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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 107

The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty (continued) (A/5977; A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1, L.349/Rev.1, L.350 and Corr.1, L.351-L.353)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PRADITH (Laos) said that his Government appreciated the Soviet Union's initiative in submitting a draft declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention, coming as it did at a time when Laos was being invaded by North Viet-Nam.
2. Laos was a peace-loving country which had experienced half a century of colonial rule and a short period of communism, neither of which had been to its liking. The only wish of the Laotian people was to live in peace; and it had been grateful to the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for agreeing at Vienna in 1961 that Laos should be left alone as a neutral and non-aligned State.
3. Unfortunately, Laos lay at a crossroads of military expansion, and had long been a victim of foreign intervention, aggression and subversion. At the present time, the Laotian people was being prevented from living as it wished by its neighbours to the north, who were trying to impose on it a régime and an ideology which it rejected. It would be useful to outline the circumstances which had led to that situation.
4. The 1962 agreements on Laos<sup>1/</sup> had been signed by thirteen countries, including the five nuclear Powers and both North and South Viet-Nam. The signatories had agreed to recognize and guarantee the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos, and had undertaken not to introduce foreign troops into its territory. They had also undertaken not

<sup>1/</sup> Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, and Protocol to the Declaration, signed at Geneva on 23 July 1962 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 456 (1963), No. 6564).

to resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of Laos. After the signature of those agreements, more than 700 American and other military advisers to the rightists had left the country; but of the thousands of regular troops from North Viet-Nam who had sided with the Pathet Lao only twenty had left. The rest were hiding in the jungles and mountains, waiting to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam and join the so-called National Liberation Front, which operated under the orders of Peking and Hanoi.

5. Laos had fought hard for its liberation from French rule, from Japanese occupation and Chinese occupation and, more recently, from United States influence on the one hand and North Viet-Nameese domination on the other. It was important to differentiate between the Geneva Agreements of 1954,<sup>2/</sup> which had been concerned with the partition of Viet-Nam, and the agreements of 1962, which had dealt with the reunification of Laos. Because the two régimes in Viet-Nam were its neighbours and were signatories to the 1962 agreements, Laos had recognized both. But its policy of good-neighbourliness and peaceful coexistence should not be taken as a sign of weakness.

6. In May 1964, the eastern part of the Plain of Jars had been taken by force by North Viet-Nameese and rebel troops. Sixteen regular soldiers from North Viet-Nam had been captured and dozens more killed. Abundant documentary evidence had been obtained, and the International Commission for Supervision and Control had later sent a report to the USSR and the United Kingdom, as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, confirming that the prisoners were of North Viet-Nameese nationality, had been dispatched into Laos as members of the regular armed forces of North Viet-Nam, and had fought with the Pathet Lao as members of complete North Viet-Nameese army units.

7. He wished to draw the Committee's attention to the events which had occurred on 15 November 1965. The city of Thakhek had been attacked by four battalions of North Viet-Nameese regulars, of whom sixty had been killed and fifteen captured. The prisoners had revealed that they had been deceived into the belief that they would be fighting United States imperialists and that there would be no counter-attack from the air. Their task had been to burn the city of Thakhek, to steal the people's food supply and to retreat into South Viet-Nam. Little wonder, then, that Laotians, who had in the past respected the leaders of North Viet-Nam as fellow-fighters with Laos in the struggle for independence from colonial

<sup>2/</sup> Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China, signed at Geneva on 20 July 1964.

rule, now regarded them as murderous war-mongers who violated the most elementary principles of humanity.

8. The Laotian Government had protested to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference and the International Commission for Supervision and Control, and he now appealed to the representatives of the countries signatories to the 1962 agreements on Laos, and to all other nations represented in the Committee, to condemn the aggression committed against Laos, a co-signatory to those agreements and a Member of the United Nations.

9. He repeated that Laos had no interest in the war in Viet-Nam and merely wished to be left alone. North Viet-Nameese troops had no right to use his country for the purposes of infiltration into South Viet-Nam. In accordance with its policy of strict neutrality the Laotian delegation would vote for the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1) with the amendments submitted by the United States (A/C.1/L.350 and Corr.1) and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.351) and it would be even happier to vote for an agreed draft sponsored by the three countries.

10. Mr. SHAW (Australia) said that he too welcomed the initiative taken by the USSR in requesting the inclusion in the agenda of the item under discussion, for the question of intervention in the domestic affairs of States went to the very heart of the Charter of the United Nations. Everyone agreed on the Principles and Purposes underlying the Charter: the difficulty lay in applying them in practice. Attempts to define "aggression" had so far failed, and responsibility for determining the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression therefore lay with the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. In practice, however, it was difficult for the Security Council to arrive at agreed conclusions, and there had been many more such situations than the Council had formally found to exist. Similar difficulties arose in attempting to define "intervention", which was a concept closely related to that of aggression. Those difficulties had been reflected at the meeting of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, whose report was now before the Sixth Committee.<sup>3/</sup>

11. However, the First Committee had to deal with a problem not of semantics but of the failure of a number of Members of the United Nations to live up to their obligations under the Charter. There was also the question of how to deal with a Power outside the Organization which was disinclined even to acknowledge the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations. The task before the Committee had perhaps been simpler in earlier times. Clear cases of aggression such as those which had taken place in 1914 and 1939 were less likely to occur in the nuclear age, and a policy of total war would surely not be contemplated by any major Power represented in the Committee, although there were others apparently prepared to contemplate it. As a consequence, the danger of an escalated war originating in Europe had lessened.

The danger of a world conflict now arose more from forms of intervention short of open warfare, such as propaganda, subversion and terrorism; and that type of indirect aggression was now mainly to be found outside Europe. For example, a number of Latin American representatives, in describing the experience of their countries in formulating principles relating to intervention, had drawn attention to the dangers they were facing as a result of organized subversion and infiltration from neighbouring countries. A new factor was the advocacy by Peking of what it called "wars of national liberation" in Latin America. And in Africa also, an effective counter had to be found to the advocacy from outside of revolutionary movements aimed at the overthrow of newly established Governments.

12. Australia was particularly concerned with the indirect aggression practised in Asia, not only since that was the geographical region to which it belonged, but also because it was in Asia that such intervention had the backing of a major Power and was therefore the most dangerous. Australia had no wish or need to intervene in the affairs of any other State; but its development was dependent on the freedom of other countries in the area to retain their national identities free from foreign interference. Unfortunately, the countries of South-East Asia were faced with the existence of a Power which exercised unremitting pressure to bring about the overthrow of their existing economic, social and political structures. Australians had to ask themselves whether they could stand by while other countries were brought under domination by force, and against their will, by minorities supported from outside.

13. Because of the policies of intervention pursued by other countries in its area, Australia had been forced to divert to defence expenditure some of its resources, which were fully committed to the development of the country and its dependent Territories and to economic and social assistance under the Colombo Plan and the United Nations schemes. An example of such policies was the Indonesian threat to "crush" Malaysia. It was interesting to recall that when that question had been brought before the Security Council by Malaysia, a draft resolution designed to restrain aggression which had had the support of nine members of the Council had been vetoed by the USSR,<sup>4/</sup> which was now championing the principle of non-intervention.

14. While Australia was determined in its support of Malaysia and Singapore against the Indonesian confrontation, it had always taken account of the international difficulties which Indonesia was experiencing, and kept open the possibility of future co-operation with Indonesia, which could be to the mutual benefit of both countries and the region as a whole.

15. The other major case of intervention in the affairs of neighbouring States which was compelling his Government to expand the Australian defence forces was that of Viet-Nam, in which the techniques of indirect aggression were being used by North

<sup>3/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session.

<sup>4/</sup> See Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year.

lished by the Communist Party newspaper Nhan Dan on 31 October 1956 described the methods of violence and terror practised by the Viet-Nameese Communists. The aim of the North Viet-Nameese régime was to extend that type of rule over the people of South Viet-Nam. His delegation did not share the Soviet representative's view that such a development would be in line with the "advance of history".

16. The decision of the Hanoi authorities to step up their intervention in South Viet-Nam had been taken when they had realized that South Viet-Nam was not going to fall easily into their lap. The South Viet-Nameese Government had in fact been making progress with its programmes of social and economic development, in spite of the fact that it had been faced with all the difficulties familiar to Governments of newly independent countries. It had had to establish the administrative, social and economic structures most suited to its country's history, environment and national temperament; and, added to those normal strains, there had been the terrible burden of the campaign of terrorism and assassination mounted by the Viet-Cong, which had cost the lives of many thousands of the most skilled administrators and teachers. At the time when North Viet-Nam had embarked on its active policy of assassination, terrorism, military infiltration and subversion, there had been only a few hundred foreign military advisers in South Viet-Nam. Foreign assistance in that part of the country had been concentrated on economic and social development programmes, which had also been the targets of Viet-Cong sabotage.

17. But the South Viet-Nameese people's will to resist the campaign waged from the north had remained strong. It knew that it was faced with an attempt to destroy any separate existence for Viet-Nam, to impose on the South the communist Government of the North, and to unify the country not by negotiation but solely on terms dictated by the North.

18. In other South-East Asian countries, dissident movements had been established or encouraged and were being used by outside interests as instruments for so-called wars of national liberation. The representative of Laos had referred to the North Viet-Nameese aggression against his country, and Peking and Hanoi had made it clear that the same technique of indirect aggression which they were using elsewhere was to be used against the independent country of Thailand. In those circumstances, Australia had lent its support to any independent Governments in South-East Asia which had requested its assistance; and it believed that its action was consistent with its obligations under the United Nations Charter. It regarded Viet-Nam and the other countries of the South-East Asian region as partners which shared a common abhorrence of intervention and aggression and a common determination to live their lives as they chose. Its object in Viet-Nam was to deter and not to destroy, and to make it clear to the Viet-Cong that they could not win the war in South Viet-Nam. Australia had no military designs against the aggressor—North Viet-Nam—and no purpose other than to prove that intervention and aggression, direct or indirect, could not succeed. For a long time, it had

without imposing conditions which amounted to the political and military surrender of the other side.

19. In the region as a whole, Australia's overriding objective was a just and lasting peace based on the principles of the Charter and on the interests and needs of the Asian peoples themselves. But the security of the region could not be guaranteed, and its economic and social development could not be realized without external aid; any local settlement in South-East Asia would have to be guaranteed and supported by the great Powers, all of which had interests and responsibilities in the region.

20. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 had embodied the results of negotiations between the countries immediately concerned and the great Powers, and they could now be taken as a starting-point for more widely ranging negotiations aimed at establishing, with appropriate guarantees, the conditions under which countries of South-East Asia could have some reasonable confidence in their future, free from outside interference. In seeking such a settlement, none of the countries concerned was blind to the existence of the several hundred million people of China; the most difficult and pressing problem was to discover how peoples living near China could come to terms with the Chinese, so that they and other peoples could live together in peace and mutual respect.

21. The present discussion in the Committee would have served a useful purpose if it threw some light on the real nature of intervention; and something more would have been achieved if the United Nations could make it clear that indirect aggression by any techniques or for any purposes whatever was unacceptable as a means of conducting international relations. He hoped that all Member States, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, would act together towards that end. Countries such as his own—that is, the medium-sized and smaller Powers which constituted the great bulk of the Organization's membership—had everything to gain from the development of a world Organization in which States were willing to maintain respect for the principle of the territorial integrity and independence of other States.

22. It was in the light of those principles that his delegation would determine its attitude to the draft resolutions and amendments which had been submitted to the Committee.

23. Mr. SHEVCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that of the various items discussed by the General Assembly at the present and past sessions, agenda item 107 ranked equal in importance to general and complete disarmament and the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. In a world made up of countries with different social and economic systems, respect for the equality and sovereign rights of all countries, great and small, and for the principle of self-determination of peoples was absolutely essential; peace and international security depended on the strict observance by States of the obligations they had assumed under the United Nations Charter.

24. In recent times, however, international tension had become dangerously acute as a result of acts committed by certain imperialist States which had disregarded their obligations under the Charter and grossly flouted the generally accepted principles of international law—including the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of States. In particular, intervention by United States imperialists in the domestic affairs of the peoples of South-East Asia had created a very dangerous situation; indeed, it had developed into a war between United States imperialism and the Viet-Nameese people, involving a huge invasion army and large naval and air force units; and United States aircraft were committing undisguised aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, by bombing its territory. Every clear-thinking person realized that in Viet-Nam the United States was waging an imperialist and unjust war, and there had been an increasing number of protests and demonstrations against it even in the United States itself. His own Government, for its part, once again condemned United States aggression in Viet-Nam and pledged its support for the Viet-Nameese people in their just struggle for freedom and independence.

25. Another example of the contempt displayed by United States imperialists for the sovereignty and independence of small countries had been the landing of United States marines in the Dominican Republic. As the National Guardian had stated in an editorial published on 8 May 1965, the United States was using its armed forces in the Dominican Republic to re-establish a régime which the people of that country had overthrown. The violence directed by United States troops against Panamanian patriots in January 1964, the countless acts of provocation against the Cuban people and the occupation of Santo Domingo by United States marines were all typical examples of United States intervention in its various forms—which ranged from economic blockade to open armed aggression; if peace was to be preserved and if the objectives defined in the United Nations Charter were to be realized, aggressive acts of that kind by the imperialist Powers must be prohibited once and for all.

26. The principle of non-intervention had been given due recognition in the United Nations Charter, and had been reaffirmed in the declarations issued by the Asian-African Conference, held at Bandung in 1955, and by the first and second Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held respectively at Belgrade in 1961 and at Cairo in 1964. The adoption by the United Nations of a declaration on the subject, in the terms proposed by the USSR, would be a suitable way of reasserting that basic principle of international relations in a multilateral and universal instrument.

27. Governing circles in the United States had a number of different ways of intervening in the domestic affairs of States, in addition to the forms of open aggression which he had already cited. Year after year, for instance, they had been conducting a political campaign at the official level against his country, and had been lamenting the disappearance

element of hypocrisy in those lamentations, since at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the United States Secretary of State had opposed the Ukrainian people's right to self-determination and unification in a single State. The echo of that policy had been heard at the First Committee's 1396th meeting when the United States representative had made a slighting reference to the unification of the Ukrainian people; he wished to inform the United States representative that the unification of the Ukrainian people in a single Ukrainian State had been effected in accordance with the people's will, as expressed in free and democratic referendums. The Ukrainian people could have been reunited twenty-five years earlier had it not been for the interference of foreign interventionists—including the United States.

28. Thus, his country knew from its own history how essential it was that all countries and peoples should be protected from outside interference. A solemn affirmation of the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations would be of great value for the young countries which had recently cast off the yoke of colonialism but were not yet strong enough to resist intervention by the imperialists in their domestic affairs. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1), which called for the immediate cessation of armed or any other type of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, would help to improve the existing international situation and would serve as a warning against any future intervention. Paragraph 3 was worded in a particularly direct and unequivocal manner. The principle of non-intervention was now applicable over a much larger field than it had been in earlier times; under established principles of international law, it had been extended to cover the just struggle of peoples for national independence and freedom—a progressive trend which was fully taken into account in the USSR draft.

29. The resolution recently adopted by the United States House of Representatives, to the effect that United States troops were entitled to intervene in the domestic affairs of any Latin American country on the pretext of preventing the spread of communist ideology, was a gross violation of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. A declaration adopted by the United Nations should therefore specifically state that intervention in the domestic affairs of States for any reason, whether economic, political or ideological, was inadmissible; and his delegation could not therefore agree with the United States proposal (A/C.1/L.350 and Corr.1) to delete the last paragraph from the Soviet draft declaration.

30. In the course of the debate, a number of delegations had adopted a serious and constructive approach to the USSR draft, and some of the amendments suggested contained useful elements. Other speakers, on the other hand, had unfortunately tried to confuse the issue by referring to the many possible forms of intervention—including concealed intervention—and had overlooked the fact that blood and tears were being shed as the result of open armed intervention by the imperialist Western Powers. In the general

in interfering in the internal affairs of States was to stop the peoples towards political and economic independence; and that was undoubtedly the motive underlying the United States amendments, particularly the amendments to paragraph 3. Though the United States claimed that it supported the principle of self-determination of peoples, it refused to recognize that the principle of non-intervention was applicable to the just struggle of peoples for independence and freedom. That attitude was entirely in keeping with the policy pursued by the United States in recent years. The United Kingdom amendments (A/C.1/L.351) were likewise designed to frustrate the struggle of peoples for national freedom.

31. But the United Nations could not refuse its moral support to peoples fighting for their freedom and their lawful rights; in any declaration that it adopted, it should pledge its support for national liberation movements.

32. The Committee should not countenance the direct and indirect attempts being made by certain delegations to reduce the force of the Soviet draft declaration. He hoped that that draft would eventually be supported by all delegations; its adoption would be a landmark in the history of the United Nations.

33. Mr. OTEMA ALLIMADI (Uganda) said that his country was emphatically opposed to policies of unscrupulous intervention in the affairs of other States. In that connexion, the warning given by the representative of the USSR deserved careful consideration. The smaller nations should unite to reject the attempts of some of the great Powers to undermine their sovereignty and independence and reduce them to the status of political appendages. After their long struggle to regain their independence and sovereignty, the small countries found the interference of some Powers in their internal affairs especially painful.

34. Interference sometimes took the form of direct military intervention and sometimes that of intrigue directed from inside or outside the country concerned. The pretext was always the defence of a particular concept of democracy or the protection of the vital interests, usually economic, of the big Powers. But democracy implied freedom of expression and acceptance of the voice of the majority; it was undemocratic to suppress the will of the majority by military action, sabotage or the promotion of a coup d'état, or to try to dislodge a Government because it had different ideological views or was regarded as a puppet régime. The decision to change a Government should be left to the people of the country concerned; there should be no military or economic blackmail by other States. Like most small and non-aligned nations, Uganda wished to manage its domestic affairs in its own way. Attempts to corrupt young and inexperienced politicians, to instigate mutiny within national military forces and to overthrow a popularly elected Government were immoral and deplorable and should be rejected by all peace-loving peoples.

35. The smaller and newer nations needed stability more than anything else. They needed to devote their scarce resources to economic and social development, not to the establishment of security forces to

light external intrigues aimed at disrupting their orderly development. It was therefore important that intervention in the domestic affairs of States, which had become habitual on the part of the great Powers, should be condemned. Such intervention was a crime against humanity.

36. Those who claimed to be the protectors of democracy and who habitually intervened in the affairs of other States under the pretext of preserving democracy should reconsider their position of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Not one of them had made any move to intervene militarily there to protect democracy, which had just been stifled as a result of the unilateral declaration of independence by the white racist government. In that situation, military intervention by the United Kingdom to quell the rebellion and protect the lives of millions was fully justified and necessary.

37. In view of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations should ensure that interference in the internal affairs of other States, which was a threat to the peace, was not allowed to continue. It should lose no time in issuing a clear declaration enjoining Member States to observe the principle of non-intervention. His delegation welcomed the initiative taken by the Soviet delegation in proposing the inclusion in the agenda of the present item. It would support any reasonable measure to prevent countries from interfering in the domestic affairs of others, and would dissociate itself from any measure which did not seek the attainment of that goal.

38. Mr. MUDENGE (Rwanda) said that, despite the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, acts of aggression and intervention were today becoming increasingly widespread. Armed intervention, so-called "wars of national liberation" and subversive propaganda had become the subtle tactics of a new form of colonization which was seriously obstructing the economic and social development of the developing countries. Yet the principle of non-intervention had long been universally recognized in international relations. The Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, had condemned "the use of force, and all forms of intimidation, interference and intervention". The same principle was also laid down in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity; and on 24 October 1965, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meeting at Accra, had adopted a solemn declaration on the problem of subversion.

39. Rwanda, which would oppose any direct or indirect intervention from any source, was convinced that there would be no peace until the principle of non-intervention was respected. It was high time for the United Nations to reaffirm that principle categorically by condemning any direct or indirect act of aggression. The small countries which had been the victims of colonialism for many years would not tolerate a neo-colonialism aimed at the forcible imposition of a particular political or economic ideology. Experience had shown that any intervention by the great Powers in the affairs of other States on the pretext of protecting their freedom or independence

in fact only sowed disorder in those States and set back their development. In addition, it created tension and threatened international peace and security.

40. The General Assembly should also condemn subversive activities promoted from outside a country with the aim of overthrowing its legally established institutions and replacing them by régimes which would place the country under foreign domination. It was asserted that such intervention was intended to free young States from colonialism and imperialism; but that could not be believed. Each people should choose the form of government which best suited it and decide its own destinies. The African countries would not accept neo-colonialism in any form, and would not be swayed by political or economic ideologies which did not suit their mentality. He hoped that the General Assembly would take measures which would enable the small countries, whose only concern was to raise the standard of living of their peoples, to choose their own way of life.

41. The Government of Rwanda also condemned the practice of training groups of young people or political refugees to sow death and destruction in their own countries. The resources and energies wasted on such strife should instead be devoted to the rapid and balanced development of the newly independent countries.

42. If the future of the United Nations was to be assured and mankind was to be saved from the cataclysm of a nuclear war, the General Assembly should at its current session define the concepts of direct and indirect aggression. The United Nations should proclaim clearly the inadmissibility of any kind of intervention in the domestic affairs of States.

43. His delegation would support the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1), if the suggestions made by the representative of Afghanistan at the 1396th meeting were accepted. The draft should cover all cases, and some of the amendments submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom should therefore be adopted. His delegation was also prepared to vote for the Latin American draft resolution (A/C.1/L.349/Rev.1), on the understanding that certain parts of the preamble did not apply to Latin America alone. He regretted that the declaration on the problem

of subversion adopted at Accra by the African Heads of State and Government was not mentioned in the various drafts. The establishment of a working group to study the drafts with a view to combining them in a single text, as suggested by the representative of Afghanistan, would be a useful step. He would comment later on the draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic (A/C.1/L.353), which had only just been circulated.

44. Mr. LEBRON PUMAROL (Dominican Republic) said that his country had a long and sad experience as a victim of aggression, and was therefore opposed to any type of intervention and in favour of the self-determination of peoples. In the speech he made upon taking office,<sup>5/</sup> the Provisional President of the Dominican Republic had said that, until the principles of the legal equality of States and of non-intervention were followed consistently by the weak and the strong, the best defence for the small countries lay in observing faithfully the laws and agreements regulating international life. In the American continent, where intervention had caused much harm, an extensive body of juridical doctrine had been built up in support of the principle of the equality of all States and respect for their sovereignty.

45. His delegation had some criticisms of the Soviet draft resolution, which it would explain on a later occasion. Although his Government was in principle in favour of the Latin American draft resolution, it had not sponsored that text because it was not entirely satisfied with certain of its details. He had not yet had time to study the draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic.

46. He was convinced that the present debate would help to strengthen the principle of non-intervention, which implied the primacy of law and the equality of States, the preservation of a balance between powerful and weaker nations, and the banning of subversive ideological expansion. Non-intervention was the key to world peace and security and consequently to the survival of peoples, their culture and their civilization.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

<sup>5/</sup> See Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1965, document S/6676.