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22nd meeting of the Committee of the Whole

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work out a common text, which would then be submitted to the informal consultations group.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{It was so agreed.}

**PREPARATION OF A DRAFT PREAMBLE AND DRAFT FINAL CLAUSES**

94. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee’s attention to the statement he had made at the 15th meeting requesting delegations which intended to submit proposals for the preamble and final clauses of the draft convention to do so as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{22} In order to facilitate the Committee’s work, he suggested that such proposals should be submitted direct to the Drafting Committee, which should be entrusted with the preparation of the draft preamble and draft final clauses for submission to the Conference.

95. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to adopt that suggestion.

\textit{It was so decided.}

The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.

\\textsuperscript{21} See the report of the informal consultations group at the 34th meeting, paras. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{22} See above, 15th meeting, para. 1.

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**22nd MEETING**

\textit{Thursday, 21 April 1977, at 11.05 a.m.}

\textit{Chairman: Mr. RIAD (Egypt)}

Consideration of the question of succession of States in respect of treaties in accordance with resolutions 3496(XXX) and 31/18 adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1975 and 24 November 1976 [Agenda item 11] (continued)

**ARTICLE 13 (Questions relating to the validity of a treaty)**

1. Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan) said that article 13, like article 6, stated a cardinal principle of the draft and constituted a proviso to articles 11 and 12. Furthermore, it served the aims of part V of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and met the requirements of the whole régime of conventions whose purpose was to deal with situations in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The brevity of the International Law Commission’s commentary to the article was due to the positive character of the rule which the article contained; it was a rule which did not require any explanation. The reasons why the International Law Commission had included the rule in the draft were explained in paragraphs (43) and (44) of the commentary to articles 11 and 12 (A/CONF.80/4, pp. 47-48), where it was pointed out that those two articles were not contrary to the principle of self-determination and had no effect on the validity of treaties establishing boundary or other territorial régimes or on the validity of such régimes themselves. His delegation therefore supported draft article 13, which the Committee should adopt and refer to the Drafting Committee.

2. Mr. SETTE CÂMARA (Brazil) observed that, in the International Law Commission’s discussion of the provisions appearing in articles 11 and 12, it had been found necessary to include a saving clause of a general nature covering the draft as a whole and not just those two articles, for without such a proviso the other provisions of the draft might possibly have been interpreted as prejudicing a question relating to the validity of a treaty; it had also been thought necessary to include the saving clause in part I of the draft, entitled “General Provisions”. Although his delegation did not feel that article 13 was indispensable, it had no objection to its inclusion in the draft and was prepared to support it.

3. Mr. RANJEVA (Madagascar) said that his delegation had no particular objection to article 13, but that at the same time it prompted a number of comments which should be brought to the attention of the Drafting Committee. In article 13, the International Law Commission had drawn a distinction between two basic questions, namely the validity of a treaty, a matter covered by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and succession of States; in his view, however, making that distinction did not add anything new to the draft. He therefore hoped that the Expert Consultant would explain why the International Law Commission had found it necessary to restate a truism, for behind that truism lay the whole problem of the effects of a treaty. Although it was self-evident that a succession of States in no way prejudiced the validity of a treaty, on the other hand the effects of a treaty were directly influenced by a succession, since a new subject of law appeared on the international scene. Might there not arise a conflict between the provisions of a treaty and the rules of law governing succession of States? A treaty which was valid but incompatible with the rules of law relating to succession of States might be rendered inoperative. It would therefore be interesting to know how the International Law Commission had reconciled the following three factors: the validity of a treaty, the effects of a treaty and the problem of a succession of States \textit{stricto sensu.}

4. Sir Francis VALLAT (Expert Consultant) said that in the first place several articles provisionally adopted by the Committee stated rules that were more or less obvious. The International Law Commission had
decided to include article 13 in the draft for the reasons given by the representatives of Afghanistan and Brazil. When the text of the provisions now constituting articles 11 and 12 had been submitted to Governments for comment in 1972, the great majority had found the provisions acceptable, but some Governments had expressed doubts and had considered that the International Law Commission should expressly stipulate that the continuance of territorial regimes on the occurrence of a succession should in no way prejudice any question relating to the validity of a treaty. The discussion of articles 11 and 12 had shown, moreover, that the majority of the Committee felt that the International Law Commission had been right to take account of those doubts. Furthermore, as it was rarely the case that a provision having a specific purpose did not affect other provisions of the draft, the International Law Commission had decided that article 13 ought to refer to the draft as a whole.

5. Mr. MUSEUX (France) said that article 13 did not present any problem to his delegation, but he would like some clarification on points analogous to those raised by the representative of Madagascar. The question of the validity of a treaty clearly had no connexion per se with the question of succession of States, whence the relevance of article 13, although doubts might be expressed as to the need for such an article. At the same time, his delegation was uncertain as to what relationship existed between the provision under discussion and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The International Law Commission had stipulated that "nothing in the present articles shall be considered as prejudicing in any respect any question relating to the validity of a treaty", probably in the belief that part V of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regulated the question of the validity of the treaty, but he would like confirmation of that, especially as it did not appear to be completely self-evident in the light of article 73 of the Vienna Convention, which dealt with cases of State succession. Furthermore, certain provisions of the procedure for impeaching the validity of a treaty which were contained in part V of the Vienna Convention did not appear appropriate to cases of State succession; that suggested that the draftsmen had actually excluded from the scope of the Convention the question of succession of States from the point of view of the validity of treaties.

6. Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan) said he felt that the explanations given by the Expert Consultant to the representative of Madagascar also answered the question raised by the French representative. Since the international community consisted of a large number of States, it was natural that a draft convention should pose different problems for each. The discussion on articles 11 and 12 in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and in the International Law Commission, and the comments made by Governments, had highlighted the importance of a saving clause. Madagascar was fortunate not to have a boundary problem, but those in favour of article 13 knew that one of the sources of dispute between a large number of nations was the question of boundary regimes.

7. Sir Francis VALLAT (Expert Consultant) pointed out that the question had been raised of the relationship between article 73 and part V of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; that very fact indicated the advisability of dispelling all doubts by including in the draft the proviso which constituted article 13. Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made it clear that the Vienna Convention was not applicable to the effects of a succession of States, but that article did not refer to the question of the validity of a treaty as such. In its draft, the International Law Commission had taken care to ensure that no single provision could be interpreted as implying that a succession of States affected the validity of a treaty, but it had nevertheless deemed it best to say so explicitly. It was true that some of the procedures provided for in part V of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could not apply to cases of State succession, but the Committee might consider that question when it discussed the provisions relating to settlement of disputes.

8. Mr. GOULART DE A VILA (Portugal) said that, despite the arguments which could be advanced against including article 13 in the draft, it would be preferable to accept the text proposed by the International Law Commission. Referring to the position adopted during the discussion of article 11 by several delegations which had expressed concern over the inflexible manner in which the International Law Commission had formulated the exception to the "clean slate" principle, he said that it was a fact that article 11 did not provide for the possibility of revising boundary treaties. Boundaries had often been established by colonial Powers without regard to the ethnic, cultural or linguistic characteristics of colonial peoples, sometimes under pressure from another colonial Power. Article 13 therefore had an important role to play in countering such difficulties; it supported the conclusion that only validly concluded treaties were covered by article 11. Yet article 13 went still further. In the context of the draft, the question of the validity of a treaty did not arise solely in connexion with territorial regimes; account had to be taken of the case where, for example, a succession of States arose from the division of the territory of a State which had been established by a treaty concluded by the predecessor State when subject to political pressure from another State. According to article 6, such a situation could not be governed by the draft, but article 6 could not be applied without relying on article 13. His delegation therefore gave article 13 its unqualified support.

9. Mr. MARESCA (Italy) said that the article under discussion had the advantage of serving as a reminder that all questions relating to the validity of treaties had been regulated conclusively by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In article 73, the Vienna Convention stated that its provisions did not prejudice any question that might arise in regard to a treaty from, inter alia, a succession of States. Although a succession, considered as a juridical fact, was not governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the latter nevertheless applied to any question relating to the validity of a treaty. From a purely legal point of view, therefore, the article under discussion was unnecessary, but it provided a useful clarification.

10. The juridical technique used in drawing up article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the article under discussion was not new. The participants at the United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities (Vienna, 1961) had debated whether a diplomatic mission could exercise consular functions. While some delegations had held that the matter fell within the competence of another conference, the majority had subscribed to a Spanish proposal that the Convention on Diplomatic Relations should include a provision to the effect that the Convention did not prevent the exercise of consular functions by a diplomatic mission. The United Nations Conference on Consular Relations (Vienna, 1963) had subsequently been able to rely on that provision.

11. Mr. SATTAR (Pakistan) said that it was apparent from the explanations provided by the Expert Consultant that the article under discussion was not really necessary, since it enunciated a self-evident rule. Besides, no provision of the draft could be construed as in any way prejudicing any question in regard to the validity of a treaty. Still his delegation had no objection to the inclusion of article 13 in the draft. He would like to make two points, however.

12. Firstly, the subject of the validity of treaties was dealt with extensively in articles 46 to 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; those articles codified the rules concerning factors which might invalidate a treaty under that Convention. The factors in question related to objective criteria which did not by any means confer upon a State the right to declare unilaterally that a treaty was invalid. Secondly, a succession of States did not provide occasion for questioning the validity of a treaty. It was not possible to invoke the rebus sic stantibus rule as embodied in article 62, paragraph 2, subparagraph (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in order to terminate a pre-existing treaty establishing a boundary. Just as a succession did not legalize a boundary established by an invalid treaty, so it could not invalidate a boundary established by a valid treaty.

13. The CHAIRMAN noted that no other representative wished to express any views on article 13 and said that, unless there was any objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to adopt article 13 provisionally and refer it to the Drafting Committee.

*It was so decided.*

**ARTICLE 14 (Succession in respect of part of territory)**

14. Mr. KOECK (Holy See) said that, in principle, he approved article 14 since the rules it expressed appeared to be firmly established in customary international law.

15. During the discussion on article 3, concerning cases not within the scope of the proposed convention, the delegation of the Holy See had expressed reservations regarding the wholesale application of articles of the draft to all treaties of whatever character. In its view, article 3 could not bring about the unconditional application of any rule of the draft convention to international treaties which the Holy See concluded with States on religious matters i.e., without their special character being taken into account. The Holy See reserved for itself the right to examine individually each case that concerned a concordat. Consequently, the rules laid down in article 14 could not, through the door opened by article 3, apply to a concordatory régime. Concordats were closely related to the ecclesiastical structure of a particular region and that structure could not be modified by the simple fact that part of the territory of a State became part of the territory of another State. It was because of that territorial aspect that the moving treaty-frontiers rule could not apply to concordats. The concordatory régime applicable in part of a territory before the transfer of that territory could not cease to apply to it, just as the concordatory régime existing in the successor State could not be extended to the transferred part of territory.

16. The position of the Holy See was supported by international practice. Thus in 1871, when the territories of Alsace and Lorraine had been ceded by France to the German Empire, the concordatory régime instituted in the concordat between the Holy See and France in 1801 had continued in force in those territories. When Alsace and Lorraine had been returned to France after the First World War, the same concordatory régime had remained applicable even though in the meantime the concordat of 1801 had ceased to constitute the ground for the relationship between Church and State in France. Other examples could be adduced to show that the rules contained in article 14 were not applicable to concordats.

17. In conclusion, he said that the delegation of the Holy See did not object to article 14 provided it was

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2 For resumption of the discussion of article 13, see 34th meeting, paras. 1-2.

3 See above, 4th meeting, paras. 1-2.
understood that the article could not be applicable to concordats through the operation of article 3.

18. Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan) said that the rule contained in article 14 was again closely connected with article 6, which restricted the scope of the proposed convention to lawful situations, and with the saving clauses contained in articles 38 and 39 concerning the outbreak of hostilities and military occupation. In accordance with State practice, article 14 should only apply to lawful transfers of territory from one State to another, and it was subject to the principle of self-determination of the people residing in the territory where the change of sovereignty occurred. As the transfer of territory must be lawful, article 14 was also linked to article 13, relating to the validity of treaties.

19. In his view, it would be better if article 14 were included among the general provisions, i.e., in part I of the draft convention, so that it would be covered by articles 6 and 13. He would be interested to hear the comments of the Expert Consultant and of other delegations on that suggestion. His delegation would then concur with the view of the majority.

20. Mr. STEEL (United Kingdom) said that the substance of article 14 was acceptable but he had reservations about the wording of the clause in subparagraph (b) concerning the incompatibility of the application of a treaty with its object and purpose. An analogous clause was to be found in a dozen or so provisions elsewhere in the draft. The clause had resulted from the combining of two provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to be found in article 19, on formulation of reservations, and article 62, on fundamental change of circumstances, respectively. Such a combination gave rise to some technical difficulties. He wondered whether the proposed convention should use, in a somewhat different context, wording which concerned the formulation of reservations to a treaty and whether it might not be better to have recourse to other criteria. Referring to that part of the article which dealt with fundamental change of circumstances, he pointed out that the criterion appearing in article 62 of the Convention of 1969 differed slightly from the one which appeared in the corresponding wording of article 14. That might give rise to confusion especially in circumstances when both provisions might apply to the same treaty. It might be that no better formulation was possible, but an effort should nevertheless be made to devise an improved text.

21. In any event, whether the wording of article 14, subparagraph (b) could be improved or not, the idea underlying it appeared to depend on criteria that were too vague, and therefore disputes might arise. That was a further reason for including in due course a provision on the settlement of disputes.

22. Mr. BEDJAOU (Algeria) said that he had no difficulty in accepting the rule stated in article 14, but he was worried by a problem which concerned the different kinds of succession. Part II of the draft, in which article 14 had been included, dealt with a particular type of succession, i.e., succession in respect of part of a territory. The case envisaged was that of a State ceding part of its territory to a neighbouring State. But article 14 covered not only that case but also an entirely different one, namely the case where "any territory, not being part of the territory of a State, for the international relations of which that State is responsible, becomes part of the territory of another State". That was the case where a dependent territory achieved decolonization not by becoming independent, but by being incorporated into a State that already existed. From the standpoint of purely juridical logic, those two hypotheses had nothing in common.

23. For a predecessor State to be able to cede part of its territory to a successor State, it must of necessity own that part. However, the territory of a dependent country was not the property of the administering Power, except perhaps according to the nineteenth century fiction of a colonial law, which was now completely out of date. The unfortunate assimilation of the two hypotheses in article 14 appeared to revive that fiction. As it appeared from contemporary international law and particularly from the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), the territory of a dependent country remained separate and distinct from that of the administering Power.

24. In his opinion, cases of succession in which a territory achieved decolonization by free and orderly incorporation into a neighbouring State should be dealt with in a different part of the proposed convention. It should be remembered that, at its last session, the International Law Commission had reverted to its earlier decisions in regard to the classification of types of succession in its study on succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties.

25. Mr. KEARNEY (United States of America) said that the draft convention contained a whole series of articles in which the application of a treaty depended on whether such application "would be incompatible with its object and purpose or would radically change the conditions for the operation of the treaty". Those conditions applied to both bilateral and multilateral treaties. The application of provisions of such a nature raised problems, because in many cases it was difficult to determine the object and purpose of a treaty. Some treaties had multiple objects and purposes and the application of the treaty under certain circumstances might be in accord with some of those objects and purposes but not with others. Friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, for example, generally had the object and purpose of improving relations between the parties, particularly in the field of commerce and trade. Many such treaties contained
provisions whose object and purpose was to place citizens of State A residing in State B in the same position as citizens of State B in regard to a number of commercial activities. If State B acquired a territory that had a different economic structure or level of development, the application of the national treatment might not be compatible with the general object and purpose of a friendship, commerce and navigation treaty. It was probable, however, that other activities provided for in the agreement, such as the establishment of consular activities in the new territory, would be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. State B, of course, might claim that the application of the treaty to the newly acquired territory would be contrary to its object and purpose or radically change the conditions for its application, while State A asserted the contrary.

26. Although the draft articles contained conditions for the application of treaties already in force to new situations resulting from a succession of States, they did not make any provision for what was to be done when a difference of that kind arose. Even if that purely procedural matter could be settled, and his delegation would be introducing an article to that effect in due course, serious insoluble problems would nevertheless remain. Those problems arose not only with regard to acquisition of territory, under article 14, but were also raised by articles 16, 17, 18, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36. As those articles were among the most important provisions of the draft convention, the complete absence of any procedure for dealing with possible objections to the application of a treaty in the case of a succession was a serious weakness. At best, the Conference could only add articles to solve some of those problems, otherwise it would have to embark on a task that would prevent it from completing its work.

27. The questions concerning the procedure for raising objections were relatively simple in comparison with the questions raised by the substantive effects of an objection. Some articles raised even more problems than article 14 in that respect. In the case of a uniting of States under article 30, for example, if predecessor State A was party to a copyright convention to which predecessor State B was not a party, the unified State AB would, under article 30, maintain the copyright convention in force in the territory of former State A but not in that of former State B. If publishing houses in territory A then transferred much of their activity to territory B and State X objected that, as a result, the application of the copyright convention was incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and radically changed the conditions for the operation of the treaty, what would be the effect of the objection? Should the copyright convention be suspended in its entirety throughout State AB? That hypothetical situation, along with many others, illustrated how difficult it was to determine the consequences of objecting to the application of the treaty and to work out the relevant rules.

28. The value of the proposed convention on succession of States in respect of treaties would be considerably diminished if no provision was made for solving the problems of objection to the application of a treaty. In his view, the best remedy would be to provide a workable and efficient system for settling disputes. Without such a system, newly independent States, successor States and States that had made territorial adjustments could find themselves in situations where it was completely unclear to them whether treaties did or did not apply in whole or in part to a part or the whole of their territories.

29. As the problem of objections to the application of treaties could give rise to serious differences among States concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention, a method of settling disputes should be adopted which was equitable, easily workable and broadly acceptable to States. The major difficulty was that of acceptability, since States' views differed widely with regard to what system of settling disputes should be selected. Some States favoured recourse to the International Court of Justice; others preferred arbitration or conciliation procedures, or leaving the entire subject to diplomatic negotiations. It was obviously impossible to satisfy all States, but it should be possible to devise a body of acceptable rules by turning to methods adopted by recent conferences in which a great many States had participated.

30. Mr. TREVISANUS (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he fully endorsed the substance of article 14, which codified the moving treaty-frontiers rule, since that rule was applied in international practice and could be regarded as belonging to customary international law. Article 14 corresponded to article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which dealt with the territorial scope of treaties and stipulated that "a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory"—including newly acquired parts of its territory. The International Law Commission had answered in many recognized rules in the draft articles. In his view, the question whether the case covered by article 14 was a genuine case of succession of States or simply a transfer of territory was a secondary one, which the International Law Commission had answered in paragraph (3) of its commentary to the article (A/CONF.80/4, p. 49).

31. The words "becomes part of the territory of another State" in the opening portion of article 14 described the transfer of a territory factually, in keeping with the definition in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) to the effect that "succession of States" means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory. It was quite obvious that the answer to the question of the legality of a transfer of territory should not be sought in the draft convention. It was likely that, in most future cases involving article 14, the transfer of a territory would be the result of an
agreement between the States concerned and would therefore be of a contractual nature.

32. It might be asked then why article 14 did not contain one of the usual clauses providing for derogation from the established rules in cases where the parties agreed on different rules or where the treaty provided otherwise. Such clauses made it possible, in the case of general or individual consent or even tacit agreement, to derogate from the residuary rules of a convention. It was conceivable in the case of article 14 that, owing to agreements concluded between the predecessor State and the successor State, the predecessor State would continue to have financial obligations in respect of the ceded territory. Article 14 did not exclude that possibility and, in general, the draft articles did not set out to establish peremptory rules from which there could be no derogation by the freely expressed consent of the parties concerned. Nevertheless, the Drafting Committee should, wherever necessary, add clauses allowing derogation from the rules of the Convention if the parties so agreed, or else systematically eliminate such clauses from the entire draft in order to avoid any misunderstanding.

33. The exception proviso in subparagraph (b) of article 14 had been formulated in the same manner in 11 other articles of the draft convention. By such a formula, the International Law Commission had intended, as stated in paragraph (14) of its commentary to article 14, “to lay down an international objective legal test of compatibility which, if applied in good faith, should provide a reasonable, flexible and practical rule”, and which would make it possible to “take account of the interests of all the States concerned and to cover all possible situations and all kinds of treaties” (ibid., p. 51). Obviously, however, as the interests of States were not always identical, such provisos would inevitably give rise to divergent interpretations.

34. Provision should therefore be made for a procedure for the application of those provisos in the event of a dispute. There would undoubtedly be disputes about the criteria to be employed in determining whether the application of a treaty to a territory would be incompatible with its object and purpose or would radically change the conditions for the operation of the treaty. Settlement of disputes was consequently the indispensable corollary to the saving clauses appearing in the draft convention. The compatibility criterion had first been applied by the International Court of Justice in a genocide case; also, articles 62 and 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should be seen in conjunction with each other.

35. Concerning the second part of the proviso, he noted that the formula used in subparagraph (b) of article 14—“would radically change the conditions for the operation of the treaty”—differed from that in article 62, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, from which only the word “radically” had been taken. He wondered whether the new formula should be interpreted differently from the old one and whether it would be feasible, in the event of a serious difference of opinion, to rely on one interpretation rather than the other. It would be best, he thought, to define—both in general and in this particular respect—the relationship that existed between the draft convention under consideration and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

36. In conclusion, he said that the practical applicability of the proposed convention under considerations would depend to a large extent on how the problem of the provisos was solved. He felt they were indispensable, as the draft articles did not provide specific rules for the various types of treaty, apart from articles 14, 11 and 12, and relied on individual interpretation of the provisos to introduce a certain amount of flexibility into hard and fast rules. It was consequently the interpretation of the provisos that should ensure an equitable solution in doubtful and controversial cases of succession of States. His delegation felt that the formula proposed by the International Law Commission for cases of succession involving part of a territory was acceptable.

37. Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) said that he could accept article 14 as proposed by the International Law Commission, on the understanding that the article related only to lawful transfers of territory and excluded all illegal situations, as the International Law Commission had clearly indicated in its commentary.

38. Mr. KRISHNADASAN (Swaziland) said that he agreed with the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany that the words “incompatible with its object and purpose” in subparagraph (b) of article 14 posed certain problems. At the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, some delegations had opposed the inclusion of the words in question in subparagraph (c) of article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on the ground that the subjective nature of the clause could give rise to divergent interpretations. Furthermore, article 19 concerned the formulation of reservations—a limited aspect of treaties—whereas the scope of article 14 was much wider. He therefore proposed the deletion of the words “would be incompatible with its object and purpose or”, which could give rise to controversy. He did not think that would harm article 14, as the second part of the proviso—“would radically change the conditions for the operation of the treaty”—took account of the first part. He also proposed that the words in question should be deleted from all the other articles in which they appeared.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.