RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES

[Agenda item 4]

DOCUMENT A/CN.4/586

Note by the Special Rapporteur on draft guideline 2.1.9 (Statement of reasons for reservations)

[Original: French]

[26 July 2007]

CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral instruments cited in the present document</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>..................................................................................................................</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note on draft guideline 2.1.9 .................................................................</td>
<td>1–13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multilateral instruments cited in the present document


  Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby (Strasbourg, 11 May 1994)

- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951)

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966)

- Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969)

- European Agreement supplementing the Convention on road signs and signals (Geneva, 1 May 1971)

- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York, 18 December 1979)

- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (Vienna, 21 March 1986)

- United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 20 December 1988)

Note on draft guideline 2.1.9 (Statement of reasons for reservations)

1. In his eleventh report on reservations to treaties, devoted to the formulation of objections, the Special Rapporteur proposed a draft guideline 2.6.10 (Statement of reasons), which might read as follows:

   Whenever possible, an objection should indicate the reasons why it is being made.¹


2. During the consideration of this draft guideline in 2007, the Special Rapporteur, supported by several other members, noted with regret that he had not proposed a similar draft guideline on the reasons for reservations. The need for such a guideline was also mentioned at the meeting between members of the Commission²

and representatives of human rights bodies, held on 15–16 May 2007.\(^7\)

3. The Commission’s work on the law of treaties, the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (hereinafter the 1969 Vienna Convention) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (hereinafter the 1986 Vienna Convention) in no way stipulate that a State or international organization which formulates a reservation must give its reasons for doing so and explain why it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects. Thus, giving reasons is not an additional condition for validity under the Vienna regime and it is not proposed that it should be made obligatory.

4. However, some conventional instruments require States to give reasons for their reservations and to explain why they are formulating them. A particularly clear example is article 57 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), which states:

1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article.

2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.

Under this regime, which is unquestionably lex specialis with respect to general international law, indication of the law on which the reservation is based is a genuine condition for the validity of any reservation to the Convention. In its famous Belilos case, the European Court of Human Rights decided that article 57 (former art. 64), paragraph 2, “is not a purely formal requirement but a condition of substance.”\(^6\)

In the Court’s view, the required reasons or explanations provide a guarantee—in particular for the other Contracting Parties and the Convention institutions—that a reservation does not go beyond the provisions expressly excluded by the State concerned.\(^4\)

The penalty for failure to meet this requirement to give reasons (or to explain) is the invalidity of the reservation.\(^6\)

5. Under general international law, such a drastic consequence certainly does not follow automatically from a failure to give reasons, but the justification and usefulness of giving reasons for reservations, stressed by the European Court of Human Rights in 1988, are, generally speaking, applicable to treaties and reservations. Stating the reasons for a reservation is not an additional requirement that further limits States’ and international organizations’ ability to formulate reservations. It cannot be either the object or the purpose of a provision that encourages indication of the reasons for formulating a reservation. Such an indication gives the author of the reservation an opportunity not only to explain and clarify the reasons why the reservation was formulated—which may include (but not be limited to) impediments under domestic law that may make implementation of the provision on which the reservation is based difficult or impossible—but also to provide information that will be useful in assessing the validity of the reservation. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the author of a reservation is also responsible for assessing its validity.

6. The reasons and explanations given by the author of a reservation also facilitate the work of the bodies with competence to assess the reservation’s validity, including other contracting States or organizations, dispute settlement bodies responsible for interpreting or implementing the treaty and the treaty monitoring bodies.\(^7\) Giving reasons for a reservation is, therefore, also one of the ways in which States and international organizations can cooperate with the other Contracting Parties and monitoring bodies so that the validity of the reservation can be assessed.\(^8\)

7. Giving and explaining the reasons that, in the author’s view, made it necessary to formulate the reservation also help establish a fruitful reservations dialogue among the author of the reservation, the contracting States and international organizations and the monitoring body, if any. This benefits not only the States or international organizations which, under article 20 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, are called upon to comment on the reservation by accepting or objecting to it, but also the author of the reservation, which, to the extent possible, can help allay any concerns that its partners may have regarding the validity of its reservation and steer the reservations dialogue towards greater mutual understanding.

8. Giving reasons (which, in any event, must be optional) is not an additional requirement that would make it more difficult to formulate reservations; it is a useful way for both the author of the reservation and the other States concerned, international organizations or monitoring bodies to fulfil their responsibilities effectively.

9. In practice, reasons are more likely to be given for reservations than for objections. States often formulate reservations without giving any reason for them. For

---

1. Ibid., vol. II (Part Two), para. 398, footnote 572.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., para. 60.
5. See the tenth report on reservations to treaties (Yearbook … 2005, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/558 and Add.1–2, paras. 151–180) and, in particular, draft guideline 3.2 (Competence to assess the validity of reservations), para. 167.
6. The Commission stressed this obligation to cooperate with monitoring bodies in its preliminary conclusions on reservations to normative multilateral treaties including human rights treaties, paragraph 9 of which states: “The Commission calls upon States to cooperate with monitoring bodies” (Yearbook … 1997, vol. II (Part Two), p. 57). This obligation to cooperate is explored at greater length in the tenth report of the Special Rapporteur (see footnote 7 above), paras. 178–179, and is the subject of draft guideline 3.2.3 (Cooperation of States and international organizations with monitoring bodies). It was also stressed by the international human rights treaty bodies in 2007 at their Sixth Inter-Committee Meeting (see the report of the meeting of the working group on reservations (HR/MC/2007/5 and Add.1, para. 19, recommendation 9 (a))).
example, Botswana simply appended the following reservation to its instrument of ratification of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, without explanation:

Subject to the reservation of articles 7, 17, 26, 31, 32 and paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Convention. 9

The same is true of Bahrain’s reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women:

... the Kingdom of Bahrain makes reservations with respect to the following provisions of the Convention:

- Article 2, in order to ensure its implementation within the bounds of the provisions of the Islamic Shariah;
- Article 9, paragraph 2;
- Article 15, paragraph 4;
- Article 16, in so far as it is incompatible with the provisions of the Islamic Shariah;
- Article 29, paragraph 1. 10

10. Nevertheless, this purely “descriptive” formulation of reservations is more rare than might be thought. States and international organizations often make a point of giving their reasons for formulating a particular reservation. In some cases, they do so purely for reasons of convenience, in which case their explanations are of no particular use in assessing the value of the reservation except perhaps insofar as they establish that it is motivated by such considerations of convenience. 11 But often, the explanations that accompany reservations shed considerable light on the reasons for their formulation. For example, Barbados justified its reservation to article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by practical problems of implementation:

The Government of Barbados states that it reserves the right not to apply in full, the guarantee of free legal assistance in accordance with paragraph 3 (a) of Article 14 of the Covenant, since, while accepting the principles contained in the same paragraph, the problems of implementation are such that full application cannot be guaranteed at present. 12

In another example (among the many precedents), the Congo formulated a reservation to article 11 of the Covenant, accompanying it with a long explanation:

The Government of the People’s Republic of Congo declares that it does not consider itself bound by the provisions of article 11 [...] 13

Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is quite incompatible with articles 386 et seq. of the Congolese Code of Civil, Commercial, Administrative and Financial Procedure, derived from Act 51/83 of 21 April 1983. Under those provisions, in matters of private law, decisions or orders emanating from conciliation proceedings may be enforced through imprisonment or debt when other means of enforcement have failed, when the amount due exceeds 20,000 CFA francs and when the debtor, between 18 and 60 years of age, makes himself insolvent in bad faith. 14

11. Generally speaking, giving reasons is not a formal obligation on which the validity of the reservation depends. In practice, however, States frequently make a point of explaining the reasons for their reservations. For the aforementioned reasons, this practice should be encouraged.

12. Furthermore, although it seems wise to encourage the giving of reasons, this practice must not become a convenient smokescreen used to justify the formulation of general or vague reservations. According to draft guideline 3.1.7 (Vague or general reservations), adopted during the first part of the 2007 session,

A reservation shall be worded in such a way as to allow its scope to be determined, in order to assess in particular its compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. 15

Giving reasons cannot obviate the need for the reservation to be formulated in terms that make it possible to assess its validity. Even without reasons, a reservation must be self-sufficient as a basis for assessment of its validity; the reasons can only facilitate this assessment. 16

13. On the basis of these comments, the Commission will doubtless wish to adopt a draft guideline recommending a statement of reasons for reservations. Logically, it should be included in the first section of the second part of the Guide to Practice having to do with the form and formulation of reservations and might read:

“2.1.9 Statement of reasons

“Whenever possible, a reservation should indicate the reasons why it is being made.”

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., chap. IV.4. See also Gambia’s reservation (ibid.).
13. See also Gambia’s reservation (ibid.).
15. Nevertheless, there are cases in which the clarification resulting from the reasons given for the reservation might make it possible to consider a “dubious” reservation to be valid. For example, Belize accompanied its reservation to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances with the following explanation:

“Article 8 of the Convention requires the Parties to give consideration to the possibility of transferring to one another proceedings for criminal prosecution of certain offences where such transfer is considered to be in the interests of a proper administration of justice. The courts of Belize have no extra-territorial jurisdiction, with the result that they will have no jurisdiction to prosecute offences committed abroad unless such offences are committed partly within and partly without the jurisdiction, by a person who is within the jurisdiction. Moreover, under the Constitution of Belize, the control of public prosecutions is vested in the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is an independent functionary and not under Government control.

“Accordingly, Belize will be able to implement article 8 of the Convention only to a limited extent insofar as its Constitution and the law allows.”

(Multilateral Treaties ... (see footnote 9 insofar as its Constitution and the law allows.)

Without such an explanation, Belize’s reservation might have been considered “vague or general” and might thus have fallen within the scope of draft guideline 3.1.7. Accompanied by this explanation, it appears much more defensible.