International Criminal Justice: Where do we stand today?

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

[Introduction]

It is a very great pleasure to be here today to deliver the inaugural Oxford Global Justice Lecture. I am delighted to speak of the development of international law in recent decades, which has been shaped to an enormous extent by judicial institutions established by the international community. It is timely, then, that your conference will focus on the changing nature of international institutions and their impact on the international legal framework.

Of the subject which I will speak about is international criminal justice, an intrinsic part of today’s international legal landscape which would be almost unrecognisable to a jurist of the early twentieth century is that of international criminal justice. The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) in the early 1990s demonstrated a new-found and serious commitment on the part of the international community that those responsible for perpetrating the most serious crimes of international concern should be held accountable for their actions. Over the past two decades in particular, international criminal justice has made an indelible mark upon international relations.
I have found in my five years as Legal Counsel that this topic has woven its way through my daily work in one way and another.

Twenty years after the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, and ten years after the establishment of the International Criminal Court, we have the opportunity to take stock of the developments and achievements in the field of international criminal justice. Now is a good moment to assess where we stand. I ask myself: – What lessons can we learn from the establishment and operation of the international criminal tribunals? The ICTY, ICTR and Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) draw close to completing their mandates and to transferring their remaining functions to residual mechanisms. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is currently engaged in bringing justice to the people of Cambodia who suffered so terribly under Khmer Rouge rule. And the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) will begin its trial proceedings this year. While the STL is distinct in nature and mandate from the other UN and UN-assisted tribunals, it is acting as a catalyst for the implementation of the rule of law in the region. We now need to focus on how the ICC can ensure that it lives up to the expectations placed by the international community upon it as the world’s first permanent international criminal court.

I will take this opportune moment, first, to identify the principal challenges faced by international criminal justice today, and then to highlight some lessons which might be learned from the past twenty years. My Office – the Office of Legal Affairs – has been closely involved in the establishment and operation of the international and UN-assisted tribunals, working with them on a daily basis. We have a unique perspective on the issues faced by the international criminal tribunals throughout their mandates and as they move into their residual phase. We were also intimately involved in the birth of the ICC and now work closely to support it on a range of matters. We can draw, then, on the benefit of our experience across the full landscape of international criminal justice.
Your conference affords us the opportunity to consider why international criminal justice really matters. So, having set out the challenges which have been faced in building the system which we have today, I will move to analyse some of the theoretical bases for international criminal justice.

Finally, I will look at the principal effects of the developments in international criminal law over the past two decades. These effects, of course, reach beyond the courtrooms of The Hague, Arusha, Freetown and Phnom Penh. The impact of international criminal law can be heard in the dialogues and discussions which take place in the Security Council, the General Assembly and many other fora, both national and international. It can be seen in the newspaper headlines which call for justice and an end to impunity for those who commit serious international crimes – headlines which would simply not have been written twenty-five years ago. And, perhaps most importantly, given the centrality of the principle of complementarity to the system, it can be seen in the development of the capacity – and willingness – of domestic jurisdictions to try international criminals.

[The challenges faced by international criminal justice].

Turning first, to the challenges faced by international criminal justice.

The international and UN-assisted tribunals, and likewise the ICC, have been subject to criticism on a number of levels. Some of these criticisms stem from difficulties which the courts and tribunals face at a practical level. Other challenges are deeper and relate to the question which I will address later, namely why should Member States and international organisations expend political and financial capital in support of international criminal justice at all.

Accused persons have a fundamental right to trial without undue delay. We must acknowledge that the magnitude of the crimes of which defendants before international tribunals are accused is of a different scale to crimes tried before domestic courts. The
consequence is that disclosure and presentation of documentary and witness evidence is often extensive. This must not, however, preclude trials from proceeding speedily and efficiently. A balance must be found between ensuring a fair trial for the accused and moving proceedings forward expeditiously. Indeed, these twin goals should be mutually reinforcing.

Questions have been raised about the length of the first proceedings before the ICC. Its first case (Lubanga), involving a single accused on what was effectively a single charge, took over three years from the opening of the trial to delivery of the verdict. Its second verdict (Ngudjolo), which involved another single accused facing charges relating to a single incident on a single day, followed a trial which also lasted a full three years.

In this regard, it is worth remembering that the ICTY and the ICTR also faced criticism for the length of their proceedings, the most extreme case being that of the Butare trial before the ICTR, which lasted a full ten years. However, despite their slow starts, the ICTY and ICTR certainly improved their handling of the cases and, as time has passed, have conducted trials more expeditiously than in their earlier years. Lessons were learned and improvements made. However, we must also bear in mind that the ICTY and the ICTR have not only developed an almost entirely new body of jurisprudence. The tribunals have also had to address and resolve novel, complex and varied procedural issues to ensure the fairness of the proceedings before.

I think we can anticipate that the ICC will follow a similar trajectory, as its workload increases and it gains experience and develops its jurisprudence. It will be some time before we know for sure whether it has met this challenge and its first major, complex cases still lie ahead.
This brings me to a further challenge faced by international criminal justice. It is often said that international justice is neither swift nor cheap. Indeed, the budgets of the ICTY and ICTR to date run to over some $3.5 billion. The first ten years of the ICC have cost States close to $1 billion. I will later evaluate whether the achievements of international criminal justice have justified Member States’ commitment to the system, in financial and other terms.

International and UN-assisted tribunals can be funded in two ways: as part of the expenses of the Organisation, or through voluntary contributions. Funding has been a crucial issue for all of the international tribunals, and insecurity as to financing has at times had a deleterious effect on their work. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General at the time of establishment of the SCSL, cautioned against it being reliant on voluntary funding. He reiterated this message when the ECCC was being established, emphasising that “the operation of judicial bodies cannot be left entirely to the vagaries of voluntary funding”. This position has been borne out. Uncertain financing has, at times, had a negative impact on the ability of certain tribunals to attract and retain staff. It is clearly problematic to conduct trials to prosecute the most serious international crimes in circumstances in which there is doubt as to whether there will be sufficient funds to conclude those proceedings. These are challenges with which my Office deals on a day-to-day basis, particularly at present in regard to the ECCC.

Having made a commitment that there will be no impunity for those who commit serious international crimes, the international community must ensure that the institutions charged with bringing perpetrators to justice have the resources – financial and otherwise – to do so.

The means required to bring such individuals to justice extend beyond money and people: international tribunals and the ICC are heavily reliant upon the cooperation of Member States to fulfil their mandates. The jurisdiction of the ICC, as a treaty-based institution, extends only to the 122 States Parties to the Rome Statute, and to States which make a voluntary declaration accepting the Court’s
jurisdiction. Referral of a situation to the ICC by the Security Council – as has occurred with regard to the situations in Darfur and Libya – is subject, of course, to the veto power of the five permanent members of the Council.

Although the ICC enjoys the firm support of many countries, including many which are not States Parties, and although the number of States Parties continues steadily to grow, we still remain a long way from universal ratification of the Rome Statute. Large parts of the world, particularly in Asia, remain outside the Court’s scope. We also remain some way from full compliance with their obligations by those States which are parties to the Rome Statute. The ICC relies upon Member States to provide it with evidence, to enforce warrants of arrest, to protect and relocate witnesses, and to enforce sentences. Unfortunately, there have been instances in which Member States have not complied with the orders issued by the Court, and individuals who are the subject of arrest warrants have travelled with relative freedom in certain jurisdictions.

This brings me to the final challenge facing the regime of international criminal justice which I will address today, namely the expectations placed upon it. As the Secretary-General declared in 2010 during his address to the ICC Review Conference in Kampala, we now talk of an “age of accountability”. The international and UN-assisted criminal tribunals were each created in the aftermath of grave atrocities. Yet we find ourselves confronted with situations such as that in Syria today, where, the UN Commission of Inquiry recently estimated, as many as 70,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad began in March 2011. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has highlighted that Syrians are fleeing their homes in ever-increasing numbers – an estimated 2 million people have been internally displaced, with over one million Syrians having sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

Although there have been calls for the perpetrators – including those in the highest echelons of power – to be brought to justice since that conflict began, the international community has so far been
unable to act – collectively at least. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has called upon the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC, although no referral has to date been made.

A lot is expected of the ICC. Hopes are expressed, each time that atrocities are committed, that the ICC will be able to “fill the gap” when national legal systems stand by, unable or unwilling to act. Sometimes, it has been able to, as in the cases of Libya and Mali. In others, though, it too stands by, helpless to act. And failure weakens faith in the system of international criminal justice, or breeds the cynicism that says that international criminal justice is selective and partial – that it brings only the friendless and the powerless to justice and that those who are, or who have, powerful masters continue to enjoy the impunity they always have. But this ignores the wider picture – the phenomenon of complementarity – and to this I will return.

As I move to analyse a range of theories of international criminal justice, it will become clear that a vast range of goals are attributed to the system. It is my view that while international criminal justice may well fulfil a number of these goals, at the end of the day its principal function lies in upholding the principle of accountability and the end of impunity. Maintenance of this principle at the centre of the system does not preclude international criminal justice meeting some of the other goals which I will come on to discuss.

[The bases and arguments in favour of international criminal justice]

An assessment of where matters stand today in the field of international criminal justice affords us the opportunity to look at the deeper question of why the system has developed as it has, and why it merits our support.

The 2004 UN Report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies highlighted the important role which criminal justice can play in the aftermath of serious violations of
human rights and humanitarian law. It does so by upholding, entrenching and internalising the related rules of international criminal law in the public conscience. It was noted that trials can provide a forum for the public denunciation of criminal behaviour, a collective rejection of what is wrong and a communal affirmation of correct standards of behaviours.

It was also noted that international criminal proceedings may give victims the opportunity to participate in the trials of their persecutors and to present their stories. In addition to contributing to the creation of a powerful historical record, this can help victims to reclaim their dignity.

We must also not underestimate the effect which it can have on a society to see a powerful leader indicted – even more to see a once-powerful leader in the dock. It can help to de-legitimise extremists, thereby contributing to the restoration of peace and security.

No account of criminal justice – national or international – would be complete without mention of deterrence. The ICC Statute in its fifth preambular paragraph makes express reference to deterrence, in the States Parties’ affirmation that they are “determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”. Yet, a difficulty with relying upon deterrence as a justification for international criminal justice lies in the fact that, to a large extent, it relies upon those who would perpetrate heinous crimes making a rational decision not to do so for fear of prosecution. The situations in which atrocity crimes take place are often characterised by an absence of reason and rational thinking. And, if they are, the stakes involved are so great that the immediate demands of power and wealth will often greatly outweigh the prudential calculations of the risks of being caught and sentenced. That said, it cannot be denied that the “long shadow” of the ICC is having some effect on the way that governments “wage war”, if you will. This can be seen in the measures that certain States have taken to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law in recent conflicts, and to investigate and prosecute violations committed by members of their armed forces.
Although comparisons between international and domestic systems of criminal law only take us so far, some of the same principles do apply. Retribution and incapacitation (that is, the prevention of crimes by detention of the culprits) are both, to some extent, relevant in the operation of international criminal justice, as may even be rehabilitation. I will come on to discuss the important role of victims in international proceedings, but would simply note here that there may also be some role for restorative justice in international criminal law. The ICC Statute in particular makes provision for victim participation in proceedings and reparations.

International crimes are, however, different in nature, scale and seriousness from those tried before domestic courts, and as a consequence the expectations placed upon international courts and tribunals are often greater.

It cannot be denied, for example, that the historical record created during an international trial can be of vital importance to the people affected by the conflict in which the crimes were perpetrated. Witness testimony, often given by the most vulnerable in society, can give rise to a personal, first-hand account of events, inclusive of those whose voices often go unheard. The archives of the international criminal tribunals will be an essential and valuable resource, both for the country affected by the conflict, as well as for the international community. Records of judicial proceedings can provide an important tool to counter denial and revisionism.

We should pay particular heed in this context to the vital role of the institutions which will continue the residual functions of the international criminal tribunals as they complete their mandates. My Office was intimately involved in the preparation of the Secretary-General’s report that informed and assisted the Security Council’s Informal Working Group on International Tribunals during their four-year deliberations on the establishment of the Residual Mechanism. The preservation and location of the tribunals’ archives was a key issue in the Group’s deliberations.
However, it is not the primary function of an international criminal trial to create a record for the future nor indeed is it its objective to bring about reconciliation: the judges are called upon to adjudicate upon the criminal responsibility of a particular individual for specific acts.

The presentation of evidence in trials can of course enable a tribunal to make findings of fact which go to the historical record – for example the ICTR takes juridical notice of the fact that there was genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Such determinations by an independent, impartial tribunal which has carefully weighed the evidence are clearly significant. However, just as no international tribunal could try every perpetrator of crimes committed in a conflict, such that priority is given to the prosecution of those most responsible and to senior leaders, it cannot be expected to create a complete historical record of every crime – much less of complex events which may have taken place over a protracted period and an extensive geographical area.

The late Antonio Cassese, writing in 1998 after the first five years of operation of the ICTY and ICTR, offered a number of reflections on international criminal justice which I think remain relevant today. He looked at the alternatives to international criminal justice, and concluded that, although there are difficulties with the system, it is better than the alternatives, and it remains essential that the international community work to strengthen it.

First, he asked why justice is a better alternative to revenge, forgetting or amnesty. As to the first, I think that we can all agree that violence begetting violence is not an acceptable solution.
As to why justice is preferable to forgetting or amnesia, Cassese points to the moral imperative – “forgetting makes a mockery of the dead”. On a practical level, moreover, people do not forget - the memories of those lost live on. The victims and their families have a right to know the truth and a right to have the truth known. And those rights correspond to a powerful and elemental human desire, as we have seen in so many countries.

Finally, with regard to amnesty, I would simply note the consistent position of the United Nations that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of sexual violence committed in the context of armed conflict and gross violations of human rights. I would also observe that countries that have granted amnesties have so often seen them unravel under the unrelenting pressure of public opinion and an irresistible popular demand to see justice done.

Cassese also highlights a number of benefits of international criminal justice. He notes – and this is a point to which I will return in conclusion – that prior to 1994, the criminal provisions in the Geneva Conventions 1949 were simply not applied by domestic courts.

As a practical matter, an international institution may be better placed to administer justice in a post-conflict scenario than the domestic courts that remain. We have seen this again and again over recent years. The legal institutions of a society are often badly damaged by strife within a country, and there may simply not be the capacity to conduct large scale investigations and trials. International judges and international staff, working in an international tribunal, sensitively located, can deliver “not only the reality, but also the appearance of complete impartiality and objectivity in the prosecution of persons responsible for crimes committed by both sides to the conflict”.

When establishing the ICTY and ICTR, the Security Council expressly stated that it was “convinced that [in the circumstances prevailing in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda] the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law ... would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace”. The States Parties to the ICC Statute have recognised that the commission of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”. Although the extent to which international criminal justice contributes to restoration of peace in specific situations has at times been questioned, and many are concerned with a potential conflict between justice and peace, the rule of law must, ultimately, prevail. To leave perpetrators of atrocity crimes free from the hand of justice – particularly if they remain in positions of power and influence – precludes the re-establishment of the rule of law, and thereby stability, in post-conflict situations.

The contribution of international criminal justice to the restoration of peace and security, and the re-establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict situations can extend beyond adjudication of the guilt or innocence of specific individuals. International criminal jurisdictions have neither the resources nor the capacity to try every individual responsible for the perpetration of serious international crimes. And, frankly, I don’t think anyone would – or should – wish that they ever did. On the whole, and with certain possible exceptions, justice is best done locally, by national courts. It is on national courts that people must rely if the rule of law is ever to prevail in any society; and it helps little to strengthen the foundations of the rule of law in any society if the preponderance of cases, where all thirst to see justice done; right upheld and evil condemned, are spirited away to some other jurisdiction.

The transfer of cases to national jurisdictions is a measure which has been used by the ICTY and the ICTR to ensure that those responsible face justice, and which has also facilitated capacity building of the domestic judicial systems.

Thus, under rule 11bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR, if the tribunal is satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial, and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out, it can order the transfer of the case to a national court. By way of example, requests for transfer of cases to Rwanda had been refused by Referral Chambers of the ICTR. With the help of the ICTR
Prosecutor and others, Rwanda made improvements in various aspects of its judicial system, (including conditions of detention; access to witnesses and witness protection; the right to an effective defence; and judicial competence, independence and impartiality).

Consequently, the ICTR Referral Chamber in the *Uwinkindi* case recently concluded that Rwanda would be able to prosecute the case “consistent with internationally recognised fair trial standards enshrined in the Statute of [the ICTR] and other human rights instruments”. Still, the Referral Chamber paid particular heed to the role of the monitoring mechanism which would be provided by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Subsequent Referral Benches have followed the *Uwinkindi* decision and decided to transfer cases to Rwanda, demonstrating that a tribunal can assist in building national judicial capacity through the referral of cases.

In his most recent report to the Security Council, the Prosecutor of the ICTY highlighted the efforts of his Office to help countries in the former Yugoslavia more successfully handle war crimes cases at the domestic level. This assistance has included provision of access to information in the databases of the Office of the Prosecutor and in ICTY case records; the establishment of effective partnerships with prosecutors and courts in the region to facilitate the transfer of expertise; and the involvement of ICTY prosecutorial staff in training initiatives in the region.

The War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides an example of international participation in the prosecution of serious crimes, without the establishment of an international tribunal. As a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of the State, it was established by national legislation, with the intention that the international components will be phased out and ultimately become national. The referral of cases by the ICTY for prosecution in domestic jurisdictions is therefore not only an integral element of the completion strategy for the ICTY, but also contributes to capacity-building of the national legal system.
The ICC is unique in that it places the primary responsibility to prevent and prosecute atrocities on States. The Court was established as a court of last resort. The principle of complementarity is enshrined in Article 17 of the ICC Statute, which provides that a case will be inadmissible where it is being, or has been, investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction over it. In such circumstances, the ICC may only take jurisdiction if the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution, or if a decision not to prosecute results from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute. States therefore have the principal role in the prosecution of such cases, and it is imperative that they live up to their obligations in this regard. ICC States Parties in particular have a primary duty to investigate and prosecute Rome Statute crimes that are committed in their territory or by their nationals.

The notion of positive complementarity refers more specifically to the actions taken in order to strengthen national investigations and prosecutions of Rome Statute crimes. Although the ICC is not involved in the capacity building, it has cooperated with national prosecutions, notably in France and Germany of persons accused of having participated in atrocities committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. If complementarity is judged to be successful, we will be able to witness a system where national and international courts work interdependently in order to punish serious crimes of international concern.

[What have been the effects of the ICL developments of the last 20 years?]

In making an assessment of where we stand today, we do well to look at the broader effect of the developments of the past twenty years in international criminal law.

One of the most important developments, in my opinion, has been the gradual “domestication” of the norms of international criminal law. As I mentioned briefly earlier, prior to the early 1990s, the Geneva Conventions 1949 essentially lacked any practical
enforcement. Those who acted in violation of their provisions simply were not brought to justice, at the domestic level or elsewhere – bar in one or two rare cases – exceptions that were so unusual that they only seemed to “prove the rule” of general impunity. However, with the early judgments of the ICTY and ICTR, and then the SCSL, the provisions and protections were given practical force. The jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals, and the ICC, are in no way some sort of novel “substitute” for the Geneva framework. Rather, this rich body of case law and the accompanying verdicts and sentences handed down have made real protections which were, effectively, previously theoretical. Almost fifty years after the Geneva Conventions were drafted, international criminal courts and tribunals have contributed to making their protection effective.

This brings me to the second important development. The international criminal tribunals, and the ICC, are courts of last resort. The ICTY and ICTR were established, at a time, when there was no prospect of justice being done locally – or in the case of the SCSL, ECCC and STL, being done locally and unaided. As for the ICC, the primacy of domestic jurisdictions is enshrined in its Statute. States are expected to prosecute before their national courts those who have perpetrated atrocity crimes, and it is only where a State is unable or unwilling to prosecute that the ICC will step in.

The system of international criminal justice relies first and foremost upon Member States taking responsibility for promoting and ensuring accountability at the domestic level. At times, a perception may have existed that international criminal justice is synonymous with international jurisdiction over international crimes. This is not the case. States must play their part and seek to ensure that their own courts and prosecutorial authorities are able to exercise jurisdiction over such crimes and that they actually do so in a full and meaningful way.

Now, moving to the third important development. As I mentioned earlier, situations in which grave international crimes are committed do persist today. Neither the creation of the ad hoc courts and tribunals nor the establishment of a permanent international criminal criminal
court has delivered us from evil. Although atrocities continue to be perpetrated, and it may sometimes seem as though the international community stands by, we must believe that we are edging slowly but surely towards a world in which the international community acts together to prevent the commission of serious international crimes. As stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document – the product of the largest ever gathering of world leaders – individual States, and the international community, have the responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Indeed, we see that the nature of the dialogue surrounding these situations has changed, and this change has come about as a consequence of the fact that accountability through international criminal justice has become a reality. It may take time to bring perpetrators of international crimes before a court – be that at the domestic or the international level – but, in the statements of world leaders; in the work of journalists; and in expressions of public opinion, accountability is a pervasive theme. We hear expressions of outrage, not only at the perpetration of atrocities, but at the idea that those responsible could ever enjoy impunity. Calls to bring an end to violence and conflict are accompanied by calls to bring perpetrators to justice. Indeed, there is an ever-growing expectation that they will be. The notion that those responsible can be spirited away to some safe place of secluded retirement to live out the rest of their lives untroubled and in peace is now anathema.

I see this change in discourse as evidence of an irreversible shift towards accountability; and, having examined earlier the various bases for and arguments made in favour of international criminal justice, I consider that, ultimately, individual accountability lies at its core. While the trial of an individual for international crimes may fulfil a number of objectives – giving a voice to victims, creating a historical record, contributing to peace and reconciliation within a society and so on – the ultimate purpose of any criminal trial, be it domestic or international, is to establish responsibility for the acts with which an individual is charged.
We must therefore recognise accountability as the core of international criminal justice. As Judge Meron, President of the ICTY and of the Residual Mechanism said during his recent address at the opening of the judicial year of the European Court of Human Rights, international courts and criminal tribunals, together with courts at the national level “are contributing to the creation of a world in which human dignity and human rights are respected without normative gaps ... in which accountability will be the rule, and not the exception”.

Justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives. Accountability is an integral element in promoting and ensuring the rule of law at the domestic and at the international levels. Taking stock today of where international criminal justice stands, we must recognise its achievements; but we must also pay heed to the challenges with which it is faced.

These challenges, I have described; and I think we do no service to anything or anybody if we ignore them or try to wish them away. They must be addressed head on if our cause is to succeed. We may be able to overcome some challenges and, with time, they will be seen as episodes in our story – perhaps like the legal bugaboos and juridical spectres that the British invoked back in 1954 to say that any idea of establishing a permanent international criminal court was inevitably doomed to failure. Other challenges, though, will always be with us, such as – the cost, and the fact that some atrocities will always defy any system we may create and so threaten its legitimacy. The creation of a universal system of international criminal justice will be a never-ending work, calling us to perpetual vigilance and unceasing effort. But I am confident that, with the resolute support of the international community, and of course of the United Nations, international criminal justice will continue to develop, and that the next twenty years will lead to achievements as significant as the last.

This brings me to the end of my address to you today. Thank you very much for your kind attention. I look forward to the discussion with the Panel beside me, and will be happy to answer any questions that you may wish to raise.