First report on State succession and its impact on the nationality of natural and legal persons, by Mr. Vaclav Mikulka, Special Rapporteur

Topic:
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OF NATURAL AND LEGAL PERSONS

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Introduction

A. Historical review

1. PREVIOUS WORK BY THE COMMISSION ON THE TOPIC OF STATE SUCCESSION

1. The topic of succession of States and Governments is one of the topics that the Commission selected at its first session, in 1949, with a view to their codification. Pursuant to the recommendation which the General Assembly made in its resolution 1686 (XVI) of 18 December 1961, the Commission, at its fourteenth session, in 1962, listed the topic of succession of States and Governments among its priorities. The Commission decided further to establish a Sub-Committee on Succession of States and Governments which would be responsible for preparing a preliminary report containing suggestions as to the scope of the topic, approaches to studying it and means of providing the necessary documentation.

2. At its fifteenth session, in 1963, the Commission considered the report of the Sub-Committee, and decided that succession of Governments would be considered at that stage only to the extent necessary to complete the study on State succession. The Commission endorsed the broad outline, the order of priority of the headings and the division of the topic recommended by the Sub-Committee, namely: succession in respect of treaties, succession in respect of rights and duties resulting from other sources than treaties (revised in 1968 to read “Succession in respect of matters other than treaties”) and succession in respect of membership of international organizations.

3. The Commission, after having unanimously approved the Sub-Committee’s report, appointed Mr. Manfred Lachs as Special Rapporteur for the topic of succession of States and Governments. Following the resignation of

1 Yearbook ... 1949, p. 281.

Mr. Lachs, the Commission decided, at its nineteenth session, in 1967, to divide the topic into three main headings in accordance with the broad outline set forth in the report of the Sub-Committee in 1963. The Commission appointed Sir Humphrey Waldock as Special Rapporteur for succession in respect of treaties and Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui as Special Rapporteur for succession in respect of matters other than treaties. The Commission decided to leave aside, for the time being, the third aspect of the topic.

4. Following Sir Humphrey Waldock’s resignation, the Commission decided, at its twenty-fifth session, in 1973, to appoint a new Special Rapporteur, Sir Francis Vallat, to succeed him for the topic. In accordance with the decision taken in 1963, it was agreed that priority should be given to the study on State succession and that succession of Governments should be considered only to the extent necessary to complete the study on State succession.

5. The question of nationality, which was covered by a broader title, namely, “Status of the inhabitants”, was at first part of the second aspect of the topic, namely, “Succession in respect of matters other than treaties”.

6. This second aspect was considered by the Commission from 1968 to 1981, with some preliminary comments being made on State succession during the debate on the first report of the Special Rapporteur at the twentieth session, in 1968. In view of its breadth and complexity, it was later narrowed down to the economic aspects of succession. Nationality was not included therein.4

7. While two sets of draft articles prepared by the Commission under the first two headings mentioned above led to the adoption of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties and the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, other aspects of State succession were left aside by the Commission for more than one decade.

2. PREVIOUS WORK BY THE COMMISSION ON THE TOPIC OF NATIONALITY

8. In the work of the Commission, the topic of nationality has its own history, separate from that of State succession. While the topic “Nationality, including statelessness” was also included in 1949 in the list of topics selected for codification, it was not given priority by the Commission.

9. At the fourth session of the Commission in 1952, further to Economic and Social Council resolution 304 D (XI) of 17 July 1950, a draft convention on the nationality of married persons was submitted to the Commission by Mr. Manley O. Hudson, who had been appointed in 1951 as Special Rapporteur for the topic of nationality, including statelessness. This draft followed very closely the terms proposed by the Commission on the Status of Women and approved by the Council. However, ILC was of the opinion that the question of the nationality of married women could only be considered in the broader context of the whole subject of nationality.5

10. With regard to the topic of elimination of statelessness, the Commission, further to Economic and Social Council resolution 319 B III (XI) of 11 August 1950, considered at its fourth session, in 1952, a working paper on statelessness.6 The Commission requested the Special Rapporteur to prepare a draft convention on the elimination of statelessness. This draft followed very closely the terms proposed by the Commission on the Status of Women and approved by the Council. However, ILC was of the opinion that the question of the nationality of married women could only be considered in the broader context of the whole subject of nationality.5

11. The United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, of which the first session was held in Geneva in 1959 and the second in New York in 1961, adopted, on the basis of the second draft convention of the Commission referred to above, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which entered into force on 13 December 1975.

12. With regard to present statelessness, the Commission in 1954 formulated its proposals in seven articles with commentaries and submitted them to the General Assembly as part of its final report on the topic of nationality, including statelessness.7 It further decided, accordingly, to defer any further consideration of multiple nationality and other questions relating to nationality.8

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3 See the first report of the Special Rapporteur on succession of States in respect of rights and duties resulting from sources other than treaties (Yearbook ... 1968, vol. II, document A/CN.4/204, paras. 133–137).

4 See Yearbook ... 1968, vol. II, pp. 220 and 221, document A/7209/Rev.1, paras. 73 and 78.

5 Nevertheless, other organs of the United Nations system have continued their consideration of the question of the nationality of married women. After the articles of the draft convention prepared by the Commission on the Status of Women had been finalized by the Third Committee, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1040 (XI) of 29 January 1957, adopted the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, which entered into force on 11 August 1958.

6 Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Yearbook ... 1952, vol. II, annex III, pp. 13 et seq.


8 Ibid., p. 149, para. 39.
3. **Inclusion of the topic “State succession and its impact on nationality of natural and legal persons” in the agenda of the Commission**

13. At its forty-fifth session, in 1993, the Commission decided to include in its agenda as one of two new topics the question of State succession and its impact on nationality of natural and juridical persons. The General Assembly, in the light of the situation prevailing in Eastern Europe, endorsed this proposal in its resolution 48/31 of 9 December 1993.

14. At its forty-sixth session, in 1994, the Commission appointed the present Special Rapporteur for the topic. The General Assembly, in its resolution 49/51 of 9 December 1994, endorsed the intention of the Commission to undertake work on the topic and, at the same time, requested the Secretary-General to invite Governments to submit, by 1 March 1995, relevant materials including national legislation, decisions of national tribunals and diplomatic and official correspondence relevant to the topic.

**B. Delimitation of the topic**

15. The topic of nationality, as envisaged in the first report by the Special Rapporteur on succession of States in respect of rights and duties resulting from sources other than treaties, was part of the broader problem of the status of the inhabitants which, in addition to the question of the nationality of natural persons, has also to encompass that of conventions of establishment. The task which the Commission has now undertaken differs from the one defined in 1968 in two respects: first, it does not refer to the issue of conventions of establishment (which has become anachronistic); secondly, it encompasses the issue of the nationality of legal persons, which had not been mentioned explicitly in 1968.

16. In order to define in a substantive way the relation between the topic under consideration and the two topics studied previously by the Commission, namely, State succession and nationality, including statelessness, it is useful to recall the statement contained in the first report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bedjaoui, namely:

In all cases of succession, traditional or modern, there is in theory no succession or continuity in respect of nationality. The successor State does not let the inhabitants of the territory retain their former nationality. This is a manifestation of its sovereignty.

In contrast to international treaties or debts, where one State replaces another in an international legal relation subject to transfer, the relation of the State to the individual which is covered by the concept of nationality excludes a priori any notion of “substitution” or “devolution”. Nationality, like sovereignty, is always inherent. By its nature, therefore, nationality is not a “successional matter” as, for example, State treaties, property and debts, and so on, are.

17. The questions which the Commission must study in the context of the present topic are, of course, part of the branch of international law dealing with nationality. By their nature, they are very similar to those which the Commission has already considered under the topic “Nationality, including statelessness”. However, they differ from it in two respects: on the one hand, the vision of the Commission is broader than before—it is not limited to the topic of statelessness (although this is of paramount importance), but covers all of the issues resulting from changes of nationality. On the other hand, the scope of consideration is limited to changes of nationality resulting from State succession. Changes of nationality should therefore be considered exclusively in relation to changes of sovereignty. What is involved is the phenomenon often termed “collective naturalizations”.

18. Owing to the progress made in its previous work in the area of the progressive development and codification of international law in respect of nationality and of State succession, the Commission is able to approach consideration of the present topic with a deeper knowledge of the relationship between nationality issues and issues of State succession.

19. The topic under consideration relates also to another question: that of the continuity of nationality, which arises in the context both of the present topic and of diplomatic protection, a topic included in the 1949 list which has never been considered. It is for the Commission to decide whether and to what extent this issue should be considered in the context of the present topic.

**C. Working method**

20. Consideration of the topic “State succession and its impact on nationality of natural and legal persons”, as defined by General Assembly resolution 49/51, falls into the category of special assignments. The Assembly has, on some occasions, requested the Commission to consider specific texts or to prepare reports on specific legal issues without any consideration being given to the drafting of a convention on the topic or any decision being taken as to the final form which the outcome of the work should take. The Commission has always decided in

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9. See *Yearbook ... 1993*, vol. II (Part Two), p. 97, para. 440.
12. Ibid., p. 114, para. 133.
13. See, for example, article 13 of the Code of Private International Law (Bustamante Code).
14. Thus, at the express request of the General Assembly, the Commission studied the following topics: draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States (1949), formulation of the Nürnberg Principles (1950), question of an international criminal jurisdiction (1950), question of defining aggression (1951), reservations to multilateral conventions (1951), draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (1954), extended participation in general multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations (1962), question of the protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents and other persons entitled to special protection under international law (1972) and review of the multilateral treaty-making process (1979).
such cases that it was free to adopt special methods with which to accomplish special assignments, rather than conform to the methods envisaged by its statute for the ordinary work of progressive development and codification.

21. In the view of the Special Rapporteur, the Commission should, in dealing with the present topic, retain this flexible approach in respect of the working method.

D. Form which the outcome of the work on this topic might take

22. When the Commission, at its forty-fifth session, included the topic “State succession and its impact on nationality of natural and legal persons” in its agenda, it expressed the view that “[t]he outcome of the work ... could for instance be a study or a draft declaration to be adopted by the General Assembly”, and decided that the final form of the work would be determined at a later stage.  

23. The General Assembly endorsed the decision of the Commission to include in its agenda the new topics on the understanding that the final form to be given to the results of the work will be decided after a preliminary study is presented to the Assembly.  

24. The history of the Commission shows that its work undertaken under the heading of special assignments has culminated either in a simple report or in draft articles with commentaries, as, for instance, in the case of the draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, the formulation of the Nürnberg Principles, the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the draft articles on the protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents and other persons entitled to special protection under international law. In the last of the above-mentioned cases, the draft served as the basis for the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

25. As a first step, the work of the Commission on the topic will have the character of a study to be presented to the General Assembly in the form of a report. In the view of the Special Rapporteur, the Commission will only be able to discuss meaningfully the form of the final outcome of the work after it has conducted an in-depth study of the topic.

E. Terminology used

26. In its work on the codification and progressive development of the law concerning succession of States in respect of treaties and matters other than treaties, the Commission has consistently borne in mind the desirability of using, as far as possible, common definitions and common basic principles, without ignoring or neglecting the specific characteristics of each topic. The Special Rapporteur therefore considers that in order to ensure uniformity of terminology, the Commission should continue to use the definitions it formulated previously in the context of the two conventions on succession of States, especially as regards the basic concepts, defined in article 2 of the two conventions as follows:

(a) “Succession of States” means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory;

(b) “Predecessor State” means the State which has been replaced by another State on the occurrence of a succession of States;

(c) “Successor State” means the State which has replaced another State on the occurrence of a succession of States;

(d) “Date of the succession of States” means the date upon which the successor State replaced the predecessor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory to which the succession of States relates;

(e) “Newly independent State” means a successor State the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible;

(f) “Third State” means any State other than the predecessor State or the successor State.

27. As the Commission explained in its commentary to those provisions, the term “succession of States” is used “as referring exclusively to the fact of the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory, leaving aside any connotation of inheritance of rights or obligations on the occurrence of that event”.  

15 See Yearbook ... 1993, vol. II (Part Two), p. 97, para. 439. The Commission thus took into consideration certain hesitations as to the form of the outcome of the work, as expressed in the preliminary note on the topic submitted at the forty-fifth session, as follows: “[T]he drafting of a convention ... might face the risk of the same kind of problems the Commission faced during the work on the previous State succession topics (such as lengthy codification work, the problem of applying the convention to new States which are not parties to it, and the like)” (ibid., vol. II (Part One), p. 223, document A/CN.4/454, para. 28). This view, however, was not shared by the entire Commission.

16 See General Assembly resolutions 48/31 (para. 7) of 9 December 1993 and 49/51 of 9 December 1994, paragraph 6 of which reads as follows:

“6. Endorses the intention of the International Law Commission to undertake work on the topics ‘The law and practice relating to reservations to treaties’ and ‘State succession and its impact on nationality of natural and legal persons’, on the understanding that the final form to be given to the work on these topics shall be decided after a preliminary study is presented to the General Assembly, and, in connection with the latter topic, requests the Secretary-General to invite Governments to submit, by 1 March 1995, relevant materials including national legislation, decisions of national tribunals and diplomatic and official correspondence relevant to the topic;”

that the expression “in the responsibility for the international relations of territory” was preferable to other expressions such as “in the sovereignty in respect of territory”, because it was a formula commonly used in State practice and more appropriate to cover in a neutral manner any specific case independently of the particular status of the territory in question. The Commission stated that the word “responsibility” should be read in conjunction with the words “for the international relations of territory” and was not intended to convey any notion of “State responsibility”, a topic under study by the Commission at that time.

28. The meanings attributed to the terms “predecessor State”, “successor State” and “date of the succession of States” were merely consequential upon the meaning given to “succession of States” and did not appear to the Commission to require any comment. With regard to the expression “newly independent State”, the Commission deemed it useful to note that it signified “a State which has arisen from a succession of States in a territory which immediately before the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible”, no distinction being drawn among the various cases of emergence to independence. The definition excludes cases concerning the emergence of a new State as a result of a separation of part of an existing State or of a uniting of two or more existing States.

29. As one eminent author recognized, “[t]he effect of change of sovereignty upon the nationality of the inhabitants of [the] territory [concerned] is one of the most difficult problems in the law of State succession”. Nevertheless, the same author stressed, as early as 1956, that “[u]pon this subject, perhaps more than any other in the law of State succession, codification, or international legislation, is urgently demanded. It is undesirable that as a result of change of sovereignty persons should be rendered stateless against their wills. It is equally undesirable that persons who have only an accidental relationship with absorbed territory should be invested with a nationality which they do not want.”

30. The change of nationality resulting from State succession is a matter of great importance because it occurs on a collective basis and has numerous serious consequences for the persons involved. Nationality is a precondition for the exercise of a number of political and civil rights. But this matter also has important implications with respect to the exercise of the sovereign powers of the States concerned, i.e. the successor and predecessor State. Thus, the employment of alien officials or alien control of natural resources or public utilities after the date of succession of States may constitute a real problem. Moreover, the loss of the nationality of the predecessor State and the difficulties connected to the acquisition of the nationality of the successor State may lead to many human tragedies.

31. But as this matter belongs primarily to the sphere of internal law, no serious attempt has ever been made to set up a universal instrument providing for a uniform solution to the problem. Nor has the Commission been anxious to deal with the problem of nationality in relation to that of State succession, which it discussed for nearly 20 years. Nationality has once again become an issue of special interest for the international community against the backdrop of the emergence of new States and, in particular, the dissolution of States in Eastern Europe. The manner in which problems relating to nationality in the context of State succession are being resolved has become a matter of concern to the international community. Nationality problems, and in particular the problem of statelessness, have attracted the attention of a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and international forums, including the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization (previously Conference) for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Arbitration Commission of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

Chapter I

Current relevance of the topic

22 See the initial debate in 1963, during which Mr. Rosenne suggested the exclusion from the topic of certain questions and Mr. Castrén expressed the view that it was not possible to exclude such questions as nationality. Mr. Castrén acknowledged, however, that in the working paper he had prepared as a member of the Sub-Committee on Succession of States and Governments, he had perhaps gone too far in suggesting the study of all questions relating to the legal status of the local population coming under the territorial and personal jurisdiction of the new State (Yearbook ... 1963, vol. II, document A/5509, annex II, p. 260).

23 See the recommendations by the High Commissioner on National Minorities upon his visits to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (CSCE Communication No. 124 of 23 April 1993).


25 UNHCR is particularly concerned with the question of statelessness in the context of State succession. Its contribution takes two forms: organization of seminars and symposia, and provision of technical assistance for the drafting of laws on nationality with a view to avoiding cases of statelessness.
the Council of Europe and its Commission for Democracy through Law. 26

32. Several international meetings involving scholars and legal experts from different countries have dealt with these issues, including the following: Round table on nationality, minorities and State succession in Eastern Europe, organized by the International Law Centre of the University of Paris X in Nanterre, on 3–4 December 1993; Workshop on international law and nationality laws in the former USSR, organized by UNHCR in cooperation with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, at Divonne-les-Bains, France, on 25–26 April 1994; Seminar on nationality, minorities and State succession in Eastern Europe, organized by the International Law Centre of the University of Paris X and the Czech Society of International Law in Prague, from 22 to 24 September 1994; 27 Workshop on nationality matters, organized by the International Organization for Migration in cooperation with UNHCR in Dagomis, Russian Federation, in October 1994; Workshop on Citizenship, Stateless and the Status of Aliens in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic States, organized by the Government of Finland and the Office of UNHCR in Helsinki, from 12 to 15 December 1994.

33. During the last few years, in a number of States confronted with problems of State succession or of resumption of independence, new nationality laws have been adopted, or nationality laws dating from the period prior to the Second World War have been re-enacted. 28

34. With the growth in the number of new States, the rules on State succession have found a new material sphere of application. 29 This justifies the effort to shed more light on the rules concerning nationality which might be applicable in the event of State succession.

Thus, the following enumeration of national legislation is based not only on the replies of Governments but also on other available sources and cannot be considered as exhaustive:

(a) Croatia: Law on Croatian nationality of 28 June 1991; Law on amendments and supplements to the Law on Croatian nationality of 8 May 1992;
(b) Czech Republic: Law on acquisition and loss of citizenship of 29 December 1992;
(c) Eritrea: Eritrean Nationality Proclamation No. 21/1992 of 6 April 1992;
(d) Estonia: Law on citizenship (1938), re-enacted by the resolution of the Supreme Council on the application of the Law on Citizenship of 26 February 1992; Law on Estonian language requirements for applicants for citizenship of 10 February 1993;
(e) Latvia: Law on citizenship (1919), re-enacted by the resolution of the Supreme Council on the renewal of the Republic of Latvia citizens’ rights and fundamental principles of naturalization of 15 October 1991;
(f) Lithuania: Law on citizenship of 5 December 1991; resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania on the procedure for implementing the Republic of Lithuania law on citizenship of 11 December 1991;
(g) Slovenia: Law on citizenship of 5 June 1991;

For legislation on the issue of nationality, including the effects of State succession on nationality, previously compiled by the Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, see “Laws concerning nationality”, United Nations Legislative Series (ST/LEG/SER.B/4) (Sales No. 1954.V.1) and supplement thereto (ST/LEG/SER.B/9) (Sales No. 1959.V.3), and “Materials on succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties” (ibid. ST/LEG/SER.B/17) (Sales No. E/F.77.V.9).

29 As for the content of such rules, the Arbitration Commission of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia has stated that “the phenomenon of State succession is governed by the principles of international law, from which the Vienna Conventions [on State succession] of 23 August 1978 and 8 April 1983 have drawn inspiration”, opinion 1, reproduced in ILM, vol. 31 (1992), p. 1495.

CHAPTER II
Nationality—concept and function

35. The problem of nationality is closely linked to the phenomenon of population as one of the constitutive elements of the State, because “[i]f States are territorial entities, they are also aggregates of individuals”. 30 While statehood is contingent on the existence of at least some permanent population, nationality is contingent on decisions of the State. And, being in fact “a manifestation of sovereignty, nationality is jealously guarded by States”. 31

36. Before any further thoughts are developed concerning the concept of nationality, a clear distinction must be made between the nationality of individuals and that of legal persons. The fundamental difference between the

30 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, p. 40.

31 Chan, “The right to a nationality as a human right: the current trend towards recognition”, p. 1.
concept of the nationality of an individual (natural person) and that of a legal person has been explained by a number of authors.

All natural persons can possess the quality of a national, although in fact some of them, referred to as stateless persons, do not possess that quality in any country. Legal persons, on the other hand, being persons created by law, are viewed as possessing a nationality. But this term then expresses a concept which is quite different, to the point where it has been denied that the term ‘nationality’ in this context has any value other than that of an image. Nevertheless, it continues to be used in positive law, but the subject-matter is too closely linked to the concept of legal personality for study of one to be dissociated from that of the other.

A. Nationality of natural persons

37. The nationality of individuals is most often seen as a legal bond between the individual and the State. According to Jennings and Watts, the “[n]ationality of an individual is his quality of being a subject of a certain state”. Batiffol and Lagarde consider that, according to current thinking, legal nationality is “the juridical attachment of a person to the population forming a constitutive element of a State. This attachment subjects the national to the so-called personal competence of that State, which is enforceable against other States”. The Draft Convention on Nationality prepared by Harvard Law School defines nationality as “the status of a natural person who is attached to a State by the tie of allegiance” while, for O’Connell, the “expression ‘nationality’ in international law is only shorthand for the ascription of individuals to specific States for the purpose either of jurisdiction or of diplomatic protection. In the sense that a person falls within the plenary jurisdiction of a State, and may be represented by it, such a person is said to be a national of that State”.

38. The various components of the concept of nationality have been identified by ICJ in a definition which states that nationality is:

a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.

32 Batiffol and Lagarde, Droit international privé, pp. 97–98.
33 Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, p. 851.
34 Batiffol and Lagarde, op. cit., p. 95.
35 op. cit. 1. Nationality”, Supplement to AJIL, vol. 23, special number, April 1929, pp. 13 et seq.
36 Ibid., p. 22.
37 O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, p. 498.
38 Notebohm, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4, at p. 23. As Jennings and Watts point out, the “last part of this passage does not entirely reflect the situation which exists in cases of dual nationality” (op. cit., p. 854).

39. Aside from the meaning given to the concept of nationality at the international level, there can be various categories of “nationals” at the level of internal law:

… a state’s internal laws may distinguish between different kinds of nationals—for instance, those who enjoy full political rights, and are on that account named citizens, and those who are less favoured, and are on that account not named citizens. In some Latin-American countries, for example, the expression “citizenship” has been used to denote the sum total of political rights of which a person may be deprived, by way of punishment or otherwise, and thus lose citizenship, without being divested of nationality as understood in international law. In the United States, while the expression “citizenship” and nationality are often used interchangeably, the term “citizen” is, as a rule, employed to designate persons endowed with full political and personal rights within the United States, while some persons—such as those belonging to territories and possessions which are not among the states forming the Union—are described as “nationals”. They owe allegiance to the United States and are United States nationals in the contemplation of international law; they do not possess full rights of citizenship in the United States. It is their nationality in the wider sense, not their citizenship, which is internationally relevant. In the Commonwealth it is the citizenship of the individual states of the Commonwealth which is primarily of importance for international law, while the quality of a “British subject” or “Commonwealth citizen” is primarily relevant only as a matter of the internal law of the countries concerned.

“Nationality”, in the sense of citizenship of a certain state, must not be confused with “nationality” as meaning membership of a certain nation in the sense of race.

40. However, other examples may be cited:

Since nationality defines the population constituting the internal order vis-à-vis the external order, the possible modalities concerning the participation of nationals in internal legal affairs, in particular as regards political rights, is of little importance. Thus the distinction between French citizens and French subjects, “indigenous inhabitants of the colonies”, has had no effect with regard to nationality, for the latter, as well as the former, were part of the population forming a constitutive element of the French State. The Act of 7 May 1946 sanctioned the situation by providing that “all nationals of the overseas territories (including Algeria) possess the quality of citizen”, while adding “special laws shall establish the conditions in which they shall exercise their rights as citizens”.

The 1946 Constitution (art. 81) had, however, introduced the quality of “citizen of the French Union”, possessed by French men and women, citizens of protected or associated States and inhabitants of associated territories ... The 1958 Constitution, on the other hand, stated that “there is only a citizenship of the Community” (art. 77).

The term ressortissants has been used to express a concept whereby certain aliens who are more or less permanently dependent on the sovereignty concerned are approximated to nationals. Those involved were essentially individuals belonging to a protectorate or a country under mandate: Tunisians and Moroccans were said to be “French ressortissants”, although they did not possess French nationality …

It should be noted, however, that this never involved more than the granting to certain aliens rights which were refused to others; from the legal standpoint, they remained aliens.

41. The existence of different categories of nationality within a State has been a phenomenon specific to the federal States of Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Thus, at the time of the creation of the Czechoslovak Federation, in 1969, Czech
and Slovak nationalities were introduced parallel to Czechoslovak nationality, which originally had been the only nationality. Law No. 165/1968 establishing a formal distinction between the (federal) Czechoslovak nationality and that of each of the two republics forming the Federation opened the way for the adoption by the two republics of their own laws on nationality: Law No. 206/68 of the Slovak National Council and Law No. 39/69 of the Czech National Council.41

42. The introduction of citizenship of the two republics was based on the principle of jus soli, whereas the federal legislation, like the Czechoslovak legislation which preceded the date of the creation of the Federation, was based on the principle of jus sanguinis. The traditional principle of jus sanguinis was nevertheless used to determine the nationality of children under 15 years old.

43. A recent noteworthy development is the establishment by the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) of a “citizenship of the Union”. Under the terms of article 8, “[e]very person holding the nationality of a member State shall be a citizen of the Union”. The question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a member State is to be settled solely by reference to the national law of that State.

44. Moreover, the concept of nationality or of the term “national” may, for the purposes of a particular treaty, have yet another meaning. Thus, for example, the Peace Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye and other peace treaties of 1919 use the term “ressortissant” as a notion wider than that of “national”.42 Many agreements for the settlement of claims contain special definitions to identify the nationals whose claims are being settled.43

45. The notion or the concept of nationality may be defined in widely different ways depending on whether the problem is approached from the perspective of internal (municipal) or international law. For the function of nationality is, in each case, different. Seen from the second perspective, to the extent that individuals are not direct subjects of international law, nationality is the medium through which they can normally enjoy benefits from international law. For only nationals automatically enjoy the advantages of the diplomatic protection and the set of rules—whether convention or not—accepted by States in their mutual relations for the benefit of their nationals. Nationality is also a prerequisite for the full enjoyment of human rights.

46. By way of analogy with the position of individuals, legal persons (corporations) are to have a nationality as well. As in the case of an individual, the existence of the bond of nationality is necessary for the purposes of application of international law in relation to a legal person, and, most often, for the purposes of diplomatic protection.44

47. Corporations are usually considered to possess the nationality of the State under the laws of which they have been incorporated and to which they owe their legal existence, insofar as it is a matter of municipal law to determine whether an entity has legal personality at all, and what the effects of such determination are. Consequently, if a company incorporated under the laws of one State establishes, under the laws of another, a subsidiary as a separate legal person, in principle the two companies will have different nationalities for the purposes of international law. As ICJ observed in the Barcelona Traction case:

The traditional rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has registered office. These two criteria have been confirmed by long practice and by numerous international instruments. This notwithstanding, further or different links are at times said to be required in order that a right of diplomatic protection should exist.46

Thus, in many cases the traditional criterion of the company’s place of incorporation and location of its registered office just establishes a prima facie presumption of the bond of nationality between the company and the State.

48. There is a limit to the analogy that can be drawn between nationality of individuals and the nationality of corporations. Most authors warn that:

While sometimes convenient, [this analogy] may often be misleading: those rules of international law which are based upon the nationality of individuals are not always to be applied without modification in relation to corporations. Various considerations militate against attributing to the nationality of corporations the same consequences as attach to the nationality of individuals: these include the manner in which corporations are created, operate and are brought to an end, their development as legal entities distinct from their shareholders, the inapplicability to companies of the essentially personal conception of allegiance which underlies the development of much of the present law regarding nationality, the general absence in relation to companies of any nationality legislation to provide a basis in municipal law for the operation of rules of international law, the great variety of forms of

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41 The Czech law and the Slovak law on nationality were amended by Laws Nos. 92/1990 and 88/1990 of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council respectively.

42 See, for example, the National Bank of Egypt v. Austro-Hungarian Bank case (Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1923–1924 (London), vol. 2, 1933, case No. 10).


44 See Caflisch, “La nationalité des sociétés commerciales en droit international privé”, pp. 119 et seq.

45 In some exceptional cases, where the State has brought the company’s existence to an end, the company may nevertheless be regarded by other States as continuing to exist. See Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations in and under International Law, pp. 29–38 and 51–54.

company organization, and the possibilities for contriving an artificial and purely formal relationship with the state of “nationality”.

49. There exists no rigid notion of nationality with respect to legal persons, and different tests of nationality are used for different purposes. For this reason, it is a usual practice of States to provide, expressly in a treaty or in their domestic laws, which legal persons may enjoy the benefits of treaty provisions reserved to “nationals” or to define “national” companies for the purposes of application of national laws in specific fields (fiscal law, labour law, etc.). Owing to the fact that legal persons may have links with several States, the establishment of the “national” status of a company involves a balancing of various factors.

50. The above remarks lead to the question of whether it is useful to undertake the study of the impact of State succession on the nationality of legal persons in parallel with the study concerning the nationality of natural persons, and, in particular, whether the study of problems of nationality of legal persons has the same degree of urgency as the study of problems concerning the nationality of individuals. The obvious alternative for the Commission is to separate the two issues and to study first the most urgent one—that of the nationality of natural persons.

CHAPTER III

Roles of internal law and international law

A. Internal law

51. In the literature, it is generally accepted that “it is not for international law but for the internal law of each state to determine who is, and who is not, to be considered its national”.48 The State, and the State alone, is entitled to decide that an individual is or is not its national. “[N]ationality is essentially an institution of the internal laws of states, and the international application of the notion of nationality in any particular case must be based on the nationality law of the state in question.”49 The law of each State “determines who are its nationals, both on the basis of origin and as regards the conditions governing the acquisition or subsequent loss of its nationality”.50

52. The principle that it is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals was confirmed by article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the State succession and its impact on nationality of natural and legal persons 167

[...]


50 Batiffol and Lagarde, op. cit., p. 93. According to Crawford, “[i]t appears that the grant of nationality is a matter which only States by their municipal law (or by way of treaty) can perform. Nationality is thus dependent upon statehood, not the reverse” (op. cit., p. 40).


52 Ibid., No. 7, p. 16.

53 See footnote 38 above.

48 Ibid., p. 852.

49 Ibid., p. 853.

54 See, for example, article 3 of the Citizenship Act of Slovenia. See also O’Connell, The Law of State Succession: “Even if a treaty provides that inhabitants of absorbed territory are to become nationals of the successor State the enactment is ineffective until embodied in municipal law”, p. 249, footnote 3, referring to Graupner, “Nationality and State succession”, p. 94.

ity law". This begs the question whether the existence of two distinct concepts of nationality—one under municipal law and another under international law—is accepted. This issue has a special importance in the context of State succession, when considerable time can elapse between the "date of the State succession" and the adoption of the nationality law of the successor State. O’Connell describes this situation in the following words:

While the State concerned must first claim jurisdiction over the individual, or to represent him internationally, before he will actually be ascribed to it, it does not follow that such a person is regarded as a national by the State concerned, for, as in the case of Israel between 1948 and 1952, the State may lack a domestic conception of nationality. It would be fallacious to assume that, because international law permissively ascribes certain individuals to successor States in virtue of a change of sovereignty, these automatically become nationals in the eyes of municipal law, for the most international law can do is to authorize or disapprove of a claim by successor States to bring individuals within their plenary jurisdiction, or to claim them in diplomatic matters.

56. If the concept of nationality for international purposes is to be considered as generally accepted, what are its elements and what exactly is its function?

B. International law

1. Limitations on the discretionary power of the State

57. Although nationality is essentially governed by internal legislation, it is of direct concern to the international order. State sovereignty in the determination of its nationals does not mean, of course, the absence of all rational constraints. The legislative competence of the State with respect to nationality is not absolute. The various authorities which established the principle of State freedom also affirmed the existence of limits to that freedom.

58. Thus, in its advisory opinion in the case concerning ‘Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco’, PCIJ emphasized that the question whether a matter was solely within the jurisdiction of a State was essentially a relative question, depending on the development of international relations, and it held that even in respect of matters which in principle were not regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its discretion may be restricted by obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States, so that its jurisdiction becomes limited by rules of international law.

59. The commentary to article 2 of the Draft Convention on Nationality of 1929 prepared by the Harvard Law School asserts that the power of a State to confer its nationality is not unlimited. As stated in article I of the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, signed in The Hague in 1930, while it is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals, such law shall be recognized by other States “in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality”.

60. The impact of the rules of international law in the area of nationality is of particular importance in cases of State succession. “Collective naturalizations” give rise to many problems, in view of the number of persons—sometimes the whole population—affected by the change. The complexity and urgency of these problems vary depending on the nature of the territorial change (transfer of territory, secession, dissolution of a State or unifying of States) and the manner (whether or not peaceful) in which it came about. But to what extent can international law claim ascendancy? Is it conceivable that an international authority, or at least the rules to which States are subject, would play a role in the allocation of individuals among different States in order to preclude either statelessness or positive conflicts?

61. According to the predominant opinion, the role of international law with respect to nationality is very limited. The function of international law is at the most to delimit the competence of the predecessor State to retain certain persons as its nationals and of the successor State to claim them as its own. International law cannot prescribe that such persons change their nationality, either automatically or by submission. While, on the one hand, it places restrictions upon the categories of persons whose nationality is claimed by the successor State, on the other hand, because of the restrictive character of its operation, international law “cannot dictate to the predecessor State whether or not it is obliged to retain these persons as its nationals”. By delimiting the competence of States to ascribe their nationality to individuals, international law permits “some control of exorbitant attributions by states of their nationality, by depriving them of much of their international effect”. Thus, “the determination by each state of the grant of its own nationality is not necessarily to be accepted internationally without question”.

62. The most commonly quoted example in this respect is the Nottebohm case, in which ICJ stated that:

a State cannot claim that the rules pertaining to the acquisition of nationality] it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual’s genuine connection with the State which assumes the defence of its citizens by means of protection as against other States.

63. The necessary conclusion is that the function of international law with respect to nationality is, in princi-
ple, a negative function. In any event, international law cannot directly remedy the flaws of internal legislation, that is to say it cannot substitute for internal legislation indicating who are and who are not nationals of the State. There is no doubt that ICJ considered Nottebohm a national of Liechtenstein in accordance with that country’s internal law.64

64. The function of international law is, therefore, in the first place, to delimit the competence of States, or in other words to eliminate as regards third States the consequences of an exaggerated or abusive exercise by a State of its legislative competence with respect to nationality. However, there is a long-recognized limitation deriving from human rights which should be added to this limitation. This point had already been raised in connection with the preparations for the 1930 Hague Codification Conference.64 The development, after the Second World War, of international norms for the protection of human rights gave the rules of international law a greater say in the area of nationality. By virtue of these norms and principles, some of the processes of internal law, such as those leading to statelessness or any type of discrimination, have become questionable at the international level.

65. According to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, while the conferment and regulation of nationality falls within the jurisdiction of the State, this principle is limited by the requirements imposed by international law for the protection of human rights.65 Unlike the first category of limitations discussed above, the substantive question in this case is not whether the State exercises its discretionary power within the scope of its territorial or personal competence, but whether it does so in a manner consistent with its international obligations in the field of human rights. But, it must be stated once again, the international norms which give rise to this second category of limitations do not affect the validity of the national legislation and its effectiveness within the State. (The question of the State’s international responsibility for non-fulfilment of its obligations in the area of human rights protection has been left aside.)

66. States are therefore subject to two types of limitations in the area of nationality, the first type relating to the delimitation of competence between States (whose non-compliance with the rules results in the non-enforceability against third States of the nationality thus conferred) and the second, to the obligations associated with the protection of human rights (whose non-observance entails international responsibility).

2. FORMS OF INTERVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

67. International law intervenes through both customary and conventional rules. The sovereignty of the State in the determination of its nationals must therefore be exercised within the limits imposed by general international law and by international treaties. The Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws refers to “international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality”, and PCIJ alluded to existing treaties in the two opinions previously cited (para. 52 above). But neither the Convention nor the opinions indicate specific rules of positive international law which would have the effect of limiting the freedom of States.

68. Some customary rules which relate to the consequences resulting from nationality from the standpoint of third States have been developed in the context of diplomatic protection. It is in this context that the principle of effective nationality has emerged in international law. According to this principle, which was endorsed by the judgment of ICJ in the Nottebohm case, if nationality is to be enforceable against third States, an effective and genuine link must exist between the State and the individual concerned. A naturalization based on an insufficiently effective link does not oblige other States to recognize the right of the State which conferred naturalization to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of that individual.

69. A survey of bodies of national legislation fails to reveal anything very conclusive about the existence of customary rules of public international law with respect to nationality. It is, however, established that a State cannot grant its nationality of origin to a person who has no link with it, on the basis of jus sanguinis or jus soli, a conclusion which has but limited practical import for the solution of the real problems arising in connection with State succession. It is therefore the case that customary international law offers only a few guidelines to States for the formulation of their legislation on nationality.

70. While the rules of customary law are still at the elementary stage and provide a merely rudimentary basis, international conventions and treaties are more developed. They often aim at a harmonization of national legislations, with a view to eliminating the unfortunate consequences which result from the use by States of differing processes of acquisition or loss of nationality. Some of these consequences—such as statelessness—are considered more serious than others—such as double nationality—for the international community.

71. There has been for some time an effort to reduce, through the adoption of international conventions, the instances of statelessness or, where that is not possible, to
render the position of stateless persons less difficult. The Hague Codification Conference of 1930 adopted a number of provisions aimed at reducing the possibility of statelessness, as well as a unanimous recommendation to the effect that it was desirable that, in regulating questions of nationality, States should make every effort to reduce cases of statelessness as far as possible. Among the multilateral treaties relating to this problem the following instruments must be mentioned: the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, signed in The Hague in 1930, its Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness and its Special Protocol concerning Statelessness as well as the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.

72. The problems resulting from dual nationality are addressed in the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and its Protocol relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality, in the Convention on Nationality of the League of Arab States and in the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, concluded between the States members of the Council of Europe in 1963. The issue of dual nationality may, moreover, give rise to specific problems in some States (namely those with a large immigrant population) and may therefore also require regulation on a bilateral basis.66

73. While only very few provisions of the above conventions directly address the issue of nationality in the context of State succession (as, for example, article 10 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness), they cannot be deemed as simply irrelevant in such situations. First of all, they provide useful guidance to the States concerned by offering solutions which can mutatis mutandis be used by national legislators in search of solutions to problems arising from territorial change. Secondly, they may, when the parties thereto include the predecessor State, be formally binding upon successor States in accordance with the relevant rules of international law governing State succession in respect of treaties. These instruments can thus add to the general limitations imposed by customary rules of international law on the discretion of the successor State in the field of nationality.

74. Other international treaties directly concerned with problems of nationality in cases of State succession have played an important role, in particular after the First World War. They have established, in a relatively uniform way, the criteria for acquiring the nationality of successor States. The most frequently used criterion was that of domicile or habitual residence. Examples of such treaty provisions include articles 4 and 6 of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland.67 The treaties adopted after the First World War provided, at the same time, for the recognition, by the defeated States, of a new nationality acquired ipso facto by their former nationals under the laws of the successor State and for the consequent loss of the allegiance of these persons to their country of origin.68 These multilateral treaties have been supplemented by bilateral agreements between the States concerned.68

C. Principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality

75. As was stated earlier, the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws includes “the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality” among the limitations to which the freedom of States is subjected in the area of nationality. But the Convention remains silent with respect to the precise content of this concept, which the Commission might therefore attempt to spell out in its study of the subject.

66 See, for example, paragraph 5 of the Joint Communiqué on the normalization of relations between China and Malaysia (ILM, vol. XIII, No. 4 (July 1974), p. 877).


68 See, for example, the Treaty between the Austrian Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic with regard to citizenship and to the protection of minorities of 7 June 1920 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. III, p. 189).

CHAPTER IV

Limitations on the freedom of States in the area of nationality

A. Principle of effective nationality

76. It is widely accepted that, as in the case of naturalization in general,

[there must be a sufficient link between the successor State and the persons it claims as its nationals in virtue of the succession, and the sufficiency of the link might be tested if the successor State attempted to exercise a jurisdiction over those persons in circumstances disapproved of by international law, or attempted to represent them diplomatically; provided, that is, there is some State competent to protest on behalf of the persons concerned.69

Such a link may, in cases of State succession, have special characteristics. No doubt,

[territory, both socially and legally, is not to be regarded as an empty plot: territory (with obvious geographical exceptions) connotes population, ethnic groupings, loyalty patterns, national aspirations, a part of humanity, or, if one is tolerant of the metaphor, an organism. To
regard a population, in the normal case, as related to particular areas of territory, is not to revert to forms of feudalism but to recognize a human and political reality, which underlies modern territorial settlements.69

77. A number of writers on the topic of State succession who hold the view that the successor State may be limited in its discretion to extend its nationality to persons who lack a genuine link with the territory concerned base their argument on the ICJ decision in the Nottebohm case.

78. In its judgment, the Court indicated what considerations have been regarded as relevant in establishing a genuine connection, as follows:

International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous cases of dual nationality, where the question arose with regard to the exercise of protection. They have given their preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.70

79. The Court’s judgment admittedly elicited some criticism, although the principle of effective nationality as such was not challenged. In particular, the Nottebohm judgment was reproached for not furnishing any criterion by which to establish the effectiveness of an individual’s link with a State.71 It has been argued, in particular, that the Court had transferred the requirement of an effective connection from the context of dual nationality to a situation involving only one nationality and that a person who had only one nationality should not be regarded as disentitled to rely on it against another State because he/she had no effective link with the State of nationality but only with a third State. The point has also been made that the Court did not, in its judgment, adequately consider the implications of its adoption of the theory of “genuine link” in matters of diplomatic protection—which raised the question of the extent to which the State of which a person possessed purely formal nationality could protect him/her as against a State other than that of which he/she enjoyed effective nationality. It has also been stressed that it remained unclear whether the “genuine link” principle applied only to the acquisition of nationality by naturalization.

80. The concept of genuine link has a long history behind it. Different tests for genuine link have been considered or applied, such as domicile, residence or birth, both in general or in the context of changes of sovereignty.72 Thus, article 84 of the Treaty of Versailles stated that “German nationals habitually resident in any of the territories recognised as forming part of the Czecho-Slovak State will obtain Czecho-Slovak nationality ipso facto...”. But, as often pointed out, “[a]lthough habitual residence is the most satisfactory test for determining the competence of the successor State to impress its nationality on specified persons, it cannot be stated with assurance to be the only test admitted in international law”.73

81. Some authors have favoured the test of birth in the territory concerned as proof of a “genuine link”, on the basis of which the successor State would be entitled to impose its nationality on those inhabitants of the territory born in it. This, however, is not broadly accepted. Nevertheless, in the case of Romano v. Comma, in 1925, the Egyptian Mixed Court of Appeal relied on this doctrine when it held that a person born in Rome and resident in Egypt became, as a result of the annexation of Rome in 1870, an Italian national.74

82. The need for the existence of certain links between an individual and a State as a basis for conferring nationality was emphasized by various members of ILC during the debates on the elimination and reduction of statelessness.75 The discussions envisaged the application of the genuine link principle for purposes of naturalization in general rather than in the specific context of State succession. In this respect, the question arises whether the application of the genuine link concept in the event of State succession presents any particularities in comparison with its application to traditional cases of naturalization. Another question is whether the criteria for establishing a genuine link could be further clarified and developed.

83. If views vary among commentators as to the use of this or that criterion, it seems to be because they have in mind different types of State succession. Yet, in drawing conclusions based on a particular type of State succession, they tend to express themselves in general terms, as if such conclusions applied in all situations. Similar problems can arise from the simplistic classification of the various types of State succession into two categories, namely “universal” and “partial” succession.

84. The genuine link concept can give rise, in the context of State succession, to yet another delicate problem from the point of view of the individual concerned: as has happened in some recent cases of dissolutions in Eastern Europe, a series of State successions may occur on the same territory during the lifetime of a particular generation. The criterion for granting nationality to the inhabitants of the territory concerned may be different in each case, leading to surprising or even absurd results and considerable personal hardship.

69 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 664.
70 Nottebohm case (footnote 38 above), p. 22.
71 The Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, in the Flegenheimer case, in 1958, went even further and said that it was not in its power to deny the effects at the international level of a nationality conferred by a State, even without the support of effectiveness, except in cases of fraud, negligence or serious error (see UNRIAA, vol. XIV (Sales No. 65.V.4), p. 327.
72 O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law ..., p. 518.
74 See Yearbook ... 1953, vol. I, passim.
B. Protection of human rights

85. It seems to be generally accepted that, in parallel with the rules on the delimitation of the competence of States with regard to nationality, some obligations of States in the area of human rights impose additional limits on the exercise of their discretion when it comes to granting or withdrawing their nationality. This holds true for naturalizations in general as well as in the particular context of State succession. The importance of this category of limitations increased considerably after the Second World War as a result of the impetus given to the protection of human rights. This is one of the more remarkable attributes of the developing legal framework in which recent cases of succession are set.

86. Unlike the successor States which appeared after the First World War, the successor States born of the most recent dissolutions are confronted with a substantial number of multilateral conventions. These conventions—especially, where appropriate, those on nationality, including the reduction of statelessness, and the protection of human rights—to which some predecessor States had become parties, are binding on successor States under the rules of international law governing succession of States in respect of treaties. Moreover, some successor States (including those of the USSR) have acceded to human rights instruments that impinge on the resolution of nationality questions, instruments to which the predecessor State had not become a party.

87. The obligations of States in the field of the protection of human rights put into question, above all, techniques leading to statelessness or to any kind of discrimination. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,\(^75\) provides:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

In the light of that provision, it is necessary to study carefully the precise limits of the discretionary competence of the predecessor State to deprive of its nationality the inhabitants of the territory it has lost, as well as the question whether an obligation of the successor State to grant its nationality to the inhabitants concerned can be deduced from the principle above. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, it is no longer possible to maintain without any reservation the traditional opinion expressed by O’Connell, according to which, “[u]ndesirable as it may be that any persons become stateless as a result of a change of sovereignty, it cannot be asserted with any measure of confidence that international law, at least in its present stage of development, imposes any duty on the successor State to grant nationality”.\(^76\) The view that “apart from treaty a new State is not obliged to extend its nationality to all persons resident on its territory”\(^77\) reflects a more cautious approach in this respect. It seems to allow an a contrario conclusion that, as far as at least some inhabitants are concerned, such an obligation does exist. The contours of these obligations may vary according to the types of territorial changes.

88. In addition to possible obligations arising for States from the principles quoted above, article 8 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provides that a contracting State “shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless”. Furthermore, according to article 9 of the same convention, the State “may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds”. In the event of State succession, this provision must be understood as a prohibition of any arbitrary policy on the side of the predecessor State when withdrawing its nationality from the inhabitants of the territory affected by State succession. The question, moreover, arises whether—and if so which—obligations incumbent upon successor States could possibly be deduced from these provisions.

89. As stated by one author, “[a]n arbitrary change of nationality on the transfer of territory may have a number of different meanings. It may mean that the rule that nationality changes ipso facto with the change of sovereignty has an element of arbitrariness ... [E]thic options based on the subjective test of ‘race’, for example, may be arbitrary in the sense that they are contrary to the prohibition of discrimination based on ‘race, sex, language, or religion’, as expressed in article 1 (3), of the Charter [of the United Nations] and subsequent international instruments”.\(^78\) Thus, the application of such criteria could be objected to on the basis of fundamental human rights standards. The international community has recently manifested on several occasions its concern about such practices and has endeavoured in competent multilateral forums to ensure that the States concerned adopt measures fully compatible with contemporary international law. Thus, as stressed by the same author, “the primary purpose of the law of State succession is to ensure social and political stability at a time when the transfer of sovereign power is conducive to instability. Stability in this case may mean the refusal of a right of option of nationality, contrary to humanitarian considerations”\(^78\).

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\(^75\) General Assembly resolution 217 A (III).

\(^76\) See *State Succession in Municipal Law* ..., p. 503.

\(^77\) Crawford, op. cit., p. 41.

\(^78\) Donner, op. cit., pp. 261–262.
CHAPTER V

Categories of succession

90. Contrary to the opinion that “no help is to be derived from the categories of the law of state succession”,79 the Special Rapporteur holds the view that the study which the Commission is called upon to prepare must address separately the problems of nationality arising in the context of different types of territorial changes. Such a case-by-case analysis will reveal whether it is appropriate to maintain that “[m]ost of the principles referred to in connection with universal succession apply, mutatis mutandis, to the effects of partial succession on nationality”.80

91. In the context of its work on the topic of succession of States in respect of treaties, the Commission concluded that “for the purpose of codifying the modern law of succession of States in respect of treaties it would be sufficient to arrange the cases of succession of States under three broad categories: (a) succession in respect of part of territory; (b) newly independent States; (c) unifying and separation of States”.79 These categories were maintained by the diplomatic conference and are incorporated in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties.

92. For the purposes of the draft articles on succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties, the Commission deemed that, in view of the characteristics and requirements peculiar to the subject, particularly as regards State property, some further precision in the choice of categories was necessary. Consequently, as regards succession in respect of part of territory, the Commission decided that it was appropriate to distinguish and deal separately in the draft articles with three cases: (a) the case where part of the territory of a State is transferred by that State to another State; (b) the case where a dependent territory becomes part of the territory of a State other than the State which was responsible for its international relations, that is, the case of a non-self-governing territory which achieves its decolonization by integration with a State other than the colonial State; (c) the case where a part of the territory of a State separates from that State and unites with another State. Also, as regards the unifying and separation of States, the Commission found it appropriate to distinguish between the “separation of part or parts of the territory of a State” and the “dissolution of a State”.92 These categories were approved by the diplomatic conference and are at the basis of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts.

93. In the judgement of the Special Rapporteur, for the purposes of the current study of State succession and its impact on nationality of natural and legal persons, it would be appropriate to keep the categories which the Commission adopted for the codification of the law of succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties rather than those it arrived at when considering the topic of succession of States in respect of treaties. The reason for so doing is quite straightforward: during the consideration of the current topic, the question of the continuity or discontinuity of the international personality of the predecessor State in cases of secession or dissolution of States has direct implications in the area of nationality. The issues which arise in the first case are by nature substantially different from those which arise in the second case. Moreover, there is a need for an additional adjustment to the categories as prepared by the Commission: for cases of unifying of States, a distinction is required between the situation in which a State unites freely with another State, consequently disappearing as a subject of international law, while the other State continues to exist as a subject of international law— “absorption” hypothesis—and the situation in which the two predecessor States unite to form a new subject of international law and therefore both disappear as sovereign States.

94. In view of the current requirements of the international community and since the decolonization process has now been completed, the Commission could limit its study to issues of nationality which arose during that process insofar as study of them sheds light on nationality issues common to all types of territorial changes.

79 Brownlie, op. cit., p. 661.
80 Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, pp. 144–145. The author nevertheless subjects the above statement to two qualifications: “(a) questions of nationality will, in cases of partial succession, more frequently be regulated by treaty; and (b) since the predecessor State continues to exist, two nationalities, the nationality of the predecessor and that of the successor State, are involved. There thus arises not only the question of acquisition of the new nationality, but also that of the loss of the old nationality” (ibid.).

81 Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II (Part One), p. 176, document A/9610/Rev.1, para. 71. In the 1972 provisional draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties adopted by the Commission at its twenty-fourth session (see Yearbook ... 1972, vol. II, pp. 230 et seq., document A/8710/Rev.1, chap. II, sect. C), four distinct types of State succession were envisaged: (a) transfer of part of territory; (b) case of newly independent States; (c) unifying of States and dissolution of unions; and (d) secession or separation of part of parts of one or more States. However, at its twenty-sixth session, in 1974, the Commission, during the second reading of the draft articles, made some changes which, on the one hand, clarified and developed the first type of succession and, on the other, merged the last two types. First of all, the case of transfer of part of territory was termed “succession in respect of part of territory”. The Commission added to this type the case where “territory, not being part of the territory of a State, for the international relations of which that State is responsible, becomes part of the territory of another State” (see Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II (Part One), p. 208, document A/9610/Rev.1, chap. II, sect. D, art. 14). With this formula, the Commission intended to cover the case of a non-self-governing territory which achieves its decolonization by integration with a State other than the colonial State. Such cases are assimilated, for the purposes of succession of States in respect of treaties, to the first type of succession, “succession in respect of part of territory”. In addition, the Commission reclassified the last two types of State succession under a single heading entitled “Uniting and separation of States”.

82 Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part Two), para. 75 in fine.
95. Like the previous work of the Commission on the topic of State succession, the current study of the impact of State succession on nationality of natural and legal persons should also apply “only to the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”83 As stated in the commentary to article 6 of the draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties, the Commission “[i]n preparing draft articles for the codification of the rules of international law relating to normal situations naturally assumes that those [draft] articles are to apply to facts occurring and situations established in conformity with international law ... Only when matters not in conformity with international law call for specific treatment or mention does it deal with facts or situations not in conformity with international law.”84 Accordingly, the current study should not deal with questions of nationality which might arise, for example, in cases of annexation by force of the territory of a State.

83 See article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts.


CHAPTER VI

Scope of the problem under consideration

96. In order to establish the precise framework of the preliminary study, it would be appropriate to delimit the scope of the problem ratione personae, ratione materiae and ratione temporis.

A. Scope of the problem ratione personae

97. The first problem is that of the definition of the categories of persons whose nationality is presumed to be affected as a consequence of State succession. According to widespread opinion, “it is not at all certain which categories of persons are susceptible of having their nationality affected by change of sovereignty”.19 This uncertainty is largely due to the fact that many authors try to answer this question in abstracto, as if there existed a unique and simple response which would apply to all categories of territorial changes.

98. By “persons ... susceptible of having their nationality affected” one must understand all individuals who could potentially lose the nationality of the predecessor State, as well as all individuals susceptible of being granted the nationality of the successor State. It is obvious that the two categories of persons will not necessarily be identical.

99. Determining the category of individuals affected by the loss of the nationality of the predecessor State is easy in the event of total State succession, when the predecessor State or States disappear as a result of the change of sovereignty: all individuals possessing the nationality of the predecessor State lose this nationality as an automatic consequence of that State’s disappearance. But determining the category of individuals susceptible of losing the predecessor State’s nationality is quite complex in the case of partial State succession, when the predecessor State survives the change. In the latter case, it is necessary to distinguish among three groups of individuals possessing the nationality of the predecessor State: those born in the territory affected by the change of sovereignty and resident there at the date of the change, those born elsewhere but temporarily or permanently resident in the territory affected by the change, and those born in the territory affected by the change but temporarily or permanently absent at the date of the change. Within the last category a distinction must be made between those individuals residing in the territory which remains part of the predecessor State and those individuals residing in a third State.

100. The delimitation of categories of persons susceptible of acquiring the nationality of the successor State is not less difficult. In the event of total State succession, such as the absorption of one State by another State or the unification of States, when the predecessor State or States respectively cease to exist, all nationals of the predecessor State or States are candidates for the acquisition of the nationality of the successor State. But the inhabitants of the territory subject to State succession include, in addition, stateless persons residing in that territory at the date of succession. “Persons habitually resident in the absorbed territory who are nationals of foreign [third] States and at the same time not nationals of the predecessor State cannot be invested with the successor’s nationality. On the other hand, stateless persons so resident there are in the same position as born nationals of the predecessor State. There is an ‘inchoate right’ on the part of any State to naturalize stateless persons resident upon its territory.”85

101. In the case of dissolution of a State, to which the above considerations equally apply, the situation becomes more complicated owing to the fact that two or more successor States appear and the range of individ-

uals susceptible of acquiring the nationality of each particular successor State has to be defined separately. It is obvious that there will be overlaps between the categories of individuals susceptible of acquiring the nationality of the different successor States.

102. Similar difficulties will arise with the delimitation of the categories of individuals susceptible of acquiring the nationality of the successor State in the event of secession or transfer of a part or parts of territory.

B. Scope of the problem ratione materiae

103. Ratione materiae, the preliminary study should deal with questions of loss of the nationality of the predecessor State and acquisition of the nationality of the successor State and with questions of conflict of nationalities susceptible of resulting from State succession, namely statelessness (negative conflict) and double or multiple nationality (positive conflict). Problems of statelessness or double nationality can arise both in the relations between the predecessor State and the successor State and in the relations between two or more successor States. Lastly, the question of option of nationality should also be considered in the context of the preliminary study.

1. LOSS OF NATIONALITY

104. The study should also aim at clarifying the extent to which the loss of the nationality of the predecessor State occurs automatically, as a logical consequence of the succession of States, and the extent to which international law obliges the predecessor State to withdraw its nationality from the inhabitants of the territory concerned or, on the contrary, limits the discretionary power of that State to withdraw its nationality from certain categories of individuals susceptible of changing nationality.

2. ACQUISITION OF NATIONALITY

105. The study should answer the following questions: first, whether the successor State is required to confer its nationality on the population of the territory affected by the change of sovereignty; and, secondly, whether international law imposes limits—to be defined—on the discretionary power of the successor State as regards the collective naturalization of the population.

3. CONFLICT OF NATIONALITIES

106. The answers which the study will provide to the above questions should furnish a basis for evaluating the extent to which contemporary international law guards against conflicts of nationalities, both positive (double or multiple nationality) and negative (statelessness). The Commission might also investigate whether the States concerned (the predecessor State and the successor State or States) are required to negotiate and settle nationality questions by mutual agreement with a view to warding off conflicts of nationalities, especially statelessness.

4. OPTION

107. The role of the right of option in the resolution of problems concerning nationality in cases of State succession is closely related to the function that international law attributes to the will of individuals in this field. There is substantial doctrinal support for the conclusion that the successor State is entitled to extend its nationality to those individuals susceptible of acquiring such nationality by virtue of the change of sovereignty, irrespective of the wishes of those individuals. Nevertheless, the right of option was provided for in a substantial number of international treaties, some of which have been mentioned above. In exceptional cases, this right was granted for a considerable period of time, during which affected individuals enjoyed a kind of dual nationality.86

108. For the majority of authors, the right of option can be deduced only from a treaty. Some authors, however, tend to assert the existence of an independent right of option as an attribute of the principle of self-determination.87

109. The right of option was also quite recently envisaged by the Arbitration Commission of the European Community on Yugoslavia. The Arbitration Commission recalled that, by virtue of the right to self-determination, every individual may choose to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or language community he or she wishes. In the Arbitration Commission‘’s view, one possible consequence of this principle might be for the members of the Serbian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to be recognized under agreements between the Republics as having the nationality of their choice, with all the rights and obligations which that entails with respect to the States concerned.24

110. The function which contemporary international law attributes to the option of nationality is among the issues that should be further clarified in the preliminary study.

C. Scope of the problem ratione temporis

111. It follows from the title of the topic under consideration that ILC is required to study the question of nationality solely in relation to the phenomenon of State succession. The scope of the study therefore excludes questions relating to changes of nationality which occur prior to or as a result of events or acts prior to the date of the succession of States. As a corollary, the scope of this study might also have excluded all questions relating to the acquisition or loss of nationality after the date of the succession of States. It should not be forgotten, however, that, in the majority of cases, successor States take time to adopt their laws on nationality and that in the interim period, between the date of the succession of States and the date of the adoption of the law on nationality, human life continues, children are born, individuals marry, and so forth. There may therefore be problems concerning nationality which, although not resulting directly from the change of sovereignty as such, nevertheless deserve the attention of the Commission.


87 See Kunz, “L’option de nationalité” and “Nationality and option clauses in the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947.”
CHAPTER VII

Continuity of nationality

112. The rule of the continuity of nationality is a part of the regime of diplomatic protection. According to this rule, it is necessary that from the time of the occurrence of the injury until the making of the award, the claim belongs continuously and without interruption to a person having the nationality of the State putting such claim forward. The essence of the rule is to prevent the individual from choosing a powerful protecting State through a shift of nationality.88

113. Neither the practice nor the doctrine gives a clear answer to the question of the relevance of this rule in the event of involuntary changes brought about by State succession. There are good reasons to believe that, in the case of State succession, this rule may be modified, because, as was stated by President Verzijl in the Pablo Najera case:

In the case of collective changes of nationality on the basis of a succession of States, the legal situation must be weighed far less inflexibly than is customary in arbitral practice in normal cases of individual change of nationality by the deliberate act of the person concerned.

114. Since the problem of continuity of nationality is closely associated with the regime of diplomatic protection, the question arises whether it should be brought within the scope of the current study. It seems unlikely that the topic of regime of diplomatic protection will be placed on the agenda of the Commission in the near future and there is therefore no risk of overlap. In the circumstances, it would be beneficial to analyse the question of continuity of nationality in the context of the preliminary study which the General Assembly has asked the Commission to prepare.

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88 See, for example, Brownlie, op. cit., p. 481.