasons, often political rather than legal in nature, and with different intentions” (A/C.6/58/SR.20, para. 9). During the sixtieth session, the representative of the Netherlands stated that “in the current system, the political aspect of an objection, namely, the view expressed by the objecting State on the desirability of a reservation, played a central role, and the legal effects of such an objection were becoming increasingly peripheral” (A/C.6/60/SR.14, para. 31); on the political aspect of an objection, see Portugal
embarrassing an objecting State or international organization, without any gain to the objecting State or international organization or to the other States or international organizations concerned.

(3) Yet the issue is different where a State or international organization objects to a reservation because it considers it invalid (whatever the reason for this position). Leaving aside the question as to whether there may be a legal obligation for States to object to reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty nevertheless, in a “flexible” treaty regime the objection clearly plays a vital role in the determination of the validity of a reservation. In the absence of a mechanism for reservation control, the onus is on States and international organizations to express, through objections, their view, necessarily subjective, on the validity of a given reservation. Such a function can only be fulfilled, however, by objections motivated by considerations regarding the non-validity of the reservation in question. Even if only for this reason, it would seem reasonable to indicate to the extent possible the reasons for an objection. It is difficult to see why an objection formulated for purely political reasons should be taken into account in evaluating the conformity of a reservation with the requirements of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions.

(4) In addition, indicating the reasons for an objection not only allows a reserving State or international organization to understand the views of the other States and international organizations concerned regarding the validity of the reservation but, like the statement of reasons for the reservation itself, also provides important evidence to the monitoring bodies called on to decide on the conformity of a reservation with the treaty. Thus, in the Loizidou case, the European Court of Human Rights found confirmation of its conclusions regarding the reservation of Turkey to its declaration of acceptance to the Court’s jurisdiction in the declarations and objections made

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1205 The Netherlands observed that “States parties, as guardians of a particular treaty, appeared to have a moral, if not legal, obligation to object to a reservation that was contrary to the object and purpose of that treaty” (A/C.6/60/SR.16, para. 29). According to this line of reasoning, “a party is required to give effect to its undertakings in good faith and that would preclude it from accepting a reservation inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty” (Françoise Hampson, Final working paper on reservations to human rights treaties (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42), para. 24). Ms. Hampson observed, however, that there did not seem to be a general obligation to formulate an objection to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty (ibid., para. 30).

1206 Some treaty regimes go so far as to rely on the number of objections in order to determine the admissibility of a reservation. See for example article 20, paragraph 2, of the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which states: “A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reservation shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least two-thirds of the States Parties to this Convention object to it” (emphasis added).
by other States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights.  

Similarly, in the working paper she submitted to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 2004, Ms. Hampson stated that “in order for a treaty body to discharge its role, it will need to examine, amongst other materials, the practice of the parties to the treaty in question with regard to reservations and objections”.  

The Human Rights Committee itself, in its general comment No. 24, which, while demonstrating deep mistrust with regard to the practice of States concerning objections and with regard to the conclusions that one may draw from it in assessing the validity of a reservation, nevertheless states that “an objection to a reservation made by States may provide some guidance to the Committee in its interpretation as to its compatibility with the object and purpose of the Covenant”.  

(5) State practice shows that States often indicate in their objections not only that they consider the reservation in question contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty but also, in more or less detail, how and why they reached that conclusion. At the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, the representative of Italy to the Sixth Committee expressed the view that the Commission should encourage States to make use of the formulas set forth in article 19 of the Vienna Convention, with a view to clarifying their objections.  

(6) In the light of these considerations and notwithstanding the absence of an obligation in the Vienna regime to give the reasons for objections, the Commission considered it useful to include in the Guide to Practice guideline 2.6.10, which encourages States and international organizations to expand and develop the practice of stating reasons. However, it must be clearly understood that such a provision is only a recommendation, a guideline for State practice, and that it does not codify an established rule of international law.  

(7) Guideline 2.6.10 is worded along the lines of guideline 2.1.9 concerning the statement of reasons for reservations, and goes no further than this; it does not specify the point at which the reasons for an objection must be given. Since the same causes produce the same effects, it

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1207 [410, 2008] See guideline 2.1.9 and paragraphs (4) to (6) of the commentary above.  
1209 [412, 2008] Loizidou v. Turkey, Final working paper on reservations to human rights treaties (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42, para. 28); see, more generally, paragraphs 21-35 of this study.  
1210 [413, 2008] CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 17.  
1212 [415, 2008] See paragraph (8) of the commentary to guideline 2.1.9 above.
would nonetheless seem desirable that, to the extent possible, the objecting State or international organization should indicate the reasons for its opposition to the reservation in the instrument giving notification of the objection.

2.6.11 Non-requirement of confirmation of an objection made prior to formal confirmation of a reservation

An objection to a reservation made by a State or an international organization prior to confirmation of the reservation in accordance with guideline 2.2.1 does not itself require confirmation.

Commentary

(1) While article 23, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions requires formal confirmation of a reservation when the reserving State or international organization expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty objections do not need confirmation. Article 23, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions provides:

“An express acceptance of, or an objection to, a reservation made previously to confirmation of the reservation does not itself require confirmation.”

Guideline 2.6.11 simply reproduces some of the terms of this provision with the necessary editorial amendments to limit its scope to objections only.

(2) The provision contained in article 23, paragraph 3, of the 1969 Vienna Convention was included only at a very late stage of the travaux préparatoires for the Convention. The early draft articles relating to the procedure applicable to the formulation of objections did not refer to cases where an objection might be made to a reservation that had yet to be formally confirmed. It was only in 1966 that the non-requirement of confirmation of an objection was expressed in draft article 18, paragraph 3, adopted on second reading in 1966, without explanation or illustration; however, it was presented at that time as lex ferenda.

(3) This is a common sense rule: the formulation of the reservation concerns all States and international organizations that are contracting parties or entitled to become parties; acceptances

1213 [416, 2008] See also guideline 2.2.1 (Reservations formulated when signing and formal confirmation) and, for the commentary to this guideline, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), para. 157.
1215 [418, 2008] “The Commission did not consider that an objection to a reservation made previously to the latter’s confirmation would need to be reiterated after that event” (ibid., para. (5) of the commentary).
and objections affect primarily the bilateral relations between the author of the reservation and each of the accepting or objecting States or organizations. The reservation is an “offer” addressed to all contracting parties, which may accept or reject it; it is the reserving State or organization that endangers the integrity of the treaty and risks reducing it to a series of bilateral relations. On the other hand, it is not important whether the acceptance or objection is made before or after the confirmation of the reservation: what is important is that the reserving State or organization is aware of its partners’ intentions;\textsuperscript{1216} which is the case if the communication procedure established in article 23, paragraph 1, has been followed.

(4) State practice regarding the confirmation of objections is sparse and inconsistent: sometimes States confirm their previous objections once the reserving State has itself confirmed its reservation, but at other times they refrain from doing so.\textsuperscript{1217} Although the latter approach seems to be more usual, the fact that these confirmations exist does not invalidate the positive quality of the rule laid down in article 23, paragraph 3: these are precautionary measures that are by no means dictated by a sense of legal obligation (\textit{opinio juris}). However, some members of the Commission consider that such confirmation is required when a long period of time has elapsed between the formulation of the reservation and the formal confirmation of the reservation.

(5) In the opinion of a minority of members who refuse to view declarations made by States or international organizations that are not contracting parties as real objections,\textsuperscript{1218} such declarations should in all cases be confirmed. This position was not accepted by the Commission, which considers that it is not necessary to make such a distinction.\textsuperscript{1219}

\textsuperscript{1216} [419, 2008] In its advisory opinion of 28 May 1951 on \textit{Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide}, the International Court of Justice described the objection made by a signatory as a “warning” addressed to the author of the reservation (\textit{I.C.J. Reports 1951}, p. 29).

\textsuperscript{1217} [420, 2008] For example, Australia and Ecuador did not confirm their objections to the reservations formulated at the time of the signing of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine and the Soviet Union when those States ratified that Convention while confirming their reservations (\textit{Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 2006 (ST/LEG/SER.E/25)}, vol. I, pp. 131-132 (chap. IV.1)). Similarly, Ireland and Portugal did not confirm the objections they made to the reservation formulated by Turkey at the time of the signing of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child when Turkey confirmed its reservation in its instrument of ratification (\textit{ibid.}, pp. 341-342 (chap. IV.11)).

\textsuperscript{1218} [421, 2008] See paragraph (3) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.5 above.

\textsuperscript{1219} [422, 2008] See paragraphs (4) and (5) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.5 above.
2.6.12 Requirement of confirmation of an objection formulated prior to the expression of consent to be bound by a treaty

An objection formulated prior to the expression of consent to be bound by the treaty does not need to be formally confirmed by the objecting State or international organization at the time it expresses its consent to be bound if that State or that organization had signed the treaty when it had formulated the objection; it must be confirmed if the State or the international organization had not signed the treaty.

Commentary

(1) Article 23, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions does not, however, answer the question of whether an objection by a State or an international organization that, when formulating it, has yet to express its consent to being bound by the treaty must subsequently be confirmed if it is to produce the effects envisaged. Although H. Waldock did not overlook the possibility that an objection might be formulated by signatory States or by States only entitled to become parties to the treaty, the question of the subsequent confirmation of such a reservation was never raised. A proposal in that regard made by Poland at the Vienna Conference was not considered. Accordingly the Convention has a gap that the Commission should endeavour to fill.

(2) State practice in this regard is all but non-existent. One of the rare examples is provided by the objections formulated by the United States of America to a number of reservations to the 1969 Vienna Convention itself. In its objection to the Syrian reservation, the United States - which has yet to express its consent to be bound by the Convention - specified that it:

“intends, at such time as it may become a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to reaffirm its objection to the foregoing reservation and to reject treaty relations

1220 [423, 2008] See in particular paragraph 3 (b) of the draft article 19 proposed by H. Waldock in his first report on the law of treaties (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 62) or paragraph 6 of the draft article 20 proposed in his fourth report (Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 55).

1221 [424, 2008] Except, perhaps, in a comment made incidentally by Mr. Tunkin, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 799th meeting, para. 38: “It was clearly the modern practice that a reservation was valid only if made or confirmed at the moment when final consent to be bound was given, and that was the presumption reflected in the 1962 draft. The same applied to objections to reservations. The point was partially covered in paragraph 6 of the Special Rapporteur’s new text for article 20.”

1222 [425, 2008] Mimeograph A/CONF.39/6/Add.1, p. 18. The Polish Government proposed that paragraph 2 of article 18 (which became article 23), should be worded as follows: “If formulated on the occasion of the adoption of the text or upon signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, a reservation as well as an eventual objection to it must be formally confirmed by the reserving and objecting States when expressing their consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the reservation and the objection shall be considered as having been made on the date of their confirmation.”

1223 [426, 2008] The reservations in question are those formulated by the Syrian Arab Republic (point E) and Tunisia (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. II, p. 411 (chap. XXIII.1).
with the Syrian Arab Republic under all provisions in Part V of the Convention with regard to which the Syrian Arab Republic has rejected the obligatory conciliation procedures set forth in the Annex to the Convention”.  

Curiously, the second United States objection, formulated against the Tunisian reservation, does not contain the same statement. 

(3) In its 1951 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice also seemed to take the view that objections made by non-States parties do not require confirmation. It considered that:

“Pending ratification, the provisional status created by signature confers upon the signatory a right to formulate as a precautionary measure objections which have themselves a provisional character. These would disappear if the signature were not followed by ratification, or they would become effective on ratification.

[...] The reserving State would be given notice that as soon as the constitutional or other processes, which cause the lapse of time before ratification, have been completed, it would be confronted with a valid objection which carries full legal effect.”

The Court thereby seemed to accept that an objection automatically takes effect as a result of ratification alone, without the need for confirmation. Nonetheless, it has yet to take a formal stand on this question and the debate has been left open.

(4) It is possible, however, to deduce from the omission from the text of the Vienna Conventions of any requirement that an objection made by a State or an international organization prior to ratification or approval should be confirmed that neither the members of the Commission nor the delegates at the Vienna Conference considered that such a confirmation was necessary. The fact that the Polish amendment, which aimed to bring objections in line with reservations in that respect, was not adopted further confirms this argument. These considerations are further strengthened if one bears in mind that, when the requirement of formal confirmation of reservations formulated when signing the treaty, an obligation now firmly enshrined in article 23, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions, was adopted by the Commission, it was more in the nature of

1227 [430, 2008] Ibid.
progressive development than codification \textit{stricto sensu}. Therefore, the disparity on this score between the procedural rules laid down for the formulation of reservations, on the one hand, and the formulation of objections, on the other, could not have been due to a simple oversight but could reasonably be considered deliberate.

(5) There are other grounds for the non-requirement of formal confirmation of an objection made by a State or an international organization prior to the expression of its consent to be bound by the treaty. A reservation formulated before the reserving State or international organization becomes a contracting party to the treaty should produce no legal effect and will remain a “dead letter” until such a time as the State’s consent to be bound by the treaty is effectively given. Requiring formal confirmation of the reservation is justified in this case in particular by the fact that the reservation, once accepted, modifies that consent. The same is not true of objections. Although objections, too, produce the effects provided for in article 20, paragraph 4, and article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions only when the objecting State or international organization has become a contracting party, they are not without significance even before then. They express their author’s opinion of a reservation’s validity or admissibility and, as such, may be taken into consideration by the bodies having competence to assess the validity of reservations. Moreover, and on this point the 1951 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice remains valid, objections give notice to reserving States with regard to the attitude of the objecting State \textit{vis-à-vis} their reservation. As the Court observed:

“The legal interest of a signatory State in objecting to a reservation would thus be amply safeguarded. The reserving State would be given notice that as soon as the constitutional or other processes, which cause the lapse of time before ratification, have been completed, it would be confronted with a valid objection which carries full legal effect and consequently, it would have to decide, when the objection is stated, whether it wishes to maintain or withdraw its reservation.”

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[1230] See paragraph (4) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.10 above.\item[1231] I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 29.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Such an objection, formulated prior to the expression of consent to be bound by the treaty, therefore encourages the reserving State to reconsider, modify or withdraw its reservation in the same way as an objection raised by a contracting State. This notification would, however, become a mere possibility if the objecting State were required to confirm its objection at the time it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty. The requirement for an additional formal confirmation would thus, in the view of the Commission, largely undermine the significance attaching to the freedom of States and international organizations that are not yet contracting parties to the treaty to raise objections.

(6) Moreover, non-confirmation of the objection in such a situation poses no problem of legal security. The objections formulated by a signatory State or by a State entitled to become a party to the treaty must, like any notification or communication relating to the treaty, be made in writing and communicated and notified, in the same way as an objection emanating from a party. Furthermore, unlike a reservation, an objection modifies treaty relations only with respect to the bilateral relations between the reserving State - which has been duly notified - and the objecting State. The rights and obligations assumed by the objecting State vis-à-vis other States parties to the treaty are not affected in any way.

(7) As convincing as these considerations might seem, the Commission nevertheless felt it necessary to draw a distinction between two different cases: objections formulated by signatory States or international organizations and objections formulated by States or international organizations that had not yet signed the treaty at the time the objection was formulated. It seems that by signing the treaty the first category of States and international organizations enjoys legal status vis-à-vis the instrument in question, while the others have the status of third parties. Even though such third parties can formulate an objection to a reservation, the Commission is of the view that formal confirmation of such objections would be appropriate at the time the author State or international organization signs the treaty or expresses its consent to be bound by it. This would seem all the more necessary in that a significant amount of time can elapse between the time an objection is formulated by a State or international organization that had not signed the treaty when it made the objection and the time at which the objection produces its effects.

1232 See article 78 of the 1969 Vienna Convention and article 79 of the 1986 Vienna Convention.
1233 See in particular article 18, subparagraph (a), of the Vienna Conventions.
1234 See guideline 2.6.5 above.
The Vienna Conventions do not define the notion of a “State [that] has signed the treaty”, which the Commission has used in guideline 2.6.12. It nevertheless follows from article 18, subparagraph (a), of the Vienna Conventions that it is States or international organizations that have “signed the treaty or [have] exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until [they] shall have made [their] intention clear not to become a party to the treaty”.

2.6.13 Time period for formulating an objection

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a State or an international organization may formulate an objection to a reservation by the end of a period of 12 months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which such State or international organization expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.

Commentary

(1) The question of the time at which, or until which, a State or an international organization may raise an objection is partially and indirectly addressed by article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions. In its 1986 form, this provision states:

“For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4, and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State or an international organization if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.”

(2) Guideline 2.6.13 isolates those elements of the provision having to do specifically with the time period within which an objection can be formulated. Once again, a distinction is drawn between two possible situations.

1235 [438, 2008] Paragraph 2 refers to reservations to treaties with limited participation; paragraph 4 establishes the effects of the acceptance of reservations and objections in all cases other than those of reservations expressly authorized by the treaty, with reference to treaties with limited participation and the constituent acts of international organizations.

1236 [439, 2008] The Commission notes that from a strictly logical standpoint it would have been more appropriate to speak of the time period during which an objection can be “made”. It nevertheless chose to remain faithful to the letter of article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions.
(3) The first situation involves States and international organizations that are contracting States or international organizations at the time the reservation is notified. They have a period of 12 months within which to make an objection to a reservation, a period that runs from the time of receipt of the notification of the reservation by the States and international organizations for which it is intended, in accordance with guideline 2.1.6.

(4) The 12-month period established in article 20, paragraph 5, was the result of an initiative by H. Waldock and was not chosen arbitrarily. By proposing such a time period, he did, however, depart from - the fairly diverse - State practice at that time. The Special Rapporteur had found time periods of 90 days and of six months in treaty practice, but preferred to follow the proposal of the Inter-American Council of Jurists. In that regard, he noted the following:

“But there are, it is thought, good reasons for proposing the adoption of the longer period. First, it is one thing to agree upon a short period for the purposes of a particular treaty whose contents are known, and a somewhat different thing to agree upon it as a general rule applicable to every treaty which does not lay down a rule on the point. States may, therefore, find it easier to accept a general time limit for voicing objections, if a longer period is proposed.”

(5) The 12-month period within which an objection must be formulated in order to reverse the presumption of acceptance, provided for in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, did not, however, seem to be a well-established customary rule at the time of the Vienna Conference; nevertheless, it is still “the most acceptable” period. F. Horn noted the following in this regard:

“A too long period could not be admitted, because this would result in a protracted period of uncertainty as to the legal relations between the reserving State and the confronted parties. Nor should the period be too short. That again would not leave enough time for the confronted States to undertake the necessary analysis of the possible effects a reservation may have for them.”

1238 [441, 2008] Ibid., p. 67, para. 16.
1239 [442, 2008] Ibid.
In fact, this time period - which clearly emerged from the progressive development of international law when the Vienna Convention was adopted - has never fully taken hold as a customary rule that is applicable in the absence of text. For a long time, the practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties was difficult to reconcile with the provisions of article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions. This is because in cases where the treaty was silent on the issue of reservations, the Secretary-General traditionally considered that, if no objection to a duly notified reservation had been received within 90 days, the reserving State became a contracting State. However, having decided that this practice delayed the entry into force of treaties and their registration, the Secretary-General abandoned this practice and now considers any State that has formulated a reservation to be a contracting State as of the date of effect of the instrument of ratification or accession. In order to justify this position, the Secretary-General has pointed out that it is unrealistic to think that the conditions set out in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), could ever be met, since in order to preclude the entry into force of the treaty for the reserving State, all the contracting Parties would have had to object to the reservation. The Secretary-General’s comments are, therefore, less about the presumption established in paragraph 5 than about the unrealistic nature of the three subparagraphs of paragraph 4. In 2000, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations also stated that he was in favour of the 12-month period specified in paragraph 5, which now applies to the - necessarily unanimous - acceptance of late reservations. Moreover, State practice shows that States formulate objections even if the 12-month period specified in article 20, paragraph 5, has elapsed. Whatever uncertainties there may be regarding the


1244 Summary of practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties (ST/LEG/8), p. 55, para. 185.

1245 The 90-day period continued to be applied, however, to the acceptance of late reservations for which unanimous acceptance by the contracting States is generally required (ibid., pp. 61-62, paras. 205-206).

1246 Memorandum from the Legal Counsel of the United Nations addressed to the Permanent Representatives of States Members of the United Nations, 4 April 2000. See paragraphs (8) and (9) of the commentary to guideline 2.3.2, Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 190. The practice of the Council of Europe regarding the acceptance of late reservations, however, is to give contracting States a period of only nine months to formulate an objection (Jörg Polakiewicz, Treaty-Making in the Council of Europe (Council of Europe Publications, 1999), p. 102).
“positive quality” of the rule with regard to general international law, the rule is retained by the Vienna Conventions, and modifying it for the purposes of the Guide to Practice would undoubtedly give rise to more disadvantages than advantages: according to the practice adopted by the Commission during its work on reservations, there should be good reason for departing from the wording of the provisions of the Conventions on the law of treaties; surely no such reason exists in the present case.

(7) For the same reason, while the expression “unless the treaty otherwise provides” is self-evident, given the relevant provisions of the Vienna Conventions are of a residuary, voluntary nature and apply only if the treaty does not otherwise provide, the Commission felt that it would be useful to retain this wording in guideline 2.6.13. A review of the travaux préparatoires of article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1969 Vienna Convention in fact explains why this expression was included and thus justifies its retention. Indeed, this phrase (“unless the treaty otherwise provides”) was included in response to an amendment proposed by the United States of America. The United States representative to the Conference explained that an amendment had been proposed because

“[t]he Commission’s text seemed to prevent the negotiating States from providing in the treaty itself for a period shorter or longer than twelve months.”

Thus, the United States amendment was not directed specifically at the 12-month period established by the Commission, but sought only to make it clear that it was merely a voluntary residual rule that in no way precluded treaty negotiators from establishing a different period.

(8) The second case covered by guideline 2.6.13 involves States and international organizations that do not acquire “contracting status” until after the 12-month time period following the date they received notification has elapsed. In this case, the States and international organizations may make an objection up until the date on which they express their consent to be bound by the treaty, which, obviously, does not prevent them from doing so before that date.

(9) This solution of drawing a distinction between contracting States and those that have not yet acquired this status vis-à-vis the treaty was contemplated in J.L. Brierly’s proposals but was not taken up by either H. Lauterpacht or G.G. Fitzmaurice nor retained by the International Law

Commission in the articles adopted on first reading in 1962, even though H. Waldock had included it in the draft article 18 presented in his 1962 report. In the end, it was reintroduced during the second reading in order to address the criticism voiced by the Australian Government, which was concerned about the practical problems that might arise when the principle of tacit acceptance was actually applied.

(10) However, this solution in no way places States and international organizations that are not contracting parties at the time the reservation is notified in a position of inequality vis-à-vis the contracting parties. On the contrary, one should not lose sight of the fact that under article 23, paragraph 1, any reservation that has been formulated must be notified not only to the contracting parties but also to other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty. States and international organizations “entitled to become parties to the treaty” thus have all the information they need with regard to reservations to a specific treaty and also have a period for reflection that is at least as long as that given to contracting parties (12 months).

### 2.6.14 Conditional objections

An objection to a specific potential or future reservation does not produce the legal effects of an objection.

**Commentary**

(1) Guideline 2.6.13 provides only a partial response with respect to the date from which an objection to a reservation may be formulated. It does state that the time period during which the objection may be formulated commences when the reservation is notified to the State or international organization that intends to make an objection, in accordance with guideline 2.1.6, which implies that the objection may be formulated as from that date. This does not necessarily mean, however, that it may not be made earlier. Similarly, the definition of objections adopted by

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1251 [454, 2008] Indeed, draft article 19, paragraph 3, presented in the Commission’s report to the General Assembly concerned only implied acceptance in the strict sense of the word. See *Yearbook…* 1962, vol. II, p. 176.


1254 [457, 2008] See also guideline 2.1.5, first paragraph.

1255 [458, 2008] Draft article 18, paragraph 3 (b), in H. Waldock’s first report formulated the same rule as an exception to observance of the 12-month period, stipulating that a State that was not a party to the treaty “shall not be deemed to have consented to the reservation if it shall subsequently [i.e. after the 12-month period has elapsed] lodge an objection to the reservation, when executing the act or acts necessary to qualify it to become a party to the treaty” (*Yearbook…* 1962, vol. II, p. 61).
the Commission in guideline 2.1.6 provides that a State or an international organization may make an objection “in response to a reservation to a treaty formulated by another State or another international organization”\textsuperscript{1256}, which would seem to suggest that an objection may be made by a State or an international organization only after a reservation has been formulated. \textit{A priori}, this would seem quite logical, but in the Commission’s view this conclusion is hasty.

(2) State practice in fact demonstrates that States also raise objections for “pre-emptive” purposes. Chile, for example, formulated the following objection to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:

“The Republic of Chile formulates an objection to the reservations which have been made or may be made in the future relating to article 62, paragraph 2, of the Convention.”\textsuperscript{1257} In the same vein, Japan raised the following objection:

“The Government of Japan objects to any reservation intended to exclude the application, wholly or in part, of the provisions of article 66 and the Annex concerning the obligatory procedures for settlement of disputes and does not consider Japan to be in treaty relations with any State which has formulated or will formulate such reservation, in respect of those provisions of Part V of the Convention regarding which the application of the obligatory procedures mentioned above are to be excluded as a result of the said reservation.”\textsuperscript{1258}

However, in the second part of this objection the Japanese Government noted that the effects of this objection should apply \textit{vis-à-vis} the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia. It went on to reiterate its declaration to make it clear that the same effects should be produced \textit{vis-à-vis} the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which had formulated reservations similar to those of the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia.\textsuperscript{1259} Other States, for their part, have raised new objections in reaction to every reservation to the same provisions newly formulated by another State party.\textsuperscript{1260}

\textsuperscript{1256}[459, 2008] Italics added.
\textsuperscript{1257}[460, 2008] \textit{Multilateral Treaties ...}, vol. II, p. 421 (chap. XXIII.1).
\textsuperscript{1258}[461, 2008] \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 413-414.
\textsuperscript{1259}[462, 2008] \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{1260}[463, 2008] See, for example, the declarations and objections of Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to the comparable reservations of several States to the 1969 Vienna Convention (\textit{ibid.}, pp. 413-417).
(3) The Japanese objection to the reservations formulated by the Government of Bahrain and the Government of Qatar to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations also states that not only are the two reservations specifically concerned not regarded as valid, but that this [Japan’s] “position is applicable to any reservations to the same effect to be made in the future by other countries”\(^\text{1261}\).

(4) The objection of Greece regarding the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide also belongs in the category of advance objections. It states:

“We further declare that we have not accepted and do not accept any reservation which has already been made or which may hereafter be made by the countries signatory to this instrument or by countries which have acceded or may hereafter accede thereto.”\(^\text{1262}\)

A general objection was also raised by the Netherlands concerning the reservations to article IX of the same convention. Although this objection lists the States that had already formulated such a reservation, it concludes: “The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands therefore does not deem any State which has made or which will make such reservation a party to the Convention.” That objection was, however, withdrawn in 1996 with respect to the reservations made by Malaysia and Singapore and, on the same occasion, withdrawn in relation to Hungary, Bulgaria and Mongolia which had, for their part, withdrawn their reservations.\(^\text{1263}\)

(5) State practice is therefore far from uniform in this regard. The Commission believes that there is nothing to prevent a State or international organization from formulating pre-emptive or precautionary objections, before a reservation has been formulated or, in the case of reservations already formulated, from declaring in advance its opposition to any similar or identical reservation.

(6) Such objections do not, of course, produce the effects contemplated in article 20, paragraph 4, and article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions until a corresponding reservation is formulated by another contracting State or contracting organization. This situation is rather similar to that of a reservation formulated by a State or international organization that is a signatory but not yet a party, against which another State or organization has raised an objection; objections of this kind do not produce their effects until the reserving State expresses its consent to be bound by the...
treaty. Similarly, a pre-emptive objection produces no effect so long as no reservation relating to its provisions is formulated; it nevertheless constitutes notice that its author will not accept certain reservations. As the International Court of Justice noted, such notice safeguards the rights of the objecting State and warns other States intending to formulate a corresponding reservation that such a reservation will be met with an objection.

(7) The Commission has decided to call this category of objections “conditional objections”. They are in fact formulated on the condition that a corresponding reservation will actually be formulated by another State or international organization. Until this condition is met, the objection remains ineffective and does not produce the legal effects of a “conventional” objection.

(8) Nevertheless, the Commission refrained from specifying in guideline 2.6.14 the effects that such a conditional objection might produce once the condition was met, i.e. once a corresponding reservation was formulated. This question has nothing to do with the formulation of objections, but rather with the effects they produce.

2.6.15 Late objections

An objection to a reservation formulated after the end of the time period specified in guideline 2.6.13 does not produce the legal effects of an objection made within that time period.

Commentary

(1) Just as it is possible to formulate an objection in advance, there is nothing to prevent States or international organizations from formulating objections late, in other words after the end of the 12-month period (or any other time period specified by the treaty), or after the expression of consent to be bound in the case of States and international organizations that accede to the treaty after the end of the 12-month period.

(2) This practice is far from uncommon. In a study published in 1988, F. Horn found that of 721 objections surveyed, 118 had been formulated late, and this figure has since increased. Many

1264 [467, 2008] See guideline 2.6.12 above.
1265 [468, 2008] See the citations from the Court’s advisory opinion of 1951 in paragraph (5) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.12 above.
1266 [469, 2008] See guideline 2.6.13 above.
examples can be found relating to human rights treaties, but also to treaties covering subjects as diverse as the law of treaties, or the fight against terrorism, as well as with respect to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

(3) This practice should certainly not be condemned. On the contrary, it allows States and international organizations to express - in the form of objections - their views as to the validity of a reservation, even when the reservation was formulated more than 12 months earlier, and this practice has its advantages, even if such late objections do not produce any immediate legal effect. As it happens, the position of the States and international organizations concerned regarding the validity of a reservation is an important element for the interpreting body, whether a monitoring body or international court, to take into consideration when determining the validity of the reservation. The practice of the Secretary-General as the depositary of multilateral treaties confirms this view. The Secretary-General receives late objections and communicates them to the other States and organizations concerned, in general not as objections but as “communications”.

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1269 [472, 2008] The examples cited hereafter are solely cases identified by the Secretary-General and, consequently, notified as “communications”. The study is complicated by the fact that, in the collection of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, the date indicated is not that of notification but of deposit of the instrument containing the reservation.


1272 [475, 2008] See the late objections to the declaration made by Pakistan (13 August 2002) upon accession to the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings: Republic of Moldova (6 October 2003), Russian Federation (22 September 2003) and Poland (3 February 2004) (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. II, pp. 151-152, note 7 (chap. XVIII.9, note 5)); or the late objections to the reservations formulated by the following States in regard to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism: reservation by Belgium (17 May 2004): Russian Federation (7 June 2005) and Argentina (22 August 2005); declaration by Jordan (28 August 2003): Belgium (24 September 2004), Russian Federation (1 March 2005), Japan (14 July 2005), Argentina (22 August 2005); Ireland (23 June 2006), Czech Republic (23 August 2006); reservation by the Syrian Arab Republic (24 April 2005): Ireland (23 June 2006), Czech Republic (23 August 2006); reservation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (12 November 2001, at the time of signature; as the State has not ratified the Convention, the reservation has not been confirmed): Republic of Moldova (6 October 2003), Germany (17 June 2004), Argentina (22 August 2005) (ibid., pp. 197-200, notes 6, 7, 11 and 12 (chap. XVIII.11)).

1273 [476, 2008] See the late objections by Portugal (15 December 2005) concerning the declaration by Turkey (9 August 2004) (ibid., p. 130, note 5 (chap. XVIII.8)).

1274 [477, 2008] See the late objections by Ireland (28 July 2003), the United Kingdom (31 July 2003), Denmark (21 August 2003) and Norway (29 August 2003) to the interpretative declaration (considered by objecting States to constitute a prohibited reservation) by Uruguay (28 June 2002) (ibid., pp. 164-165, note 8 (chap. XVIII.10)).

1275 [478, 2008] Summary of practice ... (ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, New York, 1997, para. 213): “taking into account the indicative value of this provision in the Vienna Convention [article 20, paragraph 5], the Secretary-General, when thus receiving an objection after the expiry of this time lapse, calls it ‘communication’ when informing the parties concerned of the deposit of the objection”. In Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, however, several examples of late objections are given in the section “Objections”: This is the case, for example, for the objection raised by Japan (27 January 1987) to the reservations formulated by Bahrain (2 November 1971) and Qatar (6 June 1986) to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. While the objection was very late concerning the reservation made by Bahrain, it was received in good time concerning the reservation made by Qatar; it was no doubt for that reason that the objection was communicated as such, and not simply as a “communication” (Multilateral Treaties ..., vol. I, p. 96 (chap. III.3)).
Furthermore, an objection, even a late objection, is important in that it may lead, or contribute, to a reservations dialogue.1276

(4) However, it follows from article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions that if a State or international organization has not raised an objection by the end of the 12-month time period following the formulation of the reservation or by the date on which it expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty, it is considered to have accepted the reservation, with all the consequences that that entails. Without going into the details of the effects of this type of tacit acceptance, suffice it to say that the effect of such an acceptance is, in principle, that the treaty enters into force between the reserving State or international organization and the State or organization considered as having accepted the reservation. This result cannot be called into question by an objection formulated several years after the treaty has entered into force between the two States or international organizations without seriously affecting legal security.

(5) States seem to be aware that a late objection cannot produce the normal effects of an objection made in good time. The Government of the United Kingdom, in its objection (made within the required 12-month period) to the reservation of Rwanda to article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, said that it wished “to place on record that they take the same view [in other words, that they were unable to accept the reservation] of the similar reservation [to that of Rwanda] made by the German Democratic Republic as notified by the circular letter [...] of 25 April 1973”.1277 It is clear that the British objection to the reservation of the German Democratic Republic was late. The careful wording of the objection shows that the United Kingdom did not expect it to produce the legal effects of an objection formulated within the period specified by article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

(6) The communication of 21 January 2002 by the Peruvian Government in relation to a late objection by Austria1278 - only a few days late - concerning its reservation to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is particularly interesting:

1276 [479, 2008] Following the late objection by Sweden, Thailand withdrew its reservation in respect of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ibid., vol. I, p. 345, note 15 (chap. IV.11)). Roberto Baratta considered that “objections are a tool used not only and not chiefly to express disapproval of the reservation of another and sometimes to point out its incompatibility with further obligations under international law but also and mainly to induce the author of the reservation to reconsider and possibly to withdraw it” (Gli effetti delle riserve ai trattati (Milan: Giuffré, 1999) pp. 319-320).
1277 [480, 2008] Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General ..., p. 133 (chap. IV.1).
1278 [481, 2008] This late objection was notified as a “communication” (ibid., vol. II, pp. 419-420, note 19 (chap. XXIII.1)).
“[The Government of Peru refers to the communication made by the Government of Austria relating to the reservation made by Peru upon ratification]. In this document, Member States are informed of a communication from the Government of Austria stating its objection to the reservation entered in respect of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by the Government of Peru on 14 September 2000 when depositing the corresponding instrument of ratification.

As the [Secretariat] is aware, article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Convention states that ‘a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation (...).’ The ratification and reservation by Peru in respect of the Vienna Convention were communicated to Member States on 9 November 2000.

Since the communication from the Austrian Government was received by the Secretariat on 14 November 2001 and circulated to Member States on 28 November 2001, the Peruvian Mission is of the view that there is tacit acceptance on the part of the Austrian Government of the reservation entered by Peru, the 12-month period referred to in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Convention having elapsed without any objection being raised. The Peruvian Government considers the communication from the Austrian Government as being without legal effect, since it was not submitted in a timely manner.”

Although it would appear excessive to consider the Austrian communication as being completely devoid of legal effect, the Peruvian communication shows very clearly that a late objection does not preclude the presumption of acceptance under article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions.

(7) It follows from the above that while a late objection may constitute an element in determining the validity of a reservation, it cannot produce the “normal” effects of an objection of the type provided for in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), and article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions.

(8) Some members of the Commission feel that these late declarations do not constitute “objections”, given that they are incapable of producing the effects of an objection. Terms such as

\[482, 2008\] Ibid.

\[483, 2008\] This does not prejudge the question of whether, and how, the reservation presumed to be accepted produces the “normal” effect provided for under article 21, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions.
“declaration”, “communication” or “objecting communication” have been proposed. The Commission considers, however, that such declarations correspond to the definition of objections contained in guideline 2.6.1 as it relates to guideline 2.6.13. As the commentary to guideline 2.6.5 notes, an objection (like a reservation) is defined not by the effects it produces but by those that its author wishes it to produce.

(9) The wording of guideline 2.6.15 is sufficiently flexible to accommodate established State practice where late reservations are concerned. While it does not prohibit States or international organizations from formulating objections after the time period required by guideline 2.6.13 has elapsed, it spells out explicitly that they do not produce the legal effects of an objection made within that time period.

2.7 Withdrawal and modification of objections to reservations

Commentary

(1) The question of the withdrawal of objections to reservations, like that of the withdrawal of reservations, is addressed only very cursorily in the Vienna Conventions. There are merely some indications as to how objections may be withdrawn and when such withdrawals become operative. The modification of objections is not addressed at all.

(2) Article 22, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the 1986 Vienna Convention provides as follows:

“2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, an objection to a reservation may be withdrawn at any time.

3. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, or it is otherwise agreed:

(a) [...] 

(b) the withdrawal of an objection to a reservation becomes operative in relation to another contracting State or international organization only when notice of it has been received by that State.”

Article 23, paragraph 4, stipulates how objections may be withdrawn:

“The withdrawal of a reservation or of an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing.”

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1281 See in particular paragraph (4) of the commentary.
(3) The *travaux préparatoires* of the Vienna Conventions are equally inconclusive on the withdrawal of objections. The question is not dealt with at all in the work of the early special rapporteurs; this is hardly surprising, given their advocacy of the traditional theory of unanimity, which logically precluded the possibility of an objection being withdrawn. Just as logically, it was the first report by H. Waldock, who favoured the flexible system, which contained the first proposal for a provision concerning the withdrawal of objections to reservations. He proposed the following text for draft article 19, paragraph 5:

“A State which has lodged an objection to a reservation shall be free to withdraw it unilaterally, either in whole or in part, at any time. Withdrawal of the objection shall be effected by written notification to the depositary of the instruments relating to the treaty, and failing any such depositary, to every State which is or is entitled to become a party to the treaty.”

After major reworking of the provisions on the form and procedure relating to reservations and objections, this draft article - which simply reiterated *mutatis mutandis* the similar provision on the withdrawal of a reservation - was abandoned; the reasons for this are not clear from the Commission’s work. No such provision is to be found in either the text adopted on first reading or in the Commission’s final draft.

(4) It was only during the Vienna Conference that the issue of the withdrawal of objections was reintroduced into the text of articles 22 and 23, based on a Hungarian amendment which realigned the procedure for the withdrawal of objections with that of withdrawal of reservations. As Ms. Bokor-Szegó explained on behalf of the Hungarian delegation:

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1284 [487, 2008] Draft article 17, paragraph 6, provided as follows: “A State which has formulated a reservation is free to withdraw it unilaterally, either in whole or in part, at any time, whether the reservation has been accepted or rejected by the other States concerned. Withdrawal of the reservation shall be effected by written notification to the depositary of instruments relating to the treaty and, failing any such depositary, to every State which is or is entitled to become a party to the treaty” (*ibid.*, p. 61). The similarity between the two texts was highlighted by H. Waldock, who considered in the commentary on draft article 19, paragraph 5, that the latter provision reflected paragraph 6 of draft article 17 and “[did] not therefore need further explanation” (*ibid.*, p. 68, paragraph (22) of the commentary).
“If a provision on the withdrawal of reservations was included, it was essential that there should also be a reference to the possibility of withdrawing objections to reservations, particularly since that possibility already existed in practice.”

The representative of Italy at the Conference also argued in favour of aligning the procedure for the withdrawal of an objection to a reservation with that for the withdrawal of a reservation:

“The relation between a reservation and an objection to a reservation was the same as that between a claim and a counter-claim. The extinction of a claim, or the withdrawal of a reservation, was counter-balanced by the extinction of a counter-claim or the withdrawal of an objection to a reservation, which was equally a diplomatic and legal procedural stage in treaty-making.”

(5) However, there is virtually no State practice in this area. F. Horn could only identify one example of a clear, definite withdrawal of an objection. In 1982 the Cuban Government notified the Secretary-General of the withdrawal of objections it had made when ratifying the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide with respect to the reservations to articles IX and XII formulated by several socialist States.

(6) Although the provisions of the Vienna Convention do not go into detail on the issue of withdrawal of objections, it is clear from the travaux préparatoires that, in principle, the withdrawal of objections ought to follow the same rules as the withdrawal of reservations, just as the formulation of objections follows the same rules as the formulation of reservations. To make the relevant provisions clear and specific, the Commission based itself on the draft guidelines already adopted on the withdrawal (and modification) of reservations, making the necessary changes to take account of the specific nature of objections. However, this should not be seen in any way as an attempt to implement the theory of parallelism of forms; it is not a matter of aligning the procedure for the withdrawal of objections with the procedure for their formulation, but of applying the same rules to the withdrawal of an objection as those applicable to the withdrawal of a reservation. The two acts, of course, have different effects on treaty relations and

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1287 [490, 2008] Ibid., para. 27.
1290 [493, 2008] See the commentary to guideline 2.6.9, paragraphs (1) to (6).
1291 [494, 2008] Guidelines 2.5.1 to 2.5.11. For the relevant texts and commentaries, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/58/10), pp. 183-188.
differ in their nature and their addressees. Nevertheless, they are similar enough to be governed by comparable formal systems and procedures, as was suggested during the travaux préparatoires of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

(7) Like those relating to the withdrawal and modification of reservations, the guidelines contained in this section concern, respectively: the form and procedure for withdrawal; the effects of withdrawal; the time at which withdrawal of the objection produces those effects; partial withdrawal; and the possible widening of the scope of the objection.

2.7.1 Withdrawal of objections to reservations

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, an objection to a reservation may be withdrawn at any time.

Commentary

(1) The question of the possibility of withdrawing an objection and the time at which it is withdrawn is answered in the Vienna Conventions, in particular in article 22, paragraph 2. Neither the possibility of withdrawing an objection at any time nor the time at which it may be withdrawn require further elaboration, and the provisions of article 22, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions are in themselves sufficient. Moreover, there is virtually no State practice in this area. Guideline 2.7.1 thus simply reproduces the text of the Vienna Conventions.

(2) While in principle it would be prudent to align the provisions relating to the withdrawal of objections with those relating to the withdrawal of reservations, it must be noted that there is a significant difference in the wording of paragraph 1 (relating to the withdrawal of reservations) and that of paragraph 2 (relating to the withdrawal of objections) of article 22: whereas paragraph 1 is careful to state, with regard to a reservation, that “the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for its withdrawal”, paragraph 2 does not make the same specification as far as objections are concerned. This difference in wording is logical: in the latter case, the purely unilateral character of the withdrawal is self-evident. This is in fact why the part of

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1292 See ibid., pp. 212-213, paragraph (6) of the commentary to guideline 2.5.4.
1293 See paragraph (2) of the introductory commentary to section 2.7.
1294 See ibid., passim.
1295 On this point, see guideline 2.5.1 and the commentary thereto, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/58/10), pp. 183-188.
the Hungarian amendment, which would have brought the wording of paragraph 2 into line with that of paragraph 1, was set aside at the request of the British delegation,

“in view of the differing nature of reservations and objections to reservations; the consent of the reserving State was self-evidently not required for the withdrawal of the objection, and an express provision to that effect might suggest that there was some doubt on the point”.1297

This is a convincing rationale for the different wording of the two provisions, which does not need to be revisited.

2.7.2 Form of withdrawal of objections to reservations

The withdrawal of an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing.

Commentary

(1) The answer to the question of the form the withdrawal of an objection should take is likewise to be found in the Vienna Conventions, in article 23, paragraph 4.1298 The requirement that it should be in writing does not call for any lengthy explanations, and the rules of the Vienna Conventions are adequate in themselves: while the theory of parallelism of forms is not accepted in international law,1299 it is certainly reasonable to require a certain degree of formality for the withdrawal of objections, which, like reservations themselves, must be made in writing.1300 A verbal withdrawal would entail considerable uncertainty, which would not necessarily be limited to the bilateral relations between the reserving State or organization and the author of the initial objection.1301

(2) Guideline 2.7.2 now reproduces the text of article 23, paragraph 4, of both the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, which have identical wording.


1298 [501, 2008] See paragraph (2) of the introductory commentary to section 2.7.


1301 [504, 2008] Given that the withdrawal of an objection resembles an acceptance of a reservation, it might, in certain circumstances, lead to the entry into force of the treaty vis-à-vis the reserving State or organization.
(3) The form of a withdrawal of an objection to a reservation is thus identical to the form of a withdrawal to a reservation.

2.7.3 Formulation and communication of the withdrawal of objections to reservations

Guidelines 2.5.4, 2.5.5 and 2.5.6 are applicable mutatis mutandis to the withdrawal of objections to reservations.

Commentary

(1) None of the provisions contained in either the 1969 or the 1986 Vienna Conventions is useful or specific with regard to questions relating to the formulation and communication of a withdrawal. However, it is abundantly clear from the travaux préparatoires of the 1969 Convention\(^{1302}\) that, as in the case of the formulation of objections and the formulation of reservations,\(^{1303}\) the procedure to be followed in withdrawing unilateral declarations must be identical to that followed when withdrawing a reservation.

(2) It therefore seemed prudent to the Commission simply to take note, within the framework of the Guide to Practice, of this procedural parallelism between the withdrawal of a reservation and the withdrawal of an objection, which holds for the authority competent to make the withdrawal at the international level and the consequences (or, rather, the absence of consequences) of the violation of the rules of internal law at the time of formulation and those of notification and communication of the withdrawal. It would appear that they can be transposed mutatis mutandis to the withdrawal of objections. Rather than reproduce, by merely replacing the word “reservation” with the word “objection” in the text, guidelines 2.5.4 (Formulation of the withdrawal of a reservation at the international level),\(^{1304}\) 2.5.5 (Absence of consequences at the international level of the violation of internal rules regarding the withdrawal of reservations)\(^{1305}\) and 2.5.6 (Communication of withdrawal of a reservation),\(^{1306}\) with the last of these itself referring back to the guidelines concerning the communication of reservations and the role of the depositary; the

\(^{1302}\) [505, 2008] See paragraphs (3) to (6) of the introductory commentary to section 2.7 above.

\(^{1303}\) [506, 2008] See guideline 2.6.9 and the commentary thereto, above.


\(^{1305}\) [508, 2008] Ibid., p. 185 and pp. 219-221.

\(^{1306}\) [509, 2008] Ibid., p. 185 and pp. 221-226.
Commission considered it preferable to refer to all of these guidelines, which apply *mutatis mutandis* to objections.

### 2.7.4 Effect on reservation of withdrawal of an objection

A State or an international organization that withdraws an objection formulated to a reservation is considered to have accepted that reservation.

**Commentary**

(1) As it did with the withdrawal of reservations, the Commission considered the effects of the withdrawal of an objection in the part devoted to the procedure for withdrawal. However, the question proved to be infinitely more complex: whereas withdrawing a reservation simply restores the integrity of the treaty in its relations between the author of the reservation and the other parties, the effects of withdrawing an objection are likely to be manifold.

(2) Without doubt, a State or an international organization that withdraws its objection to a reservation must be considered to have accepted the reservation. This follows implicitly from the presumption of article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Convention, which considers the lack of an objection by a State or an international organization to be an acceptance. Professor Bowett also asserts that “the withdrawal of an objection to a reservation ... becomes equivalent to acceptance of the reservation”.

(3) Yet it is not evident that with the withdrawal of an objection “the reservation has full effect”. As it happens, the effects of the withdrawal of an objection or of the resulting “delayed” acceptance can be manifold and complex, depending on factors relating not only to the nature and validity of the reservation, but also - and above all - to the characteristics of the objection itself.

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1307 [510, 2008] The Commission proceeded in a similar manner with guidelines 1.5.2 (which refers back to guidelines 1.2 and 1.2.1), 2.4.3 (which refers back to guidelines 1.2.1, 2.4.6 and 2.4.7) and, even more obviously, 2.5.6 (which refers back to guidelines 2.1.5, 2.1.6 and 2.1.7) and 2.6.9 (which refers back to guidelines 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6 and 2.1.7).


If the objection was not accompanied by the definitive declaration provided for in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Convention, the reservation produces its “normal” effects as provided for in article 21, paragraph 1;

If the objection was a “maximum-effect” objection, the treaty enters into effect between the two parties and the reservation produces its full effects in accordance with the provisions of article 21;

If the objection was a cause precluding the treaty from entering into force between all parties pursuant to article 20, paragraph 2, or with regard to the reserving State in application of article 20, paragraph 4, the treaty enters into force (and the reservation produces its effects).

This last situation in particular shows that the effects of the withdrawal of an objection not only relate to whether the reservation is applicable or not, but may also have an impact on the actual entry into force of the treaty. The Commission nevertheless considered it preferable to restrict guideline 2.7.4 to the effects of an objection “on the reservation” and adopted the title of this guideline for that reason.

Not only would it seem difficult to adopt a provision covering all the effects of the withdrawal of an objection, owing to the complexity of the question, but doing so might also prejudge the question of the effects of a reservation and of the acceptance of a reservation. The Commission therefore considered that, owing to the complexity of the effects of the withdrawal of an objection, it would be better to regard the withdrawal of an objection to a reservation as being equivalent to an acceptance and to consider that a State that has withdrawn its objection must be considered to have accepted the reservation, without examining, at the present stage, the nature and substance of the effects of such an acceptance. Such a provision implicitly refers to acceptances and their effects. The question of when these effects occur is the subject of guideline 2.7.5.

See paragraph (3) of the commentary to guideline 2.7.5 below.
2.7.5 Effective date of withdrawal of an objection

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal of an objection to a reservation becomes operative only when notice of it has been received by the State or international organization which formulated the reservation.

Commentary

(1) The Vienna Conventions contain a very clear provision concerning the time at which the withdrawal of an objection becomes operative. Article 22, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1986 Convention states:

“3. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, or it is otherwise agreed:

(a) ... 

(b) the withdrawal of an objection to a reservation becomes operative only when notice of it has been received by the State or international organization which formulated the reservation.”

(2) This provision differs from the corresponding rule on the effective date of withdrawal of a reservation in that, in the latter case, the withdrawal becomes operative “in relation to another contracting State only when notice of it has been received by that State”. The reasons for this difference in wording can easily be understood. Whereas withdrawing a reservation hypothetically modifies the content of treaty obligations between the reserving State or international organization and all the other contracting States or organizations, withdrawing an objection to a reservation modifies in principle only the bilateral treaty relationship between the reserving State or organization and the objecting State or organization. Ms. Bokor-Szegó, the representative of Hungary at the 1969 Vienna Conference, explained the difference in the wording between subparagraph (a) and the subparagraph (b) proposed by her delegation as follows:1313

“Withdrawal of an objection directly concerned only the objecting State and the reserving State.”1314

1313 [516, 2008] See paragraph (4) of the introductory commentary to section 2.7 above.
(3) However, the effects of withdrawing an objection to a reservation may go beyond this strictly bilateral relationship between the reserving party and the objecting party. All depends on the content and scale of the objection: the result of its withdrawal may even be that a treaty enters into force between all the States and international organizations that ratified it. This occurs in particular when an objection has prevented a treaty from entering into force between the parties to a treaty with limited participation (article 20, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions) or, a less likely scenario, when the withdrawal of an objection allows the reserving State or international organization to be a party to the treaty in question and thus brings the number of parties up to that required for the treaty’s entry into force. Accordingly, it could be questioned whether it is legitimate that the effective date of withdrawal of an objection to a reservation should depend solely on when notice of that withdrawal is given to the reserving State, which is certainly the chief interested party but not necessarily the only one. In the above-mentioned situations, limiting the requirement to give notice in this way means that the other contracting States or organizations are not in a position to determine the exact date when the treaty enters into force.

(4) This disadvantage appears to be more theoretical than real, however, since the withdrawal of an objection must be communicated not only to the reserving State but also to all the States and organizations concerned or to the depositary of the treaty, who will transmit the communication.1315

(5) The other disadvantages of the rule setting the effective date at notification of the withdrawal were presented in the context of the withdrawal of reservations in the commentary to guideline 2.5.8 (Effective date of withdrawal of a reservation).1316 They concern the immediacy of that effect, on the one hand, and, on the other, the uncertainty facing the author of the withdrawal as to the date notification is received by the State or international organization concerned. The same considerations apply to the withdrawal of an objection, but there they are less problematic. As far as the immediacy of the effect of the withdrawal is concerned, it should be borne in mind that the chief interested party is the author of the reservation, who would like the reservation to produce all its effects on another contracting party: the quicker the objection is withdrawn, the better it is from the

1315 [518, 2008] This follows from guideline 2.7.3 and of guidelines 2.5.6 (Communication of withdrawal of a reservation) and 2.1.6 (Procedure for communication of reservation), to which it refers. Consequently, the withdrawal of the objection must be communicated “to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”.

author’s perspective. It is the author of the objection, meanwhile, who determines this notification and who must make the necessary preparations (including the preparation of domestic law) to ensure that the withdrawal produces all its effects (and, in particular, that the reservation is applicable in the relations between the two States).

(6) In view of these considerations and in keeping with the Commission’s practice, it does not seem necessary to modify the rule set forth in article 22, paragraph 3 (b), of the Vienna Convention. Taking into account the recent practice of the principal depositaries of multilateral treaties and, in particular, that of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who use modern, rapid means of communication to transmit notifications, States and international organizations other than the reserving State or organization should normally receive the notification at the same time as the directly interested party. Simply reproducing this provision of the Vienna Convention would thus seem justified.

(7) In accordance with the practice followed by the Commission, guideline 2.7.5 is thus identical to article 22, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1986 Vienna Convention, which is more comprehensive than the corresponding 1969 provision in that it takes into account international organizations, without altering the meaning in any way. It is for this very reason that, notwithstanding the view of some of its members, the Commission decided not to replace the phrase “becomes operative” in the English text with the phrase “takes effect”, which would seem to mean the same thing. This linguistic problem arises only in the English version of the text.

2.7.6 Cases in which an objecting State or international organization may unilaterally set the effective date of withdrawal of an objection to a reservation

The withdrawal of an objection becomes operative on the date set by its author where that date is later than the date on which the reserving State or international organization received notification of it.


1318 [521, 2008] See also paragraph (3) of the commentary to guideline 2.7.6 and paragraph (5) of the commentary to guideline 2.7.7 below.
Commentary

(1) For the reasons given in the commentary to guideline 2.5.9 (Cases in which a reserving State may unilaterally set the effective date of withdrawal of a reservation),\(^{1319}\) the Commission felt it necessary to adopt a draft guideline that was analogous in order to cover the situation in which the objecting State or international organization unilaterally sets the effective date of withdrawal of its objection, without, however, entirely reproducing the former draft guideline.

(2) In fact, in the case where the author of the objection decides to set as the effective date of withdrawal of its objection a date earlier than that on which the reserving State received notification of the withdrawal, a situation corresponding mutatis mutandis to subparagraph (b) of guideline 2.5.9,\(^{1320}\) the reserving State or international organization is placed in a particularly awkward position. The State or international organization that has withdrawn its objection is considered as having accepted the reservation, and may therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 21, paragraph 1, invoke the effect of the reservation on a reciprocal basis; the reserving State or international organization would then have incurred international obligations without being aware of it, and this could seriously undermine legal security in treaty relations. It is for this reason that the commission decided quite simply to rule out this possibility and to omit it from guideline 2.7.9. As a result, only a date later than the date of notification may be set by an objecting State or international organization when withdrawing an objection.

(3) In the English version of guideline 2.7.6, the phrase “becomes operative”, which some English-speaking members of the Commission found awkward, was nevertheless retained by the Commission because it is used in article 22, paragraph 3 (b), of the Vienna Conventions and also in guideline 2.7.5.\(^{1321}\) The phrase simply means “takes effect”. This linguistic problem does not arise in any of the other language versions.

### 2.7.7 Partial withdrawal of an objection

Unless the treaty provides otherwise, a State or an international organization may partially withdraw an objection to a reservation. The partial withdrawal of an objection is subject to the


\(^{1320}\) [523, 2008] *Ibid.*, pp. 243-244, paragraphs (4) and (5) of the commentary to guideline 2.5.9.

\(^{1321}\) [524, 2008] See paragraph (7) of the commentary to guideline 2.7.5 above and paragraph (5) of the commentary to guideline 2.7.7 below.
same formal and procedural rules as a complete withdrawal and becomes operative on the same conditions.

Commentary

(1) As with the withdrawal of reservations, it is quite conceivable that a State (or international organization) might modify an objection to a reservation by partially withdrawing it. If a State or an international organization can withdraw its objection to a reservation at any time, it is hard to see why it could not simply reduce its scope. Two quite different situations illustrate this point:

- In the first place, a State might change an objection with “maximum”\textsuperscript{1322} or intermediate\textsuperscript{1323} effect into a “normal” or “simple” objection;\textsuperscript{1324} in such cases, the modified objection will produce the effects foreseen in article 21, paragraph 3. Moving from an objection with maximum effect to a simple objection or one with intermediate effect also brings about the entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection;\textsuperscript{1325}

- In the second place, it would appear that there is nothing to prevent a State from “limiting” the actual content of its objection (by accepting certain aspects of reservations that lend themselves to being separated out in such a way)\textsuperscript{1326} while maintaining its principle; in this case, the relations between the two States are governed by the new formulation of the objection.

\textsuperscript{1322} [525, 2008] An objection with “maximum” effect is an objection in which its author expresses the intention of preventing the treaty from entering into force as between itself and the author of the reservation in accordance with the provisions of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions. See \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly}, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/60/10), p. 199, paragraph (22) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.1.

\textsuperscript{1323} [526, 2008] By making an objection with “intermediate” effect, a State expresses the intention to enter into treaty relations with the author of the reservation but considers that the exclusion of treaty relations should go beyond what is provided for in article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions. See \textit{ibid.}, p. 199, paragraph (23) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.1.

\textsuperscript{1324} [527, 2008] “Normal” or “simple” objections are those with “minimum” effect, as provided for in article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions. See \textit{ibid.}, p. 199, paragraph (22) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.1.

\textsuperscript{1325} [528, 2008] If, on the contrary, an objection with “super-maximum” effect were abandoned and replaced by an objection with maximum effect, the treaty would no longer be in force between the States or international organizations concerned; even if an objection with super-maximum effect is held to be valid, that would enlarge the scope of the objection, which is not possible (see guideline 2.7.9 and the commentary thereto below). An objection with “super-maximum” effect states not only that the reservation to which the objection is made is not valid, but also that, consequently, the treaty applies \textit{ipso facto} as a whole in the relations between the two States. See \textit{ibid.}, p. 200, paragraph (24) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.1.

\textsuperscript{1326} [529, 2008] In some cases, the question of whether, in the latter hypothesis, it is really possible to speak of a “limitation” of this kind is debatable - but neither more nor less than the question of whether modifying a reservation is tantamount to its partial withdrawal.
The Commission has no knowledge of a case in State practice involving such a partial withdrawal of an objection. This does not, however, appear to be sufficient ground for ruling out such a hypothesis. In his first report, H. Waldock expressly provided for the possibility of a partial withdrawal of this kind. Paragraph 5 of draft article 19, which was devoted entirely to objections but subsequently disappeared in the light of changes made to the structure of the draft articles, states:

“A State which has lodged an objection to a reservation shall be free to withdraw it unilaterally, either in whole or in part, at any time.”\textsuperscript{1327}

The commentaries to this provision\textsuperscript{1328} presented by the Special Rapporteur offer no explanation of the reasons why he proposed it. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that this draft article 19, paragraph 5, was again identical to the corresponding proposal concerning the withdrawal of reservations,\textsuperscript{1329} as was made explicit in H. Waldock’s commentary.\textsuperscript{1330}

The arguments which led the Commission to allow for the possibility of partial withdrawal of reservations\textsuperscript{1331} may be transposed \textit{mutatis mutandis} to partial withdrawal of objections, even though in this case the result is not to ensure a more complete application of the provision of the treaty but, on the contrary, to give full effect (or greater effect) to a reservation. Consequently, just as partial withdrawal of a reservation follows the rules applicable to full withdrawal,\textsuperscript{1332} it would seem that the procedure for the partial withdrawal of an objection should be modelled on that of its total withdrawal. Guideline 2.7.7 has been formulated to reflect this.

Given the problems inherent in determining the effects of total withdrawal of an objection in the abstract,\textsuperscript{1333} the Commission felt that it was neither possible nor necessary to define the term “partial withdrawal” any further. It was enough to say that partial withdrawal is necessarily something less than full withdrawal and that it limits the legal effects of the objection \textit{vis-à-vis} the reservation without wiping them out entirely: as the above examples show, the reservation is not

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\textsuperscript{1328} [531, 2008] Ibid., p. 68.
\textsuperscript{1329} [532, 2008] See draft article 17, paragraph 6, \textit{ibid.}, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{1330} [533, 2008] Ibid., p. 68.
\textsuperscript{1331} [534, 2008] See the commentary to guideline 2.5.10 (Partial withdrawal of a reservation), \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10} (A/58/10), paragraphs (11) and (12) of the commentary.
\textsuperscript{1332} See the second paragraph of guideline 2.5.10 (Partial withdrawal of a reservation): “The partial withdrawal of a reservation is subject to the same formal and procedural rules as a total withdrawal and takes effect on the same conditions.”
\textsuperscript{1333} [535, 2008] See the commentary to guideline 2.7.4 above.
\end{flushright}
simply accepted; rather, the objecting State or international organization merely wishes to alter slightly the effects of an objection which, in the main, is maintained.

(5) In the English version of guideline 2.7.7, the phrase “becomes operative”, which is perhaps awkward, was retained by the Commission on account of its use in article 22, paragraph 3 (b), of the Vienna Conventions and also in guidelines 2.7.5 and 2.7.6. The phrase simply means “takes effect”. This linguistic problem does not arise in any of the other language versions.

2.7.8 Effect of a partial withdrawal of an objection

The partial withdrawal modifies the legal effects of the objection on the treaty relations between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation to the extent of the new formulation of the objection.

Commentary

(1) It is difficult to determine in abstracto what effects are produced by the withdrawal of an objection and even more difficult to say with certainty what concrete effect a partial withdrawal of an objection is likely to produce. In order to cover all possible effects, the Commission wanted to adopt a guideline that was sufficiently broad and flexible. It considered that the wording of guideline 2.5.11 concerning the effects of a partial withdrawal of a reservation met this requirement. Consequently, guideline 2.7.8 is modelled on the analogous guideline dealing with the partial withdrawal of a reservation.

(2) While the text of guideline 2.7.8 does not explicitly say so, it is clear that the term “partial withdrawal” implies that by partially withdrawing its objection, the State or international organization that is the author of the objection intends to limit the legal effects of the objection, it being understood that this may prove fruitless if the legal effects of the reservation are already weakened as a result of problems relating to the validity of the reservation.

(3) The objection itself produces its effects independently of any reaction on the part of the author of the reservation. If States and international organizations can make objections as they see fit, they may similarly withdraw them or limit their legal effects at will.

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1334 [536, 2008] See paragraph (7) of the commentary to guideline 2.7.5 and paragraph (3) of the commentary to guideline 2.7.6.
2.7.9  **Widening of the scope of an objection to a reservation**

A State or international organization which has made an objection to a reservation may widen the scope of that objection during the time period referred to in guideline 2.6.13 provided that the widening does not have as an effect the modification of treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection.

**Commentary**

(1) Neither the *travaux préparatoires* of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions nor the text of the Conventions themselves contain any provisions or indications on the question of the widening of the scope of an objection previously made by a State or international organization, and there is no State practice in this area.

(2) In theory it is conceivable that a State or international organization that has already raised an objection to a reservation may wish to widen the scope of its objection, for example by adding the declaration provided for in article 20, paragraph 4 (b) of the Vienna Conventions, thereby transforming it from a simple objection, which does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving parties, into a qualified objection, which precludes any treaty-based relations between the objecting and reserving parties.

(3) In the view of some Commission members, this example alone demonstrates the problems of legal security that would result from such an approach. They argue that any hint of an intention to widen or enlarge the scope of an objection to a reservation could seriously undermine the status of the treaty in the bilateral relations between the reserving party and the author of the new objection. Since in principle the reserving party does not have the right to respond to an objection, to allow the widening of the scope of an objection would amount to exposing the reserving State to the will of the author of the objection, who could choose to change the treaty relations between the two parties at any time. The lack of State practice suggests that States and international organizations consider that widening the scope of an objection to a reservation is simply not possible.

(4) Other considerations, according to this point of view, support such a conclusion. In its work on reservations, the Commission has already examined the similar issues of the widening of the scope of a reservation and the widening of the scope of a conditional interpretative

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In both cases the widening is understood as the late formulation of a new reservation or a new conditional interpretative declaration. Because of the presumption of article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, the late formulation of an objection cannot be said to have any legal effect. Any declaration formulated after the end of the prescribed period is no longer considered to be an objection properly speaking but a renunciation of a prior acceptance, without regard for the commitment entered into with the reserving State, and the practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties bears out this conclusion.

(5) Other Commission members, however, held that a reading of the provisions of the Vienna Conventions does not justify such a categorical solution. Under article 20, paragraph 5, States and international organizations are given a specific time period within which to make their objections, and there is nothing to prevent them from widening or reinforcing their objections during that period; for practical reasons, then, it is appropriate to give States such a period for reflection.

(6) A compromise was nevertheless reached between the two points of view. The Commission considered that the widening of the scope of an objection cannot call into question the very existence of treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection. Making a simple objection that does not imply an intention to preclude the entry into force of the treaty between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation may indeed have the immediate effect of establishing treaty relations between the two parties, even before the time period allowed for the formulation of objections has elapsed. To call this fait accompli into question by subsequently widening the scope of the objection and accompanying it with a clear expression of intent to preclude the entry into force of the treaty in accordance with article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Convention is inconceivable and seriously undermines legal security.

(7) The guideline reflects this compromise. It does not prohibit the widening of objections within the time period prescribed in guideline 2.6.13 - which simply reproduces the provision contained in

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1337 [540, 2008] See guideline 2.4.10 (Limitation and widening of the scope of a conditional interpretative declaration) and the commentary thereto, ibid., pp. 263 and 277-278.
1338 [541, 2008] See paragraph (1) of the commentary to guideline 2.3.5 (Widening of the scope of a reservation), ibid., p. 269, and paragraph (1) of the commentary to guideline 2.4.10 (Limitation and widening of the scope of a conditional interpretative declaration), ibid., p. 277.
1339 [542, 2008] See also guideline 2.6.15 above.
1340 [543, 2008] See the commentary to guideline 2.6.15 above.
article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions - provided that such widening does not modify treaty relationships. Widening is thus possible if it is done before the expiry of the 12-month period (or any other period stipulated in the treaty) that follows notification of the reservation or before the date on which the State or international organization that made the objection expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty, if it is later and if it does not call into question the very existence of treaty relations acquired subsequently through the formulation of the initial objection.

2.8    Formulation of acceptances of reservations

2.8.0 [2.8] Forms of acceptance of reservations

The acceptance of a reservation may arise from a unilateral statement in this respect or silence kept by a contracting State or contracting international organization within the periods specified in guideline 2.6.13.

Commentary

(1) In accordance with paragraph 5 of article 20\textsuperscript{(1342)} of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations of 1986:

“For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4\textsuperscript{(1343)} and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State or an international organization if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of 12 months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.”

(2) It emerges from this definition that acceptance of a reservation can be defined as the absence of any objection. Acceptance is presumed in principle from the absence of an objection, either at the end of the 12-month period following receipt of notification of the reservation or at the time of

\textsuperscript{1341}[544, 2008] Ibid., paragraph (4) of the commentary.
\textsuperscript{1342}[545, 2008] This article is entitled “Acceptance of and objection to reservations”. Unlike the English text, the French version of the two Vienna Conventions keeps the word “acceptance” in the singular but leaves “objections” in the plural. This distortion, which appeared in 1962 (see Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 663rd meeting, 18 June 1962, p. 248 and Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, p. 223 (text adopted by the Drafting Committee); Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 194 and Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 176), was never corrected or explained.
\textsuperscript{1343}[546, 2008] Paragraph 2 refers to reservations to treaties with limited participation; paragraph 4 establishes the effects of the acceptance of reservations and objections in all cases other than those of reservations expressly authorized by the treaty, treaties with limited participation and constituent acts of international organizations.
expression of consent to be bound. In both cases, which are conceptually distinct but yield identical results in practice, silence is tantamount to acceptance without the need for a formal unilateral declaration. This does not mean, however, that acceptance is necessarily tacit; moreover, paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 23 make explicit reference to “express acceptance of a reservation”, and such express formulation may be obligatory, as is implied by the phrase “unless the treaty otherwise provides” in article 20, paragraph 5, even if this phrase was inserted in that provision for other reasons, and the omission from the same provision of any reference to paragraph 3 of article 20, concerning the acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization, which does indeed require a particular form of acceptance.

(3) Guideline 2.8, which opens the section of the Guide to Practice dealing with the procedure and forms of acceptance of reservations, presents two distinct forms of acceptance:

- Express acceptance, resulting from a unilateral declaration to that end; and
- Tacit acceptance, resulting from silence or, more specifically, the absence of any objection to the reservation during a certain period of time. This time period corresponds to the time during which an objection may legitimately be made, *i.e.* the period specified in guideline 2.6.13.

(4) It has been argued nevertheless that this division between formal acceptances and tacit acceptances of reservations disregards the necessary distinction between two forms of acceptance without a unilateral declaration, which could be either tacit or implicit. Furthermore, according to some authors, reference should be made to “early” acceptance when the reservation is authorized by the treaty:

“Reservations may be accepted, according to the Vienna Convention, in three ways: in advance, by the terms of the treaty itself or in accordance with article 20 (1).”

While these distinctions may have some meaning in academic terms, the Commission did not feel that it was necessary to reflect them in the Guide to Practice, given that they did not have any concrete consequences.

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1344 [547, 2008] See paragraph (7) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.13.
1345 [548, 2008] D.W. Greig, (footnote 432 above), p. 118. This article is perhaps the most thorough study of the rules that apply to the acceptance of reservations (see in particular pp. 118-135 and 153).
With respect to so-called “early” acceptances, the Commission’s commentary on draft article 17 (current article 20) clearly indicates that:

“Paragraph 1 of this article covers cases where a reservation is expressly or impliedly authorized by the treaty; in other words, where the consent of the other contracting States has been given in the treaty. No further acceptance of the reservation by them is therefore required.”

Under this provision, and unless the treaty otherwise provides, an acceptance is not, in this case, a requirement for a reservation to be established: it is established *ipso facto* by virtue of the treaty, and the reaction of States - whether an express acceptance, tacit acceptance or even an objection - can no longer call this acquired acceptance into question. Although this does not prohibit States from expressly accepting a reservation of this kind, such an express acceptance is a redundant act, with no specific effect. Moreover, no examples of such an acceptance exist. This does not mean that article 20, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions should not be reflected in the Guide to Practice; however, the provision has much more to do with the effects of a reservation than with formulation or the form of acceptance; accordingly, its rightful place is in the fourth part of the Guide.

Similarly, the Commission did not feel it appropriate to reflect in the Guide to Practice the distinction made by some authors, based on the two cases provided for in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, between “tacit” and “implicit” acceptances, depending on whether or not the reservation has already been formulated at the time the other interested party expresses its consent to be bound. In the former case, the acceptance would be “implicit”; in the latter, it would be “tacit”. In the former case, States or international organizations are deemed to have accepted the reservation if they have raised no objection thereto when they express their consent to be bound by the treaty. In the latter case, the State or international organization has a period of 12 months in which to raise an objection, after which it is deemed to have accepted the reservation.

Although the result is the same in both cases - the State or international organization is deemed to have accepted the reservation if no objection has been raised at a specific time - their grounds are different. With respect to States or international organizations which become

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contracting parties to a treaty after the formulation of a reservation, the presumption of acceptance is justified not by their silence but rather by the fact that this State or international organization, aware of the reservations formulated,\(^{1348}\) accedes to the treaty without objecting to the reservations. The acceptance is thus implied in the act of ratification of or accession to the treaty, that is, in a positive act which fails to raise objections to reservations already formulated,\(^{1349}\) hence the notion of “implicit” acceptances. In the case of States or international organizations that are already parties to a treaty when the reservation is formulated, however, the situation is different: it is their protracted silence - generally for a period of 12 months - or, in particular, the absence of any objection on their part which is considered as an acceptance of the reservation. This acceptance is therefore inferred only from the silence of the State or international organization concerned; it is tacit.

(8) In fact, this doctrinal distinction is of little interest in practice and should probably not be reflected in the Guide to Practice. It is sufficient, for practical purposes, to distinguish the States and international organizations which have a period of 12 months to raise an objection from those which, not yet being parties to the treaty at the time the reservation is formulated, have time for consideration until the date on which they express their consent to be bound by the treaty, which nevertheless does not prevent them from formulating an acceptance or an objection before that date.\(^{1350}\) The question is one of time period, however, and not one of definition.

(9) Another question relates to the definition itself of tacit acceptances. One may well ask whether in some cases an objection to a reservation is not tantamount to a tacit acceptance thereof. This paradoxical question stems from the wording of paragraph 4 (b) of article 20. The paragraph states:

> “An objection by a contracting State or by a contracting organization to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting State or international organization and the reserving State or organization unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State or organization.”

\(^{1348}\) See article 23, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention of 1986, which stipulates that reservations must be “formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty”. See also guideline 2.1.5 and paragraphs (1) to (16) of the commentary thereto, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10)*, pp. 79-97.

It thus seems to follow that in the event that the author of the objection raises no objection to the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, an objection has the same effects as an acceptance of the reservation, at least concerning the entry into force of the treaty (and probably the “establishment” of the reservation itself). This question, which involves much more than purely hypothetical issues, nevertheless primarily concerns the problem of the respective effects of acceptances and objections to reservations.

(10) Guideline 2.8 limits the potential authors of an acceptance to contracting States and organizations alone. The justification for this is to be found in article 20, paragraph 4, which takes into consideration only acceptances made by a contracting State or contracting international organization, and article 20, paragraph 5, which provides that the presumption of acceptance applies only to States that are parties to the treaty. Thus, a State or an international organization which on the date that notice of the reservation is given is not yet a contracting party to the treaty will be considered as having accepted the reservation only on the date when it expresses its consent to be bound - that is, on the date when it definitively becomes a contracting State or contracting organization.

(11) It is a different matter, however, for acceptances of reservations to the constituent instruments of international organizations referred to in paragraph 3 of the same article on the one hand and express acceptances on the other. In the latter case, there is nothing to prevent a State or international organization that has not yet expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty from making an express declaration accepting a reservation formulated by another State, even though that express acceptance cannot produce the same legal effects as those described in article 20, paragraph 4, for acceptances made by contracting States or international organizations. The same holds true for any express acceptances by a State or international organization of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization: there is nothing to prevent such express acceptances from being formulated, but they cannot produce the same effects as the acceptance of a reservation to a treaty that does not take this form.

(12) Furthermore, it can be seen both from the text of the Vienna Conventions and their travaux préparatoires and from practice that tacit acceptance is the rule and express acceptance the

1350 [553, 2008] See also paragraphs (8) and (9) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.5 and paragraphs (8) and (9) of guideline 2.6.13 above.
exception. Guideline 2.8, however, is purely descriptive and is not intended to establish cases in which it is possible or necessary to resort to either of the two possible forms of acceptances.

2.8.1 Tacit acceptance of reservations

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State or an international organization if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation within the time period provided for in guideline 2.6.13.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 2.8.1 supplements guideline 2.8\textsuperscript{1351} by specifying the conditions under which one of the two forms of acceptance of reservations mentioned in the latter provision (silence of a contracting State or international organization) constitutes acceptance of a reservation. It reproduces - with a slight editorial adaptation - the rule expressed in article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1986 Vienna Convention.

(2) How a reservation’s permissibility is related to the tacit or express acceptance of a reservation by States and international organizations does not require elucidation in the section of the Guide to Practice concerning procedure. It concerns the effects of reservations, acceptances and objections, which will be the subject of the fourth part of the Guide.

(3) In the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Court emphasized that the “very great allowance made to tacit assent to reservations”\textsuperscript{1352} characterized international practice, which was becoming more flexible with respect to reservations to multilateral conventions. Although, traditionally, express acceptance alone had been considered as expressing consent by other contracting States to the reservation\textsuperscript{1353} this solution, already outdated in 1951, no

\textsuperscript{1351} For the text of this guideline and the commentary thereto, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), pp. 243-248.

\textsuperscript{1352} I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 21.

longer seemed practicable owing to, as the Court stated, “the very wide degree of participation”\textsuperscript{1354} in some of these conventions.

(4) Despite the different opinions expressed by the members of the Commission during the discussion of article 10 of the draft of J.L. Brierly in 1950,\textsuperscript{1355} which asserted, to a limited degree,\textsuperscript{1356} the possibility of consent to reservations by tacit agreement,\textsuperscript{1357} H. Lauterpacht and G.G. Fitzmaurice also allowed for the principle of tacit acceptance in their drafts.\textsuperscript{1358} This should come as no surprise. Under the traditional system of unanimity widely defended by the Commission’s first three Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties, the principle of tacit acceptance was necessary in order to avoid excessive periods of legal uncertainty: in the absence of a presumption of acceptance, the protracted silence of a State party to a treaty could tie up the fate of the reservation and leave in doubt the status of the reserving State in relation to the treaty for an indefinite period, or even prevent the treaty from entering into force for some time.

(5) In that light, although the principle of tacit consent is not as imperative under the “flexible” system ultimately adopted by the Commission’s fourth Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, it still has some merits and advantages. Even in his first report, Waldock incorporated the principle in the draft articles which he had submitted to the Commission.\textsuperscript{1359} He put forward the following explanation for doing so:

“It is ... true that, under the “flexible” system now proposed, the acceptance or rejection by a particular State of a reservation made by another primarily concerns their relations with each other, so that there may not be the same urgency to determine the status of a reservation as under the system of unanimous consent. Nevertheless, it seems very undesirable that a

\textsuperscript{1354} \textsuperscript{[548, 2009]} I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{1355} \textsuperscript{[549, 2009]} Yearbook ... 1950, vol. I, 53rd meeting, 23 June 1950, pp. 92-95, paras. 41 to 84. Mr. El-Khoury argued for the contrary view that the mere silence of a State should not be regarded as implying acceptance but rather as a refusal to accept the reservation (ibid., p. 94, para. 67); this view remained, however, an isolated one.
\textsuperscript{1356} \textsuperscript{[550, 2009]} Briefly’s draft article 10 in fact envisaged only cases of implicit acceptance, that is, cases where a State accepted all existing reservations to a treaty of which it was aware when it acceded thereto. For the text of draft article 10, see his report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/23), Yearbook ... 1950, vol. II, pp. 238-242.
\textsuperscript{1357} \textsuperscript{[551, 2009]} In fact, this was instead a matter of implicit acceptance; see para. (6) of the commentary to guideline 2.8 in Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), p. 246.
\textsuperscript{1359} \textsuperscript{[553, 2009]} See draft article 18, para. 3, of his first report, ibid., p. 61 and pp. 66-68, paras. (14)-(17); reproduced in draft article 19, para. 4, in his fourth report (A/CN.4/177), Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 54-55.
State, by refraining from making any comment upon a reservation, should be enabled more or less indefinitely to maintain an equivocal attitude as to the relations between itself and the reserving State ...”.\footnote{554, 2009}

(6) The provision that would become the future article 20, paragraph 5, was ultimately adopted by the Commission without debate.\footnote{555, 2009} During the Vienna Conference of 1968-1969, article 20, paragraph 5, also raised no problem and was adopted with only one change, inclusion of the words\footnote{556, 2009} “unless the treaty otherwise provides”.\footnote{557, 2009}

(7) The work of the Commission on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between international organizations did not greatly change or challenge the principle of tacit consent. However, the Commission had decided to assimilate international organizations to States with regard to the issue of tacit acceptance.\footnote{558, 2009} In view of criticisms from some States,\footnote{559, 2009} the Commission decided to “refrain from saying anything in paragraph 5 of article 20 concerning the problems raised by the protracted absence of any objection by an international organization”, but “without thereby rejecting the principle that even where treaties are concerned, obligations can arise for an organization from its conduct”.\footnote{560, 2009} Draft article 20, paragraph 4, as adopted by the Commission thus reproduced article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1969 Vienna Convention word for word.\footnote{561, 2009} During the Vienna Conference, however, the idea of

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{554, 2009} First report (A/CN.4/144) (footnote 552 above), p. 67, para. (15).
  \item \footnote{555, 2009} Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 816th meeting, 2 July 1965, pp. 283-284, paras. 43-53; see also Imbert, (footnote 547 above), p. 105.
  \item \footnote{556, 2009} On the meaning of this part of the provision, see below, para. (11) of the present commentary.
  \item \footnote{558, 2009} See draft articles 20 and 20 bis adopted on first reading, Yearbook ... 1977, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 111-113.
  \item \footnote{560, 2009} See the commentary on draft article 20, Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 35-36, paras. (5) and (6).
  \item \footnote{561, 2009} Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II (Part Two), p. 35.
\end{itemize}
assimilating international organizations to States was reintroduced on the basis of several amendments to that effect\textsuperscript{1368} and thorough debate.\textsuperscript{1369}

(8) In line with the position it has taken since adopting guideline 1.1 (which reproduces the wording of article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1986 Vienna Convention), the Commission has decided that it is necessary to include in the Guide to Practice a guideline reflecting article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1986 Vienna Convention. The latter provision cannot be reproduced word for word, however, as it refers to other paragraphs in the same article that do not belong in the part of the Guide to Practice having to do with the formulation of reservations, acceptances and objections; the paragraphs 2 and 4 mentioned in paragraph 5 of article 20 relate, not to the procedure for formulating reservations, but to the conditions under which they produce their effects - in other words, the conditions necessary in order for them to be “established” in the sense of the opening phrase of paragraph 1 of article 21 of the Vienna Conventions. What is pertinent here is that article 20, paragraph 2, requires unanimous acceptance of reservations to certain treaties; that question is dealt with, from a purely procedural perspective, in guideline 2.8.2 below.

(9) In addition, the adoption of guideline 2.6.13 (Time period for formulating an objection)\textsuperscript{1370} makes it redundant to repeat in guideline 2.8.1 the specific conditions \textit{ratione temporis} contained in article 20, paragraph 5.\textsuperscript{1371} It therefore seemed sufficient for guideline 2.8.1 simply to refer to guideline 2.6.13.

(10) In the Commission’s view, this wording also has the advantage of bringing out more clearly the dialectic between (tacit) acceptance and objection - objection excludes acceptance and vice

\textsuperscript{1368} [562, 2009] China (A/CONF.129/C.1/L.18, proposing a period of 18 months applicable to States and international organizations), Austria (A/CONF.129/C.1/L.33) and Cape Verde (A/CONF.129/C.1/L.35), United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, Official Records, Vienna, 18 February-21 March 1986, vol. II, Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.129/16/Add.1), pp. 70-71, para. 70. See also the amendment proposed by Australia (A/CONF.129/C.1/L.32), which was ultimately withdrawn but proposed a more nuanced solution (\textit{ibid.}, pp. 70-71, para. 70.B).


\textsuperscript{1371} [565, 2009] “For the purposes of paras. 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it
versa. During the Vienna Conference of 1968, the French representative expressed this idea in the following terms:

“[A]cceptance and objection are the obverse and reverse sides of the same idea. A State which accepts a reservation thereby surrenders the right to object to it; a State which raises an objection thereby expresses its refusal to accept a reservation.”

(11) The Commission did consider, however, whether the expression “unless the treaty provides otherwise”, to be found in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, should be retained in guideline 2.8.1. That proviso does not really need to be spelled out, since all the provisions of the Vienna Convention are of a residuary, voluntary nature. Moreover, it seems redundant, since the same phrase appears in guideline 2.6.13, where its inclusion is justified by the travaux préparatoires for article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Although opinion was divided in the Commission, it nevertheless decided that it was useful to recall that the rule set out in guideline 2.8.1 applied only if the treaty did not provide otherwise.

2.8.2 Unanimous acceptance of reservations

In the event of a reservation requiring unanimous acceptance by some or all States or international organizations which are parties or entitled to become parties to the treaty, such an acceptance once obtained is final.

Commentary

(1) The time period for tacit acceptance of a reservation by States or international organizations that are entitled to become parties to the treaty is subject to a further limitation when unanimous

\[\text{was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.} \] (Italics added.)


\[\text{[568, 2009]} \] For similar comments on the same issue, see, for example, paras. (15) and (16) of the commentary to guideline 2.5.1 (Withdrawal of reservations), which reproduces the provisions of article 22, para. 1, of the 1986 Vienna Convention, in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/58/10), pp. 200-201.

acceptance is necessary in order to establish a reservation. That limitation is set forth in guideline 2.8.2.

(2) *A priori*, article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions seems to mean that the general rule applies when unanimity is required: paragraph 5 explicitly refers to article 20, paragraph 2, which requires acceptance of a reservation by all parties to a treaty with limited participation. However, that interpretation would have unreasonable consequences. Allowing States and international organizations that are entitled to become parties to the treaty but have not yet expressed their consent to be bound by the treaty when the reservation is formulated to raise an objection on the date that they become parties to the treaty (even if this date is later than the date on which the objection is notified) would have extremely damaging consequences for the reserving State and, more generally, for the stability of treaty relations. The reason for this is that in such a scenario it could not be presumed, at the end of the 12-month period, that a State that was a signatory of, but not a party to, a treaty with limited participation had agreed to the reservation and this situation would prevent unanimous acceptance, even if the State had not formally objected to the reservation. The application of the presumption implied by article 20, paragraph 5, would therefore have exactly the opposite effect to the one desired, i.e., the rapid stabilization of treaty relations and of the reserving State’s status vis-à-vis the treaty.

(3) This issue was addressed by Waldock in draft article 18 contained in his first report, which made a clear distinction between tacit acceptance and implicit acceptance in the case of multilateral treaties (subject to the “flexible” system), on the one hand, and plurilateral treaties (subject to the traditional system of unanimity), on the other. Indeed, paragraph 3 (c) of that draft article provided the following:

“A State which acquires the right to become a party to a treaty after a reservation has already been formulated\(^\text{1376}\) shall be presumed to consent to the reservation:

(i) In the case of a plurilateral treaty, if it executes the act or acts necessary to enable it to become a party to the treaty;

\(^{1376}\) [570, 2009] “Made” would undoubtedly be more appropriate: if the period within which an objection can be raised following the formulation of a reservation has not yet ended, there is no reason why the new contracting State could not object.
(ii) In the case of a multilateral treaty, if it executes the act or acts necessary to qualify it to become a party to the treaty without signifying its objection to the reservation.  

(4) Waldock also noted, with reference to the scenario envisaged in paragraph 3 (c) (i), in which unanimity remains the rule, that lessening the rigidity of the 12-month rule for States that are not already parties to the treaty:

“… is not possible in the case of plurilateral treaties because there the delay in taking a decision does place in suspense the status of the reserving State vis-à-vis all the States participating in the treaty.”

(5) It follows that, wherever unanimity remains the rule, a State or international organization that accedes to the treaty may not validly object to a reservation that has already been accepted by all the States and international organizations that are already parties to the treaty, once the 12-month period has elapsed from the time that it received notification of the reservation. This does not mean, however, that the State or international organization may never object to the reservation: it may do so within the stipulated time period as a State entitled to become a party to the treaty. If, however, it has not taken that step and subsequently accedes to the treaty, it has no choice but to consent to the reservation.

(6) Guideline 2.8.2 says nothing about situations in which a State or an international organization is prevented from objecting to a reservation at the time that it accedes to the treaty. It merely notes that, when the special conditions imposed by the treaty are fulfilled, the particular reservation is established and cannot be called into question through an objection.

(7) The reference to “some” States or international organizations is intended to cover the scenario in which the requirement of acceptance is limited to certain parties. That might be the case, for example, if a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone stipulates that reservations are established only if all nuclear-weapons States that are parties to the treaty accept them; the

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1378 [572, 2009] Ibid., p. 67, para. (16) of the commentary.
1379 [573, 2009] As to the limited effect of such an objection, see guideline 2.6.5, subpara. (ii), and the commentary thereto in Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), pp. 189-193.
subsequent accession of another nuclear Power would not call into question a reservation thus made.

2.8.3 Express acceptance of a reservation

A State or an international organization may, at any time, expressly accept a reservation formulated by another State or international organization.

Commentary

(1) It is certainly true that “the ... acceptance of a reservation is, in the case of multilateral treaties, almost invariably implicit or tacit”. Nevertheless, it can be express, and there are situations in which a State expressly makes known the fact that it accepts the reservation.

(2) The presumption postulated in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions in no way prevents States and international organizations from expressly stating their acceptance of reservations that have been formulated. That might seem to be debatable in cases where a reservation does not satisfy the conditions of permissibility laid down in article 19 of the Vienna Conventions.

(3) Unlike the reservation itself and unlike an objection, an express acceptance can be declared at any time. That presents no problem for the reserving State, since a State or an international organization which does not expressly accept a reservation will nevertheless be deemed to have accepted it at the end of the 12-month period specified in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, from which guideline 2.8.1 derives the legal consequences.

(4) Even a State or an international organization which has previously raised an objection to a reservation remains free to accept it expressly (or implicitly, by withdrawing its objection) at any

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1381 [575, 2009] See above, para. (2) of the commentary to guideline 2.8.1.
This amounts to a complete withdrawal of the objection, which produces the same effects as an acceptance.

(5) In any case, despite these broad possibilities, State practice in the area of express acceptances is practically non-existent. There are only a few very isolated examples to be found, and some of those are not without problems.

(6) An example often cited in the literature is the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Germany of a French reservation, communicated on 7 February 1979, to the 1931 Convention providing a Uniform Law for Cheques. It should be noted that this reservation on the part of the French Republic had been formulated late, some 40 years after France’s accession to that Convention. The German communication clearly states that the Federal Republic “raises no objections” to it and thus clearly constitutes an acceptance. The text of the communication from the Federal Republic of Germany does not make it clear, however, whether it is accepting the deposit of the reservation despite its late formulation or the content of the reservation itself, or both.

(7) There are other, less ambiguous examples as well, such as the declarations and communications of the United States of America in response to the reservations formulated by Bulgaria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Romania to article 21, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the 1954 Convention concerning Customs Facilities for Touring, in which it made it clear that it

1385 [579, 2009] This communication was issued on 20 February 1980, more than 12 months after the notification of the reservation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, depositary of the Convention. At that time, in any case, the (new) French reservation was “considered to have been accepted” by Germany on the basis of the principle set out in article 20, para. 5, of the Vienna Conventions. Furthermore, the Secretary-General had already considered the French reservation as having been accepted as of 11 May 1979, three months after its deposit.
1387 [581, 2009] In effect, provided that no objection has been raised, the State is considered to have accepted the reservation; see article 20, para. 5, of the Vienna Conventions.
1388 [582, 2009] On this point, see guideline 2.3.1 (Late formulation of a reservation) and the commentary thereto in Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/60/10), pp. 477-489.
1389 [583, 2009] The disadvantage of using the same terminology for both hypotheses was pointed out in para. (2) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.2 in Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/60/10), p. 202, and in para. (23) of the commentary to guideline 2.3.1 in ibid., Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), p. 489.
1390 [584, 2009] Bulgaria ultimately withdrew this reservation. See Multilateral Treaties ..., (footnote 532 above), chap. XI.A.6 (note 16).
had no objection to these reservations. The United States also stated that it would apply the reservation reciprocally with respect to each of the States making reservations, which, in any case, it was entitled to do by virtue of article 21, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Conventions. A Yugoslav declaration concerning a reservation by the Soviet Union was similar in intent but expressly referred to article 20, paragraph 7, of the Convention, relating to the reciprocal application of reservations. That being said, and even if the United States and Yugoslav declarations were motivated by a concern to emphasize the reciprocal application of the reservation and thus refer to article 20, paragraph 7, of the 1954 Convention, the fact remains that they indisputably constitute express acceptances. The same is true in the case of the United States declarations regarding the reservations of Romania and the Soviet Union to the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic, which are virtually identical to the United States declarations in relation to the Convention concerning Customs Facilities for Touring, despite the fact that the 1949 Convention does not include a provision comparable to article 20, paragraph 7, of the 1954 Convention.

(8) In the absence of significant practice in the area of express acceptances, one is forced to rely almost exclusively on the provisions of the Vienna Conventions and their travaux préparatoires to work out the principles and rules for formulating express acceptances and the procedures applicable to them.

2.8.4 Written form of express acceptance

The express acceptance of a reservation must be formulated in writing.

Commentary

(1) Article 23, paragraph 1, of the 1986 Vienna Convention states:

1392 [586, 2009] On the question of reciprocity of reservations, see Müller, (footnote 566 above), pp. 901-907, paras. 30-38.
1394 [588, 2009] Article 20, para. 7, of the Convention concerning Customs Facilities for Touring provides that “[n]o Contracting State shall be required to extend to a State making a reservation the benefit of the provisions to which such reservation applies”, and that “[a]ny State availing itself of this right shall notify the Secretary-General accordingly”.
1395 [589, 2009] Multilateral Treaties ..., (footnote 532 above), chap. XI.B.1 (notes 14 and 18). The declarations by Greece and The Netherlands concerning the Russian reservation are considerably less clear in that they limit themselves to stating that the two Governments “do not consider themselves bound by the provisions to which the reservation is made, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned” (ibid., note 18). Nevertheless, this effect might be produced by an acceptance as well as by an objection.
1396 [590, 2009] Article 54, para. 1, of the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic simply provides for the reciprocity of a reservation concerning article 52 (Settlement of disputes), without requiring a declaration to that effect on the part of States accepting the reservation.
“A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation and an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting States and contracting organizations and other States and international organizations entitled to become parties to the treaty.”

(2) The travaux préparatoires for this provision were analysed in connection with guidelines 2.1.1 and 2.1.5. It is thus unnecessary to duplicate that general presentation, except to recall that the question of form and procedure for acceptance of reservations was touched upon only incidentally during the elaboration of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

(3) As in the case of objections, this provision places express acceptances on the same level as reservations themselves in matters concerning written form and communication with the States and international organizations involved. For the same reasons as those given for objections, it is therefore sufficient, in the context of the Guide to Practice, to take note of this convergence of procedures and to stipulate in a separate guideline, for the sake of clarity, that an express acceptance, by definition, must be in written form.

(4) Despite appearances, guideline 2.8.4 can in no way be considered superfluous. The mere fact that an acceptance is express does not necessarily imply that it is in writing. The written form is not only called for by article 23, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions, from which the wording of guideline 2.8.4 is taken, but is also necessitated by the importance of acceptances to the legal regime of reservations to treaties, in particular their permissibility and effects. Although the various proposals of the Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties never required, in so many words, that express acceptances should be in writing, it can be seen from their work that they always leaned towards the maintenance of a certain formality. Wallock’s various proposals and drafts require that an express acceptance should be made in the instrument, or by any other appropriate formal procedure, at the time of ratification or approval by the State concerned, or, in other cases, by formal notification; hence a written version would be required in every case. Following the

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1397 [591, 2009] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10),* pp. 64-66, paras. (2) to (7) of the commentary to guideline 2.1.1, and pp. 81-85, paras. (5) to (11) of the commentary to guideline 2.1.5, as well as pp. 94-95, paras. (3) and (4) of the commentary to guideline 2.1.6. See also *ibid., Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10),* pp. 200-203.

simplification and reworking of the articles concerning the form and procedure for reservations, express acceptances and objections, the Commission decided to include the matter of written form in draft article 20, paragraph 1 (which became article 23, paragraph 1). The harmonization of provisions applicable to the written form and to the procedure for formulating reservations, objections and express acceptances did not give rise to debate in the Commission or at the Vienna Conference.

2.8.5 Procedure for formulating express acceptance

Guidelines 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6, and 2.1.7 apply mutatis mutandis to express acceptances.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 2.8.5 is, in a sense, the counterpart of guideline 2.6.9 on objection procedure, and is based on the same rationale.\textsuperscript{1400} It is clear from the work of the Commission that culminated in the wording of article 23 of the Vienna Convention that reservations, express acceptances and objections are all subject to the same rules of notification and communication.\textsuperscript{1401}

2.8.6 Non-requirement of confirmation of an acceptance made prior to formal confirmation of a reservation

An express acceptance of a reservation made by a State or an international organization prior to confirmation of the reservation in accordance with guideline 2.2.1 does not itself require confirmation.

Commentary

\textsuperscript{1399} See guideline 2.8 and commentary thereto, in particular paras. (2) and (3) (\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 243-244).

\textsuperscript{1400} See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 200-203.

\textsuperscript{1401} See in particular the proposal of Mr. Rosenne, \textit{Yearbook ... 1965}, vol. II, p. 73, and \textit{ibid.}, vol. I, 803rd meeting, 16 June 1965, pp. 197-199, paras. 30-56. See also \textit{Yearbook ... 1966}, vol. II, p. 276, para. (1) of the commentary to draft article 73. For a summary of the work of the International Law Commission, see A. Pellet and W. Schabas, Commentary to article 23 (1969), in \textit{Les Conventions de Vienne ...}, (footnote 566 above), p. 974, para. 5.
(1) Even though the practice of States with regard to the confirmation of express acceptances made prior to the confirmation of reservations appears to be non-existent, article 23, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions\textsuperscript{1402} clearly states:

“An express acceptance of, or an objection to, a reservation made previously to confirmation of the reservation does not itself require confirmation.”

(2) As the Commission already noted with regard to the confirmation of objections,\textsuperscript{1403} this is a common-sense rule, which has been reproduced in guideline 2.8.6 in a form adapted to the logic of the Guide to Practice:

− It is limited to the confirmation of acceptances and does not refer to objections;\textsuperscript{1404} and

− Instead of containing the formulation “made previously to confirmation of the reservation”, it refers to guideline 2.2.1 (Formal confirmation of reservations formulated when signing a treaty).\textsuperscript{1405}

(3) On the other hand, it would seem inappropriate to include in the Guide to Practice a guideline on express acceptance of reservations that was analogous to guideline 2.6.12 (Requirement of confirmation of an objection formulated prior to the expression of consent to be bound by the treaty).\textsuperscript{1406} Not only is the idea of formulating an acceptance prior to the expression of consent to be bound by the treaty excluded by the very wording of article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, which allows the formulation of acceptances only by contracting States or international organizations,\textsuperscript{1407} but also, in practice, it is difficult to imagine a State or international organization actually proceeding to such an acceptance. In any case, such a practice (which would be tantamount to soliciting reservations) should surely be discouraged, and would not serve the

\textsuperscript{1402} On the travaux préparatoires to this provision, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), pp. 206-207.
\textsuperscript{1403} Ibid., p. 207.
\textsuperscript{1404} Ibid., p. 208.
\textsuperscript{1405} Ibid., Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), pp. 208-213.
\textsuperscript{1406} See guideline 2.6.12 and the commentary thereto (Ibid., Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), pp. 208-213).
\textsuperscript{1407} See para. (10) of the commentary to guideline 2.8 (Ibid., pp. 247-248).
purpose of “preventive objections”: the “warning” made in advance to States and international organizations seeking to formulate reservations unacceptable to the objecting State.

2.8.7 Acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization

When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.

Commentary

(1) Article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions has the same wording:

“When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.”

(2) This provision originated in the first report of Waldock, who proposed a draft article 18, paragraph 4 (c), which read as follows:

“In the case of a plurilateral or multilateral treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization, the consent of the organization, expressed through a decision of its competent organ, shall be necessary to establish the admissibility of a reservation not specifically authorized by such instrument and to constitute the reserving State a party to the instrument.”

The same idea was taken up in the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur, but the wording of draft article 19, paragraph 3, was simpler and more concise:

1408 [602, 2009] A/CN.4/144 (footnote 552 above), p. 61. See also draft article 20, para. 4, as adopted by the Commission on first reading, which restated the principle of intervention of the competent organ of an organization but which appeared to subsume it under cases in which an objection had effectively been raised against the reservation concerned (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 176 and p. 181, para. (25) of the commentary to draft article 20).
“Subject to article 3 (bis) [the origin of the current article 5], when a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization, acceptance of a reservation shall be determined by the competent organ of the international organization.”

(3) The very principle of recourse to the competent organ of an international organization for a ruling on the acceptance of a reservation made regarding its constituent instrument was severely criticized at the 1969 Vienna Conference, in particular by the Soviet Union, which said:

“Paragraph 3 of the Commission’s article 17 should also be deleted, since the sovereign right of States to formulate reservations could not be made dependent on the decisions of international organizations.”

(4) Other delegations, while less hostile to the principle of intervention by an organization’s competent organ in accepting a reservation to its constituent instrument, were of the view that this particular regime was already covered by what would become article 5 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Article 5 does, in fact, make the 1969 Vienna Convention applicable to the constituent instruments of international organizations “without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization”, including provisions concerning the admission of new members or the assessment of reservations that may arise. Nevertheless, the provision was adopted by the Vienna Conference in 1986.

(5) The commentaries to the draft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between international organizations also clearly show that article 5 of the Convention and paragraph 3 of article 20 are neither mutually exclusive nor redundant. In fact, it was after the reintroduction, following much hesitation, of a provision corresponding to article 5 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which had been initially omitted, that it appeared necessary to the
Commission to also reintroduce paragraph 3 of article 20 in the draft which led to the 1986 Convention.

(6) In principle, recourse to the competent organ of an organization for acceptance of reservations formulated with regard to the constituent instrument of that organization is perfectly logical. The constituent instruments of international organizations are not of a nature to be subject to the flexible system. Their main objective is the establishment of a new juridical person, and in that context a diversity of bilateral relations between member States or organizations is essentially inconceivable. There cannot be numerous types of “membership”; even less can there be numerous decision-making procedures. The practical value of the principle is particularly obvious if one tries to imagine a situation where a reserving State is considered a “member” of the organization by some of the other States members and, at the same time, as a third party in relation to the organization and its constituent instrument by other States who have made a qualified objection opposing the entry into force of the treaty in their bilateral relations with the reserving State. A solution of this sort, creating a hierarchy among or a bilateralization of the membership of the organization, would paralyse the work of the international organization in question and would thus be inadmissible. The Commission, basing itself largely on the practice of the Secretary-General in the matter, therefore rightly noted in its commentary to draft article 20, paragraph 4, adopted on first reading:

“… in the case of instruments which form the constitutions of international organizations, the integrity of the instrument is a consideration which outweighs other considerations and that it must be for the members of the organization, acting through its competent organ, to determine how far any relaxation of the integrity of the instrument is acceptable."

(7) Furthermore, it is only logical that States or member organizations should take a collective decision concerning acceptance of a reservation, given that they take part, through the competent organ of the organization, in the admissions procedure for all new members and must assess at that

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1414 [608, 2009] M.H. Mendelson has demonstrated that “[t]he charter of an international organization differs from other treaty regimes in bringing into being, as it were, a living organism, whose decisions, resolutions, regulations, appropriations and the like constantly create new rights and obligations for the members” (Mendelson, (footnote 605 above), p. 148).
time the terms and extent of commitment of the State or organization applying for membership. It is thus up to the organization, and to it alone, and more particularly to the competent organ, to interpret its own constituent instrument and to decide on the acceptance of a reservation formulated by a candidate for admission.

(8) This principle is confirmed, moreover, by practice in the matter. Despite some variation in the practice of depositaries other than the Secretary-General of the United Nations,\(^ {1417} \) the latter clearly sets out his position in the case of the Indian reservation to the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).\(^ {1418} \) On that occasion, it was specifically stated that the Secretary-General “has invariably treated the matter as one for reference to the body having the authority to interpret the convention in question”.\(^ {1419} \) However, there are very few examples of acceptances by the competent organ of the organization concerned to be found in the collection *Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General*, particularly as the depositary does not generally communicate acceptances. It is nonetheless worth noting that the reservations formulated by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to the Agreement establishing the African Development Bank as amended in 1979 were expressly accepted by the Bank.\(^ {1420} \) Similarly, the French reservation to the 1977 Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development was expressly accepted by the Institute’s Governing Council.\(^ {1421} \) Chile’s instrument of ratification of the 1983 Statutes of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology also took effect on the date that the reservations formulated in respect of that instrument were accepted by the Centre’s Board of Governors.\(^ {1422} \)

(9) In keeping with its usual practice, the Commission therefore considered it necessary to reproduce article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions in draft guideline 2.8.7 in order to

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\(^ {1417} \) [611, 2009] Thus, the United States has always applied the principle of unanimity for reservations to constituent instruments of international organizations (see the examples given by Mendelson, (footnote 605 above), p. 149, and pp. 158-160, and Imbert, (footnote 547 above), pp. 122-123 (note 186)), while the United Kingdom has embraced the Secretary-General’s practice of referring the question back to the competent organ of the organization concerned (ibid., p. 121).


\(^ {1420} \) [614, 2009] *Multilateral Treaties …*, (footnote 532 above), chap. X.2.b (note 7).

\(^ {1421} \) [615, 2009] Ibid., chap. XXV.3 (note 4).

\(^ {1422} \) [616, 2009] Ibid., chap. XIV.7 (note 6).
stress the special nature of the rules applicable to the constituent instruments of international organizations with regard to the acceptance of reservations.

2.8.8 Organ competent to accept a reservation to a constituent instrument

Subject to the rules of the organization, competence to accept a reservation to a constituent instrument of an international organization belongs to the organ competent to decide on the admission of a member to the organization, or to the organ competent to amend the constituent instrument or to the organ competent to interpret this instrument.

Commentary

(1) The question of determining which organ is competent to decide on the acceptance of a reservation is not answered either in the Vienna Conventions themselves or in the travaux préparatoires to them. It was therefore thought helpful to indicate in the Guide to Practice what is meant by the “competent organ” of an organization for purposes of applying article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions, the wording of which is reproduced in draft guideline 2.8.7.

(2) The silence of the Vienna Conventions on this point is easily explained: it is impossible to determine in a general and abstract way which organ of an international organization is competent to decide on the acceptance of a reservation. This question is covered by the “without prejudice” clause in article 5, according to which the provisions of the Conventions apply to constituent instruments of international organizations “without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization”.

(3) Thus, the rules of the organization determine the organ competent to accept the reservation, as well as the applicable voting procedure and required majorities. If the rules are silent on that point, in view of the circumstances in which a reservation can be formulated it can be assumed that “competent organ” means the organ that decides on the reserving State’s application for admission or the organ competent to amend the constituent instrument of the organization or to interpret it. It does not seem to be possible for the Commission to determine a hierarchy among those different organs.

(4) The wide diversity of practice has not been of great assistance in resolving this point. Thus, the Indian “reservation” to the IMCO Constitution - once the controversy over the procedure to be
followed was resolved\footnote{617, 2009} - was accepted by the IMCO Council under article 27 of the Convention,\footnote{618, 2009} whereas the Turkish reservation to the same Convention was (implicitly) accepted by the Assembly. With regard to the reservation by the United States of America to the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Secretary-General referred the matter to the WHO Assembly, which was, by virtue of article 75 of the Constitution, competent to decide on any disputes with regard to the interpretation of that instrument. In the end, the WHO Assembly unanimously accepted the United States reservation.\footnote{619, 2009}

2.8.9 Modalities of the acceptance of a reservation to a constituent instrument

Subject to the rules of the organization, the acceptance by the competent organ of the organization shall not be tacit. However, the admission of the State or the international organization which is the author of the reservation is tantamount to the acceptance of that reservation.

For the purposes of the acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization, the individual acceptance of the reservation by States or international organizations that are members of the organization is not required.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 2.8.9 sets out, in a single provision, the consequences of the principle laid down in article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions and reproduced in guideline 2.8.7:

1. The principle that, apart from one nuance, the acceptance of a reservation by the competent organ of the organization must be express; and

2. The fact that this acceptance is necessary but sufficient and that, consequently, individual acceptance of the reservation by the member States is not required.

(2) Article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions is scarcely more than a “safeguard clause”\footnote{620, 2009} that excludes the case of constituent instruments of international organizations, from the

\footnote{617, 2009}{See Mendelson, (footnote 605 above), pp. 162-169, and Imbert, (footnote 547 above), pp. 123-125.}
\footnote{618, 2009}{By virtue of this provision, the Council assumes the functions of the organization if the Assembly does not meet.}
\footnote{619, 2009}{On this case see, in particular, Mendelson, (footnote 605 above), pp. 161-162. For other examples, see para. (8) of the commentary to guideline 2.8.7.}
\footnote{620, 2009}{Müller, (footnote 566 above), p. 858, para. 114.}
scope of the flexible system, including the principle of tacit acceptance,\footnote{[621, 2009] Article 20, para. 5, of the Vienna Conventions excludes from its scope the case of reservations to constituent instruments of international organizations, specifying that it applies solely to the situations referred to in paras. 2 and 4 of article 20.} while specifying that acceptance by the competent organ is necessary to “establish” the reservation within the meaning of article 21, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions. Moreover, as guidelines 2.8.7 and 2.8.8 show, article 20, paragraph 3, is far from resolving all the problems which can arise with regard to the legal regime applicable to reservations to constituent instruments: not only does it not define either the notion of a constituent instrument or the competent organ which has to decide, but it also fails to give any indication of the modalities of the organ’s acceptance of reservations.

(3) One thing, however, is certain: the acceptance by the competent organ of an international organization of a reservation to its constituent instrument cannot be presumed. Under article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, the presumption that a reservation is accepted at the end of a 12-month period applies only to the cases described in paragraphs 2 and 4 of that article. Thus, the case set out in article 20, paragraph 3, is excluded and this is tantamount to saying that, unless the treaty (in this case, the constituent instrument of the organization) otherwise provides, acceptance must necessarily be express.

(4) In practice, even leaving aside the problem of the 12-month period stipulated in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, which would be difficult, if not impossible, to respect in some organizations where the organs competent to decide on the admission of new members meet only at intervals of more than 12 months,\footnote{[622, 2009] One example is the case of the General Assembly of the World Tourism Organization (WTO) which, under article 10 of its Statutes, meets every two years.} the failure by the competent organ of the organization concerned to take a position is scarcely conceivable in view of the very special nature of constituent instruments. In any case, at one point or another, an organ of the organization must take a position on the admission of a new member that wishes to accompany its accession to the constituent instrument with a reservation; without such a decision, the State cannot be considered a member of the organization. Even if the admission of the State in question is not subject to a formal act of the organization, but is simply reflected in accession to the constituent instrument, article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions requires the competent organ to rule on the question.
(5) It is possible, however, to imagine cases in which the organ competent to decide on the admission of a State implicitly accepts the reservation by allowing the candidate State to participate in the work of the organization without formally ruling on the reservation. The phrase “subject to the rules of the organization” at the beginning of the first paragraph of the guideline is designed to introduce some additional flexibility into the principle stated in the guideline.

(6) The fact remains that there is one exception to the rule of tacit acceptance prescribed in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions and reproduced in guideline 2.8.1. It therefore seems useful to recall in a separate guideline that the presumption of acceptance does not apply with regard to the constituent instruments of international organizations, as least as far as acceptance expressed by the competent organ of the organization is concerned.

(7) The unavoidable logical consequence of the principle established in article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions and the exception it introduces to the general principle of tacit acceptance is that acceptance of the reservation by contracting States or international organizations is not a prerequisite for the establishment of the reservation. This is the idea expressed in the second paragraph of guideline 2.8.9. It does not mean that contracting States or international organizations are precluded from formally accepting the reservation in question if they so wish. As guideline 2.8.11 explains, that acceptance will simply not produce the effects normally attendant upon such a declaration.

2.8.10 Acceptance of a reservation to a constituent instrument that has not yet entered into force

In the case set forth in guideline 2.8.7 and where the constituent instrument has not yet entered into force, a reservation is considered to have been accepted if no signatory State or signatory international organization has raised an objection to that reservation by the end of a period of 12 months after they were notified of that reservation. Such a unanimous acceptance once obtained is final.

1429 [623, 2009] See the example of the reservation formulated by Turkey to the IMCO Convention. This reservation was not officially accepted by the Assembly. Nonetheless, the Assembly allowed the Turkish delegation to participate in its work. This implied acceptance of the instrument of ratification and the reservation (William W. Bishop, “Reservations to Treaties”, Recueil des cours ..., vol. 103, 1961-II, pp. 297-298; Mendelson, (footnote 605 above), p. 163). Technically, this is not, however, a “tacit”
Commentary

(1) A particular problem arises with regard to reservations to the constituent instrument of an organization in cases where the competent organ does not yet exist because the treaty may not yet have entered into force or the organization may not yet have been established. In this respect, guideline 2.8.10 clarifies article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions on a matter which may seem to be of minor importance, but which has posed some fairly substantial difficulties in some cases in the past.

(2) This situation occurred with respect to the Convention establishing the International Maritime Organization (IMO) at the time still IMCO - to which some States had formulated reservations or declarations in their instruments of ratification and with respect to the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, which the United States, France and Guatemala intended to ratify with reservations before the respective constituent instruments of these two organizations had entered into force. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as depositary of these Conventions and unable to submit the question of declarations and/or reservations to the International Refugee Organization (as it did not yet exist), decided to consult the States most immediately concerned, in other words, the States that were already parties to the Convention and, if there was no objection, to admit the reserving States as members of the organization.

(3) It should also be noted that, while article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions excludes the application of the “flexible” system for reservations to a constituent instrument of an international organization, it does not place it under the traditional system of unanimity. The Secretary-General’s practice, however - which is to consult all the States that are already parties to

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1431 See, in particular, the declarations of Switzerland, the United States of America, Mexico and Ecuador (Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. XII.1).
1432 These declarations are cited in Imbert, (footnote 547 above), p. 40 (note 6).
1433 Mendelson, (footnote 605 above), pp. 162-163. In this same spirit, the United States of America, during the Vienna Conference, proposed replacing article 20, para. 3, with the following text: “When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization, it shall be deemed to be of such a character that, pending its entry into force, and the functioning of the organization, a reservation may be established if none of the signatory States objects, unless the treaty otherwise provides.” (See Summary Records (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.3) (footnote 567 above), A/CONF.39/11, 24th meeting, 16 April 1968, pp. 130-131, para. 54). This amendment, which was not adopted, would have considerably enlarged the circle of States entitled to decide.
the constituent instrument - leans in that direction. Had it been adopted, an Austrian amendment to this provision, submitted at the Vienna Conference, would have led to a different solution:

“When the reservation is formulated while the treaty is not yet in force, the expression of the consent of the State which has formulated the reservation takes effect only when such competent organ is properly constituted and has accepted the reservation.”

This approach, which was not followed by the Drafting Committee at the time of the Conference, is supported by M.H. Mendelson, who considers, moreover, that “[t]he fact that ... the instrument containing the reservations should not count towards bringing the treaty into force, is a small price to pay for ensuring the organization’s control over reservations”.

(4) The organization’s control over the question of reservations is certainly one advantage of the solution advocated by the Austrian amendment, which was also supported by some members of the Commission who considered that acceptance of the reservation could wait until the organization had actually been established. Nonetheless, the undeniable disadvantage of this solution - which was rejected by the Vienna Conference - is that it leaves the reserving State in what can be a very prolonged undetermined status with respect to the organization, until such time as the treaty enters into force. Thus, one might well wonder whether the practice of the Secretary-General is not a more reasonable solution. Indeed, asking States that are already parties to the constituent instrument to assess the reservation with a view to obtaining unanimous acceptance (no protest or objection) places the reserving State in a more comfortable situation. Its status with respect to the constituent instrument of the organization and with respect to the organization itself is determined much more rapidly. What is more, it should be borne in mind that the organization’s consent is nothing more than the sum total of acceptances of the States members of the organization. Requiring unanimity

1434 [628, 2009] A/CONF.39/C.1/L.3, in United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2) (footnote 557 above), p. 135. A Chinese amendment was very much along these lines, but could have meant that the reserving State becomes a party to the instrument even so. It provided that “When the reservation is made before the entry into force of the treaty, the reservation shall be subject to subsequent acceptance by the competent organ after such competent organ has been properly instituted.” (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.162, ibid., p. 135).
1437 [631, 2009] The example of the Argentine reservation to the constituent instrument of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows that the status of the reserving State can be determined very rapidly and depends essentially on the depositary (the
before the competent organ comes into being can, of course, be a disadvantage to the reserving State, since in most cases - at least in the case of international organizations with a global mandate - a decision will probably be taken by majority vote. Nonetheless, if there is no unanimity among the contracting States or international organizations, there is nothing to prevent the author of the reservation from resubmitting its instrument of ratification and accompanying reservation to the competent organ of the organization once it is established.

(5) Both solutions seem to have an identical result. The difference, however - and it is not negligible - is that the reserving State is spared an intermediate and uncertain status until such time as the organization is established and its reservation can be examined by the competent organ. That is a major advantage on the score of legal certainty.

(6) The Commission has pondered the question of which States and international organizations should be called upon to decide on the fate of a reservation in such circumstances. Most members apparently incline to the view that allowing only contracting States and international organizations to do so could, in some cases, unduly facilitate the establishment of a reservation since, ultimately, just one contracting State could seal its fate. For this reason, the Commission has finally decided to refer to the States and international organizations that are signatories of the constituent instrument. It is understood that the term “signatory” means those that are signatories at the time when the reservation is formulated.

(7) The purpose of the clarification in the last sentence of the guideline that “[s]uch a unanimous acceptance once obtained is final” is to ensure the stability of the legal situation resulting from the acceptance. It is predicted on the same rationale as that underlying guideline 2.8.2. Generally speaking, the other rules on acceptance continue to apply here, and the reservation must be deemed to have been accepted if no signatory State or signatory international organization has objected to it within the 12-month period stipulated in guideline 2.6.13.

(8) Although it seemed unnecessary to spell out such details in the guideline itself, the Commission considers that if the constituent act enters into force during the 12-month period in

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United States of America in this case). The Argentine instrument was accepted after a period of only three months. See Mendelson, (footnote 605 above), p. 160.
question, guideline 2.8.10 is no longer applicable and it is the general rule laid down in guideline 2.8.7 which applies.

(9) In any event, it seems desirable that during the negotiations States or international organizations should come to an agreement on a *modus vivendi* for the period of uncertainty between the time of signature and the entry into force of the constituent instrument, for example, by transferring the competence necessary to accept or reject reservations to the interim committee responsible for setting up the new international organization.\footnote{[632, 2009]} \footnote{This solution was envisaged by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in a document prepared for the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that “before entry into force of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, it would of course be possible to consult a preparatory commission or some organ of the United Nations” (A/CONF.62/L.13, *Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (third session)*, vol. VI, p. 128, footnote 26). For a brief discussion of the difficulty, in certain circumstances, of determining the “organ qualified to accept a reservation”, see the second paragraph of guideline 2.1.5 (*Communication of reservations*) and the commentary thereto (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10* (A/57/10), pp. 91-92, paras. (28) and (29) of the commentary).}

**2.8.11 Reaction by a member of an international organization to a reservation to its constituent instrument**

Guideline 2.8.7 does not preclude States or international organizations that are members of an international organization from taking a position on the permissibility or appropriateness of a reservation to a constituent instrument of the organization. Such an opinion is in itself devoid of legal effects.

**Commentary**

(1) According to the terms of guideline 2.8.9, “[f]or the purposes of the acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization, the individual acceptance of the reservation by States or international organizations that are members of the organization is not required”. But, as explained in the commentary to that provision,\footnote{[633, 2009]} this principle does not mean that “contracting States or international organizations are precluded from formally accepting the reservation in question if they so wish”. Guideline 2.8.11 confirms the point.

(2) The reply to the question of whether the competence of the organ of the organization to decide on whether to accept a reservation to the constituent instrument precludes individual reactions by
other members of the organization may seem obvious. Why allow States to express their individual views if they must make a collective decision on acceptance of the reservation within the competent organ of the organization? Would it not give the green light to reopening the debate on the reservation, particularly for States that were not able to “impose” their point of view within the competent organ, and thereby create a dual or parallel system of acceptance of such reservations that would in all likelihood create an impasse if the two processes had different outcomes?

(3) During the Vienna Conference, the United States of America introduced an amendment to article 17, paragraph 3 (which became paragraph 3 of article 20), specifying that “such acceptance shall not preclude any Contracting State from objecting to the reservation”. Adopted by a slim majority at the 25th meeting of the Committee of the Whole and incorporated by the Drafting Committee in the provisional text of article 17, this passage was ultimately deleted from the final text of the Convention by the Committee of the Whole “on the understanding that the question of objections to reservations to constituent instruments of international organizations formed part of a topic already before the International Law Commission [the question of relations between international organizations and States], and that meanwhile the question would continue to be regulated by general international law”. It became apparent in the work of the Drafting Committee that the formulation of the American amendment was not very clear and left open the question of the legal effects of such an objection.

(4) In actual fact, it is hard to understand why member States or international organizations could not take individual positions on a reservation outside the framework of the international organization and communicate their views to interested parties, including to the organization. In all likelihood, taking such a position would probably have no concrete legal effect; however, it has happened more than once, and the absence of a legal effect *stricto sensu* of such declarations does not rob them of their importance - they provide an opportunity for the reserving State, in the first

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instance, and, afterward, for other interested States, to become aware of and assess the position of the State that is the author of the unilaterally formulated acceptance or objection, and this, in the end, could make a useful contribution to the debate within the competent organ of the organization and could also form the basis for launching a “reservations dialogue” among the protagonists. Such a position might also be taken into consideration, where appropriate, by a third party who might have to decide on the permissibility or scope of the reservation.

(5) In the Commission’s opinion, guideline 2.8.11, which does not question the necessary and sufficient nature of the acceptance of a reservation by the competent organ of the international organization, is in no way contrary to the Vienna Conventions, which take no position on this matter.

2.8.12 Final nature of acceptance of a reservation

Acceptance of a reservation cannot be withdrawn or amended.

Commentary

(1) Although they deal with objections, neither the 1969 nor the 1986 Vienna Convention contains provisions concerning the withdrawal of the acceptance of a reservation. They neither authorize it nor prohibit it.

(2) The fact remains that article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions and its ratio legis logically exclude calling into question a tacit (or implicit) acceptance through an objection formulated after the end of the 12-month time period stipulated in that paragraph (or of any other time period specified by the treaty in question): to allow a “change of heart” that would call into question the treaty relations between the States or international organizations concerned to be expressed several years after the intervention of an acceptance that came about because a contracting State or an international organization remained silent until one of the “critical dates” had passed would pose a serious threat to legal certainty. While States parties are completely free to express their disagreement with a reservation after the end of the 12-month period (or of any other time period specified by the treaty in question), their late “objections” can no longer have the normal effects of an objection, as provided for in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), and article 21,
paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions. A comparable conclusion must be drawn with regard to the question of widening the scope of an objection to a reservation.

(3) There is no reason to approach express acceptances any differently. Without there being any need for an in-depth analysis of the effects of an express acceptance - which are no different from those of a tacit acceptance - suffice it to say that, like tacit acceptances, the effect of such an acceptance would in theory be the entry into force of the treaty between the reserving State or international organization and the State or international organization that has accepted the reservation and even, in certain circumstances, among all States or international organizations that are parties to the treaty. It goes without saying that to call the legal consequences into question \textit{a posteriori} would seriously undermine legal certainty and the status of the treaty in the bilateral relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the acceptance. This is certainly true where acceptance has been made expressly: even if there is no doubt that a State’s silence in a situation where it should have expressed its view has legal effects by virtue of the principle of good faith (and, here, the express provisions of the Vienna Conventions), it is even more obvious when the State’s position takes the form of a unilateral declaration; the reserving State, as well as the other States parties, can count on the manifestation of the will of the State author of the express acceptance.

(4) The dialectical relationship between objection and acceptance, established and affirmed by article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, and the placement of controls on the objection mechanism with the aim of stabilizing the treaty relations disturbed, in a sense, by the reservation necessarily imply that acceptance (whether tacit or express) is final. This is the principle firmly stated in guideline 2.8.12 in the interests of the certainty of treaty-based legal relations, even though some members of the Commission contended that it would have been preferable for a State to be able to go back on a previous acceptance provided that the 12-month period set in guideline 2.6.13 had not expired.

\footnote{[639, 2009]} See article 20, para. 3, of the Vienna Conventions and guideline 2.8.7.
2.9 Formulation of reactions to interpretative declarations

2.9.1 Approval of an interpretative declaration

“Approval” of an interpretative declaration means a unilateral statement made by a State or an international organization in reaction to an interpretative declaration in respect of a treaty formulated by another State or another international organization, whereby the former State or organization expresses agreement with the interpretation formulated in that declaration.

Commentary

(1) It appears that practice with respect to positive reactions to interpretative declarations is virtually non-existent, as if States considered it prudent not to expressly approve an interpretation given by another party. This may be due to the fact that article 31, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions provides that, for the interpretation of a treaty,

“There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.”

(2) The few instances of express reactions that can be found combine elements of approval and disapproval or have a conditional character, subordinating approval of the initial interpretation to ... the interpretation given to it by the reacting State.

(3) For example, Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General includes a text submitted by Israel reacting positively to a declaration submitted by the Arab Republic of Egypt\textsuperscript{1446} concerning the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:

\footnote{\cite{640,2009} “The provisions of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel concerning passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba come within the framework of the general regime of waters forming straits referred to in part III of the Convention, wherein it is stipulated that the general regime shall not affect the legal status of waters forming straits and shall include certain obligations with regard to security and the maintenance of order in the State bordering the strait” (Multilateral Treaties ..., (footnote 532 above), chap. XI.6).}
“The concerns of the Government of Israel, with regard to the law of the sea, relate principally to ensuring maximum freedom of navigation and overflight everywhere and particularly through straits used for international navigation.

In this regard, the Government of Israel states that the regime of navigation and overflight, confirmed by the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, in which the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are considered by the Parties to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight, is applicable to the said areas. Moreover, being fully compatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the regime of the Peace Treaty will continue to prevail and to be applicable to the said areas.

It is the understanding of the Government of Israel that the declaration of the Arab Republic of Egypt in this regard, upon its ratification of the [said] Convention, is consonant with the above declaration.”

It appears from this declaration that the interpretation put forward by Egypt is regarded by Israel as correctly reflecting the meaning of chapter III of the Montego Bay Convention, assuming that it is itself compatible with the Israeli interpretation. The Egyptian interpretation is, in a manner of speaking, confirmed by the reasoned “approbatory declaration” made by Israel.

(4) Another example that could be cited is the reaction of the Government of Norway to a declaration made by France concerning the 1978 Protocol relating to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, published by the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization:

“the Government of Norway has taken due note of the communication, which is understood to be a declaration on the part of the Government of France and not a reservation to the

1447 [641, 2009] Ibid. In fact, this statement expresses approval of both the classification and the substance of the Egyptian declaration; given the formulation of these declarations, it may be wondered whether they might have been made as a result of a diplomatic agreement.
provisions of the Convention with the legal consequence such a formal reservation would have had, if reservations to Annex I had been admissible.”  

It appears that this statement could be interpreted to mean that Norway accepts the French declaration insofar as (and on the condition that) it does not constitute a reservation.

(5) Even though examples are lacking, it is clear that a situation may arise in which a State or an international organization simply expresses its agreement with a specific interpretation proposed by another State or international organization in an interpretative declaration. Such agreement between the respective interpretations of two or more parties corresponds to the situation contemplated in article 31, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions, it being unnecessary at this stage to specify the weight that should be given to this “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty”.

(6) It is sufficient to note that such agreement with an interpretative declaration is not comparable to acceptance of a reservation, if only because, under article 20, paragraph 4, of the Vienna Conventions, such acceptance entails the entry into force of the treaty for the reserving State - which is evidently not the case of a positive reaction to an interpretative declaration. To underscore the differences between the two, the Commission thought it would be wise to use different terms. The term “approval”, which expresses the idea of agreement or acquiescence without prejudging the legal effect actually produced, could be used to denote a positive reaction to an interpretative declaration.

2.9.2 Opposition to an interpretative declaration

“Opposition” to an interpretative declaration means a unilateral statement made by a State or an international organization in reaction to an interpretative declaration in respect of a treaty formulated by another State or another international organization, whereby the former State or

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1448 [642, 2009] Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions (as of 31 December 2007), p. 108 (note 1).
1449 [643, 2009] See para. (1) of the present commentary.
1450 [644, 2009] See the fourth part of the Guide to Practice, on the effects of reservations, interpretative declarations and related statements.
organization rejects the interpretation formulated in the interpretative declaration, including by formulating an alternative interpretation.

Commentary

(1) Examples of negative reactions to an interpretative declaration, in other words, of a State or an international organization disagreeing with the interpretation given in an interpretative declaration, while not quite as exceptional as positive reactions, are nonetheless sporadic. The reaction of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the interpretative declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic\footnote{[646, 2009]} in respect of article 52 of the 1969 Vienna Convention is an illustration of this:

“The United Kingdom does not accept that the interpretation of Article 52 put forward by the Government of Syria correctly reflects the conclusions reached at the Conference of Vienna on the subject of coercion; the Conference dealt with this matter by adopting a Declaration on this subject which forms part of the Final Act.”\footnote{[647, 2009]}

(2) The various conventions on the law of the sea also generated negative reactions to the interpretative declarations made in connection with them. Upon ratification of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, concluded in Geneva in 1958, Canada declared “... that it does not find acceptable the declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to article 5, paragraph 1”.\footnote{[648, 2009]}

(3) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, by virtue of its articles 309 and 310, which prohibit reservations but authorize interpretative declarations, gave rise to a considerable number of “interpretative declarations”, which also prompted an onslaught of negative reactions by other contracting States. Tunisia, in its communication of 22 February 1994, made it known, for example, that:

\footnote{[646, 2009]} This declaration reads as follows: “D - The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic interprets the provisions in article 52 as follows: The expression ‘the threat or use of force’ used in this article extends also to the employment of economic, political, military and psychological coercion and to all types of coercion constraining a State to conclude a treaty against its wishes or its interests” \textit{(Multilateral Treaties ...}, (footnote 532 above), chap. XXIII.1).

\footnote{[647, 2009]} Ibid.

\footnote{[648, 2009]} \textit{Ibid.}, chap. XXI.4. The German interpretative declaration reads as follows: “The Federal Republic of Germany declares with reference to article 5, para. 1, of the Convention on the Continental Shelf that in the opinion of the Federal
“… in that declaration [of Malta], articles 74 and 83 of the Convention are interpreted to mean that, in the absence of any agreement on delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf or other maritime zones, the search for an equitable solution assumes that the boundary is the median line, in other words, a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial waters is measured.

“The Tunisian Government believes that such an interpretation is not in the least consistent with the spirit and letter of the provisions of these articles, which do not provide for automatic application of the median line with regard to delimitation of the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”

Another very clear-cut example can be found in the statement of Italy regarding the interpretative declaration of India in respect of the Montego Bay Convention:

“Italy wishes to reiterate the declaration it made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification according to which ‘the rights of the coastal State in such zone do not include the right to obtain notification of military exercises or manoeuvres or to authorize them’. According to the declaration made by Italy upon ratification, this declaration applies as a reply to all past and future declarations by other States concerning the matters covered by it.”

(4) Examples can also be found in the practice relating to conventions adopted within the Council of Europe. Thus, the Russian Federation, referring to numerous declarations by other States parties in respect of the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in which they specified the meaning to be ascribed to the term “national minority”, declared that it:

Government, article 5, para. 1, guarantees the exercise of fishing rights (Fischerei) in the waters above the continental shelf in the manner hitherto generally in practice” (ibid.).

1455 [649, 2009] Ibid., chap. XXI.6 (note 18). The relevant part of the Maltese declaration reads as follows: “The Government of Malta interprets article 74 and article 83 to the effect that in the absence of agreement on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf or other maritime zones, for an equitable solution to be achieved, the boundary shall be the median line, namely a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial waters of Malta and of such other States is measured” (ibid., chap. XXI.6).

“... considers that none is entitled to include unilaterally in reservations or declarations, made while signing or ratifying the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, a definition of the term ‘national minority’, which is not contained in the Framework Convention. In the opinion of the Russian Federation, attempts to exclude from the scope of the Framework Convention the persons who permanently reside in the territory of States parties to the Framework Convention and previously had a citizenship but have been arbitrarily deprived of it, contradict the purpose of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”.1457

(5) Furthermore, the example of the statement of Italy regarding the interpretative declaration of India1458 shows that, in practice, States that react negatively to an interpretative declaration formulated by another State or another international organization often propose in the same breath another interpretation that they believe is “more accurate”. This practice of “constructive” refusal was also followed by Italy in its statement in reaction to the interpretative declarations of several other States parties to the March 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal:

“The Government of Italy, in expressing its objection vis-à-vis the declarations made, upon signature, by the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela, as well as other declarations of similar tenor that might be made in the future, considers that no provision of this Convention should be interpreted as restricting navigational rights recognized by international law. Consequently, a State party is not obliged to notify any other State or obtain authorization from it for simple passage through the territorial sea or the exercise of freedom of navigation in the exclusive economic zone by a vessel showing its flag and carrying a cargo of hazardous wastes.”1459

Germany and Singapore, which had made an interpretative declaration comparable to that of Italy, remained silent in respect of declarations interpreting the Basel Convention differently, without deeming it necessary to react in the same way as the Italian Government.\footnote{On the question of “silence”, see below, guideline 2.9.9 and the commentary thereto.}

(6) The practice also evoked reactions that, \textit{prima facie}, were not outright rejections. In some cases, States seemed to accept the proposed interpretation on the condition that it was consistent with a supplementary interpretation.\footnote{This practice coincides with the practice described above of partial or conditional approval (see guideline 2.9.1, paras. (3)-(5)).} The conditions set by Germany, Poland and Turkey for consenting to Poland’s interpretative declaration in respect of the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957\footnote{Declaration of 15 June 1993: “The Republic of Poland declares, in accordance with para. 1 (a) of Article 6, that it will under no circumstances extradite its own nationals. The Republic of Poland declares that, for the purposes of this Convention, in accordance with para. 1 (b) of Article 6, persons granted asylum in Poland will be treated as Polish nationals” (\textit{European Treaty Series}, No. 024 (http://conventions.coe.int)).} are a good example of this. Hence, Germany considered:

“the placing of persons granted asylum in Poland on an equal standing with Polish nationals in Poland’s declaration with respect to Article 6, paragraph 1 (a), of the Convention to be compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention only with the proviso that it does not exclude extradition of such persons to a State other than that in respect of which asylum has been granted”.\footnote{See also the identical reaction of Austria to the interpretative declaration of Romania (\textit{ibid.}).}

(7) A number of States had a comparable reaction to the declaration made by Egypt upon ratification of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.\footnote{Considering that the declaration by the Arab Republic of Egypt “aims ... to extend the scope of the Convention” - which excludes assigning the status of “reservation” - the German Government declared that it:}

“is of the opinion that the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt is only entitled to make such a declaration unilaterally for its own armed forces, and it interprets the declaration as having binding effect only on armed forces of the Arab Republic of Egypt. In the view of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, such a unilateral declaration cannot apply
to the armed forces of other States Parties without their express consent. The Government of
the Federal Republic of Germany therefore declares that it does not consent to the Egyptian
declaration as so interpreted with regard to any armed forces other than those of the Arab
Republic of Egypt, and in particular does not recognize any applicability of the Convention to
the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany".  

(8) In the context of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, a declaration by Canada concerning Arctic waters also triggered
conditional reactions. France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declared that they:

“take [ ] note of this declaration by Canada and consider [ ] that it should be read in
conformity with Articles 57, 234 and 236 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea. In particular, the … Government recalls that Article 234 of that Convention applies
within the limits of the exclusive economic zone or of a similar zone delimited in conformity
with Article 57 of the Convention and that the laws and regulations contemplated in Article
234 shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment based on the best available scientific evidence”.

(9) The Czech declaration made further to Germany’s interpretative declaration in respect of
Part X of the Montego Bay Convention should be viewed from a slightly different perspective in
that it is difficult to determine whether it is opposing the interpretation upheld by Germany or
recharacterizing the declaration as a reservation:

1464 [658, 2009] The Egyptian “reservation” is formulated as follows: “The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt declares that
it shall be bound by article 19, para. 2, of the Convention to the extent that the armed forces of a State, in the exercise of their duties,
do not violate the norms and principles of international law” (Multilateral Treaties ..., (footnote 532 above), chap. XVIII.9.
1465 [659, 2009] Ibid. See also comparable declarations by the United States of America (ibid.), the Netherlands (ibid.), the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (ibid.) and Canada (ibid. (note 7)).
1466 [660, 2009] For the text of the Canadian declaration, see Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in respect of Which
the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions (as of 31 December
1467 [661, 2009] The relevant part of the German declaration reads as follows: “As to the regulation of the freedom of transit enjoyed
by landlocked States, transit through the territory of transit States must not interfere with the sovereignty of these States. In
accordance with article 125, para. 3, the rights and facilities provided for in Part X in no way infringe upon the sovereignty and
legitimate interests of transit States. The precise content of the freedom of transit has in each single case to be agreed upon by the
transit State and the landlocked State concerned. In the absence of such agreement concerning the terms and modalities for exercising
the right of access of persons and goods to transit through the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is only regulated by
"The Government of the Czech Republic having considered the declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany of 14 October 1994 pertaining to the interpretation of the provisions of Part X of the [said Convention], which deals with the right of access of land-locked States to and from the sea and freedom of transit, states that the [said] declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be interpreted with regard to the Czech Republic in contradiction with the provisions of Part X of the Convention."1468

(10) Such “conditional acceptances” do not constitute “approvals” within the meaning of guideline 2.9.1 and should be regarded as negative reactions. In fact, the authors of such declarations are not approving the proposed interpretation but rather are putting forward another which, in their view, is the only one in conformity with the treaty.

(11) All these examples show that a negative reaction to an interpretative declaration can take varying forms: it can be a refusal, purely and simply, of the interpretation formulated in the declaration, a counter-proposal of an interpretation of the contested provision(s), or an attempt to limit the scope of the initial declaration, which was, in turn, interpreted. In any case, reacting States or international organizations are seeking to prevent or limit the scope of the interpretative declaration or its legal effect on the treaty, its application or its interpretation. In this connection, a negative reaction is therefore comparable, to some extent, to an objection to a reservation without, however, producing the same effect. Thus, a State or an international organization cannot oppose the entry into force of a treaty between itself and the author of the interpretative declaration on the pretext that it disagrees with the interpretation contained in the declaration. The author views its negative reaction as a safeguard measure, a protest against establishing an interpretation of the treaty that it might consider opposable, which it does not find appropriate, and about which it must speak out.1469

(12) That is why, just as it preferred the term “approval” to “acceptance” to designate a positive reaction to an interpretative declaration,1470 the Commission decided to use the term
“opposition”,\footnote[1471]{665, 2009} rather than “objection”, to refer to a negative reaction, even though this word has sometimes been used in practice.\footnote[1472]{666, 2009}

(13) The Commission considered how it could most appropriately qualify oppositions that reflected a different interpretation than the one contained in the initial interpretative declaration. It rejected the adjectives “incompatible” and “inconsistent”, choosing instead the word “alternative” in order not to constrict the definition to oppositions to interpretative declarations unduly.

(14) Adhering strictly to the subject matter of the second part, the definition selected avoids any reference to the possible effects of either interpretative declarations themselves or reactions to them. Guidelines will be formulated in respect of both of these in the fourth part of the Guide to Practice.

(15) The Commission also found that, contrary to the approach it had taken when drafting guideline 2.6.1 on the definition of objections to reservations,\footnote[1473]{667, 2009} it was not advisable to include in the definition of oppositions to interpretative declarations a reference to the intention of the author of the reaction, which a majority of the members considered to be too subjective.

2.9.3 Recharacterization of an interpretative declaration

“Recharacterization” of an interpretative declaration means a unilateral statement made by a State or an international organization in reaction to an interpretative declaration in respect of a treaty formulated by another State or another international organization, whereby the former State or organization treats the declaration as a reservation.

A State or an international organization that intends to treat an interpretative declaration as a reservation should take into account draft guidelines 1.3 to 1.3.3.

Commentary

\footnote[1471]{665, 2009} The definition of “opposition” so understood is very similar to the definition of the term “protestation” as provided in the \textit{Dictionnaire de droit international public}: “Act by which one or more subjects of international law express their intention not to recognize the validity or opposability of acts, conduct or claims issuing from third parties” (footnote 645 above, p. 907).

\footnote[1472]{666, 2009} See, for example, Italy’s reaction to the interpretative declarations of Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (see \textit{Multilateral Treaties} ..., (footnote 532 above), chap. XXVII.3). Canada’s reaction to the interpretative declaration of Germany to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (see \textit{ibid.}, chap. XXI.4) was also registered in the “objection” category by the Secretary-General.

(1) Even though in certain respects the recharacterization of an interpretative declaration as a reservation resembles an opposition to the initial interpretation, the majority of the members of the Commission considered that it constituted a sufficiently distinct manifestation of a divergence of opinion to warrant devoting a separate guideline to it. This is the subject matter of guideline 2.9.3.

(2) As the definitions of reservations and interpretative declarations make clear, the naming or phrasing of a unilateral statement by its author as a “reservation” or an “interpretative declaration” is irrelevant for the purposes of characterizing such a unilateral statement,\textsuperscript{1474} even if it provides a significant clue\textsuperscript{1475} as to its nature. This is conveyed by the phrase “however phrased or named” in guidelines 1.1 (replicating article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions) and 1.2 of the Guide to Practice.

(3) What frequently occurs in practice is that interested States do not hesitate to react to unilateral statements which their authors call interpretative, and to expressly regard them as reservations.\textsuperscript{1476} These reactions, which might be called “recharacterizations” to reflect their purpose, in no way resemble approval or opposition, since they do not (obviously) refer to the actual content of the unilateral statement in question but rather to its form and to the applicable legal regime.

(4) There are numerous examples of this phenomenon:

(a) The reaction of the Netherlands to Algeria’s interpretative declaration in respect of article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:

“In the opinion of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the interpretative declaration concerning article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights must be regarded as a reservation to the Covenant. From the text and history of the Covenant, it follows that the reservation with respect to

\textsuperscript{1474} See also guidelines 1.1 (Definition of reservations) and 1.2 (Definition of interpretative declarations).

\textsuperscript{1475} In this connection, guideline 1.3.2 (Phrasing and name) provides that: “The phrasing or name given to a unilateral declaration is an indication of the purported legal effect. This is the case in particular when a State or international organization formulates several unilateral statements in respect of a single treaty and designates some of them as reservations and others as interpretative declarations.” For commentary on this provision, see Yearbook ... 1999, vol. II, Part Two, pp. 109-111.
article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4, made by the Government of Algeria is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands therefore considers the reservation unacceptable and formally raises an objection to it.”

(b) The reactions of many States to the declaration made by Pakistan with respect to the same Covenant of 1966, which, after lengthy statements of reasons, conclude:

“The Government of … therefore regards the above-mentioned declarations as reservations and as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.

The Government of … therefore objects to the above-mentioned reservations made by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Covenant between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”

(c) The reactions of many States to the declaration made by the Philippines with respect to the 1982 Montego Bay Convention:

“The … considers that the statement which was made by the Government of the Philippines upon signing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and confirmed subsequently upon ratification of that Convention in essence contains reservations and exceptions to the said Convention, contrary to the provisions of article 309 thereof.”

(d) The recharacterization formulated by Mexico, which considered that:

“… the third declaration [formally classified as interpretative] submitted by the Government of the United States of America … constitutes a unilateral claim to justification, not envisaged

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1476 [670, 2009] Nor do the tribunals and treaty monitoring bodies hesitate to recharacterize an interpretative declaration as a reservation (see paras. (5) to (7) of the commentary to guideline 1.3.2, *Yearbook … 1999*, vol. II, Part Two, pp. 109-111). This does not, however, touch on the formulation of these reactions; it is therefore not useful to revisit it here.

1477 [671, 2009] *Multilateral Treaties …* (footnote 532 above), chap IV.3. See also the objection of Portugal (*ibid.*) and the objection of the Netherlands to the declaration of Kuwait (*ibid.*).

1478 [672, 2009] *Ibid.* See also the objections registered by Denmark (*ibid.*), Spain (*ibid.*), Finland (*ibid.*), France (*ibid.*), Latvia (*ibid.*), Norway (*ibid.*), Netherlands (*ibid.*), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (*ibid.*) and Sweden (*ibid.*).

1479 [673, 2009] Belarus, *ibid.*, chap. XXI.6; see also the reactions similar in letter or in spirit from Australia, Bulgaria, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (*ibid.*).
in the Convention [the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances], for denying legal assistance to a State that requests it, which runs counter to the purposes of the Convention". 1480

(e) The reaction of Germany to a declaration whereby the Government of Tunisia indicated that it would not, in implementing the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, “adopt any legislative or statutory decision that conflicts with the Tunisian Constitution”:

“The Federal Republic of Germany considers the first of the declarations deposited by the Republic of Tunisia to be a reservation. It restricts the application of the first sentence [sic] of article 4 ….” 1481

(f) The reactions of 19 States to the declaration made by Pakistan with regard to the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, whereby Pakistan specified that “nothing in this Convention shall be applicable to struggles, including armed struggle, for the realization of right of self-determination launched against any alien or foreign occupation or domination”:

“The Government of Austria considers that the declaration made by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is in fact a reservation that seeks to limit the scope of the Convention on a unilateral basis and is therefore contrary to its objective and purpose ….” 1482

(g) The reactions of Germany and the Netherlands to the declaration made by Malaysia upon accession to the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, whereby Malaysia made the implementation of article 7 of the Convention subject to its domestic legislation:

“The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers that in making the interpretation and application of Article 7 of the Convention subject to the national legislation of Malaysia, the Government of Malaysia introduces a general and indefinite reservation that

1480 [674, 2009] Ibid., chap. VI.19.
1481 [675, 2009] Ibid., chap. IV.11.
makes it impossible to clearly identify in which way the Government of Malaysia intends to change the obligations arising from the Convention. Therefore the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hereby objects to this declaration which is considered to be a reservation that is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and Malaysia."1483

(h) The reaction of Sweden to the declaration by Bangladesh indicating that article 3 of the 1953 Convention on the Political Rights of Women could only be implemented in accordance with the Constitution of Bangladesh:

“In this context the Government of Sweden would like to recall, that under well-established international treaty law, the name assigned to a statement whereby the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty is excluded or modified, does not determine its status as a reservation to the treaty. Thus, the Government of Sweden considers that the declarations made by the Government of Bangladesh, in the absence of further clarification, in substance constitute reservations to the Convention.

The Government of Sweden notes that the declaration relating to article III is of a general kind, stating that Bangladesh will apply the said article in consonance with the relevant provisions of its Constitution. The Government of Sweden is of the view that this declaration raises doubts as to the commitment of Bangladesh to the object and purpose of the Convention and would recall that, according to well-established international law, a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty shall not be permitted”.1484

(5) These examples show that recharacterization consists of considering that a unilateral statement submitted as an “interpretative declaration” is in reality a “reservation”, with all the legal effects that this entails. Thus, recharacterization seeks to identify the legal status of the unilateral statement in the relationship between the State or organization having submitted the statement and

1482 [676, 2009] Ibid. chap. XVIII.9. See the reactions similar in letter or in spirit from Germany, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Spain, the United States, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden (ibid.). See also the reactions of Germany and the Netherlands to the unilateral declaration made by Malaysia (ibid.).

the “recharacterizing” State or organization. As a general rule, such declarations, which are usually extensively reasoned, are based essentially on the criteria for distinguishing between reservations and interpretative declarations.

(6) These recharacterizations are “attempts”, proposals made with a view to qualifying as a reservation a unilateral statement which its author has submitted as an interpretative declaration and to imposing on it the legal status of a reservation. However, it should be understood that a “recharacterization” does not in and of itself determine the status of the unilateral statement in question. A divergence of views between the States or international organizations concerned can be resolved only through the intervention of an impartial third party with decision-making authority. The last clause of the first paragraph of guideline 2.9.3 (“whereby the former State or organization treats the declaration as a reservation”) clearly establishes the subjective nature of such a position, which does not bind either the author of the initial declaration or the other contracting or concerned parties.

(7) The second paragraph of guideline 2.9.3 refers the reader to guidelines 1.3 to 1.3.3, which indicate the criteria for distinguishing between reservations and interpretative declarations and the method of implementing them.

(8) Even though contracting States and international organizations are free to react to the interpretative declarations of other parties, which is why this second paragraph is worded in the form of a recommendation, as evidenced by the conditional verb “should”, they are taking a risk if they fail to follow these guidelines, which should guide the position of any decision-making body competent to give an opinion on the matter.

2.9.4 Freedom to formulate approval, opposition or recharacterization

An approval, opposition or recharacterization in respect of an interpretative declaration may be formulated at any time by any contracting State or any contracting international

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1484 [678, 2009] Ibid. chap. XVI.1. See also the identical declaration of Norway (ibid.).
1485 [679, 2009] For a particularly striking example, see the reactions to Pakistan’s interpretative declaration in relation to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (para. 4 (b) above and Multilateral Treaties ..., (footnote 532 above), chap. IV.3.
1486 [680, 2009] For texts of guidelines 1.3 to 1.3.3, see sect. C.1. above.
organization and by any State or any international organization that is entitled to become a party to the treaty.

Commentary

(1) In keeping with the basic principle of consensualism, guideline 2.9.4 conveys the wide range of possibilities open to States and international organizations in reacting to an interpretative declaration; whether they accept it, oppose it or consider it to be actually a reservation.

(2) With respect to time frames, reactions to interpretative declarations may in principle be formulated at any time. Interpretation occurs throughout the life of the treaty, and there does not seem to be any reason why reactions to interpretative declarations should be confined to any specific time frame when the declarations themselves are not, as a general rule (and in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the treaty), subject to any particular time frame.1487

(3) Moreover, and on this score reactions to interpretative declarations resemble acceptances of and objections to reservations, both contracting States and contracting international organizations and States and international organizations that are entitled to become parties to the treaty should be able to formulate an express reaction to an interpretative declaration at least from the time they become aware of it, on the understanding that the author of the declaration is responsible for disseminating it (or not)1488 and that the reactions of non-contracting States or non-contracting international organizations will not necessarily produce the same legal effect as those formulated by contracting parties (and probably no effect at all, for as long as the author State or international organization has not expressed consent to be bound). It is thus perfectly logical that the Secretary-General should have accepted Ethiopia’s communication of its opposition to the interpretative declaration formulated by the Arab Republic of Yemen with respect to the Montego Bay Convention, even though Ethiopia had not ratified the Convention.1489

2.9.5 Form of approval, opposition and recharacterization

An approval, opposition or recharacterization in respect of an interpretative declaration should preferably be formulated in writing.

1488 [682, 2009] See para. (4) of the commentary to guideline 2.9.5 below.
Commentary

(1) While reactions to interpretative declarations differ considerably from acceptances of or objections to reservations, it seems appropriate to ensure, to the extent possible, that such reactions are publicized widely, on the understanding that States and international organizations have no legal obligation in this regard\textsuperscript{1490} but that any legal effects which they may expect to arise from such reactions will depend in large part on how widely they disseminate those reactions.

(2) Although the legal effects of such reactions (combined with those of the initial declaration) on the interpretation and application of the treaty in question will not be discussed at this stage, it goes without saying that such unilateral statements are likely to play a role in the life of the treaty; this is their \textit{raison d’être} and the purpose for which they are formulated by States and international organizations. The International Court of Justice has highlighted the importance of these statements in practice:

“Interpretations placed upon legal instruments by the parties to them, though not conclusive as to their meaning, have considerably probative value when they contain recognition by a party of its own obligations under an instrument.”\textsuperscript{1491}

(3) In a study on unilateral statements, Rosario Sapienza also underlined the importance of reactions to interpretative declarations, which:

“forniranno utile contributo anche alla soluzione. E ancor più le dichiarazioni aiuteranno l’interprete quando controversia non si dia, ma semplice problema interpretativo” (contribute usefully to the settlement [of a dispute]. Statements will be still more useful to the interpreter when there is no dispute, but only a problem of interpretation).\textsuperscript{1492}

(4) Notwithstanding the undeniable usefulness of reactions to interpretative declarations not only for the interpreter or judge but also for enabling the other States and international organizations concerned to determine their own position with respect to the declaration, the Vienna Convention

\textsuperscript{1489} [683, 2009] See Multilateral Treaties ..., (footnote 532 above), chap. XXI.6.
\textsuperscript{1490} [684, 2009] See para. (4) of the present commentary, below.
does not require that such reactions be communicated. As has already been indicated in the commentary to guideline 2.4.1 on the formulation of interpretative declarations:

“There seems to be no reason to transpose the rules governing the communication of reservations to simple interpretative declarations, which may be formulated orally; it would therefore be paradoxical to insist that they be formally communicated to other interested States or international organizations. By refraining from such communication, the author of the declaration runs the risk that the declaration may not have the intended effect, but this is a different problem altogether. There is no reason to transpose the corresponding parts of the provisions of draft guidelines 2.1.5 to 2.1.8 on the communication of reservations and it does not seem necessary to include a clarification of this point in the Guide to Practice.”

(5) There is no reason to take a different approach with respect to reactions to such interpretative declarations, and it would be inappropriate to impose more stringent formal requirements on them than on the interpretative declarations to which they respond. The same caveat applies, however: if States or international organizations do not adequately publicize their reactions to an interpretative declaration, they run the risk that the intended effects may not be produced. If the authors of such reactions want their position to be taken into account in the treaty’s application, particularly when there is a dispute, it would probably be in their interest to formulate the reaction in writing to meet the requirements of legal security and to ensure notification of the reaction. The alternative whether to use the written form or not does not leave room for any intermediate solutions. Accordingly, a majority of the members of the Commission was of the view that the word “preferably” was more appropriate than the expression “to the extent possible”, used in the text of guidelines 2.1.9 (Statement of reasons for reservations), 2.6.10 (Statement of reasons for objections) and 2.9.6 (Statement of reasons for approval, opposition and recharacterization), which could convey the idea of the existence of such intermediate solutions.

(6) The Commission adopted guideline 2.9.5 in the form of a simple recommendation addressed to States and international organizations: it does not reflect a binding legal norm but conveys what the Commission considers to be, in most cases, the real interests of the contracting parties to a treaty
or of any State or international organization that is entitled to become a party to a treaty in respect of which an interpretative declaration has been made.\textsuperscript{1494} It goes without saying - as indicated by the use of the conditional (“should”) - that such entities (States or international organizations) are still free simply to formulate an interpretative declaration, if that is what they prefer.

(7) Guideline 2.9.5 corresponds to guideline 2.4.0,\textsuperscript{1495} which recommends that the authors of interpretative declarations should formulate them in writing.

\textbf{2.9.6 Statement of reasons for approval, opposition and recharacterization}

An approval, opposition or recharacterization in respect of an interpretative declaration should, to the extent possible, indicate the reasons why it is being made.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) For the same reasons that, in its view, made it preferable to formulate interpretative declarations in writing,\textsuperscript{1496} the Commission adopted guideline 2.9.6, which recommends that States and international organizations entitled to react to an interpretative declaration state their reasons for an approval, opposition or recharacterization. This recommendation is modelled on those adopted, for example, with respect to statements of reasons for reservations\textsuperscript{1497} and objections to reservations.\textsuperscript{1498}

(2) Moreover, as may be seen from the practice described above,\textsuperscript{1499} States generally take care to explain, sometimes in great detail, the reasons for their approval, opposition or recharacterization. These reasons are useful not only for the interpreter: they can also alert the State or the international organization that submitted the interpretative declaration to the points found to be problematic in

\textsuperscript{1494} [688, 2009] Concerning the entities that may formulate an approval, opposition or recharacterization, see guideline 2.9.4 above.
\textsuperscript{1495} [689, 2009] See the text of this guideline and the commentary thereto above.
\textsuperscript{1496} [690, 2009] See guideline 2.9.5 and the commentary thereto above.
\textsuperscript{1498} [692, 2009] See guideline 2.6.10 and the commentary thereto, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 203-206.
\textsuperscript{1499} [693, 2009] See paras. (1) to (9) of the commentary to guideline 2.9.2 and para. (4) of the commentary guideline 2.9.3 above.
the declaration and, potentially, induce the author to revise or withdraw the declaration. This constitutes, with respect to interpretative declarations, the equivalent of the “reservations dialogue”.

(3) The Commission wondered, however, whether the recommendation regarding a statement of reasons should be extended to cover the approval of an interpretative declaration. Besides the fact that the practice is extremely rare,\textsuperscript{1500} it may be assumed that approvals are formulated for the same reasons that prompted the declaration itself and generally even use the same wording.\textsuperscript{1501} Although some members considered that stating the reasons for an approval might cause confusion (if, for example, reasons were given for the interpretative declaration itself and the two reasons differed), the majority of the Commission considered that there should be no distinction in that regard between the various categories of reaction to interpretative declarations, particularly in the present case, since guideline 2.9.6 is a simple recommendation that has no binding force for the author of the approval.

(4) The same applies to opposition or recharacterization. In all cases, incidentally, an explanation of the reasons for a reaction may be a useful element in the dialogue among the contracting parties and entities entitled to become so.

\textbf{2.9.7 Formulation and communication of approval, opposition or recharacterization}

An approval, opposition or recharacterization in respect of an interpretative declaration should, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, be formulated and communicated in accordance with guidelines 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6 and 2.1.7.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) The formulation in writing of a reaction to an interpretative declaration, whether approval, opposition or recharacterization,\textsuperscript{1502} makes it easier to disseminate it to the other entities concerned, contracting parties or States or international organizations entitled to become so.

\textsuperscript{1500} [694, 2009] See the commentary to guideline 2.9.1 above.

\textsuperscript{1501} [695, 2009] It is primarily for this reason that the Commission did not consider it useful to include in the Guide to Practice a recommendation that reasons should be given for interpretative declarations themselves (see para. (10) of the commentary to guideline 2.4.3 bis above).

\textsuperscript{1502} [696, 2009] See guideline 2.9.5 above.
Although there is no legal requirement to disseminate a reaction, the Commission strongly believes that it is in the interests of both the authors of a reaction to a unilateral declaration and all the entities concerned to do so and that the formulation and communication of a reaction could follow the procedure for other types of declarations relating to a treaty, which is actually very similar - namely, guidelines 2.1.3 to 2.1.7 in the case of reservations, 2.4.1 and 2.4.7 in the case of interpretative declarations and 2.6.9 and 2.8.5, in the case of, respectively, objections to reservations and their express acceptance. Given that all these guidelines are modelled on those relating to reservations, it seemed sufficient to refer the user to the rules on reservations, mutatis mutandis.

Unlike the effect produced by the formulation of reservations, however, these rules on the formulation and communication of reactions to interpretative declarations are of an optional nature only, and guideline 2.9.7 is simply a recommendation, as the use of the conditional ("should") indicates.

The Commission wondered whether reference should be made in guideline 2.9.7 to guideline 2.1.7 concerning the functions of depositaries. It was decided that, since the provision is based on the idea that “the depositary shall examine whether a reservation to a treaty ... is in due and proper form” and that interpretative declarations do not have to take any particular form, such a reference was unnecessary. Since there may be cases, however, in which an interpretative declaration is not permissible (where the treaty precludes such a declaration), the prevailing view was that a reference should be made to guideline 2.1.7, which sets out the course to take in the event of a divergence of views in cases of this kind.

### 2.9.8 Non-presumption of approval or opposition

An approval of, or an opposition to, an interpretative declaration shall not be presumed.

Notwithstanding guidelines 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, an approval of an interpretative declaration or an opposition thereto may be inferred, in exceptional cases, from the conduct of the States or international organizations concerned, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

**Commentary**

1503 [697, 2009] See guideline 3.5 (Substantive validity of interpretative declarations), which is currently before the Drafting Committee and for which a commentary will be provided at the sixty-second session of the Commission.
(1) Guideline 2.9.8 establishes a general framework and should be read in conjunction with guideline 2.9.9., which relates more specifically to the role that may be played by the silence of a State or an international organization with regard to an interpretative declaration.

(2) As is clear from the definitions of an approval of and an opposition to an interpretative declaration contained in guidelines 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, both essentially take the form of a unilateral declaration made by a State or an international organization whereby the author expresses agreement or disagreement with the interpretation formulated in the interpretative declaration.

(3) In the case of reservations, silence, according to the presumption provided for in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, means consent. The International Court of Justice, in its 1951 advisory opinion, noted the “very great allowance made for tacit assent to reservations”, and the work of the Commission has from the outset acknowledged the considerable part played by tacit acceptance. Waldock justified the principle of tacit acceptance by pointing out that:

“It is (...) true that, under the ‘flexible’ system now proposed, the acceptance or rejection by a particular State of a reservation made by another primarily concerns their relations with each other, so that there may not be the same urgency to determine the status of a reservation as under the system of unanimous consent. Nevertheless, it seems very undesirable that a State, by refraining from making any comment upon a reservation, should be enabled more or less indefinitely to maintain an equivocal attitude as to the relations between itself and the reserving State.”

(4) In the case of simple interpretative declarations (as opposed to conditional interpretative declarations), there is no rule comparable to that contained in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions (the principle of which is reflected in guideline 2.8.1), so these concerns do not arise. By definition, an interpretative declaration purports only to “specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions”, and in no way imposes

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1507 [701, 2009] See guideline 2.9.10 below.
conditions on its author’s consent to be bound by the treaty. Whether or not other States or international organizations consent to the interpretation put forward in the declaration has no effect on the author’s legal status with respect to the treaty; the author becomes or remains a contracting party regardless. Continued silence on the part of the other parties has no effect on the status as a party of the State or organization that formulates an interpretative declaration: such silence cannot prevent the latter from becoming or remaining a party, in contrast to what could occur in the case of reservations under article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the Vienna Conventions were it not for the presumption provided for in paragraph 5 of that article.

(5) Thus, since it is not possible to proceed by analogy with reservations, the issue of whether, in the absence of an express reaction, there is a presumption of approval of or opposition to interpretative declarations remains unresolved. In truth, however, this question can only be answered in the negative. It is indeed inconceivable that silence, in itself, could produce such a legal effect.

(6) Moreover, this appears to be the position most widely supported in the literature. Frank Horn states that:

“Interpretative declarations must be treated as unilaterally advanced interpretations and should therefore be governed only by the principles of interpretation. The general rule is that a unilateral interpretation cannot be opposed to any other party in the treaty. Inaction on behalf of the confronted states does not result in automatic construction of acceptance. It will only be one of many cumulative factors which together may evidence acquiescence. The institution of estoppel may become relevant, though this requires more explicit proof of the readiness of the confronted states to accept the interpretation.”

(7) Although inaction cannot in itself be construed as either approval or opposition - neither of which can by any means be presumed (which is stated more specifically in guideline 2.9.9 on the silence of a State or an international organization with respect to an interpretative declaration) - the position taken by Horn indicates that silence can, under certain conditions, be taken to signify

\[\text{[702, 2009]} \text{ The situation is evidently different with respect to conditional interpretative declarations. See ibid.} \]
acquiescence in accordance with the principles of good faith and, more particularly in the context of interpreting treaties, through the operation of article 31, paragraph 3 (b), of the Vienna Conventions, which provides for the consideration, in interpreting a treaty, of “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. Further, the concept of acquiescence itself is not unknown in treaty law: article 45 of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides that:

“A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 and 62 if, after becoming aware of the facts:

(a) …

(b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or in operation, as the case may be.”

Article 45 of the 1986 Vienna Convention reproduces this provision, adapting it to the specific case of international organizations.

(8) However, this provision does not define the “conduct” in question, and it would seem extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine in advance the circumstances in which a State or an organization is bound to protest expressly in order to avoid being considered as having acquiesced to an interpretative declaration or to a practice that has been established on the basis of such a declaration.1510 In other words, it is particularly difficult to determine when and in what specific circumstances inaction with respect to an interpretative declaration is tantamount to consent. As the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission underscored:

“The nature and extent of the conduct effective to produce a variation of the treaty is, of course, a matter of appreciation by the tribunal in each case. The decision of the International Court of Justice in the Temple case is generally pertinent in this connection. There, after

identifying conduct by one party which it was reasonable to expect that the other party would expressly have rejected if it had disagreed with it, the Court concluded that the latter was stopped or precluded from challenging the validity and effect of the conduct of the first. This process has been variously described by such terms, amongst others, as estoppel, preclusion, acquiescence or implied or tacit agreement. But in each case the ingredients are the same: an act, course of conduct or omission by or under the authority of one party indicative of its view of the content of the applicable legal rule - whether of treaty or customary origin; the knowledge, actual or reasonably to be inferred, of the other party, of such conduct or omission; and a failure by the latter party within a reasonable time to reject, or dissociate itself from, the position taken by the first.”

(9) It therefore seems impossible to provide, in the abstract, clear guidelines for determining when a silent State has, by its inaction, created an effect of acquiescence or estoppel. This can only be determined on a case-by-case basis in the light of the circumstances in question.

(10) For this reason, the first paragraph of guideline 2.9.8, which is the negative counterpart of guidelines 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, unequivocally states that the presumption provided for in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions is not applicable. The second paragraph, however, acknowledges that, as an exception to the principle arising from these two guidelines, the conduct of the States or international organizations concerned may be considered, depending on the circumstances, as constituting approval of, or opposition to, the interpretative declaration.

(11) Given the wide range of “relevant circumstances” (a cursory sample of which is given in the preceding paragraphs), the Commission did not think it possible to describe them in greater detail.

2.9.9 Silence with respect to an interpretative declaration

An approval of an interpretative declaration shall not be inferred from the mere silence of a State or an international organization.

In exceptional cases, the silence of a State or an international organization may be relevant to determining whether, through its conduct and taking account of the circumstances, it has approved an interpretative declaration.

**Commentary**

(1) The practice (or, more accurately, the absence of practice) described in the commentary to guidelines 2.9.2 and, in particular, 2.9.1 shows the considerable role that States ascribe to silence in the context of interpretative declarations. Express positive - and even negative - reactions are extremely rare. One wonders therefore whether it is possible to infer from such overwhelming silence consent to the interpretation proposed by the State or international organization making the interpretative declaration.

(2) As was noted in a study on silence in response to a violation of a rule of international law, which is fully applicable here: “le silence en tant que tel ne dit rien puisqu’il est capable de ‘dire’ trop de choses à la fois” (silence in itself says nothing because it is capable of “saying” too many things at once).\(^\text{1512}\) Silence can express either agreement or disagreement with the proposed interpretation. States may consider it unnecessary to respond to an interpretative declaration because it accurately reflects their own position, or they may feel that the interpretation is erroneous but that there is no point in proclaiming as much because, in any event, the interpretation would not, in their view, be upheld by an impartial third party in case of a dispute. It is impossible to decide which of these two hypotheses is correct.\(^\text{1513}\)

(3) The first paragraph of guideline 2.9.9 expresses this idea by applying the general principle established in the first paragraph of guideline 2.9.8 specifically to silence.

(4) The second paragraph of guideline 2.9.9 - which is the counterpart of the second paragraph of guideline 2.9.8 - signals to users of the Guide to Practice that although silence is not in principle


\(^{1513}\) [707, 2009] In this connection, Heinrich Drost, “Grundfragen der Lehre vom internationalen Rechtsgeschäft”, in D.S. Constantopoulos and Hans Wehberg (eds.), Gegenwartsprobleme des internationalen Rechts und der Rechtsphilosophie, Festschrift für Rudolf Laun zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstag, Hamburg, Girardet, 1953, p. 218: “Wann Schweigen als eine Anerkennung angesehen werden kann, ist Tatfrage. Diese ist nur dann zu bejahen, wenn nach der Sachlage - etwa nach vorhergegangener Notifikation - Schweigen nicht nur als ein objektiver Umstand, sondern als schlüssiger Ausdruck des dahinterstehenden Willens aufgefaßt werden kann” (The question as to when silence can be construed as acceptance is a question of circumstances. The answer cannot be affirmative unless, given the factual circumstances - following prior notification, for example - silence cannot be understood simply as an objective situation, but as a conclusive expression of the underlying will).
equivalent to approval of or acquiescence to an interpretative declaration, in some circumstances the silent State may be considered as having acquiesced to the declaration by reason of its conduct, or lack of conduct in circumstances where conduct is required, in relation to the interpretative declaration.

(5) The expression “in exceptional cases”, which introduces the paragraph, highlights the fact that what follows is an inverse derogation from the general principle, the existence of which must not be affirmed lightly. The word “may” reinforces this idea by emphasizing the lack of any automatic construction and by referring instead to the general conduct of the State or international organization that has remained silent with respect to a unilateral declaration as well as to the circumstances of the case. Silence must therefore be considered as only one aspect of the general conduct of the State or international organization in question.

[2.9.10 Reactions to conditional interpretative declarations

Guidelines 2.6.1 to 2.8.12 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to reactions of States and international organizations to conditional interpretative declarations.]

[Commentary

(1) Conditional interpretative declarations differ from “simple” interpretative declarations in their potential effect on the treaty’s entry into force. The key feature of conditional interpretative declarations is that the author makes its consent to be bound by the treaty subject to the proposed interpretation. If this condition is not met, i.e. if the other States and international organizations parties to the treaty do not consent to this interpretation, the author of the interpretative declaration is considered not to be bound by the treaty, at least with regard to the parties to the treaty that contest the declaration.1514 The declaration made by France upon signing1515 Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America provides a particularly clear example of this:1516

1514 [708, 2009] Concerning all these points, see the commentary to guideline 1.2.1 (Conditional interpretative declarations) in Yearbook ... 1999, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 103-106.
1515 [709, 2009] The declaration was confirmed upon ratification, on 22 March 1974; see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 936, p. 419.
1516 [710, 2009] See also Yearbook ... 1999, vol. II (Part Two), p. 103, para. (3) of the commentary to guideline 1.2.1.
“In the event that the interpretative declaration thus made by the French Government should be contested wholly or in part by one or more Contracting Parties to the Treaty or to Protocol II, these instruments shall be null and void in relations between the French Republic and the contesting State or States.”

(2) This feature brings conditional interpretative declarations infinitely closer to reservations than “simple” interpretative declarations. The commentary on guideline 1.2.1 (Conditional interpretative declarations) states in this connection:

“Consequently, it seems highly probable that the legal regime of conditional interpretative declarations would be infinitely closer to that of reservations, especially with regard to the anticipated reactions of the other contracting parties to the treaty, than would the rules applicable to simple interpretative declarations.”

(3) Given the conditionality of such an interpretative declaration, the regime governing reactions to it must be more orderly and definite than the one applicable to “simple” interpretative declarations. There is a need to know with certainty and within a reasonable time period the position of the other States parties concerning the proposed interpretation so that the State or organization that submitted the conditional interpretative declaration will be able to take a decision on its legal status with respect to the treaty - is it or is it not a party to the treaty? These questions arise in the same conditions as those pertaining to reservations to treaties, the reactions to which (acceptance and objection) are governed by a very formal, rigid legal regime aimed principally at determining, as soon as possible, the legal status of the reserving State or organization. This aim is reflected not only by the relative formality of the rules, but also by the establishment of a presumption of acceptance after a certain period of time has elapsed in which another State or another international organization has not expressed its objection to the reservation.

(4) Thus, the procedure for reactions to conditional interpretative declarations should follow the same rules as those applicable to acceptance of and objection to reservations, including the rule on the presumption of acceptance. There was a view, however, that the time period for reactions to reservations should not be applicable to conditional interpretative declarations.
(5) There may be doubts about the length of the period set out in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions. Nonetheless, the reasons that led Sir Humphrey Waldock to propose this solution seem valid and transposable *mutatis mutandis* to the case of conditional interpretative declarations. As he explained:

“But there are, it is thought, good reasons for proposing the adoption of the longer period [of 12 months]. First, it is one thing to agree upon a short period [of three or six months] for the purposes of a particular treaty whose contents are known, and a somewhat different thing to agree upon it as a general rule applicable to every treaty which does not lay down a rule on the point. States may, therefore, find it easier to accept a general time limit for voicing objections, if a longer period is proposed.”

(6) A problem of terminology arises, however. The relative parallelism noted up to this point between conditional interpretative declarations and reservations implies that reactions to such declarations could borrow the same vocabulary and be termed “acceptances” and “objections”. However, the definition of objections to reservations does not seem to be at all suited to the case of a reaction expressing the disagreement of a State or an international organization with a conditional interpretative declaration made by another State or another international organization. Guideline 2.6.1 lays down a definition of objections to reservations that is based essentially on the effect intended by their author: according to this definition, an objection means a unilateral statement “whereby the ... State or organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effects of the reservation, or to exclude the application of the treaty as a whole, in relations with the reserving State or organization”.

(7) Consequently, there may be serious doubts about the wisdom of using the same terminology to denote both negative reactions to conditional interpretative declarations and objections to reservations. By definition, such a reaction can neither modify nor exclude the legal effect of the conditional interpretative declaration as such (regardless of what that legal effect may be); all it can do

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1518 [712, 2009] See guideline 2.4.8 (Late formulation of a conditional interpretative declaration), sect. C.1 above.
1521 [715, 2009] For text of this guideline, see sect. C.1 above.
is to exclude the State or international organization from the circle of parties to the treaty. Refusal to accept the conditional interpretation proposed creates a situation in which the condition for consent to be bound is absent. What is more, it is not the author of the negative reaction, but the author of the conditional interpretative declaration, that has the responsibility to take the action that follows from the refusal.

(8) Regardless of these uncertainties, the version of guideline 2.9.10 retained by the Commission is neutral in this respect and does not require the taking of a position on this point, which has no practical impact.]

3. Permissibility of reservations and interpretative declarations

3.1 Permissible reservations

A State or an international organization may, when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:

(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;

(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or

(c) In cases not falling under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 3.1 faithfully reproduces the wording of article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations of 21 March 1986, which is patterned after the corresponding provision of the 1969 Convention with just two additions, which were needed in order to cover treaties concluded by international organizations.

(2) By providing that, when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, “[a] State or an international organization may (...) formulate a reservation”, albeit under certain conditions, that provision sets out “the general principle that the formulation of
reservations is permitted …". This is an essential element of the “flexible system” stemming from the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 1951, and it is no exaggeration to say that, on this point, it reverses the traditional presumption resulting from the system of unanimity, the stated aim being to facilitate the widest possible participation in treaties and, ultimately, their universality.

(3) In this regard, the text of article 19 finally adopted in 1969 resulted directly from Waldock’s proposals and takes the opposite view from the drafts prepared by the Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties who preceded him, all of whom started from the inverse assumption, expressing in negative or restrictive terms the principle that a reservation might only be formulated (or “made”) if certain conditions were met. Waldock, on the other hand, presents the principle as the “power to formulate, that is, to propose, a reservation”, which a State has “in virtue of its sovereignty”.

(4) However, this power is not unlimited:

- In the first place, it is limited in time, since a reservation may only be formulated “when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty”,

- In the second place, the formulation of reservations may be incompatible with the object of some treaties, either because they are limited to a small group of States - a situation that is taken into account in article 20, paragraph 2, of the Convention, which reverts to

1522 [766, 2006] Commentary to draft article 18 adopted on first reading in 1962, Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 180, para. (15); see also the commentary to draft article 16 adopted on second reading, Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 207, para. (17). For the 1986 Convention, see the commentary to draft articles 19 (Case of treaties between international organizations) adopted in 1977, Yearbook ... 1977, vol. II (Part Two), p. 106, para. (1), and 19 bis (Case of treaties between States and one or more international organizations or between international organizations and one or more States), Yearbook ... 1977, vol. II (Part Two), p. 106, para. (3).


1524 [768, 2006] This concept, which had undoubtedly become the customary norm in the period between the wars (see the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, McNair, Read and Hsu Mo, appended to the advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 34-35), significantly restricted the freedom to make reservations: this was possible only if all the other parties to the treaty accepted the reservation, otherwise the author remained outside the treaty. In its comments on the draft article 18 adopted by the Commission in 1962, Japan proposed reverting to the opposite presumption (see the fourth report of Sir Humphrey Waldock on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/177 and Add.1 and 2), Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 49).

1525 [769, 2006] On this point, see paras. (6) and (7) below.


1527 [771, 2006] “A State is free, when signing, ratifying, acceding to or accepting a treaty, to formulate a reservation … unless: …” (first report (A/CN.4/144), Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 60, article 17, para. 1 (a)).

1528 [772, 2006] Commentary to article 17, ibid., p. 65, para. (9) - emphasis in the original.

the system of unanimity where such instruments are concerned\textsuperscript{1530} - or, in the case of instruments of universal scope, because the parties intend to make the integrity of the treaty take precedence over its universality or, at any rate, to limit the power of States to formulate reservations; on this issue, as on all others, the Vienna Convention is only intended to be residuary in nature, and there is nothing to prevent the negotiators from inserting in the treaty “reservations clauses” that limit or modify the freedom set out as a principle in article 19.\textsuperscript{1531}

(5) It is probably excessive to speak of a “right to reservations”,\textsuperscript{1532} even though the Convention proceeds from the principle that there is a presumption in favour of their validity. Some members contested the existence of such a presumption. This, moreover, is the significance of the very title of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions (“Formulation of reservations”),\textsuperscript{1533} which is confirmed by its \textit{chapeau}: “A State may (...) formulate a reservation unless …”. Certainly, by using the verb “may”, the introductory clause of article 19 recognizes that States have a right; but it is only the right to “formulate” reservations.\textsuperscript{1534}

(6) The words “formulate” and “formulation” were carefully chosen. They signify that, while it is up to the State intending to attach a reservation to its expression of consent to be bound to

\textsuperscript{1530} [774, 2006] “When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.”


\textsuperscript{1532} [776, 2006] Some members of the Commission, however, spoke in support of the existence of such a right.

\textsuperscript{1533} [777, 2006] Concerning the modification of this title in the context of the Guide to Practice, see para. (10) below.

\textsuperscript{1534} P.-H. Imbert, \textit{Les réserves aux traités ...}, op. cit., p. 83; see also Paul Reuter, \textit{Introduction au droit des traités}, 3rd ed., Philippe Cahier, ed. (Paris: PUF, 1995), p. 75; or R. Riquelme Cortado, \textit{Las reservas a los tratados ...}, op. cit., p. 84. It may also be noted that a proposal by Briggs to replace the word “free” in Waldock’s draft (see footnote 18 above) with the words “legally entitled” (\textit{Yearbook ... 1962}, vol. I, 651st meeting, 25 May 1962, p. 140, para. 22) was not accepted, nor was an amendment along the same lines proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the Vienna Conference (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.115, \textit{Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second Sessions}, Vienna, 26 March-24 May 1968 and 9 April-22 May 1969; \textit{Documents of the Conference} (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2), p. 133, para. 175). The current wording (“A State may ... formulate a reservation unless ...”) was adopted by the Commission’s Drafting Committee (\textit{Yearbook ... 1962}, vol. I, 663rd meeting, 18 June 1962, p. 221, para. 3), then by the Commission in plenary meeting in 1962 (\textit{ibid.}, vol. II, pp. 175-176, article 18, para. 1). No amendments were made in 1966, other than the replacement of the words “\textit{Tout État}” [in the French text] with the words “\textit{Un État}” (see \textit{Yearbook ... 1965}, vol. I, 813th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 287, para. 1 (text adopted by the Drafting Committee), and \textit{Yearbook ... 1966}, vol. II, p. 202 (article 16 adopted on second reading)).
indicate how it means to modify its participation in the treaty,\textsuperscript{1535} this formulation is not sufficient of itself. The reservation is not “made”, it does not produce any effect, merely by virtue of such a statement. For that reason an amendment by China seeking to replace the words “formulate a reservation” with the words “make reservations”,\textsuperscript{1536} was rejected by the Drafting Committee of the Vienna Conference.\textsuperscript{1537} As Waldock noted, “there is an inherent ambiguity in saying (...) that a State may ‘make’ a reservation; for the very question at issue is whether a reservation \textit{formulated} by one State can be held to have been effectively ‘made’ unless and until it has been assented to by the other interested States”.\textsuperscript{1538} Now, not only is a reservation only “established”\textsuperscript{1539} if certain procedural conditions - admittedly, not very restrictive ones\textsuperscript{1540} - are met, but it must also comply with the substantive conditions set forth in the three subparagraphs of article 19 itself, as the word “unless” clearly demonstrates.\textsuperscript{1541}

(7) According to some authors, the terminology used in this provision is not consistent in that regard, since “[l]orsque le traité autorise certaines réserves (article 19, alinéa b), elles n’ont pas besoin d’être acceptées par les autres États (...). Elles son donc ‘faites’ dès l’instant de leur formulation par l’État réservataire” [“if the treaty permits specified reservations (article 19, subparagraph (b)), they do not need to be accepted by the other States … They are thus ‘made’ from the moment of their formulation by the reserving State”].\textsuperscript{1542} Now, if subparagraph (b) meant to say that such reservations “may be \textit{made}”, the \textit{chapeau} of article 19 would be misleading, for it implies that they, too, are merely “formulated” by their author.\textsuperscript{1543} But this is an empty


\textsuperscript{1539} [783, 2006] See the \textit{chapeau} of article 21: “A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23 …”.

\textsuperscript{1540} [784, 2006] See articles 20, paras. 3-5, 21, para. 1, and 23 and draft guidelines 2.1 to 2.2.3. See also Massimo Coccia, “Reservations to multilateral treaties on human rights”, \textit{California Western International Law Journal}, vol. 15 (1985) at p. 28.

\textsuperscript{1541} [785, 2006] “This article states the general principle that the \textit{formulation} of reservations is permitted except in three cases” (emphasis added) \textit{(Yearbook … 1966}, vol. II, p. 207, commentary to art. 16, para. (17)); the use of the word “\textit{faire}” in the French text of the commentary (ibid., p. 225) is open to criticism, but it is probably a translation error, rather than a deliberate choice - contra: P.-H. Imbert, \textit{Les réserves aux traités …}, op. cit. 17, p. 90. Moreover, the English text of the commentary is correct.


argument: subparagraph (b) is not about reservations that are established (or made) simply by virtue of being formulated, but rather about reservations that are not permitted by the treaty. As in the situation in subparagraph (a), such reservations may not be formulated: in one case (subparagraph (a)), the prohibition is explicit; in the other (subparagraph (b)), it is implied.

(8) Moreover, the principle of freedom to formulate reservations cannot be separated from the exceptions to the principle. For this reason, the Commission, which in general has avoided modifying the wording of the provisions of the Vienna Conventions that it has carried over into the Guide to Practice, decided against elaborating a separate draft guideline dealing only with the principle of the presumption of the validity of reservations.

(9) For the same reason, the Commission chose not to leave out of draft guideline 3.1 a reference to all the different moments (or “cases” or “instances”, to reproduce the terminology used at various times in draft guideline 1.1.2), “in which a reservation may be formulated”. As discussed above, article 19 reproduces the temporal limitations included in the definition of reservations in article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions, and this repetition is no doubt superfluous, as was stressed by Denmark during the consideration of the draft articles on the law of treaties adopted in 1962. However, the Commission did not think it necessary to correct the anomaly when the final draft was adopted in 1966, and the repetition is not a sufficiently serious drawback to merit rewriting the Vienna Convention, which allowed this drawback to remain.

(10) The repetition also provides a discreet reminder that the validity of reservations does not depend solely on the substantive conditions set forth in article 19 of the Vienna Conventions but is also dependent on conformity with conditions of form and timeliness. However, those formal conditions are dealt with in the second part of the Guide to Practice, so that the third part places more emphasis on the substantive validity, that is, the permissibility of reservations - hence the title of “Permissible reservations” chosen by the Commission for draft guideline 3.1, for which it was

1544 [788, 2006] One may, however, question the use of the verbs “formulate” and “make” in article 23, para. 2; it is not consistent to state, at the end of this provision, that, if a reservation formulated when signing a treaty is confirmed at the time of the expression of consent to be bound, “the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation”. In elaborating the Guide to Practice on reservations, the Commission has endeavoured to adopt consistent vocabulary in this regard (the criticisms directed at it by R. Riquelme Cortado, Las reservas a los tratados ..., op. cit., p. 85, appear to be based on a translation error in the Spanish text).


1547 [791, 2006] See draft guidelines 1.1 (Definition of reservations) and 1.1.2 (Cases in which a reservation may be formulated) and the commentary to them in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/53/10), pp. 196-199 and 203-206.
not possible to retain the title of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions (“Formulation of reservations”), already used for draft guideline 2.1.3.\textsuperscript{1549} In any case, it would tend to put the accent, inappropriately, on the formal conditions for the validity of reservations.

3.1.1  \textbf{Reservations expressly prohibited by the treaty}

A reservation is expressly prohibited by the treaty if it contains a particular provision:

(a) Prohibiting all reservations;

(b) Prohibiting reservations to specified provisions and a reservation in question is formulated to one of such provisions; or

(c) Prohibiting certain categories of reservations and a reservation in question falls within one of such categories.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) According to Paul Reuter, the situations envisaged in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 19 (reproduced in draft guideline 3.1) constitute very simple cases.\textsuperscript{1550} However, this does not seem to be the case. It is true that these provisions refer to cases where the treaty to which a State or an international organization wishes to make a reservation contains a special clause prohibiting or permitting the formulation of reservations. But, aside from the fact that not all possibilities are explicitly covered,\textsuperscript{1551} delicate problems can arise regarding the exact scope of a clause prohibiting reservations and the effects of a reservation formulated despite that prohibition.

(2) Draft guideline 3.1.1 is intended to clarify the scope of subparagraph (a) of draft guideline 3.1, which does not indicate what is meant by “reservation prohibited by the treaty”, while draft guidelines 3.1.2 and 3.1.4 undertake to clarify the meaning and the scope of the expression “specified reservations” contained in subparagraph (b).


\textsuperscript{1551} [795, 2006] See footnote 800 and the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.3, para. (9), below.
(3) In draft article 17, paragraph 1 (a), which he submitted to the Commission in 1962, Waldock distinguished three situations:

- Reservations “prohibited by the terms of the treaty or excluded by the nature of the treaty or by the established usage of an international organization”;

- Reservations not provided for by a clause that restricts the reservations that can be made;

- Reservations not provided for by a clause that authorizes certain reservations.

What these three cases had in common was that, unlike reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, “when a reservation is formulated that is not prohibited by the treaty, the other States are called upon to indicate whether they accept or reject it but, when the reservation is one prohibited by the treaty, they have no need to do so, for they have already expressed their objection to it in the treaty itself”.

(4) Even though it was taken up again, in a slightly different form, by the Commission, this categorization was unnecessarily complicated and, at the rather general level at which the authors of the Convention intended to operate, there was no point in drawing a distinction between the first two situations identified by the Special Rapporteur. In draft article 18, paragraph 2, which he proposed in 1965 in the light of the observations by Governments, he limited himself to distinguishing reservations prohibited by the terms of the treaty (or “by the established rules of an international organization”) from those implicitly prohibited as a result of the authorization of

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1553 [797, 2006] Situation envisaged in para. 2 of draft article 17 but in a rather different form than in the current text.
1555 [799, 2006] Draft article 18, para. 1 (b), (c) and (d), Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/5209), Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 176 (see the commentary to this para., p. 180, para. (15)).
1556 [800, 2006] On the contrary, during the discussion of the draft, Briggs considered that “the distinction was between the case set out in subparagraph (a), where all reservations were prohibited, and the case set out in subparagraphs (b) and (c), where only some reservations were either expressly prohibited or impliedly excluded” (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 663rd meeting, 18 June 1962, p. 222, para. 12); contra: Waldock, ibid., p. 247, para. 32; as the example of article 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (see the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.2, para. (6) above) indicates, this comment is highly relevant.
1557 [801, 2006] Although the principle had not been disputed at the time of the debate in the plenary Commission in 1965 but had been disputed by Lachs in 1962 (see Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 651st meeting, 25 May 1962, p. 142, para. 53) and had been retained in the text adopted during the first part of the seventeenth session (see Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 174) this indication disappeared without explanation from draft article 16 as finally adopted by the Commission in 1966 following the “final cleanup” by the Drafting Committee (see Yearbook ... 1966, vol. I (Part Two), 887th meeting, 11 July 1966, p. 195, para. 91). The deletion of this phrase should be seen in the context of the general safeguards clause concerning constituent instruments of international organizations and treaties adopted within an international organization appearing in article 5 of the Convention and adopted the same day in its final
specified reservations by the treaty.¹⁵⁵⁸ This distinction is found in a more refined form¹⁵⁵⁹ in article 19, subparagraphs (a) and (b), of the Convention, without any distinction being made as to whether the treaty prohibits, or fully or partially authorizes reservations.¹⁵⁶⁰

(5) According to Tomuschat, the prohibition in subparagraph (a), as it is drafted, should be understood as covering both express prohibitions and implicit prohibitions of reservations.¹⁵⁶¹ Some justification for this interpretation can be found in the travaux préparatoires for this provision:

- In the original wording, proposed by Waldock in 1962,¹⁵⁶² it was specified that the provision concerned reservations that were “prohibited by the terms of the treaty”, a clarification that was abandoned in 1965 without explanation by the Special Rapporteur and with little light being shed by the discussions in the Commission on this matter;¹⁵⁶³

form by the Commission (ibid., p. 294, para. 79). In practice, it is very unusual to allow reservations to be formulated to the constituent instruments of an international organization (see Maurice H. Mendelson, “Reservations to the constitutions of international organizations”, BYBIL, vol. 45 (1971), pp. 137-171). As for treaties concluded within the context of international organizations, the best example of (purported) exclusion of reservations is that of the International Labour Organization, whose consistent practice is not to accept the deposit of instruments of ratification of international labour conventions when accompanied by reservations (see the Memorandum submitted by the Director of the International Labour Office to the Council of the League of Nations on the admissibility of reservations to general conventions, Official Journal of the League of Nations, 1927, p. 882, or the memorandum submitted by the International Labour Organization to the International Court of Justice in 1951 in the case concerning Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, in I.C.J. Reports 1951, Pleadings, Oral Arguments and Documents, pp. 227-228, or the statement of Wilfred Jenks, Legal Adviser of the International Labour Organization, during the oral pleadings on that case, ibid., p. 234); for a discussion and critique of this position, see the commentary to draft guideline 1.1.8 (Reservations made under exclusionary clauses) of the Guide to Practice, in the Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/55/10), pp. 230-241, paras. (3)-(5).

¹⁵⁵⁹ [803, 2006] On the editorial changes made by the Commission, see the debate on draft article 18 (Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, especially the 797th and 798th meetings, 7 and 9 June 1965, pp. 163-173) and the text adopted by the Drafting Committee (ibid., 813th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 287, para. 1) and the debate on it (ibid., pp. 287-289). The final texts of art. 16 (a) and (b) adopted on second reading by the Commission read as follows: “A State may ... formulate a reservation unless: (a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty authorizes specified reservations which do not include the reservation in question” (Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 202), see also the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.2, footnote 838, below.
¹⁵⁶² [806, 2006] See para. (3) above.
¹⁵⁶³ [807, 2006] See, however, the statement by Yasseen, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 797th meeting, 8 June 1965, p. 149, para. 19 “the words ‘the terms of’ (expression) could be deleted and it could read simply: ‘[unless] the making of reservations is prohibited by the treaty ...’ For it was enough that the treaty was not silent on the subject; it did not matter whether it referred to reservations implicitly or expressly” - but he was referring to the 1962 text.
In the commentary on draft article 16 adopted on second reading in 1965, the Commission in effect seems to place on the same footing “reservations expressly or implicitly prohibited by the provisions of the treaty”.

(6) This interpretation, however, is open to discussion. The idea that certain treaties could “by their nature”, exclude reservations was discarded by the Commission in 1962, when it rejected the proposal along those lines made by Waldock. Thus, apart from the case of reservations to the constituent instruments of international organizations - which will be covered by one or more specific draft guidelines - it is hard to see what prohibitions could derive “implicitly” from a treaty, except in the cases covered by subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 19, and it must be recognized that subparagraph (a) concerns only reservations expressly prohibited by the treaty. Moreover, this interpretation appears to be compatible with the relative flexibility that pervades all the provisions of the Convention that deal with reservations.

(7) There is no problem - other than determining whether or not the declaration in question constitutes a reservation - if the prohibition is clear and precise, in particular when it is a general

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1564 [808, 2006] Like, moreover, “those expressly or impliedly authorized”, Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 205, para. (10) of the commentary; see also p. 207, para. (17). In the same vein, article 19, para. 1 (a) of the draft articles on the law of treaties concluded between States and international organizations or between two or more international organizations adopted by the Commission in 1981 places on equal footing cases where reservations are prohibited by treaties and those where it is “otherwise established that the negotiating States and negotiating organizations were agreed that the reservation is prohibited” (Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part Two), p. 137).

1565 [809, 2006] See para. (4) above. The Special Rapporteur indicated that, in drafting this clause, “what he had had in mind was the Charter of the United Nations, which, by its nature, was not open to reservations” (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 651st meeting, 25 May 1962, p. 143, para. 60). This exception is covered by the safeguard clause of article 5 of the Convention (see footnote 801 above). The words “nature of the treaty” drew little attention during the discussion (Castrén, however, found the expression imprecise - ibid., 652nd meeting, 28 May 1962, p. 166, para. 28; see also Verdross, ibid., para. 35); it was deleted by the Drafting Committee (ibid., 663rd meeting, 18 June 1962, p. 221, para. 3).

1566 [810, 2006] The amendments of Spain (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.147) and of the United States of America and Colombia (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.126 and Add.1) aimed at reintroducing the idea of the “nature” of the treaty in subparagraph (c) were withdrawn by their authors or rejected by the Drafting Committee (see the reaction of the United States, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session, Vienna, 9 April to 22 May 1969, Summary records of plenary meetings and meetings of the plenary Committee (A/CONF.39/11/Add.1, p. 37). During the Commission’s discussion of draft guideline 3.1.1, some members stated the view that certain treaties, such as the Charter of the United Nations, by their very nature excluded any reservations. The Commission nonetheless concluded that this idea was consistent with the principle enunciated in subparagraph (c) of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions and that, where the Charter was concerned, the requirement of the acceptance of the competent organ of the organization (see article 20, para. 3, of the Vienna Conventions) provided sufficient guarantees.

1567 [811, 2006] This is also the final conclusion arrived at by C. Tomuschat, “Admissibility and legal effects of reservations ...”, op. cit., p. 471.

1568 [812, 2006] See draft guideline 1.3.1 (Method of implementation of the distinction between reservations and interpretive declarations) and its commentary, Yearbook ... 1999, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 107-109.
prohibition, on the understanding, however, that there are relatively few such examples even if some are famous, such as that in article 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations:

“The original Members of the League shall be those of the Signatories (...) as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant.”

Likewise, article 120 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court states:

“No reservations may be made to this Statute.”

And similarly, article 26, paragraph 1, of the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal states:

“No reservation or exception may be made to this Convention.”

(8) Sometimes, however, the prohibition is more ambiguous. Thus, in accordance with paragraph 14 of the Final Act of the 1961 Geneva Conference which adopted the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, “the delegations taking part in the negotiation of the

1569 [813, 2006] Even in the area of human rights (see P.-H. Imbert, “Reservations and human rights conventions”, Human Rights Review (1981), p. 28 or W.A. Schabas, “Reservations to human rights treaties: time for innovation and reform”, Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1955), p. 46; see, however, for example, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 7 September 1956 (article 9), the Convention against Discrimination in Education of 14 December 1960 (article 9, para. 7), Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights on the abolition of the death penalty of 28 April 1983 (article 4) or the European Convention against Torture of 26 November 1987 (article 21), which all prohibit any reservations to their provisions. Reservation clauses in human rights treaties sometimes refer to the provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning reservations (cf. article 75 of the American Convention on Human Rights) - which conventions containing no reservation clauses do implicitly - or reproduce its provisions (cf. article 28, para. 2, of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women or article 51, para. 2, of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child).

1570 [814, 2006] It could be maintained that this rule was set aside when the Council of the League recognized the neutrality of Switzerland (in this respect, see M. Mendelson, “Reservations to the Constitutions of international organizations”, op. cit., pp. 140 and 141).

1571 [815, 2006] However straightforward it may seem, this prohibition is not actually totally devoid of ambiguity: the highly regrettable article 124 of the Statute, which authorizes “a State on becoming a party [to] declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court” with respect to war crimes, constitutes an exception to the rule stated in article 120, for such declarations amount to reservations (see A. Pellet, “Entry into force and amendment of the Statute” in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W. Jones, eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002), vol. I, p. 157; see also the European Convention on the Service Abroad of Documents relating to Administrative Matters, whose art. 21 prohibits reservations, while several other provisions authorize certain reservations. For other examples, see Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, “Reservations clauses in treaties concluded within the Council of Europe”, ICLQ, vol. 48 (1999), pp. 493 and 494; P. Daillier and A. Pellet, Droit international public (Nguyen Quoc Dinh), L.G.D.J., 7th edition (Paris, 2002), p. 181; P.-H. Imbert, Les réserves aux traités ..., op. cit., pp. 165 and 166; F. Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations ..., op. cit., p. 113; R. Riquelme Cortado, Las reservas a los tratados ..., op. cit., pp. 105-108; W.A. Schabas, “Reservations to human rights treaties ...”, op. cit., p. 46.

1572 [816, 2006] For a very detailed commentary, see Alessandro Fodella, “The Declarations of States Parties to the Basel Convention” in Tullio Treves (ed.), Six Studies on Reservations, Comunicazioni e Studi, vol. XXII, 2002, pp. 111-148; art. 26, para. 2, authorizes States parties to make “declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effects of the provisions of the Convention in their application to that State”. The distinction between the reservations of para. 1 and the declarations of para. 2 can prove laborious, but this is a problem of definition that does not in any way restrict the prohibition stated in para. 1: if a declaration made under para. 2 proves to be a reservation, it is prohibited. The combination of arts. 309 and 310 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea poses the same problems and calls for the same responses (see, in particular, A. Pellet, “Les réserves aux conventions sur le droit de la mer”, La mer et son droit -
Convention ... declare that their respective countries do not intend to make any reservations to the Convention; not only is it not a categorical prohibition, but this declaration of intention is even made in an instrument separate from the treaty. In a case of this type, it could seem that reservations are not strictly speaking prohibited, but that if a State formulates a reservation, the other Parties should, logically, object to it.

(9) More often, the prohibition is partial and relates to one or more specified reservations or one or more categories of reservations. The simplest (but rather rare) situation is that of clauses listing the provisions of the treaty to which reservations are not permitted. Examples are article 42 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and article 26 of the 1972 International Convention for Safe Containers of the International Maritime Organization.

(10) The situation where the treaty does not prohibit reservations to specified provisions but excludes certain categories of reservations is more complicated. An example of this type of clause is provided by article 78, paragraph 3, of the International Sugar Agreement of 1977:

“Any Government entitled to become a Party to this Agreement may, on signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, make reservations which do not affect the economic functioning of this Agreement ...”.

(11) The distinction between reservation clauses of this type and those excluding specific reservations was made in Sir Humphrey Waldock’s draft in 1962. For their part, the Vienna Conventions do not make such distinctions, and, despite the uncertainty that prevailed in their travaux préparatoires, it should certainly be assumed that subparagraph (a) of article 19 covers all three situations that a more precise analysis can discern:

– Reservation clauses prohibiting all reservations;

– Reservation clauses prohibiting reservations to specified provisions;

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[818, 2006] This situation is very similar to that in which the treaty specifies the provisions to which reservations are permitted - see the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.2, para. (5), below and the comments by Briggs (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 663rd meeting, 18 June 1962).
[819, 2006] With regard to this provision, P.-H. Imbert notes that the influence of the opinion (of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted two months earlier) is very clear, since such a clause effectively protects the provisions which cannot be the object of reservations (Les réserves aux traités ..., op. cit., p. 167); see the other examples given, ibid., or in the commentary to draft guidelines 3.1.2, paras. (5)-(8), below.
Lastly, reservation clauses prohibiting certain categories of reservations.

(12) This clarification seems all the more helpful in that the third of these situations poses problems (of interpretation) of the same nature as those arising from the criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty, which certain clauses actually reproduce expressly. By indicating that these reservations, prohibited without reference to a specific provision of the treaty, still come under article 19, subparagraph (a), of the Vienna Conventions, the Commission seeks from the outset to emphasize the unity of the legal regime applicable to the reservations mentioned in the three subparagraphs of article 19.

3.1.2 Definition of specified reservations

For the purposes of guideline 3.1, the expression “specified reservations” means reservations that are expressly envisaged in the treaty to certain provisions of the treaty or to the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects.

Commentary

(1) A cursory reading of article 19, subparagraph (b), of the Vienna Conventions might suggest that it represents one side of the coin and subparagraph (a) represents the other. The symmetry is far from total, however. To create such symmetry, it would have been necessary to stipulate that reservations other than those expressly provided for in the treaty were prohibited. But that is not the case. Subparagraph (b) contains two additional elements which prevent oversimplification. The implicit prohibition of certain reservations arising from this provision, which is considerably more complex than it seems, depends on the fulfilment of three conditions:

(a) The treaty’s reservation clause must permit the formulation of reservations;

(b) The reservations permitted must be “specified”;

1577 [821, 2006] “Whether a reservation is permissible under exceptions (a) or (b) will depend on interpretation of the treaty” (A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, op. cit., p. 110).

1578 [822, 2006] See the examples given in footnote 813 above. This is a particular example of “categories of prohibited reservations” - in a particularly vague way, it is true.
(c) It must be specified that “only” those reservations “may be made”. The purpose of draft guideline 3.1.2 is to clarify the meaning of the expression “specified reservations”, which is not defined by the Vienna Conventions. This definition could, however, have important consequences for the applicable legal regime, as, among other things, reservations which are not “specified” must pass the test of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.

(2) The origin of article 19, subparagraph (b), of the Vienna Conventions can be traced back to paragraph 3 of draft article 37 submitted to the Commission in 1956 by Fitzmaurice:

“In those cases where the treaty itself permits certain specific reservations, or a class of reservations, to be made, there is a presumption that any other reservations are excluded and cannot be accepted.”

Waldock took up that concept again in paragraph 1 (a) of draft article 17, which he proposed in 1962 and which the Commission used in paragraph 1 (c) of draft article 18. That draft article was adopted the same year and, following a number of minor drafting changes, was incorporated into article 16, subparagraph (b), of the 1966 draft, then into article 19 of the Convention. That course of action did not go unchallenged, however, as during the Vienna Conference a number of amendments were submitted with a view to deleting the provision on the pretext that it was “too rigid” or redundant because it duplicated subparagraph (a), or that it had not been confirmed by practice; all those amendments were, however, withdrawn or rejected.

1579 [823, 2006] On this word, see the commentary to draft guideline 3.1, paras. (6)-(7), above.
1580 [824, 2006] See draft guideline 3.1.4 below.
1582 [826, 2006] See the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.1, paras. (3)-(4), above.
1584 [828, 2006] Amendments by the United States of America and Colombia (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.126 and Add.1) and the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.128), which were specifically designed to delete subparagraph (b), and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.115), France (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.169), Ceylon (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.139) and Spain (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.147), which proposed major revisions of article 16 (or of articles 16 and 17) that would also have led to the disappearance of that provision (for the text of these amendments, see Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second Sessions, Vienna, 26 March-24 May 1968 and 9 April-22 May 1969, Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2), pp. 144 and 145, paras. 174-177). During the Commission’s discussion of the draft, certain members had also taken the view that that provision was unnecessary (Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 797th meeting, 8 June 1965, Yasseen, p. 149, para. 18; Tunkin, ibid., p. 150, para. 29; but, for a more nuanced position, see ibid., p. 151, para. 33; or Ruda, p. 154, para. 70).
1586 [830, 2006] Colombia, ibid., p. 123, para. 68.
(3) The only change to subparagraph (b) was made by means of a Polish amendment inserting the word “only” after the word “authorizes”, which was accepted by the Drafting Committee of the Vienna Conference “in the interest of greater clarity”. This bland description must not obscure the vast practical implications of this specification, which actually reverses the presumption made by the Commission and, in keeping with the Eastern countries’ persistent desire to facilitate as much as possible the formulation of reservations, offers the possibility of doing so even when the negotiators have taken the precaution of expressly indicating the provisions in respect of which a reservation is permitted. This amendment does not, however, exempt a reservation which is neither expressly permitted nor implicitly prohibited from the requirement to observe the criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. Such a reservation may also be subject to objections on other grounds. This is why, in the wording of draft guideline 3.1.2, the Commission favoured the word “envisaged” over the word “authorized” to qualify the reservations in question, in contrast to the expression “reservation expressly authorized”, as found in article 20, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions.

(4) In practice, the types of clauses permitting reservations are comparable to those containing prohibitive provisions and pose the same kind of difficulties with regard to determining a contrario those reservations which may not be formulated:

- Some of them authorize reservations to particular provisions, expressly and restrictively listed either affirmatively or negatively;

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1589 [833, 2006] A/CONF.39/C.1/L.136; see Summary records (A/CONF.39/11), Plenary Committee, 70th meeting, 14 May 1968, p. 453, para. 16. Already in 1965, during the Commission’s discussion of draft article 18, subparagraph (b), as reviewed by the Drafting Committee, Castrén proposed inserting “only” after “authorizes” in subparagraph (b) (Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 797th meeting, 8 June 1965, p. 149, para. 14, and 813th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 264, para. 13); see also the similar proposal made by Yasseen, ibid., para. 11, which, in the end, was not accepted following a further review by the Drafting Committee (see ibid., 816th meeting, p. 308, para. 41).

1590 [834, 2006] See F. Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations ..., op. cit., p. 114; Liesbeth Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin?, T.M.C. Asser Institut (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994), p. 39; Jean-Marie Ruda, “Reservations to Treaties”, ... op. cit., p. 181; or Renata Szafarz, “Reservations to multilateral treaties”, Polish Yearbook of International Law (1970), pp. 299-300. Such restrictive formulas are not unusual - see, for example, article 17, para. 1, of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1954 (“1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession any State may make a reservation in respect of articles 11, 14 or 15. 2. No other reservations to this Convention shall be admissible”) and the other examples given by R. Riquelme Cortado, Las reservas a los tratados ..., op. cit., pp. 128-129. On the significance of the reversal of the presumption, see also M. Robinson, Yearbook ... 1995, vol. I, 2402nd meeting, p. 169, para. 17.

1591 [835, 2006] See draft guideline 3.1.3 and commentary, in particular paras. (2)-(3), below.

1592 [836, 2006] See draft guideline 3.1.1 and commentary above.
– Others authorize specified categories of reservations;
– Lastly, others (few in number) authorize reservations in general.

(5) Article 12, paragraph 1, of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf appears to illustrate the first of those categories:

“At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1 to 3 inclusive.”

As Ian Sinclair noted, “Article 12 of the 1958 Convention did not provide for specified reservations, even though it may have specified articles to which reservations might be made” and neither the scope nor the effects of that authorization are self-evident, as demonstrated by the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases and, above all, by the arbitral award given in 1977 in the Mer d’Iroise case.

(6) In that case, the Arbitral Tribunal emphasized that:

“The clear terms of article 12 [of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf] authorize any Contracting State, in particular the French Republic, to make its consent to be bound by the Convention conditional upon reservations to articles other than articles 1 to 3 inclusive.”

However,

“Article 12 cannot be understood to compel States to accept in advance any kind of reservation to articles other than articles 1 to 3. Such an interpretation of article 12 would almost give contracting States the freedom to draft their own treaty, which would clearly go beyond the object of this article. Only if the article in question had authorized the formulation of specific reservations could it be understood that parties to the Convention

1593 [837, 2006] Article 309 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides: “No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention” (on this provision, see A. Pellet, “Les réserves aux conventions sur le droit de la mer”, op. cit., pp. 505-511). A treaty may set a maximum number of reservations or provisions that can be subject to reservations (see, for example, article 25 of the 1967 European Convention on the Adoption of Children). These provisions may be compared with those authorizing Parties to accept certain obligations or to choose between the provisions of a treaty, which are not reservation clauses stricto sensu (see draft guidelines 1.4.6. and 1.4.7. of the Commission and the related commentary in the Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/55/10), pp. 241-252).

1594 [838, 2006] Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention ..., op. cit., p. 73. On the distinction between specified and non-specified reservations, see also paras. (11)-(13) below.


had accepted in advance a specified reservation. But that is not the case here, because article 12 authorizes the formulation of reservations to articles other than articles 1 to 3 in very general terms.\footnote{1598}

(7) The situation is different when the reservation clause defines the categories of permissible reservations. Article 39 of the General Act of Arbitration of 1928 provides an example of this:

\footnote{\[841, 2006\] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 161, para. 39.} \footnote{\[842, 2006\] \textit{Ibid.}}
1. In addition to the power given in the preceding article[1599], a Party, in acceding to the present General Act, may make his acceptance conditional upon the reservations exhaustively enumerated in the following paragraph. These reservations must be indicated at the time of accession.

2. These reservations may be such as to exclude from the procedure described in the present Act:

“(a) Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accession either of the Party making the reservation or of any other Party with whom the said party may have a dispute;

“(b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States;

“(c) Disputes concerning particular cases or clearly specified subject matters, such as territorial status, or disputes falling within clearly defined categories.”

As the International Court of Justice pointed out in its judgment of 1978 in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case:

“When a multilateral treaty thus provides in advance for the making only of particular, designated categories of reservations, there is clearly a high probability, if not an actual presumption, that reservations made in terms used in the treaty are intended to relate to the corresponding categories in the treaty”,

even when States do not “meticulously” follow the “pattern” set out in the reservation clause.1600

(8) Another particularly famous and widely discussed example1601 of a clause authorizing reservations (which falls under the second category mentioned above)1602 is found in article 57 (ex 64) of the European Convention on Human Rights:

1599 [843, 2006] Article 38 provides that Parties may accede to only parts of the General Act.


“1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this article.

“2. Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.”

In this instance, the power to formulate reservations is limited by conditions relating to both form and content; in addition to the usual limitations ratione temporis, a reservation to the Convention must:

- Refer to a particular provision of the Convention;
- Be justified by the state of legislation [in the reserving State] at the time that the reservation is formulated;
- Not be “couched in terms that are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact meaning and scope”; and
- Be accompanied by a brief statement explaining “the scope of the Convention provision whose application a State intends to prevent by means of a reservation”.

Assessing whether each of these conditions has been met raises problems. It must surely be considered, however, that the reservations authorized by the Convention are “specified” within the meaning of article 19 (b) of the Vienna Conventions and that only such reservations are valid.
It has been noted that the wording of article 57 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not fundamentally different from that used, for example, in article 26, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Extradition of 1957:

“All Contracting Party may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification or accession, make a reservation in respect of any provision or provisions of the Convention”,

even though the latter could be interpreted as a general authorization. While, however, the type of reservations that can be formulated to the European Convention on Human Rights is “specified”, here the authorization is restricted only by the exclusion of across-the-board reservations.

In fact, a general authorization of reservations itself does not necessarily resolve all the problems. It leaves unanswered the question of whether the other Parties may still object to reservations and whether these authorized reservations are subject to the test of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. The latter question is addressed by draft guideline 3.1.4, which draws a distinction between specified reservations whose reservation clause defines the content and those which leave the content relatively open.

This distinction is not self-evident. It caused particular controversy following the 1977 arbitration award in the *Mer d'Iroise* case and divided the Commission, whose members advocated different positions. Some reserving States thought that a reservation was “specified” if the treaty set precise limits within which it could be formulated; those criteria then superseded (but only in that instance) the criterion of the object and purpose. Others pointed out that that occurred very

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1608 [852, 2006] For another even clearer example, see article 18, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes of 1983: “Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it avails itself of one or more reservations.”

1609 [853, 2006] This is sometimes expressly stated (see, for example, article VII of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women of 1952 and the related comments by R. Riquelme Cortado, *Las reservas a los tratados …*, op. cit., p. 121).

1610 [854, 2006] It cannot be reasonably argued that subparagraph (b) could include “implicitly authorized” reservations - other than on the grounds that any reservations that are not prohibited are, a contrario, authorized, subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c).


1612 [856, 2006] For the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.4, see section C.2.

exceptionally, perhaps only in the rare case of “negotiated reservations”, and, furthermore, that the Commission had not retained Mr. Rosenne’s proposal that the expression “specified reservations”, which he considered “unduly narrow”, should be replaced by “reservations to specific provisions”; accordingly, it would be unrealistic to require the content of specified reservations to be established with precision by the treaty, otherwise subparagraph (b) would be rendered meaningless. According to a third view, a compromise was possible between the undoubtedly excessive position that would require the content of the reservations envisaged to be precisely stated in the reservation clause and the position that equated a specified reservation with a “reservation expressly authorized by the treaty”, even though articles 19, paragraph (b), and article 20, paragraph 1, use different expressions. Consequently, it was suggested that it should be recognized that reservations that were specified within the meaning of article 19, subparagraph (b) (and of draft guideline 3.1 (b)), must, on the one hand, relate to specific provisions and, on the other, fulfil certain conditions specified in the treaty, but without going so far as to require their content to be predetermined.

(12) The case law was not very helpful in reconciling those opposing views. The arbitral award of 1977, invoked by the proponents of both arguments, says more about what a specified reservation is not than what it is. Indeed, the upshot of all this is that the mere fact that a reservation clause authorizes reservations to particular provisions of the treaty is not enough to “specify” these reservations within the meaning of article 19, subparagraph (b). The Tribunal, however,
confined itself to requiring reservations to be “specific”\textsuperscript{1621} without indicating what the test of that specificity was to be. In addition, during the Vienna Conference, K. Yasseen, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, assimilated specified reservations to those which were expressly authorized by the treaty\textsuperscript{1622} with no further clarification.

(13) Accordingly, most members of the Commission held that a reservation should be considered specified if a reservation clause indicated the treaty provisions in respect of which a reservation was possible or, to take into account draft guideline 1.1.1 on “across-the-board reservations”,\textsuperscript{1623} indicated that reservations were possible to the treaty as a whole in certain specific aspects. The divergence between these different points of view should not be overstated, however; while the term “envisaged” reservations, which was preferred to “authorized” reservations undoubtedly gives more weight to the broad-brush approach favoured by the Commission, at the same time, in draft guideline 3.1.4, the Commission introduced a distinction between specified reservations with defined content and those whose content is not defined, the latter being subject to the test of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.

3.1.3 Permissibility of reservations not prohibited by the treaty

Where the treaty prohibits the formulation of certain reservations, a reservation which is not prohibited by the treaty may be formulated by a State or an international organization only if it is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Commentary

(1) Draft guidelines 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 specify the scope of article 19, subparagraphs (a) and (b), of the Vienna Conventions (the 1986 text of which is repeated in draft guideline 3.1). They make explicit what the Conventions leave implicit, viz., that failing a contrary provision in the treaty - and in particular if the treaty authorizes specified reservations as defined in draft guideline 3.1.2 - any reservation must satisfy the basic requirement, set forth in article 19, subparagraph (c), of not being incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

\footnote{1621}{[865, 2006] In reality, it is the authorization that must apply to specific or specified reservations - terms which the Tribunal considered to be synonymous, in the Mer d’Iroise case.}

\footnote{1622}{[866, 2006] A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.70, para. 23.}

(2) This principle is one of the fundamental elements of the flexible system established by the Vienna regime, moderating the “radical relativism”\textsuperscript{1624} resulting from the pan-American system, which reduces multilateral treaties to a network of bilateral relations,\textsuperscript{1625} while avoiding the rigidity resulting from the system of unanimity.

(3) The notion of the object and purpose of the treaty,\textsuperscript{1626} which first appeared in connection with reservations in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 1951,\textsuperscript{1627} has become increasingly accepted. It is now the fulcrum between the need to preserve the essence of the treaty and the desire to facilitate accession to multilateral treaties by the greatest possible number of States. There is, however, a major difference between the role of the criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty according to the 1951 advisory opinion, on the one hand, and article 19, subparagraph (c), of the Convention, on the other.\textsuperscript{1628} In the advisory opinion, the criterion applied equally to the formulation of reservations and to objections:

“The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them.”\textsuperscript{1629}

In the Convention, it is restricted to reservations: article 20 does not restrict the ability of other contracting States to formulate objections.

(4) While there is no doubt that this requirement that a reservation must be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty now represents a rule of customary law which is unchallenged,\textsuperscript{1630} its content remains vague\textsuperscript{1631} and there is some uncertainty as to the consequences of

\textsuperscript{1624} [868, 2006] P. Reuter, Introduction au droit des traités, op. cit., p. 73, para. 130. This author applies the term to the system adopted by the International Court of Justice in its 1951 advisory opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15); the criticism applies perfectly well, however, to the pan-American system.

\textsuperscript{1625} [869, 2006] On the pan-American system, see the bibliography in P.-H. Imbert, Les réserves aux traités ..., op. cit., pp. 485-486.

\textsuperscript{1626} [870, 2006] This notion will be defined in draft guideline 3.1.5.


\textsuperscript{1630} [874, 2006] See the many arguments to that effect given by C. Riquelme Cortado, Las reservas a los tratados ..., op. cit., pp. 138-143. See also the Commission’s 1997 preliminary conclusions, in which it reiterated its view that “articles 19 to 23 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986 govern the regime of reservations to treaties and that, in particular, the object and purpose of the treaty is the most important of the criteria for determining the admissibility of reservations”. Yearbook ..., 1997, vol. II (Part Two), p. 57, para. (1).

\textsuperscript{1631} [875, 2006] See draft guidelines 3.1.5 to 3.1.13 proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his tenth report (A/CN.4/558/Add.1).
incompatibility. Moreover, article 19 does not dispel the ambiguity as to its scope of application.

(5) The principle set forth in article 19, subparagraph (c), whereby a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty may not be formulated, is of a subsidiary nature since it applies only in cases not covered in article 20, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention and where the treaty itself does not resolve the reservations issue.

(6) If the treaty does regulate reservations, a number of cases must be distinguished which offer different answers to the question whether the reservations concerned are subject to the test of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. In two of these cases the answer is clearly negative:

- There is no doubt that a reservation expressly prohibited by the treaty cannot be held to be valid on the pretext that it is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty;\(^{1634}\)

- The same applies to “specified” reservations that are expressly authorized by the treaty, with a defined content: they are automatically valid without having to be accepted by the other contracting States\(^ {1635}\) and they are not subject to the test of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.\(^ {1636}\)

In the Commission’s view, these obvious truths are not worth mentioning in separate provisions of the Guide to Practice; they follow directly and inevitably from article 19, subparagraph (c), of the Vienna Conventions, the text of which is repeated in draft guideline 3.1.

(7) The same is not true of two other cases which arise a contrario out of the provisions of article 19, subparagraphs (a) and (b):

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1632 [876, 2006] See draft guidelines 3.3 to 3.3.4 proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his tenth report (A/CN.4/558/Add.1).
1633 [877, 2006] In the case of treaties with limited participation and the constituent instruments of international organizations. These cases do not constitute instances of implicit prohibitions of formulating reservations; they reintroduce the system of unanimity for particular types of treaties.
1634 [878, 2006] In its observations on the draft adopted on first reading by the Commission, Canada had suggested that “consideration should be given to extending the criterion of ‘compatibility with the object and purpose’ equally to reservations made pursuant to express treaty provisions in order not to have different criteria for cases where the treaty is silent on the making of reservations and cases where it permits them.” (Sir Humphrey Waldock, fourth report, A/CN.4/177, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 48). That proposal, which was not very clear, was not retained by the Commission; cf. the clearer proposals along the same lines by Briggs in Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 663rd meeting, 18 June 1962, p. 246, paras. 13 and 14, and Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 813th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 288, para. 10; contra: Ago, ibid., para. 16.
1636 [880, 2006] See draft guideline 3.1.2 and commentary above.
− Those in which a reservation is authorized because it does not fall under the category of prohibited reservations (subparagraph (a));

− Those in which a reservation is authorized without being “specified” within the meaning of subparagraph (b) as spelt out in draft guideline 3.1.2.

(8) In both these cases, it cannot be presumed that treaty-based authorization to formulate reservations offers States or international organizations carte blanche to formulate any reservation they wish, even if it would leave the treaty bereft of substance.

(9) On the subject of implicitly authorized reservations, Humphrey Waldock recognized, in his fourth report on the law of treaties, that “a conceivable exception [to the principle of automatic validity of reservations permitted by the treaty] might be where a treaty expressly forbids certain specified reservations and thereby implicitly permits others; for it might not be unreasonable to regard compatibility with the object and purpose as still an implied limitation on the making of other reservations”. However, he excluded that eventuality not because this was untrue but because “this may, perhaps, go too far in refining the rules regarding the intentions of the parties, and there is something to be said for keeping the rules in article 18 [which became article 19 of the Convention] as simple as possible”. These considerations do not apply to the Guide to Practice, the aim of which is precisely to provide States with coherent answers to all questions they may have in the area of reservations.

(10) This is why draft guideline 3.1.3 stipulates that reservations which are “implicitly authorized” because they are not formally excluded by the treaty must be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. It would be paradoxical, to say the least, if reservations to treaties containing reservations clauses should be allowed more liberally than in the case of treaties which contain no such clauses. Thus the criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty applies.

3.1.4 Permissibility of specified reservations

Where the treaty envisages the formulation of specified reservations without defining their content, a reservation may be formulated by a State or an international organization only if it is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Commentary

(1) Draft guideline 3.1.3 states that reservations not prohibited by the treaty are still subject to the criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. Draft guideline 3.1.4 does likewise in the case of specified reservations in the sense of draft guideline 3.1.1 where the treaty does not define the content of the reservation: the same problem arises, and the considerations put forward in support of draft guideline 3.1.3 apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) The Polish amendment to subparagraph (b), adopted by the Vienna Conference in 1968, restricted the possibility of implicit prohibition of reservations to treaties which provided “that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be formulated”. But it does not follow that reservations thus authorized may be made at will: the arguments applicable to non-prohibited reservations apply here, and if one accepts the broad definition of specified reservations favoured by the majority of Commission members, a distinction must be drawn between reservations whose content is defined in the treaty itself and those which are permitted in principle but which there is no reason to suppose should be allowed to deprive the treaty of its object or purpose. The latter must be subject to the same general conditions as reservations to treaties which do not contain specific clauses.

(3) The modification made to article 19, subparagraph (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention following the Polish amendment in fact goes in that direction. In the Commission’s text, subparagraph (c) was drafted as follows:

“(c) In cases where the treaty contains no provisions regarding reservations, the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”

This was consistent with subparagraph (b), which prohibited the formulation of reservations other than those authorized by a reservations clause. Once an authorization was no longer interpreted a
contrario as automatically excluding other reservations, the formula could not be retained;\textsuperscript{1643} it was therefore changed to the current wording by the Drafting Committee of the Vienna Conference.\textsuperscript{1644} The result is, a contrario, that if a reservation does not fall within the scope of subparagraph (b) (because its content is not specified), it is subject to the test of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.

(4) That was, indeed, the reasoning followed by the arbitral tribunal which settled the \textit{Mer d'Iroise} dispute in deciding that the mere fact that article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf authorized certain reservations without specifying their content\textsuperscript{1645} did not necessarily mean that such reservations were automatically valid.\textsuperscript{1646}

(5) In such cases, the validity of the reservation “cannot be assumed simply on the ground that it is, or purports to be, a reservation to an article to which reservations are permitted”.\textsuperscript{1647} Its validity must be assessed in the light of its compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.\textsuperscript{1648}

(6) A contrario, it goes without saying that when the content of a specified reservation is indeed indicated in the reservations clause itself, a reservation consistent with that provision is not subject to the test of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.

\textsuperscript{1643} [887, 2006] Poland had not, however, put forward any amendment to subparagraph (c), drawing the consequences from the amendment it had successfully proposed for subparagraph (b). An amendment by Viet Nam, however, intended to delete the phrase “in cases where the treaty contains no provisions regarding reservations” (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.125), \textit{Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2)}, p. 145, para. 177, was rejected by the plenary Commission (\textit{ibid.}, p. 148, para. 181).

\textsuperscript{1644} [888, 2006] Curiously, the reason given by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee makes no connection between the modifications made to subparagraphs (b) and (c). K. Yasseen merely stated that “certain members of the Committee considered that a treaty could conceivably contain provisions on reservations which did not come under any of the categories envisaged in subparagraphs (a) and (b)” (\textit{Summary records (A/CONF.39/11)}, plenary Commission, 70th meeting, 14 May 1968, p. 452, para. 17). Cf. a remark by Briggs to the same effect during discussions in the Commission in 1965 (\textit{Yearbook … 1965}, vol. I, 796th meeting, 4 June 1965, p. 161, para. 37).

\textsuperscript{1645} [889, 2006] See the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.2, para. (5).

\textsuperscript{1646} [890, 2006] UNRIAA, vol. XVIII, p. 161, para. 39. See the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.2, para. (6).

\textsuperscript{1647} [891, 2006] D. Bowett, “Reservations to non-restricted multilateral treaties”, \textit{… op. cit.}, p. 72. In the same vein, J.M. Ruda, “Reservations to Treaties”, \textit{… op. cit.}, p. 182; or Gérard Teboul, “Remarques sur les réserves aux conventions de codification”, \textit{Revue générale de droit international public}, 1982, pp. 691-692. \textit{Contra} P.-H. Imbert, “La question des réserves dans la décision arbitrale du 30 juin 1977 …”, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 50-53; this opinion, very well argued, does not sufficiently take into account the consequences of the modification made to subparagraph (c) at the Vienna Conference (cf. above para. (3)).

\textsuperscript{1648} [892, 2006] C. Tomuschat gives a pertinent example: “If, for example, a convention on the protection of human rights prohibits in a ‘colonial clause’ the exception of dependent territories from the territorial scope of the treaty, it would be absurd to suppose that consequently reservations of any kind, including those relating to the most elementary guarantees of individual freedom, are authorised, even if by these restrictions the treaty would be deprived of its very substance” (“Admissibility and legal effects of reservations to multilateral treaties …”, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 474).
3.1.5 Incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty

A reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty if it affects an essential element of the treaty that is necessary to its general thrust, in such a way that the reservation impairs the raison d’être of the treaty.

Commentary

(1) The compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty constitutes, in the terms of article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention, reflected in guideline 3.1, subparagraph (c), the fundamental criterion for the permissibility of a reservation. It is also the criterion that poses the most difficulties.

(2) In fact the concept of the object and purpose of the treaty is far from being confined to reservations. In the Vienna Convention, it occurs in eight provisions, only two of which - articles 19 (c) and 20, paragraph 2 - concern reservations. However, none of them defines the concept of the object and purpose of the treaty or provides any particular “clues” for this purpose. At most, one can infer that a fairly general approach is required: it is not a question of “dissecting” the treaty in minute detail and examining its provisions one by one, but of extracting the “essence”, the overall “mission” of the treaty:

- It is unanimously accepted that article 18, paragraph (a), of the Convention does not oblige a signatory State to respect the treaty, but merely to refrain from rendering the treaty inoperative prior to its expression of consent to be bound;

- Article 58, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), is drafted in the same spirit: one can assume that it is not a case of compelling respect for the treaty, the very object of this provision being to

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1649 [152, 2007] Cf. articles 18, 19 (c), 20, paragraph 2, 31, paragraph 1, 33, paragraph 4, 41, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), 58, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), and 60, paragraph 3 (b). A connection can be made with the provisions relating to the “essential bas[e]s” or “condition[s] of the consent to be bound” (see Paul Reuter, “Solidarité et divisibilité des engagements conventionnels” in International Law at a Time of Perplexity - Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1999), p. 627 (also reproduced in Paul Reuter, Le développement de l’ordre juridique international - Écrits de droit international (Paris: Économica, 1999), p. 366)).


determine the conditions in which the operation of the treaty may be suspended, but rather of preserving what is essential in the eyes of the contracting parties;

- Article 41, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), is also aimed at safeguarding the “effective execution ... of the treaty as a whole”\(^\text{1652}\) in the event that it is modified between certain of the contracting parties only;

- Likewise, article 60, paragraph 3 (b), defines a “material breach” of the treaty, in contrast to other breaches, as “the violation of a[nn] essential provision”; and

- According to articles 31, paragraph 1, and 33, paragraph 4, the object and purpose of the treaty are supposed to “clarify” its overall meaning thereby facilitating its interpretation.\(^\text{1653}\)

3) There is little doubt that the expression “object and purpose of the treaty” has the same meaning in all of these provisions: one indication of this is that Waldock, who without exaggeration can be considered to be the father of the law of reservations to treaties in the Vienna Convention, referred to them\(^\text{1654}\) explicitly in order to justify the inclusion of this criterion in article 19, subparagraph (c), through a kind of a fortiori reasoning: since “the objects and purposes of the treaty ... are criteria of fundamental importance for the interpretation ... of a treaty” and since “the Commission has proposed that a State which has signed, ratified, acceded to, accepted or approved a treaty should, even before it comes into force, refrain from acts calculated to frustrate its objects”, it would seem “somewhat strange if a freedom to make reservations incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty were to be recognized”.\(^\text{1655}\) However, this does not solve the problem: it simply demonstrates that there is a criterion, a unique and versatile criterion, but as yet no definition. As has been noted, “the object and purpose of a treaty are indeed something of an

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\(^{1652}\) [155, 2007] In this provision, the words “of the object and purpose”, which are replaced by an ellipsis in the above quotation, obscure rather than clarify the meaning.


\(^{1654}\) [157, 2007] More precisely, to (the current) articles 18 and 31.

enigma”.1656 Certainly, the attempt made in article 19, subparagraph (c), pursuant to the 1951 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice,1657 to introduce an element of objectivity into a largely subjective system is not entirely convincing.1658 “The claim that a particular reservation is contrary to object and purpose is easier made than substantiated.”1659 In their joint opinion, the dissenting judges in 1951 had criticized the solution retained by the majority in the advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, emphasizing that it could not “produce final and consistent results”,1660 and this had been one of the main reasons for the Commission’s resistance to the flexible system adopted by the Court in 1951:

“It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation.”

Sir Humphrey Waldock himself still had hesitations in his all-important first report on the law of treaties in 1962:1662

“... the principle applied by the Court is essentially subjective and unsuitable for use as a general test for determining whether a reserving State is or is not entitled to be considered a party to a multilateral treaty. The test is one which might be workable if the question of


1657 [160, 2007] See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 24: “It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation.”


1662 [165, 2007] It was this report (A/CN.4/144) that introduced the “flexible system” to the Commission and vigorously defended it (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, pp. 72-74).
‘compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty’ could always be brought to independent adjudication; but that is not the case ...

“Nevertheless, the Court’s criterion of ‘compatibility with the object and purpose of the convention’ does express a valuable concept to be taken into account both by States formulating a reservation and by States deciding whether or not to consent to a reservation that has been formulated by another State. ... The Special Rapporteur, although also of the opinion that there is value in the Court’s principle as a general concept, feels that there is a certain difficulty in using it as a criterion of a reserving State’s status as a party to a treaty in combination with the objective criterion of the acceptance or rejection of the reservation by other States.”

No doubt, this was a case of tactical caution for the “conversion” of the self-same Special Rapporteur to compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty, not only as a test of the validity of reservations, but also as a key element to be taken into account in interpretation,

(5) This criterion has considerable merit. Notwithstanding the inevitable “margin of subjectivity” - which is limited, however, by the general principle of good faith - article 19, subparagraph (c), is undoubtedly a useful guideline capable of resolving in a reasonable manner most problems that arise.

1663 [166, 2007] Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, pp. 65-66, para. 10; along the same lines, see Waldock’s oral statement, ibid., vol. I, 651st meeting, 25 May 1962, p. 139, paras. 4-6; however, during the discussion the Special Rapporteur did not hesitate to characterize the principle of compatibility as a “test” (see p. 145, para. 85 - this paragraph also shows that, from the outset, in Waldock’s mind, this test was decisive as far as the formulation of reservations was concerned (in contrast to objections, for which the consensual principle alone appeared practicable to him)). The wording used in draft article 17, paragraph 2 (a), which was proposed by the Special Rapporteur, reflects this uncertainty: “When formulating a reservation under the provisions of paragraph 1 (a) of this article [with respect to this provision, see the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.1, para. 3], a State shall have regard to the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty” (ibid., vol. II, p. 60). This principle met with general approval during the Commission’s debates in 1962 (see in particular Briggs (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 651st meeting, 25 May 1962, p. 140, para. 23); Lachs (p. 142, para. 54); Rosenne (pp. 144-145, para. 79), who has no hesitation in speaking of a “test” (see also p. 145, para. 82, and 653rd meeting, 29 May 1962, p. 156, para. 27); Castrén (652nd meeting, p. 148, para. 25)) and in 1965 (Yasseen (Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 797th meeting, 8 June 1965, pp. 149-150, para. 20); Tunkin (p. 150, para. 25); see, however, the objections by De Luna (652nd meeting, 28 May 1962, p. 148, para. 18, and 653rd meeting, p. 160, para. 67); Gros (652nd meeting, p. 150, paras. 47-51); or Ago (653rd meeting, p. 157, para. 34); or, during the debate in 1965, those of Ruda (ibid., 796th meeting, 4 June 1965, p. 147, para. 55, and 797th meeting, 8 June 1965, p. 154, para. 69); and Ago (798th meeting, 9 June 1965, p. 161, para. 71)). To the end, Tsuruoka opposed subparagraph (c) and, for that reason, abstained in the voting on draft article 18 as a whole (adopted by 16 votes to none with one abstention on 2 July 1965 - ibid., 816th meeting, p. 283, para. 42).

1664 [167, 2007] See article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention.

(6) The preparatory work on this provision is of little assistance in determining the meaning of the expression. As has been noted, the commentary to draft article 16, adopted by the - usually more prolix - Commission in 1966, is confined to a single paragraph and does not even allude to the difficulties involved in defining the object and purpose of the treaty, other than very indirectly, through a simple reference to draft article 17: “The admissibility or otherwise of a reservation under paragraph (c) ... is in every case very much a matter of the appreciation of the acceptability of the reservation by the other contracting States.”

(7) The discussion of subparagraph (c) in the Commission and subsequently at the Vienna Conference does not shed any more light on the meaning of the expression “object and purpose of the treaty” for the purposes of this provision. Nor does international jurisprudence enable us to define it, even though it is in common use. There are, however, some helpful hints, particularly in the 1951 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the Genocide Convention.

(8) The expression seems to have been used for the first time in its current form in the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice of 31 July 1930 on the Greco-Bulgarian “Communities” case. However, it was not until 1986 in the Nicaragua case that the Court put an end to what has been described as “terminological

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1668 [171, 2007] Future article 20 of the Vienna Convention. The article in no way resolves the issue, which is left pending.
1671 [174, 2007] It is significant that none of the amendments proposed to the Commission’s draft article 16 - including the most radical ones - called this principle into question. At most, the amendments by Spain, the United States of America and Colombia proposed adding the concept of the “nature” of the treaty or substituting it for that of the object (see paragraph 6 of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.1, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), p. 336, note 810).
1673 [176, 2007] I. Buffard and K. Zemanek note (ibid., p. 315) that the expression “the aim and the scope” had already been used in the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice of 23 July 1926 on Competence of the International Labour Organization to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer in reference to Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 13, p. 18. The same authors, after citing exhaustively the relevant decisions of the Court, describe the difficulty of establishing definitive terminology (especially in English) in the Court’s case-law (ibid., pp. 315-316).
1674 [177, 2007] The terms are inverted, however: the Court bases itself on “the aim and object” of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention of 27 November 1919, P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 17, p. 21.
“chaos”, no doubt influenced by the Vienna Convention. It is difficult, however, to infer a great deal from this relatively abundant case law regarding the method to be followed for determining the object and purpose of a given treaty: the Court often proceeds by simple affirmations and, when it seeks to justify its position, it does so empirically.

(9) It has been asked whether, in order to get around the difficulties resulting from such uncertainty, there is a need to delink the concept of the “object and purpose of the treaty” by looking first for the object and then for the purpose. For example, during the discussion of draft article 55 concerning the rule of *pacta sunt servanda*, Reuter emphasized that “the object of an obligation was one thing and its purpose was another”. While the distinction is common in French (or francophone) doctrine, it provokes scepticism among authors trained in the German or English systems.

(10) However, one (French) author has shown convincingly that “the question cannot be settled” by reference to international jurisprudence, particularly since neither the object - defined as the...
actual content of the treaty\textsuperscript{1684} - still less the purpose - the outcome sought\textsuperscript{1685} - remain immutable over time, as the theory of emergent purpose advanced by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice clearly demonstrates: “The notion of object and purpose is itself not a fixed and static one, but is liable to change, or rather develop as experience is gained in the operation and working of the convention.”\textsuperscript{1686} Thus, it is hardly surprising that the attempts made in scholarly writing to define a general method for determining the object and purpose of the treaty have proved to be disappointing.\textsuperscript{1687}

(11) As Ago argued during the debate in the Commission on draft article 17 (now article 19 of the Vienna Convention):

“The question of the admissibility of reservations could only be determined by reference to the terms of the treaty as a whole. As a rule it was possible to draw a distinction between the essential clauses of a treaty, which normally did not admit of reservations, and the less important clauses, for which reservations were possible.”\textsuperscript{1688}


\textsuperscript{1685} [188, 2007] Ibid.


\textsuperscript{1687} [190, 2007] The most successful method, devised by I. Buffard and K. Zemanek, would involve a two-stage process: in the first stage, one would have “recourse to the title, preamble and, if available, programmatic articles of the treaty”; in the second stage, the conclusion thus reached \textit{prima facie} would have to be tested in the light of the text of the treaty (\textit{op. cit.}, p. 333). However, the application of this apparently logical method (even though it reverses the order stipulated in article 31 of the Vienna Convention, under which the “terms of the treaty” are the starting point for any interpretation; see also the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of 8 September 1983 in \textit{Restrictions to the Death Penalty}, OC-3/83, Series A, No. 3, para. 50) to concrete situations turns out to be rather unconvincing: the authors admit that they are unable to determine objectively and simply the object and purpose of four out of five treaties or groups of treaties used to illustrate their method (the Charter of the United Nations, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the general human rights conventions and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, as well as the other human rights treaties dealing with specific rights; the method proposed proves convincing only in the latter instance (I. Buffard and K. Zemanek, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 334-342)) and conclude that the concept indeed remains an “enigma” (see above, para. (3) of the present commentary). Other scholarly attempts are scarcely more convincing, despite the fact that their authors are often categorical in defining the object and purpose of the treaty studied. Admittedly, they are often dealing with human rights treaties, which lend themselves easily to conclusions influenced by ideologically oriented positions, one symptom of which is the insistence that all the substantive provisions of such treaties reflect their object and purpose (which, taken to its logical extremes, is tantamount to precluding any reservation from being valid) - for a critique of this extreme view, see W.A. Schabas, “Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child”, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 476-477, or “Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?”, \textit{Brooklyn Journal of International Law}, vol. 21 (1995), pp. 291-293. On the position of the Human Rights Committee, see paragraph (1) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.12.

These are the two fundamental elements: the object and purpose can only be determined by an examination of the treaty as a whole;[^1689] and, on that basis, reservations to the “essential”[^1690] clauses, and only to such clauses, are rejected.

(12) In other words, it is the “raison d’être”[^1691] of the treaty, its “fundamental core”[^1692] that is to be preserved in order to avoid the “effectiveness”[^1693] of the treaty as a whole to be undermined. “It implies a distinction between all obligations in the treaty and the core obligations that are the treaty’s raison d’être.”[^1694]

(13) Even if the general approach is fairly clear, it is no easy matter to reflect this in a simple formulation. In the view of some members of the Commission, the “threshold” has been set too high in draft guideline 3.1.5 and may well unduly facilitate the formulation of reservations. Most members, however, have taken the view that by definition any reservation “purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects in their application” to the author of the reservation[^1695] and that the definition of the object and purpose of the treaty should not be so broad as to impair the capacity to formulate reservations. By limiting the incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty to cases in which (i) it impairs an essential element, (ii) necessary to the general thrust of the treaty, (iii) thereby compromising the raison d’être of the treaty, the formulation in draft guideline 3.1.5 strikes an acceptable balance between the need to preserve the integrity of the treaty and the concern to facilitate the broadest possible participation in multilateral conventions.

(14) Although a definition of each of these three inseparable elements is doubtless not possible, some clarification may be useful:

[^1689]: [192, 2007] What is involved is to examine whether the reservation is compatible “with the general tenor” of the treaty (Bartoš, *ibid.*, p. 142, para. 40).


[^1691]: [194, 2007] International Court of Justice, *Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951*, p. 21: “none of the contracting parties is entitled to frustrate or impair ... the purpose and raison d’être of the convention”.


The term “essential element” is to be understood in terms of the object of the reservation as formulated by the author and is not necessarily limited to a specific provision. An “essential element” may be a norm, a right or an obligation which, interpreted in context, is essential to the general thrust of the treaty and whose exclusion or amendment would compromise its raison d’être. This would generally be the case if a State sought to exclude or significantly amend a provision of the treaty which embodied the object and purpose of the treaty. Thus a reservation which excluded the application of a provision comparable to article I of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran of 15 August 1955 would certainly impair an “essential element” within the meaning of guideline 3.1.5, given that this provision “must be regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which the other treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied”.

This “essential element” must thus be “necessary to the general thrust of the treaty”, that is the balance of rights and obligations which constitute its substance or the general concept underlying the treaty. While the Commission has had no difficulty in adopting, in French, the term “économie générale du traité”, which seems to it to accurately reflect the concept that the essential nature of the point to which the reservation applies must be assessed in the context of the treaty as a whole, it has been somewhat more hesitant as regards the English expression to be used. After having vacillated between “general framework”, “general structure” and “overall structure”, it appeared to the Commission that the expression “general thrust” had the merit of placing the emphasis on the global nature of the assessment to be made and of not imposing too rigid an interpretation. Thus the International Court of Justice has...

(iii) Similarly, in an endeavour to avoid too high a “threshold”, the Commission chose the adjective “necessary” in preference to the stronger term “essential”, and decided on the verb “impair” (rather than “vitiate”) to qualify the “raison d’être” of the treaty, it being understood that this can be simple and unambiguous (the “raison d’être” of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is clearly defined by its title) or much more complex (in the case of a general human rights treaty\footnote{\[203, 2007\] See draft guideline 3.1.12 below.} or an environmental protection convention or commitments relating to a broad range of questions) and that the question arises of whether it may change over time.\footnote{\[203, 2007\] See draft guideline 3.1.12 below.}

(15) The fact remains that draft guideline 3.1.5 indicates a direction rather than establishing a clear criterion that can be directly applied in all cases. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to complement it in two ways: on the one hand, by seeking to specify means of determining the object and purpose of a treaty - as in draft guideline 3.1.6, and, on the other hand, by illustrating the methodology more clearly by means of a series of examples chosen from areas in which the question of permissible reservations frequently arises (draft guidelines 3.1.7 to 3.1.13).

\subsection*{3.1.6 Determination of the object and purpose of the treaty}

The object and purpose of the treaty is to be determined in good faith, taking account of the terms of the treaty in their context. Recourse may also be had in particular to the title of the treaty, the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion and, where appropriate, the subsequent practice agreed upon by the parties.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) It is by no means easy to put together in a single formula all the elements to be taken into account, in each specific case, in determining the object and purpose of the treaty. Such a process...
undoubtedly requires more “esprit de finesse” than “esprit de géométrie”, like any act of interpretation, for that matter - and this process is certainly one of interpretation.

(2) Given the great variety of situations and their susceptibility to change over time, it would appear to be impossible to devise a single set of methods for determining the object and purpose of a treaty, and admittedly a certain amount of subjectivity is inevitable - however, that is not uncommon in law in general and in international law in particular.

(3) In this context, it may be observed that the International Court of Justice has deduced the object and purpose of a treaty from a number of highly disparate elements, taken individually or in combination:

− From its title;

− From its preamble;

− From an article placed at the beginning of the treaty that “must be regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which the other treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied’;

− From an article of the treaty that demonstrates “the major concern of each contracting party” when it concluded the treaty;

− From the preparatory works on the treaty, and

1701 See paragraph (10) above and paragraph (7) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.6 below.
1703 See above paragraph (10) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.5. The question could also be raised whether the cumulative weight of separate reservations, each of which, taken alone, would be admissible, might not ultimately result in their incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty (see Belinda Clark, “The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 85 (1991), p. 314, and Rebecca J. Cook, “Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women”, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 30 (1990), pp. 706 and 707).
(4) It is difficult, however, to regard this as a “method” properly speaking: these disparate elements are taken into consideration, sometimes separately, sometimes together, and the Court forms a “general impression”, in which subjectivity inevitably plays a considerable part. Since, however, the basic problem is one of interpretation, it would appear to be legitimate, *mutatis mutandis*, to transpose the principles in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conventions applicable to the interpretation of treaties - the “general rule of interpretation” set forth in article 31 and the “supplementary means of interpretation” set forth in article 32 - and to adapt them to the determination of the object and purpose of the treaty.

(5) The Commission is fully aware that this position is to some extent tautological, since paragraph 1 of article 31 reads:

“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and *in the light of its object and purpose*.”

(6) That said, however, the determination of the object and purpose of a treaty is indeed a question of interpretation, whereby the treaty must be interpreted as a whole, in good faith, in its entirety, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context, including the preamble, taking into account practice and, when appropriate, the preparatory work of the treaty and the “circumstances of its conclusion”.  

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1711 [214, 2007] See the advisory opinion of 8 September 1983 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on *Restrictions to the death penalty*, OC-3/83, *Series A*, No. 3, para. 63; see also L. Sucharipa-Behrmann, *op. cit.*, p. 76. While showing that it was aware that the rules on interpretation of treaties could not be directly transposed to unilateral statements formulated by the parties concerning a treaty (reservations and interpretative declarations), the International Law Commission recognized that those rules constituted useful guidelines in that regard (see draft guideline 1.3.1, “Method of implementation of the distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations”, and the commentary thereto, *Yearbook … 1999*, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 107-109). This is true *a fortiori* when the aim is to assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty itself.


These are the parameters underlying draft guideline 3.1.6, which partly reproduces the terms of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conventions, in that it highlights the need for determination in good faith based on the terms of the treaty in their context. As, for the purposes of interpretation, this latter comprises the text, including the preamble, it was not deemed useful to reproduce it. On the other hand, mention of the preparatory works and of the circumstances of the conclusion is of indisputably greater importance for the determination of the object and purpose of the treaty than for the interpretation of one of its provisions, as is the case with the title of the treaty, which is not mentioned in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conventions but which is of importance in determining the treaty’s object and purpose. As for the phrase “the subsequent practice agreed upon by the parties”, this reflects paragraphs 2, 3 (a) and 3 (b) of article 31, since most members of the Commission were of the view that the object and purpose of a treaty was likely to evolve over time. Furthermore, even though it was argued that this mention was redundant in subsequent practice, since objections, if there are any, must be made during the year following the formulation of the reservation, it was pointed out that the reservation could be assessed by third parties at any time, even years after its formulation.

In some cases, the application of these methodological guidelines raises no problems. It is obvious that a reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by which a State sought to reserve the right to commit some of the prohibited acts in its territory or in certain parts thereof would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.

Germany and a number of other European countries presented the following arguments in support of their objections to a reservation formulated by Viet Nam to the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:

[219, 2007] Mention of the text also appeared to suffice for the purposes of including the provisions setting out the general objects of the treaty; these objects might, however, be of particular significance in a determination of the “general thrust” of the treaty (see note 209 above).
[220, 2007] See paragraph (10) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.5, and paragraph (2) above.
[221, 2007] The question is particularly relevant with regard to the scope of the “colonial clause” in article XII of the Convention, a clause contested by the Soviet bloc countries, which had made reservations to it (see Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 2005 (ST/LEG/SER.E/24), vol. I, pp. 126-134 (chap. IV.1)); but the focus here is on the validity of that quasi-reservation clause.
“The reservation made in respect of article 6 is contrary to the principle ‘aut dedere aut iudicare’ which provides that offences are brought before the court or that extradition is granted to the requesting States.

“The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is therefore of the opinion that the reservation jeopardizes the intention of the Convention, as stated in article 2, paragraph 1, to promote cooperation among the parties so that they may address more effectively the international dimension of illicit drug trafficking.

“The reservation may also raise doubts as to the commitment of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to comply with fundamental provisions of the Convention.

(10) It can also happen that the prohibited reservation relates to less central provisions but is nonetheless contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty because it makes its implementation impossible. That is the rationale behind the wariness the Vienna Convention displays towards reservations to constituent instruments of international organizations. For example, the German Democratic Republic, when ratifying the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, declared that it would only bear its share of the expenses of the Committee against Torture for activities for which it recognized that the Committee had competence. Luxembourg objected to that “declaration” (which was actually a reservation),

1719 [222, 2007] Ibid., p. 466 (chap. VI.19); in the same vein see also the objections of Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and the less explicitly justified objections of Austria and France, ibid., pp. 466-468. See also the objection of Norway, and the less explicit objections of Germany and Sweden to the Tunisian declaration concerning the application of the 1961 Convention relating to the Reduction of Statelessness, ibid., pp. 400 and 401. Another significant example is provided by the declaration of Pakistan concerning the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which excluded from the application of the Convention “struggles, including armed struggle, for the realization of the right of self-determination launched against any alien or foreign occupation or domination, in accordance with the rules of international law”, ibid., vol. II, pp. 135 and 136 (chap. XVIII.9). A number of States considered that “declaration” to be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, which is “the suppression of terrorist bombings, irrespective of where they take place and of who carries them out”; see the objections of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan (with a particularly clear statement of reasons), the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, ibid., pp. 137-143. Similarly, Finland justified its objection to the reservation made by Yemen to article 5 of the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by the argument that “provisions prohibiting racial discrimination in the granting of such fundamental political rights and civil liberties as the right to participate in public life, to marry and choose a spouse, to inherit and to enjoy freedom of thought, conscience and religion are central in a convention against racial discrimination”, ibid., vol. I, pp. 145 and 146 (chap. IV.2).

1720 [223, 2007] Cf. article 20, paragraph 3: “When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.”

arguing, correctly, that the effect would be “to inhibit activities of the Committee in a manner incompatible with the purpose and the goal of the Convention”.1722

(11) It is clearly impossible to draw up an exhaustive list of the potential problems that may arise concerning the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty. It is also clear, however, that reservations to certain categories of treaties or treaty provisions or reservations having certain specific characteristics raise particular problems that should be examined, one by one, in an attempt to develop guidelines that would be helpful to States in formulating reservations of that kind or in responding to them knowledgeably. This is the intent of draft guidelines 3.1.7 to 3.1.13, the preparation of which was prompted by the relative frequency with which problems arise; these draft guidelines are of a purely illustrative nature.

### 3.1.7 Vague or general reservations

A reservation shall be worded in such a way as to allow its scope to be determined, in order to assess in particular its compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.

**Commentary**

(1) Since, under article 19 (c) of the Vienna Conventions, reproduced in draft guideline 3.1, a reservation must be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, and since other States are required, under article 20, to take a position on this compatibility, it must be possible for them to do so. This will not be the case if the reservation in question is worded in such a way as to preclude any determination of its scope, in other words, if it is vague or general, as indicated in the title of draft guideline 3.1.7. This is not, strictly speaking, a case in which the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty: it is rather a hypothetical situation in which it is impossible to assess this compatibility. This shortcoming seemed sufficiently serious to the Commission for it to come up with particularly strong wording: “shall be worded” rather than “should be worded” or “is worded”. Furthermore, use of the term “worded” highlights the fact that this is a requirement of substance and not merely one of form.

(2) In any event, the requirement for precision in the wording of reservations is implicit in their very definition. It is clear from article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions, from which

the text in draft guideline 1.1 of the Guide to Practice is taken, that the object of reservations is to exclude or to modify “the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application” to their authors. 1723 Thus, it cannot be maintained that the effect of reservations could possibly be to prevent a treaty as a whole from producing its effects. And, although “across-the-board” reservations are common practice, they are, as specified in draft guideline 1.1.1 of the Guide to Practice, 1724 valid only if they purport “to exclude or modify the legal effect ... of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects ...”.

(3) Furthermore, it follows from the inherently consensual nature of the law of treaties in general, 1725 and the law of reservations in particular, 1726 that, although States are free to formulate (not to make1727) reservations, the other parties must be entitled to react by accepting the reservation or objecting to it. That is not the case if the text of the reservation does not allow its scope to be assessed.

(4) This is often the case when a reservation invokes the internal law of the State which has formulated it without identifying the provisions in question or specifying whether they are to be found in its constitution or its civil or criminal code. In these cases, the reference to the domestic

1723 [226, 2007] See the comments of the Israeli Government on the Commission’s first draft on the law of treaties, which caused the English text of the definition of reservations to be brought into line with the French text by changing the word “some” to “certain” (in Sir Humphrey Waldock, fourth report (A/CN.4/177), Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 3 at p. 15); see also Chile’s statement at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, second session, Vienna, 9 April to 22 May 1969, summary records of plenary meetings and of meetings of the plenary Committee (A/CONF.39/11), 4th plenary meeting, p. 21, para. 5: “the words ‘to vary the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty’ (subparagraph (d)) meant that the reservation must state clearly what provisions it related to. Imprecise reservations must be avoided”.


1726 [229, 2007] The International Court of Justice specified in this connection in its advisory opinion of 1951 on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide that “it is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent, and that consequently no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto” (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 21). The authors of the joint dissenting opinion accompanying the advisory opinion express this idea still more strongly: “The consent of the parties is the basis of treaty obligations. The law governing reservations is only a particular application of this fundamental principle, whether the consent of the parties to a reservation is given in advance of the proposal of the reservation or at the same time or later” (p. 32). See also the arbitral award of 30 June 1977 in the case concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (also known as the “Mer d'Iroise” case), in United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (UNRlAA), vol. XVIII, pp. 41 and 42, paras. 60 and 61; and William Bishop, Jr., “Reservations to Treaties”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International, vol. 103 (1996-II), p. 255, note 96.

law of the reserving State is not *per se* the problem, but the frequent vagueness and generality of the reservations referring to domestic law, which make it impossible for the other States parties to take a position on them. That was the thinking behind an amendment submitted by Peru at the Vienna Conference seeking to add the following subparagraph (d) to future article 19 of the Convention:

“(d) The reservation renders the treaty inoperative by making its application subject, in a general and indeterminate manner, to national law.”

(5) Finland’s objections to the reservations of several States parties to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child are certainly more solidly reasoned on that ground than by a reference to article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention; for instance, in response to the reservation by Malaysia, which had accepted a number of the provisions of the 1989 Convention “only if they are in conformity with the Constitution, national laws and national policies of the Government of Malaysia”, Finland considered that the “broad nature” of that reservation left open “to what extent Malaysia commits itself to the Convention and to the fulfilment of its obligations under the Convention”. Thailand’s interpretative declaration to the effect that it “does not interpret and apply the provisions of this Convention [the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination] as imposing upon the Kingdom of Thailand any obligation beyond the confines of [its] Constitution and [its] laws” also prompted an objection on the part of Sweden that, in so doing, Thailand was making the application of the Convention subject to a

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1728 [231, 2007] See paragraph (4) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.11.
1729 [232, 2007] Reports of the Plenary Commission (A/CONF.39/14), Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second Sessions, Vienna, 26 March–24 May 1968 and 9 April–22 May 1969, Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2), p. 134, para. 177; see the explanations of the representative of Peru at the 21st plenary meeting of the Conference, on 10 April 1968, Summary records (A/CONF.39/11), cited in note 226 above, p. 109, para. 25. The amendment was rejected by 44 votes to 16 with 26 abstentions (ibid., 25th plenary meeting of 16 April 1968, p. 135, para. 26); a reading of the debate gives little explanation for the rejection: no doubt a number of delegations, like Italy, considered it “unnecessary to state that case expressly, since it was a case of reservations incompatible with the object of the treaty” (ibid., 22nd plenary meeting, 10 April 1968, p. 120, para. 75); along these same lines, see Renata Szafarz, “Reservations to Multilateral Treaties”, *Polish Yearbook of International Law*, vol. 3 (1970), p. 302.
1730 [233, 2007] See paragraph (4) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.11. Similarly, the reason given by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in support of their objections to the second United States reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, namely, that it created “uncertainty as to the extent of the obligations which the Government of the United States of America is prepared to assume with regard to the Convention” (*Multilateral Treaties …, op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 130-132 (chap. IV.1)) is more convincing than the argument based on an invocation of domestic law (see paragraph (4) (notes 333 and 334) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.11).
1732 [235, 2007] Ibid., pp. 331 and 332. See also the objections by Finland and several other States parties to comparable reservations by several other States, *ibid.*, pp. 330-335.
1733 [236, 2007] Ibid., p. 142 (chap. IV.2).
general reservation which made reference to the limits of national legislation the content of which was not specified.\textsuperscript{1734}

(6) The same applies when a State reserves the general right to have its constitution prevail over a treaty,\textsuperscript{1735} as for instance in the reservation by the United States of America to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

“... Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.”\textsuperscript{1736}

(7) Some of the so-called “sharia reservation”\textsuperscript{1737} give rise to the same objection, a case in point being the reservation by which Mauritania approved the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women “in each and every one of its parts which are not contrary to Islamic sharia”.\textsuperscript{1738} Here again, the problem lies not in the very fact that Mauritania is invoking a law of religious origin which it applies,\textsuperscript{1739} but, rather that, as Denmark noted, “the general reservations with reference to the provisions of Islamic law are of unlimited scope and undefined

\textsuperscript{1734}[237, 2007]\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, pp. 148 and 149. See the Norwegian and Swedish objections of 15 March 1999, which follow the same line of thinking with regard to Bangladesh’s reservation to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women of 31 March 1953, \textsuperscript{Ibid.}, vol. II, pp. 85 and 86 (chap. XVI.1) or the objections by Finland to a reservation by Guatemala to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and by the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria to a comparable reservation by Peru to the same Convention, in \textsuperscript{Ibid.}, pp. 381-384 (chap. XXIII.1).

\textsuperscript{1735}[238, 2007] See Pakistan’s reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, vol. I, p. 253 (chap. IV.8)), and the objections made by Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway (\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, pp. 256-272) and by Portugal (\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, p. 286, note 52).

\textsuperscript{1736}[239, 2007]\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, p. 128 (chap. IV.1)


\textsuperscript{1738}[241, 2007] \textit{Multilateral Treaties ...}, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. I, p. 251 (chap. IV.8). See also the reservations by Saudi Arabia (citing “the norms of Islamic law” - \textit{ibid.}, p. 253) and by Malaysia (\textit{ibid.}, p. 250), or again the initial reservation by Maldives: “The Government of the Republic of Maldives will comply with the provisions of the Convention, except those which the Government may consider contradictory to the principles of the Islamic sharia upon which the laws and traditions of the Maldives is founded” (\textit{ibid.}, p. 284, note 43); the latter reservation having elicited several objections, the Maldives Government modified it in a more restrictive sense, but Germany once again objected to it and Finland criticized the new reservation (\textit{Ibid.}). Likewise, several States formulated objections to the reservation by Saudi Arabia to the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which made the application of its provisions subject to the condition that “these do not conflict with the precepts of the Islamic sharia” (\textit{ibid.}, pp. 141 and 144-149).

\textsuperscript{1739}[242, 2007] The Holy See ratified the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child provided that “the application of the Convention be compatible in practice with the particular nature of the Vatican City State and of the sources of its objective law ..."
Thus, as the United Kingdom put it, such a reservation “which consists of a general reference to national law without specifying its contents does not clearly define for the other States Parties to the Convention the extent to which the reserving State has accepted the obligations of the Convention”.1741

(8) Basically, it is the impossibility of assessing the compatibility of such reservations with the object and purpose of the treaty, and not the certainty that they are incompatible, which makes them fall within the purview of article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As the Human Rights Committee pointed out:

“Reservations must be specific and transparent, so that the Committee, those under the jurisdiction of the reserving State and other States parties may be clear as to what obligations of human rights compliance have or have not been undertaken. Reservations may thus not be general, but must refer to a particular provision of the Covenant and indicate in precise terms its scope in relation thereto.”1742

(9) According to article 57 of the European Convention on Human Rights, “[r]eservations of a general character shall not be permitted ...”. The European Court of Human Rights, in the Belilos case, declared invalid the interpretative declaration (equivalent to a reservation) by Switzerland on article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention because it was “couchèd in terms that are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact meaning and scope”.1743 But it is unquestionably the European Commission on Human Rights that most clearly formulated the

(1bid., pp. 324 and 325). As has been pointed out (W.A. Schabas, “Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child”, op. cit., pp. 478 and 479), this text raises, mutatis mutandis, the same problems as the “sharia reservation”.

1741 [244, 2007] Ibid., pp. 277 and 278. See also the objections by Austria, Finland, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden (ibid., pp. 256-278). The reservations of many Islamic States to specific provisions of the Convention, on the grounds of their incompatibility with the sharia, are certainly less criticizable on that basis, although a number of them also drew objections from some States parties. (For example, whereas Clark, op. cit., p. 300, observes that Iraq’s reservation to article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, based on the sharia, is specific and entails a regime more favourable than that of the Convention, this reservation nonetheless elicited the objections of Mexico, the Netherlands and Sweden, Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 267, 269 and 275 (chap. IV.8)).
1742 [245, 2007] General comment No. 24, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 11 November 1994, para. 19; see also paragraph 12, which links the issue of the invocation of domestic law to that of widely formulated reservations.
principle applicable here when it judged that “a reservation is of a general nature ... when it is worded in such a way that it does not allow its scope to be determined”.\textsuperscript{1744}

(10) Draft guideline 3.1.7 reflects this fundamental notion. Its title gives an indication of the (alternative) characteristics which a reservation needs to exhibit to come within its scope: it applies to reservations which are either “vague” or “general”. The former might be a reservation which leaves some uncertainty as to the circumstances in which it might be applicable\textsuperscript{1745} or to the extent of the obligations effectively entered into by its author. The latter corresponds to the examples enumerated above.\textsuperscript{1746}

(11) Although the present commentary may not be the right place for a discussion of the effects of vague or general reservations, it must still be noted that they raise particular problems. It would seem difficult, at the very outset, to maintain that they are invalid \textit{ipso jure}: the main criticism that can be levelled against them is that they make it impossible to assess whether or not the conditions for their substantive validity have been fulfilled.\textsuperscript{1747} For that reason, they should lend themselves particularly well to a “reservations dialogue”.

3.1.8 Reservations to a provision reflecting a customary norm

1. The fact that a treaty provision reflects a customary norm is a pertinent factor in assessing the validity of a reservation although it does not in itself constitute an obstacle to the formulation of the reservation to that provision.

2. A reservation to a treaty provision which reflects a customary norm does not affect the binding nature of that customary norm which shall continue to apply as such between the reserving State or international organization and other States or international organizations which are bound by that norm.

Commentary


\textsuperscript{1745} \[248, 2007\] See Malta’s reservation to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “While the Government of Malta accepts the principle of compensation for wrongful imprisonment, it is not possible at this time to implement such a principle in accordance with article 14, paragraph 6, of the Covenant” (\textit{Multilateral Treaties ...}, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 182 and 183 (chap. IV.4).

\textsuperscript{1746} \[249, 2007\] See paragraphs (5)-(9) above.

\textsuperscript{1747} \[250, 2007\] See paragraphs (1) and (4) above.
(1) Draft guideline 3.1.8 relates to a problem which arises fairly often in practice: that of the validity of a reservation to a provision which is restricted to reflecting a customary norm - the word “reflect” is preferred here to “enunciate” in order to demonstrate that the process of enshrining the norm in question in a treaty has no effect on its continued operation as a customary norm. This principle of the persistence of customary norms (and of the obligations flowing therefrom for the States or international organizations bound by them) is also reflected in paragraph 2 of the draft guideline, which recalls that the author of a reservation to a provision of this type may not be relieved of his obligations thereunder by formulating a reservation. Paragraph 1, meanwhile, underlines the principle that a reservation to a treaty rule which reflects a customary norm is not ipso jure incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, even if due account must be taken of that element in assessing such compatibility.

(2) In some cases, States parties to a treaty have objected to reservations and challenged their compatibility with its object and purpose under the pretext that they were contrary to well-established customary norms. Thus, Austria declared, in cautious terms, that it was

“... of the view that the Guatemalan reservations [to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] refer almost exclusively to general rules of [the said Convention] many of which are solidly based on international customary law. The reservations could call into question well-established and universally accepted norms. Austria is of the view that the reservations also raise doubts as to their compatibility with the object and purpose of the [said Convention] ...

For its part, the Netherlands objected to the reservations formulated by several States in respect of various provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and took “the view that this provision remains in force in relations between it and the said States in accordance with international customary law”.

1748 [251, 2007] Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. II, p. 380 (chap. XXIII.1); see also the objections formulated in similar terms by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom (ibid., pp. 380-385). In the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf ... (“Mer d’Iroise) case, the United Kingdom maintained that France’s reservation to article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf was aimed at “the rules of customary international law” and was “inadmissible as a reservation to article 6”, arbitral award of 30 June 1977, UNRJAA, vol. XVIII, p. 38, para. 50.

1749 [252, 2007] Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. I, p. 96 (chap. III.3); in reality, it is not the provisions in question that remain in force, but rather the rules of customary law that they express (see below, paragraphs (13)-(16)). See also Poland’s objections to the reservations of Bahrain and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (ibid., p. 96) and D.W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, Australian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 16 (1995), p. 88.
(3) It has often been thought that this inability to formulate reservations to treaty provisions which codify customary norms could be deduced from the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases.  

"... speaking generally, it is a characteristic of purely conventional rules and obligations that, in regard to them, some faculty of making unilateral reservations may, within certain limits, be admitted; - whereas this cannot be so in the case of general or customary law rules and obligations which, by their very nature, must have equal force for all members of the international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favour".  

(4) While the wording adopted by the Court is certainly not the most felicitous, the conclusion that some have drawn from it seems incorrect if this passage is put back into its context. The Court goes on to exercise caution in respect of the deductions called for by the exclusion of certain reservations. Noting that the faculty of reservation to article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (delimitation) was not excluded by article 12 on reservations, as it was in the case of articles 1-3, the Court considered it "normal" and  

"a legitimate inference that it was considered to have a different and less fundamental status and not, like those articles, to reflect pre-existing or emergent customary law".  

(5) Thus, it is not true that the Court affirmed the inadmissibility of reservations in respect of customary law, it simply stated that, in the case under consideration, the different treatment which the authors of the Convention accorded to articles 1-3, on the one hand, and article 6, on the other, suggested that they did not consider that the latter codified a customary norm which, moreover, confirms the Court’s own conclusion.

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1753 [256, 2007] *I.C.J. Reports* 1969, p. 40, para. 66; see also p. 39, para. 63. In support of this position, see the individual opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo, *ibid.*, p. 89; against it, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Koretsky, *ibid.*, p. 163.  
1754 [257, 2007] P.-H. Imbert, *op. cit.*, p. 244, note 22, and, in the same vein, Alain Pellet, "La C.I.J. et les réserves aux traités: Remarques cursive sur une révolution inachevée", *Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 507 and 508. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tanaka takes the opposing position with respect to "the application of the provision for settlement by agreement, since this is required by general international law, notwithstanding the fact that article 12 of the Convention does not expressly exclude article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, from the exercise of the reservation faculty" (*I.C.J. Reports* 1969, p. 182); this confuses the question of the faculty to make a reservation with that of the reservation’s effects, where the provision that the reservation concerns is of a customary, and even a peremptory, nature. (Strangely, Judge Tanaka considers that the equidistance principle “must be recognized as jus cogens” - *ibid.*)
(6) Furthermore, the Judgment itself states, in an often-neglected dictum, that “no reservation could release the reserving party from obligations of general maritime law existing outside and independently of the Convention [on the Continental Shelf] ...”. Judge Morelli, dissenting, does not contradict this when he writes: “Naturally the power to make reservations affects only the contractual obligation flowing from the Convention ... It goes without saying that a reservation has nothing to do with the customary rule as such. If that rule exists, it exists also for the State which formulated the reservation, in the same way as it exists for those States which have not ratified.”

This clearly implies that the customary nature of the norm reflected in a treaty provision in respect of which a reservation is formulated does not in itself constitute grounds for invalidating the reservation: “the faculty of making reservations to a treaty provision has no necessary connection with the question whether or not the provision can be considered as expressing a generally recognized rule of law”.

(7) Moreover, although this principle is sometimes challenged, it is recognized in the preponderance of doctrine, and rightly so:

- Customary norms are binding on States, independently of their expression of consent to a conventional rule, but, unlike the case of peremptory norms, States may opt out by agreement inter se; it is not clear why they could not do so through a reservation - providing that the latter is valid - but this is precisely the question raised;

- A reservation concerns only the expression of the norm in the context of the treaty, not its existence as a customary norm, even if, in some cases, it may cast doubt on the norm’s

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1756 [259, 2007] Ibid., p. 198.
1757 [260, 2007] Dissenting opinion of ad hoc Judge Sørensen, ibid., p. 248.
1758 [261, 2007] See the position taken by Briggs in the declaration which he attached to the arbitral award of 30 June 1977 in the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf ... (“Mer d’Iroise”) case, UNRIAA, vol. XVIII, p. 262.
1760 [263, 2007] See Finland’s objection to Yemen’s reservations to article 5 of the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: “By making a reservation a State cannot contract out from universally binding human rights standards [but this is true as a general rule]” (Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. I, p. 147 (chap. IV.2)).
1761 [264, 2007] In that regard, see the dissenting opinion of ad hoc Judge Sørenson in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 248; see also M. Coccia, op. cit., p. 32; see, however, below, paragraph (3) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.9.
general acceptance “as of right”; as the United Kingdom remarked in its observations on general comment No. 24, “there is a clear distinction between choosing not to enter into treaty obligations and trying to opt out of customary international law”;  

- If this nature is clear, States remain bound by the customary norm, independently of the treaty;  

- Appearances to the contrary, there may be an interest (and not necessarily a laudable one) involved - for example, that of avoiding application to the relevant obligations of the monitoring or dispute settlement mechanisms envisaged in the treaty or of limiting the role of domestic judges, who may have different competences with respect to conventional rules, on the one hand, and customary rules, on the other;  

- Furthermore, as noted by France in its observations on general comment No. 24 of the Human Rights Committee, “the State’s duty to observe a general customary principle should [not] be confused with its agreement to be bound by the expression of that principle in a treaty, especially with the developments and clarifications that such formalization involves”;  

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1765 [268, 2007] Such is the case in France, where treaties (under article 55 of the Constitution), but not customary norms, take precedence over laws; see the 20 October 1989 decision by the Assembly of the French Council of State in the Nicolet case, Recueil Lebon, p. 748, Frydman’s conclusions, and the 6 June 1997 decision in the Aquaron case, Recueil Lebon, p. 206, Bachelier’s conclusions.  

And, lastly, a reservation may be the means by which a “persistent objector” manifests the persistence of its objection; the objector may certainly reject the application, through a treaty, of a norm which cannot be invoked against it under general international law.1767

(8) Here again, however, the question is whether this solution can be transposed to the field of human rights.1768 The Human Rights Committee challenged this view on the basis of the specific characteristics of human rights treaties:

“Although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between States allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of general international law, it is otherwise in human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction.”1769

(9) First, it should be noted that the Committee confirmed that reservations to customary norms are not excluded a priori. In arguing to the contrary in the specific case of human rights treaties, it simply notes that these instruments are designed to protect the rights of individuals. But this premise does not have the consequences that the Committee attributes to it since, on the one hand, a reservation to a human rights treaty provision which reflects a customary norm in no way absolves the reserving State of its obligation to respect the norm as such and, on the other, in practice, it is quite likely that a reservation to such a norm (especially if the latter is peremptory) will be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty by virtue of the applicable general rules.1770 It is these considerations which led the Commission to indicate, at the outset, that: “[t]he

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1771 [274, 2007] See paragraph (7) above. According to the Human Rights Committee, “a State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to presume a person guilty unless he proves his innocence, to execute pregnant women or children, to permit the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of marriageable age the right to marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, profess their own religion, or use their own language” (general comment No. 24, cited in note 272 above, para. 8). This is certainly true, but it does not automatically mean that reservations to the relevant provisions of the Covenant are prohibited; if these rights must be respected, it is because of their customary and, in some cases, peremptory nature, not because of their inclusion in the Covenant. For a similar view, see G. Gaja, “Le riserve …”, op. cit., p. 452. Furthermore, the Committee simply makes assertions; it does not justify its identification of customary rules attached to these norms; in another context, it has been said that “[t]he ‘ought’ merges with the ‘is’, the lex ferenda with the lex lata” (Theodore Meron, “The Geneva Conventions as customary norms”, AJIL, vol. 81 (1987) p. 55; see also W.A. Schabas’s well-argued critique concerning articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant (“Invalid Reservations …” op. cit., pp. 296-310).
1772 [275, 2007] In that regard, see Françoise Hampson’s working paper on reservations to human rights treaties (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/28, para. 17) and her final working paper on that topic (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42, para. 51): “In theory, a State may make a reservation to a treaty provision without necessarily calling into question the customary status of the norm or its
fact that a treaty provision reflects a customary norm is a pertinent factor in assessing the validity of a reservation”.

(10) On the more general issue of codification conventions, it might be wondered whether reservations to them are not incompatible with their object and purpose. There is no doubt that the desire to codify is normally accompanied by a concern to preserve the rule being affirmed: if it were possible to formulate a reservation to a provision of customary origin in the context of a codification treaty, the codification treaty would fail in its objectives, to the point that reservations and, at all events, multiple reservations, have been viewed as the very negation of the work of codification.

(11) This does not mean that, in essence, any reservation to a codification treaty is incompatible with its object and purpose:

− It is certain that reservations are hardly compatible with the desired objective of standardizing and clarifying customary law but, on reflection, the overall balance which the reservation threatens is not the object and purpose of the treaty itself, but the object and purpose of the negotiations which gave rise to the treaty;

− The very concept of a “codification convention” is tenuous. As the Commission has often stressed, it is impossible to distinguish between the codification stricto sensu of international law and the progressive development thereof. How many rules of customary origin must a treaty contain in order to be defined as a “codification treaty”?

− The status of the rules included in a treaty changes over time: a rule which falls under the heading of “progressive development” may become pure codification and a “codification

willingness to be bound by the customary norm. Nevertheless, in practice, reservations to provisions which reflect customary international law norms are likely to be viewed with considerable suspicion.”

1773 [276, 2007] P.-H. Imbert, Les réserves ..., op. cit., p. 246; see also G. Teboul, op. cit., p. 680, who notes that while both are useful, the concept of a reservation is incompatible with that of a codification convention; this study gives a clear overview of the whole question of reservations to codification conventions (ibid., pp. 679-717, passim).

1774 [277, 2007] P. Reuter, “Solidarité ...”, op. cit., pp. 630 and 631 (also reproduced in Le développement ..., op. cit., p. 370). The author adds that, for this reason, the treaty would also give rise to a situation further from its object and purpose than if it had not existed, since the scope of application of a general rule would be restricted (ibid). This second statement is more debatable: it seems to assume that the reserving State, by virtue of its reservation, is exempt from the application of the rule; this is not the case (see below, note 286).


convention” often crystallizes into a rule of general international law a norm which was not of this nature at the time of its adoption.1779

(12) Thus, the nature of codification conventions does not, as such, constitute an obstacle to the formulation of reservations to some of their provisions on the same grounds (and with the same restrictions) as any other treaty and the arguments that can be put forward, in general terms, in support of the ability to formulate reservations to a treaty provision that sets forth a customary norm1780 are also fully transposable thereto. Furthermore, there is well-established practice in this area: there are more reservations to human rights treaties (which are, moreover, to a great extent codifiers of existing law) and codification treaties than to any other type of treaty.1781 And while some objections may have been based on the customary nature of the rules concerned,1782 the specific nature of these conventions seems never to have been invoked in support of a declaration of incompatibility with their object and purpose.

(13) Nevertheless, the customary nature of a provision which is the object of a reservation has important consequences with respect to the effects produced by the reservation; once established, it prevents application of the conventional rule which is the object of the reservation in the reserving State’s relations with the other parties to the treaty, but it does not eliminate that State’s obligation to respect the customary norm (the content of which may be identical).1783 The reason for this is simple and appears quite clearly in the famous dictum of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case:


1779 [282, 2007] See paragraph (17) below; on the issue of the death penalty from the point of view of articles 6 and 7 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (taking a negative position), see W.A. Schabas, “Invalid reservations...”; op. cit., pp. 308-310.

1780 [283, 2007] See paragraph (2) above.

1781 [284, 2007] For example, on 31 December 2003, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was the object of 57 reservations or declarations (of which 50 are still in force) by 34 States parties (currently, 31 States have reservations still in force) (Multilateral Treaties..., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 90-100) and the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was the subject of 70 reservations or declarations (of which 60 are still in force) by 35 States (32 at present) (ibid., vol. II, pp. 340-351). For its part, the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which (now, at least) seems primarily to codify the general international law currently in force, was the object of 218 reservations or declarations (of which 196 are still in force) by 58 States (ibid., pp. 173-184).

1782 [285, 2007] See paragraph (2) above.

1783 [286, 2007] In support of this position, see Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed. (London: Longman, Harlow, 1992), vol. II, p. 1244; G. Teboul, op. cit., p. 711; and Prosper Weil, “Vers une normativité relative en droit international?”, RGDIP, vol. 86 (1982), pp. 43-44. See also the authors cited in note 265 above or W.A. Schabas, “Reservations to Human Rights Treaties...”; op. cit., p. 56. Paul Reuter takes the opposing view, arguing that the customary norm no longer applies between the State that formulates a reservation and the parties that refrain from objecting to it since, through a conventional mechanism subsequent to the establishment of the customary rule, its application has been suspended (op. cit. in note 265 above); for a similar argument, see G. Teboul, op. cit., pp. 690 and 708. There are serious objections to this view; see paragraph (2) of guideline 3.1.9.
“The fact that the above-mentioned principles [of general and customary international law], recognized as such, have been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean that they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even as regards countries that are parties to such conventions.” 1784

(14) Thus, the United States of America rightly considered, in its objection to the Syrian Arab Republic’s reservation to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that “the absence of treaty relations between the United States of America and the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to certain provisions in Part V will not in any way impair the duty of the latter to fulfil any obligation embodied in those provisions to which it is subject under international law independently of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”. 1785

(15) In his dissenting opinion appended to the 1969 judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ad hoc Judge Sørensen summarized the rules applicable to reservations to a declaratory provision of customary law as follows:

“... the faculty of making reservations to a treaty provision has no necessary connection with the question whether or not the provision can be considered as expressing a generally recognized rule of law. To substantiate this opinion it may be sufficient to point out that a number of reservations have been made to provisions of the Convention on the High Seas, although this Convention, according to its preamble, ‘generally declaratory of established principles of international law’. Some of these reservations have been objected to by other contracting States, while other reservations have been tacitly accepted. The acceptance, whether tacit or express, of a reservation made by a contracting party does not have the effect of depriving the Convention as a whole, or the relevant article in particular, of its declaratory character. It only has the effect of establishing a special contractual relationship between the parties concerned within the general framework of the customary law embodied in the Convention. Provided the customary rule does not belong to the category of jus cogens, a special contractual relationship of this nature is not invalid as such. Consequently, there is no incompatibility between the faculty of making reservations to certain articles of the


1785 [288, 2007] See Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. II, p. 385 (chap. XXIII.1); see also the objections of the Netherlands and Poland, cited in paragraphs (6) and (7) above.
Convention on the Continental Shelf and the recognition of that Convention or the particular articles as an expression of generally accepted rules of international law”.  

(16) This means that the (customary) nature of the rule reflected in a treaty provision does not in itself constitute an obstacle to the formulation of a reservation, but that such a reservation can in no way call into question the binding nature of the rule in question in relations between the reserving State or international organization and other States or international organizations, whether or not they are parties to the treaty.

(17) The customary nature of the rule “reflected” in the treaty provision pursuant to which a reservation is formulated must be determined at the moment of such formulation. Nor can it be excluded that the adoption of the treaty might have helped crystallize this nature, particularly if the reservation was formulated long after the conclusion of the treaty.  

(18) The somewhat complicated wording of the last part of draft guideline 3.1.8, paragraph 2, may be explained by the diversity ratione loci of customary norms: some may be universal in application while others have only a regional scope and may even be applicable only at the purely bilateral level.  

3.1.9 Reservations contrary to a rule of jus cogens  

A reservation cannot exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in a manner contrary to a peremptory norm of general international law.  

Commentary  

(1) Draft guideline 3.1.9 is a compromise between two opposing lines of argument which emerged during the Commission’s debate. Some members held that the peremptory nature of the norm to which the reservation related made the reservation in question invalid, while others

1787 [290, 2007] In its judgment of 20 February 1969 in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the International Court of Justice also recognized that “a norm-creating provision [may constitute] the foundation of, or [generate] a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in its origin, has since passed into the general corpus of international law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do not, become parties to the Convention. There is no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one and does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary international law may be formed” (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 41, para. 71).


maintained that the logic behind draft guideline 3.1.8, on reservations to a provision reflecting a customary norm, should apply and that it should be accepted that such a reservation was not invalid in itself, provided it concerned only some aspect of a treaty provision setting forth the rule in question and left the norm itself intact. Both groups agreed that a reservation should not have any effect on the content of the binding obligations stemming from the *jus cogens* norm as reflected in the provision to which it referred. This consensus is reflected in draft guideline 3.1.9; without adopting a position as to whether these opposing arguments are founded or unfounded, it establishes that a reservation should not permit a breach of a peremptory norm of general international law.

(2) According to Paul Reuter, since a reservation, through acceptances by other parties, establishes a “contractual relationship” among the parties, a reservation to a treaty provision that sets forth a peremptory norm of general international law is inconceivable: the resulting agreement would automatically be null and void as a consequence of the principle established in article 53 of the Vienna Convention.  

(3) This reasoning is not, however, axiomatic, but is based on one of the postulates of the “opposability” school, according to which the issue of the validity of reservations is left entirely to the subjective judgement of the contracting parties and depends only on the provisions of article 20 of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions. Yet this reasoning is far from clear; above all, it regards the reservations mechanism as a purely treaty-based process, whereas a reservation is a unilateral act; although linked to the treaty, it has no exogenous effects. By definition, it “purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of *certain provisions of the treaty* in their application” to the reserving State and, if it is accepted, those are indeed its consequences; however, whether or not it is accepted, “neighbouring” international law remains intact; the legal situation of interested States is affected by it only in their *treaty relations*. Other, more numerous authors assert the incompatibility of any reservation with a provision which reflects a peremptory norm of general international law.

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1791 [294, 2007] “The validity of a reservation depends, under the Convention’s system, on whether the reservation is or is not accepted by another State, not on the fulfilment of the condition for its admission on the basis of its compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty” (José María Ruda, “Reservations to Treaties”, *Recueil des cours ..., vol. 146 (1975-III), p. 180).


1793 [296, 2007] See article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions, reproduced in draft guideline 1.1; see also draft guideline 1.1.1.


1795 [298, 2007] See paragraph (13) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.8.
international law, either without giving any explanation, or arguing that such a reservation would, \textit{ipso facto}, be contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty.

(4) This is also the position of the Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 24:

“Reservations that offend peremptory norms would not be compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.”

This formulation is debatable and, in any case, cannot be generalized: it is perfectly conceivable that a treaty might refer marginally to a rule of \textit{jus cogens} without the latter being its object and purpose.

(5) It has, however, been asserted that the rule prohibiting derogation from a rule of \textit{jus cogens} applies not only to treaty relations, but also to all legal acts, including unilateral acts. This is certainly true and in fact constitutes the only intellectually convincing argument for not transposing to reservations to peremptory provisions the reasoning that would not exclude, in principle, the ability to formulate reservations to treaty provisions embodying customary rules.

(6) Conversely, it should be noted that when formulating a reservation, a State may indeed seek to exempt itself from the rule to which the reservation itself relates, and in the case of a peremptory norm of general international law this is out of the question - all the more so because it is inconceivable that a persistent objector could thwart such a norm. The objectives of the reserving

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1796 [299, 2007] See, for example, R. Riquelme Cortado, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 147. See also Alain Pellet, Second report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/477/Add.1), paras. 141-142.

1797 [300, 2007] See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in the \textit{North Sea Continental Shelf} cases, \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1969, p. 182.


1799 [302, 2007] See the doubts expressed on this subject by the United States of America which, in its commentary on general comment No. 24, transposes to provisions which set forth peremptory norms the solution which is essential for those norms which formulate rules of customary law: “it is clear that a State cannot exempt itself from a peremptory norm of international law by making a reservation to the Covenant. It is not at all clear that a State cannot choose to exclude one means of enforcement of particular norms by reserving against inclusion of those norms in its Covenant obligations” (\textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session} (A/50/40), vol. I, p. 127).


1801 [304, 2007] This is true \textit{a fortiori} if we consider the reservation/acceptance “pair” as an agreement amending the treaty in the relations between the two States concerned. (See M. Coccia, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 30-31; see also the position of P. Reuter referred to above in paragraph (2)); this analysis, however, is unconvincing (see paragraph (3) above).

1802 [305, 2007] There are, of course, few examples of reservations which are clearly contrary to a norm of \textit{jus cogens}. See, however, the reservation formulated by Myanmar when it acceded, in 1993, to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. Myanmar reserved the right not to apply article 37 of the Convention and to exercise “powers of arrest, detention, imprisonment, exclusion, interrogation, enquiry and investigation” in respect of children, in order to “protect the supreme national interest” (\textit{Multilateral Treaties ...}, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. I, p. 339, note 29 (chap. IV.11)); this reservation, to which four States expressed objections (on the basis of referral to domestic legislation, not the conflict of the reservation with a peremptory norm), was withdrawn in 1993 (\textit{ibid.})
State, however, may be different: while accepting the content of the rule, it may wish to escape the consequences arising out of it, particularly in respect of monitoring,\textsuperscript{1803} and on this point there is no reason why the reasoning followed in respect of customary rules which are merely binding should not be transposed to peremptory norms.

(7) However, as regrettable as this may seem, reservations do not have to be justified, and in fact they seldom are. In the absence of clear justification, therefore, it is impossible for the other contracting parties or for monitoring bodies to verify the validity of the reservation, and it is best to adopt the principle that any reservation to a provision which formulates a rule of \textit{jus cogens} is null and void \textit{ipso jure}.

(8) Yet, even in the eyes of its advocates, this conclusion must be accompanied by two major caveats. Firstly, this prohibition does not result from article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention but, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, from the principle set out in article 53. Secondly, there are other ways for States to avoid the consequences of the inclusion in a treaty of a peremptory norm of general international law: they may formulate a reservation not to the substantive provision concerned, but to “secondary” articles governing treaty relations (monitoring, dispute settlement, interpretation), even if this means restricting its scope to a particular substantive provision.\textsuperscript{1804}

(9) This dissociation is illustrated by the line of argument followed by the International Court of Justice in the \textbf{Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo} case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda):

> “In relation to the DRC’s argument that the reservation in question [to article 22 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination] is without legal effect because, on the one hand, the prohibition on racial discrimination is a peremptory norm of general international law and, on the other, such a reservation is in conflict with a peremptory norm”,

the Court referred

\textsuperscript{1803} See paragraph (7) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.8.

\textsuperscript{1804} In this regard, see, for example, the reservations of Malawi and Mexico to the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, subjecting the application of article 17 (dispute settlement and jurisdiction of the Court) to the conditions of their optional declarations pursuant to article 36 (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, \textit{Multilateral Treaties ...}, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. II, p. 112 (chap. XVIII.5). There can be no doubt that such reservations are not prohibited in principle; see draft guideline 3.1.13 and the commentary thereto.
“to its reasoning when dismissing the DRC’s similar argument in regard to Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention (see paragraphs 64-69 above [1805]): the fact that a dispute concerns non-compliance with a peremptory norm of general international law cannot suffice to found the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute, and there exists no peremptory norm requiring States to consent to such jurisdiction in order to settle disputes relating to the Convention on Racial Discrimination.”1806

In this case, it is clear that the Court found that the peremptory nature of the prohibition on racial discrimination did not invalidate the reservations relating not to the prohibitory norm itself but to the rules surrounding it.

(10) Since it proved impossible to opt for one or the other of these two opposing lines of argument, the Commission decided to tackle the question from a different angle, namely that of the legal effects which a reservation could (or could not) produce. Having its basis in the actual definition of reservations, draft guideline 3.1.9 states that a reservation cannot in any way exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in a manner contrary to \textit{jus cogens}. For the sake of conciseness, it did not seem necessary to reproduce the texts of draft guidelines 1.1 and 1.1.1 in full, but the phrase “exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty” must be understood to mean to exclude or modify both the “legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty” and “the legal effect … of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain aspects” in their application to the State or to the international organization which formulates the reservation.

(11) The draft guideline covers the case in which, although no rule of \textit{jus cogens} was reflected in the treaty, a reservation would require that the treaty be applied in a manner conflicting with \textit{jus cogens}. For instance, a reservation could be intended to exclude a category of persons from benefiting from certain rights granted under a treaty, on the basis of a form of discrimination that would be contrary to \textit{jus cogens}.

(12) Some Commission members did not think that draft guideline 3.1.9 had a direct bearing on the questions examined in this part of the Guide to Practice and had to do more with the effects of reservations than with their validity. The same members also contended that the draft guideline did not answer the question, which was nevertheless significant, of the material validity of reservations to treaty provisions reflecting \textit{jus cogens} norms.

\footnote{1805 [308, 2007] On this aspect of the Judgment, see paragraphs (2) and (3) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.13.}
3.1.10 Reservations to provisions relating to non-derogable rights

A State or an international organization may not formulate a reservation to a treaty provision relating to non-derogable rights unless the reservation in question is compatible with the essential rights and obligations arising out of that treaty. In assessing that compatibility, account shall be taken of the importance which the parties have conferred upon the rights at issue by making them non-derogable.

Commentary

(1) In appearance, the question of reservations to non-derogable obligations contained in human rights treaties, as well as in certain conventions on the law of armed conflict, environmental protection or diplomatic relations, is very similar to the question of reservations to treaty provisions reflecting peremptory norms of general international law. It could however be resolved in an autonomous manner. States frequently justify their objections to reservations to such provisions on grounds of the treaty-based prohibition on suspending their application whatever the circumstances.

(2) Clearly, to the extent that non-derogable provisions relate to rules of jus cogens, the reasoning applicable to the latter applies also to the former. However, the two are not necessarily identical. According to the Human Rights Committee:

1807 [310, 2007] The principles set out in common article 3, paragraph 1, of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are non-derogable and must be respected “at any time and in any place”.
1808 [311, 2007] Although most environmental protection conventions contain rules considered to be non-derogable (see article 11 of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal), they very often prohibit all reservations. See also article 311, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
1812 [315, 2007] See the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 24: “some non-derogable rights, which in any event cannot be reserved because of their status as peremptory norms [...] - the prohibition of torture and arbitrary deprivation of life are examples” (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 11 November 1994, para. 10).
“While there is no automatic correlation between reservations to non-derogable provisions, and reservations which offend against the object and purpose of the Covenant, a State has a heavy onus to justify such a reservation.”

This last point is question-begging and is undoubtedly motivated by reasons of convenience but is not based on any principle of positive law and could only reflect the progressive development of international law, rather than codification *stricto sensu*. Incidentally, it follows *a contrario* from this position that, in the Committee’s view, if a non-derogable right is not a matter of *jus cogens*, it can in principle be the object of a reservation.

(3) The Inter-American Court on Human Rights declared in its advisory opinion of 8 September 1983 on *Restrictions to the Death Penalty*:

“Article 27 of the Convention allows the States Parties to suspend, in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens their independence or security, the obligations they assumed by ratifying the Convention, provided that in doing so they do not suspend or derogate from certain basic or essential rights, among them the right to life guaranteed by article 4. It would follow therefrom that a reservation which was designed to enable a State to suspend any of the non-derogable fundamental rights must be deemed to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and, consequently, not permitted by it. The situation would be different if the reservation sought merely to restrict certain aspects of a non-derogable right without depriving the right as a whole of its basic

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purpose. Since the reservation referred to by the Commission in its submission does not appear to be of a type that is designed to deny the right to life as such, the Court concludes that to that extent it can be considered, in principle, as not being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.” 1815

(4) In opposition to any possibility of formulating reservations to a non-derogable provision, it has been argued that, when any suspension of the obligations in question is excluded by the treaty, “with greater reason one should not admit any reservations, perpetuated in time until withdrawn by the State at issue; such reservations are … without any caveat, incompatible with the object and purpose of those treaties”. 1816 This argument is not persuasive: it is one thing to prevent derogations from a binding provision, but another thing to determine whether a State is bound by the provision at issue. 1817 It is this second problem that needs to be resolved.

(5) It must therefore be accepted that, while certain reservations to non-derogable provisions are certainly ruled out - either because they would hold in check a peremptory norm, assuming that such reservations are impermissible, 1818 or because they would be contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty - this is not necessarily always the case. 1819 The non-derogable nature of a right protected by a human rights treaty reveals the importance with which it is viewed by the contracting parties, and it follows that any reservation aimed purely and simply at preventing its implementation is without doubt contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. 1820 It does not follow, however, that this non-derogable nature in itself prevents a reservation from being

1816 [319, 2007] Separate opinion of Mr. Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, appended to the decision of the Inter-American Court dated 22 January 1999 in the case of Blake, Series C, No. 27, para. 11; see the favourable comment by R. Riquelme Cortado, op. cit., p. 155. To the same effect, see the objection by the Netherlands mentioning that the United States reservation to article 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “has the same effect as a general derogation from this article, while according to article 4 of the Covenant, no derogation, not even in times of public emergency, are permitted” (Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 192-193 (chap. IV.4)).
1818 [321, 2007] Regarding this ambiguity, see draft guideline 3.1.9 and the commentary thereto.
1820 [323, 2007] See draft guideline 3.1.5: “A reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty if it affects an essential element of the treaty ...”.

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formulated to the provision setting out the right in question, provided that it applies only to certain limited aspects relating to the implementation of that right.

(6) This balanced solution is well illustrated by Denmark’s objection to the United States reservations to articles 6 and 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

“Denmark would like to recall article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, according to which no derogations from a number of fundamental articles, inter alia 6 and 7, may be made by a State Party even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.

In the opinion of Denmark, reservation (2) of the United States with regard to capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age as well as reservation (3) with respect to article 7 constitute general derogations from articles 6 and 7, while according to article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant such derogations are not permitted.

Therefore, and taking into account that articles 6 and 7 are protecting two of the most basic rights contained in the Covenant, the Government of Denmark regards the said reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, and consequently Denmark objects to the reservations.”

Denmark objected not only because the United States reservations related to non-derogable rights, but also because their wording was such that they left essential provisions of the treaty empty of any substance. It should be noted that in certain cases, States parties formulated no objection to reservations relating to provisions in respect of which no derogation is permitted.

(7) Naturally, the fact that a provision may in principle be the object of a derogation does not mean that all reservations relating to it will be valid. The criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty also applies to them.

(8) This leads to several observations:

- Firstly, different principles apply in evaluating the validity of reservations, depending on whether they relate to provisions setting forth rules of jus cogens or to non-derogable rules;

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1821 [324, 2007] *Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 189 (chap. IV.4); see also, although they are less clearly based on the non-derogable nature of articles 6 and 7, the objections of Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands (note 319 above), Norway, Portugal or Sweden (*ibid.*, pp. 194-196).
− In the first case, questions persist as to whether it is possible to formulate a reservation to a treaty provision setting out a peremptory norm, because the reservation might threaten the integrity of the norm, the application of which (unlike that of customary rules, which permit derogations) must be uniform;

− In the second case, however, reservations remain possible provided they do not call into question the principle set forth in the treaty provision; in that situation, the methodological guidance contained in draft guideline 3.1.6\textsuperscript{1824} is fully applicable;

− Nevertheless, it is necessary to proceed with the utmost caution, and this is why the Commission has drafted the first sentence of draft guideline 3.1.10 in the negative (“A State or an international organization may not formulate a reservation … unless …”), as it has done on several occasions in the past when it wished to draw attention to the exceptional nature of certain behaviour in relation to reservations\textsuperscript{1825};

− Moreover, in elaborating this draft guideline the Commission took care not to give the impression that it was introducing an additional criterion of permissibility with regard to reservations: the assessment of compatibility referred to in the second sentence of the provision concerns the reservation’s relationship to “the essential rights and obligations arising out of the treaty”, the effect on “an essential element of the treaty” being cited as one of the criteria for incompatibility with the object and purpose\textsuperscript{1826}.

### 3.1.11 Reservations relating to internal law

A reservation by which a State or an international organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole in order to preserve the integrity of specific norms of the internal law of that State or rules of that organization may be formulated only insofar as it is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

\textsuperscript{1824} [327, 2007] “Determination of the object and purpose of the treaty”.

\textsuperscript{1825} [328, 2007] See draft guidelines 2.3.1 (“Late formulation of a reservation”), 2.4.6 (“Late formulation of an interpretative declaration”), 2.4.8 (“Late formulation of a conditional interpretative declaration”), 2.5.11 (“Effect of a partial withdrawal of a reservation”), 3.1.3 (“Permissibility of reservations not prohibited by the treaty”) and 3.1.4 (“Permissibility of specified reservations”).
Commentary

(1) A reason frequently put forward by States in support of their formulation of a reservation relates to their desire to preserve the integrity of specific norms of their internal law.

(2) Although similar in certain respects, a distinction must be drawn between such reservations and those arising out of vague or general reservations. The latter are often formulated by reference to internal law in general or to whole sections of such law (such as constitution, criminal law, family law) without any further detail, thus making it impossible to assess the compatibility of the reservation in question with the object and purpose of the treaty. The question which draft guideline 3.1.11 seeks to answer is a different one, namely whether the formulation of a reservation - clearly expressed and sufficiently detailed - could be justified by considerations arising from internal law.1827

(3) Here again, in the Commission’s view, a nuanced response is essential, and it is certainly not possible to respond categorically in the negative, as certain objections to reservations of this type would seem to suggest. For instance, several States have objected to the reservation made by Canada to the Convention on the Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context of 25 February 1991, on the grounds that the reservation “renders compliance with the provisions of the Convention dependent on certain norms of Canada’s internal legislation”.1828 Similarly, Finland objected to reservations made by several States to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child on the “general principle of treaty interpretation according to which a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty”.1829

(4) This ground for objection is unconvincing. Doubtless, in accordance with article 27 of the Vienna Convention,1830 no party may invoke the provisions of its domestic law as justification for

1826 [329, 2007] See draft guideline 3.1.5 and, in particular, paragraph (14) of the commentary thereto.
1827 [330, 2007] See paragraphs (4) to (6) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.7.
1828 [331, 2007] See the objection by Spain, as well as those by France, Norway, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden in Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. II, pp. 509-510 (chap. XXVI.4).
1829 [332, 2007] Objections by Finland to the reservations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Qatar, Singapore and Oman, ibid., vol. I, pp. 337-339 (chap. IV.11). See also, for example, the objections of Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Sweden to the second reservation of the United States to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ibid., pp. 130 and 131 (chap. IV.1); for the text of the reservation itself, see paragraph (6) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.7; see also paragraph (4) of the same commentary.
1830 [333, 2007] Expressly invoked, for instance, by Estonia and the Netherlands to support their objections to this same reservation by the United States (ibid., p. 130).
failure to apply a treaty.\textsuperscript{1831} The assumption, however, is that the problem is settled, in the sense that the provisions in question are applicable to the reserving States; but that is precisely the issue. As has been correctly pointed out, a State very often formulates a reservation \textit{because} the treaty imposes on it obligations incompatible with its domestic law, which it is not in a position to amend,\textsuperscript{1832} at least initially.\textsuperscript{1833} Moreover, article 57 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not simply authorize a State party to formulate a reservation where its internal law is not in conformity with a provision of the Convention, but restricts even that authority exclusively to instances where “a law … in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision”.\textsuperscript{1834} Besides the European Convention, there are indeed reservations relating to the implementation of internal law that give rise to no objections and have in fact not met with objections.\textsuperscript{1835} On the other hand, this same article expressly prohibits “reservations of a general character”.

\textsuperscript{1831} [334, 2007] In the words of article 27: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46” (which has to do with “imperfect ratifications”). The rule set out in article 26 of the Convention concerns treaties in force, whereas, by definition, a reservation purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provision in question in its application to the author of the reservation.


\textsuperscript{1833} [336, 2007] Sometimes the reserving State indicates the period of time it will need to bring its domestic law into line with the treaty (as in the case of Estonia’s reservation to the application of article 6, or Lithuania’s to article 5, paragraph 3, of the European Convention on Human Rights which gave one-year time limits (http://conventions.coe.int/)), or it indicates its intention to do so (as in the case of the reservations Cyprus and Malawi made upon accession to the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, commitments which were in fact kept - see Multilateral Treaties …, op. cit., vol. I, p. 281, note 25, and p. 283, note 40 (chap. IV.8)); see also Indonesia’s statement upon accession to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal of 22 March 1989, ibid. vol. II, p. 487 (chap. XXVII.3)). It is also not unusual for a State to withdraw a reservation made without any time indication after it has amended the provisions of its national law that had prompted the reservation: as in the case of withdrawal by France, Ireland and the United Kingdom of several reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (see ibid. vol. I, pp. 281 and 282, notes 28 and 32, and pp. 286 and 287, note 58 (chap. IV.8); see also the successive partial withdrawals (1996, 1998, 1999, 2001) by Finland of its reservations to article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights (http://conventions.coe.int/). Such practices are laudable and should definitely be encouraged (see draft guideline 2.5.3 in the Guide to Practice and the commentary thereto, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/58/10), pp. 207-209); yet they cannot be used as an argument for the invalidity of the principle of draft reservations on the grounds of domestic law.


(5) What matters here is that the State formulating the reservation should not use its domestic law\textsuperscript{1836} as a cover for not actually accepting any new international obligation,\textsuperscript{1837} even though the treaty’s aim is to change the practice of States parties to the treaty. While article 27 of the Vienna Conventions cannot rightly be said to apply to the case in point,\textsuperscript{1838} it should nevertheless be borne in mind that national laws are “merely facts” from the standpoint of international law\textsuperscript{1839} and that the very aim of a treaty can be to lead States to modify them.

(6) The Commission preferred the term “particular norms of internal law” to the term “provisions of internal law”, which ran the risk of suggesting that only the written rules of a constitutional, legislative or regulatory nature were involved, whereas draft guideline 3.1.11 applied also to customary norms or norms of jurisprudence. Similarly, the term “rules of the organization” means not only the “established practice of the organization” but also the constituent instruments and “decisions, resolutions and other acts taken by the organization in accordance with the constituent instruments”.\textsuperscript{1840}

(7) The Commission is aware that draft guideline 3.1.11 may, on first reading, seem to be merely a repetition of the principle set out in article 19 (c) of the Vienna Conventions and reproduced in draft guideline 3.1. Its function is important, nonetheless: it is to establish that, contrary to an erroneous but fairly widespread perception, a reservation is not invalid solely because it aims to preserve the integrity of particular norms of internal law - it being understood that, as in the case of any reservation, those made with such an objective must be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty to which they relate.

\textsuperscript{1836} [339, 2007] Or in the case of international organizations their “rules of the organization”: the term is taken from articles 27 and 46 of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations. It also appears (and is defined) in article 4, paragraph 4, of the Commission’s articles on responsibility of international organizations (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10), p. 103). However, the reference to the rules of the organization may not raise a similar problem if the reservation only applies to the relations between the organization and its members.

\textsuperscript{1837} [340, 2007] In its concluding observations of 6 April 1995 on the initial report of the United States of America on its implementation of the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee “regrets the extent of the State party’s reservations, declarations and understandings to the Covenant. It believes that, taken together, they intended to ensure that the United States has accepted what is already the law of the United States. The Committee is also particularly concerned at reservations to article 6, paragraph 5, and article 7 of the Covenant, which it believes to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant” (CCPR/CE/79/Add.50, para. 14). See the analysis by W.A. Schabas, “Invalid Reservations . . .”, op. cit., pp. 277-238; and J. McBride, op. cit., p. 172.

\textsuperscript{1838} [341, 2007] See paragraph (4) above.


\textsuperscript{1840} [343, 2007] Draft article 4, paragraph 4, of the Commission’s articles on responsibility of international organizations.
A proposal was also made to create an additional draft guideline dealing with reservations to treaty clauses relating to the implementation of the treaty in internal law. Without underestimating the potential significance of this issue, the Commission was of the view that it was premature to devote a separate draft article to it, given that, in practical terms, the problem did not seem to have arisen and that the purpose of draft articles 3.1.7 to 3.1.13 was to illustrate the general guidance given in draft guideline 3.1.5, with examples chosen on the basis of their practical importance for States. The Commission in fact considers that reservations to provisions of this type would not be valid if they had the effect of hindering the effective implementation of the treaty.

3.1.12 Reservations to general human rights treaties

To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a general treaty for the protection of human rights, account shall be taken of the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of the rights set out in the treaty as well as the importance that the right or provision which is the subject of the reservation has within the general thrust of the treaty, and the gravity of the impact the reservation has upon it.

Commentary

(1) It is in the area of human rights that the most reservations have been made and the liveliest debates on their validity have taken place. Whenever necessary, the Commission has drawn attention to specific problems that could arise. It was nonetheless deemed useful to have a specific draft guideline dealing with reservations made to general treaties such as the European, Inter-American and African Conventions or the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights.

1841 [344, 2007] See, for example, article I of the Convention relating to a uniform law on the formation of contracts for the international sale of goods (The Hague, 1 July 1964); article I of the European Convention providing a uniform law on arbitration (Strasbourg, 20 January 1966); or articles 1 and 2 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 17 December 1979).

1842 [345, 2007] See paragraph (15) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.5 below.

1843 [346, 2007] With regard to guidelines on the permissibility of reservations, see in particular paragraphs (8) and (9) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.7 (“Vague or general reservations”), paragraphs (8) and (9) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.8 (“Reservations to a provision reflecting a customary norm”) or paragraph (4) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.9 (“Reservations contrary to a rule of jus cogens”) and the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.10, passim.

1844 [347, 2007] These treaties are not the only ones covered by this draft guideline: a treaty such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989) also seeks to protect a very wide range of rights. See also the Convention on the Elimination of All
(2) In the case of the latter, the Human Rights Committee stated in its general comment No. 24 that: “In an instrument which articulates very many civil and political rights, each of the many articles, and indeed their interplay, secures the objectives of the Covenant. The object and purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of obligations which are legally binding for those States which ratify; and to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken.”

Taken literally, this position would render invalid any general reservation bearing on any one of the rights protected by the Covenant. That is not, however, the position of States parties which have not systematically formulated objections to reservations of this type, and the Committee itself does not go that far because, in the paragraphs following the statement of its position of principle, it sets out in greater detail the criteria it uses to assess whether reservations are compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. It does not follow that, by its very nature, a general reservation bearing on one of the protected rights would be invalid as such.

(3) Likewise, in the case of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, a great many reservations have been made to the provisions concerning adoption. As has been noted, “[i]t would be difficult to conclude that this issue is so fundamental to the Convention as to render such reservations contrary to its object and purpose”.

Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York, 18 December 1979) or the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (New York, 18 December 1990).


1847 [350, 2007] See, for example, the reservation of Malta to article 13 (on the conditions for the expulsion of aliens, to which no objection has been entered (see Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit.), vol. I, pp. 182-183 (chap. IV.4)). See also the reservation by Barbados to article 14, paragraph 3, or the reservation by Belize to the same provision (ibid., p. 179); or else the reservation by Mauritius to article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ibid., p. 326 (chap. IV.11)).

1848 [351, 2007] See general comment No. 24, paragraphs 8-10: these criteria, beyond that of the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Covenant, have to do with the customary, peremptory or non-derogable nature of the norm in question; see draft guidelines 3.1.8-3.1.10.


(4) In contrast with treaties relating to a particular human right, such as the conventions on torture or racial discrimination, the object and purpose of general human rights treaties is a complex matter. These treaties cover a wide range of human rights and are characterized by the global nature of the rights that they are intended to protect. Nevertheless, some of the protected rights may be more essential than others;\textsuperscript{1851} moreover, even in the case of essential rights, one cannot preclude the validity of a reservation dealing with certain limited aspects of the implementation of the right in question. In this respect reservations to general human rights treaties pose similar problems to reservations to provisions relating to non-derogable rights.\textsuperscript{1852}

(5) Draft guideline 3.1.12 attempts to strike a particularly delicate balance between these different considerations by combining three elements:

− “The indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of the rights set out in the treaty”;

− “The importance that the right or provision which is the subject of the reservation has within the general thrust of the treaty”; and

− “The gravity of the impact the reservation has upon it”.

(6) The wording of the first element is taken from paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993. It emphasizes the global nature of the protection afforded by general human rights treaties and is intended to prevent their dismantling.\textsuperscript{1853}

(7) The second element qualifies the previous one by recognizing - in keeping with practice - that certain rights protected by these instruments are no less important than other rights - and, in particular, non-derogable ones.\textsuperscript{1854} The wording used signals that the assessment must take into account both the rights concerned (substantive approach) and the provision of the treaty in question (formal approach), since it has been noted that one and the same right may be the subject of several

\textsuperscript{1851}[354, 2007] See paragraph (3) above.
\textsuperscript{1852}[355, 2007] See draft guideline 3.1.10 above, and in particular paragraphs (4) to (8) of the commentary thereto.
\textsuperscript{1853}[356, 2007] Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (A/CONF.157/23). This wording has since been regularly adopted - see in particular General Assembly resolutions on human rights, which systematically use the expression.
\textsuperscript{1854}[357, 2007] See draft guideline 3.1.10 above.
provisions. As for the expression “general thrust of the treaty”, it is taken up in draft guideline 3.1.5.1855

(8) Lastly, the reference to “the gravity of the impact the reservation has upon” the right or the provision with respect to which it was made indicates that even in the case of essential rights, reservations are possible if they do not preclude protection of the rights in question and do not have the effect of excessively modifying their legal regime.

3.1.13 Reservations to treaty provisions concerning dispute settlement or the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty

A reservation to a treaty provision concerning dispute settlement or the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty is not, in itself, incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, unless:

(i) The reservation purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of a provision of the treaty essential to its raison d’être; or

(ii) The reservation has the effect of excluding the reserving State or international organization from a dispute settlement or treaty implementation monitoring mechanism with respect to a treaty provision that it has previously accepted, if the very purpose of the treaty is to put such a mechanism into effect.

Commentary

(1) In his first report on the law of treaties, Fitzmaurice categorically stated: “It is considered inadmissible that there should be parties to a treaty who are not bound by an obligation for the settlement of disputes arising under it, if this is binding on other parties”.1856 His position, obviously inspired by the cold war debate on reservations to the Genocide Convention, is too sweeping; moreover, it was rejected by the International Court of Justice, which, in its orders of 2 June 1999 in response to Yugoslavia’s requests for the indication of provisional measures against Spain and against the United States in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force, clearly recognized the validity of the reservations made by those two States to article IX of the Genocide Convention of

1855 See in particular paragraph (14) (ii) of the commentary to draft guideline 3.1.5.
1856 A/CN.4/101, Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, p. 127, para. 96; this was the purpose of draft article 37, paragraph 4, which the Special Rapporteur was proposing (ibid., p. 115).
1948, which gives the Court jurisdiction to hear all disputes relating to the Convention, even though some of the parties thought that such reservations were not compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.

(2) In its order on a request for the indication of provisional measures in the case concerning *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002)*, the Court came to the same conclusion with regard to the reservation of Rwanda to that same provision, stating that “that reservation does not bear on the substance of the law, but only on the Court’s jurisdiction” and that “it therefore does not appear contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.” It upheld that position in its Judgment of 3 February 2006: in response to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which had held that the Rwandan reservation to article IX of the Genocide Convention “was invalid”, after reaffirming the position it had taken in its advisory opinion of 28 May 1951 on *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, according to which a reservation to that Convention would be permitted provided it was not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, the Court concluded:

“Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention bears on the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect substantive obligations relating to acts of genocide themselves under that Convention. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot conclude that the reservation of Rwanda in question, which is meant to exclude a particular method of settling a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, is to be regarded as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.”

The International Court of Justice, confirming its prior case law, thus gave effect to Rwanda’s reservation to article IX of the Genocide Convention. This conclusion is corroborated by the very common nature of such reservations and the erratic practice followed in the objections to them.

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1858 [361, 2007] See *Multilateral Treaties …*, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 129-132 (chap. IV.1) (see in particular the clear objections to that effect of Brazil, China (Taiwan), Mexico and the Netherlands).
1862 [365, 2007] See in this connection R. Riquelme Cortado, op. cit., pp. 192-202. As it happens, objections to reservations to dispute settlement clauses are rare. Apart from the objections raised to reservations to article IX of the Genocide Convention, however, see the objections formulated by several States to the reservations to article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in particular the objections of Germany, Canada, Egypt, the United States of America (which argued that the reservation of Syria “is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and undermines the principle of impartial settlement of disputes concerning the invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties, which was the subject of extensive negotiation at
(3) In their joint separate opinion, however, several judges stated the view that the principle applied by the Court in its judgment might not be absolute in scope. They stressed that there might be situations where reservations to clauses concerning dispute settlement could be contrary to the treaty’s object and purpose: it depended on the particular case.  

(4) The Human Rights Committee, meanwhile, felt that reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 relating to guarantees of its implementation and contained both in the Covenant itself and in the Optional Protocol thereto could be contrary to the object and purpose of those instruments:

“These guarantees provide the necessary framework for securing the rights in the Covenant and are thus essential to its object and purpose. ... The Covenant ... envisages, for the better attainment of its stated objectives, a monitoring role for the Committee. Reservations that purport to evade that essential element in the design of the Covenant, which is ... directed to securing the enjoyment of the rights, are ... incompatible with its object and purpose. A State may not reserve the right not to present a report and have it considered by the Committee. The Committee’s role under the Covenant, whether under article 40 or under the Optional Protocols, necessarily entails interpreting the provisions of the Covenant and the development of a jurisprudence. Accordingly, a reservation that rejects the Committee’s competence to interpret the requirements of any provisions of the Covenant would also be contrary to the object and purpose of that treaty.”

With respect to the Optional Protocol, the Committee adds:

“A reservation cannot be made to the Covenant through the vehicle of the Optional Protocol but such a reservation would operate to ensure that the State’s compliance with the obligation may not be tested by the Committee under the first Optional Protocol. And because the object and purpose of the first Optional Protocol is to allow the rights obligatory for a State under the Covenant to be tested before the Committee, a reservation that seeks to preclude this would be

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the Vienna Conference” (Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. II, p. 385 (chap. XXIII.1)), Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands (“provisions regarding the settlement of disputes, as laid down in article 66 of the Convention, are an important part of the Convention and ... cannot be separated from the substantive rules with which they are connected” (ibid., p. 382)), the United Kingdom (“These provisions are inextricably linked with the provisions of Part V to which they relate. Their inclusion was the basis on which those parts of Part V which represent progressive development of international law were accepted by the Vienna Conference.” (ibid., p. 384)) and Sweden (espousing essentially the same position as the United Kingdom (ibid., p. 383)).
contrary to the object and purpose of the first Optional Protocol, even if not of the Covenant. A reservation to a substantive obligation made for the first time under the first Optional Protocol would seem to reflect an intention by the State concerned to prevent the Committee from expressing its views relating to a particular article of the Covenant in an individual case.”

Based on this reasoning, the Committee, in the Rawle Kennedy case, held that a reservation made by Trinidad and Tobago excluding the Committee’s competence to consider communications relating to a prisoner under sentence of death was not valid.

(5) The European Court of Human Rights, in the Loizidou case, concluded from an analysis of the object and purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights “that States could not qualify their acceptance of the optional clauses thereby effectively excluding areas of their law and practice within their ‘jurisdiction’ from supervision by the Convention institutions” and that any restriction of its competence ratione loci or ratione materiae was incompatible with the nature of the Convention.

(6) This body of case law led the Commission to:

1. Recall that the formulation of reservations to treaty provisions concerning dispute settlement or the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty is not in itself precluded; this is the purpose of the “chapeau” of draft guideline 3.1.13,

2. Unless the regulation or monitoring in question is the purpose of the treaty instrument to which a reservation is being made, and

3. Nevertheless indicate that a State or an international organization cannot minimize its substantial prior treaty obligations by formulating a reservation to a treaty provision concerning

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1865 [368, 2007] Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 24, cit., para. 13. In the following paragraph, the Committee "considers that reservations relating to the required procedures under the first Optional Protocol would not be compatible with its object and purpose".

1866 [369, 2007] Communication No. 845/1999, Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago (CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999), Report of the Human Rights Committee (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/55/40), vol. II), annex XLA, para. 6.7. To justify its reservation Trinidad and Tobago argued that it accepted “the principle that States cannot use the Optional Protocol as a vehicle to enter reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights itself, but [it] stresses that its Reservation to the Optional Protocol in no way detracts from its obligations and engagements under the Covenant ...” (Multilateral Treaties ..., op. cit., vol. I, p. 234 (chap. IV.5)). Seven States reacted with objections to the reservation, before Trinidad and Tobago finally denounced the Protocol as a whole (ibid., pp. 239-240, note 3).

dispute settlement or the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty at the time it accepts the provision.

(7) Although some members have disagreed, the Commission felt that there was no reason to draw a distinction between these two types of provisions: even if their purposes are somewhat different, the reservations that can be formulated to both types give rise to the same type of problems, and splitting them into two separate draft guidelines would have entailed setting out the same rules twice.

3.2 Assessment of the permissibility of reservation

The following may assess, within their respective competences, the permissibility of reservations to a treaty formulated by a State or an international organization:

- Contracting States or contracting organizations
- Dispute settlement bodies
- Treaty monitoring bodies

Commentary

(1) Guideline 3.2 introduces the section of the Guide to Practice on assessment of the permissibility of reservations. It is a general provision whose purpose is to recall that there are various modalities for assessing such permissibility which, far from being mutually exclusive, are mutually reinforcing - in particular and including when the treaty establishes a body to monitor its implementation. This statement corresponds to the one found in a different form in paragraph 6 of the Commission's 1997 preliminary conclusions on reservations to normative multilateral treaties including human rights treaties. Of course, these generally applicable modalities for the

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1868 [371, 2007] Ibid., paras. 70-89; see in particular paragraph 79. See also the decision of 4 July 2001 of the Grand Chamber on the admissibility of Application No. 48787/99 in the case of Ilie Iluşcu et al. v. Moldova and the Russian Federation, p. 20, or the judgment of the Grand Chamber of 8 April 2004 in the case of Assanidze v. Georgia (Application No. 71503/01), para. 140.

1869 [372, 2007] In part simply because the (non-binding) settlement of disputes could be one of the functions of a treaty monitoring body and could be part of its overall task of monitoring.

1870 [716, 2009] “The Commission stresses that this competence of the monitoring bodies does not exclude or otherwise affect the traditional modalities of control by the contracting parties, on the one hand, in accordance with the above-mentioned provisions of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 and, where appropriate by the organs for settling any dispute that may arise concerning the interpretation or application of the treaties” (Yearbook ... 1997, vol. II (2), para. 157).
permissibility of reservations may be supplemented or replaced\textsuperscript{1871} by specific modalities of assessment established by the treaty itself.

(2) Indeed, it goes without saying that any treaty can include a special provision establishing particular procedures for assessing the permissibility of a reservation either by a certain percentage of the States parties or by a body with competence to do so. One of the most well-known and discussed clauses\textsuperscript{1872} of this kind is article 20, paragraph 2, of the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination:

"2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the bodies established by this Convention be allowed. \textit{A reservation shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least two thirds of the States Parties object to it.}"\textsuperscript{1873}

(3) This reservations clause no doubt draws its inspiration from the unsuccessful attempts made to include in the Vienna Convention itself a mechanism enabling a majority to assess the permissibility of reservations:\textsuperscript{1874}

− Two of the four proposals submitted as rules \textit{de lege ferenda} in 1953 by Hersch Lauterpacht made the acceptance of a reservation conditional upon the consent of two thirds of the States concerned;\textsuperscript{1875}

\textsuperscript{1871} [717, 2009] Depending on what is envisaged by the relevant provision.


\textsuperscript{1873} [719, 2009] Emphasis added. Other examples are article 20 of the Convention concerning Customs Facilities for Touring of 4 June 1954, which authorizes reservations if they have been “accepted by a majority of the members of the Conference and recorded in the Final Act” (para. 1) or made after the signing of the Final Act without any objection having been expressed by one third of the Contracting States within 90 days from the date of circulation of the reservation of the Secretary-General (paras. 2 and 3); the similar clauses in article 14 of the Additional Protocol to this Convention and in article 39 of the Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles (see the \textit{Handbook of Final Clauses prepared by the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat} (ST/LEG/6), 5 August 1957, pp. 103-107); or article 50, para. 3, of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and article 32, para. 3, of the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotrophic Substances, which make the admissibility of the reservation subject to the absence of objections by one third of the contracting States.

\textsuperscript{1874} [720, 2009] For a summary of the discussions on the matter by the Commission and during the Vienna Conference, see Riquelme Cortado, (footnote 574 above), pp. 314-315.

\textsuperscript{1875} [721, 2009] Variants A and B, in the first report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/63), pp. 8-9 (English text in \textit{Yearbook ... 1953}, vol. II, pp. 91-92). Variants C and D, respectively, assigned the task of assessing the admissibility of reservations to a commission set up by the States parties and to a Chamber of Summary Procedure of the International Court of Justice (\textit{ibid.}, pp. 9-10 and 92); see
− Fitzmaurice made no express proposal on this matter because he held to a strict interpretation of the principle of unanimity, yet on several occasions he let it be known that he believed that a collective assessment of the permissibility of reservations was the “ideal” system;

− Although Waldock had also not proposed such a mechanism in his first report in 1962, several members of the Commission took up its defence;

− During the Vienna Conference, an amendment to this effect proposed by Japan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea was rejected by a large majority despite the support of several delegations, the Expert Consultant Waldock, and some other delegations were very doubtful about this kind of collective monitoring system.


1879 [725, 2009] See especially Briggs in Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 651st meeting, of 25 May 1952, para. 28, and the 652nd meeting, 28 May 1962, paras. 73-74; Gros, 654th meeting, 30 May 1962, para. 43; Bartos, 654th meeting, para. 66; contra: Rosenne, 651st meeting, para. 83; Tounkine, 653rd meeting, 29 May 1962, paras. 24-25 and 654th meeting, para. 31; Jimenez de Arechaga, 653rd meeting, para. 47; and Amado, 654th meeting, para. 34. Waldock proposed a variant reflecting these views (see 654th meeting, para. 16), and although they were rejected by the Commission, they appear in the commentary on draft article 18 (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 179, para. 11) and in the 1966 commentaries to draft articles 16 and 17 (Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 205, para. 11). See also Waldock’s fourth report (A/CN.4/177) Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 46, para. 3.

1880 [726, 2009] Amendment to article 16, paras. 2, stipulated that, if objections “have been raised ... by a majority of the contracting States as of the time of expiry of the 12-month period, the signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession accompanied by such a reservation shall be without legal effect” (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.133/Rev.1 in Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second Sessions, Documents of the Conference, Committee of the Whole (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2), para. 177 (i) (a)). The original amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.133) had set a time limit of 3 months instead of 12 months. See also Japan’s statement at the Conference, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Summary records (A/CONF.39/11), Committee of the Whole, 21st meeting, 10 April 1968, paras. 29, and 24th meeting, 16 April 1968, paras. 62-63); and another amendment along the same lines introduced by Australia (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.166 in A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, para. 179), which subsequently withdrew it (see ibid., para. 181). Without submitting a formal proposal, the United Kingdom indicated that “there was an obvious need for some kind of machinery to ensure that the [compatibility] test was applied objectively, either by some outside body or through the establishment of a collegiate system for dealing with reservations which a large group of interested States considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty” (Summary records (A/CONF.39/11), Committee of the Whole, 21st meeting, para. 76).

1881 [727, 2009] By 48 votes to 14, with 25 abstentions (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2 (footnote 726 above), para. 182 (c)).

1882 [728, 2009] Viet Nam (Summary records (A/CONF.39/11) (footnote 726 above), Committee of the Whole, 21st meeting, 10 April 1968, para. 22), Ghana (22nd meeting, paras. 71 and 72), Italy (22nd meeting, 11 April 1968, para. 79), China (23rd meeting, 11 April 1968, para. 3), Singapore (23rd meeting, para. 16), New Zealand (24th meeting, 16 April 1968, para. 18), India (24th meeting, paras. 32 and 38), Zambia (24th meeting, para. 41). The Swedish representative, while supportive in principle of the idea of a monitoring mechanism, believed that the Japanese proposal was “no more than an attempt at solving the problem (22nd meeting, para. 32). See also the reservations expressed by the United States of America (24th meeting, para. 49) and by Switzerland (25th meeting, 16 April 1968, para. 9).

1883 [729, 2009] With regard to the amendment proposed by Japan and other delegations (see footnote 726 above), the view of the Expert Consultant was that “proposals of that kind, however attractive they seemed, would tilt the balance towards inflexibility and
One is, however, compelled to recognize that such clauses - however attractive they may seem intellectually, at all events fall short of resolving all the problems: in practice they do not encourage States parties to maintain the special vigilance that is to be expected of them and they leave important questions unanswered:

- Do such clauses make it impossible for States parties to avail themselves of the right to raise objections under article 20, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the Vienna Convention? Given the very broad latitude that States have in this regard, the answer must be in the negative; indeed, States objecting to reservations formulated under article 20 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination have maintained their objections even though their position did not receive the support of two thirds of the States parties, which is needed for an “objective” determination of incompatibility under article 20;

- On the other hand, the mechanism set up by article 20 dissuaded the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination established under the Convention from taking a position on the permissibility of reservations, which raises the issue of whether the Committee’s attitude is the result of a discretionary judgment or whether, in the absence of specific assessment mechanisms, the monitoring bodies have to refrain from taking a

might make general agreement on reservations more difficult. In any case, such a system might prove somewhat theoretical, since States did not readily object to reservations” (Summary records (A/CONF.39/11) (footnote 726 above), 24th meeting, 16 April 1968, para. 9).

It is possible, though, to question the value of a collegiate system when the very purpose of a reservation is precisely “to cover the position of a State, which regarded as essential a point on which a two-thirds majority had not been obtained” (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, Jiménez de Aréchaga, 654th meeting, 30 May 1962, para. 37). See also the sharp criticisms by Cassese (footnote 718 above), passim and, in particular, pp. 301-304.

On the question of State inertia in this regard, see the comments of the Expert Consultant during the Vienna Conference, footnote 729 above, and Imbert, footnote 547 above, pp. 146-147, or Riquelme Cortado (footnote 574 above), pp. 316-321.

“The Committee must take the reservations made by States parties at the time of ratification or accession into account: it has no authority to do otherwise. A decision - even a unanimous decision - by the Committee that a reservation is unacceptable could not have any legal effect” (Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/33/18), para. 374). On this subject, see the comments of P.-H. Imbert, “La question des réserves et les conventions en matière de droits de l’homme”, Actes du cinquième colloque sur la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (Paris: Pedone, 1982), pp. 125-126 (Human Rights Review, 1981, pp. 41-42); and Dinah Shelton, “State Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties”, Canadian Human Rights Yearbook, 1983, pp. 229-230. Recently, however, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has taken a somewhat more flexible position: for instance, in 2003, it stated with reference to a reservation made by Saudi Arabia that “the broad and imprecise nature of the State party’s general reservation raises concern as to its compatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention. The Committee encourages the State party to review the reservation with a view to formally withdrawing it” (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/58/18), para. 209).
position. Actually, nothing obliges them to do so; once it is recognized that such mechanisms take precedence over the procedures provided for in the treaty for determining the permissibility of reservations, and that the human rights treaty bodies are called upon to rule on that point as part of their mandate, they can do so in every instance, just as States can.

(5) In reality, the controversy raging on this issue among the commentators can be ascribed to the conjunction of several factors:

- The issue really arises only in connection with the human rights treaties;

- This is the case because, to begin with, it is in this area and only this area that modern treaties almost invariably create mechanisms to monitor the implementation of the norms that they enact; however, while it has never been contested that a judge or an arbitrator is competent to assess the permissibility of a reservation, including its compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty to which it refers, the human rights treaties endow the bodies which they establish with distinct powers (some - at the regional level - can issue binding decisions but others, including the Human Rights Committee, can address to States only general recommendations or recommendations related to an individual complaint);

- This is a relatively new phenomenon which was not taken into account by the drafters of the Vienna Convention;

- Furthermore, the human rights treaty bodies have held to a particularly broad concept of their powers in this field: not only have they recognized their own competence to assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty that established them, but they may have also seemed to consider that they had a decision-making power to that end, even when they are not otherwise so empowered and, applying the “divisibility” theory, they have declared that the States making the reservations they have

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judged to be invalid are bound by the treaty, including by the provision or provisions of the treaty to which the reservations applied;¹⁸⁹²

- In doing so, they have aroused the opposition of States, which do not expect to be bound by a treaty beyond the limits they accept; some States have even denied that the bodies in question have any jurisdiction in the matter;¹⁸⁹³

- This is compounded by the reactions of human rights activists and the doctrine peculiar to this area, which has done nothing to calm a contentious debate that is nevertheless largely artificial.

(6) In reality, the issue is unquestionably less complicated than is generally presented by commentators - which does not mean that the situation is entirely satisfactory. In the first place, there can be no doubt that the human rights treaty bodies are competent to assess the permissibility of a reservation, when the issue comes before them in the exercise of their functions, including the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty.¹⁸⁹⁴ Indeed, it must be acknowledged that the treaty bodies could not carry out their mandated functions if they could not be sure of the exact extent of their jurisdiction vis-à-vis the States concerned, whether in their consideration of claims by States or individuals or of periodic reports, or in their exercise of an advisory function; it is therefore part of their functions to assess the permissibility of reservations made by the States parties to the treaties establishing them.¹⁸⁹⁵ Secondly, in so doing, they have neither more nor less authority than in any other area: the Human Rights Committee and the other


¹⁸⁹⁴ [740, 2009] See para. 5 of the Commission’s 1997 preliminary conclusions on reservations to normative multilateral treaties including human rights treaties: "... where these treaties are silent on the subject, the monitoring bodies established thereby are competent to comment upon and express recommendations with regard, inter alia, to the admissibility of reservations by States, in order to carry out the functions assigned to them" (footnote 716 above, para. 157).

¹⁸⁹⁵ [741, 2009] For an exhaustive presentation of the position of the human rights treaty bodies, see the second report on reservations to treaties, A/CN.4/477/Add.1, paras. 193-210; see also Greig, (footnote 574 above), pp. 90-107; Riquelme Cortado, (footnote 574
international human rights treaty bodies which do not have decision-making power do not acquire it in the area of reservations; the regional courts which have the authority to issue binding decisions do have that power, but within certain limits. Thus, thirdly and lastly, while all the human rights treaty bodies (or dispute settlement bodies) may assess the permissibility of a contested reservation, they may not substitute their own judgment for the State’s consent to be bound by the treaty. It goes without saying that the powers of the treaty bodies do not affect the power of States to accept reservations or object to them, as established and regulated under articles 20, 21 and 23 of the Vienna Convention.

(7) Similarly, although guideline 3.2 does not expressly mention the possibility that national courts might have competence in such matters, neither does it exclude it: domestic courts are, from the viewpoint of international law, an integral part of the “State”, and they may, if need be, engage its responsibility. Hence, nothing prevents national courts, when necessary, from assessing the permissibility of reservations made by a State on the occasion of a dispute brought before them, including their compatibility with the object and purpose of a treaty.

(8) It follows that the competence to assess the permissibility of a reservation can also belong to international jurisdictions or arbitrators. This would clearly be the case if a treaty expressly provided for the intervention of a jurisdictional body to settle a dispute regarding the permissibility of reservations, but no reservation clause of this type seems to exist, even though the question easily


[742, 2009] See para. 8 of the Commission’s preliminary conclusions: “The Commission notes that the legal force of the findings made by the monitoring bodies in the exercise of their power to deal with reservations cannot exceed that resulting from the powers given to them for the performance of their general monitoring role” (footnote 716 above).

[743, 2009] The Commission has stated in this connection, in paras. 6 and 10 of its preliminary conclusions, that the competence of the monitoring bodies to assess the validity of reservations “does not exclude or otherwise affect the traditional modalities of control by the contracting parties ...” and “that, in the event of inadmissibility of the reservation, it is the reserving State that has the responsibility for taking action. This action may consist, for example, in the State either modifying its reservation so as to eliminate the inadmissibility, or withdrawing its reservation, or forgoing becoming a party to the treaty” (ibid.).

[744, 2009] See, however, Human Rights Committee general comment No. 24 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6), para. 18: “... It is an inappropriate task [the determination of the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty] for States parties in relation to human rights treaties ...”. This passage contradicts the preceding paragraph in which the Committee recognizes that “an objection to a reservation made by States may provide some guidance to the Committee in its interpretation as to its compatibility with the object and purpose of the Covenant”.


lends itself to a jurisdictional determination. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that such a dispute can be settled by any organ designated by the parties to rule on differences in interpretation or application of the treaty. It should therefore be understood that any general clause on settlement of disputes establishes the competence of the body designated by the parties in that respect. What is more, that was the position of the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 1951 on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

“It may be ... that certain parties, who consider that the assent given by other parties to a reservation is incompatible with the purpose of the Convention, will decide to adopt a position on the jurisdictional plane in respect of this divergence and to settle the dispute which thus arises either by special agreement or by the procedure laid down in Article IX of the Convention.”

(9) It must therefore be concluded that the competence to assess the permissibility of a reservation belongs, more generally, to the various entities that are called on to apply and interpret treaties: States, and, within the limits of their competence, their domestic courts, bodies for the settlement of disputes and monitoring of the application of the treaty; however, the positions that these bodies may adopt in such matters have no greater legal value than that accorded by their status: the verb “assess” that the Commission has chosen to use in the introductory sentence of guideline 3.2 is neutral and does not prejudge the question of the authority underlying the assessment. Similarly, the phrase “within their respective competences” indicates that the


1902 [748, 2009] On the role that dispute settlement bodies can play in this area, see guideline 3.2.5 below.

1903 [749, 2009] I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 27. Likewise, in its decision of 30 June 1977, the arbitral tribunal constituted for the Mer d’Iroise case was implicitly recognized as competent to rule on the permissibility of the French reservations “on the basis that the three reservations to article 6 [of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958] are true reservations and admissible” (Reports of the International Arbitral Awards, vol. XVIII, p. 40, para. 56). See also the position of the International Court of Justice concerning the permissibility of “reservations” (of a specific nature, it is true, and different from those covered in the Guide to Practice - cf. guideline 1.4.6 (Unilateral statements made under an optional clause) and the commentary thereto (Yearbook ... 2000, vol. II, Part Two, pp. 112-114), included in optional declarations of acceptance of its obligatory jurisdiction (see in particular the Judgment of 26 November 1957, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections), I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp. 141-144, the opinions of Judge Hersch Lauterpacht, individual in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Judgment of 6 July 1957, I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp. 43-45) and dissenting in the case of Interhandel (Judgment of 21 November 1959, I.C.J. Reports 1959, pp. 103-106 - see also the dissenting opinions of President Klaedstad and Judge Armand-Ugon, ibid., pp. 75 and 93). See also the orders of 2 June 1999 on Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), I.C.J. Report 1999, p. 772, para. 29 to 33; Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), ibid., pp. 923-924, paras. 21 to 25; and the order of 10 July 2002 on Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 246, para. 72.
competence of the dispute settlement and monitoring bodies to carry out such an assessment is not unlimited but corresponds to the competences accorded to these bodies by States.

(10) On the other hand, in accordance with the widely dominant principle of the “letter box depositary” endorsed by article 77 of the Vienna Convention of 1969, in principle the depositary can only take note of reservations of which it has been notified and transmit them to the contracting States without ruling on their permissibility.

(11) In adopting guideline 2.1.8, however, the Commission took the view that, from the perspective of the progressive development of international law, in the case of reservations that were in the depositary’s opinion manifestly impermissible, the depositary should draw “the attention of the author of the reservation to what, in the depositary’s view, constituted such impermissibility“. It is worth noting that at that time, “the Commission considered that it was not justified to make a distinction between the different types of ‘impermissibility’ listed in article 19” of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.

(12) The present situation regarding assessment of the permissibility of reservations to treaties, more particularly human rights treaties, is therefore one in which there is concurrence, or at least coexistence of several mechanisms for assessing the permissibility of reservations:

- One of these, which constitutes general law, is the purely inter-State mechanism provided for by the Vienna Conventions, which can be adapted by special reservation clauses contained in the treaties concerned;

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1908 [754, 2009] Commentary to guideline 2.1.8, ibid., para. (5).

Where the treaty establishes a body to monitor its implementation, it is accepted that this body can also assess the permissibility of reservations, the position taken thereby having no greater authority than that accorded by the status of the body in question;

However, this still leaves open the possibility for the States and international organizations parties to have recourse, where appropriate, to the customary methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, including jurisdictional or arbitral methods, in the event of a dispute arising among them concerning the permissibility of a reservation;\footnote{[756, 2009] Subject, however, to the possible existence of “self-contained regimes”, among which those instituted by the European and Inter-American Conventions on Human Rights or the African Charter should undoubtedly be included (cf. Bruno Simma, “Self-Contained Regimes”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 16 (1985), pp. 130 et seq., or Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 230 et seq.).}

It may well be, moreover, that national courts themselves, like those in Switzerland,\footnote{[757, 2009] See footnote 746 above.} also consider themselves entitled to determine the permissibility of a reservation in the light of international law.

(13) It is clear that the multiplicity of possibilities for assessment presents certain disadvantages, not least of which is the risk of conflict between the positions different parties might take on the same reservation (or on two identical reservations of different States).\footnote{[758, 2009] See, in particular, P.-H. Imbert, who refers to the risks of incompatibility within the European Convention system, in particular between the positions of the Court and the Committee of Ministers [“Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights Before the Strasbourg Commission: The Temeltasch Case”, R.G.D.I.P. 1983, pp. 617-619 (ICLQ, vol. 33 (1984), pp. 590-591)].} In fact, however, this risk is inherent in any assessment system - over time, any given body may take conflicting decisions - and it is perhaps better to have too much assessment than no assessment at all.

(14) A more serious danger is that constituted by the succession of assessments over time, in the absence of any limitation of the duration of the period during which the assessment may be carried out. In the case of the “Vienna regime”, article 20, paragraph 5, of the Convention, insofar as it is applicable, sets a time limit of 12 months following the date of receipt of notification of the reservation (or the expression by the objecting State of its consent to be bound) on the period during which a State may formulate an objection.\footnote{[759, 2009] It should be noted that the problem nevertheless arises because ratifications and accessions are spread over time.} A real problem arises, however, in all cases of jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional verification, which are unpredictable and depend on referral of
the question to the monitoring or settlement body. In order to overcome this problem, it has been proposed that the right of the monitoring bodies to give their opinion should also be limited to a 12-month period. Apart from the fact that none of the relevant texts currently in force provides for such a limitation, the limitation seems scarcely compatible with the very basis for action by monitoring bodies, which is designed to ensure compliance with the treaty by parties, including the preservation of the object and purpose of the treaty. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, one of the reasons why States lodge few objections is precisely that the 12-month rule often allows them insufficient time; the same problem is liable to arise a fortiori in the monitoring bodies, as a result of which the latter may find themselves paralysed.

(15) It could be concluded that the possibilities of cross-assessment in fact strengthen the opportunity for the reservations regime, and in particular the principle of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty, to play its real role. The problem is not one of setting up one possibility against another or of affirming the monopoly of one mechanism, but of combining them so as to strengthen their overall effectiveness, for while their modalities differ, their end purpose is the same: the aim in all cases is to reconcile the two conflicting but fundamental requirements of integrity of the treaty and universality of participation. It is only natural that the States that wished to conclude the treaty should be able to express their point of view; it is also natural that the monitoring bodies should play fully the role of guardians of treaties entrusted to them by the parties.

(16) This situation does not exclude - in fact it implies - a degree of complementarity among the various methods of assessment, as well as cooperation among the bodies concerned. In particular, it is essential that, in assessing the permissibility of a reservation, monitoring bodies (as well as


1916 [762, 2009] Meanwhile, it is the natural tendency of competent institutions to issue rulings; see the opposing points of view between the Human Rights Committee (“this is an inappropriate task for States parties in relation to human rights treaties” - general comment No. 24 (footnote 738 above), para. 18) and France (“it is [for States parties] and for them alone, unless the treaty states
dispute settlement bodies) should take fully into account the positions taken by the contracting parties through acceptances or objections. Conversely, States, which are required to abide by the decisions taken by monitoring bodies when they have given those bodies decision-making power, should pay serious attention to the well-thought-out and reasoned positions of those bodies, even when the bodies cannot take legally binding decisions.\textsuperscript{1917}

(17) The examination of competence to assess the permissibility of reservations both from the viewpoint of the object and purpose of a treaty and from that of treaty clauses excluding or limiting the ability to formulate reservations provided an opportunity to “revisit” some of the preliminary conclusions adopted by the Commission in 1997, in particular paragraphs 5, 6 and 8,\textsuperscript{1918} without there being any decisive element that would lead to a change in their meaning. Accordingly, the Commission felt that the time had come to reformulate them in order to include them in the form of guidelines in the Guide to Practice, without specifically mentioning human rights treaties, even though in practice it is mainly in reference to such treaties that the intertwining of powers to assess the permissibility of reservations poses a problem.

\textbf{3.2.1 Competence of the treaty monitoring bodies to assess the permissibility of reservations}

A treaty monitoring body may, for the purpose of discharging the functions entrusted to it, assess the permissibility of reservations formulated by a State or an international organization.

\textsuperscript{1917} See, however, the extremely strong reaction to general comment No. 24 found in the bill submitted to the United States Senate by Senator Helms on 9 June 1995 in terms of which “no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act nor any other Act, or otherwise made available may be obligated or expended for the conduct of any activity which has the purpose or effect of (A) reporting to the Human Rights Committee in accordance with article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or (B) responding to any effort by the Human Rights Committee to use the procedures of articles 41 and 42 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to resolve claims by other parties to the Covenant that the United States is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant, until the President has submitted to the Congress the certification described in para. (2).

\textsuperscript{1918} See, in particular, para. (6) above.
The conclusions formulated by such a body in the exercise of this competence shall have the same legal effect as that deriving from the performance of its monitoring role.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 3.2.1, like those that follow, defines the scope of the general guideline 3.2.

(2) Guideline 3.2 implies that the monitoring bodies established by the treaty are competent to assess the permissibility of reservations formulated by the contracting parties but does not expressly state this, unlike paragraph 5 of the preliminary conclusions adopted by the Commission in 1997, whereby even if the treaty is silent on the subject, the monitoring bodies established by normative multilateral treaties “are competent to comment upon and express recommendations with regard to the admissibility of reservations by States, in order to carry out the functions assigned to them”.

(3) The meaning of this last phrase is illuminated by paragraph 8 of the preliminary conclusions:

“The Commission notes that the legal force of the findings made by monitoring bodies in the exercise of their power to deal with reservations cannot exceed that resulting from the powers given to them for the performance of their general monitoring role.”

(4) Guideline 3.2.1 combines these two principles by recalling, in the first paragraph, that the treaty monitoring bodies are inevitably competent to assess the permissibility of reservations made to the treaty whose implementation they are responsible for overseeing and, in the second paragraph, that the legal force of the findings that they make in this respect cannot exceed that which is generally recognized for the instruments that they are competent to adopt.

(5) However, guideline 3.2.1. deliberately refrains from addressing the consequences of the assessment of the permissibility of a reservation: such consequences cannot be determined without a thorough study of the effects of the acceptance of reservations and of the objections that might be

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1919 [765, 2009] In the rarest cases, after a treaty has been adopted, a monitoring body can also be set up by collective decision of the parties or of an organ of an international organization - cf. the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Economic and Social Council resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985).

1920 [766, 2009] For more information on this point, see the commentary to guideline 3.2 above, in particular paras. (6) and (7).
made to them, a matter that falls within the purview of the fourth part of the Guide to Practice, on the effects of reservations and related statements.

3.2.2 Specification of the competence of treaty monitoring bodies to assess the permissibility of reservations

When providing bodies with the competence to monitor the application of treaties, States or international organizations should specify, where appropriate, the nature and the limits of the competence of such bodies to assess the permissibility of reservations. For the existing monitoring bodies, measures could be adopted to the same ends.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 3.2.2 reproduces the language of - and incorporates in the Guide to Practice, using slightly different wording - the recommendation set out in paragraph 7 of the preliminary conclusions of 1997.1921 This read as follows:

“7. The Commission suggests providing specific clauses in normative multilateral treaties, including in particular human rights treaties, or elaborating protocols to existing treaties if States seek to confer competence on the monitoring body to appreciate or determine the admissibility of a reservation.”

(2) It would certainly not be appropriate to include a provision of this type in draft articles intended for adoption in the form of an international convention. Such is not the case, however, of the Guide to Practice, which is understood to constitute a “code of recommended practices” designed to “guide” the practice of States and international organizations with regard to reservations but without being legally binding.1922 Moreover, the Commission already decided to include in the

Guide several guidelines clearly drafted in the form of a recommendation to States and international organizations.  

(3) In the same spirit, the Commission wished to recommend that States and international organizations should include in multilateral treaties that they conclude in the future and that provide for the establishment of a monitoring body, specific clauses conferring competence on that body to assess the permissibility of reservations and specifying the legal effect of such assessments.

(4) The Commission nevertheless wishes to point out that it does not purport in this guideline to take a position on the appropriateness of establishing such monitoring bodies. It merely considers that if such a body is established, it could be appropriate to specify the nature and limits of its competence to assess the permissibility of reservations in order to avoid any uncertainty and conflict in the matter. This is what is meant by the neutral wording that introduces the guideline: “When providing bodies with the competence to monitor the application of treaties ...”. In the same spirit, the expression “where appropriate” emphasizes the purely recommendatory nature of the guideline.

(5) This clarification obviously applies also to the second sentence of the guideline, which concerns existing monitoring bodies. Even though the Commission is aware of the practical difficulties that might arise from this recommendation, it considers such specifications to be advisable. They could be made by adopting protocols to be annexed to the existing treaty or by amending the treaty, or they could be contained in instruments of soft law adopted by the parties.

3.2.3 Cooperation of States and international organizations with treaty monitoring bodies

States and international organizations that have formulated reservations to a treaty establishing a treaty monitoring body are required to cooperate with that body and should give full consideration to that body’s assessment of the permissibility of the reservations that they have formulated.

1923 [769, 2009] See guideline 2.5.3 (Periodic review of the usefulness of reservations) and para. (5) of the commentary thereto, ibid.; see also guidelines 2.1.9 (Statement of reasons), 2.6.10 (Statement of reasons), 2.9.5 (Form of approval, opposition and recharacterization) and 2.9.6 (Statement of reasons for approval, opposition and recharacterization).
Commentary

(1) Guideline 3.2.3 reflects the spirit of the recommendation formulated in paragraph 9 of the preliminary conclusions of 1997, which states:

“9. The Commission calls upon States to cooperate with monitoring bodies and give due consideration to any recommendations that they may make or to comply with their determination if such bodies were to be granted competence to that effect in the future.” 1925

(2) This call to States and international organizations to cooperate with monitoring bodies is carried over into guideline 3.2.3, which has nonetheless been reformulated so as to remove the ambiguity in the wording adopted in 1997: the phrase “if such bodies were to be granted competence to that effect in the future” seems to imply that they do not have such competence at the present time. This is not so, since there is no question but that they may assess the permissibility of reservations to treaties whose observance they are required to monitor. 1926 On the other hand, they may not:

- Compel reserving States and international organizations to accept their assessment, since they do not have general decision-making power; 1927 or
- In any case, take the place of the author of the reservation in determining the consequences of the impermissibility of a reservation. 1928

(3) Although paragraph 9 of the preliminary conclusions is drafted as a recommendation (“The Commission calls upon States ...”), it seemed possible to adopt firmer wording in guideline 3.2.3: there is no doubt that contracting parties have a general duty to cooperate with the treaty monitoring bodies that they have established - which is what is evoked by the expression “are required to cooperate” in the first part of the guideline. Of course, if these bodies have been vested with decision-making power, which is currently only the case of regional human rights courts, the

1926  [772, 2009] See para. (6) of the commentary to guideline 3.2 above; see also the second report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/477/Add.1), paras. 206-209.
1927  [773, 2009] See the second paragraph of guideline 3.2.1 (sect. C.1 above) and A/CN.4/477/Add.1, paras. 234-240.
1928  [774, 2009] See para. 10 of the preliminary conclusions (see footnote 716 above) and the second report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/477/Add.1), paras. 218-230.
parties must respect their decisions, but this is currently not the case in practice except in the case of the regional human rights courts.\textsuperscript{1929} In contrast, the other monitoring bodies lack any legal decision-making power, both in the area of reservations and in other areas in which they possess declaratory powers.\textsuperscript{1930} Consequently, their conclusions are not legally binding, which explains the use of the conditional tense in the second part of the guideline and the merely recommendatory nature of the provision.

(4) Equally, treaty monitoring bodies should take into account the positions expressed by States and international organizations with respect to the reservation. This principle could be established in a future guideline 3.2.6 (Consideration of the positions of States by monitoring bodies)\textsuperscript{1931} and would constitute the indispensable counterpart to those set out in guideline 3.2.3.

3.2.4 Bodies competent to assess the permissibility of reservations in the event of the establishment of a treaty monitoring body

When a treaty establishes a treaty monitoring body, the competence of that body is without prejudice to the competence of the contracting States or contracting international organizations to assess the permissibility of reservations to that treaty, or to that of dispute settlement bodies competent to interpret or apply the treaty.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 3.2.4 further develops, from a particular angle and in the form of a “without prejudice” clause, the principle established in guideline 3.2 of the plurality of bodies competent to assess the permissibility of reservations.

(2) It should also be noted that the wording of guideline 3.2 takes up only part of the substance of paragraph 6 of the preliminary conclusions of 1997:\textsuperscript{1932} it lists the persons or institutions competent to rule on the permissibility of reservations but does not specify that such powers are cumulative and not exclusive of each other. The Commission considered it useful that this be spelled out in a separate guideline.

\textsuperscript{1929} [775, 2009] Given their very specific nature, these bodies - as is the case of all dispute settlement bodies - form the subject matter of a separate guideline; see guideline 3.2.5 below.

\textsuperscript{1930} [776, 2009] See the second paragraph of guideline 3.2.1, sect. C.1 above.
(3) As in the case of guideline 3.2.3, the monitoring bodies in question are those established by a treaty, not dispute settlement bodies whose competence in this area forms the subject matter of guideline 3.2.5.

3.2.5 Competence of dispute settlement bodies to assess the permissibility of reservations

When a dispute settlement body is competent to adopt decisions binding upon the parties to a dispute, and the assessment of the permissibility of a reservation is necessary for the discharge of such competence by that body, such assessment is, as an element of the decision, legally binding upon the parties.

Commentary

(1) The Commission found it necessary to draw a distinction between monitoring bodies in the strict sense, which have no decision-making power and whose competence to assess the permissibility of reservations forms the subject matter of guideline 3.2.3, and dispute settlement bodies that have been vested with decision-making power. Even though the regional human rights courts may in a broader sense be considered monitoring bodies, they are included in the second category because their decisions constitute res judicata. Such bodies also include those which, like the International Court of Justice, have general competence to settle disputes between States and which, in the event of a dispute involving a potentially broader subject matter, may be called upon to rule on the permissibility of a reservation.

(2) The statement that their assessment of the permissibility of a reservation “is, as an element of the decision, legally binding upon the parties” indicates that the principle established by the guideline applies not only to cases in which the dispute has a direct bearing on this question, but also to those cases, much more frequent, in which the permissibility of the reservation constitutes a related problem that must be resolved first so that the broader dispute submitted to the competent body can be settled.

1933 [779, 2009] See, however, footnote 765 above.
It goes without saying that in any event the decision\textsuperscript{1934} of the dispute settlement body is binding solely on the parties to the dispute in question, and only to the extent of the authority of the dispute settlement body to make such a decision.

3.3 \textbf{Consequences of the non-permissibility of a reservation}

A reservation formulated in spite of a prohibition arising from the provisions of the treaty or in spite of its incompatibility with the object and the purpose of the treaty is impermissible, without there being any need to distinguish between the consequences of these grounds for non-permissibility.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) Guideline 3.3 establishes the unity of the rules applicable to the consequences of the non-permissibility of a reservation, whatever the reason for such non-permissibility, among those set out in guideline 3.1.

(2) Just as it does not specify the consequences of the formulation of a reservation prohibited, either expressly (subparagraph (a)) or implicitly (subparagraph (b)), by the treaty to which it refers, so article 19 of the Vienna Conventions makes no reference to the effects of the formulation of a reservation prohibited by subparagraph (c),\textsuperscript{1935} and nothing in the text of the Vienna Convention indicates how these provisions relate to those of article 20, concerning acceptance of reservations and objections. The question has been raised as to whether this “normative gap”\textsuperscript{1936} may not have been deliberately created by the authors of the Convention.\textsuperscript{1937}

(3) It must in any case be acknowledged that the \textit{travaux préparatoires} for subparagraph (c) are confused and do not provide any clearer indications of the consequences that the drafters of the

\textsuperscript{1934} Or “findings”, if it is assumed that a non-judicial body may, in the exercise of its competence, be called upon to assess the permissibility of a reservation.

\textsuperscript{1935} Cf. Greig, (footnote 574 above), p. 83.

\textsuperscript{1936} Horn, (footnote 574 above), p. 131; see also Combacau (footnote 750 above), p. 199.

\textsuperscript{1937} See Imbert, (footnote 547 above), pp. 137-140.
Convention intended to draw from the incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention:

- In draft article 17 proposed by Waldock in 1962, the object and purpose of the treaty appeared only as guidance for the reserving State itself;

- The debates on that draft were particularly confused during the Commission’s plenary meetings and, more than anything else, revealed a split between members who advocated an individual assessment by States and those who were in favour of a collegial mechanism, without the consequences of such assessment being really discussed;

- However, after the Drafting Committee had recast the draft along lines very close to the wording of the present article 19, the overriding feeling seems to have been that the object and purpose constituted a criterion by which the permissibility of the reservation should be assessed. This is attested by the new amendment to article 18 bis, which entailed, on the one hand, the inclusion of the criterion of incompatibility and, on the other hand, and most importantly, the modification of the title of that provision, which became “The legal effect of reservations” instead of “The validity of reservations”, which shows that their permissibility is the subject of draft article 17 (which became article 19 of the Convention);

- The deft wording of the commentary to draft articles 18 and 20 (corresponding respectively to articles 19 and 21 of the Convention) adopted in 1962 leaves the question open: it affirms both that the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty is the criterion governing the formulation of reservations and that, since this criterion “is to some extent a matter of subjective appreciation ... the only means of applying it in most cases will be through the individual State’s acceptance or rejection of

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1938 [784, 2009] It should be recalled that this criterion was included in the draft belatedly, going back only to Waldock’s first report in 1962 (A/CN.4/144, Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, pp. 66-67, para. 10); see also the oral presentation by Waldock, Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 651st meeting, 25 May 1962, p. 139, paras. 4-6.

1939 [785, 2009] Article 17, para. 2 (a): see ibid.; see also the remarks by the Special Rapporteur at the fourteenth session (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 651st meeting, 25 May 1962, para. 85).


1941 [787, 2009] See para. (3) of the commentary to guideline 3.2 above.

1942 [788, 2009] See in particular Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, pp. 225-234. During the discussion on new article 18 bis, entitled “The validity of reservations”, all the members referred to the criterion of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty, which was not mentioned, however, in the draft adopted by the Drafting Committee.

the reservation”, but only “in the absence of a tribunal or an organ with standing competence”;  

- In his 1965 report, the Special Rapporteur also noted, in connection with draft article 19 relating to treaties that are silent on the question of reservations (subsequently, article 20 of the Convention), that “the Commission recognized that the ‘compatibility’ criterion is to some extent subjective and that views may differ as to the compatibility of a particular reservation with the object and purpose of a given treaty. In the absence of compulsory adjudication, on the other hand, it felt that the only means of applying the criterion is through the individual State’s acceptance or rejection of the reservation”; it also recognized that “the rules proposed by the Commission might be more readily acceptable if their interpretation and application were made subject to international adjudication”;  

- The Commission’s commentaries on draft articles 16 and 17 (subsequently 19 and 20 respectively) are no longer so clear, however, and confine themselves to indicating that “the admissibility or otherwise of a reservation under paragraph (c) ... is in every case very much a matter of the appreciation of the acceptability of the reservation by the other contracting States” and that, for that reason, draft article 16 (c) should be understood “in close conjunction with the provisions of article 17 regarding acceptance of and objection to reservations”;  

- At the Vienna Conference, some delegations tried to put more content into the criterion of the object and purpose of the treaty. Accordingly, the Mexican delegation proposed that the consequences of a judicial decision recognizing the incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty should be spelled out. However, it was mainly

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1947 [793, 2009] United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, First Session, Summary Records (A/CONF.39/11), Plenary Commission, 21st meeting, 10 April 1968, para. 63. Mexico proposed two solutions. The first was that the State that had formulated the incompatible reservation should be obliged to withdraw it, failing which it should forfeit the right to become a party to the treaty; and the second was that the treaty in its entirety should be deemed not to be in force between the reserving State and the objecting State.
those in favour of a system of collegial assessment who tried to draw concrete conclusions from the incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty.1948

(4) Moreover, nothing, either in the text of article 19 or in the travaux préparatoires, gives grounds for thinking that a distinction should be made between the different cases: *ubi lex non distinguít, nec nos distinguere debemus*. In all three cases, as clearly emerges from the chapeau of article 19, a State is prevented from formulating a reservation and, once it is accepted that a reservation prohibited by the treaty is null and void by virtue of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 19, there is no reason to draw different conclusions from subparagraph (c). Three objections, of unequal weight, have nevertheless been raised to this conclusion.

(5) First, it has been pointed out that, whereas the depositaries reject reservations prohibited by the treaty, they communicate to other contracting States the text of those that are, *prima facie*, incompatible with its object and purpose.1949 Such indeed is the practice followed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,1950 albeit that its significance is only relative. For “only if there is no doubt that the statement accompanying the instrument is an unauthorized reservation does the Secretary-General refuse the deposit ... In case of doubt, the Secretary-General shall request clarification from the State concerned ... However, the Secretary-General feels that it is not incumbent upon him to request systematically such clarifications; rather, it is for the States concerned to raise, if they so wish, objections to statements which they would consider to constitute unauthorized reservations”.1951 In other words, the difference noted in the practice of the Secretary-General is not based on the distinction between the situations in subparagraphs (a) and (b) on the one hand and subparagraph (c) on the other of article 19, but on the certainty that the reservation is contrary to the treaty. When an interpretation is necessary, the Secretary-General relies on States; such is always the case when the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty; it may also be so when the reservations are expressly or implicitly prohibited.

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1948 [794, 2009] See in particular the statements of the various delegations cited above, commentary to guideline 3.2, para. (3), footnotes 726 to 730 above.


1950 [796, 2009] See the *Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties* (ST/LEG/7/Rev.1), New York, 1997, paras. 191 and 192.

1951 [797, 2009] *Ibid.*, paras. 194-196, emphasis added. The practice followed by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe is similar, except that, in the event of difficulty, he or she may consult (and does consult) the Committee of Ministers (see J. Polakiewicz, *Treaty-making in the Council of Europe*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1999, pp. 90-93).
Furthermore, in guideline 2.1.8 of the Guide to Practice, the International Law Commission, in a context of progressive development, considered that “Where, in the opinion of the depositary, a reservation is manifestly invalid, the depositary shall draw the attention of the author of the reservation to what, in the depositary’s view, constitutes the grounds for the invalidity of the reservation”. To that end, “the Commission considered that it was not justified to make a distinction between the different types of ‘impermissibility’ listed in article 19”.  

(6) Secondly, it has been pointed out in the same spirit that in the situation in subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reserving State could not be unaware of the prohibition and that, for that reason, it should be assumed to have accepted the treaty as a whole, notwithstanding its reservation (doctrine of “divisibility”). There is no doubt that it is less easy to determine objectively that a reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty than it is when there is a prohibition clause. The remark is certainly relevant, although not decisive. It is less obvious than is sometimes thought to determine the scope of reservation clauses, especially when the prohibition is implicit, as in the situation in subparagraph (b). Furthermore, it may be difficult to determine whether or not a unilateral statement is a reservation, and the State concerned may have thought in good faith that it had not violated the prohibition, while considering that its consent to be bound by the treaty depended on the acceptance of its interpretation thereof. In fact, while a State is assumed not to be ignorant of the prohibition resulting from a reservation clause, by the same token it must be aware that it cannot divest a treaty of its substance through a reservation that is incompatible with the treaty’s object and purpose.

(7) Thirdly and most importantly, it has been argued that paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 20 describe a single case in which the possibility of accepting a reservation is limited: when the treaty contains a contrary provision; a contrario, this would allow for complete freedom to accept reservations,  

1955 [801, 2009] On the distinction between reservations, on the one hand, and interpretative declarations, whether simple or conditional, on the other, see guidelines 1.3 to 1.3.3 and the commentaries thereto, Yearbook ... 1999, vol. II, pp. 107-112.  
1956 [802, 2009] The wording used in both provisions is “... unless the treaty otherwise provides ...”.  

notwithstanding the provisions of article 19, subparagraph (c). 1957 While it is true that, in practice, States infrequently object to reservations that are very possibly contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty to which they relate and that, as a consequence, the rule contained in article 19, subparagraph (c), 1958 is deprived of concrete effect, at least in the absence of an organ which is competent to take decisions in that regard, 1959 1958 many arguments based on the text of the Convention itself conflict with that reasoning:

- Articles 19 and 20 of the Convention have distinct purposes; the rules that they establish are applicable at different stages of the formulation of a reservation: article 19 sets out the cases in which a reservation may not be formulated; article 20 describes what happens when it has been formulated; 1960

- The proposed interpretation would strip article 19, subparagraph (c), of all useful effect: as a consequence, a reservation that is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty would have exactly the same effect as a compatible reservation;

- It also renders meaningless article 21, paragraph 1, which stipulates that a reservation is “established” only “in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23”; 1961 and

- It introduces a distinction between the scope of article 19, subparagraphs (a) and (b), on the one hand and article 19, subparagraph (c), on the other, which the text in no way authorizes. 1962

(8) Consequently, there is nothing in the text of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions, or in its context, or in the travaux préparatoires for the Conventions, or even in the practice of States or depositaries to justify drawing such a distinction between the consequences, on the one hand, of the

formulation of a reservation in spite of a treaty-based prohibition (article 19 (a) and (b)) and, on the other, of its incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty (article 19 (c)). However, some members of the Commission consider that this conclusion is too categorical and that the effects of these various types of reservation could differ.

3.3.1 Non-permissibility of reservations and international responsibility

The formulation of an impermissible reservation produces its consequences pursuant to the law of treaties and does not, in itself, engage the international responsibility of the State or international organization which has formulated it.

Commentary

(1) Once it has been accepted that, in accordance with guideline 3.3, the three subparagraphs of article 19 (reproduced in guideline 3.1) have the same function and that a reservation that is contrary to their provisions is impermissible, it still remains to be seen what happens when, in spite of these prohibitions, a State or an international organization formulates a reservation. If it does so, the reservation certainly cannot have the legal effects which, pursuant to article 21, are clearly contingent on its “establishment” “in accordance with articles 19 [in its entirety], 20 and 23”.1963

(2) Whatever its effects,1964 the question remains: on the one hand, should it be concluded that, by proceeding thus, the author of the reservation is committing an internationally wrongful act which engages its international responsibility? On the other hand, are other parties prevented from accepting a reservation formulated in spite of the prohibitions contained in article 19?

(3) With regard to the first of these two questions, it has been argued that a reservation that is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty1965 “amounts to a breach of [the] obligation” arising from article 19, subparagraph (c). “Therefore, it is a wrongful act, entailing such State’s responsibility vis-à-vis each other party to the treaty. It does not amount to a breach of the treaty itself, but rather of the general norm embodied in the Vienna Convention forbidding ‘incompatible’

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1963 [809, 2009] Article 21 (Legal effects of reservations and of objections to reservations): “A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23 ...”.
1964 [810, 2009] These will form the subject of the fourth part of the Guide to Practice.
1965 [811, 2009] This should also hold true a fortiori for reservations prohibited by the treaty.
reservations.” This reasoning, based expressly on the rules governing the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, is not entirely convincing.

(4) It is clear that “There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character”, and that a breach of an obligation not to act (in this case, not to formulate a reservation which is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty) is an internationally wrongful act liable to engage the international responsibility of a State in the same way as an obligation to act. However, that question has not yet arisen in the sphere of the law of responsibility. As the International Court of Justice forcefully recalled in the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, that branch of law and the law of treaties “obviously have a scope that is distinct”; while “a determination of whether a convention is or is not in force, and whether it has or has not been properly suspended or denounced, is to be made pursuant to the law of treaties,” it falls to this same branch of law to determine whether or not a reservation may be formulated. It follows, at the very least, that the potential responsibility of a reserving State cannot be determined in the light of the Vienna rules and that that responsibility is not relevant to the “law of reservations”. Furthermore, even if damage is not a requirement for engaging the responsibility of a State, it conditions the implementation of the latter and, in particular, reparation whereas, for an impermissible reservation to have concrete consequences in the sphere of the law of responsibility, the State relying on it must be able to invoke an injury, which is highly unlikely.

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1971 [817, 2009] See in this connection article 1 of the Commission’s articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, footnote 813, above.
(5) There is more, however. It is telling that no State has ever, when formulating an objection to a prohibited reservation, invoked the responsibility of the reserving State: the consequences of the observation that a reservation is not permissible may be varied, but they never constitute an obligation to make reparation and if an objecting State were to invite the reserving State to withdraw its reservation or to amend it within the framework of the “reservations dialogue”, it would be acting not in the sphere of the law of responsibility but in that of the law of treaties alone.

(6) That is in fact why the Commission, which had at first used the term “illicite” as an equivalent to the English word “impermissible” to describe reservations formulated in spite of the provisions of article 19, decided in 2002 to reserve its position on this matter pending an examination of the effect of such reservations. It seems certain that the formulation of a reservation excluded by any of the subparagraphs of article 19 falls within the sphere of the law of treaties and not within that of responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. Accordingly, it does not entail the responsibility of the reserving State. While this seems self-evident, the Commission’s intention in adopting guideline 3.3.1 was to remove any remaining ambiguity.

(7) A minority view within the Commission holds that an exception to the principle set out in guideline 3.3.1 could arise when the reservation in question was incompatible with a peremptory norm of general international law, in which case it would entail the international responsibility of the reserving State. While some other members of the Commission doubt that a reservation could breach jus cogens, the majority considers that, in any case, the mere formulation of a reservation cannot of itself entail the responsibility of its author. The phrase “in itself” nonetheless leaves open the possibility that the responsibility of the reserving State or international organization might be engaged as a result of the effects produced by such a reservation.

1973 [819, 2009] They arise, a contrario, from article 20 and, above all, article 21 of the Vienna Conventions.
1975 [821, 2009] Much less that of States which implicitly accept a reservation that is prohibited or incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty - see, however, Lijnzaad, (footnote 574 above), p. 56: “The responsibility for incompatible reservations is ... shared by reserving and accepting States” - but it appears from the context that the author does not consider either the incompatible reservation or its acceptance as internationally wrongful acts; rather than “responsibility” in the strictly legal sense, it is no doubt necessary to refer here to “accountability” in the sense of having to provide an explanation.
3.3.2 [3.3.3] Effect of individual acceptance of an impermissible reservation

Acceptance of an impermissible reservation by a contracting State or by a contracting organization shall not cure the nullity of the reservation.

Commentary

(1) According to the first part of guideline 3.3 (Consequences of the non-permissibility of a reservation), “a reservation formulated in spite of a prohibition arising from the provisions of the treaty or in spite of its incompatibility with the object and the purpose of the treaty is impermissible”. The provision makes it clear that the impermissibility of the reservation results *ipso facto* from one of the grounds listed in article 19 of the Vienna Conventions and reproduced in guideline 3.1 of the Guide to Practice. In other words, either the prohibition (explicit or implicit) of the reservation or alternatively its incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for its impermissibility.

(2) Consequently, it is clear that the acceptance of a reservation by a contracting State or international organization formulated notwithstanding article 19, subparagraphs (a) and (b), cannot cure this impermissibility, which is the “objective” consequence of the prohibition of the reservation or of its incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. That is what is explained in guideline 3.3.2.

(3) Waldock, in his capacity as Expert Consultant, clearly expressed his support for this solution at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties when he stated that a contracting State could not purport, under article 17 [current article 20], to accept a reservation prohibited under article 16 [19], paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), because, by prohibiting the reservation, the contracting States would expressly have excluded such acceptance.

(4) The logical consequence of the “impossibility” of accepting a reservation that is impermissible either under subparagraph (a) or (b) of article 19 (or of guideline 3.1), or under paragraph (c) — which follows exactly the same logic and which there is no reason to distinguish

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from the other two paragraphs of the provision — is that such an acceptance is devoid of legal effect. It cannot “permit” the reservation, nor can it cause the reservation to produce any effect whatsoever – and certainly not the effect envisaged in article 21, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions, which requires that the reservation must have been established. Furthermore, if the acceptance of an impermissible reservation constituted an agreement between the author of the impermissible reservation and the State or international organization that accepted it, it would result in a modification of the treaty in relations between the two parties; that would be incompatible with article 41, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), of the Vienna Conventions, which excludes any modification of the treaty if it relates “to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole”. However, according to a different view, the prevailing practice shows that a State party to a treaty may consider the treaty to apply subject to the reservation in its relations with the reserving State, whether or not the reservation is regarded as invalid by other States or international organizations.

(5) Despite some views to the contrary, the Commission considers that this guideline should be included in Part 3 of the Guide to Practice relating to the permissibility of reservations and not in Part 4 concerning their consequences: it is a question of identifying not the effect of acceptance of an impermissible reservation, but rather the effect of acceptance on the permissibility of the reservation itself (an issue which arises earlier in the process than the question of the effect of reservations). Permissibility logically precedes acceptance (the Vienna Conventions also follow this logic) and draft guideline 3.3.2 relates to the permissibility of the reservation – in other words, to the fact that acceptance cannot change its impermissibility. Its aim is not to determine the effects of acceptance of a reservation by a State, but simply to establish that, if the reservation in question is impermissible, it remains impermissible despite an acceptance.

1979 [350, 2010] See the last part of guideline 3.3 (Consequences of the impermissibility of a reservation): “A reservation formulated in spite of a prohibition arising from the provisions of the treaty or in spite of its incompatibility with the object and the purpose of the treaty is impermissible, without there being any need to distinguish between the consequences of these grounds for non-permissibility.”

1980 [351, 2010] See below guideline 4.5.3 [4.5.4] (Reactions to an invalid reservation) and the commentary thereto.

1981 [352, 2010] See guidelines 4.2.1 to 4.2.5 above and the commentaries thereto.

(6) Individual acceptance of an impermissible reservation has no effect as such on the consequences of this nullity, which are specified in Part 4 of the Guide to Practice. The question of the consequences of acceptance in terms of the effects of the reservation is not and should not be raised; the inquiry stops at the stage of permissibility, which is not and cannot be acquired as a result of the acceptance.

(7) Guideline 3.4.1 (Permissibility of the acceptance of a reservation) very clearly confirms this point of view. It provides that the express acceptance of an impermissible reservation also cannot have any effect; it, too, is impermissible. Guidelines 3.3.2 and 3.4.1 answer the question of the effect of an acceptance of an impermissible reservation: it can have no effect on either the permissibility of the reservation — apart from the special case envisaged in guideline 3.3.3 — or, a fortiori, on the legal consequences of the nullity of an impermissible reservation. These are dealt with in section 4.5 of the Guide to Practice.

3.3.3 [3.3.4] Effect of collective acceptance of an impermissible reservation

A reservation that is prohibited by the treaty or which is incompatible with its object and purpose shall be deemed permissible if no contracting State or contracting organization objects to it after having been expressly informed thereof by the depositary at the request of a contracting State or a contracting organization.

Commentary

(1) The principle set out in guideline 3.3.2 must be accompanied by an important caveat: it applies only to acceptances by States and international organizations on an individual basis. While there is little doubt that an individual acceptance by a contracting State or contracting organization cannot have the effect of “permitting” an impermissible reservation or produce any other effect in relation to the reservation or the treaty, the situation is different where all the contracting States and contracting organizations expressly approve a reservation that — without this unanimous acceptance — would be impermissible, which is the scenario contemplated in guideline 3.3.3.

In contrast to collective acceptance which is addressed in guideline 3.3.3. The term “individual acceptance” is also used in guideline 2.8.9 to refer to the acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization by a State or an international organization as opposed to acceptance by the competent body of the organization in question.

Guideline 3.4.1 reads: “The express acceptance of an impermissible reservation is itself impermissible.”
(2) More specifically, the situation envisaged in the present guideline is as follows: a reservation that is prohibited (explicitly or implicitly) by the treaty or which is incompatible with its object and purpose is formulated by a State or an international organization. Subsequently, another contracting State or contracting organization which regards the reservation as impermissible requests the depositary to communicate this position to all the contracting States and contracting organizations but does not raise an objection. Following such notification by the depositary, if no contracting State or organization, duly alerted, objects to the reservation producing its intended effects, it is then “deemed permissible”.

(3) Draft article 17 (1) (b) proposed by Waldock in 1962 envisaged “the exceptional case of an attempt to formulate a reservation of a kind which is actually prohibited or excluded by the terms of the treaty”, he proposed that, in such case, “the prior consent of all the other interested States” is required. This provision was not retained in the Commission’s draft articles of 1962 or 1966 and does not appear in the Convention.

(4) Silence does not solve the problem. Indeed, it can be argued that the parties always have a right to amend the treaty by general agreement inter se in accordance with article 39 of the Vienna Conventions and that nothing prevents them from adopting a unanimous agreement to that end on the subject of reservations. This possibility, which accords with the principle of consent that
underpins all the law of treaties, nevertheless poses some very difficult problems. The first problem is whether the absence of objections by all the other parties within a 12-month period is equivalent to a unanimous agreement constituting an amendment to the reservation clause. At first sight, article 20, paragraph 5, of the Convention seems to answer this in the affirmative.

(5) However, after further consideration, this is not necessarily the case: silence on the part of a State party does not mean that it is taking a position as to the permissibility of the reservation; at most, it means that the reservation may be invoked against it and that the State undertakes not to object to it in the future. This is shown by the fact that it cannot be argued that monitoring bodies — whether the International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal or a human rights treaty body — are prevented from assessing the permissibility of a reservation even if no objection has been raised to it.

(6) The idea underlying this draft guideline is, moreover, supported to some extent by practice. Although it is not, strictly speaking, a case of unanimous acceptance by the parties to a treaty, the neutrality reservation formulated by Switzerland upon acceding to the Covenant of the League of Nations is an example in which, despite the prohibition of reservations, the reserving State was admitted into the circle of States parties. This “precedent” does not, however, help to prove the existence of a customary norm along those lines. Thus, rather than leaving a gap on an issue that could arise, the Commission should approach it from the standpoint of lex ferenda and progressive development of international law.

particular subparagraph (c), constitute peremptory norms of general international law from which the parties may not derogate by agreement.


1995 [366, 2010] See D.W. Greig, footnote 353 above, pp. 57–58. Even during the Commission’s debate in 1962, Bartoš had made the point that it was almost inconceivable that the simple operation of time limits for the making of objections could mean that a clearly invalid reservation “could no longer be challenged” (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 654th meeting, 30 May 1962, p. 163, para. 29).

1996 [367, 2010] See Maurice H. Mendelson, “Reservations to the Constitutions of International Organizations”, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 45 (1971), pp. 140–141. The probative value of this example is somewhat lessened by the fact that the principle of unanimity was applied; yet the fact remains that a clearly invalid reservation succeeded in producing its effects by reason of the unanimous agreement of the parties.
(7) That is the approach taken in guideline 3.3.3. Its wording is based in part on the solution chosen by the Commission on the subject of the late formulation of a reservation. In this case it has concluded that a reservation that is prohibited by the treaty or is clearly contrary to its object and purpose may not be formulated unless none of the other contracting parties objects, after having been duly consulted by the depositary.

(8) The Commission nevertheless considered that it should proceed cautiously. This explains the phrase “shall be deemed permissible if”, which is intended to indicate that, while the reservation remains impermissible in principle, the subsequent agreement of the parties has, in fact, modified the original treaty, thereby enabling the author of the reservation to avail itself of the reservation after all. Furthermore, the phrase should be understood as allowing for the possibility of the reservation being declared impermissible on other grounds by a body competent to decide on such matters.

(9) The phrase “at the request of a contracting State or a contracting organization” appearing at the end of the guideline is intended to make it clear that the initiative must come from the contracting parties and that the Commission does not intend to derogate from the strict limits laid down by article 77 of the 1969 Vienna Convention and article 78 of the 1986 Vienna Conventions concerning the functions of depositaries. The phrase is also in keeping with part of the rationale behind the present guideline, which aims to facilitate the reservations dialogue.

(10) The Commission is aware that guideline 3.3.3 does not take a position on the time period within which contracting States and organizations must react (or be deemed not to have objected to the reservation producing its effects). It might be thought that the “customary” 12-month period, within which, in accordance with the provisions of article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions, guideline 2.6.13 allows States to object to a reservation, would be appropriate. However, legally, such a transposition is not inevitable: all the parties to a treaty always have the right to modify it by agreement without any time limit. On the other hand, allowing for this possibility to remain open indefinitely could undermine the security of treaty relations. Faced with

1997 [368, 2010] Guideline 2.3.1 (Late formulation of a reservation) reads: “Unless the treaty provides otherwise, a State or an international organization may not formulate a reservation to a treaty after expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty except if none of the other Contracting Parties objects to the late formulation of the reservation.”

such conflicting considerations, the Commission has preferred to leave matters open. The silence of
the guideline on this point implies that the contracting States and organizations should react within
a reasonable period of time.\textsuperscript{1999}

(11) Like guideline 3.3.2,\textsuperscript{2000} guideline 3.3.3 is placed in Part 3 of the Guide to Practice on the
permissibility of reservations. In any event, it would be illogical to place such a draft guideline in
the part that deals with the effects of invalid reservations. By definition, the reservation in question
here has become permissible by reason of the unanimous acceptance or the absence of unanimous
objection.

\textbf{3.4 Permissibility of reactions to reservations\textsuperscript{2001}}

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) Unlike the case of reservations, the Vienna Conventions do not set forth any criteria or
conditions for the permissibility of reactions to reservations, although acceptances and objections
occupy a substantial place as a means for States and international organizations to give or refuse
their consent to a permissible reservation. Such reactions do not, however, constitute criteria for the
permissibility of a reservation that can be evaluated objectively in accordance with the conditions
established in article 19 of the Vienna Conventions and independently of the acceptances or
objections to which the reservation has given rise. They are a way for States and international
organizations to express their point of view regarding the permissibility of a reservation, but the
permissibility (or impermissibility) of a reservation must be evaluated independently of the

\textsuperscript{2000} As the International Court of Justice underlined in the context of rules governing the termination of treaties:
“Precisely what periods of time may be involved in the observance of the duties to consult and negotiate, and what period of notice
of termination should be given, are matters which necessarily vary according to the requirements of the particular case. In principle,
therefore, it is for the parties in each case to determine the length of those periods by consultation and negotiation in good faith.
Some indications as to the possible periods involved, as the Court has said, can be seen in provisions of host agreements, including
Section 37 of the Agreement of 25 March 1951, as well as in article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and in the
corresponding article of the International Law Commission’s draft articles on treaties between States and international organizations
or between international organizations. But what is reasonable and equitable in any given case must depend on its particular
circumstances.” (Advisory Opinion of 20 December 1980,
\textit{Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
\textit{Egypt}}, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 96; see also International Court of Justice Judgment of 26 November 1984,
\textit{Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)}, Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the
\textsuperscript{2001} The Special Rapporteur wishes to recall that he remains convinced that these two guidelines do not
belong in the Part 3 of the Guide to Practice (with, perhaps, the very marginal exception of certain extremely
hypothetical objections “with intermediate effect”).
acceptances or objections to which it gave rise. Moreover, this idea is clearly expressed in guideline 3.3 (Consequences of the impermissibility of a reservation). The fact remains, however, that acceptances and objections constitute a way for States and international organizations to express their point of view regarding the permissibility of a reservation, and they may accordingly be taken into account in assessing the permissibility of a reservation.²⁰⁰²

(2) The travaux préparatoires of the Vienna regime in respect of objections leave no doubt as to the lack of connection between the permissibility of a reservation and the reactions thereto.²⁰⁰³ It also follows that while it may be appropriate to refer to the “permissibility” of an objection or acceptance, the term does not have the same connotation as in the case of reservations themselves. The main issue is whether the objection or acceptance can produce its full effects. This is why, according to one view, guidelines 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 should have been placed, not in the part of the Guide to Practice dealing with the permissibility of reservations and related unilateral declarations,²⁰⁰⁴ but in the part on the effects of reservations and of these other declarations (Guide, Part 4).

3.4.1 Permissibility of the acceptance of a reservation

The express acceptance of an impermissible reservation is itself impermissible.

Commentary

(1) This guideline is based on the idea that, in the light of the travaux préparatoires, the Vienna Convention does in fact establish some connection and puts forward the principle that the impermissibility of the reservation has some implications for its acceptance.²⁰⁰⁵

(2) It seems clear that contracting States or international organizations can freely accept a reservation that is permissible and that the permissibility of such acceptances cannot be

²⁰⁰² [373, 2010] See below the commentary to guideline 4.5.3 [4.5.4].
²⁰⁰³ [374, 2010] See above the commentary to guideline 2.6.3, paras. 4–6.
²⁰⁰⁴ [375, 2010] See the draft guideline originally proposed by the Special Rapporteur: “3.4 Substantive validity of acceptances and objections: Acceptances of reservations and objections to reservations are not subject to any condition of substantive validity.” (Fourteenth report, A/CN.4/614/Add.1, para. 127).
²⁰⁰⁵ [376, 2010] According to a minority theory ("effects"), the impermissibility of the reservation does not nullify its acceptance but prevents it from producing effects (see guideline 4.5.3 [4.5.4]).
questioned.\textsuperscript{2006} However, according to a majority of members of the Commission, such is not the case where a State or an international organization accepts a reservation that is impermissible.

(3) While acceptance cannot determine the permissibility of a reservation, commentators have argued that the opposite is not true:

An acceptance of an inadmissible reservation is theoretically not possible. Directly or indirectly prohibited reservations under article 19 (1) (a) and (b) cannot be accepted by any confronted state. Such reservations and acceptances of these will not have any legal effects. (…) Similarly, an incompatible reservation under article 19 (1) (c) should be regarded as incapable of acceptance and as eo ipso invalid and without any legal effect.\textsuperscript{2007}

(4) This is the view that the Commission has adopted. It has considered that the express acceptance of a reservation could have effects, if not on the permissibility of a reservation as such, then at least on the assessment of such permissibility, in that such a declaration, which is derived from a deliberate and considered act of a State or an international organization, must at least be taken into consideration by those who are assessing the permissibility or impermissibility of the reservation.

(5) The principle put forward in guideline 3.4.1 must be accompanied by two major caveats, however. Firstly — as the wording itself indicates — it applies only to express acceptances (which are exceedingly rare in practice) and excludes tacit acceptances. Second, what the contracting parties cannot do individually they can do collectively, in that the Commission has taken the view that conversely, when all of the contracting parties accept a reservation, this unanimity creates an agreement among the parties that modifies the treaty.\textsuperscript{2008}


\textsuperscript{2007} See F. Horn, footnote 321 above, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{2008} See above guideline 3.3.3 [3.3.4]. See also the commentary to guideline 2.3.1, in particular para. (8) \textit{(Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10)}, para. 186), and the commentary to guideline 2.3.5, in particular para. (7) \textit{(Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10)}, p. 271).
3.4.2 Permissibility of an objection to a reservation

An objection to a reservation by which a State or an international organization purports to exclude in its relations with the author of the reservation the application of provisions of the treaty to which the reservation does not relate is only permissible if:

1. The additional provisions thus excluded have a sufficient link with the provisions to which the reservation relates; and

2. The objection would not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty in the relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection.

Commentary

1. Guideline 3.4.2 relates solely to a very particular category of objections, frequently called those with “intermediate effect”, through which a State or international organization considers that treaty relations should be excluded beyond what is provided for in article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions, yet does not oppose the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the author of the reservation. The Commission has noted the existence of such objections, which might be called the “third type” of objections, in the commentary to guideline 2.6.1 on the definition of objections to reservations, without taking a position on their permissibility.

2. While treaty practice provides relatively few specific examples of intermediate-effect or “extensive” objections, some do exist. It would seem, however, that this “nueva generación” (“new generation”) of objections grew up exclusively around reservations to the 1969 Vienna Convention itself: some States agreed that the Convention could enter into force between themselves and the authors of the reservations, excluding not only the provisions on which the reservations in question had been made, but also other articles that were related to them.

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2012 [383, 2010] As a general rule, article 66 of the Convention and the annex thereto (see the reservations formulated by Algeria (Multilateral Treaties …, footnote 341 above, chap. XXIII.1), Belarus (ibid.), China (ibid.), Cuba (ibid.), Guatemala (ibid.), the Russian Federation (ibid.), the Syrian Arab Republic (ibid.), Tunisia (ibid.), Ukraine (ibid.) and Viet Nam (ibid.). Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Mongolia had formulated similar reservations but withdrew them in the early 1990s (ibid.). The German Democratic Republic had also formulated a reservation excluding the application of article 66 (ibid.).
2013 [384, 2010] These are the other provisions in Part V of the Vienna Convention, in particular article 64 on jus cogens (arts. 53 and 64). See also para. (9) below.
These objections thus had a much broader scope than that of objections with “minimum effect”, without the authors of the objections stating that they were not bound by the treaty vis-à-vis the author of the reservation. While a number of States parties to the Vienna Convention made objections to these reservations that were limited to the “presumed” effects envisaged in article 21, paragraph 3, of the 1969 Vienna Convention, other States — Canada, Egypt, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States — intended their objections to produce more serious consequences but did not wish to exclude the entry into force of the Vienna Convention as between themselves and the reserving States.

Indeed, these States not only wanted to exclude the application of the obligatory dispute settlement provision or provisions “to which the reservation refers”; they also did not consider themselves bound by the substantive provisions to which the dispute settlement procedure or procedures apply in their bilateral relations with the reserving State. For example, the United States, in its objection to Tunisia’s reservation to article 66 (a) of the Vienna Convention, stated that:

\[\text{[385, 2010] This is the case with Denmark and Germany (ibid.).}\]

\[\text{[386, 2010] In respect of the reservation by the Syrian Arab Republic (ibid.).}\]

\[\text{[387, 2010] Egypt’s objection is directed not at one reservation in particular, but at any reservation that excludes the application of article 66 (ibid.).}\]

\[\text{[388, 2010] In respect of any reservation that excludes the application of article 66 or the annex to the Vienna Convention (ibid.).}\]

\[\text{[389, 2010] In respect of all States that had formulated reservations concerning the compulsory dispute settlement procedures. This general declaration was reiterated separately for each State that had formulated such a reservation (ibid.).}\]

\[\text{[390, 2010] In respect of Tunisia’s reservation (ibid.).}\]

\[\text{[391, 2010] In respect of any reservation that excludes application of the dispute settlement provisions, in general, and of the reservations made by Cuba, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia, in particular (ibid.).}\]

\[\text{[392, 2010] Provided in its declaration of 5 June 1987 and with the exception of Viet Nam’s reservation.}\]

\[\text{[393, 2010] The objections made by the United States were formulated before it became a contracting party and concern the reservations made by the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and Cuba (ibid.).}\]

\[\text{[394, 2010] The United Kingdom made maximum-effect objections, in due and proper form, to the reservations formulated by the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia. The effect of these objections seems, however, to have been mitigated a posteriori by the United Kingdom’s declaration of 5 June 1987, which constitutes in a sense the partial withdrawal of its earlier objection (see draft guideline 2.7.7 and the commentary thereon (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), pp. 237–240), since the author does not oppose the entry into force of the Convention as between the United Kingdom and a State that has made a reservation to article 66 or to the annex to the Vienna Convention and excludes only the application of Part V in their treaty relations. This declaration, which the United Kingdom recalled in 1989 (with regard to Algeria’s reservation) and 1999 (with regard to Cuba’s reservation), states that “[w]ith respect to any other reservation the intention of which is to exclude the application, in whole or in part, of the provisions of article 66, to which the United Kingdom has already objected or which is made after the reservation by [the USSR], the United Kingdom will not consider its treaty relations with the State which has formulated or will formulate such a reservation as including those provisions of Part V of the Convention with regard to which the application of article 66 is rejected by the reservation”. (ibid.) Nevertheless, in 2002, the United Kingdom again objected with maximum effect to the reservation made by Viet Nam by excluding all treaty relations with Viet Nam (ibid.). New Zealand also chose to give its objection to the Syrian reservation maximum effect (ibid.).}\]
The United States Government intends, at such time as it becomes a party to the Convention, to reaffirm its objection [...] and declare that it will not consider that article 53 or 64 of the Convention is in force between the United States of America and Tunisia.2024

(3) While the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions do not expressly authorize these objections with intermediate effect, they do not prohibit them. On the contrary, objections with intermediate effect, as their name indicates, may be entertained in that they fall midway between the two extremes envisaged under the Vienna regime: they purport to prohibit the application of the treaty to an extent greater than a minimum-effect objection (article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions), but less than a maximum-effect objection (article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions).2025

(4) Although in principle, “a State or international organization may formulate an objection to a reservation irrespective of the permissibility of the reservation”,2026 the question arises whether objections with intermediate effect must in some cases be deemed to be impermissible.

(5) Some authors propose to consider that “these extended objections are, in fact, reservations (limited *ratione personae*)”.2027 This analysis is to some extent supported by the fact that other States have chosen to formulate reservations in the strict sense of the word in order to achieve the same result.2028 Thus, Belgium formulated a (late) reservation concerning the Vienna Convention, stating that:

The Belgian State will not be bound by articles 53 and 64 of the Convention with regard to any party which, in formulating a reservation concerning article 66 (2), objects to the settlement procedure established by this article.2029

As has been written:

2024 [395, 2010] Ibid.
2026 [397, 2010] Guideline 2.6.3 (Freedom to formulate objections).
As a partial rejection modifies the content of the treaty in relation to the reserving State to an extent that exceeds the intended effect of the reservation, acceptance or acquiescence on the part of the reserving State appear to be necessary for a partial rejection to take its effect; failing this, no relations under the treaty are established between the reserving State and an objecting State which partially rejects those relations.2030

(6) This approach has been disputed on the grounds that, by adhering to the letter of the definition of reservations,2031 the objecting State, which typically formulates its objection only after having become a party to the treaty, would be prevented from doing so within the established time period, and would be faced with the uncertainties that characterize the regime of late reservations.2032 Then, subject to the “reservations dialogue” that might be established, the reserving State would not, in principle, be in a position to respond effectively to such an objection. It has also been pointed out that it would be contradictory to make objections with intermediate effect subject to conditions of permissibility while maximum-effect objections are not subject to such conditions and that the determination and assessment of the necessary link between the provisions which could potentially be deprived of legal effect by the interaction between a reservation and a broad objection has more to do with the question of whether or not the objection with intermediate effect can produce the effect intended by its author.2033

(7) The Commission was not convinced by this view and considered that objections with intermediate effect, which in some ways constitute “counter-reservations” (but are certainly not reservations per se), should conform to the conditions for the permissibility and form of reservations and, in any event, cannot defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, if only because it makes little sense to apply a treaty deprived of its object or purpose. This is what is stated in guideline 3.4.2, paragraph 2.

2031 [402, 2010] See guideline 1.1 (and article 2, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Conventions).
2033 [404, 2010] According to this view, “it is one thing to say that an objection with intermediate effect is not valid and quite another to maintain that such an objection cannot produce the effect intended by its author. Thus, the issue does not bear on the validity of an objection and should therefore be included not in the part of the Guide to Practice on the substantive validity of declarations in respect of treaties, but rather in the part dealing with the effects that an objection with intermediate effect can actually produce” (fourteenth report on reservations to treaties, A/CN.4/614/Add.1, para. 118).
(8) Nevertheless, it would be unacceptable and entirely contrary to the principle of consensus\textsuperscript{2034} for States and international organizations to use a reservation as an excuse for attaching intermediate-effect objections of their choosing, thereby excluding any provision that they do not like. A look back at the origins of objections with intermediate effect is revealing in this regard.

(9) As pointed out above,\textsuperscript{2035} the practice of making these objections with intermediate effect has been resorted to mainly, if not exclusively, in the case of reservations and objections to the provisions of Part V of the 1969 Vienna Convention and makes clear the reasons which led objecting States to seek to make use of them. Article 66 of the Vienna Convention and its annex relating to compulsory conciliation provide procedural guarantees which many States, at the time when the Convention was adopted, considered essential in order to prevent abuse of certain provisions of Part V.\textsuperscript{2036} This link was stressed by some of the States that formulated objections with intermediate effect in respect of reservations to article 66. For example:

The Kingdom of the Netherlands is of the view that the provisions regarding the settlement of disputes, as laid down in article 66 of the Convention, are an important part of the Convention and cannot be separated from the substantive rules with which they are connected.\textsuperscript{2037}

The United Kingdom stated even more explicitly that:

Article 66 provides in certain circumstances for the compulsory settlement of disputes by the International Court of Justice (...) or by a conciliation procedure (...). These provisions are inextricably linked with the provisions of Part V to which they relate. Their inclusion was the basis on which those parts of Part V which represent progressive development of international law were accepted by the Vienna Conference.\textsuperscript{2038}

(10) The reaction of several States to reservations to article 66 of the 1969 Vienna Convention was aimed at safeguarding the package deal which some States had sought to undermine through reservations and which, save through a maximum-effect reservation,\textsuperscript{2039} could only be restored


\textsuperscript{2035} Para. (2).

\textsuperscript{2036} J. Sztucki, footnote 398 above, pp. 286 and 287 (see also the references provided by the author).

\textsuperscript{2037} Italics added – see footnote 389 above.

\textsuperscript{2038} United Kingdom, objection of 5 June 1987 in respect of a Soviet reservation to article 66 of the Vienna Convention; see footnote 392 above.

\textsuperscript{2039} See articles 20, paragraphs 4 (b), and 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions.
through an objection that went beyond the “normal” effects of the reservations envisaged by the Vienna Conventions.\textsuperscript{2040}

(11) It is thus clear from the practice concerning objections with intermediate effect that there must be an intrinsic link between the provision which gave rise to the reservation and the provisions whose legal effect is affected by the objection.

(12) After asking itself how best to define this link, and having contemplated calling it “intrinsic”, “indissociable” or “inextricable”, the Commission ultimately settled on the word “sufficient”, which seemed to it to be similar to the words just cited but had the merit of showing that the particular circumstances of each case had to be taken into account. Moreover, guideline 3.4.2 probably has more to do with the progressive development of international law than with its codification \emph{per se}; to the majority of the Commission’s members, the use of the word “sufficient” had the merit of leaving room for the clarification that might come from future practice.

(13) Other limitations on the permissibility of objections with intermediate effect have been suggested. It has been pointed out that it seems logical to exclude objections aimed at articles to which reservations are not permitted under article 19, subparagraphs (a) and (b), of the Vienna Conventions.\textsuperscript{2041} The Commission does not disagree, but such hypotheses are so hypothetical and marginal that it seems unnecessary to address them expressly in guideline 3.4.2.

(14) It has also been pointed out that since, according to guideline 3.1.9, “a reservation cannot exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in a manner contrary to a peremptory norm of general international law”,\textsuperscript{2042} the same should be true of objections with intermediate effect. The Commission has not adopted that point of view, considering that objections, even those with intermediate effect, are not reservations and have the main purpose of undermining the reservation, and that the latter’s “proximity” to the provisions excluded by the objection\textsuperscript{2043} suffices to avert any risk of lack of conformity with \textit{jus cogens}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[2040] [411, 2010] D. Müller, Commentary on article 21, footnote 396 above, pp. 927–928, para. 70.
\item[2041] [412, 2010] The text of which is incorporated in guideline 3.1 in the Guide to Practice.
\item[2043] [414, 2010] See guideline 3.4.2, para. 1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
(15) Consequently, the Commission deliberately rejected the idea of referring to the impermissibility of an objection owing to its being contrary to a rule of *jus cogens*: it thought that, in reality, such a hypothesis could not arise.

(16) It is quite clear that if the effect of an objection is to modify the bilateral treaty relations between its author and the author of the reservation in a manner that proves to be contrary to a peremptory norm of international law (*jus cogens*), this result would be unacceptable. Such an eventuality would, however, seem to be impossible: an objection purports only to, and can only, exclude the application of one or more treaty provisions. Such an exclusion cannot “produce” a norm that is incompatible with a *jus cogens* norm. The effect is simply “deregulatory”, thus leading to the application of customary law. Ultimately, therefore, the norms applicable as between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection are never different from those that predated the treaty and, unless application of the treaty as a whole is excluded, from treaty-based provisions not affected by the reservation. It is impossible under these circumstances to imagine an “objection” that would violate a peremptory norm. According to another view, however, it was conceivable that a “deregulation” of one obligation could lead to a modification of related obligations under the treaty.

(17) Furthermore, when the definition of “objection” was adopted, the Commission refused to take a position on the question of the permissibility of objections that purport to produce a “super-maximum” effect. These are objections in which the authors determine not only that the reservation is not valid but also that, as a result, the treaty as a whole applies *ipso facto* in the relations between the two States. The permissibility of objections with super-maximum effect has frequently been questioned, primarily because “the effect of such a statement is not to bar the application of the treaty as a whole or of the provisions to which the reservation refers in the relations between the two Parties but to render the reservation null and void without the consent of its author. This greatly exceeds the consequences of the objections to reservations provided for in article 21, paragraph 3, and article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions. Whereas ‘unlike

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reservations, objections express the attitude of a State, not in relation to a rule of law, but in relation to the position adopted by another State’, in this case it is the rule itself advocated by the reserving State which is challenged, and this is contrary to the very essence of an objection’. 2046

(18) It is not, however, the permissibility of the objection as such that is called into question; the issue raised by this practice is whether the objection is capable of producing the effect intended by its author; 2047 this is far from certain and depends, among other things, on the permissibility of the reservation itself. 2048 A State (or an international organization) may well make an objection and wish to give it super-maximum effect, but this does not mean that the objection is capable of producing such an effect, which is not envisaged by the Vienna regime. However, as the Commission has acknowledged in its commentary on guideline 2.6.1, where the definition of the term “objection” unquestionably includes objections with super-maximum effect:

The Commission has endeavoured to take a completely neutral position with regard to the validity of the effects [and not of the objection] that the author of the objection intends its objection to produce. This is a matter to be taken up in the consideration of the effects of objections. 2049

(19) Furthermore, it should be reiterated that one who has initially accepted a reservation may no longer properly formulate an objection thereto. While this condition may be understood as a condition for the permissibility of an objection, it may also be viewed as a question of form or of formulation. Thus, guideline 2.8.12 (Final nature of acceptance of a reservation) states that “acceptance of a reservation cannot be withdrawn or amended”. There seems to be no need to revisit the issue in the present guideline.

3.5 Permissibility of an interpretative declaration

A State or an international organization may formulate an interpretative declaration unless the interpretative declaration is prohibited by the treaty or is incompatible with a peremptory norm of general international law.

2046 [417, 2010] Ibid., para. 97.
2048 [419, 2010] See below, guidelines 4.3.4 and 4.5.3.
2049 [420, 2010] See paragraph (25) of the commentary on guideline 2.6.1 (Definition of objections to reservations) (Official Records
Commentary

(1) The Vienna Conventions do not contain any rule on interpretative declarations as such, or, of course, on the conditions for the permissibility of such unilateral declarations. From that point of view, and from many others as well, they are distinct from reservations and cannot simply be equated with them. Guideline 3.5 and the ones that follow it seek to fill in this gap in respect of the permissibility of these instruments, it being understood in this connection that “simple” interpretative declarations (guideline 3.5) must be distinguished from conditional interpretative declarations, which in this respect follow the legal regime of reservations (guidelines 3.5.2 and 3.5.3). This does not mean that reservations are involved, although sometimes a unilateral declaration presented as interpretative by its author might be a true reservation, in which case its permissibility must be assessed in the light of the rules applicable to reservations (guideline 3.5.1).

(2) The definition of interpretative declarations provided in guideline 1.2 (Definition of interpretative declarations) is also limited to identifying the practice in positive terms:

“Interpretative declaration” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions.2050

(3) However, this definition, as noted in the commentary, “in no way prejudges the validity or the effect of such declarations and (…) the same precautions taken with respect to reservations must be applied to interpretative declarations: the proposed definition is without prejudice to the permissibility and the effects of such declarations from the standpoint of the rules applicable to them”.2051

(4) There is, however, still some question as to whether an interpretative declaration can be permissible, a question that is clearly different from that of whether a unilateral statement constitutes an interpretative declaration or a reservation. Indeed, it is one thing to determine whether a unilateral statement “purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the

2051 [422, 2010] Ibid., p. 108, paragraph (33) of the commentary. The French term “licéité”, used in 1999, should now be understood, as in the case of reservations, to mean “validité”, a word which, in the view of the Commission, seems, in all cases, to be more
declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions” — which corresponds to the definition of “interpretative declaration” — and another to determine whether the interpretation proposed therein is valid, or, in other words, whether the “meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions” is valid.

(5) The issue of the permissibility of interpretative declarations can doubtless be addressed in the treaty itself; while this is quite uncommon in practice, it is still a possibility. Thus, a treaty’s prohibition of any interpretative declaration would invalidate any declaration that purported to “specify or clarify the meaning or scope” of the treaty or certain of its provisions. Article XV. 3 of the 2001 Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement is an example of such a provision. Other examples exist outside the realm of bilateral treaties. The third draft agreement for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) of November 2003, though still in the drafting stage, states in Chapter XXIV, draft article 4:

This Agreement shall not be subject to reservations [or unilateral interpretative declarations] at the moment of its ratification.

(6) It is also conceivable that a treaty might merely prohibit the formulation of certain interpretative declarations to certain of its provisions. To the Special Rapporteur’s knowledge, no multilateral treaty contains such a prohibition in this form. But treaty practice includes more general prohibitions which, without expressly prohibiting a particular declaration, limit the parties’ capacity to interpret the treaty in one way or another. It follows that if the treaty is not to be interpreted in a certain manner, interpretative declarations proposing the prohibited interpretation are invalid. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of 5 November 1992 includes examples of such prohibition clauses; article 4, paragraph 4, states:

Nothing in this Charter shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.

And article 5 states:

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Nothing in this Charter may be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any action in contravention of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations or other obligations under international law, including the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.

(7) Similarly, articles 21 and 22 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1 February 1995 also limits the potential to interpret the Convention:

Article 21

Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and in particular of the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.

Article 22

Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.

(8) These examples show that the prohibition of interpretative declarations in guideline 3.5 may be express as well as implicit.

(9) With the exception of treaty-based prohibitions of unilateral interpretative declarations, the Commission believes that another ground for the impermissibility of an interpretative declaration must be cited: the fact that the declaration is contrary to a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens).

(10) While there appear to be no specific cases when a party has invoked vis-à-vis the author of an interpretative declaration the fact that it is contrary to a peremptory norm, one cannot assume that the problem will never arise in the future. Such would be the case, for example, if a State party to the Convention against Torture sought to legitimize certain forms of torture under cover of an interpretation, or if a State that was a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

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2054 [425, 2010] See the FTAA website, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/ChapterXXIV_e.asp; the square brackets are original to the text.
the Crime of Genocide interpreted it as not covering certain forms of genocide — even though it has been pointed out that, in these examples, these so-called “interpretations” could be considered reservations and could fall within the purview of guideline 3.5.1.

(11) This is why, although there was a different point of view, the Commission did not consider it necessary to provide in guideline 3.5 for a situation when an interpretative declaration was incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty: that would be possible only if the declaration was considered a reservation, since by definition such declarations do not purport to modify the legal effects of a treaty, but only to specify or clarify them.\footnote[2055]{[426, 2010] Yearbook ... 1998, vol. II, Part Two, p. 100 (paragraph 16 of the commentary to draft guideline 1.2). See also the famous dictum of the International Court of Justice in \textit{Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion of 18 July 1950}, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 229; and the 27 August 1952 judgment of the Court in Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. the United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 196.} This situation is covered in guideline 3.5.1.

(12) Similarly, but for different reasons, and despite the opposing views of some of its members, the Commission declined to consider that an objectively wrong interpretation — for example, one that is contrary to the interpretation given by an international court adjudicating the matter — should be declared impermissible.

(13) It goes without saying that an interpretation may be held to be with or without merit although, in absolute terms, it is difficult to determine whether the author is right or wrong until a competent body rules on the interpretation of the treaty. Interpretation remains an eminently subjective process and it is rare that a legal provision, or a treaty as a whole, can be interpreted in only one way. “The interpretation of documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science.”\footnote[2056]{[427, 2010] Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 218, para. 4. See also Anthony Aust, \textit{Modern Treaty Law and Practice}, 2nd ed., (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 230.}

(14) As Kelsen has noted:

If “interpretation” is understood as cognitive ascertainment of the meaning of the object that is to be interpreted, then the result of a legal interpretation can only be the ascertainment of the frame which the law that is to be interpreted represents, and thereby the cognition of several possibilities within the frame. The interpretation of a statute, therefore, need not necessarily
lead to a single decision as the only correct one, but possibly to several, which are all of equal value ...\textsuperscript{2057}

As has also been pointed out:

The process of interpretation [in international law] is, in fact, only occasionally centralized, either through a judicial body or in some other way. Competence to interpret lies with all subjects and, individually, with each one of them. The resulting proliferation of forms of interpretation is only partially compensated for by their hierarchy. Unilateral interpretations are, in principle, of equal value, and the agreed forms are optional and consequently unpredictable. However, the practical difficulties must not be overestimated. It is not so much a question of an essential flaw in international law as an aspect of its nature, which guides it in its entirety towards an ongoing negotiation that can be rationalized and channelled using the rules currently in force.\textsuperscript{2058}

(15) Thus, “on the basis of its sovereignty, every State has the right to indicate its own understanding of the treaties to which it is party”.\textsuperscript{2059} If States have the right to interpret treaties unilaterally, they must also have the right to let their point of view be known as regards the interpretation of a treaty or of certain of its provisions.

(16) International law does not, however, provide any criterion allowing for a definitive determination of whether a given interpretation has merit. There are, of course, methods of interpretation (see, initially, articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Conventions), but they are only guidelines as to the ways of finding the “right” interpretation; they do not offer a final “objective” (or “mathematical”) test of whether the interpretation has merit. Thus, article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions specifies that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. This specification is in no way a criterion for assessing the correctness, and still less a condition for the validity, of the interpretations given to the treaty, but a means of deriving one interpretation. That is all.

In international law, the value of an interpretation is assessed not on the basis of its content, but of its authority. It is not the “right” interpretation that wins out, but the one that was given either by all the parties to the treaty — in which case it is called an “authentic” interpretation — or by a body empowered to interpret the treaty in a manner that is binding on the parties. In that regard, the instructive 1923 opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Jaworzina case is noteworthy. Although the Court was convinced that the interpretation reached by the Conference of Ambassadors was unfounded, it did not approach the problem as a question of validity, but rather of opposability. The Court stated:

And even leaving out of the question the principles governing the authoritative interpretation of legal documents, it is obvious that the opinion of the authors of a document cannot be endowed with a decisive value when that opinion has been formulated after the drafting of that document and conflicts with the opinion which they expressed at that time. There are still stronger grounds for refusing to recognize the authority of such an opinion when, as in the present case, a period of more than two years has elapsed between the day on which it was expressed and the day on which the decision to be interpreted was itself adopted.

International law in general and treaty law in particular do not impose conditions for the validity of interpretation in general and of interpretative declarations in particular. It has only the notion of the opposability of an interpretation or an interpretative declaration which, as far as it is concerned, comes into full play in the context of determination of the effects of an interpretative declaration. In the absence of any condition for validity, “[e]infache Interpretationserklärungen sind damit grundsätzlich zulässig” (“simple interpretative declarations are therefore, in principle, admissible”) (translated for the report), although this does not mean that it is appropriate to speak of validity or non-validity unless the treaty itself sets the criterion.

In addition, it seemed to the Commission, despite a contrary view, that in the course of assessing the permissibility of interpretative declarations, one must not slip into the domain of responsibility – which, for reservations, is prohibited by guideline 3.3.1. However, this would be
the case for interpretative declarations if one considered that a “wrong” interpretation constituted an internationally wrongful act that “violated” articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.

3.5.1 Permissibility of an interpretative declaration which is in fact a reservation

If a unilateral statement which purports to be an interpretative declaration is in fact a reservation, its permissibility must be assessed in accordance with the provisions of guidelines 3.1 to 3.1.13.

Commentary

(1) Section 1.3 of the Guide to Practice deals with a situation in which the effect of an interpretative declaration is in fact to undermine the legal effect of one of the provisions of the treaty or of the treaty as a whole. In such a situation, it is not an interpretative declaration but a reservation, which should be treated as such and should therefore meet the conditions for the permissibility (and formal validity) of reservations.

(2) The Court of Arbitration that settled the dispute between France and the United Kingdom concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between France and the United Kingdom case confirmed this approach. In that case, the United Kingdom maintained that France’s third reservation to article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was merely an interpretative declaration and subsequently rejected this interpretation on the grounds that it could not be invoked against the United Kingdom. The Court rejected this argument and considered that France’s declaration was not simply an interpretation; it had the effect of modifying the scope of application of article 6 and was therefore a reservation, as France had maintained:

This condition, according to its terms, appears to go beyond mere interpretation; for it makes the application of that régime dependent on acceptance by the other State of the French Republic’s designation of the named areas as involving “special circumstances” regardless of the validity or otherwise of that designation under Article 6. Article 2 (1) (d) of the Vienna

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2064 [435, 2010] It being understood that it is not enough for another State or another international organization to “recharacterize” an interpretative declaration as a reservation for the nature of the declaration in question to be modified (see guideline 2.9.3 (Recharacterization of an interpretative declaration) and the commentary thereto in Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10), pp. 263–268).
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which both Parties accept as correctly defining a “reservation”, provides that it means “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State … whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in its application to that State”. This definition does not limit reservations to statements purporting to exclude or modify the actual terms of the treaty; it also covers statements purporting to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions in their application to the reserving State. This is precisely what appears to the Court to be the purport of the French third reservation and it, accordingly, concludes that this “reservation” (sic: “declaration”?) is to be considered a “reservation” rather than an “interpretative declaration”.

(3) While States often maintain or suggest that an interpretation proposed by another State is incompatible with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty, an interpretative declaration, by definition, cannot be contrary to the treaty or to its object or purpose. If it is otherwise, the statement is, in fact, a reservation, as noted in many States’ reactions to “interpretative declarations”. Spain’s reaction to the “declaration” formulated by Pakistan in signing the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also demonstrates the different stages of thought in cases where the proposed “interpretation” is really a modification of the treaty that is contrary to its object and purpose. The term “declaration” must first be defined; only then will it be possible to apply to it conditions for permissibility (of reservations):


2066 [437, 2010] See, for example, Germany’s reactions to Poland’s interpretative declaration to the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 (European Treaty Series No. 24 (http://conventions.coe.int)) and to India’s declaration interpreting article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. IV.3 and 4).
2068 [438, 2010] In addition to the aforementioned example of Spain’s reservation, see Austria’s objection to the “interpretative declaration” formulated by Pakistan in respect of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the comparable reactions of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. XVIII.9). See also the reactions of Germany and the Netherlands to Malaysia’s unilateral statement (ibid.) and the reactions of Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden to the “interpretative declaration” formulated by Uruguay in respect of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ibid., chap. XVIII.10. For other examples of recharacterization, see the commentary to guideline 1.2, Yearbook ... 1999, vol. II, Part Two, p. 105, No. 328.
The Government of the Kingdom of Spain points out that regardless of what it may be called, a unilateral declaration made by a State for the purpose of excluding or changing the legal effects of certain provisions of a treaty as it applies to that State constitutes a reservation.

The Government of the Kingdom of Spain considers that the Declaration made by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which seeks to subject the application of the provisions of the Covenant to the provisions of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a reservation which seeks to limit the legal effects of the Covenant as it applies to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. A reservation that includes a general reference to national law without specifying its contents does not make it possible to determine clearly the extent to which the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has accepted the obligations of the Covenant and, consequently, creates doubts as to the commitment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the object and purpose of the Covenant.

The Government of the Kingdom of Spain considers that the Declaration made by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the effect that it subjects its obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the provisions of its constitution is a reservation and that that reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.

According to customary international law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty are not permissible.

Consequently, the Government of the Kingdom of Spain objects to the reservation made by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Covenant between the Kingdom of Spain and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

(4) Therefore, the issue is not the “validity” of interpretative declarations. These unilateral statements are, in reality, reservations and accordingly must be treated as such, including with respect to their permissibility and formal validity. The European Court of Human Rights followed that reasoning in its judgement in the case of Belilos v. Switzerland. Having recharacterized
Switzerland’s declaration as a reservation, it applied the conditions for the permissibility of reservations of the European Convention on Human Rights:

In order to establish the legal character of such a declaration, one must look behind the title given to it and seek to determine the substantive content. In the present case, it appears that Switzerland meant to remove certain categories of proceedings from the ambit of article 6 § 1 (art. 6–1) and to secure itself against an interpretation of that article (art. 6–1) which it considered to be too broad. However, the Court must see to it that the obligations arising under the Convention are not subject to restrictions which would not satisfy the requirements of article 64 (art. 64) as regards reservations. Accordingly, it will examine the validity of the interpretative declaration in question, as in the case of a reservation, in the context of this provision.2069

[3.5.2 Conditions for the permissibility of a conditional interpretative declaration

The permissibility of a conditional interpretative declaration must be assessed in accordance with the provisions of guidelines 3.1 to 3.1.13.]2070

Commentary

(1) According to the definition contained in guideline 1.2.1, a conditional interpretative declaration is:

A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or international organization subjects its consent to be bound by the treaty to a specific interpretation of the treaty or of certain provisions thereof (...).2071

(2) Thus the key feature of this kind of conditional interpretative declaration is not that it proposes a certain interpretation, but that it constitutes a condition for its author’s consent to be

2070 [441, 2010] See above, footnote 145.
bound by the treaty. It is that element of conditionality that brings a conditional interpretative declaration closer to being a reservation.

(3) *A priori*, however, the question of the permissibility of conditional interpretative declarations seems little different from that of “simple” interpretative declarations and it would seem unwarranted to make formulation of a conditional interpretative declaration subject to conditions for permissibility other than those applicable to “simple” interpretative declarations. It is clear from the definition of a conditional interpretative declaration that it does not purport to modify the treaty, but merely to interpret one or more of its provisions in a certain manner.

(4) The situation changes significantly, however, where the interpretation proposed by the author of a conditional interpretative declaration does not correspond to the interpretation of the treaty established by agreement between the parties. In that case, the condition formulated by the author of the declaration, stating that it does not consider itself to be bound by the treaty in the event of a different interpretation, brings this unilateral statement considerably closer to being a reservation. Frank Horn has stated that:

> If a state does not wish to abandon its interpretation even in the face of a contrary authorititative decision by a court, it may run the risk of violating the treaty when applying its own interpretation. In order to avoid this, it would have to qualify its interpretation as an absolute condition for participation in the treaty. The statement’s nature as a reservation is established at the same time the propagated interpretation is established as the incorrect one.

(5) Thus, any conditional interpretative declaration potentially constitutes a reservation: a reservation conditional upon a certain interpretation. This can be seen from one particularly clear example of a conditional interpretative declaration, the declaration that France attached to its expression of consent to be bound by its signature of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which stipulates that:

2072 [443, 2010] Ibid., p. 105, para. (16) of the commentary.
2073 [444, 2010] See above, commentary to guideline 3.5.
In the event that the interpretative declaration thus made by the French Government should be contested wholly or in part by one or more Contracting Parties to the Treaty or to Protocol II, these instruments shall be null and void in relations between the French Republic and the contesting State or States.2075

In other words, France intends to exclude the application of the treaty in its relations with any States parties that do not accept its interpretation of the treaty, exactly as if it had made a reservation.

(6) While this scenario is merely a potential one, it seems clear that the declaration in question is subject to the conditions for permissibility set out in article 19 of the Vienna Conventions. Although it might be thought _prima facie_ that the author of a conditional interpretative declaration is merely proposing a specific interpretation (subject solely to the conditions for permissibility set out in guideline 3.5), the effects of such a unilateral statement are, in fact, made conditional by its author upon one or more provisions of the treaty not being interpreted in the desired manner.

(7) The deliberate decision of the Netherlands to formulate reservations, rather than interpretative declarations, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly shows the considerable similarities between the two approaches:

The Kingdom of the Netherlands clarifies that although the reservations are partly of an interpretational nature, it has preferred reservations to interpretational declarations in all cases, since if the latter form were used doubt might arise concerning whether the text of the Covenant allows for the interpretation put upon it. By using the reservation form the Kingdom of the Netherlands wishes to ensure in all cases that the relevant obligations arising out of the Covenant will not apply to the Kingdom, or will apply only in the way indicated.2076

(8) There is therefore no alternative to the application to these conditional interpretative declarations of the same conditions for permissibility as those that apply to reservations. The (precautionary) application of the conditions set out in article 19 of the Vienna Conventions is not easy, however, unless it has been established that the interpretation proposed by the author is unwarranted and does not correspond to the authentic interpretation of the treaty.

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2075 [446, 2010] This declaration was confirmed in 1974 at the time of ratification (United Nations, _Treaty Series_, vol. 936, p. 419 (No. 9068)). See also the commentary to guideline 2.9.10 (Reactions to conditional interpretative declarations), _Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10_ (A/64/10), p. 281, para. (1) of the commentary.

(9) Two opposing arguments have been made on this point. According to one view, so long as the status of the conditional interpretative declaration as to correctness has not been, or cannot be, determined, such a conditional interpretative declaration must meet both the conditions for the permissibility of an interpretative declaration (in the event that the interpretation is ultimately shared by the other parties or established by a competent body) and the conditions for the permissibility of a reservation (in the event that the proposed interpretation is rejected). So long as the correct interpretation has not been established, the conditional interpretative declaration remains undetermined and it is impossible to determine whether it is the rules on the permissibility of an interpretative declaration or those on the permissibility of a reservation that should be applied to it. Either case is still possible. According to this view, although a treaty may prohibit the formulation of reservations to its provisions, it does not follow that a State cannot subject its consent to be bound by the treaty to a certain interpretation of that treaty. If the interpretation proves to be warranted and in accordance with the authentic interpretation of the treaty, it is a genuine interpretative declaration that must meet the conditions for the permissibility of interpretative declarations, but only those conditions. If, however, the interpretation does not express the correct meaning of the treaty and is rejected on that account, the author of the “interpretative declaration” does not consider itself bound by the treaty unless the treaty is modified in accordance with its wishes. In that case, the “conditional declaration” is indeed a reservation and must meet the corresponding conditions for the permissibility of reservations.

(10) According to the other view, which was ultimately adopted by the Commission, conditional interpretative declarations must be considered from the very outset to be reservations. Once a State that makes a declaration makes its consent to be bound by a treaty subject to a specific interpretation of its provisions, there and then it excludes any other interpretation, whether correct or incorrect, and this must, from the outset, be viewed as a reservation. By prohibiting all reservations, article 309 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea makes it impossible for a State to make its acceptance of the Convention subject to a given interpretation of one or the other of its provisions. For example, when expressing its consent to be bound, if a State wishes to say that in its view, a given island is a rock in the sense of article 121, paragraph 3, of the Convention, it may do so through a simple interpretative declaration, but if it makes its participation in the Convention subject to the acceptance of this interpretation, that would constitute a reservation that must be treated as such, and in this case, guideline 3.5.1 would apply.
(11) Furthermore, the problem remains largely theoretical. Even from the standpoint of the minority position,\textsuperscript{2077} where a treaty prohibits the formulation of interpretative declarations, a conditional interpretative declaration that proposes the “correct” interpretation must logically be considered impermissible, but the result is exactly the same: the interpretation of the author of the declaration is accepted (otherwise, the conditional declaration would not be an interpretative declaration). Thus, the permissibility or impermissibility of the conditional interpretative declaration as an interpretative declaration has no practical effect. Whether or not it is permissible, the proposed interpretation is identical with the authoritative interpretation of the treaty.

(12) The question of whether a conditional interpretative declaration meets the conditions for the permissibility of an interpretative declaration does not actually affect the interpretation of the treaty. However, in the event that the conditional interpretative declaration actually “behaves like” a reservation, the question of whether it meets the conditions for the permissibility of reservations does have a real impact on the content (and even the existence) of treaty relations.

(13) In light of these observations, there is no reason to subject conditional interpretative declarations to the same conditions for permissibility as “simple” interpretative declarations. Instead, they are subject to the conditions for the permissibility of reservations, as in the case of conditions for formal validity.\textsuperscript{2078}

(14) In conformity with the decision adopted by the Commission at its fifty-fourth session, guideline 3.5.2 and the commentary thereto will be placed in square brackets until the Commission takes a final position on the place conditional interpretative declarations are to occupy in the Guide to Practice.\textsuperscript{2079}

\textsuperscript{2077} See above, para. (9).


3.5.3 Competence to assess the permissibility of a conditional interpretative declaration

The provisions of guidelines 3.2 to 3.2.4 apply, mutatis mutandis, to conditional interpretative declarations.\textsuperscript{2080}

Commentary

(1) In light of the observations concerning the permissibility of conditional interpretative declarations, the rules on competence to assess such permissibility can only be identical to those for the assessment of the permissibility of reservations.

(2) In accordance with the Commission’s consistent practice regarding these specific interpretative declarations, and pending its final decision as to whether to maintain the distinction, guideline 3.5.3 has been included in the Guide to Practice only on a provisional basis: hence the square brackets around the text and the commentary thereto.

3.6. Permissibility of reactions to interpretative declarations

Subject to the provisions of guidelines 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, an approval of, opposition to, or recharacterization of, an interpretative declaration shall not be subject to any conditions for permissibility.

Commentary

(1) The question of the permissibility of reactions to interpretative declarations — approval, opposition or recharacterization — must be considered in light of the study of the permissibility of interpretative declarations themselves. Since any State, on the basis of its sovereign right to interpret the treaties to which it is a party, has the right to make interpretative declarations, there seems little doubt that the other contracting parties also have the right to react to these interpretative declarations and that, where appropriate, these reactions are subject to the same conditions for permissibility as those for the declaration to which they are a reaction.

(2) As a general rule, like interpretative declarations themselves, these reactions may prove to be correct or erroneous, but this does not imply that they are permissible or impermissible.
Nevertheless, according to guideline 3.5, the same is not true when an interpretative declaration is prohibited by a treaty or is incompatible with a peremptory norm of international law. This is the eventuality envisaged in guidelines 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, which refer, respectively, to the approval of an interpretative declaration and to opposition to such a declaration. This is indicated at the start of guideline 3.6: “Subject to the provisions of guidelines 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 …”.

(3) The question of the permissibility of recharacterizations of interpretative declarations should be approached slightly differently. In a recharacterization, the author does not call into question the content of the initial declaration, but rather its legal nature and the regime applicable to it.

(4) The characterization of a reservation or interpretative declaration must be determined objectively, taking into account the criteria that the Commission set forth in guidelines 1.3 and 1.3.1 to 1.3.3. Guideline 1.3 states:

The character of a unilateral statement as a reservation or an interpretative declaration is determined by the legal effect it purports to produce.

(5) This “objective” test takes into account only the declaration’s potential effects on the treaty as intended by its author. In other words:

“only an analysis of the potential — and objective — effects of the statement can determine the purpose sought. In determining the legal nature of a statement formulated in connection with a treaty, the decisive criterion lies in the effective result that implementing the statement has (or would have). If it modifies or excludes the legal effect of the treaty or certain of its provisions, it is a reservation “however phrased or named”; if the statement simply clarifies

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2081 [452, 2010] It may simultaneously call into question and object to the content of the recharacterized declaration by making an objection to it; in such cases, however, the recharacterization and the objection remain conceptually different from one another. In practice, States almost always combine the recharacterization with an objection to the reservation. It should be borne in mind, however, that recharacterizing an interpretative declaration as a reservation is one thing and objecting to the reservation thus “recharacterized” is another. Nonetheless, it should be noted that even in the case of a reservation that is “disguised” (as an interpretative declaration) — which, from a legal standpoint, has always been a reservation — the rules of procedure and formulation as set out in the present Guide to Practice remain fully applicable. This clearly means that a State wishing to formulate a recharacterization and an objection must abide by the procedural rules and time periods applicable to objections. This is why it is specified, in the second paragraph of draft guideline 2.9.3, that that State should accordingly treat the recharacterized declaration as a reservation.
the meaning or scope that its author attributes to the treaty or certain of its provisions, it is an interpretative declaration.\footnote{Ibid., loc. cit., paragraph (3) of the commentary on draft guideline 1.3.1.}

(6) Without prejudice to the effects of these unilateral statements, it is clear that they are an important factor in determining the legal nature of the initially formulated act: in order to determine whether such statements constitute interpretative declarations or reservations, they must be taken into account as expressing the position of parties to a treaty on the nature of the “interpretative declaration” or “reservation”, with all the consequences that this entails. Nevertheless, the author of a recharacterization is simply expressing its opinion on this matter. That opinion may prove to be justified or unjustified when the test of guideline 1.3 is applied, but this in no way implies that the recharacterization is permissible or impermissible; these are two different questions.

(7) Recharacterizations, whether justified or unjustified, are not subject to criteria for permissibility. Abundant State practice\footnote{See, inter alia, the commentary to guideline 2.9.3, para. (4) (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10), pp. 264–267.)} shows that contracting parties consider themselves entitled to make such declarations, often in order to ensure the integrity of the treaty or in response to treaty-based prohibitions of reservations.\footnote{For a particularly telling example, see the reactions of several States to the Philippines’ “interpretative declaration” to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. XXI.6).}

\section*{3.6.1 Permissibility of approvals of interpretative declarations}

An approval of an impermissible interpretative declaration is itself impermissible.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) In approving an interpretative declaration, the author expresses agreement with the interpretation proposed and, in so doing, conveys its own point of view regarding the interpretation of the treaty or of some of its provisions. Thus, a State or international organization which formulates an approval does exactly the same thing as the author of the interpretative declaration.\footnote{See also the commentary to guideline 2.9.1, paras. (4) to (6) (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10), pp. 255–256; see also Monika Heymann’s position (op. cit., footnote 423, pp. 119–123).} It is difficult to see how this reaction could be subject to different conditions of permissibility than those applicable to the initial act.
(2) Furthermore, the relationship between an interpretation and its acceptance is mentioned in article 31, paragraph 3 (a), of the Vienna Conventions, which speak of “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”.  

(3) Guideline 3.6.1 therefore simply transposes the rules applicable to interpretative declarations to the approval of such declarations – with implicit reference to guideline 3.5.

(4) The fact remains, however, that the question of whether the interpretation proposed by the author of the interpretative declaration, on the one hand, and accepted by the author of the approval, on the other, is the “right” interpretation and, as such, is capable of producing the effects desired by the key players in relation both to themselves and to other parties to the treaty 2089 is different from that of the permissibility of the declaration and the approval. The first of these questions is covered in the section of the Guide to Practice on the effects of interpretative declarations.

### 3.6.2 Permissibility of oppositions to interpretative declarations

An opposition to an interpretative declaration is impermissible to the extent that it does not comply with the conditions for permissibility of an interpretative declaration set forth in guideline 3.5.

**Commentary**

(1) The permissibility of a negative reaction — an opposition 2090 — to an interpretative declaration is no more predicated upon respect for any specific criteria than is that of interpretative declarations or approvals.

(2) This conclusion is particularly evident in the case of opposition expressed through the formulation of an interpretation different from the one initially proposed by the author of the interpretative declaration. There is no reason to subject such a “counter-interpretative declaration”, which simply proposes an alternative interpretation of the treaty or of some of its provisions, to different criteria and conditions for permissibility than those for the initial interpretative declaration. While it is clear that in the event of a conflict, only one of the two interpretations, at

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2089 [460, 2010] This question must be considered, in particular, in the context of article 41 of the Vienna Conventions (Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only).

best,\textsuperscript{2091} could prevail, both interpretations should be presumed permissible unless, at some point, it becomes clear to the key players that one interpretation has prevailed. In any event, the question of whether one of them, or neither of them, actually expresses the “correct” interpretation of the treaty is a different matter and has no impact on the permissibility of such declarations. This subject is also covered in the section of Part 4 of the Guide to Practice on the effects of interpretative declarations.

(3) This is also true in the case of simple opposition, where the author merely expresses its refusal of the interpretation proposed in an interpretative declaration without proposing another interpretation that it considers more “correct”. One might take the view, however, that in a situation of this type, no problem of permissibility arises; the wording chosen for guideline 3.6.2 leaves the question open.

4. Legal effects of reservations and interpretative declarations

Commentary

(1) The fourth part of the Guide to Practice covers the effects of reservations, acceptances and objections, to which the effects of interpretative declarations and reactions thereto (approval, opposition, recharacterization or silence) should also be added. This part follows the logic of the Guide to Practice, in which an attempt is made to present, as systematically as possible, all the legal issues concerning reservations and related unilateral declarations, as well as interpretative declarations: after defining the issues (in the first part of the Guide) and establishing the rules for assessing the validity (second part of the Guide) and permissibility (third part of the Guide) of these various declarations, the fourth part is concerned with determining the legal effects of the reservation or interpretative declaration.\textsuperscript{2092}

(2) First of all, it is worth recalling a point that is crucial to understanding the legal effects of a reservation or interpretative declaration. Both of these instruments are defined in relation to the
legal effects that their authors intend them to have on the treaty. Accordingly, guideline 1.1
(Definition of reservations) provides as follows:

“Reservation” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an
international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving
or acceding to a treaty or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty,
whereby the State or organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to that international
organization.2093

(3) In the same spirit, guideline 1.2 (Definition of interpretative declarations) states that:

“Interpretative declaration” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
State or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization purports to specify
or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its
provisions.2094

(4) Although the potential legal effects of a reservation or interpretative declaration are thus a
“substantive element” of its definition,2095 this does not at all mean that a reservation or
interpretative declaration actually produces those effects. The fourth part of the Guide is not
intended to determine the effects that the author of a reservation or the author of an interpretative
declaration purported it to have – this issue was dealt with in the first part on the definition and
identification of reservations and interpretative declarations. The fourth part, in contrast, deals with
determining the legal effects that reservations and interpretative declarations actually produce in
relation to eventual reactions from other contracting States or contracting organizations.2097
purported effects and the actual effects are not necessarily identical and depend on the one hand on
the validity and permissibility of the reservations and interpretative declarations and, on the other
hand, on the reactions of other interested States or international organizations.

(5) Despite the relevant provisions set out in the Vienna Conventions, the effects of a reservation
or of an acceptance of or objection to a reservation remain one of the most controversial issues of
treaty law. Article 21 of the two conventions refers exclusively to the “legal effects of reservations
and of objections to reservations”. The drafting of this provision was relatively simple compared to
that of the other provisions on reservations. Neither the International Law Commission nor the
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, held at Vienna in 1968 and 1969, seem to have
had any particular difficulty in formulating the rules presented in the first two paragraphs of article
21 concerning the effects of reservations (whereas paragraph 3 deals with the effects of objections).

(6) The Commission’s first Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, Brierly, had already
suggested in his draft article 10, paragraph 1, that a reservation should be considered as:

“limiting or varying the effect of [a] treaty in so far as concerns the relation of [the] State or
organization [author of the reservation] with one or more of the existing or future parties to
the treaty”.2098

(7) Fitzmaurice made the first proposal for a separate provision on the legal effects of a
reservation, which largely prefigured the first two paragraphs of the current article 21.2099 It is
interesting that these draft provisions seemed to smack of the obvious: Fitzmaurice did not make
any comment on the draft and noted only that “it is considered useful to state these consequences,
but they require no explanation”.2100

(8) At the outset, Waldock suggested a provision on the effects of a reservation deemed
“admissible”,2101 and since then his proposal has undergone only minor drafting changes.2102
Neither Waldock\textsuperscript{2103} nor the Commission considered it necessary to comment at length on that rule, the Commission merely stating that:

These rules, which appear not to be questioned, follow directly from the consensual basis of the relations between parties to a treaty.\textsuperscript{2104}

(9) Nor did the issue give rise to observations or criticisms from States between the two readings by the Commission or at the Vienna Conference.

(10) The drafting of the current article 21, paragraph 3, posed greater difficulties. This provision, logically absent from Sir Humphrey’s first proposals (which precluded any treaty relations between a reserving State and an objecting State\textsuperscript{2105}) had to be included in the article on the effects of reservations and objections when the Commission accepted that a State objecting to a reservation could nevertheless establish treaty relations with the author of the reservation.\textsuperscript{2106} A proposal by the United States of America to that effect convinced Sir Humphrey of the logical need for such a provision,\textsuperscript{2107} but its drafting by the Commission was nevertheless time-consuming.\textsuperscript{2108} The Conference made only a relatively minor change in order to harmonize paragraph 3 with the reversal of article 20, paragraph 4 (b).\textsuperscript{2109}


\textsuperscript{2104}See the Commission’s commentary in 1962 (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 181 (commentary to article 21)) and the commentary to draft article 19 adopted on second reading in 1965 (Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 209, para. 1).

\textsuperscript{2105}Fourth report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/177 and Add.1, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 56, para. 3.

\textsuperscript{2106}See Daniel Müller’s commentary on article 21 (1969), footnote 396 above, p. 888, paragraphs 7 and 8.

\textsuperscript{2107}Fourth report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/177 and Add.1, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, pp. 47 and 55. See also the comments of the Danish Government (ibid., p. 46).

\textsuperscript{2108}Although Waldock considered that the case of a reservation to which a simple objection had been made was “not altogether easy to express” (Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 813th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 270, para. 96), most of the members (see Mr. Ruda (ibid., para. 13); Mr. Ago (ibid., 814th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 271, paras. 7 and 11); Mr. Tunkin (ibid., para. 8) and Mr. Briggs (ibid., p. 272, para. 14)) were convinced that it was necessary, and even “indispensable” (Mr. Ago, ibid., p. 271, para. 7) to introduce a provision on that subject “in order to forestall ambiguous situations” (ibid., p. 271, para. 7). However, members had different opinions as to the basis of the paragraph proposed by the United States and the Special Rapporteur: whereas Waldock’s proposal emphasized the consensual basis of the treaty relationship established despite the objection, the paragraph proposed by the United States seemed to suggest that the intended effect originated only from the unilateral act of the objecting State, that is, from the objection, without the reserving State having a real choice. The two positions had their supporters within the Commission (see the positions of Mr. Yasseen (ibid., 800th meeting, 11 June 1965, p. 171, para. 7 and pp. 172 and 173, paras. 21–23 and 26); Mr. Tunkin (ibid., 800th meeting, 11 June 1965, p. 172, para. 18) and Mr. Pal (ibid., para. 24) and those of Mr. Waldock (ibid., p. 173, para. 31), Mr. Rosenne (ibid., p. 172, para. 10) and Mr. Ruda (ibid., p. 172, para. 13)). The text that the Commission finally adopted on an unanimous basis (ibid., 816th meeting, 2 July 1965, p. 284), however, is very neutral and clearly shows that the issue was left open by the Commission (see also the Special Rapporteur’s summing-up, ibid., 800th meeting, 11 June 1965, p. 173, paragraph 31).

The resumed consideration of article 21 during the drafting of the 1986 Vienna Convention did not pose any significant difficulties. During the very brief discussion of draft article 21, two members of the Commission emphasized that the provision in question “followed logically” from draft articles 19 and 20. Even more clearly, Mr. Calle y Calle stated that:

“if reservations were admitted, their legal effect was obviously to modify the relations between the reserving party and the party with regard to which the reservation was established”.

The Commission, and then several years later the Vienna Conference, adopted article 21 with only the drafting changes required by the broader scope of the 1986 Convention.

One might think that the widespread acceptance of article 21 during adoption of the draft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between international organizations showed that the provision was even then accepted as reflecting international custom on the subject. The arbitral ruling made in the case concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland corroborates this analysis. The Court of Arbitration recognized that:

“the law governing reservations to multilateral treaties was then undergoing an evolution which crystallized only in 1969 in Articles 19 to 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”.

Nevertheless, the effects of a reservation, acceptance or objection are by no means fully addressed by article 21 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. This provision concerns only the effect of those instruments on the content of the treaty relationship between the reserving party and the other contracting States and contracting organizations. The separate issue of the effect of the reservation, acceptance or objection on the consent of the reserving party to be bound by the treaty is covered not by article 21 of the two Vienna Conventions, but by article 20, entitled “Acceptance of and objection to reservations”.

footnote 339 above, 33rd plenary meeting, 21 May 1969, p. 181.


2110 [482, 2010] Ibid., p. 98, para. 8.


2113 [484, 2010] See below commentary to draft guideline 4.2.4.
(15) This provision, which is the result of draft article 20 adopted by the Commission on first reading in 1962, entitled “The effects of reservations”, was nevertheless incorporated in 1965 in the new draft article 19, entitled “Acceptance of and objection to reservations” (which later became article 20 of the 1969 Vienna Convention), after significant reworking out of concern for clarity and simplicity. In the context of that reworking, the Commission also decided to abandon the link between objections and the conditions for permissibility of a reservation, including its compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.

(16) At the Vienna Conference, the first paragraph of this provision underwent substantial amendment, and paragraph 4 (b) was then altered by a Soviet amendment. This latter amendment was very significant as it reversed the presumption of article 4 (b): any objection would in future be considered a simple objection unless its author had clearly expressed an intention to the contrary. Furthermore, despite the inappropriate title of article 20, it is clear from the origin of this provision that it was intended to cover, *inter alia*, the effects of a reservation, of the acceptance thereof and of any objections to that reservation.

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2114 [485, 2010] The draft guideline read as follows:

“1. (a) A reservation expressly or impliedly permitted by the terms of the treaty does not require any further acceptance.

(b) Where the treaty is silent in regard to the making of reservations, the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 4 below shall apply.

2. Except in cases falling under paragraphs 3 and 4 below and unless the treaty otherwise provides:

(a) Acceptance of a reservation by any State to which it is open to become a party to the treaty constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to such State, as soon as the treaty is in force;

(b) An objection to a reservation by a State which considers it to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and the reserving State, unless a contrary intention shall have been expressed by the objecting State.

3. Except in a case falling under paragraph 4 below, the effect of a reservation to a treaty which has been concluded between a small group of States shall be conditional upon its acceptance by all the States concerned unless:

(a) The treaty otherwise provides; or

(b) The States are members of an international organization which applies a different rule to treaties concluded under its auspices.

4. Where the treaty is the constituent instrument of an international organization and objection has been taken to a reservation, the effect of the reservation shall be determined by decision of the competent organ of the organization in question, unless the treaty otherwise provides.”


(17) Nevertheless, articles 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention have some unclear elements and some gaps. In State practice, the case contemplated in article 21, paragraph 3, namely objections with minimum effect, is no longer viewed as “unusual”, as the Commission had initially envisaged; on the contrary, owing to the presumption of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), it has become the most frequent type of objection.

(18) The practice of States is not limited to recourse to the effects set out in paragraph 3. They are increasingly trying to have their objections produce different effects. The absence of a firm position on the part of the Commission, which intentionally opted for a neutral solution that was acceptable to everyone, far from resolving the problem, created others that should be resolved in the Guide to Practice.

(19) Nor do articles 20 and 21 answer the question of what effects are produced by a reservation that does not meet the conditions of permissibility set out in article 19 or of formal validity (contained in article 23 and elsewhere). In other words, neither article 20 nor article 21 set out the consequences of the invalidity of a reservation, at least not expressly. It is also of particular concern that the application of paragraph 3 on the combined effects of a reservation and an objection is not limited to cases of permissible reservations — that is, reservations established in accordance with article 19, unlike the case set out in paragraph 1. The very least that can be said is that “Article 21 is somewhat obscure”.  

(20) Under these conditions, the Commission considered it necessary to draw a distinction between the rules applying to the legal effects of a valid reservation (see sections 4.1 to 4.4 of the fourth part of the Guide to Practice), which are set out — at least partially — in the two Vienna Conventions, and those concerning the legal effects of an invalid reservation (see section 4.5).

(21). The silence of the Vienna Conventions on the matter of interpretative declarations extends, obviously, to the effects of such declarations, which are covered in the seventh section of the present part of the Guide to Practice.

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4.1 Establishment of a reservation with regard to another State or organization

A reservation formulated by a State or an international organization is established with regard to a contracting State or a contracting organization if it is permissible and was formulated in accordance with the required form and procedures, and if that contracting State or contracting organization has accepted it.

Commentary

(1) The legal effects of a permissible reservation depend to a large extent on the reactions that it has received. A permissible and accepted reservation has different legal effects to those of a permissible reservation to which objections have been made. Article 21 of the Vienna Conventions establishes this distinction clearly. In its 1986 version, which is fuller in that it includes the effects of reservations and reactions from international organizations:

“1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23:

   (a) Modifies for the reserving State or international organization in its relations with that other party the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and

   (b) Modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving State or international organization.

2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty *inter se*.

3. When a State or an international organization objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State or organization, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the reserving State or organization and the objecting State or organization to the extent of the reservation.”

(2) While paragraph 1 of this provision concerns the legal effects of an “established” reservation, a concept that should be clarified, paragraph 3 covers the legal effects of a reservation to which an objection has been made. A distinction should therefore be drawn between the case of a permissible
and accepted reservation — that is, an “established” reservation — and that of a permissible reservation\(^{2122}\) to which an objection has been made.

(3) Some members of the Commission expressed hesitation regarding the chosen terminology, which in their view could introduce an element of confusion by unnecessarily and artificially creating a new category of reservations, because the Vienna Conventions had not defined an “established reservation”. Nevertheless, the Commission considered that the concept was found in article 21, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions, which, while not creating a specific category of reservation, was of great significance for defining the effects of reservations. It would therefore be useful, at least, to endeavour to clarify the meaning of the term in the introductory section of the Guide to Practice covering the effects of reservations.

(4) According to the *chapeau* of article 21, paragraph 1, only a reservation that has been established — in accordance with the provisions of articles 19, 20 and 23 — has the legal effects set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of that paragraph. As for the scope of application of article 21, paragraph 1, the Vienna Conventions merely make a rather clumsy reference to provisions concerning the permissibility of a reservation (art. 19), consent to a reservation (art. 20) and the form of a reservation (art. 23), without explaining the interrelation of those provisions in greater detail. It therefore seems appropriate to define what is meant by an “established” reservation within the meaning of article 21, paragraph 1, before considering the legal effects it produces.

(5) Under the terms of the *chapeau* of article 21 of the Vienna Conventions, a reservation is established “with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23”. The phrase, which at first appears clear and is often understood as referring to permissible reservations accepted by a contracting State or contracting organization, contains many uncertainties and imprecisions which are the result of a significant recasting undertaken by the Commission during the second reading of the draft articles on the law of treaties in 1965, on the one hand, and changes introduced to article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Convention during the Vienna Conference in 1969.

(6) First of all, the reference to article 23 as a whole poses a problem, since the provisions of article 23, paragraphs 3 and 4, have no effect on the establishment of a reservation. They concern

\(^{2122}\) [493, 2010] It should be noted that paragraph 3 of article 21 does not refer only to a valid reservation which has been the subject of an objection. It cannot therefore be excluded, *a priori*, that this provision also applies to the case of an objection to an invalid reservation.
only its withdrawal and the fact that, in certain cases, the formulation of an acceptance or an objection does not require confirmation.

(7) Secondly, it is difficult — indeed, impossible — to determine what connection might exist between the establishment of a reservation and the effect on the entry into force of the treaty of an objection provided for in article 20, paragraph 4 (b). The objection cannot be considered as consent to the reservation since it in fact aims to “exclude or to modify the legal effects of the reservation, or to exclude the application of the treaty as a whole, in relations with the reserving State or organization”. Accordingly, a reservation to which an objection has been made is obviously not established within the meaning of article 21, paragraph 1.

(8) Consultation of the travaux préparatoires provides an explanation for this “contradiction”. In the draft articles adopted by the Commission, which contained in article 19 (later article 21) the same reference, the presumption of article 17 (future article 20, paragraph 4 (b)) established the principle that a treaty did not enter into force between a reserving State and a State which had made an objection. Since the treaty was not in force, there was no reason to determine the legal effects of the reservation on the content of treaty relations. Moreover, the comments of the Commission specified: “Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article set out the rules concerning the legal effects of a reservation which has been established under the provisions of articles 16, 17 and 18, assuming that the treaty is in force.” The “contradiction” was introduced only during the Conference through the reversal of the presumption of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), following the adoption of the Soviet amendment. Because of this new presumption, a treaty does remain in force for the reserving State even if a simple objection is formulated. However, this could not mean that the reservation is established under article 21.

(9) In his first report on the law of treaties, Sir Humphrey Waldock took into account the condition of consent to a reservation for it to be able to produce its effects. The draft article 18 that he proposed to devote to “Consent to reservations and its effects” specified that:

2125 [496, 2010] See paragraph (16) above of the introduction to the fourth part of the Guide to Practice and, in particular, note 439 above.
“A reservation, since it purports to modify the terms of the treaty as adopted, shall only be effective against a State which has given, or is presumed to have given, its consent thereto in accordance with the provisions of the following paragraphs of this article.”

(10) In its advisory opinion on reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Court of Justice also highlighted this basic principle of the law of reservations, and of treaty law as well:

“It is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent and that consequently no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto.”

(11) It is this idea to which paragraph 1 of article 21 of the Vienna Conventions refers, and this is the meaning that must be given to the reference to article 20.

Consent to the reservation is therefore a *sine qua non* for the reservation to be considered established and to produce its effects. Yet contrary to what has been maintained by certain partisans of the opposability school, consent is not the only condition. The *chapeau* of article 21, paragraph 1, cumulatively refers to consent to the reservation (the reference to article 20), permissibility (art. 19) and formal validity (art. 23). Consent alone is thus not sufficient for the reservation to produce its “normal” effects. Moreover, the reservation must be permissible within the meaning of article 19 and have been so formulated that it complies with the rules of procedure and form set forth in article 23. Only this combination can “establish” the reservation. This was the position taken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its advisory opinion of 24 September 1982 concerning *The effect of reservations on the entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights*, which concluded from its examination of the Vienna system (to which article 75 of the Pact of San José directly refers) that “States ratifying or adhering to the

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Convention may do so with any reservations that are not incompatible with its object and purpose; the Court also found that the Convention implied the acceptance of all the reservations that were not incompatible with its object and purpose.

(12) This necessary combination of validity and consent results also from the phrase in article 21, paragraph 1, which states that a reservation is established “with regard to another party”. Logically, a reservation cannot be valid only with regard to another party. Either it is valid or it is not. This is a question that is not in principle subject to the will of the other contracting States or contracting organizations unless, of course, they decide by common agreement to “permit” the reservation. On the other hand, a reservation that is objectively valid is opposable only to the States or organizations that have, in one way or another, consented to it. It is a bilateral link which is created, following acceptance, between the reserving State and the contracting State or organization that has consented thereto. The reservation is established only in regard to that party, and it is only in relations with that party that it produces its effects.

(13) As a consequence, it seems necessary to emphasize once again in the Guide to Practice that the establishment of a reservation results from the combination of its validity and of consent. However, the Commission did not consider it appropriate simply to reproduce the chapeau of article 21, paragraph 1, which explains the meaning of the term “established reservation” by referring to other provisions of the Vienna Conventions from which it derives. Guideline 4.1 in fact has the same meaning; however, instead of referring to other provisions, it sets out their content: “if it is permissible” corresponds to the reference to article 19; “formulated in accordance with the required form and procedures” corresponds to the reference made in article 21, paragraph 1, to article 23; and “if that contracting State or contracting organization has accepted it” corresponds to the reference to article 20.

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2129 [500, 2010] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The effect of reservations on the entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights (arts. 74 and 75), advisory opinion of 24 September 1982, Series A, No. 2, para. 26 – emphasis added. The Court, referring to the specific nature of the Convention, nevertheless held that reservations to the Convention “do not require acceptance by the States Parties...” (ibid., para. 37); however, as the Court subsequently noted, that assertion was valid solely in the context of entry into force of the Convention (para. 38 – on this point, see the commentary to guidelines 4.2.2 and 4.2.5 below).

2130 [501, 2010] See guideline 3.3.2 [3.3.3].

2131 [502, 2010] See guideline 3.3.3 [3.3.4].


2133 [504, 2010] See guidelines 2.1.1 (Written form), 2.1.5 (Communication of reservations) and 2.2.1 (Formal confirmation of reservations formulated when signing a treaty). Generally speaking, this reference to “required procedures” refers to the procedural requirements established in the Vienna Conventions, the Guide to Practice and, in some cases, the treaty to which the reservation...
(14) The formulation of guideline 4.1 differs from the *chapeau* of the first paragraph of article 21 of the Vienna Conventions in another regard: instead of referring to “another party”\(^{2134}\) guideline 4.1 covers cases in which “a reservation ... is established with regard to a *contracting State or contracting organization*”. The reason for this is that, while article 21 applies to the actual effects of a reservation and presupposes that the treaty to which the reservation applies has already entered into force, guideline 4.1 merely specifies the conditions under which the reservation will be legally capable of producing the effects intended by its author, if and when the treaty enters into force.

(15) Guideline 4.1 merely sets out the general rule and does not fully answer the question of whether a reservation is established. Article 20 of the Vienna Conventions, paragraph 4 of which specifies the implications, under ordinary law, of consent to a reservation and hence constitutes the cornerstone of the “flexible” Vienna system\(^{2135}\) does in fact contain exceptions with regard to the expression of consent to the reservation by the other contracting States and contracting organizations. Moreover, paragraph 4 clearly specifies that it applies only in “cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise provides”. The establishment of the reservation, and particularly the requirement of consent, may thus be modified depending on the nature of the reservation or of the treaty, but also by any provision incorporated in the treaty to that effect. These specific cases in which the consent of the other contracting States and contracting organizations is no longer required, or must be expressed unanimously or collectively, are covered in guidelines 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.

(16) The words “with regard to a[nother] contracting State or [another] [international] organization”, which appear in both the body and title of guideline 4.1, aim to make it clear that this provision refers to the usual situation in which the establishment of the reservation produces only relative effects, between the author of a reservation and the State or international organization that has accepted the reservation, in contrast to the specific situations in which acceptance by another contracting State or another contracting international organization is not required in order for the reservation to produce its effects, which are covered by guidelines 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.

\(^{2134}\) See *Yearbook ... 1966*, vol. II, p. 266, para. 21 of the commentary on article 17. See also D.W. Bowett, footnote 363 above, p. 84; D. Müller, footnote 396 above, p. 799, para. 1.
(17) Article 21, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions does not, strictly speaking, concern the legal effects of a reservation, but rather deals with the absence of any legal effect of a reservation on the legal relations between contracting States and contracting organizations other than the author of the reservation, regardless of whether the reservation is established or valid. This matter is dealt with in section 4.6 of the Guide to Practice, which covers the effects of reservations on treaty relations between the other contracting States and contracting organizations.

4.1.1 Establishment of a reservation expressly authorized by a treaty

A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States and contracting organizations, unless the treaty so provides.

A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty is established with regard to the other contracting States and contracting organizations if it was formulated in accordance with the required form and procedures.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 4.1.1 presents the exception to the general rule concerning the establishment of reservations contained in article 20, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions while establishing a link to the term “established reservation”. Indeed, since a reservation expressly authorized by the treaty is, by definition, permissible and accepted by the contracting States and contracting organizations, making it in a way that respects the rules applicable to the formulation and communication of reservations is all that is required to establish it. This makes it binding on all the contracting States and contracting organizations.

(2) According to article 20, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions, expressly authorized reservations need not be accepted “subsequently” by the other contracting States and contracting organizations. However, this paragraph does not mean that the reservation is exempt from the requirement of the contracting States’ and contracting organizations’ assent; it simply expresses the idea that, since the parties have given their assent even before the formulation of the reservation, and have done so in the text of the treaty itself, any subsequent acceptance is superfluous.
Moreover, the expression “unless the treaty so provides” which appears in the text of this provision\textsuperscript{2136} clearly calls for such an interpretation. Only reservations that are actually covered by this prior agreement do not require subsequent acceptance, and are thus, logically established from the moment they are permissibly made.\textsuperscript{2137}

(3) The draft articles adopted by the Commission on second reading in 1966 did not restrict the possibility of acceptance solely to reservations “expressly” authorized by the treaty, but also included reservations “impliedly” authorized, but the work of the Commission sheds no light on the meaning to be attributed to this concept.\textsuperscript{2138} At the Vienna Conference, a number of delegations expressed their doubts regarding this solution\textsuperscript{2139} and proposed amendments aimed at deleting the words “or impliedly”,\textsuperscript{2140} and the change was accepted.\textsuperscript{2141} Sir Humphrey Waldock, Expert Consultant at the Conference, had himself recognized that “the words ‘or impliedly’ in article 17, paragraph 1, seemed to have been retained in the draft articles as a relic from earlier and more detailed drafts which dealt with implied prohibition and implied authorization of reservations”.\textsuperscript{2142} It is thus with good reason that reservations implicitly authorized by the treaty are not mentioned in article 20, paragraph 1.

(4) Had it been held, as was suggested,\textsuperscript{2143} that where a treaty prohibits certain reservations or certain categories of reservations, \textit{ipso facto} authorizes all others, which amounts to a reversal of the presumption of article 19 (b), this interpretation would clearly place article 20, paragraph 1, in direct contradiction to article 19. Assuming this to be the case, the inclusion in the treaty of a clause

\textsuperscript{2136} See the statements of the representatives of India (\textit{Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole} (A/CONF.39/11), 24th meeting, p. 128, para. 30), the United States (\textit{ibid.}, p. 130, para. 53) and Ethiopia (\textit{ibid.}, 25th meeting, 16 April 1968, p. 134, para. 15).


\textsuperscript{2138} The three amendments aimed at deleting “or impliedly” (see note 511 above) were adopted by 55 votes to 18, with 12 abstentions (\textit{Summary records} (A/CONF.39/11), note 488 above, 25th meeting, 16 April 1968, p. 135, para. 30).

\textsuperscript{2139} \textit{F. Horn}, footnote 321 above, p. 132.
prohibiting reservations to a specific provision would suffice to institute total freedom to make any reservation whatsoever other than those that were expressly prohibited; the criterion of the object and purpose of the treaty would then be rendered inapplicable.\footnote{2144} The Commission has already ruled out this interpretation in guideline 3.1.3 (Permissibility of reservations not prohibited by the treaty), which makes it clear that reservations not prohibited by the treaty are not \textit{ipso facto} permissible and hence can with still greater reason not be regarded as established and accepted by the terms of the treaty itself.

(5) By the same token, and despite the lack of precision in the Vienna Conventions on this point, a general authorization of reservations in a treaty cannot constitute \textit{a priori} acceptance on the part of the contracting States and contracting organizations. To say that all the parties have the right to formulate reservations to the treaty cannot imply that this right is unlimited, still less that all reservations so formulated are, by virtue of the simple general clause included in the treaty, “established” within the meaning of the \textit{chapeau} to article 21, paragraph 1. To accept this way of looking at things would render the Vienna regime utterly meaningless. Such general authorizations do no more than refer to the general regime, of which the Vienna Conventions constitute the expression, and which is based on the fundamental principle that the parties to a treaty have the power to formulate reservations.

(6) Nor is the notion of an expressly authorized reservation identical or equivalent\footnote{2145} to the concept of a specified reservation. This was very clearly established by the arbitral tribunal in the case concerning \textit{Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland} in relation to the interpretation of article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, paragraph 1 of which provides that:

\begin{quote}
“At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1 to 3 inclusive.”
\end{quote}

\footnote{2144} See \textit{inter alia} the criticisms by C. Tomuschat, footnote 321 above, p. 475. \footnote{2145} P.-H. Imbert nevertheless maintains that specified reservations are included within the term “expressly authorized reservation”. In support of this interpretation he suggests that article 20, paragraph 1, in no way limits the right of contracting States to object to an expressly authorized reservation, but expresses only the idea that the reserving State becomes a contracting party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession (“La question des réserves dans la décision arbitrale du 30 juin 1977 relative à la délimitation du plateau continental entre la République française et le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord”, \textit{Annuaire français de droit international}, 1978, pp. 52–57). He does not deny that this solution openly contradicts the provisions of article 20, but justifies his approach by referring to the work of the Vienna Conference. See also the commentary to guideline 3.1.2, \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10} (A/61/10), pp. 348–349, para. (11).
There can be no doubt that, pursuant to this provision, any State may make its consent to be bound by the Geneva Convention subject to the formulation of a reservation so “specified”, that is to say any reservation relating to articles 4 to 15, in accordance with article 19 (b) of the Vienna Conventions. This “authorization” does not however imply that any reservation so formulated is necessarily valid, nor, a fortiori, that the other parties have consented, under article 12, paragraph 1, to any and every reservation to articles 4 to 15. The Court of Arbitration considered that this provision:

“cannot be read as committing States to accept in advance any and every reservation to articles other than Articles 1 to 3 ... Such an interpretation ... would amount almost to a license to contracting States to write their own treaty”.2147

(7) State practice supports the solution used by the Court of Arbitration. The fact that 11 States objected to reservations made to this Convention, although those reservations only concern articles other than articles 1 to 3, as provided for in article 12, paragraph 1, of the Convention, is moreover revealing as regards the interpretation to be followed.

(8) The term “reservations expressly authorized” by the treaty must be interpreted restrictively in order to meet the objective of article 20, paragraph 1. In the case between France and the United Kingdom concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, the Court of Arbitration rightly considered that:

“Only if the Article had authorized the making of specific reservations could parties to the Convention be understood as having accepted a particular reservation in advance.”2149

In order to determine which “expressly authorized” reservations do not require subsequent unilateral acceptance, it is thus appropriate to determine which reservations the parties have already consented to in the treaty. In this connection, it has been noted that that “where the contents of

authorized reservations are fixed beforehand, acceptance can reasonably be construed as having been given in advance, at the moment of consenting to the treaty.”

(9) In line with this opinion, article 20, paragraph 1, covers two types of prior authorizations by which parties do not simply accept the abstract possibility of formulating reservations but determine in advance exactly what reservations may be made. On the one hand, a reservation made pursuant to a reservations clause that authorizes the parties simply to exclude the application of a provision or an entire part of the treaty must be deemed to be an “expressly authorized reservation”. In this case, the other contracting States and contracting organizations can see exactly, at the time the treaty is concluded, what contractual relations they will have with the parties that exercise the option of making reservations pursuant to the exclusion clause. On the other hand, “negotiated” reservations can also be regarded as specified reservations. Indeed, certain international conventions do not merely authorize States parties to make reservations to one provision or another but contain an exhaustive list of reservations from among which States must make their choice. This procedure also allows contracting States and contracting organizations to gauge precisely and a priori the impact and effect of a reservation on treaty relations. By expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty, a State or an international organization consents to any reservations permitted by the “list”.

(10) In these two cases, the content of the reservation is sufficiently predetermined by the treaty for these reservations to be able to be considered “expressly authorized” within the meaning of article 20, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions. The contracting States and contracting

2151 [522, 2010] See, for example, article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws: “Any High Contracting Party may, when signing or ratifying the present Convention or acceding thereto, append an express reservation excluding any one or more of the provisions of Articles 1 to 17 and 21.” Treaties often authorize a reservation excluding the application of a provision concerning the settlement of disputes (see Pierre-Henri Imbert, Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux, (Pedone: Paris, 1979), p. 169 (note 27) and R. Riquelme Cortado, footnote 343 above, pp. 135–136).
2152 [523, 2010] Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1949, article 38; European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 1957, article 34. The Convention concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security, No. 102, of the International Labour Organization (ILO) combines, moreover, this possibility of rejecting the application of entire chapters with a minimum number of chapters that must actually be applied (art. 2) (see also article 2 of ILO Convention No. 128 concerning Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits, article 20 of the European Social Charter or article 2 of the European Code of Social Security of 1964). See also R. Riquelme Cortado, footnote 343 above, p. 134.
organizations are aware in advance of the treaty relations that derive from the formulation of a given reservation and have agreed to it in the actual text of the treaty. There is no surprise, and the principle of consent is not undermined.

(11) The Commission has, moreover, provided a starting point for a definition of the notion of expressly authorized reservations in its guideline 3.1.4 (Permissibility of specified reservations). Pursuant to this provision:

“Where the treaty envisages the formulation of specified reservations without defining their content, a reservation may be formulated by a State or an international organization only if it is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”

A contrario, a specified reservation whose content is fixed in the treaty is considered ipso facto permissible and, given the provision expressly authorizing them, established.

(12) The first paragraph of guideline 4.1.1 reproduces the text of article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1986 Vienna Convention. While this repetition may not be strictly necessary, and the principle laid out follows from a close reading of guideline 4.1 and the second paragraph of guideline 4.1.1, it is in line with the Commission’s established and consistent practice of incorporating the provisions of the Convention in the Guide to Practice, to the extent possible. This is also why the Commission has not changed the wording despite the fact that the phrase “unless the treaty so provides” states the obvious and, moreover, appears superfluous in this provision.2156

(13) The second paragraph of guideline 4.1.1 sets forth the specific rule that applies to the establishment of reservations expressly authorized by the treaty as an exception to the general rule established in guideline 4.1, laying down the single condition to be met for an expressly authorized reservation to be established: it must be formulated in accordance with the required form and procedures.2157

2155 [526, 2010] The French text of guideline 3.1.4 uses, probably by mistake, the definite article “des”; it should instead read: “Lorsque le traité envisage la formulation de réserves déterminées sans en préciser le contenu, une réserve ne peut être formulée par un État ou une organisation internationale que si elle n’est pas incompatible avec l’objet et le but du traité.”


2157 [528, 2010] For the exact meaning of the required “procedures”, see note 504 above.
(14) In both paragraphs, as indeed in all the provisions that use the term, 2158 “contracting States and contracting organizations” covers three possible scenarios: one in which only States are concerned; more exceptionally, one in which international organizations alone are contracting parties; and the intermediate hypothesis, in which contracting States and contracting organizations coexist.

(15) It should also be emphasized that, once it has been clearly established that a particular reservation falls under article 20, paragraph 1, not only is its acceptance by the other parties unnecessary, but the parties are deemed to have effectively and definitively accepted it, with all the consequences that follow therefrom. One of the consequences of this particular regime is that the other parties cannot object to this type of reservation. 2159 Accepting this reservation in advance in the text of the treaty itself effectively prevents the contracting States and contracting organizations from subsequently making an objection, as “[t]he Parties have already agreed that the reservation is permissible and, having made its permissibility the object of an express agreement, the Parties have abandoned any right thereafter to object to such a reservation”. 2160 An amendment 2161 proposed by France at the Vienna Conference expressed exactly the same idea, but was not adopted by the Drafting Committee. 2162 Guideline 2.8.12 (Final nature of acceptance of a reservation) is therefore applicable  a fortiori to expressly authorized reservations. They are deemed to have been accepted, and thus there can be no objection to them.

4.1.2 Establishment of a reservation to a treaty which has to be applied in its entirety

A reservation to a treaty in respect of which it appears, from the limited number of negotiating States and organizations and the object and purpose of the treaty, that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty is established with regard to the other contracting States and contracting organizations if it is permissible and was formulated in accordance with

2161 [532, 2010] A/CONF.39/C.1/L.169. Paragraph 2 of the single article that, according to the French proposal, was to replace articles 16 and 17 of the International Law Commission draft provided that “a reservation expressly authorized by the treaty cannot be the subject of an objection by other contracting States, unless the treaty so provides” (United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2), footnote 313 above, p. 133).
2162 [533, 2010] With regard to the rejection of that amendment, Pierre-Henri Imbert concluded that the States represented at the Conference did not want to restrict the right to object to expressly authorized reservations (op. cit., footnote 522 above, p. 55).
the required form and procedures, and if all the contracting States and contracting organizations have accepted it.

Commentary

(1) A specific case provided for by article 20, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions is that of treaties which must be applied in their entirety. Paragraph 2 states that the flexible system shall not apply to any treaty whose application in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty. In such cases, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.

(2) Fitzmaurice made a distinction between plurilateral treaties, which were in his view closer to bilateral treaties, and multilateral treaties, however, it was only in Sir Humphrey Waldock’s first report that the usefulness of such a distinction became clearly apparent. What is now article 20, paragraph 2, resulted from a compromise between the members of the Commission who remained deeply convinced of the virtues of the traditional system of unanimity and the proponents of Sir Humphrey’s flexible system. At the time, the paragraph represented the last bastion which the proponents of unanimity refused to give up. During the second reading of the Waldock draft, the principle behind article 20, paragraph 2, no longer gave rise to debate in the Commission or at the Vienna Conference.

(3) However, the main issue is not the principle of unanimity, which has long been practised. Rather, the question is how to determine which treaties are not subject to the safeguard clause and are therefore excluded from the flexible system. Until 1965, the limited number of parties was the only criterion referred to by the special rapporteurs and the Commission. Sir Humphrey’s fourth report took into account the criticisms levelled against that criterion and recognized that “to find a completely precise definition of the category of treaties in issue is not within the bounds of


\[535, 2010\] The Special Rapporteur stressed that “paragraph [4] and paragraph 2 represented the balance on which the whole article was based” (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 664th meeting, 19 June 1962, p. 230, para. 17). See also the statements made by Gros (ibid., 663rd meeting, 18 June 1962, pp. 228 and 229, para. 97) and Ago (ibid., p. 228, para. 87).

\[536, 2010\] This is true of G.G. Fitzmaurice (draft article 38 in the first report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/101, Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, p. 115) and of Waldock (draft article 1 (d), first report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/144, Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 221). Draft article 20, para. 3, which was adopted by the Commission on first reading in 1962, refers to treaties concluded “between a small group of States” (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 176).
possibility”. At the same time, he proposed a reference to the intention of the parties: “the application of its provisions between all the parties is to be considered an essential condition of the treaty”. The parties’ intention to preserve the integrity of the treaty was therefore the criterion for ruling out the “flexible” system and retaining the traditional unanimity system. The Commission adopted that idea, making minor drafting changes to what would become the present paragraph 2.

(4) It is worth noting, however, that the new provision addresses a completely different category of treaty than had been envisaged before 1962. The reference to intention has two advantages. First, it allows the flexible system to extend to treaties which, although ratified by only a small number of States, are otherwise more akin to general multilateral treaties. Second, it excludes treaties that have been ratified by a more significant number of States, but whose very nature requires that the integrity of the treaty be preserved. The concept of the plurilateral treaty has therefore shifted towards that of a treaty whose integrity must be ensured.

(5) The criterion of number was never completely discarded, and is still contained in article 20, paragraph 2. However, its function has changed: whereas prior to 1965 it was the sole factor in determining whether or not a given treaty was subject to the “flexible” system, its purpose is now to shed light on the intention of the parties. As a result, it now carries less weight in determining the nature of a treaty, having become an auxiliary criterion in this respect while unfortunately remaining somewhat imprecise and difficult to apply. The reference to the “limited number of the negotiating States and negotiating organizations or, as the case may be, of the negotiating organizations” is particularly unusual, and does not allow a clear distinction to be made between such treaties and multilateral treaties proper; the latter can also be concluded as a result of negotiations between only a few States and international organizations. It would seem preferable to

refer not to negotiating States and negotiating international organizations, but rather to States authorized to become parties to the treaty.\textsuperscript{2171}

(6) Sir Humphrey proposed other “auxiliary” criteria that could assist in the intrinsically problematic task of establishing the parties’ intentions. In his fourth report, he also mentioned the nature of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.\textsuperscript{2172} The change was never explained, and despite the proposals of the United States, which pressed for the definition to refer to the nature of the treaty,\textsuperscript{2173} the object and purpose of the treaty was the only other “auxiliary” criterion adopted by the Commission and subsequently at the Vienna Conference. The criterion of the object and purpose of the treaty,\textsuperscript{2174} like the criterion of number, is far from clear-cut, and it has even been held that, rather than clarify the interpretation of paragraph 2, it renders it even more vague and subjective.\textsuperscript{2175}

(7) Furthermore, paragraph 2 of article 20 is unclear, or at any rate difficult to interpret, not only in respect of its scope, but also in respect of the applicable legal regime. Under paragraph 2, reservations require acceptance by all parties. Only two things can be deduced for certain. First, such reservations are not subject to the “flexible” system set forth in paragraph 4; indeed, paragraph 4 confirms that view, in that it applies only to “cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs”. Secondly, the reservations are indeed subject to unanimous acceptance: they must be accepted “by all the parties”.

(8) However, paragraph 2 of article 20 does not clearly state who should actually accept the reservation. The text does refer to “the parties”, but this is hardly satisfactory. It is questionable whether the acceptance of a reservation by all “parties” only should be a condition, a “party” being defined under article 2, paragraph 1 (g), as “a State or an international organization which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force”. That would contradict the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{2171} P.-H. Imbert, footnote 522 above, pp. 112–113.
\item \textsuperscript{2172} A/CN.4/177 and Add.1 and 2, Yearbook... 1965, vol. II, p. 51, para. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{2174} See guidelines 3.1.5 (Incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty) and 3.1.6 (Determination of the object and purpose of the treaty), Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/62/10), pp. 66–82. In its advisory opinion of 24 September 1982, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that “Paragraph 2 of Article 20 is inapplicable, inter alia, because the object and purpose of the Convention is not the exchange of reciprocal rights between a limited number of States, but the protection of the human rights of all individual human beings within the Americas, irrespective of their nationality” (see footnote 500 above, para. 27).
\item \textsuperscript{2175} See C. Tomuschat, footnote 321 above, p. 479; P.-H. Imbert, footnote 522 above, pp. 114–115.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
underlying idea, which is that the treaty should be implemented in its entirety by all current and future parties. To argue otherwise would, in no small measure, deprive unanimous consent of its meaning.

(9) Moreover, although article 20, paragraph 5, connects the principle of tacit or implied consent to paragraph 2, it remains a mystery how implied acceptance could apply to the treaties referred to in the latter provision. It follows from article 20, paragraph 5, that a contracting State or contracting organization may make an objection only on becoming a party to the Treaty. A signatory State or signatory organization could thus block unanimous acceptance even without formulating a formal objection to the reservation, because it would be impossible to presume that State’s assent before the 12-month deadline elapsed. Article 20, paragraph 5, would therefore have the exact opposite of the desired effect, namely the rapid stabilization of treaty relations and of the status of the reserving State vis-à-vis the treaty. For precisely that reason, the Special Rapporteur argued in 1962 that where States not yet parties to a treaty are concerned,

“[t]his qualification of the rule is not possible in the case of plurilateral treaties because there the delay of taking a decision does place in suspense the status of the reserving State vis-à-vis all the States participating in the treaty.”

(10) Such lacunae and inconsistencies are particularly surprising given that article 18 as proposed by Sir Humphrey in 1962 made a clear distinction between the tacit or implied acceptance of “plurilateral treaties” on the one hand and of multilateral treaties on the other hand. While these clarifications specified the legal regime for the treaties referred to in article 20, paragraph 2, perfectly well, they were nevertheless sacrificed in order to make the provisions on reservations less complex and more succinct.

(11) In an attempt to remove such uncertainties, guideline 4.1.2 clearly specifies that, where this type of treaty is concerned, a reservation is established only “if all the contracting States and contracting organizations have accepted it”, by which is meant all the States and international organizations that have already ratified the treaty or do so within the 12-month period following the formulation of the reservation.

(12) The relatively complex wording that the Commission adopted for guideline 4.1.2 is the result of its desire to follow the wording of article 20, paragraph 2, as closely as possible, while also giving a complete list of the conditions that must be met for reservations to the treaties in question to be established, following the pattern of guideline 4.1.

(13) The two criteria adopted for establishing that a treaty is of the type that “has to be applied in its entirety” (a limited number of negotiating States and organizations, and the object and purpose of the treaty) are indicative but not necessarily cumulative or exhaustive.

4.1.3 Establishment of a Reservation to a Constituent Instrument of an International Organization

A reservation to a treaty which is a constituent instrument of an international organization is established with regard to the other contracting States and contracting organizations if it is permissible and was formulated in accordance with the required form and procedures, and if it has been accepted in conformity with guidelines 2.8.7 to 2.8.10.

Commentary

(1) The third — and final — exception to the “flexible” regime set out in article 20, paragraph 4, of the Vienna Conventions is provided for by paragraph 3 of that article and relates to constituent instruments of international organizations. Under the terms of the provision:

When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.

(2) A simple perusal of this provision shows that, in order to be established, a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization calls for the acceptance of the competent organ of the organization. The modalities for formulating such acceptance are the subject of guidelines 2.8.7 to 2.8.11,\textsuperscript{2179} the commentaries to which explain the meaning and describe the travaux préparatoires for this provision.\textsuperscript{2180}

\textsuperscript{2179} [550, 2010] 2.8.7 Acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization – When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.

\textsuperscript{2180} 2.8.8 Organ competent to accept a reservation to a constituent instrument – Subject to the rules of the organization, competence to accept the reservation to a constituent instrument of an international organization belongs to the organ
(3) It does not appear necessary to recall once again the reasons that led the Commission and the Conference to adopt the provisions contained in article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions. Although guideline 2.8.7 is sufficient to express the need for the acceptance of the competent organ of the organization, the Commission considered that it was worth recalling this particular requirement in the section dealing with the effects of reservations, given that the acceptance of the competent organ is the *sine qua non* for the establishment of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization. Only this collective acceptance can enable the reservation to produce all its effects. The individual acceptance of the other members of the organization, while clearly not prohibited, has no effect on the establishment of the reservation.\textsuperscript{2181}

4.2 Effects of an established reservation

Commentary

(1) A reservation “established” within the meaning of guideline 4.1 produces all the effects purported by its author, that is to say, to echo the wording of guideline 1.1.1 (Object of reservations), it excludes or modifies “the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects”.\textsuperscript{2182} At that point, the object of the reservation as desired or purported by its author is achieved.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2180} See the commentaries to guidelines 2.8.7 to 2.8.10, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10* (A/64/10), pp. 243–254; on the travaux préparatoires, see in particular pp. 243–245, paras. (2) to (5).
\item \textsuperscript{2181} See guideline 2.8.11: Reaction by a member of an international organization to a reservation to its constituent instrument – Guideline 2.8.7 does not preclude States or international organizations that are members of an international organization from taking a position on the permissibility or appropriateness of a reservation to a constituent instrument of the organization. Such an opinion is in itself devoid of legal effects.
\item \textsuperscript{2182} Yearbook ... 1999, vol. II, Part Two, p. 93.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
However, modifying or excluding the legal effect of one or more provisions of the treaty is not the only result of the establishment of the reservation; it also constitutes the author of the reservation a contracting party to the treaty. Following the establishment of the reservation, the treaty relationship is established between the author of the reservation and the contracting party or parties with regard to which the reservation is established, and this has consequences in terms of the status of the contracting State or contracting organization (guideline 4.2.1), the entry into force of a treaty (guideline 4.2.2), the existence of a treaty relationship between the author of the reservation and the parties with regard to which the reservation is established (guideline 4.2.3) and the resultant treaty relations (guidelines 4.2.4 and 4.2.5).

4.2.1 Status of the author of an established reservation

As soon as a reservation is established in accordance with guidelines 4.1 to 4.1.3, its author becomes a contracting State or contracting organization to the treaty.

Commentary

(1) The establishment of the reservation has a number of consequences for its author relating to the very existence of the treaty relationship and the author’s status in relation to the other contracting parties. It may even result in the entry into force of the treaty for all of the contracting States or contracting international organizations. These consequences follow directly from subparagraphs (a) and (c) of paragraph 4 of article 20, of the Vienna Conventions. The first of these provisions relates to the establishment of treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the contracting party which has accepted it (hence, the contracting party with regard to which the reservation is established); the second relates to whether the consent of the reserving State or reserving international organization takes effect, or in other words whether the author of the reservation becomes a contracting party to the treaty. In the 1986 Convention these provisions read as follows:

4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise provides:

(a) Acceptance of a reservation by a contracting State or by a contracting organization constitutes the reserving State or international organization a party to the
treaty in relation to the accepting State or organization if or when the treaty is in force for the reserving State and for the accepting State or organization;

(b) ...

(c) An act expressing the consent of a State or of an international organization to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one contracting State or one contracting organization has accepted the reservation.

(2) The Commission’s commentary to draft article 17 (which became article 20) clearly explains the intent of these provisions:

Paragraph 4 contains the three basic rules of the “flexible” system which are to govern the position of the contracting States in regard to reservations to any multilateral treaties not covered by the preceding paragraphs. Subparagraph (a) provides that acceptance of a reservation by another contracting State constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that State if or when the treaty is in force. […] Subparagraph (c) then provides that an act expressing the consent of a State to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation. This provision is important since it determines the moment at which a reserving State may be considered as a State which has ratified, accepted or otherwise become bound by the treaty.

(3) Article 20, paragraph 4 (a), of the 1969 Vienna Convention (the gist of which is reproduced in guideline 4.2.3) does not resolve the issue of the date on which the author of the reservation may be considered to have joined the group of contracting States or contracting international organizations. Article 20, paragraph 4 (c), was inserted into the Convention by the Commission in order to fill that gap. As Waldock explained in his fourth report:

The point is not purely one of drafting, since it touches the question of the conditions under which a reserving State is to be considered a “party” to a multilateral treaty under the

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2183 [554, 2010] Subparagraph (b) primarily concerns the effects of an objection to a valid reservation. In this connection see below section 4.3 of the Guide to Practice and, in particular, guidelines 4.3.1 (Effect of an objection on the entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the objection and the author of a reservation) and 4.3.4 (Non-entry into force of the treaty as between the author of a reservation and the author of an objection with maximum effect).

“flexible” system. Indeed, not only the Australian but also the Danish Government urges the Commission to deal explicitly with that question, since it may affect the determination of the date on which the treaty comes into force and may otherwise be of concern to a depositary. The Special Rapporteur understands the position under the “flexible” system to be that a reserving State is to be considered as a “party” if and at the moment when another State which has established its consent to be bound by the treaty accepts the reservation either expressly or tacitly under paragraph 3 of the existing article 19 (paragraph 4 of the new article 20 as given below).  

(4) Waldock’s explanation, which thus gave rise to article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1969 Convention, does call for some modification or, at any event, some clarification: it is often impossible to determine whether the author of the reservation becomes a “party” to the treaty in the sense of article 2, paragraph 1 (g), of the 1969 Convention, as, independently of the establishment of the reservation, the treaty may not be in force owing to the low number of ratifications or acceptances – a situation covered by the draft guideline 4.2.3 below.

(5) However, what can be determined with certainty is whether and when the author becomes a contracting State or contracting organization, in other words, if it has “consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force” (article 2, paragraph 1 (f)). That is precisely the subject of article 20, paragraph 4 (c), which merely states that the “act expressing [the author of the reservations] consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective when at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation”.  

(6) Although the general rule seems to be clearly established by article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the Vienna Conventions — the author of a reservation becomes a contracting State or contracting organization as soon as its valid reservation has been accepted by at least one contracting State or one contracting organization — its practical application is far from consistent and is even less coherent. The main actors concerned by the application of this rule, that is, depositaries, have almost always applied it in a very approximate manner.

(7) The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as depositary of multilateral treaties, for example, agrees that any instrument expressing consent to be bound by a treaty which is accompanied by a reservation may be deposited and, refusing to adopt a position on the issue of the validity or effects of the reservation, “indicates the date on which, in accordance with the treaty provisions, the instrument would normally produce its effect, leaving it to each party to draw the legal consequences of the reservations that it deems fit”. 2187 In other words, the Secretary-General does not wait for at least one acceptance to be received before accepting the definitive deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession accompanied by a reservation, but treats such instruments in the same way as any other ratification or accession that is not accompanied by a reservation.

Since he is not to pass judgment, the Secretary-General is not therefore in a position to ascertain the effects, if any, of the instrument containing reservations thereto and, inter alia, to determine whether the treaty enters into force as between the reserving State and any other State, or a fortiori between a reserving State and an objecting State if there have been objections. As a consequence, if the final clauses of the treaty in question stipulate that the treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of a certain number of instruments of ratification, approval, acceptance or accession, the Secretary-General as depositary will, subject to the considerations in the following paragraph, include in the number of instruments required for entry into force all those that have been accepted for deposit, whether or not they are accompanied by reservations and whether or not those reservations have met with objections. 2188

(8) This position has been criticized 2189 in view of the content of article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the Vienna Conventions (read in conjunction with article 20, paragraph 5). It has been justified by the Secretary-General by the fact that:

no objection had ever in fact been received from any State concerning an entry into force that included States making reservations. Finally, for a State’s instrument not to be counted, it might conceivably be required that all other contracting States, without exception, would have

2188 [559, 2010] Ibid., para. 184.
not only objected to the participation of the reserving State, but that those objecting States
would all have definitely expressed their intention that their objection would preclude the
entry into force of the treaty as between them and the reserving State.2190

(9) To give a recent example, Pakistan acceded to the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism through a notification dated 17 June 2009. That
instrument was accompanied by reservations to articles 11, 14 and 24 of the Convention.2191
Despite these reservations, the Secretary-General noted in his depositary notification of 19 June
2009 that:
The Convention will enter into force for Pakistan on 17 July 2009 in accordance with its article 26
(2) which reads as follows:

“For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after the deposit
of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the
Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”2192

Pakistan’s instrument is therefore considered by the depositary as taking immediate effect,
notwithstanding article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1969 Vienna Convention. For the depositary,
Pakistan is one of the contracting States, indeed one of the parties, to the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, independently of whether its reservations have
been accepted by at least one other contracting party.2193

(10) This practice, which seems to have been followed for many years and which existed well
before the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention, has also been followed by other depositary
institutions or States. Thus, both the Dominican Republic and the Council of Europe informed the

2190 [561, 2010] United Nations, Summary of practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties, (New York,
1999) ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, para. 186.
Notifications.
2193 [564, 2010] See also, for example, the reservation of El Salvador accompanying its ratification on 27 May 2008 of the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. The depositary notification of the Secretary-General of 25 August 2008 states that El
Salvador will be considered to be a State party on “the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of such State or regional economic
integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession”, in accordance with article 26 of the
Convention (C.N.436.2008.TREATIES-5, ibid.), or the declaration of the Islamic Republic of Iran accompanying its act of accession
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the depositary notification relating thereto
(C.N.792.2009.TREATIES-37, ibid.).
Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1965, as depositaries,²¹⁹⁴ that a reserving State was “immediately counted among the number of countries necessary for bringing the convention into force”²¹⁹⁵ – in other words as soon as it has expressed its consent to be bound, accompanying it with a reservation. Other depositaries, including the United States of America, the Organization of American States and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, reported a more nuanced practice and do not in principle count reserving States as contracting States.²¹⁹⁶

(11) Without intending to express a view on the correctness of this practice,²¹⁹⁷ the Commission is of the view that, although application of article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the Vienna Conventions is hesitant, to say the least, the rule expressed in this provision has not lost its authority. It is certainly part of the reservations regime established by the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions which the Commission decided, as a matter of principle, to complement rather than contradict it.²¹⁹⁸

According to the terms of article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the Vienna Conventions, the author of a reservation does not become a contracting State or organization until at least one other contracting State or other contracting organization accepts the reservation, either expressly — which seldom occurs — or tacitly on expiration of the time period set by article 20, paragraph 5, and referred to in guidelines 2.6.13²¹⁹⁹ and 2.8.1.²²⁰⁰ In the worst case, the consequence of strict application of this provision is a delay of 12 months in the entry into force of the treaty for the author of the reservation. This delay may certainly be considered undesirable; nevertheless, it is caused by the author of the reservation, and it can be reduced by express acceptance of the reservation on the part of a single other contracting State or a single other contracting international organization.

(12) This is the case generally. However, the wording of guideline 4.2.1 covers both the general case and the specific situations covered by article 20, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Vienna Conventions. That is why guideline 4.2.1 does not purely and simply echo the condition of one acceptance, but speaks of the establishment of a reservation.²²⁰¹ That formulation makes it possible to cover, for example, in the same guideline reservations whose establishment does not require

²¹⁹⁵ [566, 2010] Ibid.
²¹⁹⁶ [567, 2010] Ibid.
²¹⁹⁷ [568, 2010] See below, guideline 4.2.2 and commentary thereto.
²²⁰¹ [572, 2010] See also the commentary to guideline 4.2.3, paras. (2) and (3), below.
acceptance by another party because express provision is made for them in the treaty. A reservation thus established will constitute the author of the reservation a contracting State or contracting organization.

(13) This was the reasoning followed, for example, by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its opinion of 1981, where it concluded that a reserving State became one of the contracting States or contracting parties as from the date of ratification. Admittedly the reasoning rests on a fairly broad interpretation of the notion of “reservation expressly authorized” (art. 20, para. 1). The conclusion reached regarding the effects of a reservation thus established is, however, uncontroversial:

Accordingly, for the purpose of the present analysis, the reference in Article 75 to the Vienna Convention makes sense only if it is understood as an express authorization designed to enable States to make whatever reservations they deem appropriate, provided the reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. As such, they can be said to be governed by Article 20 (1) of the Vienna Convention and, consequently, do not require acceptance by any other State Party.

(14) In the light of these considerations, the Commission has decided to include in the Guide to Practice guideline 4.2.1, which expresses the idea of article 20, paragraph 4 (c), rather than reproducing it word for word. As soon as a reservation is established within the meaning of guidelines 4.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, the instrument of ratification or accession of the author of the reservation takes effect and constitutes the author a contracting State or a contracting organization. This has the result that the author of the reservation becomes a contracting State or contracting organization, with the ensuing consequences if the treaty is not yet in force, or a party to the treaty if it has already entered into force or comes into force for this reason.

2204 [575, 2010] Ibid., para. 35.
2205 [576, 2010] See guideline 4.2.2 below.
2206 [577, 2010] See guideline 4.2.3 below.
4.2.2  Effect of the establishment of a reservation on the entry into force of a treaty

1. When a treaty has not yet entered into force, the author of a reservation shall be included in the number of contracting States and contracting organizations required for the treaty to enter into force once the reservation is established.

2. The author of the reservation may however be included at an earlier date in the number of contracting States and contracting organizations required for the treaty to enter into force, if no contracting State or contracting organization is opposed in a particular case.

Commentary

(1) When applying the general rule set forth in guideline 4.2.1, a distinction must be drawn according to whether the treaty is not in force — a situation which may give rise to some fairly complex issues, which are dealt with in guideline 4.2.2 — or is in force — a much easier situation, which is addressed in guideline 4.2.3.

(2) Indeed, if the treaty has not yet entered into force, the establishment of the reservation and the validity of the instrument through which the author of the reservation has expressed consent to be bound by the treaty may have the consequence that the treaty enters into force for all contracting States and organizations, including the author of the reservation. That is the case if, following the establishment of the reservation, the addition of the author to the number of contracting parties has the result that the conditions for the entry into force of the treaty are fulfilled. This result depends heavily on the circumstances of the case, and in particular on the conditions for the entry into force of the treaty as established by its final clauses, the number of contracting parties and so on. It is thus scarcely possible to derive a general rule in this respect except that the author of the established reservation should be included in the number of contracting States or organizations that determines the entry into force of the treaty. This is the principle established by guideline 4.2.2, paragraph 1.

(3) The purpose of paragraph 2, on the other hand, is to cover — without passing judgment on its merits — what is probably the predominant practice of depositaries (and is, in any case, the practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, described above), which is to consider the author of the reservation to be a contracting State or contracting organization as soon as the

2207 [578, 2010] Paras. (6) to (10) of the commentary to guideline 4.2.1.
instrument expressing its consent to be bound has been deposited and, moreover, without giving consideration to the validity or the invalidity of the reservation.

(4) The wording of this second paragraph is prompted by a desire to take into consideration a practice which, up until now, does not seem to have caused any particular difficulties, while not calling into question the very clear rule, scarcely open to varying interpretations, which is laid down in article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the Vienna Conventions. A mere reference to the possibility of parties reaching an agreement contrary to this rule would not have made it possible to reconcile these two concerns: quite apart from the fact that all the guidelines in the Guide to Practice are only indicative and parties remain free to depart from them by (valid) agreement inter se, it is extremely doubtful whether an agreement could be said to have come about merely because the other parties all remain silent. Similarly the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 1951, refused to consider that the mere fact of using an institutional depositary meant that States agreed to all the depositary’s rules and practices:

It must be pointed out, first of all, that the existence of an administrative practice does not in itself constitute a decisive factor in ascertaining what views the contracting States to the Genocide Convention may have had concerning the rights and duties resulting therefrom.2208

The Commission likewise did not consider it wise to refer to the depositary’s habitual practice without further clarification,2209 for a majority of its members held that that might entrench and encourage the use of such practices, which contradicted the letter and spirit of article 20, paragraph 4 (c), of the Vienna Conventions.

(5) The formula chosen, which is reflected in the addition of a second paragraph, merely describes the practice of certain depositaries as an alternative to the rule. The expression “may, however, be included” reflects the optional nature of this divergent practice, whereas the final qualification “if no contracting State or contracting organization is opposed in a particular case”

2209 [580, 2010] Moreover it provided this clarification; see guideline 2.3.2 (Acceptance of late formulation of a reservation). “Unless the treaty provides otherwise or the well-established practice followed by the depositary differs, late formulation of a reservation shall be deemed to have been accepted by a Contracting Party if it has made no objections to such formulation after the expiry of the 12-month period following the date on which notification was received.” (See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), pp. 490–493.)
safeguards the application of the principle established in paragraph 1 should any one contracting State or contracting organization be opposed to that inclusion.

(6) The phrase “at an earlier date” seeks to preserve broad flexibility for practice in the future and, for example, the possibility of not eliminating any time lag whatsoever between the expression of the consent of the author of the reservation to be bound by the treaty and the acquisition of the status of contracting State or contracting organization. But if that were to happen, the practice would remain subject to the principle of there not being any objection.

4.2.3 Effect of the establishment of a reservation on the status of the author as a party to the treaty

The establishment of a reservation constitutes its author a party to the treaty in relation to contracting States and contracting organizations in respect of which the reservation is established if or when the treaty is in force.

Commentary

(1) The rule that the acceptance of a valid reservation establishes a treaty relationship between the author of the reservation and the State or international organization that has accepted it makes good sense. It appears in various forms in the drafts of all the special rapporteurs on the law of treaties. The only difference between Waldock’s approach and that of his predecessors lies in the number of acceptances needed in order to produce this effect. The first three special rapporteurs, staunch advocates of the traditional regime of unanimity, did not consider a treaty relationship established until all the other contracting parties had accepted the reservation. In Waldock’s flexible approach, each State (or international organization) not only decides for itself whether a reservation is opposable to it or not; that individual acceptance also produces its effects independently of the reactions of the other States or international organizations, although, logically, only in the bilateral relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the acceptance. The Commission explained in its commentary to draft article 20 as adopted on first reading that the application of this flexible system could:

certainly have the result that a reserving State may be a party to the treaty with regard to State X, but not with regard to State Y, although States X and Y are mutually bound by the treaty. But in the case of a general multilateral treaty or of a treaty concluded between a considerable
number of States, this result appears to the Commission not to be as unsatisfactory as allowing State Y, by its objection, to prevent the treaty from coming into force between the reserving State and State X, which has accepted the reservation.2210

(2) This system of “relative” participation in the treaty2211 is applicable, however, only in the “normal” instance of establishment of the reservation. Clearly, it cannot be applied in cases where unanimous acceptance is required in order to establish a reservation. For such a reservation to be able to produce its effects, including the entry into force of the treaty for the author of the reservation, all of the contracting parties must have consented to the reservation.2212 Consequently, the treaty necessarily enters into force in the same way for all of the contracting parties, on the one hand, and the author of the reservation, on the other hand. A comparable solution is necessary in the case of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization; only the acceptance of the competent organ can establish the reservation and constitute its author one of the circle of contracting parties.2213 Once this acceptance is obtained, the author of the reservation establishes treaty relations with all the other contracting parties without their individual consent being required.

(3) In the light of these comments it should, however, be noted that once the reservation is established, in conformity with the rules set out in guidelines 4.1 to 4.1.3, depending on the nature of the reservation and of the treaty, a treaty relationship is formed between the author of the reservation and the contracting party or parties in respect of which the reservation is established: the contracting party which accepted the reservation (in the “normal” case), and all the contracting parties (in the other cases). It thus suffices to recall this rule, which constitutes the core of the Vienna regime, without any need to distinguish again between the general rule and the exceptions to it, as the wording of guidelines 4.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 makes it possible to determine in respect of whom the reservation is established and with whom the treaty relationship is constituted.

(4) Guideline 4.2.3 draws the consequences of this principle — which is enunciated in guideline 4.2.1 — if the treaty is in force (or enters into force pursuant to guideline 4.2.2). In this case, it goes

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2213 [584, 2010] See above guideline 4.1.3.
without saying that the author of an established reservation thereby becomes a party to the treaty within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 1 (g), of the 1986 Vienna Convention and not just a contracting State or contracting organization as defined in paragraph 1 (f) of the same article.

4.2.4 Effect of an established reservation on treaty relations

1. A reservation established with regard to another party excludes or modifies for the reserving State or international organization in its relations with that other party the legal effect of the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects, to the extent of the reservation.

2. To the extent that an established reservation excludes the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty, the author of that reservation has neither rights nor obligations under those provisions in its relations with the other parties with regard to which the reservation is established. Those other parties shall likewise have neither rights nor obligations under those provisions in their relations with the author of the reservation.

3. To the extent that an established reservation modifies the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty, the author of that reservation has rights and obligations under those provisions, as modified by the reservation, in its relations with the other parties with regard to which the reservation is established. Those other parties shall have rights and obligations under those provisions, as modified by the reservation, in their relations with the author of the reservation.

Commentary

(1) The three paragraphs of guideline 4.2.4 are structured as follows:

- The first paragraph sets out the principle contained in article 21, paragraph 1 (a), of the Vienna Convention, with the requisite adjustments for the purposes of the Guide to Practice
- The second paragraph explains the consequences of this principle specifically when an established reservation excludes the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty, and
- The third does the same when the reservation modifies this legal effect.
(2) In all three cases (and in the title of the guideline) the Commission has used the singular to describe all the consequences attendant upon the establishment of a reservation, although in reality they are diverse, out of a concern to align the wording of the guideline with that of article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions (as reproduced in guideline 1.1), which employs the singular. That provision also establishes the distinction between reservations which purport to “exclude” and those which purport to “modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application” to the author of the reservation, whereas article 21, paragraph 1, states that an established reservation “modifies … the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates”, without contemplating an exclusionary effect. Reservations that modify should not, however, be treated as having precisely the same effect as reservations that exclude.

(3) In order to clarify further the content of the obligations and rights of the author of the reservation and of the State or international organization with regard to which the reservation is established, it is helpful to distinguish between, as Frank Horn terms them, “modifying reservations” and “excluding reservations”. The distinction is not always easy to make and it can happen that one and the same reservation has both an excluding and a modifying effect. Thus, a reservation by which its author purports to limit the scope of application of a treaty obligation only to a certain category of persons may be understood equally well as a modifying reservation (it modifies the legal effect of the initial obligation by limiting the circle of persons concerned) and as an excluding reservation (it purports to exclude the application of the treaty obligation for all persons not forming part of the specified category). It can also happen that an excluding reservation indirectly has modifying effects. In order to take account of such uncertainty, paragraphs 2 and 3 both begin with the phrase “to the extent that”. The distinction does, however, permit a better insight into the two most common situations. The great majority of reservations may be classified in one or other of these categories, or at least understood by means of this distinction.

2214 [585, 2010] Guideline 1.1 (Definition of reservations) – “Reservation” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to the State or to that international organization. On the other hand, article 21 of the Vienna Conventions is entitled “Legal effects [in the plural] of reservations and of objections to reservations”.


2216 [587, 2010] See for example the Egyptian reservation to the Vienna Convention on Consular Reservations: “Article 49 concerning exemption from taxation shall apply only to consular officers, their spouses and minor children. This exemption cannot be extended to consular employees and to members of the service staff”. (Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. III.6).
(4) Article 21, paragraph 1 (a), of the Vienna Conventions broadly determines the effect that the established reservation produces on the content of its author’s treaty relations. In the 1986 Vienna Convention this provision reads:

A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23:

(a) Modifies for the reserving State or international organization in its relations with that other party the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; …

(5) Quite apart from the lack of any reference to excluding reservations, although they are included in the very definition of a reservation, another more serious inconsistency may be signalled between the definition of the term “reservation” in the Vienna Conventions and the effects contemplated in article 21, paragraph 1; whereas according to article 21 a reservation modifies “the provisions of the treaty”, the purpose of a reservation according to article 2, paragraph 1 (d), is to modify or exclude “the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty”. This problem did not go unnoticed during the debate in the Commission: while some members stressed that the reservation could not change the provisions of the treaty and that it would be preferable to replace “provisions” by “application”, 2217 other members paid little attention to the matter, 2218 or expressed their satisfaction with the text proposed by the Drafting Committee. 2219

(6) In the literature, the question of whether it is the “provisions of the treaty” or their “legal effects” that are modified has been raised more forcefully. Professor Pierre-Henri Imbert is of the view that:

C’est précisément le lien établi par les rédacteurs de la Convention de Vienne entre la réserve et les dispositions d’une convention qui nous semble le plus critiquable. En effet, une réserve ne tend à éliminer une disposition mais une obligation.

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2218 [589, 2010] Mr. Tunkin “considered it of no great importance whether the wording used was ‘modifies the provisions of the treaty’ or ‘modifies the application of the provisions of the treaty’” (ibid., para. 9). For a similar view, see Mr. Briggs (ibid., para. 13).
[It is precisely the link which the drafters of the Vienna Convention established between reservations and the provisions of a convention that seems to be most open to criticism, in that a reservation is aimed at eliminating not a provision but an obligation.] 2220

However, this view considers the effect of the reservation only from the standpoint of its author, and appears to overlook the fact that in modifying the author’s obligation the reservation also affects the correlative rights of the States or international organizations in respect of which the reservation is established. It is thus more convincing to conclude that, with regard to this question, article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1969 and 1986 Conventions is better drafted than article 21, paragraph 1. It is unclear how a reservation, which is an instrument external to the treaty, could modify a provision of that treaty. It may exclude or modify its application, that is, its effect, but not the text itself, that is, the provisions. 2221

(7) Moreover the text of article 2, paragraph 1 (d), also does not appear to correspond fully to State practice with respect to reservations, in that it specifies that a reservation can purport to exclude or modify only “the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty”. 2222 It is in fact not uncommon for States to formulate reservations in order to modify the application of a treaty as a whole, or at least of a substantial part of it. In some cases, such reservations can certainly not be regarded as permissible, in that they deprive the treaty of its object and purpose, so that they cannot be considered “established reservations”. 2223 However, that is not always the case, and there are in practice many examples of such across-the-board reservations which were not the subject of objections or challenges by the other contracting States. 2224 Article 21, paragraph 1, is more open in this respect, in that it simply provides that the reservation modifies [or excludes] “the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation”. If a reservation can thus permissibly purport to modify the legal effects of all of the provisions of a treaty with respect to certain specific aspects, as the Commission clearly acknowledged in guideline 1.1.1 (Object of

reservations), it will have the effect, once established, of modifying the application of all those provisions, or indeed, as the case may be, of all of the provisions of the treaty, in accordance with article 21, paragraph 1.

(8) It follows that a validly established reservation affects the treaty relations of the author of the reservation in that it excludes or modifies the legal effect of one or more provisions of the treaty, or even of the treaty as a whole, with respect to a specific aspect, and on a reciprocal basis.

(9) In accordance with the Commission’s well-established practice in the context of the Guide to Practice, paragraph 1 of guideline 4.2.4 largely reproduces article 21, paragraph 1 (a), of the 1986 Vienna Convention while making the modifications justified by the above-mentioned arguments:

- The inclusion of “excluding” reservations
- The point that the reservation does not modify “the provisions of the treaty” but their legal effect
- The point that it may have an effect not only on specific provisions but on the “treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects”

(10) The two following paragraphs, which provide a more detailed description of the modifying and excluding effects of established reservations, respectively, are constructed along the same lines. In each the first sentence concerns the rights and obligations (or the lack thereof) of the author of the reservation. The second sentence deals with the rights and obligations of the other parties to

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Guideline 1.1.1 (Object of reservations) reads: “A reservation purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects, in their application to the State or to the international organization which formulates the reservation” (Yearbook... 1999, vol. II, Part Two, p. 93).

“Mediante le riserve, gli Stati possono produrre l’effetto di restringere il campo d’applicazione materiale o soggettivo della convenzione, fino all’esclusione di una o più disposizioni dell’accordo o alla non applicazione per determinati soggetti, oppure manifestare la volontà di accettare le disposizioni con modalità restrittive o con limiti di ordine temporale o territoriale.” (“By means of reservations, States can reduce the material or subjective scope of application of a treaty to the point of exclusion of one or more provisions of the treaty or its non-application to specific subjects, or again they can demonstrate willingness to accept the provisions of the treaty in accordance with restrictive modalities or by attaching to the limitations of a temporal or territorial nature.”) (P. de Cesari, “Riserve, dichiarazioni e facolta’ delle convenzioni dell’Aja di diritto internazionale privato”, in Tullio Treves (ed.), “Six Studies on Reservations”, Comunicazioni e Studi, vol. 22 (2002), p. 167, para. 8).

On the matter of reciprocity, see below guideline 4.2.5 and the commentary thereto.

It should also be noted that the wording of the first sentence of both paragraphs 2 and 3 of guideline 4.2.4 seeks to remove the ambiguity stemming from the definition of “reservation” in the English version of article 2, paragraph 1 (d) of the Vienna Conventions: “a unilateral statement made by a State [or by an international organization] ... whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty”. In this wording the pronoun “it” could refer to either the statement or the State. The French version, by using “il” before “vise à exclure” is unequivocal and clearly shows that the word “it” in English refers to the author of the reservation. As in other contexts, the same pronoun is used to refer not to the author’s intent but to the effects of the reservation (see guideline 1.1.1) and in order to avoid any ambivalence resulting from the definition of “reservation” in the
the treaty with regard to which the reservation is established and in doing so it echoes the principle established in article 21, paragraph 1 (b) of the Vienna Conventions and lays down the principle of reciprocity in the application of the reservation.

(11) Paragraph 2 of guideline 4.2.4 explains the consequences of an established reservation when the latter excludes the legal effect of one or more provisions of the treaty.

(12) There are many examples of such reservations. Excluding reservations are often used, in particular to exclude compulsory dispute settlement procedures. Pakistan, for instance, notified the Secretary-General of the following reservation when it acceded on 17 June 2009 to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism:

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan does not consider itself bound by article 24, paragraph 1, of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereby declares that, for a dispute to be referred to the International Court of Justice, the agreement of all parties shall in every case be required.

(13) A considerable number of reservations also purport to exclude the application of substantive provisions of the treaty. Egypt, for example, formulated a reservation to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations purporting to exclude the legal effect of article 37, paragraph 2:

Paragraph 2 of article 37 shall not apply.

Cuba also made a reservation purporting to exclude the application of article 25, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Special Missions:

The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba enters an express reservation with regard to the third sentence of paragraph 1, article 25 of the Convention and consequently

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English text of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, the Commission had chosen wording that dispels any doubts; the first clause refers to the effects of reservations, while the second covers the rights and obligations of the author of the reservation.

See also guideline 1.1.8 and the commentary thereto (Yearbook ... 2000, vol. II, Part Two, pp. 108–112).

See also the similar reservations of Algeria, Andorra, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America, etc. (Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. XVIII.11). See also the many reservations excluding the application of article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ibid., chap. IV.1).

Ibid., chap. III.3. See also the reservation formulated by Morocco (ibid.).
does not accept the assumption of consent to enter the premises of the special mission for any of the reasons mentioned in that paragraph or for any other reasons.\textsuperscript{2232}

As another example, the Government of Rwanda formulated a reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination worded as follows:

The Rwandese Republic does not consider itself as bound by article 22 of the Convention.\textsuperscript{2233}

(14) Applying article 21, paragraph 1 (a), of the Vienna Conventions to reservations of this kind is relatively easy. An established reservation modifies the legal effect of the treaty provision to which the reservation relates “to the extent of the reservation”, that is to say by simply excluding any legal effect of that treaty provision. Once the reservation is established, everything in the treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the parties with regard to which the reservation is established takes place as if the treaty did not include the provision referred to in the reservation. Excluding reservations thus have a “contraregulatory effect”.\textsuperscript{2234} The author of the reservation is no longer bound by the obligation stemming from the treaty provision in question, but is in no way prevented from complying with it (and being held to it if it should be the case that the treaty norm enunciates a customary obligation). It follows logically that the other States or international organizations with regard to which the reservation is established have waived their right to demand performance of the obligation stemming from the treaty provision in question in the context of their treaty relationship with the author of the reservation.

(15) Paragraph 2 of guideline 4.2.4 expresses this effect of excluding reservations in simple terms intended to leave no doubt that the author of the reservation is not bound by any obligation stemming from the treaty provision to which the excluding reservation relates and cannot claim any right stemming from it. And, as the word “likewise” in the second sentence indicates, the same is true conversely for the other parties with regard to which the reservation is established.

(16) It should be noted, moreover, that the exclusion by means of a reservation of an obligation stemming from a provision of the treaty does not automatically mean that the author of the reservation refuses to fulfil the obligation. The author of the reservation may simply wish to exclude the application of the treaty obligation within the legal framework established by the treaty.

\textsuperscript{2232} [603, 2010]\textit{Ibid.}, chap. III.9.

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A State or an international organization may be in full agreement with a rule enunciated in a treaty provision, but nevertheless reject the competence of a treaty body or a judicial authority to rule on a dispute concerning the application and interpretation of that rule. While remaining entirely free to comply with the obligation established within the treaty framework, the author nevertheless excludes the applicability to itself of the control mechanisms established by the treaty.2235

(17) The concrete effect of a modifying reservation — the situation contemplated in paragraph 3 of guideline 4.2.4 — is significantly different and more difficult to grasp. Unlike the author of an excluding reservation, the author of a modifying reservation is not seeking to be released from its obligations stemming from one or more treaty provisions in order to regain freedom of action within the treaty’s legal framework. Rather, it is seeking to replace the obligation stemming from the treaty provision with a different one.

(18) By such a modifying reservation the author, once the reservation is established, does not simply purport to be released from all treaty obligations stemming from the provisions to which the reservation relates. The effect of the reservation is to replace the obligation initially provided for in the treaty by another one which is provided for in the reservation. In other words, the obligation stemming from the treaty provision referred to in the reservation is replaced or modified by the one set forth in the reservation in the treaty relations between its author and the State or international organization in regard to which the reservation is established. Or, to be more precise, the established reservation leads to replacement of the obligation and the correlative right stemming from the treaty provision in question with the obligation and the correlative right provided for in the reservation or stemming from the treaty provision as modified by the reservation.

(19) However, the substitution of obligations has effect only with respect to the author of the reservation and has implications only for the other parties with regard to which the reservation is established. The phrase “as modified by the reservation”, which is repeated twice in paragraph 3 and refers both to the rights and obligations of the author of the reservation and to those of the other parties with regard to which the reservation is established, is intended to draw attention to the diversity of these effects.

2234 [605, 2010] F. Horn, footnote 321 above, p. 84.
2235 [606, 2010] See also guideline 3.1.8 (Reservations to a provision reflecting a customary norm) and the commentary thereto, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/62/10), pp. 87–98, and in particular
(20) An example of the first type of modifying reservation — those that modify only the rights and obligations of the author of the reservation vis-à-vis the other parties without affecting the content of the rights and obligations of the latter — is the reservation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances:

In the Federal Republic of Germany, manufacturers, wholesale distributors, importers and exporters are not required to keep records of the type described [in paragraph 2 of article 11 of the Convention] but instead to mark specifically those items in their invoices which contain substances and preparations in Schedule III. Invoices and packaging slips showing such items are to be preserved by these persons for a minimum period of five years.\textsuperscript{2236}

By means of this reservation, Germany thus purports not simply to exclude the application of article 11, paragraph 2, of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, but rather to replace the obligation stemming from that provision with another, different one that applies only to the author of the reservation.

(21) The Finnish reservation to article 18 of the Convention on Road Signs and Signals of 1968 is another example that clearly shows that the author of the reservation is not simply releasing itself from its obligation under the treaty, but is replacing it, at least in part, with another obligation that in no way modifies the rights and obligations of the other parties:

Finland reserves the right not to use signs E,9a or E,9b to indicate the beginning of a built-up area, nor signs E,9c or E,9d to indicate the end of such an area. Instead of them symbols are used. A sign corresponding to sign E,9b is used to indicate the name of a place, but it does not signify the same as sign E,9b.\textsuperscript{2237}

(22) On the other hand, the reservation that Israel formulated to the first, second and fourth Geneva Conventions in relation to the articles on a distinctive sign for medical personnel,\textsuperscript{2238} while it does not appear to modify directly the content of the relevant provisions, except with respect to paragraph (7) of the commentary.

\textsuperscript{2236} Multilateral Treaties ... , footnote 341 above, chap. VI.6.
\textsuperscript{2237} Ibid., chap. XI.B.20.
\textsuperscript{2238} This reservation was formulated following the rejection of an amendment proposed by Israel at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to include the Red Shield of David among the distinctive signs for medical personnel. Israel thereupon formulated three similar reservations upon signing the Geneva Conventions (on 8 December 1949), which it confirmed upon ratification (6 July 1951).
Israel itself, does impose corresponding obligations on the other parties with regard to which it is established. The reservation to the first Geneva Convention reads as follows:

Subject to the reservation that, while respecting the inviolability of the distinctive signs and emblems of the Convention, Israel will use the Red Shield of David as the emblem and distinctive sign of the medical services of her armed forces.\textsuperscript{2239}

Israel thereby imposes on the other parties with regard to which its reservation is established the obligation, not originally provided for, to respect a new emblem in their relations with Israel.

(23) Similarly, the reservations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to article 9 of the Convention on the High Seas\textsuperscript{2240} concluded in Geneva in 1958 and to article 20 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone\textsuperscript{2241} are clearly intended to establish a treaty regime that would impose on other parties to those conventions obligations which they did not undertake when ratifying or acceding to them. The same could be said about the reservations of Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom to the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations,\textsuperscript{2242} since they modify, \textit{ratione personae}, the treaty regime by calling for the shifting of the obligation from one entity to another.

(24) While it is not mechanical, excluding reservations lend themselves better to reciprocity than do modifying reservations (especially those in the first category, which modify only the content of the rights and obligations of their author). The Commission has nevertheless thought it necessary to refer, in the second sentence of both paragraphs 2 and 3 of guideline 4.2.4, to the general principle of reciprocal application of reservations set out in article 21, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna

\textsuperscript{2240} [611, 2010] “The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers that the principle of international law according to which a ship on the high seas is not subject to any jurisdiction except that of the flag State applies without restriction to all government ships” (\textit{Multilateral Treaties ...,} footnote 341 above, chap. XXI.2).
\textsuperscript{2241} [612, 2010] “The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers that government ships in foreign territorial waters have immunity and that the measures mentioned in this article may therefore be applied to them only with the consent of the flag State” (\textit{ibid.,} chap. XXI.1).
\textsuperscript{2242} [613, 2010] These reservations all seek to preserve the delegation of certain areas of responsibility to the European Union. They are drafted in nearly identical terms, despite some slight variations in wording. The reservation of Ireland, for example, reads: “Whereas to the extent to which certain provisions of the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunications Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (‘the Convention’) fall within the responsibility of the European Community, the full implementation of the Convention by Ireland has to be done in accordance with the procedures of this international organisation” (\textit{ibid.,} chap. XXV.4).
Conventions. These references should be understood as being without prejudice to the exceptions cited in guideline 4.2.5.

(25) The principle of reciprocal application of reservations means that as soon as a reservation has been established, it can be invoked not only by its author but also by any other party in regard to which it has acquired this status, as shown by the second sentence in paragraphs 2 and 3 of guideline 4.2.4. The reservation creates between its author and the parties with regard to which it is established a special regulatory system which is applied on a reciprocal basis. In this regard, Waldock has explained that “reservations always work both ways”.2243 This idea is also to be found in article 21, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Conventions, which, in its 1986 version, reads as follows:

1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23:

(a) ... 

(b) modifies those provisions [of the treaty which is their subject] to the same extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving State or international organization.

(26) It follows that the author of the reservation is not only released from compliance with the treaty obligations which are the subject of the reservation but also loses the right to require the State or international organization with regard to which the reservation is established to fulfil the treaty obligations that are the subject of the reservation. In addition, the State or the international organization with regard to which the reservation is established is released from compliance with the obligation which is the subject of the reservation with respect to the reserving State or organization.

(27) This principle of reciprocal application is based on common sense.2244 The regulatory system governing treaty relations between the two States concerned reflects the common denominator of

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2244 [615, 2010] Dionisio Anzilotti believed that “l’effetto della riserva è che lo Stato riservante non è vincolato dalle disposizioni riservate: naturalmente, le altre parti non sono vincolate verso di lui, di guisa che, nei rapporti tra lo Stato riservante e gli altri, le disposizioni riservate sono come se non facessero parte del trattato” (“the effect of the reservation is that the reserving State is not bound by the provisions which are the subject of the reservation; naturally, the other parties are not bound in respect to it; thus, in relations between the reserving State and the others, it is as if the provisions which are the subject of the reservation are not part of
their respective commitments resulting from the overlap — albeit partial — of their wills. It follows “directly from the consensual basis of treaty regulations”, which has a significant influence on the general regime of reservations of the Vienna Convention, as Waldock explains in his first report on treaty law:

A reservation operates reciprocally between the reserving State and any other party to the treaty, so that both are exempted from the reserved provisions in their mutual relations.

The International Court of Justice has presented the problem of the reciprocal application of the optional declarations of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction contained in article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court in a comparable, although slightly different, way. In its judgment in the Norwegian Loans case, it stated that:

since two unilateral declarations are involved, such jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court only to the extent to which the two Declarations coincide in conferring it. A comparison between the two Declarations shows that the French Declaration accepts the Court’s jurisdiction within narrower limits than the Norwegian Declaration; consequently, the common will of the Parties, which is the basis of the Court’s jurisdictions, exists within these narrower limits indicated by the French reservation.

The reciprocity of the effects of the reservation also rebalances the inequalities created by the reservation in the bilateral relations between the author of the reservation and the other States or international organizations with regard to which the reservation is established. These latter cannot, through the reservations mechanism, be bound by more obligations towards the author of the reservation than the latter itself is ready to assume. Professor Simma believed in this regard that:

2245 [616, 2010] R. Baratta, footnote 401 above, p. 291: “Si è poi visto che l’orientamento che emerge della pratica internazionale appare in sintonia con il principio consensualistico posto a fondamento del diritto dei trattati: la norma riservata è priva di giuridicità non essendosi formato l’accordo fra tali soggetti a causa dell’apposizione della riserva stessa.” (“We have seen, moreover, that the trend resulting from international practice seems to be linked with the consensual principle, a basic element of treaty law: the rule which is the subject of the reservation loses its juridical status, absent an agreement between subjects of law due to the fact of the formulation of the reservation itself.”)


Wer sich bestimmten Vertragsverpflichtungen durch einen Vorbehalt entzogen hat, kann selbst auch nicht verlangen, im Einklang mit den vom Vorbehalt erfassten Vertragsbestimmungen behandelt zu werden [Whoever has withdrawn from certain treaty obligations by a reservation cannot claim treatment in accordance with the treaty provisions which are the subject of the reservation].

(30) The reciprocal application of a reservation follows directly from the idea of the reciprocity of international commitments and of give-and-take between the parties and conforms to the maxim do ut des.

(31) Furthermore, the reciprocity of the effects of the reservation plays a not negligible regulatory, even deterrent, role in the exercise of the widely recognized freedom to formulate a reservation: the author of the reservation must bear in mind that the effects of the reservation are not only to the author’s benefit; the author also runs the risk of the reservation being invoked against it. On this subject, Waldock has written:

There is of course another check upon undue exercise of the freedom to make reservations in the fundamental rule that a reservation always works both ways, so that any other State may invoke it against the reserving State in their mutual relations.

(32) Reciprocal application thus cuts both ways and “contributes significantly to resolving the inherent tension between treaty flexibility and integrity”. In a way, this principle appears to be a complement to, and is often far more of a deterrent than, the requirement of permissibility of the reservation, owing to the uncertain determination of permissibility in a good number of cases.

(33) A number of reservation clauses thus make express reference to the principle of reciprocal application of reservations, whereas other treaties recall the principle of reciprocal application in

rightly maintained that the reciprocity of the effects of a reservation has proven to be a “strumento di compensazione nelle mutue relazioni pattizie tra parti contraenti; strumento che è servito a ristabilire la parità nel quantum degli obblighi convenzionali vicendevolmente assunti, parità unilateralmente alterata da una certa riserva”. [“Compensatory mechanism in the mutual relations between contracting parties which has served to restore the balance in the quantum of reciprocally assumed treaty obligations that was unilaterally altered by a given reservation.”] (footnote 401 above, p. 292).

2253 [624, 2010] This was already the case in article 20, paragraph 2, of The Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930 (“The provisions thus excluded cannot be applied against the Contracting Party who has made the reservation nor relied on by
that Party against any other Contracting Party"). Other examples are found in The Hague Conventions on International Private Law (for these reservation clauses, see Ferenc Majoros, Clunet (JDI), 1974, p. 90 et seq.), in a number of conventions concluded within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (see P.-H. Imbert, footnote 522 above, pp. 188–191 and p. 251) and in some conventions drawn up and concluded within the Council of Europe. The Model Final Clauses for Conventions and Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1980 proposes the following provision relating to reciprocity of the effects of reservation: “A Party which has made a reservation in respect of a provision of [the Agreement concerned] may not claim the application of that provision by any other Party; it may, however, if its reservation is partial or conditional, claim the application of that provision insofar as it has itself accepted it” (art. e, para. 3). See also F. Horn, footnote 321 above, pp. 146 and 147.

2254 [625, 2010] See, for example, article 18 of the Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (“A Contracting Party shall not be entitled to avail itself of this Convention against other Contracting Parties except to the extent that it is itself bound by the Convention”) or article XIV of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention against other Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound by the Convention”).


2257 [628, 2010] R. Baratta, footnote 401 above, pp. 227 et seq. and 291; Ferenc Majoros, footnote 624 above, pp. 83 and 109; F. Parisi and C. Ševcenko, footnote 622 above. There have, however, been cases where, simply as a precaution, States have made their acceptance conditional upon the reciprocal application of the reservation. It is in this sense that we must understand the United States declarations in response to the reservation by Romania and the USSR to the Convention on Road Traffic of 1949, whereby the Government of the United States specified that it “has no objection to [these] reservation[s] but ‘considers that it may and hereby states that it will apply [these] reservation[s] reciprocally with respect to [their respective author States]’”.... Multilateral Treaties...., footnote 341 above, chap. XL.B.1.


2259 [630, 2010] Yearbook... 1966, vol. II, pp. 303 and 351. See also the comments by Austria (ibid., p. 282).


4.2.5 Non-reciprocal application of obligations to which a reservation relates

Insofar as the obligations under the provisions to which the reservation relates are not subject to reciprocal application in view of the nature of the obligations or the object and purpose of the treaty, the content of the obligations of the parties other than the author of the reservation remains unaffected. The content of the obligations of those parties likewise remains unaffected when reciprocal application is not possible because of the content of the reservation.

Commentary

(1) As its title indicates, guideline 4.2.5 deals with exceptions to the general principle of reciprocal application of a reservation as between its author and the other parties to the treaty with regard to which the reservation is established.

(2) Although the second sentences of paragraphs 2 and 3 of guideline 4.2.4 reflect the principle of the reciprocal application of reservations — both reproducing the idea set out in article 21, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Conventions — guideline 4.2.5 emphasizes that this principle is not absolute.\textsuperscript{2262} It cannot, in particular, find application in cases where a rebalancing between the obligations of the author of the reservation and the State or international organization with regard to which the reservation is established is unnecessary or proves impossible. This is the case essentially because of the nature of the obligation to which the reservation relates, the object and purpose of the treaty or the content of the reservation itself.

(3) The first sentence of guideline 4.2.5 covers the first of these hypotheses: the case in which the reciprocal application of the reservation is excluded because of the nature of the obligation to which the reservation relates or the object and purpose of the treaty; it can be difficult, moreover, to distinguish between these two sub-categories. If the treaty is not itself based on reciprocity of rights and obligations between the parties, a reservation can produce no such reciprocal effect.

(4) A typical example is afforded by the human rights treaties. The fact that a State formulates a reservation excluding the application of one of the obligations contained in such a treaty does not release a State which accepts the reservation from respecting that obligation to the extent that the obligation concerned is not reciprocal, despite the existence of the reservation. To the same extent, these obligations apply not in an inter-State relationship between the reserving State and the State which has accepted the reservation, but simply in a State-human being relationship. The Human Rights Committee considered in this respect in its general comment No. 24 that:

Although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between States allow them to reserve *inter se* application of rules of general international law, it is otherwise in human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction. For this reason, the Committee continues, the human rights treaties, “and the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] specifically, are not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place”.

(5) Moderating this formulation which may appear too absolute, the phrase “insofar as”, with which guideline 4.2.5 begins, aims to show that even if the nature of the obligation or the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole exclude the reciprocity of reservations, elements of reciprocity may nevertheless remain in the relations between the author of the reservation and the other parties to the treaty. Thus, for example, it is clear that a State or international organization that has made a reservation cannot invoke the obligation excluded or modified by that reservation and require the other parties to fulfil it – even though the other parties remain bound by the obligation in question. This also means that guideline 4.2.5 is without effect on the normal operation of the

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reservation in the relations among the other parties (whose obligations it does not modify); this is the meaning of the phrase “the content of the obligations of the parties other than the author of the reservation remains unaffected” at the end of the first sentence of guideline 4.2.5.

(6) Moreover, the human rights treaties are not, however, the only ones that do not lend themselves to reciprocity. That effect is also absent from treaties establishing obligations owed to the community of contracting States. Examples can be found in treaties on commodities, in environmental protection treaties, in some demilitarization or disarmament treaties and also in international private law treaties providing for uniform law.

(7) In all of these situations, the reservation cannot produce a reciprocal effect in the bilateral relations between its author and the State or international organization with regard to which it is established. A party owes an obligation towards all the other parties to the treaty. Thus the reverse effect of the reservation has “nothing on which it can ‘bite’ or operate”.

(8) As Roberto Baratta has pointed out:

anche in ipotesi di riserve a norme poste dai menzionati accordi l’effetto di reciprocità si produce, in quanto né la prassi, né i principi applicabili in materia inducono a pensare che lo State riservante abbia un titolo giuridico per pretendere l’applicazione della disposizione da esso riservata rispetto al soggetto non autore della riserva. Resta nondimeno, in capo a tutti i soggetti che non abbiano apposto la stessa riserva, l’obbligo di applicare in ogni caso la norma riservata a causa del regime solidaristico creato dall’accordo.

[even on the assumption of reservations to the norms enunciated in the above-mentioned agreements, the effect of reciprocity is produced, as neither practice nor the principles applicable suggest that the reserving State would have a legal right to call for the application of the provision to which the reservation relates by a subject which is not the author of the reservation. There nonetheless remains the obligation for all subjects which have not formulated the reservation to apply in all cases the norm to which the reservation relates, by virtue of the regime of solidarity established by the agreement.]^{2271}

(9) This, moreover, was the thinking underlying the model clause on reciprocity adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1980:

A Party which has made a reservation in respect of a provision of [the agreement concerned] may not claim the application of that provision by any other Party; it may, however, if its reservation is partial or conditional, claim the application of that provision insofar as it has itself accepted it."^{2272}

(10) The second sentence of guideline 4.2.5 concerns the second exception to the general principle of the reciprocal application of reservations: a situation when “reciprocal application is not possible because of the content of the reservation”.

(11) This situation arises, for example, in the case of reservations purporting to limit the territorial application of a treaty. Reciprocal application of such reservation is quite simply not possible in practice.^{2273} Similarly, reciprocal application of the effects of the reservation is also excluded if it was motivated by situations obtaining specifically in the reserving State.^{2274} Thus, the reservation formulated by Canada purporting to exclude peyotl^{2275} from the application of the Convention, formulated solely because of the presence in Canadian territory of groups which use in their “magical or religious

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2271}}\text{R. Baratta, footnote 401 above, p. 294; D.W. Greig, footnote 353 above, p. 140.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2272}}\text{Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 315th meeting, 1980, Model Final Clauses for Conventions and Agreements concluded within the Council of Europe, article e (3), available from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/ClausulesFinales.htm. On this subject, see Ferenc Majoros, footnote 624 above, p. 90, and F. Horn, footnote 321 above, pp. 146–147.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2273}}\text{P.-H. Imbert, footnote 522 above, p. 258; B. Simma, footnote 621 above, p. 61.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2274}}\text{F. Horn, footnote 321 above, pp. 165 and 166; P.-H. Imbert, footnote 522 above, pp. 258–260. See however the more cautious ideas relating to these assumptions formulated by Ferenc Majoros, op. cit., footnote 624 above, pp. 83 and 84.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2275}}\text{This is a species of small cactus which has hallucinogenic psychotropic effects.}\]
ceremonies” certain psychotropic substances that would normally fall under the Convention regime, could not be invoked in its own favour by another party to the Convention unless if it was confronted with the same situation.

(12) The principle of reciprocal application of reservations may also be limited by reservation clauses contained in the treaty itself. An example is the Convention on Customs Facilities for Touring and its Additional Protocol of 1954. Article 20, paragraph 7, of the Convention provides:

No Contracting State shall be required to extend to a State making a reservation the benefit of the provisions to which such reservation applies. Any State availing itself of this right shall notify the Secretary-General accordingly and the latter shall communicate its decision to all signatory and contracting States.

Even though this particular clause does not in itself exclude the application of the principle of reciprocal application, it deprives it of automaticity by making it subject to notification by the accepting State. Such notifications have been made by the United States of America in relation to the reservations formulated by Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR to the dispute settlement mechanism provided for in article 21 of that Convention.

4.3 Effect of an objection to a valid reservation

Unless the reservation has been established with regard to an objecting State or organization, the formulation of an objection to a valid reservation precludes the reservation from having its intended effects as against that State or international organization.

Commentary

(1) Unlike acceptance of a valid reservation, an objection to a reservation may produce a variety of effects as between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection. The choice is left to a great extent (but not entirely) to the latter, which can vary the potential legal effects of the

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reservation-objection pair. For example, it may choose, in accordance with article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, to preclude the treaty from entering into force as between itself and the reserving State by “definitely” expressing that intention. But the author of the objection may also elect not to oppose the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the author of the reservation or, to put it more accurately, may refrain from expressing a contrary intention. In that case, if the treaty does in fact enter into force for the two parties, the treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection are modified in accordance with article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions. Thus, objections to a valid reservation may have a number of effects on the very existence of treaty relations or on their content, and those effects may vary with regard to the same treaty and the same reservation.

(2) The primary function and the basic effect of every objection are, however, very simple. Unlike acceptance, an objection constitutes its author’s rejection of the reservation. As the International Court of Justice clearly stated in its 1951 advisory opinion, “no State can be bound by a reservation to which it has not consented”.

This is the fundamental effect of the same principle of mutual consent that underlies all treaty law and, in particular, the regime of reservations: the treaty is the consensual instrument par excellence, drawing its strength from the will of States. Reservations are “consubstantial” with the State’s consent to be bound by the treaty.

(3) Thus, the objection may be analysed first and foremost as the objecting State’s refusal to consent to the reservation and, as such, it prevents the establishment of the reservation with respect to the objecting State or international organization within the meaning of article 21, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions and of guideline 4.1. As the Commission pointed out in its commentary to guideline 2.6.1 (Definition of objections to reservations):

“The refusal to accept a reservation is precisely the purpose of an objection in the full sense of the word in its ordinary meaning.”

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2279 [650, 2010] On the issue of when the treaty enters into force for the author of the reservation, see guidelines 4.2.1 and 4.2.3, 4.3.1 and 4.3.4 and the commentaries thereto.
(4) Unlike an acceptance, an objection makes the reservation inapplicable as against the author of the objection. Clearly, this effect can be produced only where the reservation has not already been accepted (explicitly or tacitly) by the author of the objection. Acceptance and objection are mutually exclusive, and definitively so, at least insofar as the effects of acceptance are concerned. In this regard, guideline 2.8.12 states:

“Acceptance of a reservation cannot be withdrawn or amended”.2283

The phrase introducing guideline 4.3 refers implicitly to this principle, even if the Commission chose not to make it too heavy — it serves to introduce section 4.3 as a whole — by including a specific reference.

(5) In order to highlight the fundamental function of objections, guideline 4.3, which begins the section of the Guide to Practice on the effect of an objection to a valid reservation, sets out the principle whereby an objection prevents the reservation from producing the effects intended by its author.2284 This provides an initial clarification of the meaning of the phrase “the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation”, which appears at the end of article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions and the meaning of which is clarified further in guideline 4.3.5.

(6) The neutralization of a reservation’s effect as it applies to the State or international organization that is the author of the objection is, however, far from being the answer to all the questions concerning the effects of an objection. The objection may in fact have several different effects, both on the entry into force of the treaty (as described in guidelines 4.3.1 to 4.3.4) and, once the treaty has entered into force for the author of the reservation and the author of the objection, on the content of the treaty relations thus established (dealt with in guidelines 4.3.5 to 4.3.7).

(7) There is, however, a case in which an objection does not produce the normal effects described in guideline 4.3: it is the case in which a State or organization member of an international organization formulates an objection to a reservation formulated by another State or another international organization to the constituent instrument of the organization. Such an objection,

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2284 [655, 2010] It will be recalled that guidelines 1.1 and 1.1.1 define reservations in terms of the intended object of the State or international organization formulating them.
regardless of its content, would be devoid of legal effects. This is the meaning of guideline 2.8.11 according to which:

“Guideline 2.8.7 does not preclude States or international organizations that are members of an international organization from taking a position on the permissibility or appropriateness of a reservation to a constituent instrument of the organization. Such an opinion is in itself devoid of legal effects”. 2285

4.3.1 Effect of an objection on the entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the objection and the author of a reservation

An objection by a contracting State or by a contracting organization to a valid reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting State or organization and the reserving State or organization, except in the case mentioned in guideline 4.3.4.

Commentary

(1) As the Commission indicated in its commentary to guideline 2.6.8, the Vienna Conventions do not give any indication of the time at which the intention to oppose the entry into force of the treaty must be expressed by the author of the objection. 2286 The Commission did, however, conclude that, in accordance with the presumption established in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions, an objection not accompanied by a clear expression of such an intention does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation or, in certain cases, the entry into force of the treaty itself. This legal effect cannot be called into question by the subsequent expression of a contrary intention. This idea has already been expressed in guideline 2.6.8, which provides that the intention to oppose the entry into force of the treaty must have been expressed “before the treaty would otherwise enter into force between [the author of the objection and the author of the reservation]”. 2287 However, that guideline

2285 [656, 2010] For the commentary to this guideline, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10), pp. 250 and 251. Guideline 2.8.7 (Acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization) reads: “When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.”


2287 [658, 2010] See also paragraph (5) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.8, ibid., p. 199.
concerns the procedure for formulating the required intention and not its effects; it therefore seemed useful to reiterate that principle in the part of the Guide to Practice dealing with the legal effect of objections. Nevertheless, guideline 4.3.1 uses the expression “does not preclude the entry into force”, which implies that the treaty was not in force as between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection when the reservation was made.

(2) Concretely, the consequence of the non-entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection is that no treaty relationship exists between them — even if, as is often the case, both can be considered parties to the treaty within the meaning of the Vienna Conventions. The mere fact that one party rejects the reservation and does not wish to be bound by the provisions of the treaty in its relations with the author of the reservation does not necessarily mean that the latter cannot become a contracting party in accordance with guideline 4.2.1. It is sufficient, under the general regime, for another State or another international organization to accept the reservation expressly or tacitly for the author of the reservation to be considered a contracting party to the treaty. The absence of a treaty relationship between the author of the maximum-effect objection and the author of the reservation does not a priori have any effect except between them.2288

(3) In the absence of a definite expression of the contrary intention, an objection — which can be termed “simple” — to a valid reservation does not ipso facto result in the entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection, as is the case for acceptance. This, in fact, is one of the fundamental differences between objection and acceptance, one which, along with other considerations, makes an objection not “tantamount to acceptance”, contrary to what has often been asserted.2289 Pursuant to article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions, reproduced in guideline 4.3.1, such an objection “does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting State or international organization and the reserving

2288 [659, 2010] The International Court of Justice recognized in 1951 that “such a decision will only affect the relationship between the State making the reservation and the objecting State”. (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 26). See, however, paragraph (1) of the commentary to guideline 4.3.2 below.

State or international organization”. Yet while such an objection does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty, it remains neutral on the question as to whether or not the reserving State or organization becomes a contracting party to the treaty, and does not necessarily result in the entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation.

(4) This effect — or rather lack of effect — of a simple objection on the establishment or existence of a treaty relationship between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation derives directly from the wording of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions, as States sometimes point out when formulating an objection. The objection by the Netherlands to the reservation formulated by the United States of America to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a particularly eloquent example:

“Subject to the proviso of article 21, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, these objections do not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Covenant between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States.”

The Netherlands deemed it useful to reiterate that its objection did not constitute an “obstacle” to the entry into force of the treaty with the United States, and that if the treaty came into force, their treaty relationship would have to be determined in accordance with article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention.

(5) This effect — or lack of effect — of a simple objection on the entry into force of the treaty is spelled out in guideline 4.3.1, which, apart from a few minor changes, faithfully reproduces the language of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the 1986 Vienna Convention.

4.3.2 Entry into force of the treaty between the author of a reservation and the author of an objection

The treaty enters into force between the author of a valid reservation and the objecting contracting State or contracting organization as soon as the author of the reservation has become a contracting State or a contracting organization in accordance with guideline 4.2.1 and the treaty has entered into force.

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Commentary

(1) Guideline 4.3.2 states the moment at which the treaty enters into force as between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation.

(2) For this to happen, it is both necessary and sufficient for the treaty to enter into force and for both the author of the reservation and the author of the objection to be contracting parties thereto. In other words, the reservation must be established by the acceptance of another State or international organization, within the meaning of guideline 4.2.1. Hence, apart from the scenario envisaged in guideline 4.3.2, the entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation is in no way dependent on the objection itself, but rather on the establishment of the reservation; the objection plays no role in the establishment of the reservation.

(3) In concrete terms, a treaty that is subject to the general regime of consent as established in article 20, paragraph 4, of the Vienna Conventions enters into force for the reserving State or international organization only if the reservation has been accepted by at least one other contracting party (in accordance with article 20, paragraph 4 (c)). Only if the reservation is thus established may treaty relations be established between the author of the reservation and the author of a simple objection. Their treaty relations are, however, subject to the restrictions set out in article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions.2291

4.3.3 Non-entry into force of the treaty for the author of a reservation when unanimous acceptance is required

If unanimous acceptance is required for the establishment of the reservation, any objection by a contracting State or by a contracting organization to a valid reservation precludes the entry into force of the treaty for the reserving State or organization.

Commentary

(1) The principle set out in guideline 4.3.2 is not applicable in cases in which, for one reason or another, unanimous acceptance by the contracting parties is required in order to “establish” the reservation, as in the case of a treaty that must be applied in its entirety,2292 for example. In this

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2291 [662, 2010] See guideline 4.3.5 below.
2292 [663, 2010] See guideline 4.1.2 above.
case, any objection — simple or qualified — has a much more significant effect with regard to the entry into force of the treaty between all the contracting parties, on the one hand, and the author of the reservation, on the other. The objection, in fact, prevents the reservation from being established as such. Even if article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions were to apply to this specific case — which is far from certain, in view of the *chapeau* of the paragraph — the reservation could not be established and, consequently, the author of the reservation could never become a contracting party. Here the objection — whether simple or qualified — constitutes an insurmountable obstacle both for the author of the reservation and for all the contracting parties in relation to the establishment of treaty relations with the author of the reservation. Only the withdrawal of the reservation or of the objection would resolve the situation.

(2) Although such a solution is already implied by guidelines 4.1.2 and 4.2.1, it is worth recalling this significant effect of an objection to a reservation that requires unanimous acceptance.

### 4.3.4 Non-entry into force of the treaty as between the author of a reservation and the author of an objection with maximum effect

An objection by a contracting State or by a contracting organization to a valid reservation precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting State or organization and the reserving State or organization, if the objecting State or organization has definitely expressed an intention to that effect in accordance with guideline 2.6.8. (Expression of intention to preclude the entry into force of the treaty).

**Commentary**

(1) Article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions leaves no doubt as to the effect of an objection accompanied by the definitely expressed intention not to apply the treaty as between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation, in accordance with guideline 2.6.8 (Expression of intention to preclude the entry into force of the treaty). In this case, the objection produces what is often referred to as its “maximum effect”.

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2293 [664, 2010] “In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise provides...”
2294 [665, 2010] This guideline reads as follows: “When a State or international organization making an objection to a reservation intends to preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the reserving State or international organization, it shall definitely express its intention before the treaty would otherwise enter into force between them.” (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10* (A/63/10), p. 168).
(2) This rule is the subject of draft guideline 4.3.4, which basically echoes the language of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the 1986 Vienna Convention.

(3) It is clear from that provision — which, apart from the reference to an international organization, is identical to the corresponding provision of the 1969 Convention — that, in principle, an objection to a reservation does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting State and the reserving State:

“An objection by a contracting State or by a contracting organization to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting State or organization and the reserving State or organization …”.

(4) While such a “simple” or “minimum-effect” objection\(^2\) does not have as its immediate effect the entry into force of the treaty in relations between the two States, as is the case with an acceptance\(^3\), it does not preclude it.

(5) This is, however, a presumption that can be reversed by the author of the objection. Article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the 1986 Vienna Convention continues: “... unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State or organization”. Thus, the author of the objection may also elect to have no treaty relations with the author of the reservation, provided that it does so “definitely”. These are often referred to as objections “with maximum effect”.

(6) The system established by the Vienna Conventions corresponds to the approach taken by the International Court of Justice in 1951, according to which

“... each State objecting to it will or will not ... consider the reserving State to be a party to the Convention”.\(^4\)

(7) The sense of the presumption may be surprising. Traditionally, in keeping with the principle of consent, the immediate effect of an objection was that the reserving State could not claim to be a State party to the treaty;\(^5\) the “maximum” effect of an objection was thus the rule. This outcome was necessary under the system of unanimity, in which a single objection compromised the

\(^2\)\[666, 2010\] For examples, see R. Riquelme Cortado, footnote 343 above, pp. 279–280; and F. Horn, footnote 321 above, pp. 170–172.

\(^3\)\[667, 2010\] Provided that the treaty itself is in force or becomes so as a result of accession by the accepting State (see draft guidelines 4.2.1 to 4.2.3 and paras. 239 to 252 of the fourteenth report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/614/Add.2)).

unanimous consent of the other contracting States; no derogation was possible. The reserving State was required either to withdraw or to modify its reservation in order to become a party to the treaty. This rule was so self-evident that the Commission’s first special rapporteurs, who held to the system of unanimity, did not even formulate it in any of their reports.

(8) The revolution introduced by the flexible system advocated by Waldock did not, however, lead to a rejection of the traditional principle whereby “the objections shall preclude the entry into force of the treaty”. The Special Rapporteur did, however, allow for one major difference as compared with the traditional system, since he considered that objections had only a relative effect: rather than preventing the reserving State from becoming a party to the treaty, an objection came into play only in relations between the reserving State and the objecting State.

(9) However, in order to align the draft with the solution proposed in the 1951 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and in response to the criticisms and misgivings expressed by many Commission members, the radical solution proposed by Waldock was abandoned in favour of a simple presumption of maximum effect, leaving minimum effect available as an option. Draft article 20, paragraph 2 (b), as adopted on first reading, provided:

“An objection to a reservation by a State which considers it to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and the reserving State, unless a contrary intention shall have been expressed by the objecting State.”

(10) However, during the debate on the Commission’s draft in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the Czechoslovak and Romanian delegations argued that the presumption should be

2300 [671, 2010] See draft article 19, paragraph 4 (c), presented by Wallock in 1962 in his first report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/144; Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 62). This solution is, moreover, frequently offered as the only one that makes sense. See, for example, P. Reuter, footnote 330 above, p. 75, para. 132.
2301 [672, 2010] On this point, see also the International Law Commission’s commentary to draft article 20, paragraph 2 (b), (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 181, para. 23).
2303 [674, 2010] See, for example, Tunkin (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 653rd meeting, 29 May 1962, p. 156, para. 26, and 654th meeting, 30 May 1962, p. 161, para. 11), Rosenne (ibid., 653rd meeting, 29 May 1962, para. 30), Jiménez de Aréchaga (ibid., p. 158, para. 48), de Luna (ibid., p. 160, para. 66), Yasseen (ibid., 654th meeting, 30 May 1962, p. 161, para. 6). The Special Rapporteur was also in favour of introducing the presumption (ibid., pp. 162, paras. 17 and 20).
reversed, so that the rule would “be more likely to broaden treaty relations among States and to prevent the formation of an undesirable vacuum in the legal ties between States”. Nonetheless, despite the favourable comments of some Commission members during the second reading of the draft, this position was not retained in the Commission’s final draft.

(11) The issue arose again, however, during the Vienna Conference. The proposals of Czechoslovakia, Syria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were aimed at reversing the presumption adopted by the Commission. Although it was characterized by some delegations as innocuous, reversal of the presumption constituted a major shift in the logic of the mechanism of acceptances and objections. That was why the notion of reversing the presumption had been rejected in 1968. During the second session of the Conference, the USSR once again submitted a similar amendment, which was debated at length, insisting on the sovereign right of each State to formulate a reservation and relying on the Court’s 1951 advisory opinion. That amendment was finally adopted and the presumption of article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Convention, as proposed by the Commission, was reversed.

(12) The difficulties that the Conference encountered in adopting the amendment of the USSR show clearly that reversal of the presumption was not as innocuous as Waldock, then Expert Consultant to the Conference, had indicated. The problem is not merely that of “formulating a rule

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2310 [681, 2010] The United Arab Republic considered, for example, that those amendments were purely drafting amendments (United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Summary records (A/CONF.39/11), footnote 313 above, 24th meeting, 16 April 1968, p. 127, para. 24).
2311 [682, 2010] See the statement by the representative of Sweden on this subject, who noted that “the International Law Commission’s formula might have the advantage of dissuading States from formulating reservations” (ibid., 22nd meeting, 11 April 1968, p. 117, para. 35). The representative of Poland supported the amendments precisely because they favoured the acceptance of reservations and the establishment of a contractual relationship (ibid.), which for Argentina “would be going too far in applying the principle of flexibility” (ibid., 24th meeting, 16 April 1968, p. 129, para. 43).
2314 [685, 2010] Notably the answer to the second question, in which the Court held that the State that has formulated an objection “can in fact consider that the reserving State is not party to the Convention” (see note 668 above).
one way or the other”. This new formula, in particular, is at the origin of the doubts often expressed about the function of an objection and the real differences that exist between acceptance and objection.

(13) Still, the presumption has never been called into question since the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention. During the drafting of the 1986 Convention it was simply transposed by the Commission. It therefore seemed neither possible nor truly necessary to undo the last-minute compromise that had been struck at the Vienna Conference in 1969. According to the presumption that is now part of positive international law, the general rule remains that an objection does not preclude the entry into force of a treaty – a principle recalled in guideline 4.3.1, the exception being where no treaty relationship exists between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation, an exception dealt with in guideline 4.3.4.

4.3.5  **Effect of an objection on treaty relations**

1. When a State or an international organization objecting to a valid reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State or organization, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the author of the reservation and the objecting State or organization, to the extent of the reservation.

2. To the extent that a valid reservation purports to exclude the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty, when a contracting State or a contracting organization has raised an objection to it but has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the author of the reservation, the objecting State or organization and the author of the reservation are not bound, in their treaty relations, by the provisions to which the reservation relates.

3. To the extent that a valid reservation purports to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty, when a contracting State or a contracting organization has raised an objection to it but has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the author of the reservation, the objecting State or organization and the author of the reservation

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2316 [687, 2010] Ibid., p. 34, para. 74. See also Pierre-Henri Imbert, footnote 522 above, pp. 156 and 157.

2317 [688, 2010] F. Horn, footnote 321 above, pp. 172 and 173; see also footnote 660 above.
are not bound, in their treaty relations, by the provisions of the treaty as intended to be modified by the reservation.

4. All the provisions of the treaty other than those to which the reservation relates shall remain applicable as between the reserving State or organization and the objecting State or organization.

Commentary

(1) The potential effects of an objection are quite diverse. The outright non-application of the treaty between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection is the most straightforward hypothesis (objections with maximum effect, dealt with in guideline 4.3.4), but it is now infrequent, owing in particular to the reversal of the presumption in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions. The vast majority of objections are now intended to produce a very different effect: rather than opposing the entry into force of the treaty vis-à-vis the author of the reservation, the objecting State seeks to modify the treaty relations by adapting them to its own position. Under article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions, bilateral relations in such cases are characterized in theory by the partial non-application of the treaty (objections with minimum effect, the consequences of which are complex and can vary depending on the content of the reservation; these are addressed in guideline 4.3.5). State practice, however, has developed other types of objections with effects other than those envisaged by article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions, either by excluding the application of certain provisions of the treaty that are not (specifically) addressed by the reservation (objections with intermediate effect, whose legal regime is set out in guideline 4.3.6) or by claiming that the treaty applies without any modification (objections with “super-maximum” effect, covered in guideline 4.3.7).

(2) Guideline 4.3.5, which describes the effects of a “simple” objection between the author of a reservation and the objecting State or international organization, consists of four paragraphs:

• The first paragraph, which is of a general introductory nature, reproduces the text of article 21, paragraph 3, of the 1986 Vienna Convention while specifying that it concerns only objections to a valid reservation

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2318 [689, 2010] See paragraph (4) of the introductory commentary to the fourth part of the Guide to Practice.
• The second and third paragraphs provide details regarding the effect of an objection on treaty relations, depending on whether the objection seeks to exclude or modify the provision or provisions at which the reservation is directed

• Lastly, the fourth paragraph states that, in principle, the objection has no effect on the other provisions of the treaty

(3) Under the traditional system of unanimity, it was unimaginable that an objection could produce an effect other than non-participation by the author of the reservation in the treaty: the objection undermined unanimity and prevented the reserving State from becoming a party to the treaty. Since at the time that notion seemed self-evident, neither Brierly nor Fitzmaurice discussed the effects of objections to reservations, while Hersch Lauterpacht touched on them only briefly in his proposals de lege ferenda.

(4) Nor did Waldock find it necessary in his first report to address the effects of an objection to a reservation. This is explained by the fact that, according to his draft article 19, paragraph 4 (c), the objection precluded the entry into force of the treaty in the bilateral relations between the reserving State and the objecting State. Despite the shift away from this categorical approach in favour of a mere presumption, the draft articles adopted on first reading said nothing about the specific effect of an objection that did not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the author of the objection and the reserving State. Few States, however, expressed concern at that silence.

(5) Nevertheless, a comment by the United States of America drew the problem to the attention of the Special Rapporteur and the Commission. Although a situation where treaty relations were established despite an objection was deemed “unusual”, which was certainly true at the time, the United States still considered it necessary to cover such a situation and suggested the addition of a new paragraph, as follows:

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2319 [690, 2010] See paragraphs (1) to (5) of the commentary to guideline 4.3.4 above.
2322 [693, 2010] See paragraph (8) of the commentary to guideline 4.3.4 above.
2324 [695, 2010] Ibid., p. 55.
2325 [696, 2010] Ibid.
Where a State rejects or objects to a reservation but considers itself in treaty relations with the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation applies shall not apply between the two States.\textsuperscript{2326}

(6) The arguments put forward by the United States convinced Waldock of the “logical” need to include this situation in draft article 21. He proposed a new paragraph, the wording of which differed significantly from the United States proposal:

Where a State objects to the reservation of another State, but the two States nevertheless consider themselves to be mutually bound by the treaty, the provision to which the reservation relates shall not apply in the relations between those States.\textsuperscript{2327}

(7) The International Court of Justice had expressed a similar view in its 1951 advisory opinion:

Finally, it may be that a State, whilst not claiming that a reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, will nevertheless object to it, but that an understanding between that State and the reserving State will have the effect that the Convention will enter into force between them, except for the clauses affected by the reservation.\textsuperscript{2328}

(8) The Commission engaged in a very lively debate on the text of paragraph 3 proposed by Waldock. The view of Castrén, who considered that the case of a reservation in respect of which a simple objection had been raised was already covered by draft article 21, paragraph 1 (b),\textsuperscript{2329} was not shared by the other Commission members. Most members\textsuperscript{2330} considered it necessary, if not “indispensable”\textsuperscript{2331} to introduce a provision “in order to forestall ambiguous situations”.\textsuperscript{2332} However, members of the Commission had different opinions regarding how to explain the intended effect of the new paragraph proposed by the United States and the Special Rapporteur. Whereas Waldock’s proposal emphasized the consensual basis of the treaty relationship established despite the objection, the provision proposed by the United States seemed to imply that the intended effect originated only from the unilateral act of the objecting State, that is, from the objection,
without the reserving State having a real choice. The two positions had their supporters within the Commission.\footnote[2333]{\citeyear[704, 2010]{} MR. YASSEEN (\textit{ibid.}, 800th meeting, 11 June 1965, p. 171, para. 7, p. 172, paras. 21–23 and p. 173, para. 26), MR. TUNKIN (\textit{ibid.}, p. 172, para. 18) and MR. PAL (\textit{ibid.}, p. 172–173, para. 24) expressed the same doubts as the Special Rapporteur (\textit{ibid.}, p. 173, para. 31); in contrast, MR. ROSENNE, supported by MR. RUDA (\textit{ibid.}, p. 172, para. 13) considered that “the United States unilateral approach to the situation it had mentioned in its observations concerning paragraph 2 was more in line with the general structure of the Commission’s provisions on reservations and preferable to the Special Rapporteur’s reciprocal approach” (\textit{ibid.}, para. 10).

\footnote[2334]{\citeyear[705, 2010]{} Ibid., 816th meeting, 2 July 1965, p. 284.}

\footnote[2335]{\citeyear[706, 2010]{} Ibid., 800th meeting, 11 June 1965, p. 173, para. 31.}

\footnote[2336]{\citeyear[707, 2010]{} Ibid., 814th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 271, para. 5.}

\footnote[2337]{\citeyear[708, 2010]{} \textit{Summary records} (A/CONF.39/11/Add.1), note 339 above, 11th plenary meeting, 30 April 1969, p. 36 (emphasis added).}

\footnote[2338]{\citeyear[709, 2010]{} Ibid., para. 10 (94 votes to none).}

(9) The text that the Commission finally adopted on a unanimous basis,\footnote[2334]{\citeyear[705, 2010]{} Ibid., 816th meeting, 2 July 1965, p. 284.} however, was very neutral and clearly showed that the issue had been left open by the Commission. The Special Rapporteur in fact stated that he was able to “agree with both currents of opinion about the additional paragraph” since “the practical effect of either of the two versions would be much the same and in that particular situation both States would probably be ready to regard the treaty as being in force between them without the reserved provisions”.\footnote[2335]{\citeyear[706, 2010]{} Ibid., 800th meeting, 11 June 1965, p. 173, para. 31.}

(10) During the debate at the Vienna Conference on what would become article 21, paragraph 3, almost no problems were raised apart from a few unfortunate changes which the Conference fairly quickly reconsidered.

(11) The episode is, however, relevant for understanding article 21, paragraph 3. The Conference Drafting Committee, chaired by Yasseen — who, within the Commission, had expressed doubts regarding the difference between the respective effects of acceptance and objection on treaty relations\footnote[2336]{\citeyear[707, 2010]{} Ibid., 814th meeting, 29 June 1965, p. 271, para. 5.} —, proposed an amended text for article 21, paragraph 3, in order to take account of the new presumption in favour of the minimum effect of an objection, which had been adopted following the Soviet amendment. The amended text stated that:

\begin{quote}
When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the reservation has the effects provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2.\footnote[2337]{\citeyear[708, 2010]{} \textit{Summary records} (A/CONF.39/11/Add.1), note 339 above, 11th plenary meeting, 30 April 1969, p. 36 (emphasis added).}
\end{quote}

(12) It would thus have been very clear that a simple objection was assumed to produce the same effect as an acceptance. Although the provision was adopted at one point by the Conference,\footnote[2338]{\citeyear[709, 2010]{} Ibid., para. 10 (94 votes to none).}
A joint amendment was submitted by India, Japan, the Netherlands and the USSR a few days before the end of the Conference with a view to replacing the last part of the sentence with the words originally proposed by the Commission, thereby restoring the distinction between the effects of an objection and those of an acceptance.

(13) The joint amendment was incorporated into the text by the Drafting Committee and adopted by the Conference. Yasseen explained that it was “necessary to distinguish between cases where a State objected to a reservation but agreed that the treaty should nevertheless come into force, and cases in which the reservation was accepted”.

(14) The reinstatement of the text initially proposed by the Commission restores the true meaning and effects of objections and silences the doctrinal voices that question the distinctive nature of the institution of objections as opposed to acceptances.

(15) Paragraph 3 of article 21 of the 1969 Convention was not, however, an exercise in codification *stricto sensu* at the time of its adoption by the Commission and subsequently by the Conference. It had been included by the Commission “for the sake of completeness”, but not as a rule of customary law. Although the Commission had drafted paragraph 3 in something of a hurry and the paragraph had led to debate and proposed amendments right up to the final days of the 1969 Vienna Conference, during the *travaux préparatoires* of the draft that became the 1986 Vienna Convention some members of the Commission nevertheless found the provision to be clear and acceptable. That seems to have been the position of the Commission as a whole, since the paragraph was adopted on first reading in 1977, with only the necessary editorial changes. That endorsement demonstrated the customary nature acquired by paragraph 3 of article 21, which was confirmed by the decision of the Court of Arbitration responsible for settling the dispute in the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf case between France and the United Kingdom which

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2342 [713, 2010] See the doctrinal references cited in footnote 660 above.
was rendered a few days later. The provision is part of the flexible system of reservations to treaties.

(16) What has come to be considered the “normal” effect of an objection to a valid reservation is thus set forth in article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions. This provision, in its fuller 1986 version, provides:

When a State or an international organization objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State or organization, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the reserving State or organization and the objecting State or organization to the extent of the reservation.

(17) Despite the apparent complexity of the wording, the sense of the provision is clear: as soon as the treaty has entered into force in the bilateral relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection — a detail that article 21, paragraph 3, does not specify but which is self-evident — the provision or provisions to which the reservation relates shall be excised from their treaty relations to the extent that the reservation so provides. Article 21, paragraph 3, however, calls for three remarks.

(18) First, the intended effect of an objection is diametrically opposed to that of an acceptance. Acceptance has the effect of modifying the legal effect of the provisions to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation, whereas an objection excludes the application of those provisions to the same extent. Even though in certain specific cases the actual effect on the treaty relationship established despite the objection may be identical to that of an acceptance, the legal regimes of the reservation/acceptance pair and the reservation/objection pair are nevertheless clearly different in law.

(19) Secondly, it is surprising — and regrettable — that paragraph 3 does not expressly limit its scope to reservations that are “valid” within the meaning of articles 19 and 23 of the Vienna Conventions, as is the case in paragraph 1. It is nevertheless the case that an objection to an...
invalid reservation cannot produce the effect specified in paragraph 3, even though this would appear to be permissible in State practice in certain respects. States often object to reservations that they consider to be impermissible as being incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty without opposing the entry into force of the treaty or indeed expressly state that their objection does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty in their relations with the reserving State.

(20) An example among others is that of the objection of Germany to the reservation formulated by Myanmar to the Convention on the Rights of the Child:

The Federal Republic of Germany considers that the reservations made by the Union of Myanmar regarding articles 15 and 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention (art. 51, para. 2) and therefore objects to them.

This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Convention as between the Union of Myanmar and the Federal Republic of Germany.

(21) This example is far from isolated. There are numerous objections with “minimum effect” which, in spite of the conviction expressed by their authors as to the impermissibility of the reservation, do not oppose the entry into force of the treaty and say so clearly, while also expressly indicating, at times, that only the provisions to which the reservation relates shall not apply in the relations between the two States. Simple objections to reservations considered to be invalid are thus far from being a matter of mere speculation.

2351 [722, 2010] See guideline 4.5.1 and the commentary thereto below.
2352 [723, 2010] Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. IV.II.
2353 [724, 2010] See also, among many examples, the objections of Belgium to the reservations of Egypt and Cambodia to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (ibid., chap. III.3) or the objections of Germany to several reservations to the same Convention (ibid.). It is, however, interesting to note with regard to Germany’s objection, which considers certain reservations to be “incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Convention”, that the Government of Germany has stated only for certain objections that they do not preclude the entry into force of the treaty between Germany and the respective States, without expressly taking a position in the other cases where it objected to a reservation for the same reasons. Numerous examples can be found in the objections to the reservations formulated to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: in particular the objections raised to the reservation of the United States of America to article 6 of the Covenant by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (ibid.). All those States considered the reservation to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, but nonetheless did not oppose the entry into force of the Covenant in their relations with the United States, unlike Germany, which did not stay silent on that point even though its objection was also motivated by the incompatibility of the United States reservation “with the text as well as the object and purpose of article 6” (ibid.). Nor is the phenomenon limited to human rights treaties: see also the objections of Austria, France, Germany and Italy to the reservation of Viet Nam to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (ibid., chap. VI.19).
2354 [725, 2010] See, for example, the objection by Belgium to the reservations of several States to the Vienna Convention on
The Vienna Conventions do not resolve this thorny issue and seem to treat the effects of the objection on the content of treaty relations independently from the issue of the validity of reservations. On this point, it can be said that the Conventions went further than necessary in eliminating the link between the criteria for the validity of reservations and the effects of objections. It is one thing to allow States and international organizations to raise an objection to any reservation, whether valid or invalid, and it is quite another to assign identical effects to all these objections. Moreover, as guidelines 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 indicate, article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions does not apply to objections to reservations that do not meet the conditions for validity set out in articles 19 and 23. It is for this reason that each of the first three paragraphs of guideline 4.3.5 make it clear that they apply only to objections to valid reservations.

Thirdly, although it is clear from article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions that the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply vis-à-vis the author of the objection, the phrase “to the extent of the reservation” leaves one “rather puzzled” and requires further clarification.

The decision of the Court of Arbitration in the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf case between the United Kingdom and France clarifies the meaning to be given to this phrase. France, at the time of ratification, formulated a reservation to article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:

The Government of the French Republic will not accept that any boundary of the continental shelf determined by application of the principle of equidistance shall be invoked against it:

Diplomatic Relations: “The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium objects to the reservations made with respect to article 27, paragraph 3, by Bahrain and with respect to article 37, paragraph 2, by the United Arab Republic (now the Arab Republic of Egypt), Cambodia (now the Khmer Republic) and Morocco. The Government nevertheless considers that the Convention remains in force as between it and the aforementioned States, respectively, except in respect of the provisions which in each case are the subject of the said reservations” (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (http://treaties.un.org), chap. III.3; see also the objection of the Netherlands to the reservation formulated by the United States to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, cited in paragraph (4) of the commentary to guideline 4.3.1).

K. Zemanek, footnote 364 above, p. 331.

See the commentary to guideline 2.6.3, paragraphs (1) to (9).


The term “provisions” should not be interpreted too narrowly here. It may refer to an article or several articles of the treaty, or simply to a paragraph, a sentence or a phrase, or even to the treaty as a whole viewed from a particular perspective.

As the representative of the United States of America expressed it at the Vienna Conference, Summary Records (A/CONF.39/11/Add.1), see note 339 above, 33rd plenary meeting, 21 May 1969, p. 181, para. 9.

See note 719 above.
• If such boundary is calculated from baselines established after 29 April 1958

• If it extends beyond the 200-metre isobath

• If it lies in areas where, in the Government’s opinion, there are “‘special circumstances’” within the meaning of article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, that is to say: the Bay of Biscay, the Bay of Granville, and the sea areas of the Straits of Dover and of the North Sea off the French coast\(^ {2361} \)

The Government of the United Kingdom objected to this part of the French reservation, stating only that:

The Government of the United Kingdom are unable to accept the reservations made by the Government of the French Republic.\(^ {2362} \)

(25) Before the Court of Arbitration, France maintained that on account of the combined effect of its reservation and the objection by the United Kingdom, and in accordance with the principle of mutuality of consent, article 6 as a whole was not applicable in relations between the two parties.\(^ {2363} \) The United Kingdom took the view that, in accordance with article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention — which had at the time not entered into force and had not even been signed by France — “the French reservations cannot render article 6 inapplicable \textit{in toto}, but at the most ‘to the extent of the reservation’”.\(^ {2364} \)

(26) The Court found that:

The answer to the question of the legal effect of the French reservations lies partly in the contentions of the French Republic and partly in those of the United Kingdom. Clearly, the French Republic is correct in stating that the establishment of treaty relations between itself and the United Kingdom under the Convention depended on the consent of each State to be mutually bound by its provisions; and that when it formulated its reservations to article 6 it made its consent to be bound by the provisions of that article subject to the conditions embodied in the reservations. There is, on the other hand, much force in the United Kingdom’s observation that its rejection was directed to the reservations alone and not to


\(^{2364}\) See note 719 above, p. 40, para. 57.
article 6 as a whole. In short, the disagreement between the two countries was not one regarding the recognition of article 6 as applicable in their mutual relations but one regarding the matters reserved by the French Republic from the application of article 6. The effect of the United Kingdom’s rejection of the reservations is thus limited to the reservations themselves.\textsuperscript{2365}

The Court went on to say:

However, the effect of the rejection may properly, in the view of the Court, be said to render the reservations non-opposable to the United Kingdom. Just as the effect of the French reservations is to prevent the United Kingdom from invoking the provisions of article 6 except on the basis of the conditions stated in the reservations, so the effect of their rejection is to prevent the French Republic from imposing the reservations on the United Kingdom for the purpose of invoking against it as binding a delimitation made on the basis of the conditions contained in the reservations. Thus, the combined effect of the French reservations and their rejection by the United Kingdom is neither to render article 6 inapplicable \textit{in toto}, as the French Republic contends, nor to render it applicable \textit{in toto}, as the United Kingdom primarily contends. It is to render the article inapplicable as between the two countries to the extent, but only to the extent, of the reservations; and this is precisely the effect envisaged in such cases by article 21, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the effect indicated by the principle of mutuality of consent.\textsuperscript{2366}

(27) This 1977 decision not only confirms the customary nature of article 21, paragraph 3\textsuperscript{,2367} but also shows that the objective of this provision — which derives from the same principle of mutuality of consent — is to safeguard as much as possible the agreement between the parties. One should not exclude the application of the entirety of the provision or provisions to which a reservation relates, but only of the parts of those provisions concerning which the parties have expressed disagreement.

\textsuperscript{2364}[735, 2010] Ibid., p. 41, para. 58.  
\textsuperscript{2365}[736, 2010] Ibid., para. 59.  
\textsuperscript{2366}[737, 2010] Ibid., p. 42, para. 61.  
\textsuperscript{2367}[738, 2010] See paragraph (16) above.
In the case of France and the United Kingdom, that meant accepting that article 6 remained applicable as between the parties apart from the matters covered by the French reservation. This is what should be understood by “to the extent of the reservation”. The effect sought by paragraph 3 is to preserve the agreement between the parties to the extent possible by reducing the application of the treaty to the provisions on which there is agreement and excluding the others, or, as Jean Kyongun Koh explains:

Here the Vienna Convention seems to be overtly seeking to preserve as much of the treaty as possible even when parties disagree about a reservation. ... The Vienna Convention tries to salvage as much as is uncontroversial about the relations between reserving and opposing States.2368

Although the principle of article 21, paragraph 3, is clearer than is sometimes suggested, it is still difficult to apply, as noted by Bowett:

The practical difficulty may be that of determining precisely what part of the treaty is affected by the reservation and must therefore be omitted from the agreement between the two Parties. It may be a whole article, or a subparagraph of an article, or merely a phrase or word within the subparagraph. There can be no rule to determine this, other than the rule that by normal methods of interpretation and construction one must determine which are the “provisions”, the words, to which the reservation relates.2369

Moreover, as Horn rightfully notes:

A reservation does not only affect the provision to which it directly refers but may have repercussions on other provisions. An “exclusion” of a provision, that is the introduction of an opposite norm, changes the context that is relevant for interpreting other norms. A norm seldom exists in isolation but forms an integrated part in a system of norms. The extent of a reservation does not necessarily comprise only the provision directly affected but also those provisions the application of which is influenced by the “exclusion” or the “modification”.2370

(31) Only an interpretation of the reservation can thus help in determining the provisions of the treaty, or the parts of these provisions, whose legal effect the reserving State or international organization purports to exclude or modify. Those provisions or parts or provisions are, by virtue of an objection, not applicable in treaty relations between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation. All the provisions or parts of provisions not affected by the reservation remain applicable as between the parties.

(32) In principle, what should be excluded from relations between the two parties can be determined by asking what the reservation actually modifies in the treaty relations of its author vis-à-vis a contracting party that has accepted it.

(33) However, paragraph 1 of guideline 4.3.5 demands more precise information, depending on whether the reservation that is the subject of the objection purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty. It is precisely this information that is provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the guideline.

(34) In order to clarify the content of the treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the objecting State or international organization, it is useful to recall the distinction between “modifying reservations” and “excluding reservations” employed in guideline 4.2.4 — the pattern of which guideline 4.3.5 generally follows — to determine the effects of an established reservation.

(35) Like paragraphs 2 and 3 of guideline 4.2.4, paragraphs 2 and 3 of guideline 4.3.5 begin with the phrase “to the extent that”, to reflect the fact that a single reservation can have both excluding and modifying effects. The words “purports to exclude” or “purports to modify”, which are the very words used in article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions and are reproduced in guidelines 1.1 and 1.1.1 of the Guide to Practice in order to define reservations, contrast with the verbs “exclude” and “modify”, which appear in the corresponding provisions of guideline 4.2.4 to indicate that the reservations referred to in guideline 4.3.5 cannot be considered to be “established” in respect of the author of the objection since, ex hypothesi, the latter has not accepted them.

(36) In the case of excluding reservations, the situation is particularly straightforward. The Egyptian reservation to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is a case in point.

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2371 [742, 2010] See paragraph (3) of the commentary to guideline 4.2.4.
That reservations reads: “Paragraph 2 of article 37 shall not apply.”2373 The provision to which the reservation relates is clearly article 37, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the author of a simple objection, therefore, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations will apply without paragraph 2 of article 37. This provision does not apply, to the extent provided by the reservation: in other words, it does not apply at all. Its application is entirely excluded.

(37) Cuba made a reservation purporting to exclude the application of article 25, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Special Missions:

The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba enters an express reservation with regard to the third sentence of paragraph 1 of article 25 of the Convention, and consequently does not accept the assumption of consent to enter the premises of the special mission for any of the reasons mentioned in that paragraph or for any other reasons.2374

In this case, too, a (simple) objection results in the exclusion of the application of the third sentence of paragraph 1 of article 25 of the Convention. The rest of the provision, however, remains in force between the two parties.

(38) Some types of excluding reservations are more complex, however. This is the case, for instance, with across-the-board reservations, that is, reservations that purport to exclude the legal effect of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects.2375 The reservation of Guatemala to the Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles of 1954 thus states:

The Government of Guatemala reserves its right:

(1) To consider that the provisions of the Convention apply only to natural persons, and not to legal persons and bodies corporate as provided in chapter 1, article 1.2376

A purely mechanical application of article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions might suggest that the treaty relation established between the author of this reservation and an objecting
State excludes the application of article 1 – the provision to which the reservation refers. But the fact that only article 1 is expressly referred to does not mean that the reservation applies only to that provision. In the specific example of Guatemala’s reservation, it would be equally absurd to exclude only the application of article 1 of the Convention or to conclude that, because the reservation concerns all the provisions of the Convention (by excluding part of its scope of application \textit{ratione personae}), a simple objection excludes all the provisions of the Convention. Only that which is effectively modified or excluded as a result of the reservation remains inapplicable in the treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the simple objection: the application of the Convention as a whole to the extent that such application concerns legal persons.

(39) In such cases, but only in such cases,\textsuperscript{2377} an objection produces in concrete terms the same effects as an acceptance: the exclusion of the legal effect, or application, of the provision to which the reservation relates “to the extent of the reservation”; an acceptance and a simple objection therefore result in the same treaty relations between the author of the reservation, on the one hand, and the author of the acceptance or of the simple objection, on the other. The literature agrees on this point.\textsuperscript{2378} The similarity in the effects of an acceptance and a minimum-effect objection does not mean, however, that the two reactions are identical and that the author of the reservation “would get what it desired”.\textsuperscript{2379} Moreover, while an acceptance is tantamount to agreement, or at least to the absence of opposition to a reservation, an objection cannot be considered mere “wishful thinking”;\textsuperscript{2380} it expresses disagreement and purports to protect the rights of its author much as a unilateral declaration (protest) does.\textsuperscript{2381}

(40) In the light of these observations, it would seem useful to clarify the concrete effect of an objection to an excluding reservation by recognizing, in paragraph 2 of guideline 4.3.5, the similarity between the treaty relations established in the two cases.


\textsuperscript{2378}\textsuperscript{2379} See also the explanations of the representative of the Netherlands in respect of the four-State amendment, \textit{Summary records (A/CONF.39/11/Add.1)}, cited in footnote 686 above, 32nd plenary meeting, 20 May 1969, p. 179, para. 55; F. Horn, footnote 321 above, p. 173; J. Klabbers, footnote 660 above, pp. 186–187.

\textsuperscript{2380} Jan Klabbers, footnote 660 above, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{2381} P.-H. Imbert, footnote 522 above, p. 157 quoting Jacques Dehaussy.

\textsuperscript{2382} Karl Zemanek, footnote 364 above, p. 332.
(41) However, in the case of modifying reservations, which are the subject of paragraph 3 of guideline 4.3.5, the difference between an objection and an acceptance is very clear. Whereas the establishment of such a reservation modifies the legal obligations between the author of the reservation and the contracting parties in respect of which the reservation is established, article 21, paragraph 3, excludes the application of all the provisions that potentially would be modified by the reservation, to the extent provided by the reservation. If a State makes a reservation that purports to replace one treaty obligation with another, article 21, paragraph 3, requires that the obligation potentially replaced by the reservation shall be excised from the treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the simple objection. Neither the initial obligation, nor the modified obligation proposed by the reservation, applies: the former because the author of the reservation has not agreed to it and the latter because the author of the objection has in turn opposed it.

(42) Paragraph 3 of guideline 4.3.5 highlights this difference between a reservation with a modifying effect that has been accepted and a reservation that is the subject of a simple objection. As is the case with paragraph 2, paragraph 3 must be read in conjunction with paragraph 1 of the guideline, which it is intended to clarify.

(43) Paragraph 4, which is the final paragraph of the guideline, sets out a common-sense rule that can be deduced *a contrario* from the three preceding paragraphs, namely that the interaction of a reservation and an objection leaves intact all the rights and obligations arising under the provisions of the treaty, apart from those that are the subject of the reservation. Yet this principle must be understood as being subject to the special case of what are sometimes called declarations “with intermediate effect”, which are the subject of guideline 4.3.6.

4.3.6 Effect of an objection on provisions other than those to which the reservation relates

1. A provision of the treaty to which the reservation does not relate, but which has a sufficient link with the provisions to which the reservation does relate, is not applicable in the treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the author of an objection formulated in accordance with guideline 3.4.2.
2. The reserving State or organization may, within a period of 12 months following the notification of such an objection, oppose the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the objecting State or organization. In the absence of such opposition, the treaty shall apply between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection to the extent provided by the reservation and the objection.

Commentary

(1) According to guideline 3.4.2 (Permissibility of an objection to a reservation),

An objection to a reservation by which a State or an international organization purports to exclude in its relations with the author of the reservation the application of provisions of the treaty to which the reservation does not relate is only permissible if:

1. The additional provisions thus excluded have a sufficient link with the provisions to which the reservation relates; and

2. The objection would not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty in the relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection.

(2) Such objections, while they do not go so far as to preclude the entry into force of the treaty as a whole as between the author of the objection and the author of the reservation (objections with maximum effect\(^{2382}\)), are nevertheless intended to produce effects that go further than the situation covered by article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions, which is reproduced and amplified in guideline 4.3.5; such objections are often referred to as objections “with intermediate effect”\(^{2383}\).

(3) The object of guideline 4.3.6 is not to set out the conditions for the permissibility of such reservations — that is the purpose of guideline 3.4.2 — but to determine what effects they may produce. To what extent can the author of an objection extend the effect of the objection between a “simple” effect (article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions) and a “qualified” or “maximum” effect, which excludes the entry into force of the treaty as a whole in the relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection (article 20, paragraph 4 (b), of the Vienna Conventions)?

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\(^{2382}\) See guideline 4.3.4.

\(^{2383}\) See paragraph (1) of the commentary to guideline 3.4.2.
(4) Clearly, the choice cannot be left entirely to the discretion of the author of the objection.\textsuperscript{2384}
As the International Court of Justice emphasized in its 1951 opinion on Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

It must clearly be assumed that the contracting States are desirous of preserving intact at least
what is essential to the object of the Convention; should this desire be absent, it is quite clear
that the Convention itself would be impaired both in its principle and in its application.\textsuperscript{2385}

(5) Thus an objection cannot under any circumstances exclude from the treaty relations between
the objecting State or international organization and the author of the reservation provisions of the
treaty that are essential for the realization of its object and purpose. This clearly constitutes a limit
not to be exceeded, and draft guideline 3.4.2 even makes it a criterion for the assessment of
permissibility.\textsuperscript{2386}

(6) On the other hand, it is important not to lose sight of the principle of mutual consent, which is
the basis for the law of treaties as a whole and which, as the Court of Arbitration rightly stressed in
the Anglo-French Delimitation of the Continental Shelf case,\textsuperscript{2387} is essential for determining the
effects of an objection and of a reservation. As has been recalled many times during the
Commission’s work on reservations to treaties: “No State can be bound by contractual obligations it
does not consider suitable.”\textsuperscript{2388} This is true for both the reserving State (or international
organization) and the objecting State (or international organization). However, in some situations,
the effects attributed to objections by article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions may prove
unsuited for the re-establishment of mutual consent between the author of the reservation and the
author of the objection, even where the object and purpose of the treaty are not threatened by the
reservation.

(7) This is the case, for example, when the reservation purports to exclude or modify a provision
of the treaty which, according to the intention of the parties, is necessary to safeguard the balance
between the rights and obligations resulting from their consent to the entry into force of the treaty.

\textsuperscript{2384} See paragraph (8) of the commentary to guideline 3.4.2 above.
\textsuperscript{2385} I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{2386} See paragraph (1) above.
\textsuperscript{2388} C. Tomuschat, footnote 321 above, p. 466; see also the second report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/477/Add.1),
Yearbook ... 1996, vol. II, Part One, p. 57, paras. 97 and 99; and D. Müller’s commentary on article 20 (1969) in Olivier Corten and
This applies when the reservation not only undermines the consent of the parties to the provision to which the reservation directly refers, but also upsets the balance achieved during negotiations on a set of interrelated provisions. A contracting party may then legitimately consider that being bound by one of the provisions in question without being able to benefit from one or more of the others constitutes “a contractual obligation it does not consider suitable”.

(8) These are the types of situations that objections with intermediate effect are meant to address. The practice has been resorted to mainly, if not exclusively, in the case of reservations and objections to the provisions of Part V of the 1969 Vienna Convention, and this example makes it clear why authors of objections seek to expand the effects they intend their objections to produce.

(9) Article 66 of the Vienna Convention and the annex thereto relating to compulsory conciliation provide procedural guarantees which many States, at the time the Convention was adopted, considered essential in order to prevent abuse of certain provisions of Part V. The reaction of several States to reservations to article 66 of the 1969 Vienna Convention was aimed at safeguarding the package deal, which some States had sought to undermine through reservations and which could only be restored through an objection that went beyond the “normal” effects of the reservations envisaged by the Vienna Conventions.

(10) Hence in order to restore what could be referred to as the “consensual balance” between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection, the effect of the objection on treaty relations between the two parties should be allowed to extend to provisions of the treaty that have a specific link with the provisions to which the reservation refers.

(11) It was in the light of these remarks that the Commission included in the Guide to Practice paragraph 1 of guideline 4.3.6, specifying that an objection may exclude the application of provisions to which the reservation does not refer under the terms of guideline 3.4.2. This is mentioned expressly so that there can be no doubt whatsoever that this type of effect can only be produced if the conditions for the validity of reservations with intermediate effect set out in this

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2389 [760, 2010] See paragraphs (9) and (10) of the commentary to guideline 3.4.2.
guideline are met. To the extent possible, the wording of paragraph 1 of guideline 4.3.6 has been aligned with that of guideline 3.4.2.\textsuperscript{2391}

(12) While conceding that objections with intermediate effect could produce the effects intended by their authors under the strict conditions set out in guideline 3.4.2, the Commission is aware of the risks they may pose for the overall treaty balance, and it believes that they should continue to constitute exceptions.

(13) Paragraph 2 of guideline 4.3.6 partially addresses this concern and seeks to maintain the principle of mutual consent to the greatest extent possible. This paragraph proceeds from the principle that objections with intermediate effect constitute in some respects “counter-reservations”\textsuperscript{2392} and provide the author of the reservation with an opportunity to prevent such an effect from being produced by opposing the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the author of the objection.

(14) It seemed reasonable, as a step of progressive development, to set a time period of 12 months for the formulation of such objections, by analogy with the time period available to contracting States and contracting organizations for the expression of their intention not to be bound by the treaty in respect of the author of the reservation.\textsuperscript{2393}

(15) The second sentence of paragraph 2 of guideline 4.3.6 draws the consequence of the absence of such opposition within the stipulated time period by transposing the rule applicable to objections with “minimum” effect established in article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions and reproduced in guideline 4.3. The phrase “to the extent provided by the reservation and the objection” is a succinct way of saying that if all these conditions are met, the treaty shall apply as between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection with the exception of those provisions excluded or modified by the reservation and those additional provisions excluded by the objection.

\textsuperscript{2391} Some members of the Commission regretted this alignment, particularly the repetition of the term “sufficient link”, which they felt was unduly cautious; they would have preferred “close link” or even “inextricable link”.

\textsuperscript{2392} See paragraph (7) of the commentary to guideline 3.4.2.

\textsuperscript{2393} See article 20, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Conventions and also guideline 2.6.13.
4.3.7 Right of the author of a valid reservation not to be compelled to comply with the treaty without the benefit of its reservation

The author of a reservation which is permissible and which has been formulated in accordance with the required form and procedures cannot be compelled to comply with the provisions of the treaty without the benefit of its reservation.

Commentary

(1) The much more controversial question of objections with “super-maximum” effect whereby the author of the objection affirms that the treaty enters into force in relations between it and author of the reservation without the latter being able to benefit from its reservation,\(^\text{2394}\) can also be resolved logically by applying the principle of mutual consent.\(^\text{2395}\)

(2) It should be noted, however, that the practice of objections with super-maximum effect has developed not within the context of objections to valid reservations, but in reaction to reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty. A recent example is afforded by the Swedish objection to the reservation made by El Salvador to the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:


According to international customary law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty shall not be permitted. It is in the common interest of all States that treaties to which they have chosen to become parties, are respected as to their object and purpose by all parties, and that States are prepared to undertake any legislative changes necessary to comply with their obligations under the treaties.

The Government of Sweden notes that El Salvador in its reservation gives precedence to its Constitution over the Convention. The Government of Sweden is of the view that such a

\(^{2394}\) See paragraph (17) of the commentary to guideline 3.4.2.

\(^{2395}\) See paragraph (5) of the commentary to guideline 4.3.6 above.
reservation, which does not clearly specify the extent of the derogation, raises serious doubt as
to the commitment of El Salvador to the object and purpose of the Convention.

The Government of Sweden therefore objects to the aforesaid reservation made by the
Government of the Republic of El Salvador to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and considers the reservation null and void. This objection shall not preclude the
entry into force of the Convention between El Salvador and Sweden. The Convention enters
into force in its entirety between El Salvador and Sweden, without El Salvador benefiting
from its reservation.2396

(3) Regardless of the consequences of such an objection with super-maximum effect in the case
of an invalid reservation,2397 it is clear that such an effect of an objection is not only not provided
for in the Vienna Conventions — which is also true of an objection with intermediate effect — but
is also clearly incompatible with the principle of mutual consent. Accordingly, super-maximum
effect is excluded in the case of a valid reservation: the author of an objection cannot force the
author of the reservation to be bound by more than what it is prepared to accept. The objecting State
or international organization cannot impose on a reserving State or international organization that
has validly exercised its right to formulate a reservation any obligations which the latter has not
expressly agreed to assume. This is the question addressed in guideline 4.3.7.

(4) The author of a reservation that meets the criteria for permissibility and has been formulated
in accordance with the prescribed form and procedure cannot be bound to comply with the
provisions of the treaty without the benefit of its reservation.

(5) This does not mean, however, that an objection with super-maximum effect has no effect on
the content of treaty relations between its author and the author of the reservation. As is the case
with reservations with intermediate effect that go beyond admissible effects, such unilateral
declarations are objections through which the author expresses its disagreement with the
reservation. The application of the rules set out in guideline 4.3.5 is not limited to simple
objections. Those rules apply to all objections to a valid reservation, including objections with
super-maximum effect.

2397 [768, 2010] See guidelines 4.5.2 [4.5.3] and 4.5.3 [4.5.4].
4.4 Effect of a reservation on rights and obligations outside of the treaty

4.4.1 Absence of effect on rights and obligations under another treaty

A reservation, acceptance of it or objection to it neither modifies nor excludes the respective rights and obligations of their authors under another treaty to which they are parties.

Commentary

(1) The definition of a reservation contained in article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Vienna Conventions and reproduced in guideline 1.1 of the Guide to Practice clearly establishes that a reservation “purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty”. Likewise, article 21, paragraph 1, provides that an established reservation can only modify (or exclude) the “provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates”. Although article 21, paragraph 3, and guideline 4.2.4 are not as precise on this point, they refer to the “provisions to which the reservation relates”, which, based on the definition of a reservation, can only mean “certain provisions of the treaty”.

(2) The text of the Vienna Conventions therefore leaves no room for doubt: a reservation can only modify or exclude the legal effects of the treaty or some of its provisions. A reservation remains a unilateral statement linked to a treaty, the legal effects of which it purports to modify. It does not constitute a unilateral, independent act capable of modifying the obligations, still less the rights, of its author. Furthermore, the combined effect of a reservation and an objection cannot exclude the application of norms external to the treaty.

(3) Although technically they do not apply to a reservation to a treaty, the arguments put forward by France on its reservation to its declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court in the Nuclear Tests cases are quite instructive in this regard. In order to establish that the Court had no jurisdiction in those cases, France contended that the reservation generally limited its consent to the jurisdiction of

2398 On the differences between article 2, paragraph 1 (d), and article 21, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventions, see Daniel Müller, “Article 21 (1969)”, footnote 396 above, pp. 896–898, paras. 25 and 26.

the Court, particularly the consent given in the General Act of 1928. In their joint dissenting opinion, several judges of the Court rejected the French thesis:

   “Thus, in principle, a reservation relates exclusively to a State’s expression of consent to be bound by a particular treaty or instrument and to the obligations assumed by that expression of consent. Consequently, the notion that a reservation attached to one international agreement, by some unspecified process, is to be superimposed upon, or transferred to another international instrument is alien to the very concept of a reservation in international law; and also cuts across the rules governing the notification, acceptance and rejection of reservations.”2400

(4) This opinion is expressed in sufficiently broad terms not to be applicable exclusively to the specific situation of reservations to declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the optional clause but, more generally, to any reservation to an international treaty. This approach was later endorsed by the Court itself in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) case, in which Honduras sought to have its reservation to its declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the optional clause take precedence over its obligations by virtue of article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá. The Court, however, held that such a reservation could not in any event restrict the commitment which Honduras had undertaken by virtue of article XXXI. The Honduran argument as to the effect of the reservation to its 1986 declaration on its commitment under article XXXI of the Pact could not therefore be accepted.2401

(5) This relative effect of the reservation and of reactions to the reservation, in the sense that they can modify or exclude only the legal effects of the treaty in regard to which they were formulated and made, results from the principle pacta sunt servanda. A State or international organization cannot release itself through a reservation, acceptance of a reservation or objection to a reservation from obligations it has elsewhere.

Draft guideline 4.4.1 highlights the absence of effect of a reservation, or acceptance of or objection to it, on treaty obligations under another treaty. Only the legal effects of treaty provisions to which the reservation relates can be modified or excluded.

The strong wording employed in this guideline does not exclude the possibility that a reservation to a particular treaty as well as the reactions to it may come to play a certain role in the interpretation of other treaties by analogy or by means of a contrario reasoning. However, notwithstanding some views to the contrary, the Commission felt that such considerations lay outside the scope of guideline 4.4.1, which merely recalls that such instruments can neither modify nor exclude the rights and obligations emanating from another treaty: even if the reservations, acceptances or objections of which they are the object can play a role in interpretation, they cannot have modifying or excluding effects.

### 4.4.2 Absence of effect on rights and obligations under customary international law

A reservation to a treaty provision which reflects a rule of customary international law does not of itself affect the rights and obligations under that rule, which shall continue to apply as such between the reserving State or organization and other States or international organizations which are bound by that rule.

**Commentary**

(1) Just as a reservation cannot influence pre-existing treaty relations of its author, it cannot have an impact on other obligations, of any nature, binding on the author of the reservation apart from the treaty. This is especially clear with regard to a reservation to a provision reflecting a rule of customary international law. Certainly, as between the author of the reservation and the contracting parties with regard to which the reservation is established, the reservation has the “normal” effect provided for in article 21, paragraph 1, creating between those parties a specific regulatory system which may derogate from the customary norm concerned in the context of the

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treaty — for example, by imposing less stringent obligations. Nevertheless, the reservation in no way affects of itself the obligatory nature of the customary rule as such. It cannot release its author from compliance with the customary rule, if it is in effect with regard to the author, outside these specific regulatory systems. The International Court of Justice has clearly stressed in this regard that:

no reservation could release the reserving party from obligations of general maritime law existing outside and independently of the Convention.

The reason for this is simple:

The fact that the above-mentioned principles [of customary and general international law], recognized as such, have been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean that they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even as regards countries that are parties to such conventions.

(2) Modifying or excluding the application of a treaty provision that reflects a customary rule can indeed produce effects within the framework of treaty relations; however, it does not in any way affect the existence or obligatory nature of the customary rule per se.

(3) Concretely, the effect of the reservation (and of the reactions to it – acceptance or objection) is to exclude application of the treaty rule that reflects a customary rule, which means that the author of the reservation is not bound vis-à-vis the other contracting parties to comply with the (treaty) rule within the framework of the treaty. For example, it is not required to have recourse to arbitration or an international court for any matter of interpretation or application of the rule, despite a dispute settlement clause contained in the treaty. Nevertheless, since the customary rule retains its full legal force, the author of the reservation is not free, by virtue of the reservation, to violate the customary rule (which is by definition identical); it must comply with it as such. Compliance or the consequences of non-compliance with the customary rule are not, however, part

2404 [775, 2010] Ibid., p. 708, para. 32.
2405 [776, 2010] Prosper Weil has stated that “the will demonstrated by a State in regard to a particular convention is now of little significance … whether or not it makes reservations to some of its clauses … it will in any case be bound by those provisions of the convention which have been recognized as having the character of rules of customary or general international law” (“Vers une normativité relative en droit international?”, R.G.D.I.P., 1982, pp. 43 and 44).
of the legal regime created by the treaty but are covered by general international law and evolve along with it.

(4) This approach, moreover, is shared by States, which do not hesitate to draw the attention of the author of a reservation to the fact that the customary rule remains in force in their mutual relations, their objection notwithstanding. See, for example, the Netherlands in its objection to several reservations to article 11, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations:

The Kingdom of the Netherlands does not accept the declarations by the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People’s Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen concerning article 11, paragraph 1, of the Convention. The Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that this provision remains in force in relations between it and the said States in accordance with international customary law.2408

(5) The Commission has already adopted a guideline on this matter in the framework of the third part of the Guide to Practice on the validity of reservations. The guideline in question is 3.1.8, which reads as follows:

3.1.8 Reservations to a provision reflecting a customary norm

1. The fact that a treaty provision reflects a customary norm is a pertinent factor in assessing the validity of a reservation although it does not in itself constitute an obstacle to the formulation of the reservation to that provision.

2. A reservation to a treaty provision which reflects a customary norm does not affect the binding nature of that customary norm which shall continue to apply as such between the reserving State or international organization and other States or international organizations which are bound by that norm.2409

2408 [779, 2010] Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. III.3. In essence, the validity of the remark by the Netherlands is not in doubt; however, the way it is framed is highly debatable: it is not the treaty provision that remains in force between the reserving States and the Netherlands, but the customary norm that the provision reflects.

(6) It is the view of the Commission that paragraph 2 of guideline 3.1.8 addresses this question satisfactorily. However, this paragraph has more to do with the effects of a reservation than with its validity. Accordingly, it seems sensible to turn paragraph 2 of guideline 3.1.8 into a new draft guideline 4.4.2.

(7) In making this transposition, however, the Commission decided to modify the text of guideline 3.1.8, paragraph 2, somewhat.

(8) The principal modification involved inserting the words “of itself” between the words “does not” and the phrase “affect the rights and obligations under” the rule of customary international law reflected in the treaty provision to which the objection is made. The Commission in fact considered that while a reservation could not have any immediate or direct effect on the customary rights and obligations concerned, it could nevertheless influence the evolution or disappearance of the customary rule in question owing to the expression of *opinio juris*.

(9) The other changes made to the text of guideline 3.1.8, paragraph 2, were as follows:

- It seemed appropriate to replace the phrase “does not affect the binding nature of that customary norm” with “does not … affect the rights and obligations under that rule”, since it is these rights and obligations that are the subject of both the customary rule and the treaty rule.
- While some members saw no need for such a change, the word “rule” was found to be preferable to the word “norm” and
- In the interest of harmonization with the other guidelines contained in the fourth part of the Guide to Practice, the phrase “the reserving State or international organization” was replaced with “the reserving State or organization”.

### 4.4.3 Absence of effect on a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*)

A reservation to a treaty provision which reflects a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*) does not affect the binding nature of that norm, which shall

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2410 [781, 2010] It goes without saying that guideline 3.1.8 will now consist solely of existing paragraph 1.
continue to apply as such between the reserving State or organization and other States or international organizations.

**Commentary**

(1) The consequence of guidelines 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 is that a reservation and the reactions that it elicits neither modify nor exclude the application of other treaty or customary rules that bind the parties. This principle applies *a fortiori*, of course, when the treaty rule reflects a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*).

(2) In this connection the Commission, after an intense debate, adopted guideline 3.1.9, which deals in part with this issue:

3.1.9 Reservations contrary to a rule of *jus cogens*

A reservation cannot exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in a manner contrary to a peremptory norm of general international law. 2411

(3) It may be thought that guideline 3.1.9 has more to do with the effects of a reservation than it does with the question of its validity. 2412 Yet contrary to what it had decided with regard to reservations to a treaty provision reflecting a customary rule, 2413 the Commission did not simply move guideline 3.1.9 to the fourth part of the Guide to Practice: as drafted, this guideline does not directly address the question of the effects of reservations to a provision reflecting a peremptory norm of general international law.

(4) As there is no reason that the principle applicable to reservations to a provision reflecting a customary rule should not be transposed to reservations to a provision reflecting a peremptory norm, and as the problem arises in the same terms, guideline 4.4.3 is worded similarly to guideline 4.4.2. However, in order not to give the impression that some States might not be bound by the peremptory norm of international law in question, which *ex hypothesi* is applicable to all States and international organizations, 2414 the phrase “which are bound by that rule”, which appears at the end of guideline 4.4.2, was omitted. In addition, despite a view to the contrary, the Commission saw no

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2413 [784, 2010] See paragraph (6) of the commentary to guideline 4.4.2 above.
2414 [785, 2010] Subject to the possible existence of regional peremptory norms, which the Commission does not intend to address.
reason to include the words “of itself”\textsuperscript{2415} in guideline 4.4.3: doubtless the notion of \textit{jus cogens} will continue to evolve,\textsuperscript{2416} but it seems unlikely that a reservation can contribute to destabilizing a norm presenting such a degree of binding force.

4.5 Consequences of an invalid reservation

**Commentary**

(1) Neither the 1969 nor the 1986 Vienna Convention deals explicitly with the question of the legal effects of a reservation that does not meet the conditions of permissibility and formal validity established in articles 19 and 23, which, taken together, suggest that the reservation can be considered established in respect of another contracting State or another contracting organization as soon as that State or organization has accepted it in accordance with the provisions of article 20. The \textit{travaux préparatoires} on the provisions of these two Conventions that concern reservations are equally unrevealing as to the effects — or lack thereof — that result from the invalidity of a reservation.

(2) The effects attributed to a non-established reservation by the Commission’s early Special Rapporteurs arose implicitly from their adherence to the traditional system of unanimity: the author of such a reservation could not claim to have become a party to the treaty. Moreover, it was not a question of determining the effects of a reservation that did not fulfil certain conditions of validity, since such conditions were of little relevance under the wholly intersubjective system,\textsuperscript{2417} but rather of determining the effects of a reservation which had not been accepted by all the other contracting States and which, for that reason, did not become “part of the bargain between the parties”.\textsuperscript{2418}

(3) From this perspective, J.L. Brierly wrote in 1950 that “the acceptance of a treaty subject to a reservation is ineffective unless or until every State or international organization whose consent is requisite to the effectiveness of that reservation has consented thereto”.\textsuperscript{2419} H. Lauterpacht expressed the same idea: “A signature, ratification, accession, or any other method of accepting a

\textsuperscript{2415} See paragraph (8) of the commentary to guideline 4.4.2 above.
\textsuperscript{2416} See article 64 of the Vienna Conventions (Emergence of a new peremptory norm of international law (\textit{jus cogens})).
\textsuperscript{2417} See, however, para. (4) below.
\textsuperscript{2418} J.L. Brierly, report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/23), \textit{Yearbook ... 1950}, vol. II, p. 241, para. 96. See also \textit{ibid.}, vol. I, 53rd meeting, 23 June 1953, p. 90, para. 3 (Brierly).
multilateral treaty is void if accompanied by a reservation or reservations not agreed to by all other parties to the treaty.\textsuperscript{2420} Thus, unless a reservation is established in this manner, it produces no effect and nullifies the consent to be bound by the treaty. The League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law had already stressed that a “null and void” reservation had no effect:

In order that any reservation whatever may be validly made in regard to a clause of the treaty, it is essential that this reservation should be accepted by all the contracting parties, as would have been the case if it had been put forward in the course of the negotiations. If not, the reservation, like the signature to which it is attached, is null and void.\textsuperscript{2421}

Under this system, the issue is the ineffectiveness, rather than the invalidity, of a reservation; consent alone establishes its acceptability or unacceptability to all the other contracting parties.

(4) However, even Brierly, though a strong advocate of the system of unanimity, was aware that there might be reservations which, by their very nature or as a result of the treaty to which they referred, might \textit{ipso jure} have no potential effect. In the light of treaty practice, he considered that some treaty provisions “allow only certain reservations specified in the text, and prohibit all others; these do not bear on the position of a depositary or the question of States being consulted in regard to reservations, for \textit{such questions cannot arise as no reservations at that stage are permissible}”.\textsuperscript{2422} It followed that States were not free to “agree upon any terms in the treaty”,\textsuperscript{2423} as he had maintained the previous year; there were indeed reservations that could not be accepted because they were prohibited by the treaty itself. Gerald Fitzmaurice endorsed this idea in his draft article 37, paragraph 3, which stated:

In those cases where the treaty itself permits certain specific reservations, or a class of reservations, to be made, there is a presumption that any other reservations are excluded and cannot be accepted.\textsuperscript{2424}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2420} Draft article 9 in Lauterpacht, report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/63), Yearbook ... 1953, vol. II, p. 91.
\item \textsuperscript{2421} League of Nations, \textit{Official Journal}, eighth year, No. 7, p. 880.
\item \textsuperscript{2422} Report on reservations to multilateral conventions (A/CN.4/41), para. 11; Yearbook ... 1951, vol. II, p. 3 (emphasis added). In annex C to his report, the Special Rapporteur provided examples from the Convention providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (1930), the Convention providing a Uniform Law for Cheques (1931) and the 1948 Protocol amending the International Convention on Economic Statistics, signed at Geneva on 14 December 1928.
\item \textsuperscript{2423} Brierly, report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/23), para. 88; \textit{Yearbook ... 1950}, vol. II, p. 239.
\item \textsuperscript{2424} Brierly, report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/101); \textit{Yearbook ... 1956}, vol. II, p. 115.
\end{itemize}
(5) The situation changed with Sir Humphrey Waldock’s first report. The fourth Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, a supporter of the flexible system, deliberately made the sovereign right of States to formulate reservations subject to certain conditions of validity. Despite the uncertainty concerning his position on the permissibility of reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, draft article 17, paragraph 1, (in his first report) “accepts the view that, unless the treaty itself, either expressly or by clear implication, forbids or restricts the making of reservations, a State is free, in virtue of its sovereignty, to formulate such reservations as it thinks fit”. However, Sir Humphrey did not deem it appropriate to specify the effects arising from the formulation of a prohibited reservation; in other words, he set the criteria for the permissibility of reservations without establishing the regime governing reservations which did not meet them.

(6) Sir Humphrey’s first report does, however, contain several reflections on the effects of a reservation that it is prohibited by the treaty:

when a reservation is formulated which is not prohibited by the treaty, the other States are called upon to indicate whether they accept or reject it but, when the reservation is one prohibited by the treaty, they have no need to do so, for they have already expressed their objection to it in the treaty itself.

While this explanation does not directly address the question of the effect of prohibited reservations, it has the merit of suggesting that they are excluded from the scope of the provisions concerning the consent of the contracting States and, subsequently, of all the provisions concerning

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2427 [798, 2010] During the debate, Alfred Verdross expressed the view that the case of a “treaty which specifically prohibited reservations ... did not present any difficulties” (ibid., 652nd meeting, 28 May 1962, p. 148, para. 33), without, however, taking a clear position regarding the effects of the violation of such a specific prohibition. The members of the Commission were, however, aware that the problem could arise, as seen from the debate on draft article 27 on the functions of a depositary (Yearbook ... 1962, vol. I, 658th meeting, 6 June 1962, para. 59, p. 191 (Waldock); and ibid., 664th meeting, 19 June 1962, paras. 82–95, p. 236.
2428 [799, 2010] Ibid., vol. II, p. 65, para. (9) of the commentary to draft article 17. In that connection, see Brierly, report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/23), para. 88; Yearbook ... 1950, vol. II, p. 239.
the effects of reservations with the exception of the potential validation of an otherwise
inadmissible reservation through the unanimous consent of all the contracting States.2429

(7) For a long time, the Commission gave separate — and rather confusing — treatment to the
question of reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, and that of
prohibited reservations. Thus, paragraph 2 (b) of draft article 20 (Effects of reservations), adopted
by the Commission on first reading, envisaged the legal effect of a reservation only in the context of
an objection to it made on the grounds of its incompatibility with the object and purpose of the
treaty:

An objection to a reservation by a State which considers it to be incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting
and the reserving State, unless a contrary intention shall have been expressed by the objecting
State.2430

(8) It is also clear from this statement that the effect of an objection — which was (at that time)
also subject to the requirement that it must be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty,
in accordance with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice2431 — was envisaged
only in the case of reservations that were incompatible (or deemed incompatible) with the object
and purpose of the treaty. In 1965, however, in response to several States’ criticism of this
restriction of the right to make objections to reservations, the Special Rapporteur proposed new
wording2432 in order to make a clearer distinction between objections and the validity of

60: “The formulation of a reservation, the making of which is expressly prohibited or impliedly excluded under any of the provisions
of subparagraph (a), is inadmissible unless the prior consent of all the other interested States has been first obtained.” See also draft
article 18 as proposed by Waldock in his fourth report on the law of treaties (A/CN.4/177 and Add.1 and 2); Yearbook ... 1965, vol.
II, p. 50. On the question of the unanimous consent of the contracting States and contracting organizations, see guideline 3.3.3 above
and the commentary thereto, in particular paragraph (3).
2431 [802, 2010] In 1951, the Court stated: “it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that
must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in
objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in the appraisal which it must make,
individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation” (I.C.J. Reports 1951 (see footnote 305 above), p.
24). For a thorough analysis of the differences between the legal system adopted by the Commission and the Court’s 1951 advisory
opinion, see J.K. Koh, footnote 499 above, pp. 88–95.
II, p. 52, para. (9) of the commentary to draft article 19. Draft article 19, paragraph 4, as proposed by Waldock, states:
4. In other cases, unless the State [sic – read ‘the treaty’?] concerned otherwise specifies:
   (a) acceptance of a reservation by any party constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to
such party;
reservations. But as a result, invalid reservations fell outside of the work of the Commission and the Conference and would remain so until the adoption of the Vienna Convention.

(9) The fact that the 1969 Vienna Convention contains no rules on invalid reservations is, moreover, a consequence of the wording of article 21, paragraph 1, on the affect of acceptance of a reservation: only reservations that are permissible under the conditions established in article 19, formulated in accordance with the provisions of article 23 and accepted by another contracting party in accordance with article 20\(^{2433}\) can be considered established under the terms of this provision. Clearly, a reservation that is not valid does not meet these cumulative conditions, even if it has been accepted by one or more contracting parties.

(10) This explanation is not, however, included in article 21, paragraph 3, on objections to reservations. But that does not mean that the Convention determines the legal effects of an invalid reservation to which an objection has been made: under article 20, paragraph 4 (c), in order for such an objection to produce the effect envisaged in article 21, paragraph 3, at least one acceptance is required;\(^{2434}\) however, the effects of acceptance of an invalid reservation are not governed by the Convention.

(11) The travaux of the Vienna Conference clearly confirm that the 1969 Convention says nothing about the consequences of invalid reservations, let alone their effects. In 1968, during the first session of the Conference, the United States of America proposed to add, in the chapeau of future article 20, paragraph 4, after “In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs”, the following specification: “and unless the reservation is prohibited by virtue of [future article 19]”:\(^{2435}\) According to the explanation given by Herbert W. Briggs, the United States representative, in support of the amendment:

The purpose of the United States amendment to paragraph 4 was to extend the applicability of the prohibited categories of reservations set out in article 16 to the decisions made by States under paragraph 4 of article 17 in accepting or objecting to a proposed reservation. In

\(^{2433}\) See guideline 4.1 above (Establishment of a reservation with regard to another State or another organization) and the commentary thereto.

\(^{2434}\) See paras. (2) and (3) of the commentary to guideline 4.3.2.

particular, the proposal would preclude acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation prohibited by the treaty, and the test of incompatibility with the object or purpose of the treaty set out in subparagraph (c) of article 16 would then be applicable to such acceptance or objection. It was a shortcoming of subparagraph (c) that it laid down a criterion of incompatibility for a prohibited reservation, but failed to make it explicitly applicable to the acceptance or objection to a reservation.\textsuperscript{2436}

(12) Although it is unclear from Briggs’ explanations, which focus primarily on extending the criteria for the permissibility of a reservation to include acceptances and objections, the effect of the United States amendment would unquestionably have been that the system of acceptances of and objections to reservations established in article 20, paragraph 4, applied only to reservations that met the criteria for permissibility under article 19. Acceptance of and objection to an impermissible reservation are clearly excluded from the scope of this amendment\textsuperscript{2437} even though no new rule concerning such reservations was proposed. The representative of Canada, Max H. Wershof, then asked, “Was paragraph C of the United States amendment (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.127) consistent with the intention of the International Law Commission regarding incompatible reservations?”\textsuperscript{2438} Sir Humphrey, in his capacity as Expert Consultant, replied: “The answer was ... Yes, since it would in effect restate the rule already laid down in article 16.”\textsuperscript{2439}

(13) The “drafting” amendment proposed by the United States was sent to the Drafting Committee.\textsuperscript{2440} However, neither the language that was provisionally adopted by the Committee and submitted to the Committee of the Whole on 15 May 1968,\textsuperscript{2441} nor the language ultimately adopted by the Committee of the Whole and referred to the plenary Conference,\textsuperscript{2442} contained the wording proposed by the United States, although the failure to incorporate it is not explained in the

\textsuperscript{2437} It is, however, not entirely clear why the same restriction should not apply to the cases covered by paragraph 2 (treaties that must be applied in their entirety) and paragraph 3 (constituent instruments of international organizations).
\textsuperscript{2439} Ibid., 25th meeting, 16 April 1968, p. 133, para. 4. Draft article 16 became article 19 of the Convention.
\textsuperscript{2440} Ibid., pp. 135–136, para. 38.
published materials of the Conference. It is, however, clear that the Commission and the Conference considered that the case of impermissible reservations was not the subject of express rules adopted at the conclusion of their work and that the provisions of articles 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention did not apply to that situation.

(14) During the Commission’s work on the question of treaties concluded between States and international organizations or between two or more international organizations and the work of the 1986 Vienna Conference, the question of the potential effects of a reservation formulated despite the conditions for permissibility in article 19 was not addressed. Nevertheless, Paul Reuter, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on the topic, recognized that “even in the case of treaties between States, the question of reservations has always been a thorny and controversial issue, and even the provisions of the Vienna Convention have not eliminated all these difficulties”. Nonetheless, the Special Rapporteur “thought it wise not to depart from that Convention where the concept of reservations was concerned”.

(15) In its observations on the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 24, the United Kingdom also recognized, at least in principle, that the 1969 Vienna Convention did not cover the question of impermissible reservations:

The Committee correctly identifies articles 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as containing the rules which, taken together, regulate the legal effect of reservations to multilateral treaties. The United Kingdom wonders however whether the Committee is right to assume their applicability to incompatible reservations. The rules cited clearly do apply to reservations which are fully compatible with the object and purpose but remain open for acceptance or objection (...). It is questionable however whether they were intended also to cover reservations which are inadmissible in limine.
(16) Admittedly, neither the 1969 nor the 1986 Vienna Convention — which are largely similar, including in this respect — contains clear and precise rules concerning the effects of an invalid reservation. That is, without a doubt, one of the most serious lacunae in the matter of reservations in the Vienna Conventions. It has been referred to as a “normative gap”, and the gap is all the more troubling in that the travaux préparatoires do not offer any clear indications as to the intentions of the authors of the 1969 Convention, but instead give the impression that they deliberately left the question open. However, what was acceptable in a general treaty on the law of treaties in view of the differences raised by the question is not acceptable when the aim is precisely to fill the gaps left by the Vienna Conventions in the matter of reservations.

(17) In this area, it is particularly striking that “the 1969 Vienna Convention has not frozen the law. Regardless of the fact that it leaves behind many ambiguities, that it contains gaps on sometimes highly important points and that it could not foresee rules applicable to problems that did not arise, or hardly arose, at the time of its preparation (...), the Convention served as a point of departure for new practices that are not, or not fully, followed with any consistency at the present time”. In accordance with the method of work that has been followed by the Commission in the preparation of the Guide to Practice, it has assumed that the treaty rules — which are silent on the question of the effects of invalid reservations — are established, and that it “simply try to fill the gaps and, where possible and desirable, to remove their ambiguities while retaining their versatility and flexibility”.


2449 [820, 2010] In 2006, during the Commission’s consideration of the tenth report on reservations to treaties, “[i]t was even questioned whether the Commission should take up the matter of the consequences of the invalidity of reservations, which, perhaps wisely, had not been addressed in the Vienna Conventions. Perhaps that gap should not be filled; the regime that allowed States to decide on the validity of reservations and to draw the consequences already existed, and there was no reason to change it” (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), para. 142). In the Sixth Committee, however, this was said to be a key issue for the study (A/C.6/61/SR.17, para. 5 (France)). Several delegations supported the idea that impermissible reservations were null and void (A/C.6/61/SR.16, para. 43 (Sweden); ibid., para. 51 (Austria); and A/C.6/61/SR.17, para. 7 (France)); it was hoped that the specific consequences arising from that nullity would be spelled out in the Guide to Practice (A/C.6/61/SR.16, para. 59 (Canada)). See also the fourteenth report on reservations to treaties (2009) (A/CN.4/614), para. 14.

In so doing, the Commission had not intended to legislate and to establish ex nihilo rules concerning the effects of a reservation that does not meet the criteria for validity. State practice, international jurisprudence and doctrine have already developed approaches and solutions on this matter which the Commission considers perfectly suitable for guiding its work. It is a question not of creating, but of systematizing, the applicable principles and rules in a reasonable manner while introducing elements of progressive development, and of preserving the general spirit of the Vienna system.

The title of section 4.5 of the Guide to Practice “Consequences of an invalid reservation” was preferred over the one that was initially proposed, “Effects of an invalid reservation” because the main consequence of these instruments is, precisely, that they are devoid of legal effects.

Furthermore, it should be noted that invalid reservations, whose consequences are explicitly set out in this section of the Guide to Practice, are invalid either because they do not meet the formal and procedural requirements prescribed in Part 2 or because they are deemed impermissible according to the provisions of Part 3. The use of the words “validity/invalidity” and “valid/invalid” is consistent with the broad definition of the expression “validity of reservations” adopted by the Commission in 2006 in order “to describe the intellectual operation consisting in determining whether a unilateral statement made by a State or an international organization and purporting to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or organization was capable of producing the effects attached in principle to the formulation of a reservation”.

4.5.1 [3.3.2, later 4.5.1 and 4.5.2] Nullity of an invalid reservation

A reservation that does not meet the conditions of formal validity and permissibility set out in Parts 2 and 3 of the Guide to Practice is null and void, and therefore devoid of legal effect.


Commentary

(1) By clearly indicating that a reservation that does not meet the conditions of formal validity and permissibility set out in Parts 2 and 3 of the Guide to Practice is null and void and by formally stating the consequence that it is devoid of effect, guideline 4.5.1 aims to fill one of the major gaps in the Vienna Conventions, which deliberately left this question unanswered,\(^{2453}\) despite its very great practical importance.

(2) This guideline, which is probably one of the most important provisions in the Guide to Practice, does not duplicate guideline 3.3 (Consequences of the impermissibility of a reservation).\(^ {2454}\) First of all, it deals with both the formal invalidity and the impermissibility of reservations;\(^ {2455}\) whereas Part 3, and in particular the first three sections thereof, concerns only the permissibility of reservations. There is no reason to exclude from the conditions for the validity of a reservation — which, if not met, render the reservation null and void — those which concern form. A reservation which was not formulated in writing,\(^ {2456}\) was not communicated to the other concerned parties\(^ {2457}\) or was formulated late\(^ {2458}\) is also, in principle, unable to produce legal effects; it is null and void.\(^ {2459}\) Secondly, guideline 4.5.1 is “downstream” from guidelines 3.1 and 3.3.2, of which it draws the consequences: the latter establish the conditions under which a reservation is impermissible, while guideline 4.5.1 infers from such impermissibility that the reservation is null and void, and produces no legal effects.

(3) The purpose of the phrase “null and void” is to recall that this nullity is not dependent on the reactions of other contracting States or contracting organizations, something that guidelines 3.3.2 and 4.5.3 state even more clearly.

\(^{2453}\) See above, para. (16) of the general introduction to section 4.5 of the Guide to Practice.

\(^{2454}\) See above, footnote 350.

\(^{2455}\) See above, para. (20) of the general introduction to section 4.5 of the Guide to Practice. This broad scope explains why guideline 4.5.1 is in Part 4 and not Part 3 of the Guide to Practice (see a contrario the reasons for the inclusion of guideline 3.3.2 in Part 3, in paras. (5) to (7) of the commentary to the latter (see also para. (11) of the commentary to guideline 3.3.3)).

\(^{2456}\) Art. 23, para. 1, of the Vienna Conventions. See also guideline 2.1.1 (Written form), Yearbook ... 2002, vol. II (Part II), p. 26.

\(^{2457}\) Art. 23, para. 1, of the Vienna Conventions. See also guideline 2.1.5 (Communication of reservations), ibid., p. 26.

\(^{2458}\) See guideline 2.3 (Late reservations) and guidelines 2.3.1 (Late formulation of a reservation) to 2.3.5 (Widening of the scope of a reservation), Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 179 ... and Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10), pp. 269–274.

\(^{2459}\) In addition, guideline 4.5 is the equivalent for invalid reservations of guideline 4.1 for valid reservations (established reservations): these guidelines both related to the two types of conditions (substantive or formal) that allow a reservation to be considered “established”, in the first case (provided that it was also accepted by at least one other contracting State or contracting organization) or “invalid”, in the second case.
While the nullity of a reservation and the consequences or effects of that nullity are certainly interdependent, they are two different issues. It is not possible first to consider the effects of an impermissible reservation and then to deduce its nullity: the fact that a legal act produces no effect does not necessarily mean that it is null and void. It is the characteristics of the act that influence its effects, not the other way around. In that regard, the nullity of an act is merely one of its characteristics, which, in turn, influences the capacity of the act to produce or modify a legal situation.

With regard to acts which are null and void under civil law, the great French jurist Marcel Planiol has explained:

\[\text{un acte juridique est nul lorsqu'il se trouve privé d'effets par la loi, bien qu'il ait été réellement accompli, et qu'aucun obstacle ne le rende inutile. La nullité suppose que l'acte pourrait produire tous ses effets, si la loi le permettait}\]

[\text{a legal act is null and void when it is deprived of effect by law, even if it was in fact carried out and no obstacle renders it useless. Nullity presupposes that the act could produce all of its effects if the law allowed it to do so}].\[2460\]

The Dictionnaire du droit international public defines “nullity” as a

\[\text{caractéristique d'un acte juridique, ou d'une disposition d'un acte, dépourvu de valeur juridique, en raison de l’absence des conditions de forme ou de fond nécessaires pour sa validité}\]

[characteristic of a legal act or of a provision of an act, lacking legal value due to the absence of formal or substantive requirements necessary for its validity].\[2461\]

This is precisely the situation in the case of a reservation which does not meet the criteria for permissibility under article 19 of the Vienna Conventions: it does not meet the requirements for permissibility and, for this reason, has no legal value. Had the reservation met the requirements for permissibility, it could have produced legal effects.

Leaving it to the contracting parties to assess the permissibility of a reservation ultimately amounts to denying any \textit{effet utile} to article 19 of the Vienna Conventions (the 1986 text of which is


reproduced in guideline 3.1), even though it is central to the Vienna regime and formulates (a contrario, at least) the conditions for the permissibility of reservations not as a set of factors which States and international organizations should take into account, but in prescriptive language.\footnote{833, 2010} The opposite position would imply that, by accepting a reservation that does not meet the conditions for permissibility established in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, States can validate it; this would deprive article 19 of any substance and would contradict guideline 3.3.2.

(7) It therefore is reasonable and in line with the logic of the Vienna regime to establish this solution on which those who espouse permissibility and those who espouse opposability\footnote{834, 2010} agree, and which also accords with the positions taken by the human rights treaty bodies,\footnote{835, 2010} namely that failure to respect the conditions for the permissibility of reservations laid down in article 19 of the Vienna Conventions and repeated in draft guideline 3.1 nullifies the reservation. The nullity of an impermissible reservation is in no way a matter of lex ferenda; it is solidly established in State practice.

(8) It is not unusual for States to formulate objections to reservations which are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty while at the same time noting that they consider the reservation to be “null and void”.

(9) As early as in 1955 and 1957, upon ratifying the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the United Kingdom and the United States of America made objections to reservations formulated by several Eastern European States, stating that, since the reservations in question were null and void, the Conventions in their entirety applied to the reserving States. Thus, the United Kingdom declared that

\[\text{whilst they regard all the above-mentioned States as being parties to the above-mentioned Conventions, they do not regard the above-mentioned reservations thereto made by those}\]

\footnote{833, 2010} “A State may … formulate a reservation, unless …” which clearly means “a State cannot formulate a reservation if ….”


\footnote{835, 2010} See para. (16) of the commentary to guideline 3.2 (\textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10} (A/64/10), p. 295, as well as the commentary to guidelines 3.2.1 (Competence of the treaty monitoring bodies to assess the permissibility of a reservation) and 3.2.2 (Specification of the competence of treaty monitoring bodies to assess the permissibility of reservations), \textit{ibid.}, pp. 296–299.
States as valid, and will therefore regard any application of any of those reservations as constituting a breach of the Convention to which the reservation relates.2465

For its part, in 1982,

the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [did] not recognize the validity of the reservation made by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on its accession to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, since that reservation [was] contrary to one of the most important provisions of the Convention, namely, that “the diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained”.2466

Similarly, Italy formulated an objection to the reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights formulated by the United States:

In the opinion of Italy reservations to the provisions contained in article 6 are not permitted, as specified in article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Therefore this reservation is null and void since it is incompatible with the object and the purpose of article 6 of the Covenant.2467

In 1995, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden made objections that were comparable to the declarations formulated by Egypt upon acceding to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. In its objection, the Netherlands stated:

the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers the declaration on the requirement of prior permission for passage through the territorial sea made by Egypt a reservation which is null and void.2468

The Governments of Finland and Sweden also stated in their objections that they considered the declarations to be null and void.2469 The reactions of Sweden to reservations judged invalid frequently contain this statement, regardless of whether the reservation is prohibited by the

2465 [836, 2010] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 278, 1957, p. 268. See also the identical objections in connection with the four Geneva Conventions made by the United States of America. The objection in connection with the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war reads: “Rejecting the reservations which States have made with respect to the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, the United States accepts treaty relations with all parties to that Convention, except to the changes proposed by such reservations” (ibid., vol. 213, 1955, p. 383).
2468 [839, 2010] Ibid. (chap. XXVII.3). Art. 26, para. 1, of the Basel Convention stipulates that “No reservation or exception may be made to this Convention.”
treaty, 2470 was formulated late 2471 or is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. 2472 In the latter category, Sweden’s reaction to the declaration in respect of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment formulated by the German Democratic Republic 2473 is particularly explicit:

The Government of Sweden has come to the conclusion that the declaration made by the German Democratic Republic is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and therefore is invalid according to article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2474

(10) This objection makes it clear that the nullity of the reservation is a consequence not of the objection made by the Government of Sweden, but of the fact that the declaration made by the German Democratic Republic does not meet the requirements for the permissibility of a reservation. This is an objective issue which does not depend on the reactions of the other contracting parties, even if they might help to assess the compatibility of the reservation with the requirements of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions as reflected in guideline 3.1 (Permissible reservations). 2475

(11) It is not a question of granting the parties a competence which is clearly not theirs; individually, the contracting States and contracting organizations are not authorized to determine the nullity of an invalid reservation. 2476 Moreover, that is not the purpose of these objections and they should not be understood in that manner.

2469 [840, 2010] Ibid. (chap. XXVII.3).
2471 [842, 2010] Sweden’s objection to Egypt’s late declaration to the Basel Convention was, however, justified by both the Convention’s prohibition of reservations and the fact that “these declarations were made almost two years after the accession by Egypt contrary to the rule laid down in article 26, paragraph 2 of the Basel Convention” (ibid.). Finland, however, justified its objection based solely on the fact that the declarations were, in any event, late (ibid.). Belgium also considered that the declarations formulated by Egypt were late and that “for these reasons, the deposit of the aforementioned declarations cannot be allowed, regardless of their content” (ibid.).
2472 [843, 2010] See Sweden’s objections to the reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights formulated by Mauritania and the Maldives (ibid., chap. IV.4); its objections to the reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women formulated by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Bahrain, the Federated States of Micronesia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Brunei (ibid., chap. IV.8) and its objections to the reservation and interpretive declaration to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities formulated by El Salvador and Thailand, respectively (ibid., chap. IV.15).
2473 [844, 2010] The German Democratic Republic had declared upon signing and ratifying the Convention that it “will bear its share only of those expenses in accordance with article 17, paragraph 7, and article 18, paragraph 5, of the Convention arising from activities under the competence of the Committee as recognized by the German Democratic Republic” (ibid., chap. IV.9). See also the third report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/491 and Add.1 through 6), para. 217; Yearbook ... 1998, vol. II, Part One, p. 259.
2474 [845, 2010] Ibid. (chap. IV.9).
2475 [846, 2010] See also paras. (1) to (3) of the commentary to guideline 3.3.2 above.
(12) However, and this is particularly important in a system that lacks a control and annulment mechanism, such objections express the views of their authors on the question of the validity and effects of an invalid reservation[^2477] and are of particular importance in the context of the reservations dialogue. As the representative of Sweden pointed out in 2005 in the Sixth Committee:

Theoretically, an objection was not necessary in order to establish that fact but was merely a way of calling attention to it. The objection therefore had no real legal effect of its own and did not even have to be seen as an objection per se; consequently, the time limit of 12 months specified in article 20, paragraph 5, of the Convention, should not apply. However, in the absence of a body that could authoritatively classify a reservation as invalid, such as the European Court of Human Rights, such “objections” still served an important purpose.[^2478]

(13) It is also highly significant that in formulating objections to reservations that they consider invalid, States often pay very little attention to the conditions governing the efficacy of their objections. With regard to the Convention against Torture, for example, nine States[^2479] formulated objections against 4 reservations; of the 18 objections, 12 were late, which tends to show that their authors were convinced that the nullity of the reservations in question did not depend on their negative reactions but pre-dated their formulation. In other words, these objections recognize a pre-existing nullity based on objective criteria.

(14) Simply to state that a reservation is null and void, as in the first part of guideline 4.5.1, does not resolve the question of the effects — or lack thereof — of this nullity on the treaty and on potential treaty relations between the author of the reservation and the other contracting parties; the Vienna Conventions are silent on this matter.[^2480] It is therefore necessary to refer to the basic principles underlying all the law of treaties (beginning with the rules applicable to reservations), and above all, to the principle of consent.

(15) Many objections are formulated in respect of reservations that are considered impermissible, either because they are prohibited by the treaty or because they are incompatible with its object and

[^2479]: [850, 2010] Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden (*Multilateral Treaties …*, footnote 341 above, chap. IV.9).
[^2480]: [851, 2010] See above, commentary to the introduction to section 4.5, paras. (1) to (13).
purpose, without precluding the entry into force of the treaty. This practice is fully consistent with the principle set out in article 20, paragraph 4 (b), and article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions, although it might seem surprising that it was primarily (but not exclusively) the Western States which, at the Vienna Conference, expressed serious misgivings regarding the reversal of the presumption that was strongly supported by the Eastern countries. But the fact that the treaty remains in force does not answer the question of the status of the reservation.

(16) Belgium’s objection to the reservations of the United Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Convention on Diplomatic Relations illustrates the problem. Upon ratifying the Convention in 1968, the Belgian Government stated that it considered

“the reservation made by the United Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia to paragraph 2 of article 37 to be incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Convention”,

without drawing any particular consequences. But in 1975, in reaction to the confirmation of these reservations and to a comparable reservation by Morocco, Belgium explained:

The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium objects to the reservations made with respect to article 27, paragraph 3, by Bahrain and with respect to article 37, paragraph 2, by the United Arab Republic (now the Arab Republic of Egypt), Cambodia (now the Khmer Republic) and Morocco. The Government nevertheless considers that the Convention remains in force as between it and the aforementioned States, respectively, except in respect of the provisions which in each case are the subject of the said reservations.

In other words, according to Belgium, despite the reservations’ incompatibility with “the letter and spirit” of the Convention, the latter would enter into force between Belgium and the authors of the impermissible reservations. However, the provisions to which the reservations referred would not apply as between the authors of those reservations and Belgium; this amounts to giving impermissible reservations the same effect as permissible reservations.

2481 See above, commentary to guideline 4.3.4 (Non-entry into force of the treaty as between the author of a reservation and the author of an objection with maximum effect), paras. (7) to (13). See also the commentary to guideline 2.6.8 (Expression of intention to preclude the entry into force of the treaty), Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), p. 197, para. (1).

2482 Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. III.3.

2483 Ibid. (emphasis added).
(17) The approach taken in Belgium’s objection, which is somewhat unusual,\textsuperscript{2484} appears to correspond to the one envisaged in article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions in the case of a simple objection.\textsuperscript{2485}

(18) It is, however, highly debatable; it draws no real consequences from the nullity of the reservation but treats it in the same way as a permissible reservation by letting in “through the back door” what was excluded by the authors of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.\textsuperscript{2486}

Unquestionably, nothing in the wording of article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Conventions expressly suggests that it does not apply to the case of invalid reservations, but it is clear from the

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\textsuperscript{2484} See, however, the Netherlands’ objection to the reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights formulated by the United States of America:

“The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands objects to the reservations with respect to capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age, since it follows from the text and history of the Covenant that the said reservation is incompatible with the text, the object and purpose of article 6 of the Covenant, which according to article 4 lays down the minimum standard for the protection of the right to life.

“The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands objects to the reservation with respect to article 7 of the Covenant, since it follows from the text and the interpretation of this article that the said reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.

“In the opinion of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands this reservation has the same effect as a general derogation from this article, while according to article 4 of the Covenant, no derogations, not even in times of public emergency, are permitted.

“It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that the understandings and declarations of the United States do not exclude or modify the legal effect of provisions of the Covenant in their application to the United States, and do not in any way limit the competence of the Human Rights Committee to interpret these provisions in their application to the United States.

“Subject to the proviso of article 21, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, these objections do not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Covenant between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States” (ibid., chap. IV.4, emphasis added).

In its observations on general comment No. 24 of the Human Rights Committee, the United Kingdom also gave some weight to the exclusion of the parties to the treaty to which a reservation relates: “[t]he United Kingdom is absolutely clear that severability would entail excising both the reservation and the parts of the treaty to which it applies. Any other solution they would find deeply contrary to principle, notably the fundamental rule reflected in Article 38 (1) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice, that international conventions establish rules ‘expressly recognized by’ the Contracting States. The United Kingdom regards it as hardly feasible to try to hold a State to obligations under the Covenant which it self-evidently has not ‘expressly recognized’ but rather has indicated its express unwillingness to accept” (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/50/40), p. 163, para. 14).

In its report to the 18th meeting of chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies, the working group on reservations also did not completely rule out such an approach. In its recommendations, it suggested that “the only foreseeable consequences of invalidity are that the State could be considered as not being a party to the treaty, or as a party to the treaty but the provision to which the reservation has been made would not apply, or as a party to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation” (HRI/MC/2006/5/Rev.1, para. 16, recommendation No. 7, emphasis added). This position was, however, subsequently modified (see footnote 859 below).

\textsuperscript{2485} See above, commentary to guideline 4.3.5 (Effects of an objection on treaty relations).

travaux préparatoires that this question was no longer considered relevant to the draft article that was the basis for this provision.\footnote{[858, 2010]} \footnote{See above, introductory commentary to section 4.5, paras. (5) to (13).}

(19) As the representative of Sweden, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, rightly explained during the Sixth Committee’s debate on the report of the Commission on the work of its fifty-seventh session,

A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty was not formulated in accordance with article 19, so that the legal effects listed in article 21 did not apply. When article 21, paragraph 3, stated that the provisions to which the reservation related did not apply as between the objecting State and the reserving State to the extent of the reservation, it was referring to reservations permitted under article 19. It would be unreasonable to apply the same rule to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty. Instead, such a reservation should be considered invalid and without legal effect.\footnote{[859, 2010]} \footnote{A/C.6/60/SR.14, para. 22. See also Malaysia (A/C.6/60/SR.18, para. 86) and Greece (A/C.6/60/SR.19, para. 39), as well as the report of the meeting of the working group on reservations to the 19th meeting of chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies and the sixth inter-committee meeting of the human rights treaty bodies (HRI/MC/2007/5, para. 18): “It cannot be envisaged that the reserving State remains a party to the treaty with the provision to which the reservation has been made not applying.”}

(20) Moreover, the irrelevance of the Vienna rules is clearly confirmed by the great majority of States’ reactions to reservations that they consider invalid. Whether or not they state explicitly that their objection will not preclude the entry into force of the treaty with the author of the reservation, they nevertheless state unambiguously that an impermissible reservation has no legal effect.

(21) The objections made many years ago by the United States of America and the United Kingdom to some of the reservations formulated by Eastern European States to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is a significant example.\footnote{[860, 2010]} \footnote{See above, paras. (9) and (10) of the commentary to this guideline.}

(22) Belarus, Bulgaria, Russia and Czechoslovakia also made objections to the Philippines’ “interpretative declaration” to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, stating that this reservation had no value or legal effect.\footnote{[861, 2010]} Norwegian and Finland made objections to a declaration made by the German Democratic Republic in respect of the Convention against Torture

\footnote{[860, 2010] Multilateral Treaties ..., footnotes 341 above, chap. XXI.6.}
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;\textsuperscript{2491} the declaration was broadly criticized by several States, which considered that “any such declaration is without legal effect, and cannot in any manner diminish the obligation of a government to contribute to the costs of the Committee in conformity with the provisions of the Convention”.\textsuperscript{2492} And although Portugal had expressed doubt regarding the nullity of an impermissible reservation, it stressed in its objection to the Maldives’ reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women:

Furthermore, the Government of Portugal considers that these reservations cannot alter or modify in any respect the obligations arising from the Convention for any State party thereto.\textsuperscript{2493}

(23) State practice is extensive — and essentially homogeneous — and is not limited to a few specific States. Recent objections by Finland,\textsuperscript{2494} Sweden,\textsuperscript{2495} other States, such as Belgium,\textsuperscript{2496} Spain,\textsuperscript{2497} the Netherlands,\textsuperscript{2498} the Czech Republic\textsuperscript{2499} and Slovakia;\textsuperscript{2500} and even some international

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2491}See footnote 844 above.
\item \textsuperscript{2492}Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. IV.9.
\item \textsuperscript{2493}Ibid., chap. IV.8.
\item \textsuperscript{2494}See Finland’s objections to the reservation to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination made by Yemen (ibid., chap. IV.2); the reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women made by Kuwait, Malaysia, Lesotho, Singapore and Pakistan (ibid., chap. IV.8); the reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child made by Malaysia, Qatar, Singapore and Oman (ibid., chap. IV.11); and the reservation formulated by the United States of America upon consenting to be bound by Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (ibid., chap. XXVI.2).
\item \textsuperscript{2495}See Sweden’s objection to the reservation formulated by the United States of America upon consenting to be bound by Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (ibid., chap. XXVI.2). Sweden specified, however, that “this objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between the United States of America and Sweden. The Convention enters into force in its entirety between the United States of America and Sweden, without the United States of America benefiting from its reservation”.
\item \textsuperscript{2496}See Belgium’s objection to the reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child made by Singapore: “The Government considers that paragraph 2 of the declarations, concerning articles 19 and 37 of the Convention and paragraph 3 of the reservations, concerning the constitutional limits upon the acceptance of the obligations contained in the Convention, are contrary to the purposes of the Convention and are consequently without effect under international law” (ibid., chap. IV.9).
\item \textsuperscript{2497}See Spain’s objection to the reservation to Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women made by Qatar: “The Government of the Kingdom of Spain believes that the aforementioned declarations ... have no legal force and in no way exclude or modify the obligations assumed by Qatar under the Convention” (ibid., chap. IV.8).
\item \textsuperscript{2498}See the Netherlands’ objection to the reservation to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities made by El Salvador: “It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that the reservation of the Government of the Republic of El Salvador does not exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Convention in their application to the Republic of El Salvador” (ibid., chap. IV.15).
\item \textsuperscript{2499}See the Czech Republic’s objection to the reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women made by Qatar: “[t]he Czech Republic, therefore, objects to the aforesaid reservations made by the State of Qatar to the Convention. This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between the Czech Republic and the State of Qatar. The Convention enters into force in its entirety between the Czech Republic and the State of Qatar, without the State of Qatar benefiting from its reservation” (ibid., chap. IV.8).
\end{itemize}
organizations quite often include a statement that the impermissible reservation is devoid of legal force. And it is highly revealing that in principle, this practice of making objections with “super-maximum” effect elicits no opposition of principle from other contracting States or contracting organizations — including the authors of the reservations in question.

(24) The absence of any legal effect as a direct consequence of the nullity of an impermissible reservation — which, moreover, arises directly from the very concept of nullity — was also affirmed by the Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 24 on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant. The Committee considered that one aspect of the “normal consequence” of the impermissibility of a reservation was that its author did not have the benefit of the reservation. It is significant that, despite the active response to general comment No. 24 by the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom, none of the three States challenged this position.

(25) The Committee subsequently confirmed this conclusion from its general comment No. 24 during its consideration of the Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago communication. In its

\[871, 2010\] See Slovakia’s objection to the reservation to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights made by Pakistan: “The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights enters into force in its entirety between the Slovak Republic and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, without ... Pakistan benefiting from its reservation” (ibid., chap. IV.3); and to the reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women made by Qatar: “This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women between the Slovak Republic and the State of Qatar. The Convention (...) enters into force in its entirety between the Slovak Republic and the State of Qatar, without the State of Qatar benefiting from its reservations and declarations” (ibid.).

\[872, 2010\] See the objections made jointly by the European Community and its members (Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) to the objections to the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets made by Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic. In the two identical objections, the authors noted: “The statement made (...) concerning article 52 (3) has the appearance of a reservation to that provision, although such reservation is expressly prohibited by the Convention. The Community and the Member States therefore consider that under no circumstances can this statement be invoked against them and they regard it as entirely void” (ibid., chap. XI.A.16).

\[873, 2010\] See the commentary to guideline 4.3.7, paras. (1) to (4), and the eighth report on reservations to treaties (2003), (A/CN.4/535/Add.1), para. 96. See also Bruno Simma, footnote 818 above, pp. 667–668.

\[874, 2010\] See para. (5) of the commentary to guideline 4.5.1 above.

\[875, 2010\] Report of the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/50/40), vol. I, pp. 151–152, para. 18. See also Françoise Hampson’s final working paper on reservations to human rights treaties (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42), para. 57 (“A monitoring body cannot be expected to give effect to a reservation it has found to be incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty”) and para. 59 of her expanded working paper on the same topic (see footnote 857 above): “A monitoring body cannot be expected to give effect to a reservation it has found to be incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty”. The Human Rights Committee combined in a single statement the idea that an incompatible reservation cannot produce effects (which is not contested) and the question of the effect of that incompatibility on the author’s status as a party (which has been widely debated; see commentary to guideline 4.5.2 [4.5.3] below).

decision on the admissibility of the communication,\textsuperscript{2506} the Committee ruled on the permissibility of the reservation formulated by the State party on 26 May 1998 upon acceding again to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, after having denounced the Optional Protocol on the same day. Through its reservation, Trinidad and Tobago sought to exclude the Committee’s jurisdiction in cases involving prisoners under sentence of death.\textsuperscript{2507} On the basis of the discriminatory nature of the reservation, the Committee considered that the reservation “cannot be deemed compatible with the object and purpose of the Optional Protocol”.\textsuperscript{2508} The Committee concluded,

“The consequence is that the Committee is not precluded from considering the present communication under the Optional Protocol.”\textsuperscript{2509}

In other words, according to the Committee, Trinidad and Tobago’s reservation did not exclude application of the Optional Protocol in respect of the applicant, who was a prisoner under sentence of death. It therefore produced neither the legal effect of an established reservation,\textsuperscript{2510} nor that of a valid reservation to which an objection has been made.\textsuperscript{2511} It produced no effect.

(26) The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also stated that an impermissible reservation seeking to limit the Court’s jurisdiction could produce no effect. In \textit{Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago}, the Court stressed:

Trinidad and Tobago cannot prevail in the limitation included in its instrument of acceptance of the optional clause of the mandatory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in virtue of what has been established in Article 62 of the American Convention, because this limitation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.\textsuperscript{2512}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2506}Communication No. 845/1999, decision of 2 November 1999 (CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999).
\item \textsuperscript{2507}Also in accordance with its conclusions in general comment No. 24, the Committee maintained that the State party remained bound by the Optional Protocol; this cannot be taken for granted, even if it is agreed that Trinidad and Tobago was able to withdraw from the treaty and immediately reaccede to it (a point on which the Special Rapporteur will not, at this time, take a position).
\item \textsuperscript{2509}Ibid., para. 6.7.
\item \textsuperscript{2510}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{2511}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{2512}See the guidelines in section 4.2 of the Guide to Practice.
\item \textsuperscript{2513}See the guidelines in section 4.3 of the Guide to Practice.
\item \textsuperscript{2514}Preliminary objection, judgment of 1 September 2001, \textit{Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago}, Series C, No. 80, para. 98. See also the Court’s judgment of 1 September 2001 on the preliminary objection in \textit{Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago}, Series C, No. 81, para. 89. In the latter judgment, the Court arrived at the same conclusions without, however, stating that the reservation was incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.
\end{itemize}
(27) The European Court of Human Rights took this approach in the principle invoked in *Weber v. Switzerland*, Belilos v. Switzerland and Loizidou v. Turkey. In all three cases, the Court, after noting the impermissibility of the reservations formulated by Switzerland and Turkey, applied the European Convention on Human Rights as if the reservations had not been formulated and, consequently, had produced no legal effect.

(28) In light of this general agreement, the Commission considers that the principle that an invalid reservation has no legal effect is part of positive law. This principle is set out in the second part of guideline 4.5.1.

(29) According to one, isolated view expressed within the Commission, the principle is laid out in too rigid a fashion: a reservation would be totally deprived of effects only if it was held impermissible by a decision binding on all the parties to the treaty. Absent such a mechanism, it was for each State to decide for itself, and the nullity of a reservation would be revealed only in relation to States that considered it null and void. It was obviously correct (and inherent in the international legal system) that as long as an impartial third party with decision-making authority had not taken a position on the matter, the question of the validity of a reservation remained an open one (this, in fact, is what makes the reservations dialogue something of interest). However, the Commission considers that this position inevitably entails a generalized relativism that should not be encouraged: the substance of the applicable law (which the Guide to Practice endeavours to enunciate) must not be confused with the settlement of disputes that arise when it is put into effect. A reservation is or is not valid, irrespective of the individual positions taken by States or international organizations in this connection and, accordingly, its nullity is not a subjective question or a relative matter, but can and must be determined objectively, although this does not mean that the reactions of other parties are devoid of interest – but this is the subject of the guidelines in section 4.3 of the Guide to Practice.

**4.5.2 [4.5.3] Status of the author of an invalid reservation in relation to the treaty**

When an invalid reservation has been formulated, the reserving State or the reserving international organization is considered a contracting State or a contracting organization or, as

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the case may be, a party to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation, unless a contrary intention of the said State or organization can be identified.

The intention of the author of the reservation shall be identified by taking into consideration all factors that may be relevant to that end, including:

- The wording of the reservation
- Statements made by the author of the reservation when negotiating, signing or ratifying the treaty, or otherwise expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty
- Subsequent conduct of the author of the reservation
- Reactions of other contracting States and contracting organizations
- The provision or provisions to which the reservation relates, and
- The object and purpose of the treaty.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 4.5.1 does not resolve all the issues concerning the effects of the nullity of an impermissible reservation. While it is established that such a reservation cannot produce legal effects, it is essential to answer the question of whether its author becomes a contracting party without the benefit of its reservation, or whether the nullity of its reservation also affects its consent to be bound by the treaty. Both approaches are consistent with the principle that the reservation has no legal effect: either the treaty enters into force for the author of the reservation without the latter benefiting from its invalid reservation, which thus does not have the intended effects; or the treaty does not enter into force for the author of the reservation and, obviously, the reservation also does not produce effects since no treaty relations exist. Guideline 4.5.2 proposes the principle of a middle solution between these apparently irreconcilable positions, based on the (simple – “rebuttable”) presumption that the author of the reservation is bound by the treaty without being able to claim the benefit of the reservation, unless the author has expressed the opposite intention.

(2) The first alternative, the severability of an impermissible reservation from the reserving State’s consent to be bound by the treaty, is currently supported to some extent by State practice. Many objections have clearly been based on the invalidity of a reservation and even, in many cases, have declared such a reservation to be null and void, and unable to produce effects; nevertheless, in virtually all cases, the objecting States have not opposed the treaty’s entry into force and have even declared themselves to be in favour of the establishment of a treaty relationship with the author of the reservation. Since a reservation that is null and void has no legal effect, such a treaty relationship can only mean that the reserving State is bound by the treaty as a whole without benefit of the reservation.

(3) This approach is confirmed by the practice, followed, *inter alia*, by the Nordic States, of formulating what have come to be called objections with “super-maximum” effect (or intent), along the lines of Sweden’s objection to the reservation to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities formulated by El Salvador:

The Government of Sweden therefore objects to the aforesaid reservation made by the Government of the Republic of El Salvador to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and considers the reservation null and void. This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between El Salvador and Sweden. The Convention enters into force in its entirety between El Salvador and Sweden, without El Salvador benefiting from its reservation.

(4) Such objections, of which the Nordic States — though not the originators of this practice — make frequent use, have been appearing for some 15 years and are used more and more often, especially by the European States. Apart from Sweden, Austria, the Czech Republic and the

2519 [890, 2010] *Multilateral Treaties ...,* footnote 341 above, chap. IV.15. See also Sweden’s objection to the reservation to the same Convention formulated by Thailand (*ibid.*).
2520 [891, 2010] One of the earliest objections that, while not explicit in this regard, can be termed an objection with “super-maximum” effect was made by Portugal in response to the reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women made by the Maldives (footnote 864 above).
2521 [892, 2010] *Multilateral Treaties ...,* footnote 341 above, chap. IV.15. In its objection, the Austrian Government stressed that “[t]his objection, however, does not preclude the entry into force, *in its entirety*, of the Convention between Austria and El Salvador” (emphasis added).
The Netherlands have also sought to give super-maximum effect to their objections to the reservations of El Salvador and Thailand to the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

(5) More recently, in early 2010, several European States objected to the reservation formulated by the United States of America when expressing its consent to be bound by Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. No fewer than five of these objections contain wording intended to produce so-called “super-maximum” effect. Likewise, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Norway, Romania, Slovakia and Spain included in their objections to Qatar’s reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women the proviso that those objections did not preclude the entry into force of the Convention as between those States and the reserving State, without the latter benefiting from the reservation. This largely European practice is undoubtedly influenced by the 1999 recommendation of the Council of Europe on responses to inadmissible reservations to international treaties, which includes a number of model response clauses for use by member States; the above-mentioned objections closely mirror these clauses.

(6) It is clear that this practice is supported to some extent by the decisions of human rights bodies and regional courts, such as the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights.

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2524 [895, 2010] *Ibid.* (chap. XXVI.2): Austria (“the Government of Austria objects to the aforementioned reservation made by the United States of America to the Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (Protocol III). This position, however, does not preclude the entry into force in its entirety of the Convention between the United States of America and Austria”); Cyprus (“the Government of the Republic of Cyprus objects to the aforementioned reservation by the United States of America to Protocol III of the CCW. This position does not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Cyprus in its entirety”); Norway (“The Government of the Kingdom of Norway objects to the aforesaid reservation by the Government of the United States of America to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) to the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. However, this objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Protocol in its entirety between the two States, without the United States of America benefiting from its reservation”); and Sweden (“The Government of Sweden objects to the aforesaid reservation made by the Government of the United States of America to Protocol III of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and considers the reservation without legal effect. This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Convention between the United States of America and Sweden. The Convention enters into force in its entirety between the United States of America and Sweden, without the United States of America benefiting from its reservation”).


In its landmark judgment in *Belilos v. Switzerland*, the European Court of Human Rights, sitting in plenary session, not only recharacterized the interpretative declaration formulated by the Swiss Government, but also had to decide whether the reservation (incorrectly characterized as an interpretative declaration) was valid. Having concluded that Switzerland’s reservation was invalid, particularly in relation to the conditions set out in article 64 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), the Court added:

“At the same time, it is beyond doubt that Switzerland is, and regards itself as, bound by the Convention irrespective of the validity of the declaration.”

In its judgment in *Weber v. Switzerland*, a chamber of the Court was called upon to decide whether article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention was applicable, whether it had been violated by the respondent State and whether Switzerland’s reservation in respect of that provision — which, according to the respondent State, was separate from its interpretative declaration — was applicable. In this connection, the Swiss Government claimed that “Switzerland’s reservation in respect of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) (...) would in any case prevent Mr. Weber from relying on non-compliance with the principle that proceedings before cantonal courts and judges should be public.” The Court went on to consider the validity of Switzerland’s reservation and, more specifically, whether it satisfied the requirements of article 64 of the Convention. It noted that the reservation:

...does not fulfil one of them, as the Swiss Government did not append “a brief statement of the law — or laws — concerned” to it. The requirement of paragraph 2 of Article 64 (art. 64-2), however, “both constitutes an evidential factor and contributes to legal certainty”; its purpose is to “provide a guarantee — in particular for the other Contracting Parties and the Convention institutions — that a reservation does not go beyond the provisions expressly excluded by the State concerned” (see the Belilos judgment previously cited, Series A No. 132, pp. 27–28, § 59). Disregarding it is a breach not of “a purely formal requirement” but of “a condition of...
substance” (*ibid.*). The material reservation by Switzerland must accordingly be regarded as invalid.\textsuperscript{2532}

In contrast to its practice in the *Belilos* judgment, the Court did not go on to explore whether the reservation’s nullity had consequences for Switzerland’s consent to be bound by the Convention. It simply confined itself to considering whether article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention had in fact been violated, and concluded that “there ha[d] therefore been a breach of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1)”.\textsuperscript{2533} Thus, without saying so explicitly, the Court considered that Switzerland remained bound by the European Convention, despite the nullity of its reservation, and that it could not benefit from the reservation; that being the case, article 6, paragraph 1, was enforceable against it.

(8) In its judgment on preliminary objections in *Loizidou v. Turkey*,\textsuperscript{2534} a chamber of the European Court took the opportunity to supplement and considerably clarify its jurisprudence. While in this case the issue of validity arose in respect not of a reservation to a provision of the Convention, but of a “reservation” to the optional declaration whereby Turkey recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to articles 25 and 46 of the Convention, the lessons of the judgment can easily be transposed to the problem of reservations. Having found that the restrictions *ratione loci* attached to Turkey’s declarations of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction were “invalid”, the Strasbourg judges pursued their line of reasoning by considering “whether, as a consequence of this finding, the validity of the acceptances themselves may be called into question”.\textsuperscript{2535} The Court noted:

93. In addressing this issue the Court must bear in mind the special character of the Convention as an instrument of European public order (*ordre public*) for the protection of individual human beings and its mission, as set out in Article 19 (art. 19), “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties”.

94. It also recalls the finding in its *Belilos v. Switzerland* judgment of 29 April 1988, after having struck down an interpretative declaration on the grounds that it did not conform to

\textsuperscript{2532} Ibid., para. 38.
\textsuperscript{2533} Ibid., para. 40.
\textsuperscript{2534} Application No. 15318/89, judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A, No. 310.
\textsuperscript{2535} Ibid., para. 89.
Article 64 (art. 64), that Switzerland was still bound by the Convention notwithstanding the invalidity of the declaration (Series A No. 132, p. 28, para. 60).

95. The Court does not consider that the issue of the severability of the invalid parts of Turkey’s declarations can be decided by reference to the statements of her representatives expressed subsequent to the filing of the declarations either (as regards the declaration under Article 25) (art. 25) before the Committee of Ministers and the Commission or (as regards both Articles 25 and 46) (art. 25, art. 46) in the hearing before the Court. In this connection, it observes that the respondent Government must have been aware, in view of the consistent practice of Contracting Parties under Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46) to accept unconditionally the competence of the Commission and Court, that the impugned restrictive clauses were of questionable validity under the Convention system and might be deemed impermissible by the Convention organs. It is of relevance to note, in this context, that the Commission had already expressed the opinion to the Court in its pleadings in the Belgian Linguistic (Preliminary objection) and Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark cases (judgments of 9 February 1967 and 7 December 1976, Series A Nos. 5 and 23 respectively) that Article 46 (art. 46) did not permit any restrictions in respect of recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction (see respectively, the second memorial of the Commission of 14 July 1966, Series B No. 3, vol. I, p. 432, and the memorial of the Commission (Preliminary objection) of 26 January 1976, Series B no. 21, p. 119). The subsequent reaction of various Contracting Parties to the Turkish declarations (…) lends convincing support to the above observation concerning Turkey’s awareness of the legal position. That she, against this background, subsequently filed declarations under both Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46) — the latter subsequent to the statements by the Contracting Parties referred to above — indicates a willingness on her part to run the risk that the limitation clauses at issue would be declared invalid by the Convention institutions without affecting the validity of the declarations themselves. Seen in this light, the ex post facto statements by Turkish representatives cannot be relied upon to detract from the respondent Government’s basic — albeit qualified — intention to accept the competence of the Commission and Court.

96. It thus falls to the Court, in the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 19 (art. 19), to decide this issue with reference to the texts of the respective declarations and the special
character of the Convention regime. The latter, it must be said, militates in favour of the severance of the impugned clauses since it is by this technique that the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention may be ensured in all areas falling within Turkey’s “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 (art. 1) of the Convention.

97. The Court has examined the text of the declarations and the wording of the restrictions with a view to determining whether the impugned restrictions can be severed from the instruments of acceptance or whether they form an integral and inseparable part of them. Even considering the texts of the Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46) declarations taken together, it considers that the impugned restrictions can be separated from the remainder of the text leaving intact the acceptance of the optional clauses.

98. It follows that the declarations of 28 January 1987 and 22 January 1990 under Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46) contain valid acceptances of the competence of the Commission and Court.2536

(9) In its judgment on preliminary objections in *Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago*,2537 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights likewise noted that, in light of the object and purpose of the American Convention on Human Rights, Trinidad and Tobago could not benefit from the limitation included in its instrument of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction but was still bound by its acceptance of that compulsory jurisdiction.2538

(10) With the individual communication, *Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago*, a comparable problem concerning a reservation formulated by the State party upon reaccessing to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was brought before the Human Rights Committee. Having found the reservation thus formulated to be impermissible by reason of its discriminatory nature, the Committee merely noted, “The consequence is that the Committee is not precluded from considering the present communication under the Optional Protocol”.2539 In other words, Trinidad and Tobago remained bound by the Protocol without benefit of the reservation.

2536 [907, 2010] Ibid., paras. 93–98.
2538 [909, 2010] Ibid., para. 98.
This decision of the Human Rights Committee is consistent with its conclusions in general comment No. 24 on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, in which the Committee affirmed that:

The normal consequence of an unacceptable reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in effect at all for a reserving party. Rather, such a reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.

It should be noted that the wording adopted by the Committee does not suggest that this “normal” consequence is the only one possible or that other solutions may not exist.

On the other hand, in its observations on the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 24, France stated categorically that agreements, whatever their nature, are governed by the law of treaties, that they are based on States’ consent and that reservations are conditions which States attach to that consent; it necessarily follows that if these reservations are deemed incompatible with the purpose and object of the treaty, the only course open is to declare that this consent is not valid and decide that these States cannot be considered parties to the instrument in question.

This view, which reflects the opposite answer to the question of whether the author of an impermissible reservation becomes a contracting party, is based on the principle that the nullity of the reservation affects the whole of the instrument of consent to be bound by the treaty. In a 1951 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice answered, in response to the General Assembly’s question I, that a State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as being a party to
the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention.2543

(15) According to this approach, the reservation is seen as a *sine qua non* for the reserving State’s consent to be bound by the treaty, which alone would be in conformity with the principle of consent. If the condition is not valid, there is no consent on the part of the reserving State. In these circumstances, only the reserving State can take the necessary decisions to remedy the nullity of its reservation, and it should not be regarded as a party to the treaty until such time as it has withdrawn or amended its reservation.

(16) The practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties also seems to confirm this radical solution. The *Summary of Practice* explains in this respect:

191. If the treaty forbids any reservation, the Secretary-General will refuse to accept the deposit of the instrument. The Secretary-General will call the attention of the State concerned to the difficulty and shall not issue any notification concerning the instrument to any other State concerned (…).

192. If the prohibition is to only specific articles, or conversely reservations are authorized only in respect of specific provisions, the Secretary-General shall act, *mutatis mutandis*, in a similar fashion if the reservations are not in keeping with the relevant provisions of the treaty (…).

193. However, only if there is *prima facie* no doubt that the statement accompanying the instrument is an unauthorized reservation does the Secretary-General refuse the deposit. Such would evidently be the case if the statement, for example, read “State XXX shall not apply article YYY”, when the treaty prohibited all reservations or reservations to article YYY.2544

(17) State practice, while not completely absent, is still less consistent in this regard. For example, Israel, Italy and the United Kingdom objected to the reservation formulated by Burundi upon acceding to the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against

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Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. But whereas these three States regard the reservation entered by the Government of Burundi as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and are unable to consider Burundi as having validly acceded to the Convention until such time as the reservation is withdrawn, two other States (Federal Republic of Germany and France) that objected to Burundi’s reservation did not include such a statement in their objections.

(18) The Government of the Republic of China, which ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1951, stated that it... objects to all the identical reservations made at the time of signature or ratification or accession to the Convention by Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Chinese Government considers the above-mentioned reservations as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and, therefore, by virtue of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1951, would not regard the above-mentioned States as being Parties to the Convention.

In spite of the large number of similar reservations, only the Government of the Netherlands formulated a comparable objection, in 1966.


\[917, 2010\] The Federal Republic of Germany objected: “The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers the reservation made by the Government of Burundi concerning article 2, paragraph 2, and article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention” (ibid.). The Government of France, upon acceding to the Convention, stated that it “objects to the declaration made by Burundi on 17 December 1980 limiting the application of the provisions of article 2, paragraph 2, and article 6, paragraph 1” (ibid.).

\[918, 2010\] This notification was made prior to the adoption, on 25 October 1971, of General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI), whereby the Assembly decided “to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations”; the Government of the People’s Republic of China declared, upon ratifying the 1948 Genocide Convention on 18 April 1983, that “The ratification to the said Convention by the Taiwan local authorities on 19 July 1951 in the name of China is illegal and therefore null and void” (ibid., chap. IV.1).

\[919, 2010\] Ibid.

\[920, 2010\] The objection by the Netherlands reads: “The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands declares that it considers the reservations made by Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Morocco, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in respect of article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature at Paris on 9 December 1948, to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands therefore does not deem any State which has made or which will make such reservation a party to the Convention” (ibid.).
In the vast majority of cases, States that formulate objections to a reservation that they consider invalid expressly state that their objection does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty in their relations with the reserving State, while seeing no need to elaborate further on the content of any such treaty relationship. The International Law Commission in 2005 sought comments from Member States on the following question:

States often object to a reservation that they consider incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, but without opposing the entry into force of the treaty between themselves and the author of the reservation. The Commission would be particularly interested in Governments’ comments on this practice. It would like to know, in particular, what effects the authors expect such objections to have, and how, in Governments’ view, this practice accords with article 19 (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The views expressed by several delegations in the Sixth Committee clearly show that there is no agreement on the approach to the thorny question of the validity of consent to be bound by the treaty in the case of an invalid reservation. Several States have maintained that this practice was “paradoxical” and that, in any event, the author of the objection “could not simply ignore the reservation and act as if it had never been formulated”. The French delegation stressed that

such an objection would create the so-called “super-maximum effect”, since it would allow for the application of the treaty as a whole without regard to the fact that a reservation had been entered. That would compromise the basic principle of consensus underlying the law of treaties.

Others, however, noted that it would be better to have the author of the reservation become a contracting State or contracting organization than to exclude it from the circle of parties. In that regard, the representative of Sweden, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, said:

The practice of severing reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty accorded well with article 19, which made it clear that such reservations were not expected to be included in the treaty relations between States. While one alternative in objecting to

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2551 [922, 2010] See A/C.6/60/SR.14, paras. 3 (United Kingdom) and 72 (France); and A/C.6/60/SR.16, paras. 20 (Italy) and 44 (Portugal).

impermissible reservations was to exclude bilateral treaty relations altogether, the option of severability secured bilateral treaty relations and opened up possibilities of dialogue within the treaty regime.\textsuperscript{2554}

(20) However, it should be noted that those who share this point of view have made the entry into force of the treaty conditional on the will of the author of the reservation: “However, account must be taken of the will of the reserving State regarding the relationship between the ratification of a treaty and the reservation.”\textsuperscript{2555}

(21) Although the two approaches and the two points of view concerning the question of the entry into force of the treaty may initially appear diametrically opposed, both are consistent with the principle that underlies treaty law: the principle of consent. There is no doubt that the key to the problem is simply the will of the author of the reservation: does the author purport to be bound by the treaty even if its reservation is invalid — without benefit of the reservation — or is its reservation a \textit{sine qua non} for its commitment to be bound by the treaty?

(22) In the context of the specific but comparable issue of reservations to the optional clause concerning the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, Judge Lauterpacht, in his dissenting opinion to the Court’s judgment on the preliminary objections in the \textit{Interhandel} case, stated:

If that reservation is an essential condition of the Acceptance in the sense that without it the declaring State would have been wholly unwilling to undertake the principal obligation, then it is not open to the Court to disregard that reservation and at the same time to hold the accepting State bound by the Declaration.\textsuperscript{2556}

\textsuperscript{2553} [924, 2010] \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{2554} [925, 2010] A/C.6/60/SR.14, para. 23 (Sweden). See also A/C.6/60/SR.17, para. 24 (Spain); A/C.6/60/SR.18, para. 86 (Malaysia); and A/C.6/60/SR.19, para. 39 (Greece).
\textsuperscript{2555} [926, 2010] A/C.6/60/SR.14, para. 23 (Sweden). See also the position of the United Kingdom (\textit{ibid.}, para. 4): “On the related issue of the ‘super-maximum effect’ of an objection, consisting in the determination not only that the reservation objected to was not valid but also that, as a result, the treaty as a whole applied \textit{ipso facto} in the relations between the two States, his delegation considered that that could occur only in the most exceptional circumstances, for example, if the State making the reservation could be said to have accepted or acquiesced in such an effect.”
\textsuperscript{2556} [927, 2010] \textit{Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America)}, dissenting opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, \textit{I.C.J. Reports} 1959, p. 117.
Thus, the important issue is the will of the author of the reservation and its intent to be bound by the treaty, with or without benefit of its reservation. This is also true in the case of more classic reservations to treaty provisions.

(23) In its judgment in the Belilos case, the European Court of Human Rights paid particular attention to Switzerland’s position with regard to the European Convention. It expressly noted: “At the same time, Switzerland was, and regarded itself as, bound by the Convention irrespective of validity of the declaration.”\textsuperscript{2557} Thus, the Court clearly took into consideration the fact that Switzerland itself — the author of the invalid “reservation” — considered itself to be bound by the treaty despite the nullity of this reservation and had behaved accordingly.

(24) In the Loizidou case, the European Court of Human Rights also based its judgment, if not on the will of the Turkish Government — which had maintained during the proceedings before the Court that “if the restrictions attached to the Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46) declarations were not recognized to be valid, as a whole, the declarations were to be considered null and void in their entirety,”\textsuperscript{2558} — then on the fact that Turkey had knowingly run the risk that the restrictions resulting from its reservation would be declared invalid:

That she, against this background, subsequently filed declarations under both Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46) — the latter subsequent to the statements by the Contracting Parties referred to above — indicates a willingness on her part to run the risk that the limitation clauses at issue would be declared invalid by the Convention institutions without affecting the validity of the declarations themselves.\textsuperscript{2559}

(25) The “Strasbourg approach”\textsuperscript{2560} thus consists of acting on the reserving State’s will to be bound by the treaty even if its reservation is invalid.\textsuperscript{2561} In so doing, the Court did not, however,
rely only on the express declarations of the State in question — as, for example, it did in the Belilos case — it also sought to “reconstruct” the will of the State. As William A. Schabas has written:

The European Court did not set aside the test of intention in determining whether a reservation is severable. Rather, it appears to highlight the difficulty in identifying such intention and expresses a disregard for such factors as formal declarations by the State.

Only if it is established that the reserving State did not consider its reservation (which has been recognized as invalid) to be an essential element of its consent to be bound by the treaty is the reservation separable from its treaty obligation.

Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights do not limit their consideration to the will of the State that is the author of the invalid reservation; both Courts take into account the specific nature of the instruments that they are mandated to enforce. In the Loizidou case, for example, the European Court drew attention to the fact that:

In addressing this issue the Court must bear in mind the special character of the Convention as an instrument of European public order (ordre public) for the protection of individual human beings and its mission, as set out in Article 19 (art. 19), “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties”.

The Inter-American Court, for its part, stressed in its judgment in the Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago case:

93. Moreover, accepting the said declaration in the manner proposed by the State would lead to a situation in which the Court would have the State’s Constitution as its first point of reference, and the American Convention only as a subsidiary parameter, a situation which

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would cause a fragmentation of the international legal order for the protection of human rights, and which would render illusory the object and purpose of the Convention.

94. The American Convention and the other human rights treaties are inspired by a set of higher common values (centred around the protection of the human being), are endowed with specific supervisory mechanisms, are applied as a collective guarantee, embody essentially objective obligations, and have a special character that sets them apart from other treaties...

(28) The position expressed by the Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 24 is even more categorical. In fact, the Committee makes no connection between the entry into force of the treaty, despite the nullity of the invalid reservation, and the author’s wishes in that regard. It simply states that the “normal consequence” is the entry into force of the treaty for the author of the reservation without benefit of the reservation. However, as noted above, this “normal” consequence, which the Committee apparently views as somewhat automatic, does not exclude (and, conversely, suggests) the possibility that the invalid reservation may produce other “abnormal” consequences. But the Committee is silent on both the question of what these other consequences might be, and the question of how and by what the “normal” consequence and the potential “abnormal” consequence are triggered.

(29) In any event, the position taken by the human rights bodies has been noticeably nuanced in recent years. For example, at the fourth inter-committee meeting of the human rights treaty bodies and the seventeenth meeting of chairpersons of these bodies, it was noted:

In a meeting with ILC on 31 July 2003, HRC confirmed that the Committee continued to endorse general comment No. 24, and several members of the Committee stressed that there was growing support for the severability approach, but that there was no automatic conclusion of severability for inadmissible reservations but only a presumption.

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2566 [937, 2010] In her expanded working paper, Hamson states: “A monitoring body cannot be expected to give effect to a reservation it has found to be incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty. The result is the application of the treaty without the reservation, whether that is called ‘severance’ or disguised by the use of some other phrase, such as non-application” (see footnote 857 above, para. 59).
2568 [939, 2010] See above paragraph (11) of the commentary to this guideline.
2569 [940, 2010] Report on the practice of the treaty bodies with respect to reservations made to the core international human
In 2006, the working group on reservations, which was established to examine the practice of human rights treaty bodies, in that regard, noted that there were several potential consequences of a reservation that had been ruled invalid. It ultimately proposed the following recommendation No. 7:

... The consequence that applies in a particular situation depends on the intention of the State at the time it enters its reservation. This intention must be identified during a serious examination of the available information, with the presumption, which may be refuted, that the State would prefer to remain a party to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation, rather than being excluded.2570

According to the revised recommendation No. 7 of 2006 submitted by the working group on reservations established to examine the practice of human rights treaty bodies,2571 which the sixth inter-committee meeting of the human rights treaty bodies endorsed2572 in 2007:

As to the consequences of invalidity, the Working Group agrees with the proposal of the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission according to which an invalid reservation is to be considered null and void. It follows that a State will not be able to rely on such a reservation and, unless its contrary intention is incontrovertibly established, will remain a party to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation (emphasis added).

(30) The deciding factor is still clearly the intention of the State that is the author of the invalid reservation. Entry into force is no longer simply an automatic consequence of the nullity of a reservation, but rather a presumption. The Commission retained this position in the Guide to Practice since it offers a reasonable compromise between the underlying principle of treaty law — consent — and the potential to consider that the author of the invalid reservation is bound by the treaty without the benefit of the reservation.

(31) The phrase “the reserving State or the reserving international organization is considered a contracting State or contracting organization” was preferred by the Commission over that initially proposed by the Special Rapporteur, which provided that “the treaty applies to the reserving State...
or to the reserving international organization, notwithstanding the reservation”, 2573 in order to indicate clearly that the guideline states a mere presumption and does not have the incontrovertible nature of a rule. The word “unless” has the same function.

(32) There may, however, be doubts as to which way the presumption should be expressed; intellectually, the presumption might just as well be in the sense of an intention that the treaty should enter into force or, the reverse, that the author of the reservation did not intend it to enter into force.

(33) A negative presumption — refusing to consider the author of the reservation to be a contracting State or contracting organization until an intention to the contrary has been established — might, at first glance, appear to reflect better the principle of consent according to which, in the words of the International Court of Justice, “in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent”.2574 From this point of view, a State or international organization that has formulated a reservation — even though it is invalid — has, in fact, expressed its disagreement with the provision or provisions which the reservation purports to modify or the legal effect of which it purports to exclude. In its observations on general comment No. 24, the United Kingdom states that it is “hardly feasible to try to hold a State to obligations under the Covenant which it self-evidently has not ‘expressly recognized’ but rather has indicated its express unwillingness to accept”.2575 From that point of view, no agreement to the contrary can be noted or presumed unless the State or organization in question consents, or at least acquiesces, to be bound by the provision or provisions without benefit of its reservation.

(34) The reverse — positive — presumption has, however, several advantages which, regardless of any consideration of desirability, argue in its favour even though this rule is not established in the Vienna Conventions2576 and is probably not a rule of customary international law.2577 However, the decisions of the human rights courts, the positions taken by the human rights treaty bodies and the increasing body of State practice in this area should not be ignored.

2576 [947, 2010] As noted above in the introduction to section 4.5 of the Guide to Practice, the Vienna Conventions do not address the issue of invalid reservations; see above, paras. (1) to (18) of the general commentary to section 4.5.
(35) First and foremost, it should be borne in mind that the author of the reservation, by definition, wished to become a contracting party to the treaty in question. The reservation is formulated when the State or international organization expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty, thereby conveying its intention to enter the privileged circle of parties and committing itself to implementation of the treaty. The reservation certainly plays a role in this process; for the purposes of establishing the presumption, however, its importance should not be overestimated.

(36) Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, it is certainly wiser to presume that the author of the reservation is part of the circle of contracting States or contracting organizations in order to resolve the problems associated with the nullity of its reservation in the context of this privileged circle. In that regard, it must not be forgotten that, as the Commission has noted in its preliminary conclusions on reservations to normative multilateral treaties including human rights treaties,

in the event of inadmissibility of a reservation, it is the reserving State that has the responsibility for taking action. This action may consist, for example, in the State’s either modifying its reservation so as to eliminate the inadmissibility, or withdrawing its reservation, or forgoing becoming a party to the treaty.

To that end, as stressed at the fourth inter-committee meeting of the human rights treaty bodies and the seventeenth meeting of chairpersons of these bodies, “human rights treaty bodies” — or any other mechanism established by the treaty or the parties to the treaty as a whole — “should be encouraged to continue their current practice of entering into a dialogue with reserving States, with a view to effecting such changes in the incompatible reservation as to make it compatible with the treaty”. Although this point of view was not shared by some members, the Commission considered that this goal may more readily be achieved if the reserving State or reserving international organization is deemed to be a party to the treaty.

(37) Moreover, presuming the entry into force of the treaty provides legal certainty. This presumption (which is rebuttable) can help resolve the uncertainty between the formulation of the reservation and the establishment of its nullity; during this entire period (which may last several
years),\textsuperscript{2581} the author of the reservation has conducted itself as a party and been deemed to be so by the other parties.

(38) In light of these considerations, the majority of the members of the Commission supports the idea of a rebuttable presumption, according to which the treaty would apply to a State or international organization that is the author of an invalid reservation, notwithstanding that reservation, in the absence of a contrary intention on the part of the author. In other words, if this basic condition is met (absence of a contrary intention on the part of the author of the reservation), the treaty is presumed to have entered into force for the author — provided that the treaty has entered into force in respect of the contracting States and contracting organizations — and the reservation has no legal effect on the content of the treaty,\textsuperscript{2582} which applies in its entirety.

(39) The expression “unless a contrary intention of the said State or organization can be identified”, which appears at the end of the first paragraph of guideline 4.5.2, reflects this positive presumption retained by the Commission subject to the intention of the reserving State or reserving international organization. If a contrary intention can be identified, the presumption falls away.\textsuperscript{2583}

(40) It was proposed to accord even greater weight to the will of the author of the reservation by including in guideline 4.5.2 a provision recommending that additional options be opened for the withdrawal from a treaty in the event that a reservation was found invalid, given that the Vienna Conventions do not contemplate that hypothesis. Although certain members of the Commission supported that proposal, the Commission rejected it. Granted, the Vienna Conventions do not indicate what rules to follow in the case of invalid reservations; but they do lay down precise rules concerning withdrawal from a treaty, and such a formulation (which had no precedent on which it could be based) would exceed the scope of the “law of reservations”. It would be difficult to reconcile that proposal with the text of article 42 of the Vienna Conventions, according to which “the withdrawal of a party may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention”. Articles 54 and 56 of the Vienna Conventions confirm this point.

\textsuperscript{2581}[952, 2010] In the absence of a pronouncement by a competent organ, that uncertainty may last indefinitely.

\textsuperscript{2582}[953, 2010] See paras. (14) to (17) of the commentary to guideline 4.5.1 above.

\textsuperscript{2583}[954, 2010] In English, the word “identified” was preferred over that of “established”, which seemed too rigid to certain members of the Commission. In addition, “established” seemed to reflect a greater degree of clarity than that provided by the non-exhaustive list of elements in the second paragraph.
In practice, determining the intention of the author of an invalid reservation may be a challenging process. It is not easy to establish what led a State or an international organization to express its consent to be bound by the treaty, on the one hand, and to attach a reservation to that expression of consent, on the other, since “the State alone could know the exact role of its reservation to its consent”. Since the basic presumption is rebuttable, however, it is vital to establish whether the author of the reservation would knowingly have ratified the treaty without the reservation or whether, on the contrary, it would have refrained from doing so.

Several factors come into play, which are listed in a non-exhaustive way in paragraph 2.

First, the text of the reservation itself may well contain elements that provide information about its author’s intention in the event that the reservation is invalid. At least, that is the case when reasons for the reservation are given as recommended in guideline 2.1.9 of the Guide to Practice. The reasons given for formulating a reservation, in addition to clarifying its meaning, may also make it possible to determine whether the reservation is deemed to be an essential condition for the author’s consent to be bound by the treaty. Any declaration made by the author of the reservation upon signing, ratifying or acceding to a treaty or making a notification of its succession thereto may also provide an indication. Any declaration made subsequently, particularly declarations that the author of the reservation may be required to make in the context of judicial proceedings concerning the validity, and the effects of the invalidity, of its reservation, should, however, be treated with caution.

The reactions of other States and international organizations must also be taken into account. Although these reactions obviously cannot, in themselves, produce legal effects by neutralizing the nullity of the reservation, they can facilitate an assessment of the author’s intention or, more accurately, the risk that it may intentionally have run in formulating an invalid reservation. This is particularly well illustrated by the European Court of Human Rights in the Loizidou case; the Court,
citing case law established before Turkey formulated its reservation, as well as the objections made by several States parties to the Convention, concluded that:

The subsequent reaction of various Contracting Parties to the Turkish declarations ... lends convincing support to the above observation concerning Turkey’s awareness of the legal position. That she, against this background, subsequently filed declarations under both Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46) — the latter subsequent to the statements by the Contracting Parties referred to above — indicates a willingness on her part to run the risk that the limitation clauses at issue would be declared invalid by the Convention institutions without affecting the validity of the declarations themselves.

(45) In line with the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment in the Belilos case, it is also advisable to take into consideration the author’s subsequent conduct with respect to the treaty. The representatives of Switzerland, by their actions and their statements before the Court, left no doubt that Switzerland would regard itself as bound by the European Convention even in the event that its interpretative declaration was deemed invalid. Moreover, as Schabas pointed out in relation to the reservations to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights made by the United States of America:

Certain aspects of the U.S. practice lend weight to the argument that its general intent is to be bound by the Covenant, whatever the outcome of litigation concerning the legality of the reservation. It is useful to recall that Washington fully participated in the drafting of the American Convention whose provisions are very similar to articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant and were in fact inspired by them. … Although briefly questioning the juvenile death penalty and the exclusion of political crimes, [the U.S. representative] did not object in substance to the provisions dealing with the death penalty or torture. The United States signed the American Convention on June 1, 1977 without reservation.

Although caution is certainly warranted when making comparisons between different treaties owing to the relative effect of any reservation, it is possible to refer to the prior attitude of the reserving

2588 Ibid., para. 95.
2589 See paras. (23) to (25) above.
2590 W.A. Schabas, op. cit., footnote 934 above, p. 322 (footnotes omitted).
State with regard to provisions similar to those to which the reservation relates. If a State consistently and systematically excludes the legal effect of a particular obligation contained in several instruments, such practice could certainly constitute significant proof that the author of the reservation does not wish to be bound by that obligation under any circumstances.

(46) In addition to the actual text of the reservation and the reasons given for its formulation, as well as these circumstantial and contextual elements, the content and context of the provision or provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates, on the one hand, and the object and purpose of the treaty, on the other, must also be taken into account. As mentioned above, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have paid considerable attention to the “special character” of the treaty in question; there is no reason to limit these considerations to human rights treaties, which do not constitute a specific category of treaty for the purposes of applying rules relating to reservations and are not the only treaties to establish “higher common values”. Some members of the Commission, however, considered that the nature of the treaty should have been explicitly included, as an element of the object and purpose, in the list of factors to be taken into account when determining the intent of the author of the reservation.

(47) The combination of these factors — and of others, where appropriate — should serve as a guide to the authorities required to issue a ruling on the consequences of the nullity of an invalid reservation, given that this list is by no means exhaustive and that all elements that are likely to identify the intention of the author of the reservation must be taken into consideration. A reference to the non-exhaustive nature of this list appears twice in the chapeau of the second paragraph of guideline 4.5.2: in the expression “all factors that may be relevant to that end” and the term “including”. In turn, the phrase “to that end” underscores the fact that only factors relevant to identifying the intention of the author of the reservation are to be taken into consideration.

(48) The order in which the various factors are listed reflects the logical order in which they are taken into consideration but has no particular significance with regard to their relative importance;

\[\text{[962, 2010]}\] See para. (27) above.

\[\text{[963, 2010]}\] See the second report on reservations to treaties (A/CN.4/477 and Add.1), paras. 55–260; Yearbook ... 1996, vol. II, Part One, pp. 52–83; and the Commission’s Preliminary Conclusions on reservations to normative multilateral treaties including human rights treaties (Yearbook ... 1997, vol. II, Part Two, para. 157, pp. 56–57). For that reason, the Commission did not, despite a contrary view, expressly mention the nature of the treaty in question as one of the factors listed in the second paragraph of guidelines 4.5.2 to be taken into consideration in identifying the intention of the author of the reservation – especially since it was observed that that criterion was not easy to distinguish from the object and purpose of the treaty.
the latter depends on the specific circumstances of each situation. The factors contained in the first four bullet points relate directly to the reservation and to the attitude towards the reservation of the State or international organization concerned; the last two factors, which are more general in nature, relate to the subject of the reservation.

(49) That said, the Commission is of the view that the establishment of such a presumption should not be taken as approval of what are now generally called objections with “super-maximum” effect. Certainly, the result of the presumption may ultimately be the same as the intended result of such objections. But whereas an objection with “super-maximum” effect apparently purports to require that the author of the reservation should be bound by the treaty without the benefit of its reservation simply because the reservation is invalid, the presumption embodied in guideline 4.5.2 is based on the intention of the author of the reservation. Although this intention may be hypothetical if not expressly indicated by the author, it is understood that nothing prevents the author from making its true intention known to the other contracting parties. Thus, the requirement that the treaty must be implemented in its entirety would derive not from a subjective assessment by another contracting party, but solely from the nullity of the reservation and the intention of its author. An objection, whether simple or with “super-maximum” effect, cannot produce such an effect. “No State can be bound by contractual obligations it does not consider suitable”\(^{2593}\) neither the objecting State nor the reserving State, although such considerations clearly do not mean that the practice has no significance.\(^{2594}\)

(50) Draft guideline 4.5.2 intentionally refrains from establishing the date on which the treaty enters into force in such a situation. In most cases, this is subject to specific conditions established in the treaty itself.\(^{2595}\) The specific effects, including the date on which the treaty enters into force for the author of the invalid reservation, are therefore determined by the relevant provisions of the treaty or, failing any such provision, by treaty law\(^{2596}\) in general and are not derived specifically from the rules concerning reservations.

\(^{2593}\) See paras. (20) to (28) of the commentary to guideline 4.5.1 above.

\(^{2594}\) See art. 24, para. 1, of the 1969 Vienna Convention states: “A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the negotiating States may agree.”

\(^{2595}\) See art. 24, paras. 2 and 3, of the 1969 Vienna Convention. These paragraphs state:
4.5.3 [4.5.4] Reactions to an invalid reservation

The nullity of an invalid reservation does not depend on the objection or the acceptance by a contracting State or a contracting organization.

Nevertheless, a State or an international organization which considers that the reservation is invalid should, if it deems it appropriate, formulate a reasoned objection as soon as possible.

Commentary

(1) The first paragraph of guideline 4.5.3 is essentially a reminder — which it was considered desirable to include in Part 4 of the Guide to Practice — of a fundamental principle embodied in several previous guidelines, according to which the nullity of an invalid reservation depends on the reservation itself and not on the reactions it may elicit. The second paragraph should be seen as a recommendation to States and international organizations that they should not, as a consequence, refrain from objecting to such a reservation, specifying the reasons why they consider the reservation to be invalid.

(2) The first paragraph of draft guideline 4.5.3 is perfectly consistent with guideline 3.1 (which reproduces the text of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions), guideline 3.3.2 and guideline 4.5.1. It illustrates what is meant by the term “void” included in draft guideline 4.5.1, by serving as a reminder that the nullity of an invalid reservation is based on objective factors and does not depend on the reaction of a contracting State or contracting organization other than the author of the reservation — in other words, as expressly indicated in the first paragraph, on their acceptance or their objection.

(3) In State practice, the vast majority of objections are based on the invalidity of the reservation to which the objection is made. But the authors of such objections draw very different conclusions from them: some simply note that the reservation is invalid while others state that it is null and void.
and without legal effect. Sometimes (but very rarely), the author of the objection states that its objection precludes the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the reserving State; sometimes, on the other hand, it states that the treaty enters into force in its entirety in these same bilateral relations, and sometimes it remains silent on that point.2599

(4) The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice does not appear to be consistent on this point.2600 In its 1999 orders concerning the requests for provisional measures submitted by Yugoslavia against Spain and the United States of America, the Court simply considered that:

Whereas the Genocide Convention does not prohibit reservations; whereas Yugoslavia did not object to Spain’s reservation to article IX; and whereas the said reservation had the effect of excluding that article from the provisions of the Convention in force between the Parties (...).2601

The Court’s reasoning did not include any review of the validity of the reservation, apart from the observation that the 1948 Convention did not prohibit it. The only determining factor seems to have been the absence of an objection by the State concerned; this reflects the position which the Court had taken in 1951 but which had subsequently been superseded by the Vienna Convention, with which it is incompatible.2602

The object and purpose [of the treaty] (...) limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the...

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2599 [970, 2010] The reactions to the reservation formulated by Qatar upon acceding to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women illustrate virtually the full range of objections imaginable: while the 18 objections (including late ones made by Mexico and Portugal) all note that the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, one (that of Sweden) adds that it is “null and void”, and two others (those of Spain and the Netherlands) point out that the reservation does not produce any effect on the provisions of the Convention. Eight of these objections (those of Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Poland and Portugal) specify that the objections do not preclude the entry into force of the treaty, while 10 (those of Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden) consider that the treaty enters into force for Qatar without the reserving State being able to rely on its impermissible reservation. See Multilateral Treaties …, footnote 341 above, chap. IV.8.


2602 [973, 2010] See paras. (2) to (9) of the commentary to guideline 2.6.3.
reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation.2603

Nonetheless, in its order concerning the request for provisional measures in the case of *Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)*, the Court modified its approach by considering *in limine* the permissibility of Rwanda’s reservation:

That reservation does not bear on the substance of the law, but only on the Court’s jurisdiction; … it therefore does not appear contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.2604

And in its judgment on the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the application, the Court confirmed that:

Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention bears on the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect substantive obligations relating to acts of genocide themselves under that Convention. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot conclude that the reservation of Rwanda in question, which is meant to exclude a particular method of settling a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, is to be regarded as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.2605

The Court thus “added its own assessment as to the compatibility of Rwanda’s reservation with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention”.2606 Even though an objection by the Democratic Republic of the Congo was not required in order to assess the validity of the reservation, the Court found it necessary to add:

As a matter of the law of treaties, when Rwanda acceded to the Genocide Convention and made the reservation in question, the DRC made no objection to it.2607

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(5) This clarification is not superfluous. Indeed, although an objection to a reservation does not
determine the validity of the reservation as such, it is an important element to be considered by all
actors involved – the author of the reservation, the contracting States and contracting organizations,
and any body with competence to assess the validity of a reservation. Nonetheless, it should be
borne in mind that, as the Court indicated in its 1951 advisory opinion:

each State which is a party to the Convention is entitled to appraise the validity of the
reservation and it exercises this right individually and from its own standpoint.\textsuperscript{2608}

(6) The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the \textit{Loizidou} case also attaches great
importance to the reactions of States parties as an important element to be considered in assessing
the validity of Turkey’s reservation.\textsuperscript{2609} The Human Rights Committee confirmed this approach in
its general comment No. 24:

The absence of protest by States cannot imply that a reservation is either compatible or
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant (...). However, an objection to a
reservation made by States may provide some guidance to the Committee in its interpretation
as to its compatibility with the object and purpose of the Covenant.\textsuperscript{2610}

(7) During consideration of the report of the Commission on the work of its fifty-seventh session
in 2005 (A/60/10), Sweden, replying to the Commission’s question regarding “minimum effect”
objections based on the incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the
treaty,\textsuperscript{2611} expressly maintained this position:

Theoretically, an objection was not necessary in order to establish that fact but was merely a
way of calling attention to it. The objection therefore had no real legal effect of its own and
did not even have to be seen as an objection ... . However, in the absence of a body that could

\textsuperscript{2608} Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 26. See also the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the effect of
reservations on the entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights, OC-2/82, 24 September 1982, Series A, No. 2,
para. 38 (“The States Parties have a legitimate interest, of course, in barring reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Convention. They are free to assert that interest through the adjudicatory and advisory machinery established by the
Convention”).

\textsuperscript{2609} See para. 95 of the judgment of the European Court and para. (8) of the commentary to guideline 4.5.2
above.


\textsuperscript{2611} Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/60/10), para. 29.
authoritatively classify a reservation as invalid, such as the European Court of Human Rights, such “objections” still served an important purpose.\textsuperscript{2612}

(8) As established above,\textsuperscript{2613} the Vienna Conventions do not contain any rule concerning the effects of reservations that do not meet the conditions of permissibility set out in article 19, or — as a logical consequence thereof — concerning the potential reactions of States to such reservations. Under the Vienna regime, an objection is not an instrument by which contracting States or organizations assess the validity of a reservation; rather, it renders the reservation inapplicable as against the author of the objection.\textsuperscript{2614} The acceptances and objections mentioned in article 20 concern only valid reservations. The mere fact that these same instruments are used in State practice to react to invalid reservations does not mean that these reactions produce the same effects or that they are subject to the same conditions as objections to valid reservations.

(9) In the opinion of the Commission, however, this is not a sufficient reason not to consider these reactions as true objections. Such a negative reaction is fully consistent with the definition of the term “objection” adopted by the Commission in guideline 2.6.1 and constitutes

a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international organization in response to a reservation to a treaty formulated by another State or international organization, whereby the former State or organization purports to exclude … the legal effects of the reservation, or to exclude the application of the treaty as a whole, in relations with the reserving State or organization.\textsuperscript{2615}

The mere fact that ultimately, it is not the objection that achieves the desired goal by depriving the reservation of effects, but rather the nullity of the reservation, does not change the goal sought by the objecting State or organization: to exclude all effects of the invalid reservation. Thus, it seems neither appropriate nor useful to create a new term for these reactions to reservations, since the current term not only corresponds to the definition of “objection” adopted by the Commission but is used extensively in State practice and, it would appear, is universally accepted and understood.

\textsuperscript{2612} [983, 2010] A/C.6/60/SR.14, para. 22.
\textsuperscript{2613} [984, 2010] See paras. (1) to (18) of the general commentary to section 4.5.
\textsuperscript{2614} [985, 2010] See paras. (2) to (5) of the commentary of guideline 4.3.
\textsuperscript{2615} [986, 2010] For the full text of guideline 2.6.1 (Definition of objections to reservations) and the commentary thereto, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/60/10), pp. 186-202.
(10) Moreover, although an objection to an invalid reservation adds nothing to the nullity of the reservation, it is undoubtedly a prime instrument both for initiating the reservations dialogue and for bringing the matter to the attention of treaty bodies and international and domestic courts when they are called upon, as appropriate, to assess the validity of a reservation. Consequently, it would not be advisable — and would, in fact, be misleading — simply to note in the Guide to Practice that an objection to an invalid reservation is without effect.

(11) On the contrary, it is vitally important for States to continue to formulate objections to reservations that they consider invalid, even though such declarations do not add anything to the effects arising *_ipso jure*_ and without any other condition from the invalidity of the reservation. This is all the more important as there are, in fact, only a few bodies that are competent to assess the validity of a contested reservation. As is usual in international law — in this area as in many others — the absence of an objective assessment mechanism remains the rule, and its existence the exception.2616 Hence, pending a very hypothetical intervention by an impartial third party, “each State establishes for itself its legal situation *vis-à-vis* other States” — including, of course, on the issue of reservations.2617

(12) States should not be discouraged from formulating objections to reservations that they consider invalid. On the contrary, in order to maintain stable treaty relations, they should be encouraged to do so and encouraged to provide, as far as possible, reasons for their position.2618 This is why draft guideline 4.5.3 not only sets out the principle that an objection to an invalid reservation does not, as such, produce effects; it also discourages any hasty inference, from the statement of that principle, that such an objection is futile.

(13) Indeed, it is in every respect very important for States and international organizations to formulate an objection, when they deem it justified, in order to state publicly their position on the invalidity of a reservation. Nevertheless, they do so on the basis merely of their power of appraisal, which is why the second paragraph of guideline 4.5.3 takes the form of a simple recommendation to

2616 [987, 2010] Judgment of 18 July 1966, *South West Africa Cases, Second Phase*, I.C.J. Reports 1966, para. 86: “In the international field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the last resort be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than the exception”.

States and international organizations, the purely optional nature of which is evidenced by the use of the conditional “should” and the expression “if it deems it appropriate”.

(14) Moreover, while it may be preferable, it is not indispensable\textsuperscript{2619} for these objections to be formulated within the time period of 12 months, or within any other time period set out in the treaty.\textsuperscript{2620} Although they have, as such, no legal effect on the reservation, such objections still serve an important purpose not only for the author of the reservation — which would be alerted to the doubts surrounding its validity — but also for the other contracting States or contracting organizations and for any authority that may be called upon to assess the validity of the reservation.

(15) This comment is not, however, to be taken as an encouragement to formulate late objections on the grounds that, even without the objection, the reservation is null and void and produces no effect. It is in the interests of the author of the reservation, the other contracting States and contracting organizations and, more generally, of a stable, clear legal situation, for objections to invalid reservations to be made and to be formulated as quickly as possible, so that the legal situation can be appraised rapidly by all the actors and the author of the reservation can potentially remedy the invalidity within the framework of the reservations dialogue. For this reason, the second paragraph of guideline 4.5.3 calls on States and organizations to formulate a reasoned objection “as soon as possible”.

### 4.6 Absence of effect of a reservation on the relations between the other parties to the treaty

A reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty \textit{inter se}.

\textsuperscript{2618} See guideline 2.6.10 (Statement of reasons), which recommends that the author of an objection to a reservation should indicate the reasons why it is being made. \textit{(Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10} (A/63/10), pp. 203–206).

\textsuperscript{2619} The Government of Italy, in its late objection to Botswana’s reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, explained: “The Government of the Italian Republic considers these reservations to be incompatible with the object and the purpose of the Covenant according to article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These reservations do not fall within the rule of article 20, paragraph 5, and can be objected to at any time” \textit{(Multilateral Treaties \ldots, footnote 341 above, chap. IV.4. See also Italy’s objection to the reservation of Qatar to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, formulated by Qatar (\textit{ibid.,} chap. IV.9); and the position expressed by Sweden in the Sixth Committee during consideration of the report of the Commission on the work of its fifty-seventh session (A/C.6/60/SR.14, para. 22)}.

\textsuperscript{2620} For other recent examples, see the objections of Portugal and Mexico to the reservation formulated by Qatar upon acceding to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women \textit{(Multilateral Treaties \ldots,}
Commentary

(1) Guideline 4.6 reproduces verbatim the text of article 21, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions (the wording of which is identical in the two Conventions).

(2) Pursuant to this provision, treaty relations between the parties to the treaty other than the author of the reservation are not affected by the reservation. This rule of the relativity of legal relations is designed to preserve the normative system applicable as between the other parties to the treaty. This is not necessarily the only regime, since the other parties may also make their consent subject to reservations which would then modify their mutual relations as envisaged in article 21, paragraphs 1 and 3. Like paragraph 2 of this article, the purpose of guideline 4.6 is not to prevent the multiplication of normative systems that could be established within the same treaty, but only to limit the effects of the reservation to the bilateral relations between its author, on the one hand, and each of the other parties, on the other.

(3) The scope of the guideline is not limited to “established” reservations — reservations that meet the requirements of articles 19, 20 and 23 — but this is not a drafting inconsistency. Indeed, the principle of the relativity of reservations applies irrespective of the reservation’s permissibility or formal validity. This is particularly obvious in the case of invalid reservations, which, owing to their nullity, are deprived of any effect — for the benefit of their authors and, of course, for the benefit or to the detriment of the other parties to the treaty.

(4) Furthermore, the acceptance of a reservation or objections to which it gives rise also have no bearing on the effects of the reservation beyond the bilateral relations between the author of the reservation and each of the other parties. Whether tacit or express, acceptance merely identifies the parties for whom the reservation is considered to be established — those which have accepted the reservation — in order to distinguish them from parties for whom the reservation does not produce any effect — those which have made an objection to the reservation. However, in relations

footnote 341 above, chap. IV.8. Both objections were made on 10 May 2010 (C.N.260.2010.TREATIES-16A and C.N.264.2010.TREATIES-16); Qatar’s instrument of accession was communicated by the Secretary-General on 8 May 2009.

2622 [993, 2010] It is not appropriate here to speak of a “contracting State” or “contracting organization”, as guideline 4.6 has no practical effect until the treaty has entered into force.
2623 [994, 2010] See guideline 4.1 above (“Establishment of a reservation with regard to another State or organization”) and the commentary thereto.
2624 [995, 2010] See paragraphs (14) to (28) of the commentary to guideline 4.5.1 above.
2625 [996, 2010] See guideline 4.1 above and the commentary thereto.
between all parties other than the author of the reservation, the reservation cannot modify or exclude the legal effects of one or more provisions of the treaty, or of the treaty as a whole, regardless of whether these States or organizations have accepted the reservation or objected to it.

(5) Although article 21, paragraph 2 (and hence guideline 4.6, which uses the same wording), does not contain any limitation or exception, it might be wondered whether the rule of the “relativity of legal relations” is as absolute as these provisions state.\textsuperscript{2626} In any case, Waldock made this point more cautiously in the annex to his first report, entitled “Historical summary of the question of reservations to multilateral conventions”: “in principle, a reservation only operates in the relations of States with the reserving State”.\textsuperscript{2627} This then raises the question of whether there are treaties to which the principle of relativity does not apply.

(6) The specific treaties referred to in article 20, paragraphs 2 and 3, are definitely not an exception to the relativity rule. It is true that the relativity of legal relations is, to some extent, limited in the case of these treaties, since by definition the reservation produces its effects in the relations between the author and all other parties; however, it has no effect with regard to the other States parties’ relations inter se, which remain unchanged.

(7) Although, in the case of treaties that must be applied in their entirety, the parties must all give their consent in order for the reservation to produce its effects, this unanimous consent does not, in itself, constitute a modification of the treaty itself as between the parties thereto. Here too, a distinction should therefore be made between two normative systems within the same treaty: the system governing relations between the author of the reservation and each of the other parties which have, by definition, all accepted the reservation, on the one hand, and the system governing relations between these other parties, on the other. The relations between the other parties remain unchanged.

(8) The same reasoning applies in the case of constituent instruments of international organizations. Although in this case the consent is not necessarily unanimous, it does not in any way modify the treaty relations between parties other than the author of the reservation. The

\textsuperscript{2626} Renata Szafarz maintains that “it is obvious, of course, that ‘the reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty inter se’” (op. cit., footnote 593 above, p. 311).

majority system simply imposes on the minority members the position of the majority in respect of the author of the reservation, precisely to avoid the establishment of multiple normative systems within the constituent instrument. But in this case, it is the acceptance of the reservation by the organ of the organization which generalizes the application of the reservation, and probably exclusively in the other parties’ relations with the reserving State or organization.

(9) Even in the event of unanimous acceptance of a reservation which is a priori invalid,\footnote{2628} it is not the reservation which has been “validated” by the consent of the parties that modifies the “general” normative system applicable as between the other parties. Granted, this normative system is modified insofar as the prohibition of the reservation is lifted or the object and purpose of the treaty are modified (or deemed to be modified) in order to make the reservation valid. Nonetheless, this modification of the treaty, which has implications for all the parties, arises not from the reservation, but from the unanimous consent of the States and organizations that are parties to the treaty, which is the basis of an agreement aimed at modifying the treaty in order to authorize the reservation within the meaning of article 39 of the Vienna Conventions.\footnote{2629}

(10) It should be noted, however, that the parties are still free to modify their treaty relations if they deem it necessary.\footnote{2630} This possibility may be deduced a contrario from the Commission’s commentary to draft article 19 of the 1966 draft articles on the law of treaties (which became article 21 of the 1969 Convention). In the commentary, the Commission stated that a reservation:

“does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties, \textit{inter se}, since they have not accepted it as a term of the treaty in their mutual relations.”\footnote{2631}

(11) Moreover, nothing prevents the parties from accepting the reservation as a real clause of the treaty (\textit{“negotiated reservations”}\footnote{2632}) or from changing any other provision of the treaty, if they deem it necessary. However, such modification can neither result automatically from acceptance of a reservation nor be presumed. The parties must follow the procedures set out for this purpose in the treaty or, in the absence thereof, the procedure established by articles 39 \textit{et seq.} of the Vienna Conventions. In fact, it may become necessary, if not indispensable, to modify the treaty in its

\footnote{2628} See guideline 3.3.3 above.\footnote{2629} See para. (1) of the commentary to guideline 3.3.3 above.\footnote{2630} F. Horn, footnote 321 above, pp. 142–143.\footnote{2631} Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 209, para. 1.\footnote{2632} See Yearbook ... 2000, vol. II, Part Two, p. 116, para. (11) of the commentary on guideline 1.1.8.
entirety. This depends, however, on the circumstances of each case and remains at the discretion of the parties. Consequently, it does not seem indispensable to provide for an exception to the principle established in article 21, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions. In addition, like all the guidelines in the Guide to Practice, guideline 4.6 should be construed to mean “without prejudice to any agreement reached between the parties as to its application”.

4.7 Effect of an interpretative declaration

Commentary

(1) Despite a long-standing and highly developed practice, neither the Vienna Convention of 1969 nor that of 1986 contains rules concerning interpretative declarations, much less the possible effects of such a declaration.

(2) The travaux préparatoires to the Conventions explain this absence. While the problem of interpretative declarations was completely overlooked by the first special rapporteurs, Waldock was aware both of the practical difficulties these declarations created, and of the solution, a very simple solution, required. Indeed, several Governments returned in their comments to the draft articles adopted on first reading, not just to the absence of interpretative declarations and the distinction that should be drawn between such declarations and reservations, but also to the elements to be taken into account when interpreting a treaty. In 1965, the Special Rapporteur

2633 [1004, 2010] Such a situation may occur, inter alia, in commodity treaties in which even the principle of reciprocity cannot restore the balance between the parties (H.G. Schermers, “The suitability of reservations to multilateral treaties”, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht, vol. VI, No. 4 (1959), p. 356). Article 64, paragraph 2 (c), of the 1968 International Sugar Agreement seemed to provide for the possibility of adapting provisions the application of which had been compromised by the reservation: “In any other instance where reservations are made [namely in cases where the reservation concerns the economic operation of the Agreement], the Council shall examine them and decide, by special vote, whether they are to be accepted and, if so, under what conditions. Such reservations shall become effective only after the Council has taken a decision on the matter” (emphasis added). See also P.-H. Imbert, footnote 522 above, p. 250; and F. Horn, footnote 321 above, pp. 142–143.


2635 [1006, 2010] Fitzmaurice limited himself to specifying that the term “reservation” “does not include mere statements as to how the State concerned proposes to implement the treaty, or declarations of understanding or interpretation, unless these imply a variation on the substantive terms or effect of the treaty” (first report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/101, Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, p. 110).

2636 [1007, 2010] In his definition of the term “reservation”, Waldock explained that “an explanatory statement or statement of intention or of understanding as to the meaning of the treaty, which does not amount to a variation in the legal effect of the treaty, does not constitute a reservation” (first report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/144, Yearbook ... 1962, vol. II, p. 37).

2637 [1008, 2010] See in particular the comments of the Japanese Government summarized in the fourth report on the law of treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock (A/CN.4/177 and Add.1 and 2, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 50) and the comment of the British Government that “article 18 deals only with reservations and assumes that the related question of statements of interpretation will be taken up in a later report” (ibid., p. 51).

2638 [1009, 2010] See the comments of the United States of America on draft articles 69 and 70 concerning interpretation,
made an effort to reassure those States by affirming that the question of interpretative declarations had not escaped the notice of the Commission. He continued:

Interpretative declarations, however, remained a problem, and possibly also statements of policy made in connection with a treaty. The question was what the effect of such declarations and statement should be. Some rules which touched the subject were contained in article 69, particularly its paragraph 3 on the subject of agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty and of the subsequent practice in its application. Article 70, which dealt with further means of interpretation, was also relevant.2639

(3) Contrary to the positions expressed by some members of the Commission,2640 the effect of an interpretative declaration “was governed by the rules on interpretation”.2641 Although “interpretative statements are certainly important, (...) it may be doubted whether they should be made the subject of specific provisions; for the legal significance of an interpretative statement must always depend on the particular circumstances in which it is made”.2642

(4) At the Vienna Conference of 1968–1969, the question of interpretative declarations was debated once again, in particular in connection with a Hungarian amendment to the definition of the term “reservation”2643 and to article 19 (which became article 21) concerning the effects of a reservation.2644 The effect of this amendment was to assimilate interpretative declarations to reservations, without making any distinction between the two categories, in particular with regard

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2640 [1011, 2010] See the comments of Mr. Verdross (Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 797th meeting, 8 June 1965, p. 151, para. 36, and 799th meeting, 10 June 1965, p. 166, para. 23) and Mr. Ago (ibid., 798th meeting, 9 June 1965, p. 162, para. 76). See also Mr. Castrén (ibid., 799th meeting, 10 June 1965, p. 166, para. 30) and Mr. Bartos (ibid., para. 29).
2641 [1012, 2010] Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 799th meeting, 10 June 1965, p. 165, para. 14. See also Sir Humphrey Waldock, Fourth report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/177 and Add.1 and 2, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. II, p. 49, para. 2 (“Statements of interpretation were not dealt with by the Commission in the present section for the simple reason that they are not reservations and appear to concern the interpretation rather than the conclusion of treaties”) (emphasis added).
2642 [1013, 2010] Ibid.
2643 [1014, 2010] A/CONF.39/1/L.23, in United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.39/11/Add.2), footnote 313 above, p. 112, para. 35 (vi) (e). The Hungarian delegation proposed the following text: “‘Reservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a multilateral treaty, whereby it purports to exclude, to vary or to interpret the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State” (emphasis in the original text).
to their respective effects. Several delegations were nevertheless clearly opposed to such an assimilation. Waldock, in his capacity as Expert Consultant, had

“issued a warning against the dangers of the addition of interpretative declarations to the concept of reservations. In practice, a State making an interpretative declaration usually did so because it did not want to become enmeshed in the network of the law on reservations”.

Consequently, he appealed

“to the Drafting Committee to bear the delicacy of the question in mind and not to regard the assimilation of interpretative declarations to reservations as an easy matter”.

In the end, the Drafting Committee had not retained the Hungarian amendment. Although Mr. Sepúlveda-Amor, on behalf of Mexico, had drawn attention to “the absence of a definition of the instrument envisaged in paragraph 2 (b) of article 27 [which became article 31]”, while “interpretative declarations of that type were common in practice” and suggested that “it was essential to set forth clearly the legal effects of such declarations, as distinct from those of actual reservations”, as none of the provisions of the Vienna Convention had been devoted specifically to interpretative declarations. Waldock’s conclusions regarding the effects of these declarations were thus confirmed by the work of the Conference.

(5) Neither the work of the Commission nor the Vienna Conference of 1986 have further elucidated the question of the concrete effects of an interpretative declaration.

(6) Here too, the Commission has found itself obliged to fill a gap in the Vienna Conventions, and has done so in section 4.7 of the Guide to Practice while endeavouring to remain within the logic of the Conventions and, in particular, of their articles 31 and 32 on the interpretation of treaties.

2645 [1016, 2010] See in particular the position of Australia (ibid. (A/CONF.39/11), 5th meeting, 29 March 1968, p. 29, para. 81), Sweden (ibid., p. 30, para. 102), the United States of America (ibid., 6th meeting, p. 31, para. 116) and the United Kingdom (ibid., 25th meeting, 16 April 1968, p. 137, para. 60).


2647 [1018, 2010] Ibid.

2648 [1019, 2010] Ibid., 21st meeting, 10 April 1968, p. 113, para. 62.

2649 [1020, 2010] Ibid.

2650 [1021, 2010] See para. (2) of this commentary above.
4.7.1 [4.7 and 4.7.1] Clarification of the terms of the treaty by an interpretative declaration

An interpretative declaration does not modify treaty obligations. It may only specify or clarify the meaning or scope which its author attributes to a treaty or to certain provisions thereof and may, as appropriate, constitute an element to be taken into account in interpreting the treaty in accordance with the general rule of interpretation of treaties.

In interpreting the treaty, account shall also be taken, as appropriate, of the approval of, or opposition to, the interpretative declaration, by other contracting States or contracting organizations.

Commentary

(1) The absence a specific provision in the Vienna Conventions concerning the legal effects of an interpretative declaration is likely to produce does not mean, however, that they contain no indications on that subject, as the comments made during their elaboration will show.

(2) As their name clearly indicates, their object and function consists in proposing an interpretation of the treaty. Consequently, in accordance with the definition retained by the Commission:

“Interpretative declaration” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions.

(3) Specifying or clarifying the provisions of a treaty is indeed to interpret it and, for this reason, the Commission used those terms to define interpretative declarations. Although, as the commentary to draft guideline 1.2 (Definition of interpretative declarations) makes clear, the definition “in no way prejudges the validity or the effect of such declarations”, it seems almost

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2651 [1022, 2010] See the introductory commentary to section 4.7 of the Guide to Practice above.
2652 [1023, 2010] See para. (2) of the introductory commentary to section 4.7 above.
2655 [1026, 2010] See the commentary to draft guideline 1.2 (Definition of interpretative declarations), ibid., p. 100–101, para. (18).
2656 [1027, 2010] Ibid., p. 103, para. (33) of the commentary.
obvious that the effect of an interpretative declaration is essentially produced through the highly complex process of interpretation.

(4) Before considering the role such a declaration may play in the interpretation process, it is important to specify the effect that it may definitely not produce. It is clear from the comparison between the definition of interpretative declarations and that of reservations that whereas the latter are intended to modify the legal effect of the treaty or exclude certain of its provisions as they apply to the author of the reservation, the former have no aim other than to specify or clarify its meaning. The author of an interpretative declaration does not seek to relieve itself of its international obligations under the treaty; it intends to give a particular meaning to those obligations. As Yaseen has clearly explained:

A State which formulated a reservation recognized that the treaty had, generally speaking, a certain force; but it wished to vary, restrict or extend one or several provisions of the treaty insofar as the reserving State itself was concerned.

A State making an interpretative declaration declared that, in its opinion, the treaty or one of its articles should be interpreted in a certain manner; it attached an objective and general value to that interpretation. In other words, it considered itself bound by the treaty and wished, as a matter of conscience, to express its opinion concerning the interpretation of the treaty.2657

(5) If the effect of an interpretative declaration consisted in modifying the treaty, it would actually constitute a reservation, not an interpretative declaration. The Commission’s commentary to article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of its 1966 draft articles describes this dialectic unequivocally:

States, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty, not infrequently make declarations as to their understanding of some matter or as to their interpretation of a particular provision. Such a declaration may be a mere clarification of the State’s position or it may amount to a reservation, according as it does or does not vary or exclude the application of the terms of the treaty as adopted.2658

2658 [1029, 2010] Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, p. 190, para. (11) of the commentary. See also Waldock’s explanations, Yearbook ... 1965, vol. I, 799th meeting, p. 165, para. 14 (“the crucial point was that, if the interpretative declaration constituted a reservation, its effect would be determined by reference to the provisions of articles 18 to 22. In that event, consent would operate, but in the form of rejection or acceptance of the reservation by other interested States. If, however, the declaration did not purport to vary the legal
(6) The International Court of Justice has also maintained that the interpretation of a treaty may not lead to its modification. As it held in its advisory opinion concerning *Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania*: “It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Treaties, not to revise them.”

(7) It may be deduced from the foregoing that an interpretative declaration may in no way modify the treaty provisions. Whether or not the interpretation is correct, its author remains bound by the treaty. This is certainly the intended meaning of the *dictum* of the European Commission of Human Rights in the *Belilos* case, in which the Commission held that an interpretative declaration:

may be taken into account when an article of the Convention is being interpreted; but if the Commission or the Court reached a different interpretation, the State concerned would be bound by that interpretation.

(8) In other words, a State (or an international organization) may not escape the risk of violating its international obligations by basing itself on an interpretation that it put forward unilaterally. In the case where the State’s interpretation does not correspond to the “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”,

the conduct adopted by the author of the declaration in the course of enforcing the treaty runs a serious risk of violating its treaty obligations.

(9) If a State or international organization has made its interpretation a condition for its agreement to be bound by the treaty, in the form of a conditional interpretative declaration within the meaning of guideline 1.2.1 (Definition of conditional interpretative declarations),

the situation is slightly different. Of course, if the interpretation proposed by the author of the declaration and the interpretation of the treaty given by an authorized third body are in

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2664 [1035, 2010] It is hardly likely that the “authentic” interpretation of the treaty (that is, the one agreed by all the parties) will differ significantly from that given by the author of the interpretative declaration: by definition, an authentic interpretation arises from the parties themselves. See Jean Salmon (ed.), *Dictionnaire de droit international public*, Bruylant, Brussels, 2001, p. 604: “An
agreement, there is no problem; the interpretative declaration remains merely interpretative and may play the same role in the process of interpreting the treaty as that of any other interpretative declaration. If, however, the interpretation given by the author of the interpretative declaration does not correspond to the interpretation of the treaty objectively established (following the rules of the Vienna Conventions) by an impartial third body, a problem arises: the author of the declaration does not intend to be bound by the treaty as it has thus been interpreted, but only by the treaty text as interpreted and applied in the manner which it has proposed. It has therefore made its consent to be bound by the treaty dependent upon a particular “interpretation” which — it is assumed — does not fall within the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. In this case — but in this case only — the conditional interpretative declaration must be equated to a reservation and may produce only the effects of a reservation, if the corresponding conditions have been met. This eventuality, which is not merely hypothetical, explains why such an interpretative declaration, although not intended under its terms to modify the treaty, must nonetheless be subject to the same legal regime that applies to reservations.\(^{2665}\) As has been emphasized:

> Since the declaring State is maintaining its interpretation regardless of the true interpretation of the treaty, it is purporting to exclude or to modify the terms of the treaty. Thus, the consequences attaching to the making of reservations should apply to such a declaration.\(^{2666}\)

(10) In cases of a simple interpretative declaration, however, the fact of proposing an interpretation which is not in accordance with the provisions of the treaty in no way changes the declaring State’s position with regard to the treaty. The State remains bound by it and must respect it. This position has also been confirmed by Professor McRae:

> The State has simply indicated its view of the interpretation of the treaty, which may or may not be the one that will be accepted in any arbitral or judicial proceedings. In offering this interpretation the State has not ruled out subsequent interpretative proceedings nor has it ruled

\(^{2665}\) [1036, 2010] See in particular sections 4.2 and 4.5 of the Guide to Practice.

\(^{2666}\) [1037, 2010] Donald M. McRae, footnote 1033 above, p. 161. See also Monika Heymann, footnote 423 above, pp. 147–148. Ms. Heymann thinks that a conditional interpretative declaration must be treated as a reservation only in the case where the treaty creates a competent body to provide an authentic interpretation. In other cases, she considers that the conditional interpretative declaration may never modify the treaty provisions (ibid., pp. 148–150).
out the possibility that its interpretation will be rejected. Provided, therefore, that the State
making the reservation still contemplates an ultimate official interpretation that could be at
variance with its own view, there is no reason for treating the interpretative declaration in the
same way as an attempt to modify or to vary the treaty.2667

(11) Although an interpretative declaration does not affect the normative force and binding
character of the obligations contained in the treaty, it may still produce legal effects or play a role in
the interpretation of the treaty. It has already been noted during the consideration of the validity of
interpretative declarations2668 that “on the basis of its sovereignty, every State has the right to
indicate its own understanding of the treaties to which it is party”.2669 This corresponds to a need:
those to whom a legal rule is addressed must necessarily interpret it in order to apply it and meet
their obligations.2670

(12) Interpretative declarations are above all an expression of the parties’ concept of their
international obligations under the treaty. They are a means of determining the intention of the
contracting States or contracting organizations with regard to their treaty obligations. It is in this
connection, as an element relating to the interpretation of the treaty, that case law2671 and doctrine
have affirmed the need to take into account interpretative declarations in the treaty process. McRae
puts it this way:

   In fact, it is here that the legal significance of an interpretative declaration lies, for it provides
   evidence of intention in the light of which the treaty is to be interpreted.2672

(13) Monika Heymann shares this view. She affirms, on the one hand, that an interpretation which
is not accepted or is accepted only by certain parties cannot constitute an element of interpretation
under article 31 of the Vienna Convention; on the other hand, she adds: “Das schließt aber nicht
aus, dass sie unter Umständen als Indiz für einen gemeinen Parteiwillen herangezogen werden

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2668 [1039, 2010] See para. (15) of the introductory commentary to guideline 3.5.
résolution du différend international”, in Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung: Völkerrecht, Europarecht, Staatsrecht:
können" [That does not exclude the possibility, however, that it may be used, under certain conditions, as an indication of the common intention of the parties].

(14) The French Constitutional Council shares this view and has clearly limited the object and role of an interpretative declaration by the French Government to the interpretation of the treaty alone: "Whereas, moreover, the French Government has accompanied its signature with an interpretative declaration in which it specifies the meaning and scope which it intends to give to the Charter or to some of its provisions with regard to the Constitution, such unilateral declaration shall have normative force only in that it constitutes an instrument connected with the treaty and may contribute, in the case of a dispute, to its interpretation."

(15) Draft guideline 4.7, paragraph 1, takes up these two ideas in order to clarify, on the one hand, that an interpretative declaration has no impact on the rights and obligations under the treaty and, on the other, that it produces its effects only in the process of interpretation.

(16) Because of the very nature of the operation of interpretation — which is a process, an art rather than an exact science — it is not possible in a general and abstract manner to determine the value of an interpretation other than by referring to the “general rule of interpretation” which is set out in article 31 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties and which cannot be called into question or “revisited” in the context of the present exercise. Therefore, in the Guide to Practice, the problem must necessarily be limited to the question of the authority of a proposed interpretation in an interpretative declaration and the question of its probative value for any third party interpreter, that is, its place and role in the process of interpretation.

(17) With regard to the first question — the authority of the interpretation proposed by the author of an interpretative declaration — it should be remembered that, according to the definition of interpretative declarations, they are unilateral statements. The interpretation which such a statement proposes, therefore, is itself only a unilateral interpretation which, as such, has no

2676 [1047, 2010] See paras. (13) and (14) of the commentary to guideline 3.5.
2677 [1048, 2010] This is the reason why the final phrase in paragraph 1 of guideline 4.7.1, recalling the title of article 31 of the Vienna Conventions, refers to “the general rule of interpretation of treaties”, without going into detail on its complex ramifications.
particular value and certainly cannot, as such, bind the other parties to the treaty. This common-sense principle was affirmed as far back as Vattel:

Neither the one nor the other of the parties interested in the contract has a right to interpret the deed or treaty according to his own fancy.2679

(18) During the discussion on draft article 70 (which became article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention) containing the general rule of interpretation, Mr. Rosenne expressed the view:

that a situation might arise where, for instance, there might be a unilateral understanding on the meaning of a treaty by the United States Senate that was not always accepted by the other side. A purely unilateral interpretative statement of that kind made in connection with the conclusion of a treaty could not bind the parties.2680

(19) The Appellate Body of the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization has expressed the same idea as follows:

The purpose of treaty interpretation under article 31 of the Vienna Convention is to ascertain the common intentions of the parties. These common intentions cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjective and unilaterally determined “expectations” of one of the parties to a treaty.2681

(20) Since the declaration expresses only the unilateral intention of the author — or, if it has been approved by certain parties to the treaty, at best a shared intention2682 — it certainly cannot be given an objective value that is applicable erga omnes, much less the value of an authentic interpretation

2682 [1053, 2010] Monika Heymann has explained in this regard: “Wird eine einfache Interpretationserklärung nur von einem Teil der Vertragsparteien angenommen, ist die interpretation partagée kein selbständiger Auslegungsfaktor im Sinne der [Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention]. Dies liegt daran, dass bei der Auslegung eines Vertrags die Absichten aller Vertragsparteien zu berücksichtigen sind und die interpretation partagée immer nur den Willen einer mehr oder weniger großen Gruppe von Vertragsparteien zum Ausdruck bringt” Einseitige Interpretationserklärungen zu multilateralen Verträgen (op. cit., footnote 423 above, p. 135, footnote omitted). [If a mere interpretative declaration is accepted by only some of the contracting parties, the shared interpretation does not constitute an autonomous factor in interpretation within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This is because, when the treaty is interpreted, the intentions of the parties must be taken into account while the shared interpretation expresses only the will of a more or less large group of the contracting parties.]
accepted by all parties. Although it does not determine the meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty, it nonetheless affects the process of interpretation to some extent.

(21) However, it is difficult to determine precisely on what basis an interpretative declaration would be considered an element in interpretation under articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conventions. Already Waldock, in a particularly prudent manner, had left open a certain doubt on the question:

Statements of interpretation were not dealt with by the Commission in the present action for the simple reason that they are not reservations and appear to concern the interpretation rather than the conclusion of treaties. In short, they appear rather to fall under articles 69–71. These articles provide that the “context of the treaty, for the purposes of its interpretation”, is to be understood as comprising “any agreement or instrument related to the treaty and reached or drawn up in connection with its conclusion” (art. 69, para. 2); that “any agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty” and “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which clearly establishes the understanding of all the parties regarding its interpretation” are to be taken into account “together with the context” of the treaty for the purposes of its interpretation (art. 69, para. 3); that as “further means of interpretation” recourse may be had, inter alia, to the “preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion” (art. 70); and that a meaning other than its ordinary meaning may be given to a term if it is established conclusively that the parties intended the term to have that special meaning. Any of these provisions may come into play in appreciating the legal effect of an interpretative declaration in a given case. ... In the view of the Special Rapporteur the Commission was entirely correct in deciding that the matter belongs under articles 69–71 rather than under the present section.

(22) Whether interpretative declarations are regarded as one of the elements to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the treaty essentially depends on the context of the declaration and the assent of the other States parties. But it is particularly noteworthy that, in 1966, the Special Rapporteur very clearly refused to include unilateral declarations or agreements inter

2683 [1054, 2010] On this case, see guideline 4.7.3 and the commentary thereto below.
partes in the “context”, even though the United States had suggested doing so by means of an amendment. The Special Rapporteur explained that only a degree of assent by the other parties to the treaty would have made it possible to include declarations or agreements inter partes in the interpretative context:

As to the substance of paragraph 2, ... the suggestion of the United States Government that it should be made clear whether the “context” includes (1) a unilateral document and (2) a document on which several but not all of the parties to a multilateral instrument have agreed raises problems both of substance and of drafting which the Commission was aware of in 1964 but did not find it easy to solve at the sixteenth session. ... But it would seem clear on principle that a unilateral document cannot be regarded as part of the “context” for the purpose of interpreting a treaty, unless its relevance for the interpretation of the treaty or for determining the conditions of the particular State’s acceptance of the treaty is acquiesced in by the other parties. Similarly, in the case of a document emanating from a group of the parties to a multilateral treaty, principle would seem to indicate that the relevance of the document in connection with the treaty must be acquiesced in by the other parties. Whether a “unilateral” or a “group” document forms part of the context depends on the particular circumstances of each case, and the Special Rapporteur does not think it advisable that the Commission should try to do more than state the essential point of the principle – the need for express or implied assent.2685

(23) Mr. Sapienza also concludes that interpretative declarations which have not been approved by the other parties do not fall under article 31, paragraph 2 (b), of the Vienna Conventions:

In primo luogo, ci si potrebbe chiedere quale significato debba attribuirsi all’espressione “accepté par les autres parties en tant qu’instrument ayant rapport au traité”. Deve intendersi nel senso che l’assenso delle altre parti debba limitarsi al fatto che lo strumento in questione possa ritenersi relativo al trattato o, invece, nel senso che debba estendersi anche al contenuto dell’interpretazione? Ci pare che l’alternativa non abbia, in realtà, motivo di porsi, dato che il paragrafo 2 afferma che dei documenti in questione si terrà conto “ai fini dell’interpretazione”. Dunque, l’accettazione delle altre parti nei confronti degli strumenti di

cui alla lettera (b) non potrà che essere un consenso a che l’interpretazione contenuta nella dichiarazione venga utilizzata nella ricostruzione del contenuto normativo delle disposizioni convenzionali cui afferisce, anche nei confronti degli altri Stati.2686

[First, it could be asked what meaning should be given to the phrase “accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty”. Does it mean that the assent of the other parties should be limited to the fact that the instrument in question could be considered to be related to the treaty or, rather, should it also cover the content of the interpretation? It seems that, in fact, the alternative should not be considered, since paragraph 2 states that the instruments in question will be taken into account “for the purpose of the interpretation”. Consequently, acceptance by the other parties of the instruments referred to in subparagraph (b) can only be consent to the use of the interpretation contained in the declaration for the reconstruction of the normative content of the treaty provisions in question, even with respect to other States.]

(24) Nonetheless, although at first glance such interpretative declarations do not seem to fall under articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conventions, they still constitute the (unilateral) expression of the intention of one of the parties to the treaty and may, on that basis, play a role in the process of interpretation.

(25) In its advisory opinion on the International status of South-West Africa, the International Court of Justice noted, on the subject of the declarations of the Union of South Africa regarding its international obligations under the Mandate:

These declarations constitute recognition by the Union Government of the continuance of its obligations under the Mandate and not a mere indication of the future conduct of that Government. Interpretations placed upon legal instruments by the parties to them, though not conclusive as to their meaning, have considerable probative value when they contain recognition by a party of its own obligations under an instrument. In this case the declarations of the Union of South Africa support the conclusions already reached by the Court.2687

2686 [1057, 2010] Rosario Sapienza, Dichiarazioni interpretative unilaterali e trattati internazionali (Milan: Giuffrè, 1996), pp. 239–240. See also Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. I, 1992, p. 1268 (“An interpretation agreed between some only of the parties to a multilateral treaty may, however, not be conclusive, since the interests and intentions of the other parties may have to be taken into consideration”).

(26) The Court thus specified that declarations by States relating to their international obligations have “probative value” for the interpretation of the terms of the legal instruments to which they relate, but that they corroborate or “support” an interpretation that has already been determined by other methods. In this sense, an interpretative declaration may therefore confirm an interpretation that is based on the objective factors listed in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conventions.

(27) In the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine),2688 the Court was again seised with the question as to the value of an interpretative declaration. In signing and ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Romania formulated the following interpretative declaration:

“Romania states that according to the requirements of equity as it results from Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the uninhabited islands without economic life can in no way affect the delimitation of the maritime spaces belonging to the mainland coasts of the coastal States.”2689

In its Judgment, however, the Court paid little attention to the Romanian declaration, merely noting the following:

“Finally, regarding Romania’s declaration [...], the Court observes that under Article 310 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a State is not precluded from making declarations and statements when signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention, provided these do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in their application to the State which has made a declaration or statement. The Court will therefore apply the relevant provisions of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as interpreted in its jurisprudence, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. Romania’s declaration as such has no bearing on the Court’s interpretation.”2690

(28) The wording is rather peremptory and seems to cast serious doubt on the utility of interpretative declarations. It seems to suggest that the declaration has “no bearing” on the

interpretation of the provisions of the Montego Bay Convention that the Court has been asked to give. However, the use of the expression “as such” allows one to shade this radical observation: while the Court does not consider itself bound by the unilateral interpretation proposed by Romania, that does not preclude the unilateral interpretation from having an effect as a means of proof or a piece of information that might corroborate the Court’s interpretation “in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”.

(29) The Strasbourg Court took a similar approach. After the European Commission of Human Rights, which had already affirmed that an interpretative declaration “may be taken into account when an article of the Convention is being interpreted”2691 the Court chose to take the same approach in the case of Krombach v. France: interpretative declarations may confirm an interpretation derived on the basis of sound practice. Thus, in order to respond to the question of knowing whether the higher court in a criminal case may be limited to a review of points of law, the Court first examined State practice, then its own jurisprudence, in the matter and ultimately cited a French interpretative declaration:

“The Court reiterates that the Contracting States dispose in principle of a wide margin of appreciation to determine how the right secured by Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention is to be exercised. Thus, the review by a higher court of a conviction or sentence may concern both points of fact and points of law or be confined solely to points of law. Furthermore, in certain countries, a defendant wishing to appeal may sometimes be required to seek permission to do so. However, any restrictions contained in domestic legislation on the right to a review mentioned in that provision must, by analogy with the right of access to a court embodied in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, pursue a legitimate aim and not infringe the very essence of that right (see Haser v. Switzerland (dec.), No. 33050/96, 27 April 2000, unreported). This rule is in itself consistent with the exception authorized by paragraph 2 of Article 2 and is backed up by the French declaration regarding the interpretation of the Article, which reads: ‘... in accordance with the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 1, the review

2691 See footnote 1031 above.
by a higher court may be limited to a control of the application of the law, such as an appeal to the Supreme Court.” 2692

(30) States also put forward their interpretative declarations in these minor tones. Thus, the argument by the Agent for the United States in the case concerning *Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)* was tangentially based on the interpretative declaration made by the United States in order to demonstrate that the specific *mens rea* is an essential element of the qualification of genocide:

“[T]he need for a demonstration in such circumstances of the specific intent required by the Convention was made abundantly clear by the United States Understanding at the time of the United States ratification of the Convention. That Understanding provided that ‘acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by Article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this Convention’. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not object to this Understanding, and the Applicant made no attempt here to take issue with it.” 2693

(31) It is therefore clear from practice and doctrinal analyses that interpretative declarations come into play only as an auxiliary or complementary means of interpretation corroborating a meaning given by the terms of the treaty, considered in the light of its object and purpose. As such, they do not produce an autonomous effect: when they have an effect at all, interpretative declarations are associated with another instrument of interpretation, which they usually uphold.

(32) The interpreter can thus rely on interpretative declarations to confirm his conclusions regarding the interpretation of a treaty or a provision of it. Interpretative declarations constitute the expression of a subjective element of interpretation — the intention of one of the States parties — and, as such, may confirm “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. The phrase “as appropriate” that appears in both the first and second paragraphs of guideline 4.7.1 is meant to emphasize that interpretative declarations (and reactions to them) are taken into consideration on the basis of individual circumstances.


In that same vein, and as guideline 4.7.1, paragraph 2 stresses, the reactions (approval or opposition) that may have been expressed with regard to the interpretative declaration by the other parties — all of them potential interpreters of the treaty as well — should also be taken into consideration. An interpretative declaration that was approved by one or more States certainly has greater value as evidence of the intention of the parties than an interpretative declaration to which there has been an opposition.

4.7.2 Effect of the modification or the withdrawal of an interpretative declaration in respect of its author

The modification or the withdrawal of an interpretative declaration may not produce the effects provided for in draft guideline 4.7.1 to the extent that other contracting States or contracting organizations have relied upon the initial declaration.

Commentary

(1) Despite the auxiliary role to which interpretative declarations are confined under guideline 4.7.1, it should be recalled that they are unilateral declarations expressing their author’s intention to accept a given interpretation of the provisions of the treaty. Accordingly, although the declaration in itself does not create rights and obligations for its author or for the other parties to the treaty, it may prevent its author from taking a position contrary to that expressed in its declaration. It does not matter whether or not this phenomenon is called estoppel; in any case it is a corollary of the principle of good faith, in the sense that, in its international relations, a State cannot “blow hot...
and cold”. It cannot declare that it interprets a given provision of the treaty in one way and then take the opposite position before a judge or international arbitrator, at least if the other parties have relied on it. As indicated by principle 10 of the Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations, adopted in 2006 by the International Law Commission:

“A unilateral declaration that has created legal obligations for the State making the declaration cannot be revoked arbitrarily. In assessing whether a revocation would be arbitrary, consideration should be given to:

[...] (b) the extent to which those to whom the obligations are owed have relied on such obligations;

(2) It cannot be deduced from the above that the author of an interpretative declaration is bound by the interpretation it puts forward – which might ultimately prove unfounded. The validity of the interpretation depends on other circumstances and can be assessed only under the rules governing the interpretation process. In this context, Bowett presents a sound analysis:

“The estoppel rests on the representation of fact, whereas the conduct of the parties in construing their respective rights and duties does not appear as a representation of fact so much as a representation of law. The interpretation of rights and duties of parties to a treaty, however, should lie ultimately with an impartial international tribunal and it would be wrong to allow the conduct of the parties in interpreting these rights and duties to become a binding interpretation on them.”

Derek Bowett explained more than a half-century ago, the raison d’être of estoppel lies in the principle of good faith: “The basis of the rule is the general principle of good faith and as such finds a place in many systems of law” (“Estoppel Before International Tribunals and its Relation to Acquiescence”, British Year Book of International Law, vol. 33 (1957), p. 176 (footnotes omitted)). See also Alain Pellet and James Crawford, “Aspects des modes continentaux et anglo-saxons de plaidoiries devant la C.I.J.”, in International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation-Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner (Leiden/Boston: Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 831–867.

See the Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations, adopted in 2006 by the International Law Commission, principle 10, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), p. 369. According to principle 10, the two other factors to be taken into account when assessing the arbitrary nature of a revocation are: “(a) Any specific terms of the declaration relating to revocation” and “(c) The extent to which there has been a fundamental change in the circumstances” (ibid., p. 380). Mutatis mutandis, these two factors may also be relevant to the implementation of guideline 4.7.2.

Bowett, footnote 1067 above, p. 189. See also McRae, footnote 1033 above, p. 168.
(3) It should be recalled that under draft guidelines 2.4.9 (Modification of an interpretative declaration) and 2.5.12 (Withdrawal of an interpretative declaration), the author of an interpretative declaration is free to modify or withdraw it at any time. Depending on the circumstances, the withdrawal or modification of an interpretative declaration may be of some relevance to the interpretation of the treaty to which it relates. However, the Commission decided not to make express mention of these two provisions because they relate to procedural rules, whereas guideline 4.7.2 is included in the section of the Guide to Practice concerning the effects of interpretative declarations.

(4) Like the author of an interpretative declaration, any State or international organization that has approved this declaration is bound by the same principles vis-à-vis the author of the declaration; it may modify or withdraw its approval at any time, provided that the author of the declaration (or third parties) have not relied on it.

(5) Moreover, despite its limited binding force, and since an interpretative declaration might constitute the basis for agreement on the interpretation of the treaty, it could also preclude such an agreement from being made. In this connection, Professor McRae noted:

“The ‘mere interpretative declaration’ serves notice of the position to be taken by the declaring State and may herald a potential dispute between that State and other contracting parties.”

4.7.3 Effect of an interpretative declaration approved by all the contracting States and contracting organizations

An interpretative declaration that has been approved by all the contracting States and contracting organizations may constitute an agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty.

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2699 [1070, 2010] This guideline reads as follows: “Unless the treaty provides that an interpretative declaration may be made or modified only at specified times, an interpretative declaration may be modified at any time” (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10), pp. 275–277).

2700 [1071, 2010] This guideline reads as follows: “An interpretative declaration may be withdrawn at any time, following the same procedure applicable to its formulation, by the authorities competent for that purpose” (ibid., Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10), pp. 278–280).


Commentary

(1) Acquiescence to an interpretative declaration by all the other parties to the treaty, however, radically alters the situation. Thus, in the International Law Commission, Waldock recalled that the Commission

“agreed that the relevance of statements of the parties for purposes of interpretation depended on whether they constituted an indication of common agreement by the parties. Acquiescence by the other parties was essential.”

(2) Unanimous agreement by all the parties therefore constitutes a genuine interpretative agreement which represents the will of the “masters of the treaty” and thus an authentic interpretation. One example is the unanimous approval by the contracting States to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact of the interpretative declaration of the United States of America concerning the right to self-defence.

(3) In this case, it is just as difficult to determine whether the interpretative agreement is part of the internal context (article 31, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Conventions) or the external context (art. 31, para. 3) of the treaty. The fact is that everything depends on the circumstances in which the declaration was formulated and in which it was approved by the other parties. Indeed, in a case where a declaration is made before the signature of the treaty and approved when (or before) all the parties have expressed their consent to be bound by it, the declaration and its unanimous approval, combined, give the appearance of an interpretative agreement that could be construed as being an “agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty” within the meaning of article 31, paragraph 2 (a) or as “any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty” within the meaning of paragraph 2 (b) of the same article. If, however, the interpretative agreement is reached only once the treaty has been concluded, a question might arise as to whether it is merely a “subsequent practice in the

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application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” within the meaning of article 31, paragraph 3 (b) or if, by virtue of their formal nature, the declaration and unanimous approval combined constitute a veritable “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” (art. 3 (a)).\(^{2707}\)

(4) Without really coming to a decision on the matter, the Commission wrote in its commentary to article 27 of its 1966 draft articles (which became article 31, paragraph 3 (a) of the 1969 Convention):

“A question of fact may sometimes arise as to whether an understanding reached during the negotiations concerning the meaning of a provision was or was not intended to constitute an agreed basis for its interpretation. But it is well settled that when an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision is established as having been reached before or at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, it is to be regarded as forming part of the treaty. Thus, in the *Ambatielos* case the Court said: ‘... the provisions of the Declaration are in the nature of an interpretation clause, and, as such, should be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty ...’ Similarly, an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of the treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties which must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation.”\(^{2708}\)

(5) The fact remains, however, depending on the circumstances — the lack of an automatic effect being indicated by the verb “may” in guideline 4.7.3 — the unanimous approval by the parties of an interpretative declaration made by one of them may constitute an agreement, and an agreement among the parties as to the interpretation of the treaty must be taken into consideration when interpreting the provisions to which it relates.

\(^{2707}\) [1078, 2010] In this regard, see, in particular, M. Heymann, footnote 423 above, p. 130.

\(^{2708}\) [1079, 2010] *Yearbook ... 1966*, vol. II, p. 221, para. (14) of the commentary (footnotes omitted).
5. Reservations, acceptances of and objections to reservations, and interpretative declarations in the case of succession of States

Commentary

(1) As the title suggests, Part 5 of the Guide to Practice deals with reservations, acceptances of and objections to reservations and interpretative declarations in the case of succession of States. Part 5 is organized in four sections entitled as follows:

- Reservations and succession of States (5.1)
- Objections to reservations and succession of States (5.2)
- Acceptances of reservations and succession of States (5.3)
- Interpretative declarations and succession of States (5.4)

(2) The inclusion of guidelines in this area in the Guide to Practice is all the more important given that:

- The 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions have no provisions on this subject except a safeguard clause, which, by definition, gives no indication as to the applicable rules.

- The 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties contains only one provision on reservations, namely article 20, which is worded as follows:

Article 20. Reservations

1. When a newly independent State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty by a notification of succession under article 17 or 18, it shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation.

2709 Article 73 of the 1969 Vienna Convention reads: “The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States...” A similar safeguard clause appears in article 74, para. 1, of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations.
2. When making a notification of succession establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty under article 17 or 18, a newly independent State may formulate a reservation unless the reservation is one the formulation of which would be excluded by the provisions of subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

3. When a newly independent State formulates a reservation in conformity with paragraph 2, the rules set out in articles 20 to 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply in respect of that reservation.

(3) Article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention scarcely deals with, much less solves, potential problems arising in connection with reservations in the case of succession of States. First, it should be noted that the article is contained in Part III of the Convention, which deals with “newly independent States”, within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of the Convention, that is, States arising from decolonization, whereas the question of the rules applicable in the case of the succession of States in respect of part of a territory, the uniting of States or the separation of States is left aside completely. Secondly, while article 20, paragraph 2, provides for the option of formulating new reservations by the newly independent State and while the effect of paragraph 3 is that third States may formulate objections in that event, it fails to stipulate whether the latter can object to a reservation being maintained. Lastly, article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention makes no reference whatever to succession in respect of objections to reservations — whereas the initial proposals of Waldock did deal with this point — and the reasons for this omission are not clear.

(4) The result is that while some of the guidelines of Part 5 reflect the state of positive international law on the subject, others represent the progressive development of international law or are intended to offer logical solutions to problems to which neither the 1978 Vienna Convention

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2711 Under article 2, para. 1 (f), of the 1978 Vienna Convention, “newly independent State” means a successor State the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible”.

2712 See para. (3) of the commentary to guideline 5.1.1 below.

nor the relevant practice seems to have provided clear answers thus far. In any event, as is generally the case, it is often difficult if not impossible to make a clear distinction between proposals that come under the heading of codification *stricto sensu*, on the one hand, and proposals aimed at progressive development, on the other.

(5) That said, this Part of the Guide to Practice is based on the rules and principles set out in the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of Treaties. In particular, it relies on the definition of succession of States given in that instrument. More generally, the guidelines of this part of the Guide use the same terminology as the 1978 Vienna Convention, attribute the same meaning to the terms and expressions used in that Convention and defined in its article 2 and are based, where applicable, on the distinctions made in that instrument among the various forms of succession of States, namely:

- “Succession in respect of part of territory” (art. 15)
- “Newly independent States” (art. 2, para. 1 (f) and arts. 16 et seq.)
- “Newly independent States formed from two or more territories” (art. 30)
- “Uniting of States” (arts. 31–33) and
- “Separation of parts of a State” (arts. 34–37)

(6) Moreover, Part 5 of the Guide to Practice starts from the premise that the question of a State’s succession to a treaty has been settled as a preliminary issue. This is the implication of the word “when”, which begins several of the guidelines of this part and refers to concepts that are considered as settled and need not be revisited by the Commission in dealing with this subject. By this logic, then, the point of departure is that a successor State has the status of a contracting State or State party to a treaty as a consequence of the succession of States, not because it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty within the meaning of article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969.

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2714 [1085, 2010] Art. 2, para. 1 (b): “‘Succession of States’ means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory”; see also art. 2, para. 1 (a), of the 8 April 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, or art. 2 (a) of the articles on the nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of States annexed to General Assembly resolution 55/153 of 12 December 2000.

2715 [1086, 2010] “The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”
Lastly, like the 1978 Vienna Convention, the guidelines of Part 5 of the Guide to Practice concern only reservations formulated by a predecessor State that was a contracting State or State party to the treaty in question as of the date of the succession of States. They do not deal with reservations formulated by a predecessor State that had only signed the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, without having completed the relevant action prior to the date of the succession of States. Reservations of this second kind cannot be considered as being maintained by the successor State because they did not, at the date of the succession of States, produce any legal effects, not having been formally confirmed by the State in question when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty, as required by article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.

5.1. Reservations and succession of States

5.1.1 Newly independent States

1. When a newly independent State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty by a notification of succession, it shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation.

2. When making a notification of succession establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty, a newly independent State may formulate a reservation unless the reservation is one the formulation of which would be excluded by the provisions of subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of guideline 3.1 of the Guide to Practice.

3. When a newly independent State formulates a reservation in conformity with paragraph 2, the relevant rules set out in Part 2 (Procedure) of the Guide to Practice apply in respect of that reservation.

2716 See article 20.
4. For the purposes of this Part of the Guide to Practice, “newly independent State” means a successor State the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 5.1.1 reproduces paragraphs 1 to 3 of article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. This provision relates only to a “newly independent State” within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of the Convention, namely a State that gains independence at the end of a decolonization process. The Commission decided to place this draft guideline first in Part 5 of the Guide to Practice, since it is based on the only provision of the 1978 Vienna Convention which deals with reservations in relation to succession of States.

(2) Paragraph 4 of this guideline, which has no equivalent in article 20 of the 1978 Convention, reproduces the definition of “newly independent State” set out in article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of that Convention. The definition was reproduced in the Guide to Practice to avoid any misunderstanding regarding the use of this expression, given the importance of the distinction between successor States with the status of newly independent States and other successor States in dealing with legal issues concerning reservations, objections to reservations, acceptances of reservations and

2718 [1089, 2010] See above, para. (2) of the general commentary to Part 5 of the Guide to Practice. See also the memorandum by the Secretariat (A/CN.4/616; see footnote 1081 above), para. 2. This limitation of the scope of article 20 to newly independent States is confirmed by the fact that at the 1977–1978 Vienna Conference, it was suggested that, with respect to other cases of succession, a provision regulating the issue of reservations should be included. The delegation of India, for example, pointed out that there was a gap in the Convention in that respect and, accordingly, a need to add an article on reservations to the part of the Convention which dealt with the uniting and separation of States (A/CONF.80/16, 28th meeting, para. 17). Meanwhile, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany proposed a new article 36 bis (A/CONF.80/16/Add.1, 43rd meeting, paras. 9–12) that provided in particular for the transposition, to the cases of succession referred to in part IV of the Convention, of the rules on reservations applicable to newly independent States:

1. When under articles 30, 31, 33 and 35 a treaty continues in force for a successor State or a successor State participates otherwise in a treaty not yet in force for the predecessor State, the successor State shall be considered as maintaining:
   (a) Any reservation to that treaty made by the predecessor State in regard to the territory to which the succession of States relates;

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the successor State may however:
   (a) Withdraw or modify, wholly or partly, the reservation (paragraph 1 subparagraph (a)) or formulate a new reservation, subject to the conditions laid down in the treaty and the rules set out in articles 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ...

(A/CONF.80/30, para. 118, reproduced in Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.80/16/Add.2)).
interpretative declarations in relation to the succession of States. This limitation of the scope of guideline 5.11 is reflected in its title (“Newly independent States”).

(3) The origin of the rules set out in article 20 of the 1978 Convention and reproduced in this guideline dates back to a proposal put forward in the third report of Waldock.2719 The report contained a draft article 9 on “Succession in respect of reservations to multilateral treaties”, its purpose being to determine the position of the successor State in regard to reservations, acceptances and objections. After enunciating certain “logical principles” and noting that the — still developing — practice of depositaries was not wholly consistent with them, the Special Rapporteur concluded “that a flexible and pragmatic approach to the problem of succession in respect of reservations is to be preferred”.2720 Concerning reservations, Waldock proposed that rules should be adopted to reflect:

- A presumption in favour of succession to the reservations of the predecessor State unless the successor State has expressed a contrary intention or unless, by reason of its object and purpose, the reservation is appropriate only to the predecessor State (art. 9, para. 1) and

- The possibility for the successor State to formulate new reservations, in which case: (i) the successor State is considered to have withdrawn any different reservations made by the predecessor State; and (ii) the provisions of the treaty itself and of the 1969 Vienna Convention apply to the reservations of the successor State (para. 2).2721

(4) Paragraph 1 of guideline 5.1.1 reproduces the rebuttable presumption enunciated in article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention that a newly independent State shall be considered as maintaining the reservations formulated by the predecessor State. While article 20, paragraph 1, of the Convention makes reference in this context to a newly independent State which establishes its status as a contracting State or a party to a multilateral treaty through a notification of succession under article 17 or 18 of this Convention,2722 reference to these articles was omitted in the text of

2720 [1091, 2010] Ibid., pp. 47 and 50, commentary, paras. (2) and (11).
2721 [1092, 2010] Ibid., p. 47.
2722 [1093, 2010] These provisions read as follows:

Article 17 – Participation in treaties in force at the date of the succession of States

1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, a newly independent State may, by a notification of succession, establish its status as a party to any multilateral treaty which at the date of the succession of States was in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates.
the guideline. Such a reference seemed unnecessary to the Commission given that the basic principle — the *modus operandi* — of the present report consists in postulating that the relevant rules of the 1978 Convention apply.

(5) First proposed by Waldock in his third report, this presumption was then endorsed by the Commission, despite the proposals put forward subsequently by some States (Australia, Belgium, Canada and Poland) to reverse the presumption; the proposals in question on this subject were neither followed up by the second Special Rapporteur, Sir Francis Vallat, nor subscribed to by the Commission.

(6) The presumption in favour of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations gave rise to little debate at the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, which met in Vienna from 4 April to 6 May 1977 and from 31 July to 23 August 1978. Even though some States again proposed that the presumption should be reversed having regard to the “clean slate” principle, the Committee of the Whole, and then the Conference itself, approved the

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2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the newly independent State would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.

3. When, under the terms of the treaty or by reason of the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of the treaty, the participation of any other State in the treaty must be considered as requiring the consent of all the parties, the newly independent State may establish its status as a party to the treaty only with such consent.

Article 18 – Participation in treaties not in force at the date of the succession of States

1. Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4, a newly independent State may, by a notification of succession, establish its status as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty which is not in force if at the date of the succession of States the predecessor State was a contracting State in respect of the territory to which that succession of States relates.

2. Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4, a newly independent State may, by a notification of succession, establish its status as a party to a multilateral treaty which enters into force after the date of the succession of States if at the date of the succession of States the predecessor State was a contracting State in respect of the territory to which that succession of States relates.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 do not apply if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the newly independent State would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.

4. When, under the terms of the treaty or by reason of the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of the treaty, the participation of any other State in the treaty must be considered as requiring the consent of all the parties or of all the contracting States, the newly independent State may establish its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty only with such consent.

5. When a treaty provides that a specified number of contracting States shall be necessary for its entry into force, a newly independent State which establishes its status as a contracting State to the treaty under paragraph 1 shall be counted as a contracting State for the purpose of that provision unless a different intention appears from the treaty, or is otherwise established.

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2723 [1094, 2010] See above, para. (3) of the commentary to this guideline.


2726 [1097, 2010] Thus, for example, at the 1977–1978 Vienna Conference, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania proposed an amendment reversing the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State and providing that the successor State was considered to have withdrawn reservations formulated by the predecessor State unless it expressed a contrary intention. (See *Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of*
article on reservations (which had become article 20) as proposed by the International Law Commission, apart from some very minor drafting adjustments,\textsuperscript{2727} and the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations was reflected in the final text of article 20 as adopted at the Vienna Conference.

(7) Such a presumption had already been proposed by Professor D.P. O’Connell, Rapporteur of the International Law Association on the topic “The Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of their Predecessors”,\textsuperscript{2728} one year before Waldock endorsed the concept.\textsuperscript{2729} It is based on a concern for respecting the actual intention of the successor State by avoiding the creation of an irreversible situation: “if a presumption in favour of maintaining reservations were not to be made, the actual intention of the successor State might be irrevocably defeated; whereas, if it were made and the presumption did not correspond to the successor State’s intention, the latter could always redress the matter by withdrawing the reservations”.\textsuperscript{2730}

(8) This solution is not self-evident and has been criticized in the literature. For example, according to Professor Pierre-Henri Imbert, “il n’y au une raison pour penser que l’État n’étudiera pas le texte de la convention avec suffisamment de soin, pour savoir exactement les réserves qu’il veut maintenir, abandonner ou formuler” [“… there is no reason to think that the State would not study the text of the convention carefully enough to know exactly which reservations it wished to...

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\textsuperscript{2727} [1098, 2010] Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 4 April–6 May 1977 and 31 July–23 August 1978, vol. I, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole [1977 session], A/CONF.80/16 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 78.V.8), 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 37; and A/CONF.80/14, para. 118 (c) (reproduced in Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.80/16/Add.2)). The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, who expressed a preference for a “clean slate” in regard to reservations and pointed out that reservations formulated by the predecessor State were not necessarily in the interest of the successor State. (A/CONF.80/16, 27th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 79). That amendment was rejected by 26 votes to 14, with 41 abstentions (A/CONF.80/16, 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 41). A preference for the opposite presumption had also been expressed by other delegations; see vol. I, 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 13 (Romania), para. 18 (India) and para. 33 (Kenya).

\textsuperscript{2728} [1099, 2010] “Additional point” No. 10 proposed by the Rapporteur of the Committee on “The Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of their Predecessors”, International Law Association, Buenos Aires Conference (1968), Interim Report of the Committee on the Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of their Predecessors, cited in Waldock’s second report on succession in respect of treaties, Yearbook ... 1969, vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.V.8), document A/CN.4/214 and Add.1-2, p. 49, para. 17: “A successor State can continue only the legal situation brought about as a result of its predecessor’s signature or ratification. Since a reservation delimits that legal situation it follows that the treaty is succeeded to (if at all) with the reservation.”

\textsuperscript{2729} [1100, 2010] See above, para. (3) of the commentary to this guideline.

\textsuperscript{2730} [1101, 2010] Third report (see footnote 1090 above), Yearbook ... 1970, vol. II, p. 50; see also the elements of practice invoked in support of this solution, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 47–49.
maintain, abandon or formulate”]. This author cast doubt in particular on the assumption that the predecessor State’s reservations would be “nécessairement avantageuses pour l’État nouvellement indépendant... [L]es réserves constituant des dérogations, des limitations aux engagements de l’État, elles ne devraient pas pouvoir être présumées. Il serait au contraire normal de partir du principe que, en l’absence d’une déclaration de volonté formelle de sa part, un État est lié par l’ensemble du traité” [“necessarily advantageous to the newly independent State.... Since reservations constitute derogations from or limitations on a State’s commitments, they should not be a matter of presumption. On the contrary, it makes more sense to assume that, in the absence of a formal statement of its intention, a State is bound by the treaty as a whole”].

(9) The commentary to draft article 19 as finally adopted by the Commission nonetheless puts forward some convincing arguments supporting the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State:

“First, the presumption of an intention to maintain the reservations was indicated by the very concept of succession to the predecessor’s treaties. Secondly, a State is in general not to be understood as having undertaken more onerous obligations unless it has unmistakably indicated an intention to do so; and to treat a newly independent State, on the basis of its mere silence, as having dropped its predecessor’s reservations would be to impose upon it a more onerous obligation. Thirdly, if presumption in favour of maintaining reservations were not to be made, the actual intention of the newly independent State might be irrevocably defeated; whereas, if it were made and the presumption did not correspond to the newly independent State’s intention, the latter could always redress the matter by withdrawing the reservations.”

(10) This seems to be the majority position in the literature, tending to support the presumption in favour of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations. Thus, D.P. O’Connell explains:

2732 [1103, 2010] Ibid., p. 310. Imbert thus echoes the criticisms of some States (see footnote 1097 above) put forward at the 1977–1978 Vienna Conference, in particular by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, who expressed a preference for a “clean slate” in regard to reservations and pointed out that reservations formulated by the predecessor State were not necessarily in the interest of the successor State.
Since a State which makes a reservation to a multilateral convention commits itself only to the convention as so reserved, its successor State cannot, logically, succeed to the convention without reservations. Should the reservation be unacceptable to it the appropriate procedure would be to ask the depositary to remove it and notify all parties accordingly.2734

Similarly, Professor Giorgio Gaja takes the view that:

The opinion that the predecessor State’s reservations are maintained is also based on the reasonable assumption that when a newly independent State elects to become a party to a treaty by means of a notification of succession, in principle it wants the treaty to continue to be applied to its territory in the same way as it did before independence.2735

(11) This presumption is inferred logically, since succession to a treaty by a newly independent State, though voluntary, is a true succession that must be distinguished from accession. Because it is a succession, it seems reasonable to presume that treaty obligations are transmitted to the successor State as modified by the reservation formulated by the predecessor State.

(12) Nevertheless, as the last clause of paragraph 1 of this guideline shows, the presumption in favour of the newly independent State’s maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State is rebuttable. The presumption is reversed not only if a “contrary intention” is specifically expressed by the successor State when making the notification of succession, but also if that State formulates a reservation “which relates to the same subject matter” as the reservation formulated by the predecessor State. The exact wording of this second possibility was a subject of debate in the International Law Commission when this provision was being drafted.

(13) Waldock had proposed, in his third report, a different formulation that provided for the reversal of the presumption that the predecessor State’s reservations were maintained if the successor State formulated “reservations different from those applicable at the date of succession”2736. In its draft article 15 adopted on first reading in 1972, the Commission settled on a

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solution according to which the presumption that the predecessor State’s reservations were maintained was reversed if the successor State formulated a new reservation “which relates to the same subject matter and is incompatible with [the reservation formulated by the predecessor State]”. However, in his first report in 1974, Sir Francis Vallat, who had been appointed Special Rapporteur, endorsed a proposal made by Zambia and the United Kingdom and returned if not to the letter at least to the spirit of Waldock’s proposal, though he described the change in question as minor, by removing the “incompatibility” test and providing only that a reservation of the predecessor State is not maintained if the successor State formulates a reservation relating to the same subject matter. Subject to a further drafting change, the Commission agreed with him on that point.

(14) It should be noted that the wording that was finally adopted by the Commission and reflected in the 1978 Vienna Convention has been criticized in the literature for omitting the test of “incompatibility” between a reservation formulated by the predecessor State and one formulated by the successor State. Nonetheless, in accordance with Sir Francis Vallat’s proposal, the Commission finally deleted this requirement from the final draft article for pragmatic reasons, which it explained in the commentary to the corresponding article adopted on second reading in 1974:

The test of incompatibility for which the paragraph provided might be difficult to apply and ... if the newly independent State were to formulate a reservation relating to the same subject-matter as that of the reservation made by the predecessor State, it could reasonably be presumed to intend to withdraw that reservation.

(15) Paragraph 2 of guideline 5.1.1 reproduces article 20, paragraph 2, of the 1978 Vienna Convention. It recognizes that a newly independent State has the option of formulating a new reservation when making its notification of succession to the treaty. This capacity is subject to the general conditions laid down in article 19, subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and reiterated in guideline 3.1, to which paragraph 2 of this

2739 [1110, 2010] Ibid., p. 222 (art. 19).
guideline refers. Under article 20, paragraph 3, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, the rules set out in articles 20 to 23 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply in respect of reservations formulated by a newly independent State when making the notification of succession. Given that the relevant rules regarding the formulation of a reservation are duly specified in Part 2 of the Guide to Practice, paragraph 3 of this guideline refers to that part of the Guide.\(^{2743}\)

(16) In its commentary to draft article 19, the Commission noted that the capacity of a newly independent State to formulate reservations to a treaty to which it has made a notification of succession seemed to be confirmed in practice.\(^{2744}\) In support of this solution, Waldock, in his third report, based his views in particular on the practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who, on several occasions, had recognized that newly independent States had that capacity without prompting any objections from States to that assumption.\(^{2745}\) The second Special Rapporteur was also in favour, for “practical” reasons, of recognizing the right of a newly independent State to make new reservations when making a notification of succession.\(^{2746}\)

(17) The view of the two Special Rapporteurs prevailed in the Commission, which, as indicated in the commentary to draft article 19 as finally adopted, had a choice between two alternatives:

(a) to decline to regard any notification of succession made subject to new reservations as a true instrument of succession and to treat it in law as a case of accession, or (b) to accept it as having the character of a succession but at the same time apply to it the law governing reservations as if it were a wholly new expression of consent to be bound by the treaty.

Drawing upon the practice of the Secretary-General and wishing to take a “flexible” approach in this regard, the Commission opted for the second alternative, noting also that it might ease the
access of a newly independent State to a treaty that was not, “for technical reasons, open to its participation by any other procedure than succession”.2747

(18) At the 1977–1978 Vienna Conference, the Austrian delegation challenged this solution — which, in purely logical terms, was somewhat incompatible with the preceding paragraph — and proposed the deletion of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the provision that would become article 20 of the 1978 Convention.2748 Austria contended that recognizing the right of a newly independent State to formulate new reservations when notifying its succession “seemed to be based on an erroneous concept of succession”2749 and that “if a newly independent State wished to make reservations, it should use the ratification or accession procedure provided for becoming a party to a multilateral treaty”.2750 However, the Austrian amendment was rejected by 39 votes to 4, with 36 abstentions.2751 Those States opposing the Austrian amendment at the Vienna Conference put forth various arguments, including the desirability of ensuring that the newly independent State would “not be obliged to conform with more complicated ratification procedures than those provided for by the International Law Commission”,2752 the alleged incompatibility of the Austrian amendment with the principle of self-determination2753 or the principle of the “clean slate”,2754 the need to be “realistic” rather than “puristic”,2755 and the fact that a succession of States was not a “legal inheritance or a transmission of rights and obligations”.2756 Some authors have echoed these criticisms,2757 while others take the view that “the right to make reservations is not a right that is transmissible through inheritance, but a prerogative that is part of the set of supreme powers attributed by virtue of the protective principle to sovereign States” and that “the formal recognition

2749 [1120, 2010] Ibid., para. 60.
2750 [1121, 2010] Ibid. See also A/CONF.80/16, 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 30.
2751 [1122, 2010] Ibid., 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 40.
2753 [1124, 2010] Ibid., para. 73 in fine (Algeria) and para. 89 (Guyana).
2754 [1125, 2010] Ibid., para. 85 (Madagascar).
2755 [1126, 2010] Ibid., para. 77 (Poland).
2756 [1127, 2010] A/CONF.80/16, 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 7 (Israel). According to the representative of Israel, “A newly independent State … would simply have the right of option to establish itself as a separate party to the treaty in virtue of the legal nexus established by its predecessor. Its right was to notify its own consent to be considered as a separate party to the treaty; that was not a right to step into the predecessor’s shoes. The significance of article 19 was that a newly independent State should be ‘considered’ as maintaining its succession to the treaty. In other words, notification of succession was an independent act of the successor State’s own volition.”
of this capacity [on the part of a newly independent State] represents a ‘pragmatic’ solution that takes account of the ‘non-automatic’, i.e., voluntary, nature of succession to treaties on the part of newly independent States”.

(19) In fact, the principles laid down in article 20 of the 1978 Convention are not overly rigid and are flexible enough to accommodate a wide variety of practices, as shown by a number of cases of succession to treaties deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

(i) In many cases, newly independent States have deposited a notification of succession to a particular treaty without making any mention of the question of reservations; in such cases, the Secretary-General has included the newly independent State in the list of States parties to the treaty concerned without passing judgement upon the status of reservations formulated by the predecessor State;

(ii) Some newly independent States have expressly maintained the reservations formulated by the predecessor State;

(iii) In other cases, the newly independent State has essentially reformulated the same reservations made by the predecessor State;

(iv) There have been cases in which the newly independent State has maintained the reservations formulated by the predecessor State while adding new reservations;

(v) There have also been cases in which the newly independent State has “reworked” reservations made by the predecessor State;

(vi) In a few cases, the newly independent State has withdrawn the predecessor State’s reservations while formulating new reservations.

\[\text{References}\]

2759 [1130, 2010] See, for example, *Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. IV.2: The Solomon Islands succeeded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination without making any mention of the reservations made by the predecessor State (the United Kingdom), which are not reproduced in relation to the Solomon Islands. The same is true in the case of Senegal’s and Tunisia’s succession to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (ibid., chap. V.2).
2760 [1131, 2010] Fiji and Jamaica (ibid.).
2764 [1135, 2010] Botswana and Lesotho (ibid., chap. V.3, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons); Zimbabwe (ibid., chap. V.2,
All these possibilities are acceptable under the terms of article 20, whose flexibility is unquestionably one of its greatest virtues.

(20) Although article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention applies only to reservations formulated in respect of treaties between States, guideline 5.1.1, like the other guidelines in the Guide to Practice, also covers reservations to treaties between States and international organizations.

5.1.2 [5.2] Uniting or separation of States

1. Subject to the provisions of guideline 5.1.3, a successor State which is a party to a treaty as the result of a uniting or separation of States shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to the treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates, unless it expresses its intention not to maintain one or more reservations of the predecessor State at the time of the succession.

2. A successor State which is a party to a treaty as the result of a uniting or separation of States may not formulate a new reservation.

3. When a successor State formed from a uniting or separation of States makes a notification whereby it establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but to which the predecessor State was a contracting State, that State shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to the treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates, unless it expresses a contrary intention when making the notification or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation. That successor State may formulate a new reservation to the treaty.

4. A successor State may formulate a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 only if the reservation is one the formulation of which would not be excluded by the provisions of subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of guideline 3.1 of the Guide to Practice. The relevant rules set out in Part 2 (Procedure) of the Guide to Practice apply in respect of that reservation.

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees).
Commentary

(1) As the title suggests, this guideline deals with the uniting or separation of States. These cases are not covered by article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention or by guideline 5.1.1, which applies only to newly independent States, that is to say those arising from a decolonization process. This guideline is intended to fill a gap in the Vienna Convention. Given the general scope of this guideline, which covers both cases involving the separation of parts of a State and cases involving the uniting of two or more States, the term “predecessor State” should be understood, in cases involving the uniting of States, to mean one or more of the predecessor States.

(2) Guideline 5.1.2 deals with two situations separately. Paragraphs 1 and 2 deal with the case in which a State formed from a uniting or separation of States succeeds ipso jure to a treaty, whereas paragraph 3 deals with the case in which such a successor State succeeds to a treaty only through a notification whereby it expresses its intention to succeed thereto. While the presumption in favour of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations is applicable in both situations envisaged, the distinction between the two situations proves decisive with respect to the capacity to formulate new reservations, which is recognized to a State formed from a uniting or separation of States only in the event that succession to a treaty is voluntary in nature.

(3) The reference in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this guideline to “a successor State which is a party to a treaty as the result of a uniting or separation of States” was retained to indicate that the guideline covers the situation in which a succession to the treaty occurs ipso jure, and not on the basis of a notification to that effect by the successor State. Under part IV of the 1978 Vienna Convention, such is the situation of a State formed from a uniting or separation of States with regard to treaties in force for any of the predecessor States at the date of the succession of States; in principle, these treaties remain in force for a State formed from a uniting of two or more States. The same applies to the case of a State formed from a separation of States, with respect to treaties in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State, and also treaties in force in respect only of that part of the territory of the predecessor State which has

2765 [1136, 2010] See above, para. (2) of the general commentary to Part 5 of the Guide to Practice and paras. (1) and (2) of the commentary to guideline 5.1.1.
2766 [1137, 2010] See below, paras. (5) and (10) of the commentary.
2767 [1138, 2010] See below, paras. (11) and (15) of the commentary.
2768 [1139, 2010] Articles 31 and 34 of the Convention recognize exceptions concerning the express or tacit agreement of the parties.
become the territory of the successor State.\textsuperscript{2770} However, it was observed within the Commission that the practice of States and depositaries did not seem unanimous in terms of recognition of the automatic nature of succession to treaties in the context of a separation or uniting of States.

(4) On the other hand, under the 1978 Vienna Convention, succession does not occur \textit{ipso jure} in respect of a State formed from a uniting or separation of States with regard to treaties to which the predecessor State was a contracting State at the date of succession of States but which, at that date, were not in force for the State concerned. In such cases, succession to the treaty is of a voluntary nature and implies a notification whereby the successor State establishes, as the case may be, its status as a contracting State or as a party to the treaty in question.\textsuperscript{2771} These situations are referred to in paragraph 3 of this guideline.

(5) Paragraphs 1 and 3 of this guideline extend to the two different situations envisaged therein the presumption in favour of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations, which is provided for explicitly in article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention for newly independent States in the context of a notification of succession and which is reproduced in guideline 5.1.1. There can be no doubt as to the application of this presumption to successor States other than newly independent States; it may even be said that the presumption is even stronger when succession occurs \textit{ipso jure}. This tallies, moreover, with the view expressed during the 1977–1978 Vienna Conference by some delegations which considered that the presumption was self-evident in cases of the uniting or separation of States, in the light of the principle of continuity reflected in the Convention in relation to these kinds of succession.\textsuperscript{2772}

(6) While this provision establishes a general presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations, there are nonetheless exceptions to this presumption in certain cases involving the uniting of two or more States; these are covered by guideline 5.1.3, which is referred to in paragraph 1 of the present guideline.

\textsuperscript{2769} [1140, 2010] See article 31 of the Convention.
\textsuperscript{2770} [1141, 2010] See article 34 of the Convention.
\textsuperscript{2771} [1142, 2010] See articles 32 and 36 of the Convention.
\textsuperscript{2772} [1143, 2010] See, in this regard, the statements of the delegations of Poland (A/CONF.80/16/Add.1, 43rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 13), France (\textit{ibid.}, para. 16), Cyprus (\textit{ibid.}, para. 20), Yugoslavia (\textit{ibid.}, para. 21) and Australia (\textit{ibid.}, para. 22). See also the draft article 36 \textit{bis} proposed by Germany (see footnote 1089 above), which aimed, among other things, at extending the presumption in question to cases of uniting and separation of States.
(7) The applicability of the presumption in favour of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations to States formed from the uniting or separation of States seems to be reflected to some extent in practice.

(8) While the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the exercise of his functions as depositary, generally avoids taking a position on the status of reservations formulated by the predecessor State, the practice in cases involving the separation of States, in particular those of the States that emerged from the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, shows that the predecessor State’s reservations have been maintained. It should be noted, in this regard, that the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, subsequently, Montenegro formulated general declarations whereby these successor States reiterated the reservations of the predecessor State. In addition, in some cases the predecessor State’s

2773 [1144, 2010] There appears to be virtually no relevant practice in relation to the successor States of the former Soviet Union.

2774 [1145, 2010] In a letter dated 16 February 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General and accompanied by a list of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, the Government of the Czech Republic communicated the following: “In conformity with the valid principles of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Czech Republic, as a successor State to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1 January 1993, i.e., the date of the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by multinational international treaties to which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party on that date, including reservations and declarations to their provisions made earlier by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

The Government of the Czech Republic has examined multilateral treaties the list of which is attached to this letter. [The Government of the Czech Republic] considers to be bound by these treaties as well as by all reservations and declarations to them by virtue of succession as of 1 January 1993. The Czech Republic, in accordance with the well-established principles of international law, recognizes signatures made by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in respect of all signed treaties as if they were made by itself”, in Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, Status of Treaties, Historical Information, under “Czech Republic”.

2775 [1146, 2010] In a letter dated 19 May 1993 and also accompanied by a list of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, the Government of the Slovak Republic communicated the following: “In accordance with the relevant principles and rules of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Slovak Republic, as a successor State, born from the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1 January 1993, i.e., the date on which the Slovak Republic assumed responsibility for its international relations, by multilateral treaties to which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party as of 31 December 1992, including reservations and declarations made earlier by Czechoslovakia, as well as objections by Czechoslovakia to reservations formulated by other treaty-parties” (ibid., Historical Information, under “Slovakia”).

2776 [1147, 2010] By a notification dated 8 March 2001, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deposited an instrument, inter alia, communicating its intent to succeed to various multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General and confirming certain actions relating to such treaties: “[T]he Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia maintains the signatures, reservations, declarations and objections made by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the treaties listed in the attached annex 1, prior to the date on which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed responsibility for its international relations” (ibid., Historical Information, under “Yugoslavia”).

2777 [1148, 2010] On 23 October 2006 the Secretary-General received a letter dated 10 October 2006 from the Government of Montenegro, accompanied by a list of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, informing him that: “[The Government of] … the Republic of Montenegro does maintain the reservations, declarations and objections made by Serbia and Montenegro, as indicated in the Annex to this instrument, prior to the date on which the Republic of Montenegro assumed responsibility for its international relations” (ibid., Historical Information, under “Montenegro”).

2778 [1149, 2010] See also the case of other successors to the former Yugoslavia (apart from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), which appear in the list of successor States for a number of treaties deposited with the Secretary-General with the indication, in footnotes, of reservations formulated by the former Yugoslavia (see, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in relation to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (ibid., chap. III.1, note 2); the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (chap. V.5, note 5) and the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (chap. V.3, note 2).
reservations have been expressly confirmed\footnote{1150, 2010} or reformulated\footnote{1151, 2010} by the successor State in relation to a particular treaty. In the case of the Republic of Yemen (united), there was also maintenance of reservations by the successor State. In a letter dated 19 May 1990 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen communicated the following:

“As concerns the treaties concluded prior to their union by the Yemen Arab Republic or the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Republic of Yemen (as now united) is accordingly to be considered as a party to those treaties as from the date when one of these States first became a party to those treaties. Accordingly the tables showing the status of treaties will now indicate under the designation ‘Yemen’ the date of the formalities (signatures, ratifications, accessions, declarations and reservations, etc.) effected by the State which first became a party, those eventually effected by the other being described in a footnote.”\footnote{1152, 2010}

(9) In addition, some elements of the practice in relation to treaties deposited with other depositaries seem to confirm the general presumption in favour of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations, although, admittedly, the practice is rather sporadic. The Czech Republic and Slovakia transmitted to a number of depositaries notifications of succession similar to those transmitted to the United Nations Secretary-General and providing for the maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State.\footnote{1153, 2010} Neither the depositaries in question nor the other States parties to the treaties concerned raised any objections to this practice. The Universal Postal Union’s reply to the Special Rapporteur’s questionnaire is also worthy of note.\footnote{1154, 2010} That organization’s practice is to consider that valid reservations applicable to a member State are automatically transferred to the successor State; the same is true in the case of States that have become independent by separating from a member State. The Council of Europe applied the same

\footnote{1150, 2010}{Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, reservation formulated by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ibid., chap. IV.1).}
\footnote{1151, 2010}{Convention on the Rights of the Child (ibid., chap. IV.11, under “Slovenia”).}
\footnote{1152, 2010}{Ibid., Historical Information, under “Yemen”.}
\footnote{1153, 2010}{See Václav Mikulka, “The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Succession in Respect of Treaties”, in Mojmir Mrak (ed.), Succession of States (The Hague/Boston/London: M. Nijhoff, 1999), pp. 111–112.}
presumption with respect to Montenegro. In a letter dated 28 June 2006 addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, the Director-General of Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe indicated that, in accordance with article 20 of the Vienna Convention of 1978, the Republic of Montenegro was considered “as maintaining these reservations and declarations because the Republic of Montenegro’s declaration of succession does not express a contrary intention in that respect.”

That letter also included a list of reservations and declarations that had been revised in places to remove references to the Republic of Serbia. By a letter dated 13 October 2006, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Montenegro communicated his agreement on the wording of those reservations and declarations, as adapted by the depositary. The practice followed by Switzerland as depositary of a number of multilateral treaties likewise does not appear to be in fundamental contradiction to that of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is true that Switzerland had initially applied, to a successor State that made no reference to the status of the predecessor State’s reservations, the presumption that such reservations were not maintained. Today, however, Switzerland no longer applies any presumption, as its practice is to invite the successor State to communicate its intentions as to whether or not it is maintaining reservations formulated by the predecessor State.

(10) As with newly independent States, the presumption in favour of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations is also rebuttable in respect of successor States formed from a uniting or separation of States. In this respect, as is reflected in paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of this guideline, there is no doubt that such a successor State may reverse the presumption by expressing its intention not to maintain one or more reservations of the predecessor State. Under paragraph 1 of guideline 5.1.1, the reversal of the presumption also occurs when a newly independent State formulates a reservation which relates to the “same subject matter” as the reservation formulated by

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the predecessor State.\textsuperscript{2786} In guideline 5.1.2, this possibility is referred to in paragraph 3, which applies to situations in which succession to the treaty by a State formed from a uniting or separation of States is of a voluntary nature. In contrast, the possibility of reversing the presumption by the formulation of a reservation relating to the same subject is not mentioned in paragraph 1, as the capacity to formulate reservations is not recognized to a successor State when the succession does not depend on an expression of will on its part.

(11) If, in cases involving the uniting or separation of States, succession is considered to take place \textit{ipso jure} in respect of treaties that were in force for the predecessor State at the time of the succession of States, it is difficult to contend that a successor State may evade or lighten its obligations by formulating reservations. Paragraph 2 of the guideline therefore rules out the freedom of such a successor State to formulate new reservations to the treaty.

(12) Also worth mentioning in this regard, in addition to the arguments made against this possibility during the drafting of the 1978 Convention,\textsuperscript{2787} is the position taken by the Council of Europe in its letter of 28 June 2006 to Montenegro,\textsuperscript{2788} to the effect that that State did “not have the possibility, at this stage, to make new reservations to the treaties already ratified” and to which it had notified its succession.\textsuperscript{2789} This position seems to be consistent with the rule of \textit{ipso jure} succession to treaties, as set out in the 1978 Convention for cases involving the uniting or separation of States. This solution also seems to have been confirmed in practice, as successor States other than newly independent States do not seem to have formulated new reservations upon succeeding to treaties.

(13) The solution set out in paragraph 2 of guideline 5.1.2 also seems to be echoed in the separate opinion annexed by Judge Tomka to the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 26 February 2007 in the \textit{Genocide} case:

\textsuperscript{2786} [1157, 2010] See guideline 5.1.1, para. 1, above.
\textsuperscript{2787} [1158, 2010] It is worth recalling the objections formulated by certain delegations to the proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany (later withdrawn) to include a draft article 36 \textit{bis} in the Convention which would have granted to successor States other than newly independent States, among other things, the freedom to formulate new reservations, even in respect of a treaty that remains in force for the successor State (A/CONF.80/16/Add.1, 43rd meeting, paras. 9–12) (see footnote 1089 above). The delegations in question considered that giving a successor State the right to formulate new reservations was inconsistent with the principle of \textit{ipso jure} continuity of treaties set out by the Convention for cases involving the uniting or separation of States (see A/CONF.80/16/Add.1, 43rd meeting, para. 14 (Poland), para. 15 (United States of America), para. 18 (Nigeria), para. 19 (Mali), para. 20 (Cyprus), para. 21 (Yugoslavia), para. 22 (Australia) and para. 24 (Swaziland, albeit in more nuanced terms).
\textsuperscript{2788} [1159, 2010] See above, footnote 1155.
\textsuperscript{2789} [1160, 2010] Translated by the Secretariat in its memorandum (A/CN.4/616), see footnote 1081 above, p. 23, para. 69.
35. There can be no doubt that this decision to notify of the accession to the Genocide Convention, with a reservation to Article IX and not succession (where no reservation is allowed) was motivated by the considerations relating to the present case. (…)

“That single notification of accession, in my view, was totally inconsistent with the succession by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — notified the very same day to the United Nations Secretary-General as accession to the Genocide Convention — to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, which in article 34 provides that the treaties of the predecessor State continue in force in respect of each successor State. By the latter notification of succession, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became a contracting State of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties as of April 1992. That Convention entered into force on 6 November 1996. Although not formally applicable to the process of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, which occurred in the 1991–1992 period, in light of the fact that the former Yugoslavia consented to be bound by the Vienna Convention already in 1980, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been a contracting State to that Convention since April 1992, one would not expect, by analogy to article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a State which, through notification of its accession, expresses its consent to be considered as bound by the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties to act in a singular case inconsistently with the rule contained in article 34 of that Convention, while in a great number of other cases to acting in full conformity with that rule. These considerations, taken together, lead me to the conclusion that the Court should not attach any legal effect to the notification of accession by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Genocide Convention, and should instead consider it bound by that Convention on the basis of the operation of the customary rule of ipso jure succession codified in article 34 as applied to cases of the dissolution of a State.”

(14) However, as guideline 5.1.9 below indicates, it is necessary to consider that the formulation of a reservation by a successor State, formed from a uniting or separation of States, in respect of which the treaty remains in force should be likened to the late formulation of a reservation.

In contrast, the capacity to formulate new reservations that is recognized in the case of newly independent States in paragraph 2 of guideline 5.1.1 could be extended, it would seem, to successor States formed from a uniting or separation of States when their succession to a treaty is of a voluntary nature in that it occurs through a notification. Such is the case with respect to treaties which, on the date of the succession of States, were not in force for the predecessor State but to which it was a contracting State. In terms of the capacity to formulate new reservations, there is no reason to differentiate between successor States and newly independent States to the extent that, in both cases, succession to the treaty involves an expression of intention on the part of the State concerned.

Paragraph 4 of guideline 5.1.2 recalls that any reservation formulated by a successor State formed from a uniting or separation of States, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this guideline, is subject to the conditions of permissibility set out in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of guideline 3.1, which reproduces article 19 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. It also recalls that the relevant rules set out in Part 2 of the Guide to Practice apply in respect of that reservation. Paragraph 4 is the counterpart of paragraphs 2 and 3 of guideline 5.1.1.

5.1.3 [5.3] Irrelevance of certain reservations in cases involving a uniting of States

When, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of any of them continues in force in respect of the successor State, such reservations as may have been formulated by any such State which, at the date of the succession of States, was a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force shall not be maintained.

Commentary

(1) Unlike the separation of a State, where succession to a treaty results in the application of a single reservations regime to that treaty, a uniting of States entails a risk that two or more reservations regimes that may be different or even contradictory will apply to the same treaty. Such cases are not merely hypothetical. Nonetheless, the relevant practice does not seem to provide satisfactory answers to the many questions raised by this situation. For example, the

2791 [1162, 2010] See above, para. (4) of commentary to this guideline.
aforementioned letter of 19 May 1990 from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to the Secretary-General, in suggesting a solution to the technical problem of how the actions of the two predecessor States in relation to the same treaty should be recorded, referred to a time test whose legal scope appears uncertain in many respects and leaves unanswered the possible future question of the status of reservations formulated by the States concerned prior to the date of their union.

(2) In the case of a treaty which, at the date of a uniting of States, was in force in respect of any of the uniting States and continues in force in respect of the State so formed, guideline 5.1.2, paragraph 1, establishes the principle that any reservations to such a treaty that were formulated by any of the uniting States continue to apply to the unified State unless the latter expresses a contrary intention. The application of this presumption raises no difficulty provided that the uniting States were either parties or contracting States to the treaty. However, the situation is more complicated if one of those States was a party to the treaty and the other was a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force.

(3) It is this situation that the present guideline seeks to address: it provides only for the maintenance of reservations formulated by the State that was a party to the treaty. This solution is based on the fact that a State — in this case a State formed from a uniting of States — can have only one status in respect of a single treaty: in this case that of a State party to the treaty (principle of ipso jure continuity). Thus, for a treaty that continues in force in respect of a State formed from a uniting of States, it seems logical to consider that only those reservations formulated by the State or States in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of uniting of States may be maintained. Any reservations formulated by a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force become irrelevant.

2792 [1163, 2010] The relevant text of this letter reads:
"As concerns the treaties concluded prior to their union by the Yemen Arab Republic or the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Republic of Yemen (as now united) is accordingly to be considered as a party to those treaties as from the date when one of these States first became a party to those treaties. Accordingly the tables showing the status of treaties will now indicate under the designation ‘Yemen’ the date of the formalities (signatures, ratifications, accessions, declarations and reservations, etc.) effected by the State which first became a party, those eventually effected by the other being described in a footnote” (in Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, Status of Treaties, Historical Information, under “Yemen”.

(4) Guideline 5.1.3\textsuperscript{2794} is worded so as to cover not only the situations contemplated in articles 31 to 33 of the 1978 Convention, but also other situations involving the uniting of States in which one of the uniting States retains its international legal personality (a situation not covered by those provisions of the 1978 Vienna Convention).

5.1.4 Establishment of new reservations formulated by a successor State

Part 4 of the Guide to Practice applies to new reservations formulated by a successor State in accordance with guideline 5.1.1 or 5.1.2.

Commentary

(1) This guideline is a reminder that Part 4 of the Guide to Practice, which concerns the legal effects of a reservation, also applies to new reservations formulated by a successor State. With regard to reservations formulated by a newly independent State, this results from the reference to articles 20 to 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, contained in article 20, paragraph 3, of the 1978 Vienna Convention. The present guideline also covers new reservations that a successor State may formulate according to guideline 5.1.2, paragraph 3.

(2) While this statement might seem self-evident, it is undoubtedly useful to set it out in a guideline so as to emphasize that a successor State that formulates a new reservation is in the same position, with respect to the legal effects of that reservation, as any other State or international organization that is the author of a reservation. That applies in particular to the conditions for the establishment of a reservation, the freedom of any State or organization to decide whether or not to accept the reservation formulated by the successor State and the effects that the reservation and the reactions to it are likely to have\textsuperscript{2795}.

\textsuperscript{2794}[1165, 2010] The same is true of guidelines 5.1.6 and 5.2.2.

5.1.5 [5.4] Maintenance of the territorial scope of reservations formulated by the predecessor State

Subject to the provisions of guideline 5.1.6, a reservation considered as being maintained in conformity with guideline 5.1.1, paragraph 1, or guideline 5.1.2, paragraph 1 or 3, shall retain the territorial scope that it had at the date of the succession of States, unless the successor State expresses a contrary intention.

Commentary

(1) It seems self-evident that a reservation considered as being maintained following a succession of States retains the territorial scope that it had at the date of the succession of States. This guideline sets out this principle, which follows logically from the idea of continuity inherent in the concept of succession to a treaty, whether it occurs ipso jure or by virtue of a notification of succession.

(2) Nonetheless, the successor State’s freedom to express its intention to change the territorial scope of a reservation considered as being maintained should be recognized. That is the meaning of the phrase, “unless the successor State expresses a contrary intention”, with which this guideline ends. However, it is understood that a declaration by which a successor State expresses its intention to extend the territorial scope of a reservation considered as being maintained would not, by itself, affect the rights and obligations of other contracting States or contracting organizations.

(3) Furthermore, there are exceptions to the principle of the maintenance of the territorial scope of reservations considered as being maintained in certain situations involving the uniting of two or more States. These exceptions, which raise complex issues, are addressed in guideline 5.1.6 and are explicitly excluded from the scope of this guideline.

(4) In addition, there is a need to address separately the problems that arise in relation to reservations in cases of succession involving part of a territory. While these cases do not constitute an exception to the principle established in this guideline (as, in principle, the State that has acquired the territory in question does not in consequence succeed to the treaties by which the predecessor State was bound), they nonetheless require more specific treatment, which guideline 5.1.7 seeks to afford.
5.1.6 [5.5] Territorial scope of reservations in cases involving a uniting of States

1. When, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of only one of the States forming the successor State becomes applicable to a part of the territory of that State to which it did not apply previously, any reservation considered as being maintained by the successor State shall apply to that territory unless:

   (a) the successor State expresses a contrary intention when making the notification extending the territorial scope of the treaty; or

   (b) the nature or purpose of the reservation is such that the reservation cannot be extended beyond the territory to which it was applicable at the date of the succession of States.

2. When, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of two or more of the uniting States becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the successor State to which it did not apply at the date of the succession of States, no reservation shall extend to that territory unless:

   (a) an identical reservation has been formulated by each of those States in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the succession of States;

   (b) the successor State expresses a different intention when making the notification extending the territorial scope of the treaty; or

   (c) a contrary intention otherwise becomes apparent from the circumstances surrounding that State’s succession to the treaty.

3. A notification purporting to extend the territorial scope of reservations within the meaning of paragraph 2 (b) shall be without effect if such an extension would give rise to the application of contradictory reservations to the same territory.

4. The provisions of the foregoing paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis to reservations considered as being maintained by a successor State that is a contracting State, following a uniting of States, to a treaty which was not in force for any of the uniting States at the date of the succession of States but to which one or more of those States were contracting States at that
date, when the treaty becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the successor State to which it did not apply at the date of the succession of States.

Commentary

(1) This guideline addresses the specific problems that can arise with respect to the territorial scope of reservations considered as being maintained following a uniting of two or more States. Paragraphs 1 to 3 deal with the case of a treaty that, following the uniting of States, remain in force, with reservations, in respect of the successor State. Paragraph 4 provides for the application *mutatis mutandis* of the same solutions to the case in which, following the uniting of States, the successor State is the contracting State to a treaty that was not in force for any of the predecessor States at the date of the uniting.

(2) The principle set out in guideline 5.1.5, namely that the territorial scope of a reservation considered as being maintained following a succession of States remains unchanged, also applies to cases involving the uniting of two or more States, albeit with certain exceptions, which are set out in this guideline. Such exceptions can occur when, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the unified State to which it did not apply at the date of the succession of States.

(3) Two possible situations should be distinguished in this connection:

• The situation in which, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of only one of the uniting States becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the successor State to which it did not apply previously; and

• The situation in which a treaty that was in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of two or more of the uniting States — but was not applicable to the whole of what was to become the territory of the successor State — becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the successor State to which it did not apply before the uniting.

(4) Paragraph 1 concerns the first situation, that is, where a treaty in force, with reservations, at the date of the succession of States for only one of the States that unite to form the successor State becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the unified State to which it did not apply at the date of the succession of States. Where the territorial scope of a treaty is thus extended by the successor State — which implies its consent (expressed either by a notification or in an agreement with other
States parties), there is every reason to believe that this extension concerns the treaty relationship as modified by the reservations formulated by the State in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the uniting. Paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) and (b), however, provide for two exceptions:

- First, there is in principle nothing to prevent the State formed from a uniting of States, when it gives notification of the extension of the territorial scope of the treaty, from expressing a contrary intention in that regard and electing not to extend the territorial scope of the reservations. Paragraph 1 (a) establishes this possibility.

- Secondly, the reservation’s nature or purpose may rule out its extension beyond the territory to which it was applicable at the date of the succession of States. This could be the case, in particular, of a reservation the application of which was already limited to a part of the territory of the State that formulated it, or a reservation that specifically concerns certain institutions belonging only to that State. Paragraph 1 (b) refers to this possibility.

(5) Paragraph 2 concerns, on the other hand, the second situation envisaged in paragraph (3) above, namely the case in which the treaty whose territorial scope is extended by the successor State was in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of at least two of the uniting States but was not at that time applicable to the whole of what was to become the territory of the unified State. The question, then, is whether reservations formulated by any of those States also become applicable to the parts of the territory of the unified State to which the treaty was not applicable at the date of the succession of States. In the absence of specific indications from the successor State, it may be unclear whether and to what extent that State, in extending the territorial scope of the treaty, meant to extend the territorial scope of the reservations formulated by one or another of the States in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the succession of States. Unless there are indications to the contrary, it appears reasonable to set out the presumption that none of those reservations extend to parts of the territory of the unified State to which the treaty was not applicable at the date of the succession of States. However, there is no reason not to regard this presumption as rebuttable. A different solution should apply:

When an identical reservation has been formulated by each of the predecessor States in respect of which the treaty was in force, the situation referred to in paragraph 2 (a); in that case one should on the contrary presume that the unified State intends to maintain a reservation that is common to its predecessors and follow the logic reflected in paragraph 1 of this guideline;

- If a State formed from a uniting of States, when it agrees to extend the territorial scope of a treaty, expresses a different intention by specifying the reservations that will apply to the territory to which the treaty has been extended, the situation referred to in paragraph 2 (b); or

- If it becomes otherwise apparent from the circumstances that a State formed from a uniting of States intends to maintain reservations formulated by one of the States in particular, the situation referred to in paragraph 2 (c); this is the case, for example, when the unified State, upon extending the territorial scope of a treaty, refers specifically to formalities performed in respect of the treaty, prior to the date of the union, by one of the States concerned.

(6) In the case of identical reservations, referred to in paragraph 2 (a), the territorial extension of such a reservation to the part of the territory of the State formed from a uniting of States to which it did not apply before the date of succession of the States may, however, not be possible in some situations because of the nature or purpose of the reservation in question. That situation is similar to the one envisaged in paragraph 1 (b). In the context of identical reservations, this situation may arise in the case of the uniting of more than two States, since it is conceivable that an identical reservation formulated by all of the predecessor States in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the succession of States could not be extended, because of its nature or its purpose, to the part of the territory of the successor State that, prior to the uniting of States, belonged to another uniting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force at the date of the succession of States. While aware of this possibility, the Commission did not mention it in the text of guideline 5.1.6 so as to avoid overburdening the text.

(7) In the situation envisaged in paragraph 2 (b), the decision of a unified State to extend the scope of various reservations to the territory concerned is only acceptable if those reservations, formulated by two or more of the uniting States, are compatible with each other. They may indeed be incompatible. In that situation, a declaration to that effect by the successor State cannot be
regarded as having any effect if it would give rise to the application of contradictory reservations. This is the meaning of paragraph 3 of this guideline.

(8) The rules set out in paragraphs 1 to 3 concern the situation in which the treaty to which the predecessor States’ reservation or reservations relate was in force in respect of at least one of them at the date of the succession of States. However, according to paragraph 4, they apply mutatis mutandis to reservations considered as being maintained by a unified State that extends the territorial scope of a treaty to which, following the succession of States, it is a contracting State when the treaty was not in force, at the date of the succession of States, in respect of any of the predecessor States even though one, or two or more, of the uniting States, respectively, had the status of a contracting party. In the same spirit, this solution should be applied to situations — undoubtedly rare, but provided for in article 32, paragraph 2, of the 1978 Vienna Convention — in which a treaty to which one or more of the uniting States were contracting States at the date of the succession of States enters into force after that date because the conditions provided for in the relevant clauses of the treaty have been met; in such a case, the successor State would become a State party to the treaty.

(9) Lastly, concerning paragraph 4, it should also be recalled that the issue of the territorial scope of reservations formulated by a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force at the date of the succession of States arises only if the treaty was not in force, on that date, for any of the uniting States; otherwise, the reservations formulated by that contracting State are not considered as being maintained.

5.1.7 [5.6] Territorial scope of reservations of the successor State in cases of succession involving part of a territory

When, as a result of a succession of States involving part of a territory, a treaty to which the successor State is a party or a contracting State becomes applicable to that territory, any reservation to the treaty formulated previously by that State shall also apply to that territory as from the date of the succession of States unless:

(a) the successor State expresses a contrary intention; or

(b) it appears from the reservation that its scope was limited to the territory of the successor State that was within its borders prior to the date of the succession of States, or to a specific territory.

Commentary

(1) This guideline concerns cases involving the cession of territory or other territorial changes referred to in article 15 (Succession in respect of part of territory) of the 1978 Vienna Convention. This article provides that, as from the date of the succession of States, treaties of the successor State are in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates, while treaties of the predecessor State cease to be in force in respect of that territory. This provision represents an extension of the rule, established in article 29 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concerning flexibility in the territorial application of treaties. Accordingly, guidelines 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 would not apply to situations falling under article 15 of the Convention because, in these cases, there is in principle no succession to treaties as such. While the State in question is referred to as a “successor State” within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1978 Convention, in a manner of speaking it “succeeds” itself, and its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty remains as it was when that State acquired it by expressing its own consent to be bound by the treaty in accordance with article 11 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

(2) When this situation arises as a result of a succession involving part of a territory, the treaty of the successor State is extended to the territory in question. In this case, it seems logical to consider that the treaty’s application to that territory is subject, in principle, to the reservations which the successor State itself had formulated to the treaty.

(3) Here again, however, this principle should be qualified by two exceptions, also based on the principle of consent so prevalent in the law of treaties in general and of reservations in particular. Accordingly, a reservation should not extend to the territory to which the succession relates:

2798 [1169, 2010] See guideline 5.1.3 above.
• When the successor State expresses a contrary intention (subparagraph (a)); this case can be likened to a partial withdrawal of the reservation, limited to the territory to which the succession of States relates; or

• When it appears from the reservation itself that its scope was limited to the territory of the successor State that was within its borders prior to the date of the succession of States, or to a specific territory (subparagraph (b)).

(4) Guideline 5.1.7 is formulated so as to cover not only treaties in force for the successor State at the time of the succession of States, but also treaties not in force for the successor State on that date but to which it is a contracting State, a situation not covered by article 15 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. The verb “apply” in relation to such a treaty should be understood as encompassing both situations, which need not be distinguished from one another in this context in relation to the question of reservations.

(5) This guideline also covers situations in which the predecessor State and the successor State are parties or contracting States — or one is a party and the other is a contracting State — to the same treaty, albeit with non-identical reservations.

(6) However, this guideline does not apply to “territorial treaties” (concerning a border regime or other regime relating to the use of a specific territory). If a succession occurs in relation to such a treaty, the solutions provided for in guideline 5.1.2 concerning the uniting or separation of States apply mutatis mutandis to reservations formulated in respect of that treaty.

5.1.8 [5.7] Timing of the effects of non-maintenance by a successor State of a reservation formulated by the predecessor State

The non-maintenance, in conformity with guideline 5.1.1 or 5.1.2, by the successor State of a reservation formulated by the predecessor State becomes operative in relation to another contracting State or contracting organization or another State or international organization party to the treaty only when notice of it has been received by that State or international organization.


2800 [1171, 2010] For international jurisprudence on this point, see inter alia the Permanent Court of International Justice, Order of 6 December 1930, in the case concerning Free zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Publications of the Permanent
Commentary

(1) Article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention does not directly address the effects *ratione tempori*s of a declaration whereby a newly independent State announces, when notifying its succession to a treaty, that it is not maintaining a reservation formulated by the predecessor State; even less does it clarify the issue in the context of a succession of States resulting from a uniting or separation of States, as the 1978 Convention does not specify the status of the predecessor State’s reservations in that context. Neither practice nor the literature seems to provide a clear answer to this question, which could nonetheless be of some practical importance.

(2) Whether resulting from the expression of a “contrary intention” or from the successor State’s formulation of a reservation that “relates to the same subject matter” as a reservation formulated by the predecessor State, it seems reasonable, in relation to its effects *ratione tempori*s, to treat the non-maintenance of a reservation following a succession of States as a withdrawal of the reservation in question and to consider it subject, as such, to the ordinary rules of the law of treaties, codified in article 22 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. Pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) of that article, “unless the treaty otherwise provides, or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal of a reservation becomes operative in relation to another contracting State only when notice of it has been received by that State”.

(3) This guideline reproduces *mutatis mutandis* the rule set out in article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the 1969 Vienna Convention and reflected in draft guideline 2.5.8 concerning the effects *ratione tempori*s of the withdrawal of a reservation: this solution, which is particularly important when succession to the treaty (and to the reservation) takes place *ipso jure*, seems to lend itself to all types of succession: not until they are aware of the successor State’s intention (by means of a written notification) can the other parties take the withdrawal into account.

5.1.9 [5.9] Late reservations formulated by a successor State

A reservation shall be considered as late if it is formulated:

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2801 See para. 1 of guideline 5.1.1 and paras. 1 and 3 of guideline 5.1.2 above.
(a) by a newly independent State after it has made a notification of succession to the treaty;

(b) by a successor State other than a newly independent State after it has made a notification establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but in respect of which the predecessor State was a contracting State; or

(c) by a successor State other than a newly independent State in respect of a treaty which, following the succession of States, continues in force for that State.

Commentary

(1) The capacity of a newly independent State to formulate reservations to a treaty to which it intends to succeed is not in doubt, nor is the capacity of other successor States to formulate reservations in respect of a treaty that was not in force at the date of the succession of States. However, that capacity ought not to be unlimited over time. This guideline deals with three situations in which a reservation formulated by a successor State should be subject to the legal regime for late reservations, as set out in guidelines 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.5 provisionally adopted by the Commission. In this respect, it should be recalled that guideline 2.3.1 provides that the late formulation of a reservation is permitted only if none of the other contracting parties objects, thereby fully upholding the principle of consent.

(2) The first situation is referred to in subparagraph (a). It concerns reservations that a newly independent State might formulate after it has made a notification of succession. It seems reasonable to consider that if the newly independent State intends to exercise its capacity to formulate reservations to the treaty to which it is succeeding, it should do so when it makes a notification of succession. This is clearly implied by the very definition of reservations contained in guideline 1.1 of the Guide to Practice, which, like article 2, paragraph 1 (j), of the 1978 Vienna Convention — and unlike article 2 (d) of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties — mentions among the temporal elements included in the definition of reservations the time “when [a State is

2803 [1174, 2010] See para. 2 of guideline 5.1.1 and para. 3 of guideline 5.1.2.
making a notification of succession to a treaty”.\footnote{1176, 2010} It seems legitimate to conclude from this that reservations formulated by a newly independent State after that date should be considered as late within the meaning of the guidelines referred to in the previous paragraph.

(3) For similar reasons, it seems that the regime for late reservations should apply to the reservations referred to under subparagraph (b) formulated by a successor State other than a newly independent State after the date on which it has established, by a notification to that effect, its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but in respect of which the predecessor State was a contracting State, under the conditions stipulated in guideline 5.1.2, paragraph 3. As in that provision, the term “predecessor State” should be understood here, in cases involving a uniting of States, to mean one or more of the predecessor States.

(4) In fact, the same solution should also apply to any reservation formulated by a successor State other than a newly independent State to a treaty which, following the succession of States, continues in force for that State. In such a case, guideline 5.1.2, paragraph 2, does not recognize a capacity on the part of the successor State to formulate reservations that had not been formulated by the predecessor State. Nonetheless, should the successor State formulate a new reservation to the treaty in question, there are no grounds for treating that State differently from any other State by refusing it the benefit of the legal regime for late reservations.\footnote{1177, 2010}

5.2 Objections to reservations and succession of States

5.2.1 [5.10] Maintenance by the successor State of objections formulated by the predecessor State

Subject to the provisions of guideline 5.2.2, a successor State shall be considered as maintaining any objection formulated by the predecessor State to a reservation formulated by a
contracting State or contracting organization or by a State party or international organization party to a treaty unless it expresses a contrary intention at the time of the succession.

Commentary

(1) This guideline and guidelines 5.2.2 to 5.2.6 aim at filling gaps in the 1978 Vienna Convention. That Convention is not concerned with objections to reservations (nor with acceptances of reservations) in relation to the succession of States. The Commission itself had decided to leave the question of objections open despite a partial proposal by Waldock.\(^{2808}\) Notwithstanding a request to that effect from the representative of the Netherlands\(^{2809}\) and some concerns expressed at the Vienna Conference about this gap in the Convention,\(^{2810}\) the gap was allowed to remain.

(2) That was a deliberate stance, as explained at the Conference by Mustafa Kamil Yasseen, Chairman of the Drafting Committee: “The Drafting Committee had paid particular attention to the question of objections to reservations and objections to such objections, which had been raised by the Netherlands representative. It had noted that, as was clear from the Commission’s commentary to article 19, particularly paragraph (15) (A/CONF.80/4, p. 66),\(^{2811}\) the article did not deal with that matter, which was left to be regulated by general international law”.\(^{2812}\)

(3) Draft article 19 (the forerunner of article 20 of the 1978 Convention), as adopted by the Commission on second reading in 1974, also did not address the question of objections to reservations in the context of succession of States. Here again, this omission was deliberate; in the commentary to this provision, the Commission noted that:

it would be better, in accordance with its fundamental method of approach to the draft articles, to leave these matters to be regulated by the ordinary rules applicable to acceptances and objections on the assumption that, unless it was necessary to make some particular provision

\(^{2808}\) [1179, 2010] See below para. (5) of commentary to this guideline.

\(^{2809}\) [1180, 2010] A/CONF.80/16, 27th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 70; 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 32; and 35th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 19.

\(^{2810}\) [1181, 2010] See A/CONF.80/16, 27th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 85 (Madagascar).

\(^{2811}\) [1182, 2010] See below para. (3) of this commentary.

\(^{2812}\) [1183, 2010] A/CONF.80/16, 35th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 17.
in the context of the succession of States, the newly independent State would “step into the shoes of the predecessor State”. These last words could imply that the Commission considered that the transmission of objections should be the rule.

(4) In order to justify its silence on the question of objections to reservations, the Commission invoked an argument based on their legal effects. It noted, on the one hand, that unless the objecting State has definitely indicated that by its objection it means to preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the reserving State and the objecting State, the legal position created by an objection to a reservation is “much the same as if no objection had been lodged”, and, on the other, that if such an indication is given, the treaty will not have been in force at all between the predecessor State and the reserving State at the date of the succession. This also implies that the Commission considered that the prior (maximum-effect) objections of the predecessor State continued to apply.

(5) This was, moreover, the position of Waldock, who, while highlighting the scarcity of practice in this regard, had suggested, again along the lines of the proposals put forward by D.P. O’Connell to the International Law Association, that the rules regarding reservations should apply mutatis mutandis to objections. In particular, this meant that the same presumption that the Commission would later make with respect to reservations formulated by newly independent States, in its draft article 19, paragraph 1, which was reproduced in article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, would apply to objections. The second Special Rapporteur on the topic, Sir Francis Vallat, also supported the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections formulated by the

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2813 [1184, 2010] Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II, Part One, p. 226, para. (15) of the commentary; see also para. (23), at p. 227. This explanation was recalled at the 1977–1978 Vienna Conference by Sir Francis Vallat, acting as an expert consultant; see A/CONF.80/16, 27th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 83.

2814 [1185, 2010] In this regard, see P.-H. Imbert, footnote 522 above, p. 320, note 126.

2815 [1186, 2010] See above, however, guidelines 4.3 and 4.3.1 to 4.3.7 and the commentaries thereto.


2818 [1189, 2010] See draft article 9, para. 3 (a), contained in his third report: “The rules laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 regarding reservations apply also, mutatis mutandis, to objections to reservations”; Yearbook ... 1970, vol. II, p. 47.
predecessor State: “on the whole, the reasoning which supports the retention of the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations also supports the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections which is inherent in the present draft”, especially, he stressed, since in any event it would “always be open to the successor State to withdraw the objection if it wishes to do so”. Nonetheless, Sir Francis considered that there seemed to be “no need to complicate the draft by making express provisions with respect to objections”.

(6) Already noted 35 years ago by Professor Giorgio Gaja, the dearth of practice in this area is still apparent. It should be noted, however, that certain elements of recent practice also seem to support the maintenance of objections. Mention should be made of a number of cases in which a newly independent State, in notifying its succession, confirmed the objections made by the predecessor State to reservations formulated by States parties to the treaty. There have also been a few cases in which objections formulated by the predecessor State have been withdrawn and, at the same time, new objections have been formulated. With respect to successor States other than newly independent States, it may be noted, for example, that Slovakia explicitly maintained the objections made by Czechoslovakia to reservations formulated by other States parties to the treaties to which it succeeded. Similarly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated that it maintained the objections made by the former Yugoslavia, and Montenegro stated that it maintained the objections made by Serbia and Montenegro.

(7) It is not immediately clear how this recent practice should be interpreted: it leans in the direction of continuity but could also reflect the absence of a set rule; otherwise, such statements

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2819 [1190, 2010] See para. 1 of guideline 5.1.1 above.
2823 [1194, 2010] Multilateral Treaties ..., footnote 341 above, chap. III.3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: Malta repeated, upon succession, some of the objections formulated by the United Kingdom, and Tonga indicated that it “adopted” the objections made by the United Kingdom with respect to the reservations and statements made by Egypt; chap. XXI.1, Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and chap. XXI.2, Convention on the High Seas (Fiji); chap. XXI.4, Convention on the Continental Shelf (Tonga).
2824 [1195, 2010] Ibid., chap. XXI.2, Convention on the High Seas (Fiji).
would have been unnecessary. It nevertheless seems reasonable and logical to revert, in guideline 5.2.1, to the solution proposed by Waldock, who suggested that the rules regarding reservations should apply *mutatis mutandis* to objections, bearing in mind that, even though the Commission ultimately opted not to include in its draft articles a provision dealing specifically with objections to reservations, the solution proposed by the Special Rapporteur did not give rise to any substantive objections in the Commission.

(8) Like the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations, established in article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections is warranted for both newly independent States and other successor States. However, there are exceptions to the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections in certain cases involving the uniting of two or more States, which are referred to in guideline 5.2.2.

(9) Although it refers generally to “a successor State”, i.e. a State that replaces another in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory, guideline 5.2.1 refers only to cases whereby a successor State acquires its status as a party or a contracting State to a treaty by succession, regardless of whether this succession occurs *ipso jure* or through notification. However, the presumption set out in this guideline does not apply to situations in which a successor State that does not succeed *ipso jure* to a treaty decides to become a party or contracting State to that treaty by means other than making a notification of its succession, for instance by acceding to it within the meaning of article 11 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

5.2.2 [5.11] Irrelevance of certain objections in cases involving a uniting of States

1. When, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of any of them continues in force in respect of the State so formed, such objections to a reservation as may have been formulated by any such State which, at the date of the succession of States, was a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force shall not be maintained.

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2828 [1199, 2010] The same could be said of a number of the clarifications proposed under Part 5 of the Guide to Practice, but the case at hand is especially striking, owing to the extreme scarcity of precedents.

2829 [1200, 2010] See above para. (5) of the commentary to this guideline.

2830 [1201, 2010] See the definitions of “succession of States” and “successor State” contained, respectively, in art. 2, paras. 1 (b) and (d), of the 1978 Vienna Convention.
2. When, following a uniting of two or more States, the successor State is a party or a contracting State to a treaty to which it has maintained reservations in conformity with guideline 5.1.1 or 5.1.2, objections to a reservation made by another contracting State or a contracting organization or by a State or an international organization party to the treaty shall not be maintained if the reservation is identical or equivalent to a reservation which the successor State itself has maintained.

Commentary

(1) Guideline 5.1.3, “Irrelevance of certain reservations in cases involving a uniting of States”, sets out the exception that must qualify the principle of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations in certain situations that may arise in connection with the uniting of two or more States. Such situations arise when, at the date of the succession of States, a treaty in force for one of the predecessor States continues in force for the State formed from a uniting of States: in these circumstances, the reservations formulated by a predecessor State that, at the date of the succession of States, was only a contracting State to the treaty in question shall not be maintained.\[1202, 2010\] See the commentary to guideline 5.1.3 above.

(2) As the same causes produce the same effects, guideline 5.2.1, which sets out the principle that the successor State is presumed to maintain the predecessor State’s objections to reservations formulated by other contracting States or contracting international organizations or parties to a treaty to which it has succeeded, should be qualified by the same exception when the above-mentioned situations arise. Paragraph 1 of this guideline specifies that when a treaty continues in force in respect of a unified State, objections to a reservation formulated one of the uniting States which, at the date of the succession of States, was a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force shall not be maintained.

(3) Provision may, however, be made for another situation, one that is specific to objections, by establishing a second exception to the principle laid down in guideline 5.2.1. Paragraph 2 of guideline 5.2.2 sets out this exception, which is justified on logical grounds and relates to the fact that a successor State cannot maintain both a reservation formulated by one of the uniting States and, at the same time, objections made by another such State to an identical or equivalent
reservation formulated by a contracting State or party to the treaty that is a third State in relation to the succession of States.

5.2.3 [5.12] Maintenance of objections to reservations of the predecessor State

When a reservation formulated by the predecessor State is considered as being maintained by the successor State in conformity with guideline 5.1.1 or 5.1.2, any objection to that reservation formulated by another contracting State or State party or by a contracting organization or international organization party to the treaty shall be considered as being maintained in respect of the successor State.

Commentary

(1) This guideline sets out the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections formulated by a contracting State or party to the treaty in relation to reservations of the predecessor State that are considered as being maintained by the successor State in conformity with guidelines 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.

(2) This presumption seems to be called for. It would be difficult to explain why a contracting State or party to a treaty should have to reiterate an objection it has already formulated with respect to a reservation of the predecessor State that applied to the territory to which the succession of States relates.2832 The objecting State will always have the freedom to withdraw its objection if it does not wish to maintain it in respect of the successor State.

(3) The presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections to reservations of the predecessor State that are maintained by the successor State also finds support in the views expressed by certain delegations at the 1977–1978 Vienna Conference. For example, the representative of Japan indicated that it could go along with the International Law Commission’s text of draft article 19 on the understanding that “a State party which had objected to the original reservation which had been made by the predecessor State did not need to repeat the objection with regard to the successor State”.2833 A similar view was expressed by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who considered, with respect to both newly independent States and other successor States, that “the

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successor State was bound *ipso jure* by the individual treaty relationship created by the predecessor State, including the reservations and other declarations made by that State and the objections thereto entered by its treaty partners".2834

### 5.2.4 [5.13] Reservations of the predecessor State to which no objections have been made

When a reservation formulated by the predecessor State is considered as being maintained by the successor State in conformity with guideline 5.1.1 or 5.1.2, a contracting State or State party or a contracting organization or international organization party to the treaty that had not objected to the reservation in respect of the predecessor State may not object to it in respect of the successor State, unless:

(a) the time period for formulating an objection has not yet expired at the date of the succession of States and the objection is made within that time period; or

(b) the territorial extension of the treaty radically changes the conditions for the operation of the reservation.

**Commentary**

(1) This guideline addresses the situation where a contracting State or State party to a treaty has not objected in time to a reservation formulated by a predecessor State and considered as being maintained by the successor State after a succession of States. In these circumstances, it would be difficult to conceive why such a tacit acceptance of the reservation should be called into question merely because a succession of States has taken place. Accordingly, the guideline excludes, in principle, the capacity of a contracting State or State party to a treaty to object, in respect of a successor State, to a reservation to which it had not objected in respect of the predecessor State. However, there are two possible exceptions.

(2) The first exception, addressed in subparagraph (a), concerns the case in which the succession of States takes place prior to the expiry of the time period during which a contracting State or State party to a treaty could have objected to a reservation formulated by the predecessor State.2835

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such a situation, the capacity of a contracting State or contracting international organization or of a State or international organization party to the treaty to formulate an objection up until the expiry of that period should be recognized.

(3) The second exception, addressed in subparagraph (b), concerns the case in which “the territorial extension of the treaty radically changes the conditions for the operation of the reservation”. This hypothesis may be realized in the situations dealt with in guideline 5.1.6, in which the territorial scope of a reservation is extended because of the extension of the territorial scope of the treaty itself following a uniting of States. Even in such a situation, in order for a State or international organization that has not objected in time to the reservation prior to the date of the succession of States to be able to object to it, it would be necessary that the maintenance of the reservation the territorial scope of which has been extended should upset the balance of the treaty: that is the sense of the restrictive formulation of this exception, which covers only those situations in which the territorial extension of the reservation “radically changes the conditions for the operation of the reservation”.

(4) The relevance of the type of situation contemplated in subparagraph (b) was a subject of debate in the Commission. According to a different view, guideline 5.2.4 should not refer to such situations, since the problem that might arise would actually relate to the extension of the territorial scope of the treaty itself, which is governed by the 1978 Vienna Convention, rather than to the extension of the territorial scope of the reservation, which is only a consequence of it.

5.2.5 [5.14] Capacity of a successor State to formulate objections to reservations

1. When making a notification of succession establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty, a newly independent State may, in the conditions laid down in the relevant guidelines of the Guide to Practice, object to reservations formulated by a contracting State or State party or by a contracting organization or international organization party to the treaty, even if the predecessor State made no such objection.

2836 [1207, 2010] See in particular article 31 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, which excludes the territorial extension of a treaty by notification by the successor State “if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the successor State would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation”.

2. A successor State, other than a newly independent State, shall also have the capacity provided for in paragraph 1 when making a notification establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but in respect of which the predecessor State was a contracting State.

3. The capacity referred to in the foregoing paragraphs shall nonetheless not be recognized in the case of treaties falling under guidelines 2.8.2 and 4.1.2.

Commentary

(1) This guideline concerns the capacity of the successor State to formulate objections to reservations formulated in respect of a treaty to which it becomes a contracting State or a party following a succession of States. As in other guidelines, it is necessary to distinguish in that regard two different situations, which call for different solutions:

• On the one hand, cases where a successor State is free to decide whether or not to succeed to a treaty and establishes its status as a contracting State or, where applicable, a party to the treaty when notifying its succession; and

• On the other hand, cases of “automatic succession” in which the successor State “inherits” an existing treaty without being called upon to express its consent.

Guideline 5.2.5 covers only the first hypothesis, while guideline 5.2.6 covers the second.

(2) The hypothesis covered by guideline 5.2.5 in turn encompasses two different situations:

• The situation, dealt with in paragraph 1, of a newly independent State making a notification of succession; \(^{2837}\)

• The situation, dealt with in paragraph 2, of a successor State other than a newly independent State which, by making a notification to that effect, establishes its status as a contracting State or a party to a treaty which, at the date of succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but in respect of which the predecessor State was a contracting State.

\(^{2837}\) [1208, 2010] See articles 17 and 18 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, the text of which is reproduced above in footnote 1093 above.
In both cases envisaged in the guideline, the successor State has the choice as to whether or not to become a party to the treaty. That being the case, there is no reason in principle why it cannot formulate new objections when establishing its status as a contracting State or a party to the treaty by a notification pursuant to paragraph 1 of guideline 5.1.1 or paragraph 3 of guideline 5.1.2. That is the solution set out for each of those two situations in paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively, of guideline 5.2.5.

Waldock had briefly considered this issue in his third report on the succession of States in respect of treaties and took the view that, “whenever a successor State becomes a party not by inheritance but by an independent act establishing its consent to be bound, logic would indicate that it should be wholly responsible for its own reservations, acceptances and objections, and that its relation to any reservations, acceptances and objections of its predecessor should be the same as that of any other new party to the treaty”.

It does indeed seem logical to apply to objections the same reasoning that underlies guidelines 5.1.1, paragraph 2, and 5.1.2, paragraph 3, concerning the formulation of reservations by a successor State. Since, in the cases considered here, succession to a treaty takes place only by virtue of a deliberate act on the part of the successor State (a “notification of succession” or, in the case of successor States other than newly independent States, a “notification”), the successor State should be free to modify its treaty obligations, not only by formulating reservations but also, if it so desires, by objecting to reservations formulated by other States even before the date of its succession to the treaty.

Moreover, while practice in this area is scarce, there have been cases in which newly independent States have formulated new objections when notifying their succession to a treaty. For example, Fiji withdrew objections made by the predecessor State and formulated new objections upon making a notification of succession to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.

Paragraph 3 of the guideline, however, states an exception to the capacity of the successor State to formulate objections that is recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2. The exception concerns the situations covered by article 20, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions — the content of which is reproduced in guideline 4.1.2 — in which a reservation to the treaty must be

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2838 [1209, 2010] Yearbook ... 1970, vol. II, p. 47, para. (2) of the commentary to draft article 9; see also para. (5) of the commentary to guideline 5.2.1 above.

2839 [1210, 2010] In this regard, in the case of newly independent States, see G. Gaja, footnote 1106 above, p. 66.
accepted by all parties. The exception was proposed by Waldock in his third report; draft article 9, paragraph 3, which established the principle that the same rules should apply to both objections and reservations, included a subparagraph (b) worded as follows:

(b) However, in the case of a treaty falling under article 20, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention, no objection may be formulated by a new State to a reservation which has been accepted by all the parties to the treaty.2841

This exception is intended to ensure that a successor State cannot, by formulating an objection, compel the reserving State to withdraw from such a treaty. It is also consistent with guideline 2.8.2 (Unanimous acceptance of reservations),2842 to which paragraph 3 refers.

(7) The brevity of the reference in paragraph 1 of the guideline to “the conditions laid down in the relevant guidelines of the Guide to Practice” is warranted by the fact that it would be difficult if not impossible to give an exhaustive list in the draft guideline itself of all the guidelines applicable to the formulation of objections. For the most part the relevant guidelines are contained in section 2.6 of the Guide to Practice concerning the formulation of objections.

(8) Among those guidelines particular attention should be paid to guideline 2.6.13,2843 which reproduces the temporal requirement set forth in article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. In the case of an objection by a successor State to a prior reservation, the application of the time limit leads to the conclusion that the successor State has a period of 12 months from the date it has established by notification its status as a contracting State or a party to the treaty within which to formulate the objection. In view of the voluntary nature of succession in the cases contemplated by the present guideline, it is not until the successor State establishes its status as a contracting State or a party to a given treaty that it can be expected to inquire into all the reservations that have been formulated to the treaty and to examine them in order to decide whether

2841 [1212, 2010] Yearbook ... 1970, vol. II, p. 47; see also the explanation of the grounds for this proposal, ibid., p. 52, para. (17) of the commentary to draft article 9.
2842 [1213, 2010] Guideline 2.8.2 reads: “In the event of a reservation requiring unanimous acceptance by some or all States or international organizations which are parties or entitled to become parties to the treaty, such an acceptance once obtained is final”; see the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-first session, 4 May–5 June and 6 July–7 August 2009, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10), p. 212 (commentary, pp. 229–232).
2843 [1214, 2010] That guideline reads: “Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a State or an international organization may formulate an objection to a reservation by the end of a period of 12 months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which such State or international organization expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.” For the commentary, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/63/10), pp. 213–217.
or not it intends to object. In that light, it would appear, then, to be in keeping with the spirit of article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1969 Vienna Convention as reproduced in guideline 2.6.13 to allow the successor States that fall under guideline 5.2.5 a time period of 12 months from the date of notification of their succession to the treaty.

5.2.6 [5.15] Objections by a successor State other than a newly independent State in respect of which a treaty continues in force

A successor State, other than a newly independent State, in respect of which a treaty continues in force following a succession of States may not formulate an objection to a reservation to which the predecessor State had not objected unless the time period for formulating an objection has not yet expired at the date of the succession of States and the objection is made within that time period.

Commentary

(1) This guideline, which deals with a situation excluded from the scope of guideline 5.2.5, applies to a successor State other than a newly independent State when, following a uniting or separation of States, a treaty continues in force in respect of that State in the context of a succession that can be termed “automatic”, that is, when a treaty continues in force, following a succession of States, in respect of a successor State other than a newly independent State even though there has been no expression of consent by that State. Under Part IV of the 1978 Vienna Convention, such a situation arises, in principle, in the case of a State formed from a uniting of two or more States in relation to treaties in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of any of the predecessor States. The same is true of a State formed from a separation of States in relation to treaties in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State, as well as treaties that were in force in respect only of that part of the territory of the predecessor State that corresponds to the territory of the successor State.

(2) Since, in the situations envisaged in the present guideline, the succession to the treaty does not depend on an expression of intent on the part of the State formed from the uniting or separation

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[2844] [1215, 2010] See article 31 of the Convention.
[2845] [1216, 2010] See article 34 of the Convention.
of States, that State inherits all of the predecessor State’s rights and obligations under the treaty, including objections (or the absence thereof) that the predecessor State had (or had not) formulated in respect of a reservation to the treaty. As one author has written, “When … succession is considered to be automatic, the admissibility of objections on the part of the successor State must be ruled out … If the predecessor State had accepted the reservation, such consent cannot be subsequently revoked either by the same State or by its successor.” It does not appear, moreover, that successor States other than newly independent States have claimed the right to formulate objections to reservations to which the predecessor State had not objected.

(3) As in the case of guideline 5.2.4 (Reservations of the predecessor State to which no objections have been made), an exception should nonetheless be made for cases in which a succession of States takes place prior to the expiry of the time period during which the predecessor State could have objected to a reservation formulated by another contracting State or party to the treaty. In such a situation, recognizing the successor State’s capacity to formulate an objection to such a reservation up until the expiry of that period seems warranted.

5.3 Acceptances of reservations and succession of States

5.3.1 Maintenance by a newly independent State of express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State

When a newly independent State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty, it shall be considered as maintaining any express acceptance by the predecessor State of a reservation formulated by a contracting State or by a contracting organization unless it expresses a contrary intention within 12 months of the date of the notification of succession.
Commentary

(1) This guideline deals with the status of express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State. That is the only question that remains to be settled in the Guide to Practice with regard to acceptances of reservations in the context of the succession of States. On the one hand, there is no reason to question the right of the successor State to formulate an express acceptance of a reservation formulated, prior to the date of succession to a treaty, by a State or international organization that is a party or a contracting party: the successor State may, of course, exercise this capacity, pursuant to guideline 2.8.3, as any State is entitled to do at any time, and there is therefore no need for another draft guideline on the matter. On the other hand, what happens in the case of tacit acceptance by a predecessor State which did not object to a reservation in time prior to the date of the succession of States is governed by draft guidelines 5.2.5 and 5.2.6.

(2) As with reservations and objections, the question of the status of express acceptances formulated by a predecessor State calls for an approach that varies, at least in part, according to whether the succession to the treaty occurs through a notification by the successor State or ipso jure.

(3) In the case of newly independent States, succession to a treaty occurs by virtue of a notification of succession. In this context, article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, reproduced in guideline 5.1.1, paragraph 1, establishes the presumption in favour of the newly independent State’s maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations unless, when making the notification of succession, the newly independent State expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as the reservation of the predecessor State. The Commission is of the view that, although practice regarding express acceptances of reservations in connection with the succession of States appears to be non-existent, the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations should logically be transposed to express acceptances.

(4) By analogy, it also seems appropriate to recognize the capacity of the newly independent State to express its intention not to maintain an express acceptance formulated by the predecessor

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2851 [1222, 2010] See the commentary to guideline 5.1.1, para. (4), footnote 1093 above and accompanying text.
State in respect of a reservation. That capacity does not constitute a derogation from the general rule regarding the final nature of acceptance of a reservation, set forth in guideline 2.8.12:2852 the voluntary nature of succession to the treaty by the newly independent State justifies this apparent derogation, just as it justifies the newly independent State’s capacity to formulate new reservations when making its notification of succession to the treaty,2853 as recognized in article 20, paragraph 2, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, or the capacity of such a State to formulate objections to reservations that were formulated prior to the date of the notification of succession as recognized in guideline 5.2.5.

(5) However, the question of the time period within which the newly independent State may express its intention not to maintain an express acceptance by the predecessor State remains to be addressed. With respect to the non-maintenance of a reservation made by the predecessor State, article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention requires that the newly independent State must express its intention to that effect when making its notification of succession to the treaty. Does the same requirement apply with respect to the non-maintenance of an express acceptance? In the latter case, logic suggests that, by analogy, the approach taken with regard to a newly independent State’s formulation of an objection to a reservation formulated prior to the date of the notification of succession should be followed. In fact, it appears that the potential effects of non-maintenance of an express acceptance can be likened, to a great extent, to those of the formulation of a new objection. Consequently, guideline 5.3.1 on the maintenance by a newly independent State of the express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State should be based on the rule applicable to the formulation of an objection by the successor State, and 12 months should be retained as the time period within which the newly independent State may express its intention not to maintain an express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State.2854 Whereas guideline 5.2.5 concerning objections formulated by a successor State merely refers, in that regard, to the “conditions laid down in the relevant guidelines of the Guide to Practice”, which of course include the temporal requirement mentioned, in the present guideline it is not sufficient to refer to general rules, since the question of the maintenance or non-maintenance by the successor State of an

2853 [1224, 2010] See guideline 5.1.1, para. (2) above.
2854 [1225, 2010] See para. (8) of the commentary to guideline 5.2.5 above.
express acceptance of a reservation made by the predecessor State does not arise except in relation to the succession of States. It is thus appropriate to stipulate expressly a period of 12 months, on the basis of the approach taken with respect to the formulation of an objection by a successor State.

(6) A newly independent State’s expression of its intention on this matter may be conveyed either through its explicit withdrawal of the express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State, or through the formulation by a newly independent State of an objection to the reservation which had been expressly accepted by the predecessor State, the content of which objection would be incompatible, in whole or in part, with that acceptance.

5.3.2 [5.17] Maintenance by a successor State other than a newly independent State of express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State

1. A successor State, other than a newly independent State, in respect of which a treaty continues in force following a succession of States shall be considered as maintaining any express acceptance by the predecessor State of a reservation formulated by a contracting State or by a contracting organization.

2. When making a notification of succession establishing its status as a contracting State or as a party to a treaty which, on the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but to which the predecessor State was a contracting State, a successor State other than a newly independent State shall be considered as maintaining any express acceptance by the predecessor State of a reservation formulated by a contracting State or by a contracting organization unless it expresses a contrary intention within 12 months of the date of the notification of succession.

Commentary

(1) In the case of successor States other than newly independent States, the question of the status of express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State calls for a more nuanced approach. It is necessary to distinguish situations where succession occurs *ipso jure* from those where it occurs through notification.

(2) The first situation is governed by paragraph 1 of the present guideline. It arises, in cases involving the uniting or separation of States, with respect to treaties which, on the date of the
sucession of States, were in force for the predecessor State and remain in force for the successor Stat Hunger. Guideline 5.2.6 provides that in such a situation the successor State may not formulate an objection to a reservation to which the predecessor State did not object in a timely manner. 

A fortiori, such a successor State may not call into question an express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State.

(3) On the other hand, matters are different in the situation, envisaged in paragraph 2 of the present guideline, where succession to a treaty by a State formed from the uniting or separation of States occurs only through notification to that effect – as is the case with treaties which on the date of the succession of States were not in force for the predecessor State but to which it was a contracting State. In that situation — as for the formulation of new reservations and new objections — such other successor States must be recognized as having the same capacity that newly independent States have under guideline 5.3.1.

5.3.3 [5.18] Timing of the effects of non-maintenance by a successor State of an express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State

The non-maintenance, in conformity with guideline 5.3.1 or guideline 5.3.2, paragraph 2, by the successor State of the express acceptance by the predecessor State of a reservation formulated by a contracting State or by a contracting organization becomes operative in relation to a contracting State or a contracting organization only when notice of it has been received by that State or that organization.

Commentary

This guideline concerns the effects ratione temporis of the non-maintenance by a successor State of an express acceptance of a reservation by the predecessor State. On that point, there seems to be no reason to depart from the approach adopted in guideline 5.1.8 concerning the timing of the effects of non-maintenance by a successor State of a reservation formulated by the predecessor State.

2855 [1226, 2010] See the commentary to guideline 5.1.2 above, particularly para. (3).
2856 [1227, 2010] See article 20, para. 2, of the 1978 Vienna Convention and guideline 5.1.1, para. 2.
2857 [1228, 2010] See guideline 5.2.5, para. (2).
5.4 Interpretative declarations and succession of States

5.4.1 [5.19] Interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State

A successor State should, to the extent possible, clarify its position concerning interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State. In the absence of any such clarification, a successor State shall be considered as maintaining the interpretative declarations of the predecessor State.

The preceding paragraph is without prejudice to situations in which the successor State has demonstrated, by its conduct, its intention to maintain or to reject an interpretative declaration formulated by the predecessor State.

Commentary

(1) The succession of States to treaties may also raise questions with regard to interpretative declarations, on which the 1978 Vienna Convention, despite an unsuccessful attempt at an amendment, is as silent as the 1969 and 1986 Conventions.

(2) Although the text of the Convention is silent on this matter, two questions arise: the first concerns the status of interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State, while the second is whether the successor State has the capacity to formulate its own interpretative declarations when it succeeds to the treaty, or thereafter. In either case, it must be borne in mind that according to guideline 2.4.3, “without prejudice to the provisions of guidelines 1.2.1, 2.4.6 and 2.4.7, an interpretative declaration may be formulated at any time”.

2858 [1229, 2010] At the Vienna Conference, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany proposed an amendment that would have expanded the scope of article 20, the only provision of the 1978 Convention in which the status of reservations is mentioned. The amendment would have preceded the rules concerning reservations, as proposed by the International Law Commission, with a statement that “any statement or instrument made in respect to the treaty in connection with its conclusion or signature by the predecessor State, shall remain effective for the newly independent State” (A/CONF.80/16, 28th meeting; and A/CONF.80/14, para. 118 (b), reproduced in Documents of the Conference (A/CONF.80/16/Add.2)). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany later withdrew this proposed amendment, to which, for various reasons, several delegations had objected (A/CONF.80/16, 27th meeting, para. 73 (Algeria, which considered that the proposed amendment seemed to affect the principle of self-determination); para. 78 (Poland, which believed that the proposed amendment was not sufficiently clear); para. 87 (Madagascar, which was of the view that the wording of the proposed amendment was “much too broad in scope”); para. 90 (Guyana); and para. 95 (Italy, which found the wording of the proposed amendment “very strong and inflexible”).

2859 [1230, 2010] Guidelines 1.2.1 and 2.4.7 concern conditional interpretative declarations, which appear to be subject to the legal regime applicable to reservations. Guideline 2.4.6 concerns the late formulation of an interpretative declaration where a treaty provides that an interpretative declaration may be made only at specified times, in which case this special rule takes precedence over the general rule.
(3) Guideline 5.4.1, which is formulated in general terms in order to cover all cases of succession, seeks to answer the first of the two questions raised in the preceding paragraph, namely, the status of interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State. Practice provides no answer to this question. Furthermore, interpretative declarations are extremely diverse, both in their intrinsic nature and in their potential effects. It is these considerations, moreover, that explain, at least in part, the lack of detail in the rules governing interpretative declarations in the Guide to Practice. Under these conditions, it is probably best to opt for prudence and pragmatism.

(4) In this spirit, paragraph 1 of the guideline makes a recommendation that States should, to the extent possible, clarify their position concerning interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State. On several occasions, the Commission has taken the view that such an approach was appropriate in the context of a Guide to Practice that is not intended to become the text of a convention. This is especially true in the present case since, in the absence of express treaty provisions, States have broad discretion as to whether and when to make such declarations.

(5) That said, paragraph 1 sets forth the presumption, which seems reasonable in the context of succession to treaties, that, in the absence of such clarification, a successor State shall be considered as maintaining the interpretative declarations of the predecessor State.

(6) Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the guideline recognizes that there are situations in which, in the absence of an explicit position taken by the successor State, the latter’s conduct might answer the question of whether or not it subscribes to an interpretative declaration formulated by the predecessor State; in such cases, this conduct would suffice to establish the status of the predecessor State’s interpretative declarations.

(7) With regard to the second question raised in paragraph (2) of the commentary to this guideline, namely the successor State’s capacity to formulate interpretative declarations, including declarations that the predecessor State did not formulate, there is little doubt that the existence of this capacity follows directly from guideline 2.4.3, which states that an interpretative declaration may, with some exceptions, be formulated at any time. Hence there appears to be no valid reason to deprive any successor State of a capacity that the predecessor State could have exercised.

2860 [1231, 2010] See in particular guidelines 2.1.9, 2.4.0, 2.4.3 bis, 2.6.10 and 2.9.3.
at any time. The Commission therefore did not deem it necessary to devote a specific draft guideline to this question.

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