A declaration on non-intervention would not solve the problem if at the outset there was a basic disagreement on who was guilty of intervention. A true desire to find a solution would require the removal of the Viet-Namese problem from the battlefield to the Conference table; as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom had a special responsibility in the matter. In that connexion, he recalled the statements made recently in Moscow by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in favour of a cease-fire followed by pacification and the rehabilitation of both parts of the country under the auspices of the United Nations, so that they could in time decide their own future. The United Kingdom would be only too happy if the Soviet Union Government were prepared to join in that effort.

3. Another example of differing contentions on the responsibility for intervention was offered by Laos, concerning which the Soviet Union representative had accused the United States, although the representative of Laos had shown clearly that the intervention against his country came from another source; yet when it had been proposed that, in accordance with the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, a report by the International Commission for Supervision and Control should be circulated to the Powers which had participated in the Geneva Conference, one of the two Co-Chairmen—the Soviet Union—had not agreed to the proposal of the other. Similarly, in the case of the undisguised intervention by Indonesia in order "to crush Malaysia", it might have been thought that the Soviet Union Government would understand the need, in the actual words of its representative, "to protect the small countries against aggressive attacks". Instead, the Soviet Union had vetoed the draft resolution on that subject submitted by Norway in the Security Council. That sufficiently illustrated the point that the cause of peace would not be advanced if delegations started from the assumption that everything done by some States was bad and should be condemned as intervention, while obvious intervention by other States should be overlooked.

4. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1) failed to cover some forms of intervention which caused much concern to many Governments as did direct and armed attack; there was no mention of subversive activities, particularly the training of dissident nationals of independent States who were receiving military or militant training inside communist countries. It would be said that...
such activities were designed to aid the "people's revolution" or "national liberation movements" but, while that argument might be plausible although objectionable in the case of colonial territories, it was indefensible in the case of independent States where subversion was fostered against the will of the people.

5. The USSR text said also that the independence of the States liberated from colonialism should not be threatened. It was not the Western Powers, however, which were claiming that those States were ripe for revolution; although the USSR representative had said that his country was not seeking to export revolution, his country took pride in supporting revolution wherever it occurred and made no secret of its support. The Colombian representative had rightly pointed out that all revolutions were not necessarily good and the question therefore remained of who was to decide that matter and to determine why a particular revolution should be assisted from Moscow. A draft which ignored such issues was less than complete.

6. Yet there was no lack of sources to which the Committee could refer in that connexion. There were the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, which were accepted by all; there were several resolutions, particularly resolution 290 (IV); and the Sixth Committee had before it, in its consideration of agenda items 90 and 94, a draft resolution which had emerged from the recent session at Mexico City of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. A study of the work already done or in progress would provide a useful source of texts on which agreement might be reached.

7. Lastly, it would not be enough for a declaration of that kind merely to declare a vague and general opposition to intervention; it should include a positive statement of the right of all States freely to choose and develop their own political, social, economic and cultural systems, and of the right and duty of all Member States to co-operate with one another and to encourage closer relations among States in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, for it should not be forgotten that Article 1 of the Charter stated that one of the Purposes of the United Nations was to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of those common ends. The impression should not be given that the horizon had been narrowed to a concern only to avoid intervention, for then the publication of such a declaration would be a step backwards and a sorry memorial to the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

8. It was with those considerations in mind that the United Kingdom delegation had submitted a series of amendments (A/C.1/L.351) designed to make the draft submitted by the Soviet Union more comprehensive, more objective and more positive. His comments had related mainly to the Soviet Union text, because that was the draft which had been before the Committee for the longest time. The Committee now had before it a constructive draft resolution submitted by seven Latin American countries (A/C.1/L.349) and amendments to the USSR draft submitted by the United delegation was sure that those texts would be discussed in detail, if the working group proposed by the representative of Afghanistan at the 1397th meeting was established.

9. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Committee had any objection to the list of speakers being closed at 6 p.m., as had been suggested earlier.

10. Mr. PAZHWA (Afghanistan), supported by Mr. BARNES (Liberia), thought that it would be premature to take such a decision. He did not yet know whether his proposal to establish a working group would be adopted; if it were adopted, it would no doubt be possible to work on a single text and the debate could be continued at the same time. The closure of the list of speakers should therefore be postponed.

11. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) pointed out that the Latin American group was to meet the following day to discuss the Afghan suggestion. He therefore formally requested that no decision should be taken yet on the closure of the list of speakers.

12. The CHAIRMAN agreed but appealed to the members of the Committee to be ready to speak when their turn came, so that the consideration of the item could be concluded within the allotted time.

Mr. Benites (Ecuador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

13. Mr. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia) said that the general debate in the Assembly and the discussion in the First Committee had brought out the timeliness and the relevance of the initiative taken by the Soviet Union requesting the inclusion of the item under discussion. Its consideration would enable the General Assembly to adopt a clear stand on the problems in the present international situation. World opinion was deeply concerned about the existing tension, which was largely due to interference in the internal affairs of States, to the policy of force and arbitrariness and to the flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter. At various places in the world, the imperialist forces were engaging in acts of aggression and intervention directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of sovereign States and against the legitimate interests of the peoples who aspired to self-determination and social progress. Those were not isolated acts or accidents but part of a systematic and universal policy. If the Committee wanted its deliberations to contribute effectively to an improvement of the international situation and a reduction of the present tension, it should take into account those facts and the ensuing consequences.

14. The most patent example of that policy of arbitrariness and violence was the United States intervention in South Viet-Nam and the war being waged against the people of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States, which wanted to maintain and even improve its position in that part of the world, was stopping at nothing to attain that goal. For several years it had been trying to make South Viet-Nam into a base for its penetration of the whole of South-East Asia, in deliberate violation of the essential provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. After discovering that its aim could not be achieved
to prescribe for them. The unleashing and escalation of that war—rightly described as a "dirty war"—could not but arouse the indignation and reprobation of any sensible person. That was proved by the opposition to the war voiced in the United States itself. United States aggression was also threatening other States in South-East Asia, such as Cambodia and Laos where, according to the New York Press, the bombing raids were to be intensified.

15. The United States was pursuing the same policy in other parts of the world as well. It had not yet ended its occupation of the Dominican Republic, where it had intervened on the pretext of opposing the "communist threat". In order to disguise the purpose and extend the scope of that intervention, the United States had even tried to pass it off as an operation by the Organization of American States.

16. A few years previously, the United States, Belgium and the United Kingdom had intervened in the Congo on the pretext of protecting their nationals; to disguise the purpose of that illegal operation, they had not hesitated to invoke the hackneyed concept of "intervention for humanitarian reasons" which the reactionaries had used during the colonial period as an excuse for committing the most reprehensible acts.

17. Furthermore, the Cuban representative had given specific examples of the policy of aggression and intervention which the United States was constantly pursuing in regard to his country and had proved that responsibility for the abnormal situation and the tension in the Caribbean region lay exclusively with the United States.

18. The imperialist forces clearly regarded their policy of aggression as more important than the obligation to develop peaceful relations between peoples. In the present-day situation, it was essential to put an end to policies of that kind and to create conditions in which no one could with impunity violate the inalienable rights of States and peoples, large or small, whatever their social system or political orientation.

19. The illegality of those acts of aggression was even more flagrant in the light of the undertaking assumed by States Members of the United Nations and the obligations derived from principles of international law. Under the first principle enunciated in Article 2 of the Charter, all States enjoyed rights derived from their fully sovereign status; that principle established the obligation to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each State, and the right of each State to choose freely its own political, social and economic system. Moreover, in accordance with the fourth principle of the Charter of the United Nations, the repression of national liberation movements was prohibited, as also intervention by States in the domestic affairs of other States and the imposition of any particular social system.

20. His delegation had always supported the General Assembly's efforts to ensure respect for those provisions of the Charter and had always tried to increase the Organization's effectiveness. Apart from the Charter, there were other instruments of international law, drafted and signed after the Second World War, which expressly prohibited wars of aggression and armed intervention. Some examples were the Agreement of 8 August 1945 establishing the International Military Tribunal, the Act of Chapultepec of 8 March 1945, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 2 September 1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American States signed at Bogotá on 30 April 1948.

21. Respect for the prohibition of the use of force was all the more essential and urgent in view of the fact that any intervention or aggression increased the risk of thermonuclear war with all its disastrous consequences. The world situation showed that certain Powers were devoid of any sense of responsibility in regard to peace and security. The United States, for instance, had developed the policy of intervention into a national doctrine which had recently been approved by the supreme legislative body. The purpose of resolution 560 adopted by the United States House of Representatives on 20 September 1965 was to legalize intervention—including the use of force—in any part of the Western hemisphere which the United States regarded as its "sphere of influence". That was a revival of "gunboat diplomacy"; and the resolution had given rise to antagonism and indignation in the Latin American countries.

22. The policy of armed intervention was directed mainly against national liberation movements, whose success had annoyed the colonialists and their lackeys. Yet all the events to which he had referred had occurred at a time when the General Assembly, as also various important international conferences, such as the Asian-African Conference, held at Bandung in April 1955, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, and the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, had decisively condemned intervention to crush national liberation movements; moreover, such interventions were incompatible with the spirit of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)).

23. His delegation once again demanded the complete and immediate liquidation of colonialism in all its forms. It regarded as inadmissible any act which prevented peoples from exercising their right to freedom and independence. At the present time, the United States was the champion of the policy of intervention. On the pretext of opposing "communist infiltration", the United States had developed a policy of intervention incalculable in its consequences.
it declared war on peoples which had decided to become independent and had chosen a social or economic system suited to their own interests. Recent history proved that the slogan of "anti-communism" was being used by reactionary elements to oppose progressive and democratic forces in every part of the world.

24. The United States wished to convince the world that it had a special mission to perform; namely, to settle the destiny of mankind and to determine the way in which peoples should live. It might be asked what right that country had to set itself up as judge and arbiter. The United States had indeed great responsibility under the United Nations Charter and as a Member of the United Nations and the Security Council. In accordance with that responsibility, it should end its policy of aggression and intervention forthwith.

25. In the present situation the General Assembly should resolutely oppose the policy of intervention in any form and should demand respect for the principle of non-intervention. The adoption of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.943/Rev.1) would be an important and particularly positive step in that direction. The specific and detailed provisions which it contained would enable the General Assembly to discharge its obligations under the Charter and to reaffirm the inalienable right of every sovereign State to independence and freedom. The Assembly should demand that intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign States and acts directed against the just struggles of peoples for national freedom and independence should be halted forthwith.

26. His delegation was convinced that all peoples which valued peace, freedom and progress would enthusiastically welcome the adoption of the USSR draft. The General Assembly would thereby be able to show that it was genuinely anxious to consolidate international peace and security in the interest of the free development of peoples.

27. Mr. NIMMANHEMINDA (Thailand) regretted that, barely twenty years after the Second World War, mankind was still living in fear and without any prospect of attaining genuine peace, in spite of the ceaseless efforts made by the United Nations. Unfortunately, the world was populated both by men who wanted to live in peace with others and by those who sought to destroy, to disturb and to dominate their fellow men. The world community was a society of sovereign States which were juridically equal, regardless of their political or economic structure or their geographical situation. The principle of the equality of States meant that no State was entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of another State. The principle of non-intervention, which was a corollary of every State's right to independence, had been recognized and reaffirmed in the Charter of the Organization of American States, at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung and the Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, and in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Together with six other principles of international law, it had recently been reaffirmed by the General Assembly itself in resolutions 1815 (XVII) and 1966 (XVIII) on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

28. Thus, in the first place, the general principle that no State or group of States had a right to intervene in the internal affairs of any other State had been firmly accepted as a fundamental principle of international law, and in order to determine its precise meaning and scope the General Assembly had referred the study of that principle to a Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, which had been asked to draw up a report giving its conclusions and recommendations. Since the Special Committee had submitted its first report to the Sixth Committee, it was neither necessary nor desirable for the First Committee to consider that matter for the moment. It was essentially of a legal nature, and the Sixth Committee was therefore the most appropriate body to deal with it. Secondly, all principles of international law were interdependent, and the world order did not depend on respect for one such principle alone. Accordingly, the principle of non-intervention should not be studied separately. Lastly, the members of the Special Committee itself had not been able to reach agreement on the meaning of the terms "domestic affairs" and "intervention", nor had they been able to decide whether there might be cases of "illicit intervention" or exactly what activities were prohibited under the principle of non-intervention. It would therefore be unwise to issue a declaration intended to serve as a guideline so long as the meaning and the scope of the principle on which the declaration was supposed to be based were still unclear.

29. That did not mean that his country was opposed to the general principle of international law that no State was entitled to intervene directly or indirectly in matters which were within the domestic jurisdiction of another State. On the contrary, it was firmly convinced that the world situation would be much better if that principle were scrupulously observed by all countries. What was most important in that respect was not the meaning of the term "intervention", but the good faith of all parties. In that connexion, he pointed out that the term "intervention", as used in the principle of non-intervention, could not be applied to measures taken individually or collectively in self-defence, or to collective measures legitimately taken in the common interest in order to protect peace in accordance with the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, "intervention" was not confined only to armed attacks. It referred also to the numerous forms of ideological and political propaganda and psychological warfare, the organization of subversive and political movements inside another State, the systematic infiltration of political agents and any military, political or economic assistance provided to rebels against a de jure government. Some States were also violating international law by allowing seditious elements or their own residents to organize rebellions with a view to overthrowing the legal governments of other States. In other words, the notion of non-intervention must encompass all activi-
ties—even those not involving armed force—which were calculated to impair the authority of the legal government of another sovereign State. That was clear from General Assembly resolution 290 (IV) on the essentials of peace; it was also recognized in the draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind adopted by the International Law Commission in 1951/5 and in article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.

30. The Thai delegation would be prepared to support the declaration that it was the duty of every State to refrain from the use of any coercive measures incompatible with the United Nations Charter to force the sovereign will of another State, provided that it expressly prohibited any activities permitting, assisting, promoting or financing anywhere the organization or training of armed forces of any type having as their purpose incursions into other States. The declaration should also expressly prohibit infiltration, the supply of arms or materials designed to promote or aid a rebellion or seditious movement in any State, and, in particular, the organization or support of subversive or terrorist activities against the people and the Government of another State.

31. Leaving aside the question of the definition of the term "intervention", the practical application of the principle of non-intervention gave rise to deep-rooted differences of opinion, for non-intervention was often used as an expedient to further certain specific ends by countries which professed respect for law and peace in order to camouflage their insidious activities. Viet-Nam had been quoted as an example of armed intervention in the domestic affairs of a country. It was true that there had been intervention from outside, but it had been committed by the forces of the North, and that naturally called forth resistance from the peaceful people of South Viet-Nam, who had chosen to live in freedom and had requested assistance from those who were prepared to give it. Since the essence of the notion of intervention was the usurpation of sovereignty, aid supplied to a de jure government was not intervention, whereas aid supplied to rebels was intervention, because it infringed the sovereignty of the established Government. The armed intervention by North Viet-Namese forces was only part of a general plan to destroy the freedom and national independence of the nations of South-East Asia as a prelude to world domination. Thailand had for some time been the target of concerted aggressive designs, which took the form of verbal intimidation, infiltration and subversive activities directed and supported from outside, as captured documents and armaments proved. As a sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations, Thailand had the right to take appropriate measures to defend its territorial integrity and enforce law and order inside its own frontiers, within the limits established by international law and the United Nations Charter. He would not dwell on the accusation which the Soviet Representative had made against his country at the 1395th meeting, but would merely say that if the Soviet Union really desired peace, as it proclaimed, it should abandon its policy of domi-

32. Mr. GARCIA DEL SOLAR (Argentina) said that Latin America was undoubtedly the region which had most frequently suffered violations of the principle of non-interference in various forms. The Argentine delegation was consequently bound to take part in the discussion with a deep sense of responsibility, and would explain its views on the substance of the question dispassionately and frankly. Before doing so, however, it wished to express some criticism of the timing of the present debate.

33. To be sure, any occasion was a good one for reaffirming the obligation of States to respect the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other States. But the present debate should be viewed in the context of the prevailing atmosphere. Following the failure of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, which had almost brought about the collapse of the Organization, the opening of the twentieth session had been received with a sense of relief, reaction and disappointment had been succeeded by a feverish desire to achieve positive results. The alarm signal sounded by the nineteenth session had thus set off a beneficial reaction.

34. A climate of rapprochement had been established between the great Powers. It had been reflected in the moderation shown by speakers in their statements, and in the concerted efforts which had been made to avoid the difficulties raised by the application of Article 19 of the Charter, to adopt resolutions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the convening of a world disarmament conference, to initiate a study of the financial problems of the Organization and to establish a cease-fire in Kashmir. Argentina intended to further that climate, because it believed that the less powerful countries had a special duty: to maintain the spirit of concession and the dialogue which was indispensable if the United Nations was to fulfill its mission. It was from that viewpoint that it had approached the debate on the question of peace-keeping operations in the Special Political Committee, and it was from that viewpoint that it was approaching the present debate.

35. The Latin American countries were deeply attached to the principle of non-interference. They had taken the initiative in 1933 of proclaiming that principle in legal instruments drafted for their region. That initiative had been the outcome of efforts which dated from the independence of the Latin American countries. The weakness of those countries, the absence of international organs capable of protecting their political sovereignty and territorial integrity, and their inability to provide themselves with the material resources necessary for self-defence against the great Powers had led them to combine their efforts to assert the rule of law. That had been their weapon against arbitrary acts and offences committed against them in violation of the most elementary rules of international morality.

36. But the Latin American countries had had to travel a long and painful road before bringing about the adoption of the principle of non-interference. The injustices they had suffered were unfortunately being repeated today in various forms; that was why a reaffirmation of strict respect for the principle of non-intervention was necessary.

37. Argentina, which had freed itself from Spain in 1810 and declared its independence in 1816, had been the victim, during the difficult period of national organization, of various acts of foreign intervention. In 1831 United States marines had landed on the Malvinas following a commercial dispute. That invasion of Argentine sovereignty had opened the way for the occupation of the islands in 1833 by another Power foreign to the continent, which today still exercised jurisdiction there despite Argentine claims.

38. Those acts of intervention, which had taken place at a time when the Monroe Doctrine was in full force, had brought into being a profound sense of solidarity between Argentina and the other Latin American countries which had also been the victims, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of acts of unilateral intervention of various kinds. Argentine jurists had therefore striven to endow America with juridical principles such as those proclaimed in the Calvo and Drago doctrines, which had been incorporated into public international law and had contributed to the protection of the countries of Latin America against the encroachments and interference of the great Powers.

39. Argentina had striven to give expression to its anti-interventionist vocation in all possible spheres. Thus in 1920 President Irigoyen had ordered the Argentine ship 9 de Julio, which was on a study voyage in the Caribbean, to enter the port of Santo Domingo with the Dominican flag flying at its topmast, in order to pay its respects to the sovereignty of a brother country whose fortress was flying the flag of the occupying country. The Argentine sailors had received a triumphant welcome. At international conferences, too, Argentine jurists had exerted their efforts to have the principle of non-interference incorporated into American law. Luis Podestá Costa, the international law specialist who was to become Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, was the author of the formula proposed to the meeting of the International Commission of American Jurists at Rio de Janeiro in 1927 and incorporated in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States drawn up at Montevideo in 1933. That formula, which for part of the international community represented the cornerstone of the codification of the principle of non-intervention, was: “No State has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.” Since the adoption of that clause the Latin American countries had constantly reaffirmed, at conferences and in Latin American legal instruments, their adherence to the principle of non-intervention as the most effective means of preserving their sovereignty and their right of self-determination. They had given it supreme expression in the Charter of the Organization of American States which they had signed at Bogotá in 1948.

40. While it was strongly opposed to any form of interverence, Argentina did not go so far as to deny the right of weak countries to conclude agreements to ensure their security and defence, and in exceptional cases to call on foreign military assistance. Argentina had never desired to resort to such expedients, and was therefore morally entitled to state that there were special circumstances which necessitated the conclusion of agreements with a view to obtaining military assistance.

41. Such agreements, however, should only be concluded when the Government concerned was in full possession of its governmental prerogatives and was supported by the people and its representatives. On the other hand, their value would be extremely debatable if they were concluded in a highly revolutionary situation on the basis of a personal decision taken in desperation. The incorporation of the principle of non-interference in the legal instruments of the Latin American countries and in the United Nations Charter had reduced the possibilities of unilateral and direct intervention. But since the Second World War those forms of intervention had been superseded by many other forms which were equally prejudicial to the sovereign rights of nations. Those were the new forms of intervention of which the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zavala Ortiz, had spoken in the general debate in the Assembly (133th plenary meeting).

42. However, the Latin American countries were not the only ones concerned with the new forms of intervention, which were incompatible with peaceful coexistence. According to Press reports released shortly after the recent events in Indonesia, Soviet spokesmen had declared that no one had the right to export revolution or to influence national revolutions. And in the resolution which they had adopted on 24 October 1965 at Accra, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity had expressed their profound opposition to indirect intervention in the internal affairs of peoples. All that went to prove that the more subversive action influenced the policy of certain Governments, the stronger grew the will of the peoples not to allow their national development to be undermined by the corrosive effects of indirect intervention. The remarks which the representative of Nepal had made on that subject (139th meeting) were most revealing.

43. Seventeen Latin American countries had decided to express in a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.349) their concern over all forms of intervention. Realizing that the way to curb the forces which were attempting to destroy international order based on absolute respect for the right of peoples to forge their own destinies without foreign interference was to assert the rule of law, the countries in question had expressed in the draft resolution their dedication to law and to liberty by enumerating the principles which lay at the root of their conception of life: the sovereignty
44. There was nothing tendentious in the text, which attempted to rise above any differences of opinion that might occur over the question even among the Latin American countries themselves. The draft contained nothing that might be construed as a reference to particular situations, because such references would be incompatible with the objectives of a declaration which reaffirmed a legal principle. Lastly, he paid a deserved tribute to the Latin American countries, whose contribution to the incorporation of the principle of non-intervention in international law had been decisive.

45. Mr. HSUEH (China) said that the First Committee owed a debt of gratitude to the Latin American sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.349, which was designed to strengthen support for the principle of non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States—one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. The draft resolution carried the more weight because the Latin American countries had traditionally dedicated themselves to ensuring respect for the rule of law in international relations and had practised the principle of non-intervention among themselves for almost a century. When the inclusion of the item in the agenda of the General Assembly’s twentieth session had been requested, his delegation had feared that the purpose of its sponsor had not been to undertake a serious study of the principle of non-intervention, but to secure an opportunity for propaganda. That fear had been confirmed by the Soviet representative’s statement at the 1395th meeting, the main purpose of which had apparently been to bring up the question of Viet-Nam and to make all sorts of allegations about other areas of the world. The Soviet representative had said in particular that the Soviet Union expressed its solidarity with the struggle of the Viet-Namese patriots against the American aggressors and that it would continue to render to the fraternal Viet-Namese people its full political support and the necessary economic and military assistance. His delegation felt that those two sentences were out of place in a discussion of the principle of non-intervention, and that they in fact represented a policy of intervention. If support and assistance were to be given to the Viet-Namese people, they should be directed against the intervention from the communist North. The Viet-Namese people, like the Chinese people, were the unfortunate victims of communist infiltration, subversion, acts of terrorism, sabotage and armed intervention. In fighting against those acts of aggression, they were only exercising their right of self-determination. However, his delegation understood that the Soviet Union could hardly describe as aggressors the instigators of a communist aggression which they called a war of liberation. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s erstwhile allies in Peiping had recently accused it of providing aid to Viet-Nam that was far from compatible with its strength, and of trying to keep the situation in Viet-Nam under its control and to strike a bargain on it with United States Imperialism. It was therefore understandable that the representative of the USSR should have to make statements such as that he had made at the 1395th meeting; but he had chosen the wrong time and the wrong place to do so.

46. In the records of the United Nations and even in those of the League of Nations there was no lack of examples of intervention to show that respect for the principle of non-intervention needed to be strengthened; he cited the armed intervention in Finland by the Soviet Union in December 1939, which the Assembly of the League of Nations had solemnly condemned and which had appeared to the Council of the League to be sufficient grounds for excluding the Soviet Union from the League. Other examples of intervention, in the era of the United Nations, included the Chinese Communist armed intervention in Korea, noted by the General Assembly in resolution 498 (V), and the action of the Soviet Union in China condemned by the Assembly in resolution 505 (VI). The latter intervention had had tragic consequences for the entire world. Finally, in resolution 1004 (ES-11) the General Assembly had condemned the armed intervention of the Soviet Union in Hungary.

47. At present, however, the greatest threat came not from open intervention, but from covert or indirect intervention, the victims of which were States in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Such intervention took the form of supplies of arms, ammunition or money to an armed band, faction or group in another State which opposed the legitimate Government of that State in the name of revolution or liberation, or the dispatch of agents to that State to conduct subversive propaganda concerning its institutions. As a result of those activities the public was confused, and before it awoke to the truth a communist régime was imposed in the country in which intervention had taken place. In considering the item before the Committee should therefore pay special attention to that type of intervention. His delegation was glad to note that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.349 had stressed that aspect of the problem, and it was grateful to them for having placed the matter in proper focus. The Chinese delegation would accordingly support that draft resolution.

48. Mr. YOUDE (United Kingdom), exercising his right of reply, said that he could not accept the Argentine representative’s remarks concerning the Falkland Islands, for United Kingdom sovereignty over the islands was beyond question. He reserved the right to revert to the matter, and pointed out that his Government had accepted the suggestion made recently by the Argentine Government for talks aimed at settling the dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the islands. He hoped that the talks would produce results in keeping with the wishes of the islanders and that they would strengthen the ties of friendship between the United Kingdom and Argentina.

49. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.349 had wished to emphasize the fundamental idea that all forms of intervention, whether direct or indirect, were contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. That idea was clearly expressed in several places, in particular the last paragraph. Operative paragraph 3