1.      Historical context

 

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, (hereinafter “the Single Convention”) which opened for signature on 30 March 1961, consolidated the narcotic drugs control treaties adopted in the previous half-century. The international drug control system created through the operation of these treaties had been initiated in the pre-League of Nations era by the establishment of the Shanghai Opium Commission. [1] Prior to the Single Convention’s adoption, nine treaties and international agreements of a more limited nature had addressed international narcotic drug control.  Six of these were concluded between 1912 and 1936, most under the auspices of the League of Nations after it was entrusted with supervisory duties in the field of drug control by the Covenant of the League of Nations (art. 23(c)). [2] They were:

 

·       The 1912 International Opium Convention;

·       The 1925 International Opium Convention;

·       The 1925 Agreement concerning the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and Use of Prepared Opium;

·       The 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs;

·       The 1931 Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East; and

·       The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs.

 

These League of Nations treaties were aimed primarily at regulating the licit supply of narcotic drugs. Participants in any stage of the drug supply chain were required to have a government license (art. 10 of the 1912 Convention and art. 6 of the 1925 Convention) and to maintain records of imports, exports, sales and other distributions for government inspection (art. 6 of the 1925 Convention). The Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB), which was established by the 1925 Convention (art. 19), acted as an international clearinghouse for these statistics. The export of drugs required certification by the importing State party that the drugs were needed for medical and scientific purposes (art. 13 of the 1925 Convention). In a similar vein, drug stocks in each State party, whether imported or manufactured, had to be limited to the amount necessary for scientific or medical purposes (arts. 6-9 of the 1931 Convention). These amounts were computed based on estimates (arts. 2-5 of the 1931 Convention) made by the State party concerned and submitted annually to a Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) established by the 1931 Convention (art. 7). States parties had to take effective measures to prosecute and punish drug traffickers, chiefly by increasing the severity of penalties for a range of stipulated offenses, by providing for criminal jurisdiction over traffickers and for the extradition of traffickers, and by expediting international cooperation (arts. 2, 7-9 and 13 of the 1936 Convention). States parties were required to establish national drug control agencies in order to carry out the tasks the conventions required (art. 15 of the 1931 Convention). The States parties also had to furnish international organs with information on their activities, including the control of the legal trade, the attempts to suppress illicit traffic, and the statistics and estimates of their narcotic drug requirements (arts. 13 and 24 of the 1931 Convention and art. 11 of the 1936 Convention). The League of Nations treaties did not, however, engage in direct international control of the involvement of individuals with narcotic drugs. They relied on the principle of indirect control. Goodrich explains what this means:

 

According to this principle, the responsibility for dealing with individuals engaged in the production, manufacture, or use or traffic in drugs is placed upon national governments and the responsibilities of international organs are limited to supervising and controlling the activities of national governments. [3]

 

The prevailing view at the end of the League of Nations era was that the international drug control system that had been established by these treaties was successful and there was little need to interfere with its essentials. [4] After World War II, although the Charter of the United Nations made no express provision for the United Nations’ mandate over drug control, the United Nations moved quickly to take up the League of Nations’ work in drug control. At its first session in February 1946, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established its Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) as a functional commission to continue the work of the League’s Opium Advisory Committee. [5] The CND’s mandate was to give full effect to the international drug conventions and to provide for continual review and development of international drug control. This renewed global attention identified a number of weaknesses and gaps in the international drug control system.

 

First, although the existing narcotic drug control conventions were meant to complement each other in an intermeshing system, not every State party was a party to every convention. A new convention offered an opportunity to consolidate participation.

 

Second, the administrative system was highly complex. Four different international organs were directly concerned with narcotics control: the CND, the PCOB, the DSB and the World Health Organization (WHO) Expert Committee on Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction, each one with its own secretariat. It was considered that the DSB and the PCOB could be amalgamated because their functions overlapped, and the independent secretariats that served the CND, PCOB and DSB could be combined to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts and to remove the burden on States parties to discharge obligations to each organization.

 

Third, the principle of exclusive limitation of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific purposes was not reflected in the substance of the treaties. The “production” through the cultivation of narcotic-producing plants (opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin), and the non-medical use of raw opium, prepared opium, coca leaves, cannabis, cannabis resin and “Group II drugs”, such as codeine, remained largely or completely uncontrolled. The CND regarded opium production as the most pressing issue. [6] Raw opium was only subject to a general obligation upon States to enact laws and regulations to ensure its effective control. The international community had failed to control the production of opium because of its significance as an export crop and because of fears about supply shortages, although traditional use and supply were also a concern. [7] Coca leaves and cannabis cultivation were not subject to any regulation at all because of their traditional cultivation and usage in many States.

 

Finally, the international system failed to adequately address the illicit traffic. The volume of illicit traffic, which had grown in the latter stages of the Second World War, grew even further in the 1950s, and the market was diversifying geographically and in terms of the range of drugs. [8]

 

Once established, the United Nations first took control of the existing system and then attempted to address the weaknesses and close the gaps in the system. [9] Three further treaties were adopted:

 

·       The 1946 Lake Success Protocol, amending the previous agreements, conventions and protocols on narcotic drugs. It was designed to transfer the League of Nations’ administrative control of the international drug control system to the United Nations. Acting through the CND, ECOSOC took responsibility for policy control in the system, while the PCOB maintained the estimate system and the DSB supervised the system.

·       The 1948 Paris Protocol, bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the 1931 Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended by the 1946 Lake Success Protocol. This instrument tried to resolve the problem that an increasing number of synthetic drugs did not fall within the scope of the 1931 Convention, by authorizing the WHO Drug Dependence Expert Committee to place a new substance under international control if they found it “capable of producing addiction or of conversion into a product capable of producing addiction” (art. 1).

·       The 1953 New York Protocol, for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, and the production of, international and wholesale trade-in, and use of opium. The 1953 New York Protocol was designed to try to prevent the overproduction of opium (art. 2). It arose from a failed proposal for the establishment of an international monopoly put before the CND. [10] An alternative French proposal eventually found expression in the 1953 New York Protocol. [11]  It made provision for seven national opium monopolies that would license poppy farmers and opium producers and specify the areas where opium cultivation was permitted (art. 6). In order to enable the DSB to advise governments about the desirable size of the opium crop, the 1953 New York Protocol also established a system of the maximum permitted stock levels based on estimates of the area to be cultivated, the opium harvesting and opium requirements. Statistical returns allowed the PCOB to supervise and verify stock levels in each State party. The PCOB was granted a mandatory embargo power to correct the action of non-compliant parties or States parties that were becoming centers of illicit traffic (arts. 11(1)(b) and 12(3)). As a result of its more intrusive nature, the 1953 New York Protocol is regarded as the “high tide” of restrictive control of drugs as a commodity. [12] However, it did not receive the backing of the main opium-producing States and was not in force by the time diplomatic negotiations began on a convention unifying the laws on drug control.

 

2. Significant developments in the negotiating history of the Single Convention

 

Work on a unified convention began in 1948. [13] In May 1948, the United States proposed to the CND that the development of a new unified convention be undertaken to simplify and modernize the system. [14] The limitation of opium production was a centrepiece of this proposal. On 3 August 1948, ECOSOC adopted a resolution proposed by the CND requesting the United Nations Secretary-General to prepare a draft convention to replace the existing conventions. [15] It was suggested that a single convention would strengthen the system of international control by limiting the production of raw materials, codifying the conventions into a single convention, and simplifying the control machinery. It would also take suitable steps to improve national control of narcotics, by improving national administrative procedures, training of personnel and technical assistance to governments.

 

At an early stage in the development of the Single Convention, the CND agreed that it too would follow the principle of indirect control. [16] Proposals that threatened to increase direct international control inevitably ran into opposition. Between 1950 and 1958, the Single Convention went through three drafts [17] with detailed work being done from 1952 onwards.

 

The first draft, on the CND’s agenda from 1950 to 1955, proposed the enlargement of control over cultivation and the simplification of the management of international drug control. [18] It also suggested the replacement of the PCOB and the Drug Supervisory Body by a single organ with a single secretariat and, more controversially, the establishment of an international organ to revise estimates given by States parties of their narcotic requirements, if necessary without their consent. States rebuffed the latter innovation as an imposition on their sovereignty. A proposed international clearinghouse to approve exports of narcotic drugs based on an estimate of a State party’s needs was also rejected, principally because of the delays it would cause to international supply. A best-efforts provision urging the establishment and maintenance of a monopoly over the opium trade was also abandoned due to a lack of support.

 

The second draft, on the CND’s agenda from 1956 to 1958, picked up most of the provisions of the extant drug conventions. [19] It retained the notion of a single organ, named the International Narcotics Bureau, to replace the PCOB and DSB, although it did not favour a single secretariat for this new body and the CND. It omitted the controversial proposals dropped in the first draft. However, following the model of the 1953 New York Protocol it included a proposal for an international organ to impose a mandatory import and export embargo upon States parties breaching the convention’s provisions as well as obligations to prohibit completely particularly dangerous narcotic drugs such as heroin. In order to control the cultivation of raw materials, the drafters turned once more to the 1953 New York Protocol, extending its provisions governing opium to poppy straw intended for the extraction of opium alkaloids. Similar levels of control were proposed for the coca bush, and it also established a prohibition on the cultivation of cannabis plants for the production of cannabis, except for small amounts necessary for scientific research.

 

The third draft, [20] developed between 1957 and 1958, provided for a range of uncontroversial technical provisions such as international forms for medical prescriptions for drugs and the use of international non-proprietary names for drugs. However, it also retained most of the second draft’s institutional proposals and many of its controversial production control features. The third draft proposed a closed list of seven named States parties authorized to produce opium for export, which would be limited to maximum stocks of opium for export. Perhaps most controversially, it made a draft provision for the establishment of an international organ with the power to prohibit the use of particularly dangerous narcotics even for medical purposes, and to impose a mandatory embargo on the import or export of narcotic drugs in the case of violations of certain treaty obligations. It also proposed penal provisions for illicit traffickers along the lines of those in the 1936 Convention. The CND was fully aware of the contentious nature of these provisions.

 

    On the recommendation of the CND, [21] ECOSOC convened a plenary conference that met in New York from 24 January to 25 March 1961. Delegates from seventy-three States (with one observer) attended the conference including representatives of all the major powers except China. They were joined by representatives from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, WHO, and Interpol, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Federation of Women Lawyers and the International Conference of Catholic Charities, as well as the PCOB and DSB. The conference worked on the third draft and on comments on this draft received from governments and organizations. Four distinct negotiating positions were identifiable: producing States, manufacturing States, the neutral group and the strict control group. [22]

 

The “producing States” group was made up of producers of organic raw materials. They were led by the opium-producing States including India, Turkey, Pakistan and Burma, backed by coca and cannabis-producing States. They favoured weak international controls and battled to loosen the draft provisions on opium, coca and cannabis, while trying to ensure restrictions were also imposed on the manufacturing of synthetic drugs.

 

The “manufacturing States” group was made up mostly of industrialized States. Its key members were the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany and Japan. As the primary manufacturers of synthetic drugs, they strongly opposed restrictions on the production and distribution of manufactured drugs for medical purposes. They supported the consolidation of the extant treaties and opposed extending control over cultivation along the lines of the 1953 New York Protocol because they feared it would erode support for the new treaty.

 

The Soviet Bloc and its allies also favoured the consolidation of the existing conventions. They were opposed to any intrusion into their sovereignty through, for example, closed lists of producers or powerful international supervisory organs.

 

The “neutral” group, a diverse group of developing States, sought only to guarantee access to sufficient drug supplies.

 

Finally, the “strict control” group was made up of non-producing and non-manufacturing States without a direct economic interest in the drug trade. The key actors were the United States, France, Sweden, Brazil and China (represented by the Taiwan authority). They favoured restricting drug use exclusively to medical and scientific purposes and sought to defend the core of the more controversial proposals cloned from the 1953 Protocol that had found their way into the CND’s third draft.

 

    Given these differing interests, there is little surprise that the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, adopted on 25 March 1961, constitutes a compromise in which many of the more controversial provisions fell away.

 

3. Key provisions of the Single Convention

 

Purpose

 

The preamble of the Convention reveals the inherent difficulty of reconciling the different aims of international drug control (paras. 1-8). It stipulates that the Single Convention is concerned “with the health and welfare of mankind”, recognizing that the use of narcotics is essential for the relief of pain and suffering, and that adequate provision must be made for availability for these purposes. However, it also recognizes addiction as “a serious evil for the individual … fraught with social and economic danger to mankind”. The Single Convention’s solution is “[c]oordinated and universal action” in the form of an international convention to replace existing treaties and to limit drugs to medical and scientific use.

 

Scope

 

The Single Convention controls a large number of substances, categorized into four separate schedules, each schedule subject to a different level of control (art. 2).

 

Schedule I mainly contains plant-based products such as opium, coca and cannabis and their derivatives (morphine, heroin, codeine). These substances are subject to all the measures of control under the Single Convention other than those applying to specific drugs.

 

Although the third draft contained a provision for absolute prohibition of a limited number of substances (draft arts. 2(1)(e) and 3(3)), the view that there were scientific and medical purposes for which they could be used prevailed. [23] Instead, schedule IV, the most stringent, subjects the listed substances to a regime prohibiting the production, manufacture, trade and possession [24] except for small amounts for medical and scientific research. However, the Single Convention does provide that a State party should prohibit narcotic drugs declared particularly dangerous by the CND if, in its view, the conditions within that State party render prohibition the most appropriate means to acting for public health and welfare (art. 2(5)(b)).

 

Schedule II contains synthetic narcotics including methadone and pethidine, which are subject to a less stringent regime.

 

Schedule III lists preparations exempt from the Single Convention’s control unless control is specifically provided.

 

Together, the four schedules define the material scope of the Single Convention, which can be changed by scheduling or descheduling a substance without amending the Single Convention (art. 3). The WHO Expert Committee initiates this process by making a recommendation to the CND to add or remove a substance from the schedules. The CND makes the scheduling decision. Any party can appeal that decision to ECOSOC within ninety days, and ECOSOC’s decision is final.

 

Limitation of interaction to medical and scientific purposes

 

The Single Convention expressly requires the parties to take all necessary steps to limit the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of the scheduled drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes (art. 4). The bulk of the provisions in the Single Convention is concerned with the regulation of agricultural production, manufacture and trade of the scheduled drugs. [25]

 

Production

 

The Single Convention recognizes the economic importance of the agricultural production of narcotic drugs by requiring parties to prohibit the cultivation of opium poppies, coca bushes or cannabis plants only if they consider it necessary to protect public health and prevent diversion into illicit traffic (art. 22). The Single Convention does, however, require States parties to create national opium agencies (art. 23). The primary function of these agencies is to designate the specific areas where the cultivation of opium poppies is permitted and to license cultivators. The cultivators must be obliged to deliver the entirety of their crop to the national opium agency, which exercises an exclusive right of importing, exporting, wholesale trading and maintaining stocks of opium. Private entities are, thus, excluded from participating in the lucrative business of buying and selling the crop. A proposal to oblige parties to furnish estimates of the areas to be cultivated as well as the approximate quantity of drugs produced was dropped in the course of negotiations as unworkable and overly burdensome. [26] The third draft also contained a provision taken from the 1953 New York Protocol that limited the import or export of opium to a restricted list of seven producers in order to limit opportunities for diversion into illicit traffic. However, it too was opposed on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality of States. A compromise was adopted in the Single Convention under which the traditional producers of opium (those that had exported in the decade prior to 1961) could continue to do so. New producers could enter the export market only with the consent of the ECOSOC, unless they produced less than five tons, in which case all that was required was prior notification to the INCB (on which see below) (art. 24). The drafters of the Single Convention also jettisoned other controversial features of the third draft such as limitation of the stocks a State party may hold. [27] Less complex systems of control apply to coca bush, cannabis and poppy straw as well as poppies cultivated for purposes other than opium production. States parties that permit the cultivation of these plants should apply to them the same system of controls required for opium (arts. 26-28). The upshot of these provisions is that raw opium, coca leaves and cannabis, and in particular the methods used for their cultivation, are subject to control (although control of coca leaves and cannabis is less elaborate) (arts. 22-28).

 

Manufacture

 

Drug manufacturing is subject to the measures used in earlier conventions including the licensing of manufacturers, traders and distributors (arts. 29-31). The estimate system, adapted from the 1931 Convention, restricts the manufacture and importation of drugs to maximum levels calculated based on estimated requirements (arts. 19 and 21). It requires parties to submit annual estimates of their needs for medical or scientific use, and their total production or manufacture and import of a drug must not exceed these estimated requirements.  A statistical return system enables an audit of the parties’ estimates (art. 20). States parties are also required to furnish a wide variety of other information to the United Nations Secretary-General, including annual reports on the working of the Single Convention within each of their territories, the texts of their laws and regulations implementing the Single Convention, and details of cases of illicit trafficking (art. 18).

 

Trade

 

The Single Convention controls the trade in drugs by requiring authorization of legal transactions to distinguish it from illegal trafficking. [28] Thus, for example, prescriptions are required for the dispensation of drugs to individuals, and drugs offered for sale must show the exact drug content by weight or percentage on the label (art. 30 (2) and (5)). The international trade is controlled by the licensing of participants and through the import/export authorization system, which requires a State party authorizing the export of drugs to do so only upon receipt of an import certificate from the State party of destination (arts. 30 and 31). The strong controls over poppy straw recommended in the third draft of the Convention (draft arts. 31-4 and schedule 1) were rejected because of opposition from States that cultivated poppy for its seeds. [29] What remains is a very general obligation to apply “adequate control” over the manufacture of narcotic substances made from poppy straw and to subject imports and exports of poppy straw to a licensing system (art. 21(b) and art. 25).

 

International Control Organs

 

Power to oversee and enforce the Single Convention is divided between two “international control organs”. The CND remains the principal policy-making organization. The Single Convention accords it the authority to make recommendations for the implementation of its aims (art. 8(c)).

The Single Convention created the quasi-judicial and administrative International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), to replace both the PCOB and DSB. Composed originally of eleven independent experts (three with medical, pharmacological or pharmaceutical experience nominated by the WHO and eight by the Member States of the United Nations and by parties which are not Members of the United Nations), the INCB is a creation of the Single Convention and is not a United Nations organ. It functions to try to constrain “the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes” and “to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in, and use of, drugs” (art. 9(4)). The INCB enforces the Single Convention by, inter alia, supervision of the estimate system and statistical returns. It requests estimates of drug requirements and existing stocks from both parties and non-parties (the latter was highly contentious [30] ), as well as estimates of consumption and seizures. If estimates are not forthcoming, it can fix them itself (art. 12(3)). Although draft provisions modelled on the provisions of the 1953 New York Protocol permitting the INCB to make local inquiries and impose a mandatory embargo (the third draft, draft art. 22(4)) were abandoned in the diplomatic conference because of sovereign sensitivity, [31] the Single Convention does provide the INCB with a number of ways to force parties to comply including requests for information and explanations, public declarations that a party has violated its obligations, and the power to recommend an embargo (art. 14(2)). Moreover, unlike the PCOB’s right to recommend an embargo on imports (art. 24 of the 1925 Convention), the INCB is entitled to recommend embargoes on both imports and exports.

 

Penal measures

 

The Single Convention’s penal measures are the result of the diplomatic conference’s moderation of the third draft’s elaborate penal provisions, which was based on the 1936 Convention. [32] Restraint was necessary to avoid conflict with the parties’ different legal systems. [33] To meet the requirements of those States parties seeking stronger measures, it was agreed that they could remain a party to the 1936 Convention and apply its stronger provisions inter se. [34] The Single Convention’s penal measures include an obligation on States parties, subject to their constitutional limitations and domestic law, to adopt distinct criminal offences for the cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch and transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the Single Convention’s provisions. Subject to the same limitation, States parties are also obliged to punish these specified offences adequately on a scale commensurate with their seriousness (arts.35-36). To ensure that transnational drug traffickers do not escape prosecution, the Single Convention includes provisions for the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the desirability of extradition and law enforcement cooperation, all subject to the constitutional limitations and domestic law of the parties. An isolated provision requires parties to give special attention to and take all practical measures for the prevention of drug abuse and for early identification, treatment, education, after-care rehabilitation and social reintegration of the persons involved (art. 38).

                 

General provisions

 

In order to facilitate the slow phasing out of these practices, the Single Convention permits parties to make transitional reservations temporarily permitting, inter alia, opium and cannabis smoking and coca leaf chewing, as well as the production and supply of these drugs (art. 49). The quasi-medical production and uses are subject to time limits (15 years for smoking opium, 25 years for coca leaf chewing and the use of cannabis, with concomitant limits on production), which have since expired. The Single Convention also permits general reservations concerning a list of provisions that impose liability on third parties (art. 50(2)). 

 

A workable compromise

 

As adopted, the Single Convention, however flawed, offered a single uniform system of control acceptable to the majority of negotiating States. [35] Producing States had been able to blunt provisions such as those providing for mandatory embargoes but were unable to fend off all new obligations. Opium producers in particular were forced, however, to accept the new national licensing agency. Manufacturing States, on the other hand, had managed to prevent special restrictions from being imposed on manufacturing. The Soviet bloc tried to avoid heavy interference in their domestic affairs and managed to open the closed list of opium producers. Neutral States ensured supply, but technical assistance was neglected. States that sought greater restrictions were least satisfied. They were highly critical of the Convention’s provisions on cultivation, arguing that they were weaker than the more restrictive provisions in the 1953 New York Protocol. [36] Nevertheless, as a workable compromise, the Single Convention represented the apotheosis of centralized control over the production and trade of drugs possible in 1961; greater centralization was impossible due to sovereign sensitivity. [37] Critical of the result, the United States campaigned heavily for ratification of the 1953 New York Protocol as an alternative. [38] However, at the ECOSOC’s session in late 1962, States parties approved a resolution in favour of the adoption of the Single Convention, [39] with the United States, the State party that had initiated the formation of the Single Convention, being the only State party to vote against the resolution. [40]

 

4. The influence of the Single Convention on the development of the 1971 Psychotropic Convention

 

Psychotropic substances, stimulants of the central nervous system and hallucinogens are not adequately dealt with by the Single Convention. Attempts at the 1961 Conference to place them under control had been defeated on the grounds that the Single Convention would become too complex. A resolution requiring further study of amphetamines and barbiturates with a view to expand the scope of drug control had failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority for adoption. After 1961, these failures and the pressure of further scientific development of synthetic drugs prompted the need for adjustments in the treaty regime. Attempts by the CND to expand the scope of the Single Convention to include psychotropic substances ran into opposition, and in 1969, the CND began to consider a draft convention as an alternative path to regulation. [41] In 1971, the international community took a further step in the expansion of the scope of international drug control and a plenary conference was held from 11 January to 21 February 1971 in Vienna. At the 1971 conference, a strict control group of States was again opposed to a manufacturing group. [42] Although modelled on the Single Convention, the eventual compromise, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter “the Psychotropic Convention) was considerably less rigorous. This was mainly because of the negotiating power of the manufacturing group, although there are differences between psychotropic and narcotic substance control due to the heterogeneity of psychotropic substances and the different risks connected to their abuse.

 

    Like the Single Convention, the Psychotropic Convention’s preamble records a concern for the health and welfare of humankind and a determination to combat the abuse of psychotropic substances (preamble, paras. 1 and 3). The process for extending the scope of the Psychotropic Convention is also similar to that contained in the 1961 Convention (art. 2). The level of control instituted by the Psychotropic Convention over a particular psychotropic substance depends on its location in the four schedules annexed to the Psychotropic Convention, each of which has an elaborate system of controls linked specifically to it (art. 2). [43] The basic obligation imposed on parties is to limit the use of psychotropic substances to medical and scientific purposes, but this is not spelled out in a specific article but, rather, inferred from the different control measures linked to each schedule (art. 4). However, unlike the Single Convention, the Psychotropic Convention does not limit the cultivation of plants from which psychotropic substances are made. Its main concern is control through licensing of the manufacture, export and import of psychotropic substances (art. 8). The international trade in psychotropic substances is controlled by the authorization of exports and imports (art. 12). Control of manufacture and trade is backed up by a system of inspection of those involved (art. 15). States parties are also obliged to furnish an annual report to the CND on the working of the Psychotropic Convention in their territories (art. 16). They also have to provide statistical information to the INCB. The INCB functions in a similar fashion to the way it functions under the Single Convention, concerning itself with the maintenance of statistics, appropriate operation of the export-import system, and keeping States parties informed of urgent situations (art. 18). The INCB retains investigative and recommendatory embargo powers (art. 19). The Psychotropic Convention does not, though, contain an estimate system, and thus estimates do not have to be reported to the INCB. The Psychotropic Convention does provide for limited measures for cooperation against illicit traffic (art. 21) and for criminal sanctions in national law (art. 22). The most prominent innovation of the Psychotropic Convention, prompted by increased interest in the rehabilitation of drug users as use grew, is the inclusion of provisions relating to the abuse of psychotropic substances including provision for rehabilitation and social reintegration (art. 20).

 

    The Psychotropic Convention had a mixed reception; some of the major States parties to the Single Convention chose not to become a party to it, perhaps because of reservations about efficacy or the increasing reach of international control. [44]  

 

5.  The Protocol amending the Single Convention

 

Although the majority of the international community did not share this view, the United States was dissatisfied with the Single Convention’s measures for the control of drugs, especially opium. It wanted to strengthen the Single Convention and spearheaded the amendment of the Convention. [45] At the seventeenth session of the CND, a representative from the United States expressed the view that the Single Convention should be amended before it came into force to make it more effective. According to art. 47 of the Single Convention, amendments to the Convention could be made by a proposal put forward by a State party (with no objections) or by a conference called by ECOSOC. 

 

Initiated by an ECOSOC resolution, [46] a diplomatic conference was held from 6 to 24 March 1972 in Geneva. It considered a list of amendments to the Single Convention sponsored by thirty States parties and adopted the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (hereinafter “the 1972 Protocol”). Despite efforts by the United States, the 1972 Protocol did not revive the 1953 New York Protocol’s strict control on opium production, mainly because most States parties were concerned about ensuring global supply. The 1972 Protocol does not make dramatic changes to the system of control applied by the 1961 Convention. It increases the size of the INCB to thirteen members (art. 2) and expands its role to include the prevention of “illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and use of, drugs” (art. 2). It encourages parties to supply INCB and CND with information on illicit drug use in their territory (art. 13). Perhaps most importantly, the 1972 Protocol increases the INCB’s monitoring and enforcement powers and strengthens its powers to suppress illicit traffic (art. 13). Following the precedent in the Psychotropic Convention, the 1972 Protocol also introduces the option of alternatives to penal sanctions for traffic and possession offences committed by drug users (art. 14). It also makes greater provisions for treatment, rehabilitation and preventive measures for users of narcotic drugs (art. 15). Perhaps the most far-reaching change to the Single Convention’s measures against illicit traffic, which was adopted in later conventions, was the obligation upon States parties to include the Single Convention’s offences (except for possession) in all of their future extradition treaties (art. 14).

 

6. Longer-term legal consequences of the Single Convention

 

Despite the hopes of some of its drafters, the Single Convention did not prove to be the drug convention to end all drug conventions. It was, as noted, found necessary to develop a parallel instrument, the 1971 Psychotropic Convention, to try to control psychotropic substances, and then to amend the Single Convention itself through the 1972 Protocol. Lacunae, such as a mechanism for technical assistance to help developing States parties implement their obligations were not addressed in treaty form but through mechanisms like the creation, in 1970, of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) by a resolution of the General Assembly. [47] As a whole, the international drug control system formed in the second half of the twentieth century is concerned with the control of drug supply. The Single Convention functions as the lynchpin of this system. Its main concern is to outline what legal supply is, thus demarcating what is illegal behaviour concerning drugs. Subsequent drug treaty-making has focused chiefly on fostering direct action against illicit drug traffic.  The relative weakness of the penal provisions and in particular provisions for formalizing international cooperation against transnational drug traffickers was addressed in 1988 with the signing of the United Nations Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. More recently, we have seen greater emphasis on addressing the negative social and health impacts of the demand for drugs. Three special sessions of the General Assembly have been used to produce political declarations and plans of action in 1998 [48] and 2016 [49] directed in part at trying to balance supply and demand perspectives in the international drug control system.

 

Points of conflict remain. They include the scheduling of the coca leaf, the extensive power of the control organs, particularly the INCB, the conflict over the use of harm reduction methods, the negative human rights impacts of enforcement action and decriminalization of certain drugs, particularly cannabis. The INCB has been criticized for taking an increasingly defensive stance against the reform of the conventions. [50] Although many powerful States parties oppose reform, [51] the perception that the Single Convention is integral to the system’s rigidity has prompted calls for its reform. [52] An amendment is possible but difficult (art. 47), and it seems likely that any significant change in the direction of international drug control will precipitate calls for the replacement of the Single Convention.

 

This Introductory Note was finalized in September 2023.

 

  Related Materials

  A. Legal Instruments

  International Opium Convention, Hague, 23 January 1912, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 8, p. 187

 

Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and Use of, Prepared Opium, Geneva, 11 February 1925, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 51, p. 337.

 

International Opium Convention, Geneva, 19 February 1925, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 81, p. 317.

 

Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, 13 July 1931, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 139, p. 301.

 

Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, Bangkok, 27 November 1931, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 177, p. 373.

 

Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Geneva, 26 June 1936, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 198, p. 300.

 

Protocol (with Annex) amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs concluded at the Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and 19 February 1925, and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and at Geneva on 26 June 1936, Lake Success, New York, 11 December 1946, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 12, p. 179.

 

Protocol Bringing under International Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of 13 July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as Amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, on 11 December 1946, Paris, 19 November 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 44, p. 277.

 

Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, New York, 23 June 1953, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 456, p. 3.

 

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, New York, 30 March 1961, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 520, p. 151.

 

Convention on Psychotropic Substances (with lists of substances), Vienna, 21 February 1971, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1019, p. 175.

 

Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Geneva, 25 March 1972, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 976, p. 3.

 

United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (with Annex), Vienna, 20 December 1988, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1582, p. 95.

 

 

B. Documents

 

Economic and Social Council resolution 9(I) of 16 February 1946 (Commission on Narcotic Drugs).

 

Economic and Social Council, Official Records of the Fourth Session, 1947, Supp No. 1.

 

Commission on Narcotic Drugs 3rd session: Limitation of production of raw materials: proposal submitted by the representative of the United States of America (E/CN.7/130), 10 May 1948.

 

Economic and Social Council resolution 1948/159 (VII) IID of 3 August 1948 (Simplification of existing international instruments on narcotic drugs).

 

Economic and Social Council resolution 1949/246(IX)B of 23 July 1949 (Requests for information from Governments on Narcotic Drugs). 

 

Economic and Social Council, Official Records of the Twelfth Session, Feb-Mar 1951, Supp. No. 2.

 

Preparatory documentation on Single Convention: note / by the Secretary-General (E/CN.7/AC.3/3), October 1951.

 

The Single Convention: 2nd draft (E/CN.7/AC.3/7), 29 March 1956.

 

Economic and Social Council resolution 1958/689(XXVI)J of 28 July 1958 (The proposed Single Convention on narcotic drugs).

 

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs: 3rd draft (E/CN.7/AC.3/9), 11 September 1958.

 

United Nations Conference for the Adoption of A Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs: Compilation of Comments in the Single Convention (Third Draft) (E/CONF.34/1), 17 June 1960.

 

United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, held from 24 January to 25 March 1961, Official Records, Volume II, Preparatory documents, amendments and miscellaneous papers, Proceedings of Committees, Final Act, Single Convention and Schedules (E/.34/24/Add.1), New York, 1964.

 

Economic and Social Council, Official records of 1336th meeting of the thirty-seventh session, held on 29 July 1964 (E/SR.1336).

 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, Twenty Years of Narcotics Control under the United Nations: Review of the work of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs from its 1st to its 20th session, 1 January 1966.

 

Commission on Narcotic Drugs, report of the 23^rd session, 13-31 January 1969 (E/4606/Rev.1-E/CN.7/523/Rev.1), 1969.

 

General Assembly resolution 2719 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 (Technical assistance in the field of drug abuse control).

 

Commentary on the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (E/CN.7/589), Vienna, 21 February 1971.

 

Economic and Social Council resolution 1577(L) of 21 May 1971 (Convening of a plenipotentiary conference to amend the Single Conference on Narcotic Drugs, 1961).

 

Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (E/CN.7/588), Geneva, 25 March 1972.

 

United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic Substances, held from 11 January to 19 February 1971, Official Records, Volume I, Organizational documents, texts of the revised draft Protocol and of the Convention, record of the work of the Conference Final Act Convention on Psychotropic Substances and Schedules and resolutions (E/CONF.58/7), New York, 1973.

 

United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic Substances, held from 11 January to 19 February 1971, Official Records, Volume II, Summary records of plenary meetings Minutes of the meetings of the General Committee and the Committee on Control Measures (E/CONF.58/7/Add.1), New York, 1973.

 

Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961: Prepared by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 1 of Economic and Social Council resolution 914 D (XXXIV) of 3 August 1962, New York, 1973.

 

United Nations Conference to consider amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, held from 6 to 24 March 1972, Official Records,Volume I, Preparatory and organizational documents Main Conference documents Final Act and Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 and Annexes (E/CONF.63/10), 1973.

 

United Nations Conference to consider amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, held from 6 to 24 March 1972, Official Records, Volume II, Summary records of plenary meetings, summary records of meetings of Committee I and Committee II (E/CONF.63/10/Add.1), 1973.

 

Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (E/CN.7/590), Vienna, 20 December 1988.

 

United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, held from 25 November to 20 December 1988, Official Records, Volume II, Summary records of plenary meetings, summary records of meeting of Committee I and Committee II (E/CONF.82/16/Add.1), New York, 1991 .

 

Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1993 (E/INCB/1993/1), 1993.

 

United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, held from 25 November to 20 December 1988, Official Records, Volume I, Preparatory work, conference documents on organizational matters, main conference documents, final act, resolutions, and United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (E/CONF.82/16), New York, 1994.

 

Resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its twentieth special session, 8 to 10 June 1998 (A/S-20/14), New York, 1999.

 

General Assembly resolution 63/197 of 18 December 2008 (International cooperation against the world drug problem).

 

General Assembly resolution 69/200 of 18 December 2014 (Special session of the General Assembly on the world drug problem to be held in 2016).

 

General Assembly resolution 70/181 of 17 December 2015 (Special session of the General Assembly on the world drug problem to be held in 2016).

Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2019 (E/INCB/2019/1), Vienna, 2020.

   

C. Doctrine

 

D. R. Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 219.

 

D. Bewley-Taylor and M. Jelsma’s “Regime change: Re-visiting the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 23, 2012, pp. 72-81.

 

S. K. Chatterjee, Legal Aspects of International Drug Control, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1981, pp. 367-395.

 

C. Fazey, “The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme: politics, policies and prospect for change”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 14, 2003, pp.155-169.

 

L. M. Goodrich, “New Trends in Narcotics Control”, International Conciliation, vol. 33, no. 530, 1960, pp. 181-192.

 

R. W. Gregg, “The Single Convention for Narcotic Drugs”, Food, Drug, Cosmetic Law Journal, vol. 16(4), 1961, pp. 187-208.

 

R. W. Gregg, “The United Nations and the Opium Problem”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 13(1), 1964, pp. 96-115.

 

A. Lande, “The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961”, International Organisation, vol. 16(4), 1962, pp. 776-797.

 

W. B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: International History, Routledge, London, 1999, p. 185.

 

A. Noll, “International Treaties and the Control of Drug Use and Abuse”, Contemporary Drug Problems, vol. 6, 1977, pp. 17-40.

 

B. A. Renborg, International Drug Control: A Study of International Action by and through the League of Nations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1947.

 

I. G. Waddell, “International Narcotics Control”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 64, 1970, pp. 310-323.

 

H. Wright, “The International Opium Commission”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 3(4), 1909, pp. 828-868.