RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES

[Agenda item 3]
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Sixteenth report on reservations to treaties,
by Mr. Alain Pellet, Special Rapporteur

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CONTENTS

Multilateral instruments cited in the present report ........................................................................................................... 53
Works cited in the present report ........................................................................................................................................... 54

STATUS OF RESERVATIONS, ACCEPTANCES OF AND OBJECTIONS TO RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS IN THE CASE OF SUCCESSION OF STATES ................................................................................................................................. 55

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1–9 55

Chapter

I. STATUS OF RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES IN THE CASE OF SUCCESSION OF STATES .................................................................................................................. 10–98 56
   A. General principles ......................................................................................................................................................... 11–59 57
   B. Territorial scope of reservations in the context of a succession of States ................................................................. 60–81 66
   C. Timing of the effects of a reservation in the context of a succession of States ......................................................... 82–98 68

II. STATUS OF ACCEPTANCES OF AND OBJECTIONS TO RESERVATIONS IN THE CASE OF SUCCESSION OF STATES ................................................................................................. 99–150 70
   A. Status of objections formulated by the predecessor State ............................................................................................ 102–113 71
   B. Status of objections to reservations of the predecessor State ...................................................................................... 114–117 72
   C. Reservations of the predecessor State to which no objections have been made prior to the date of the succession of States ....................................................................................................................... 118–121 73
   D. Capacity of the successor State to object to prior reservations .................................................................................. 122–134 73
   E. Objections to reservations formulated by the successor State ...................................................................................... 135–138 75
   F. Acceptances of reservations ...................................................................................................................................... 139–150 75

III. INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 151–158 77

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
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Status of reservations, acceptances of and objections to reservations and interpretative declarations in the case of succession of States

Introduction

1. In accordance with the intention announced by the Special Rapporteur in his fourteenth report on reservations to treaties, the present report addresses the issue of reservations to treaties and objections to reservations in relation to the succession of States. In line with the general plan of the study which the Special Rapporteur proposed in his second report and has followed consistently ever since, the relevant guidelines should constitute the fifth and final chapter of the Guide to Practice.

2. The present report closely reflects the line of reasoning set forth in the Secretariat’s very valuable memorandum of 2009 on reservations to treaties in the context of succession of States. It was impossible to refer systematically in footnotes to this Secretariat study, which in a manner of speaking is the original report on which the present text is based.

3. Taking into account the (few) rules on reservations contained in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States, the elements of practice identified in the aforementioned memorandum by the Secretariat and the considerations set forth therein, it seems appropriate to consider including in the Guide to Practice some guidelines concerning the problems posed by reservations, acceptances of reservations and objections to reservations in the context of succession of States.

4. The adoption of guidelines in this area is all the more important given that:

(a) The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter “the 1969 Vienna Convention") and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (hereinafter “the 1986 Vienna Convention") have no provisions on this subject except a safeguard clause, which, by definition, gives no indication as to the applicable rules;

(b) The 1978 Vienna Convention contains only one provision on reservations (article 20), which is worded as follows:

Article 20. Reservations

1. When a newly independent State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty by a notification of succession under article 17 or 18, it shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation.

2. When making a notification of succession establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty under article 17 or 18, a newly independent State may formulate a reservation unless the reservation is one the formulation of which would be excluded by the provisions of subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

3. When a newly independent State formulates a reservation in conformity with paragraph 2, the rules set out in articles 20 to 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply in respect of that reservation.

(c) Also, as noted in the first report on reservations:


133. First, it should be noted that the article is contained in Part III of the Convention, which deals with “newly independent States”; it therefore applies in the case of the decolonization or dissolution of States, whereas the question of the rules applicable in the case of the succession of a State in respect of part of a territory, the uniting of a State or the separation of a State is left aside completely...

134. Secondly, while article 20, paragraph 1, provides for the possible formulation of new reservations by the new State and while the effect of paragraph 3 is that third States may formulate objections in that event, it fails to stipulate whether the latter can object to a reservation being maintained...

135. Lastly, and this is a serious lacuna, article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention makes no reference whatever to succession in respect of objections to reservations—whereas the initial proposals of Sir Humphrey Waldock did deal with this point—and the reasons for this omission are not clear. See Imbert, Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux... , pp. 318–322.

5. In consequence, some of the guidelines proposed herein reflect the current state of positive international

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3 With the exception of two annexes concerning the reservations dialogue and the settlement of disputes, respectively.
4 Yearbook ... 2009, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/616. The Special Rapporteur is grateful to the Secretariat staff who contributed to the preparation of this excellent study under the supervision of Mr. Václav Mikulka, Mr. George Korontzis and Mr. Gionata Buzzini.
5 Ibid.
6 Art. 73 of the 1969 Vienna Convention is worded thus: “The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudice any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States ...”. A similar safeguard clause appears in art. 74, para. 1, of the 1986 Vienna Convention.
8 As the 1978 Vienna Convention—unlike the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, article 31—does not address the “dissolution of a State”, and the present report does not explore particular forms of succession, it would probably be of little use to discuss whether States resulting from dissolution—which are “new States” but not “newly independent States” within the meaning of the 1978 Vienna Convention—may be likened to newly independent States.
law on the subject, while others represent the progressive development of international law or are intended to offer logical solutions to problems to which neither the 1978 Vienna Convention nor the relevant practice seems to have provided clear answers thus far. In any event, as is generally the case, it is often difficult if not impossible to make a clear distinction between proposals that come under the heading of codification *stricto sensu*, on the one hand, and proposals aimed at progressive development, on the other.

6. At the same time, no attempt is made in the present report to call into question the rules and principles set out in the 1978 Vienna Convention. In particular, it relies on the definition of succession of States given in that instrument. More generally, the guidelines proposed herein use the same terminology as the 1978 Vienna Convention, attribute the same meaning to the terms and expressions used in that Convention and defined in its article 2 and are based, where applicable, on the distinctions made in that instrument among the various forms of succession of States:

(a) “Succession in respect of part of territory” (art. 15);

(b) “Newly independent States” (art. 2, para. 1 (f), and arts. 16 et seq.);

(c) “Newly independent States formed from two or more territories” (art. 30);

(d) “Uniting of States” (arts. 31–33); and

(e) “Separation of parts of a State” (arts. 34–37).

7. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur has started from the initial premise that the question of the succession of a State to a treaty has been settled as a preliminary issue. This is the implication of the word “when”, which begins several of the guidelines proposed herein and refers to concepts that are considered settled and need not be revisited by the Commission in the context of the present exercise. By this logic, then, the point of departure is that a successor State has the status of a contracting State or State party to a treaty as a consequence of the succession of States, not because it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty within the meaning of article 11 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, with no need to ascertain whether this situation has arisen by virtue of and in accordance with the rules laid down in the 1978 Vienna Convention or other rules of international law.

8. Lastly, like the 1978 Vienna Convention, these guidelines concern only reservations formulated by a predecessor State that was a *contracting State or State party* to the treaty in question as of the date of the succession of States. They do not deal with reservations formulated by a predecessor State that had only signed the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, without having completed the relevant action prior to the date of the succession of States. Reservations of this second kind cannot be considered as being maintained by the successor State because they did not, at the date of the succession of States, produce any legal effects, not having been formally confirmed by the State in question when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty, as required by article 23, paragraph 2, of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

9. In the light of these general remarks, the following issues should be considered in turn:

(a) The status of reservations in the case of succession of States;

(b) The status of acceptances of and objections to reservations in the case of succession of States; and

(c) The status of interpretative declarations.

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9 Art. 2, para. 1 (b): “succession of States” means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory”; see also art. 2, para. 1 (a), of the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, or art. 2 (a) of the articles on the nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of States annexed to General Assembly resolution 55/153 of 12 December 2000.

10 “The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”

11 See art. 20.


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**Chapter I**

Status of reservations to treaties in the case of succession of States

10. As indicated above, article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention deals only with situations in which a newly independent State wishes to establish its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty. The term “newly independent State”, according to the definition set out in article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of the Convention, means “... a successor State the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible”. Thus, the rules on reservations provided for in the 1978 Vienna Convention cover only cases of succession in which a State gains independence as a result of a decolonization process. This provision, which appears in part III of the Convention, entitled “Newly independent States”, not only leaves situations involving the uniting and separation of States (the subject of part IV) unaddressed, but also requires clarification as to the territorial and temporal scope of the reservations in question.

13 See paragraph 4 above or the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 4 above).
A. General principles

11. The origin of article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention\(^4\) dates back to a proposal put forward in the third report of Sir Humphrey Waldock on succession in respect of treaties.\(^5\) The report contained a draft article 9 on “Succession in respect of reservations to multilateral treaties”, its purpose being to determine the position of the successor State in regard to reservations, acceptances and objections. After referring to certain “logical principles” and noting that the still developing practice of depositaries was not wholly consistent with them, the Special Rapporteur concluded “that a flexible and pragmatic approach to the problem of succession in respect of reservations is to be preferred”.\(^6\) Accordingly, he proposed that rules should be adopted to reflect:

(a) A presumption in favour of succession to the reservations of the predecessor State unless the successor State has expressed a contrary intention or unless, by reason of its object and purpose, the reservation is appropriate only to the predecessor State (art. 9, para. 1);

(b) The possibility for the successor State to formulate new reservations, in which case (i) the successor State is considered to have withdrawn any different reservations made by the predecessor State; and (ii) the provisions of the treaty itself and of the 1969 Vienna Convention apply to the reservations of the successor State (para. 2);

(c) The application of these rules, mutatis mutandis, to objections to reservations (para. 3 (a)), although “in cases falling under Article 20, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention no objection may be formulated by a successor State to a reservation which has been accepted by all the parties” (para. 3 (b)).\(^7\)

12. The proposals were examined only in 1972 and did not give rise to very lively discussions.\(^8\) The Commission endorsed the pragmatic and flexible approach to the treatment of reservations and objections recommended by its Special Rapporteur. Apart from drafting changes, it made only one really substantive amendment to his draft: draft article 15 (which replaced draft article 9), paragraph 1 (a), stipulated that only a reservation “incompatible” with that of the predecessor State on the same subject (and no longer a “different” reservation) replaced it.\(^9\)

13. However, in his first report in 1974, Sir Francis Val- lat, who had been appointed Special Rapporteur, endorsed a proposal made by Zambia and the United Kingdom and returned if not to the letter at least to the spirit of Sir Humphrey Waldock’s proposal, though he described the change in question as minor, by removing the “incompatibility” test and providing only that a reservation of the predecessor State is not maintained if the successor State formulates a reservation relating to the same subject matter.\(^10\) Subject to a further drafting change, the Commission agreed with him on that point.\(^11\) However, the text emerged from its consideration in the Drafting Committee somewhat “pruned”.\(^12\) In particular, paragraph 3 (b) of draft article 9,\(^13\) which, it was rightly said, dealt with the general law applicable to reservations and was not concerned with a problem specific to State succession, was deleted.

14. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the Special Rapporteur did not take up two other sets of proposals put forward with some insistence by a few States, namely, proposals made, inter alia, by Australia, Belgium, Canada and Poland to reverse the presumption (of continuity) in paragraph 1, and the wish expressed by Poland for an express provision that the successor State would not automatically succeed to the objections of the predecessor State to reservations formulated by third States.\(^14\) The Commission did not endorse those suggestions either.\(^15\)

15. This provision gave rise to little discussion at the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, which met in Vienna from 4 April to 6 May 1977 and from 31 July to 23 August 1978. Even though some States again proposed that the presumption in draft article 19, paragraph 1, should be reversed under the “clean slate” principle,\(^16\) the Committee of the Whole, and then the Conference itself, approved the article on reservations (which later became article 20) as proposed by the Commission, apart from some very minor drafting adjustments,\(^17\) and the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations was reflected in the final text of article 20 as adopted at the Conference.

\(^{14}\) The discussion that follows is largely a synthesis of the considerations contained in the first report of the Special Rapporteur on reservations (Yearbook...1995, vol. II (Part One), pp. 136–137, paras. 62–71) and the above-mentioned Secretariat study (footnote 4 above), paras. 9–27.


\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 47 and 50, paras. (2) and (11) of the commentary.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 47.


\(^{19}\) Ibid., vol. II, p. 260.

\(^{20}\) Yearbook...1974, vol. II (Part One) p. 54, para. 287.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., pp. 222–227 (art. 19).

\(^{22}\) Ibid., vol. I, 1272nd meeting, pp. 112–118, and 1293rd meeting, pp. 238–245.

\(^{23}\) See para. 11 above.

\(^{24}\) Yearbook...1974, vol. II (Part One), pp. 52–54, paras. 278–286 and 289.

16. The presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State had been proposed by D. P. O’Connell, Rapporteur of the International Law Association on the subject of “the Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of their Predecessors,” one year before Sir Humphrey Waldock endorsed the concept. It is based on a concern for respecting the actual intention of the successor State by avoiding the creation of an irreversible situation:

“If a presumption in favour of maintaining reservations were not to be made, the actual intention of the successor State might be irrevocably defeated; whereas, if it were made and the presumption did not correspond to the successor State’s intention, the latter could always redress the matter by withdrawing the reservations.”

17. This solution is not self-evident and has been criticized in the literature. For example, according to Imbert, “there is no reason to think that the State would not study the text of the convention carefully enough to know exactly which reservations it wished to maintain, abandon or formulate”. This author cast doubt in particular on the assumption that the predecessor State’s reservations would be necessarily advantageous to the newly independent State, since reservations constitute derogations from or limitations on a State’s commitments, they should not be a matter of presumption. On the contrary, it makes sense to assume that, in the absence of a formal statement of its intention, a State is bound by the treaty as a whole.

18. The commentary to draft article 19 as finally adopted by the Commission nonetheless puts forward some convincing arguments supporting the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State:

First, the presumption of an intention to maintain the reservations was indicated by the very concept of succession to the predecessor’s treaties. Secondly, a State is in general not to be understood as having undertaken more onerous obligations unless it has unmistakably indicated an intention to do so; and to treat a newly independent State, on the basis of its mere silence, as having dropped its predecessor’s reservations would be to impose upon it a more onerous obligation. Thirdly, if presumption in favour of maintaining reservations were not to be made, the actual intention of the newly independent State might be irrevocably defeated; whereas, if it were made and the presumption did not correspond to the newly independent State’s intention, the latter could always redress the matter by withdrawing the reservations.

19. This seems to be the majority position in the literature, tending to support the presumption in favour of the maintenance of the predecessor State’s reservations. Thus, explains D. P. O’Connell,

“Since a State which makes a reservation to a multilateral convention commits itself only to the convention as so reserved, its successor State cannot, logically, succeed to the convention without reservations. Should the reservation be unacceptable to it the appropriate procedure would be to ask the depositary to remove it and notify all parties accordingly.”

Similarly, Gaja takes the view that

“The opinion that the predecessor State’s reservations are maintained is also based on the reasonable assumption that when a newly independent State elects to become a party to a treaty by means of a notification of succession, in principle it wants the treaty to continue to be applied to its territory in the same way as it did before independence.”

20. This presumption is inferred logically, since succession to a treaty by a newly independent State, though voluntary, is a true succession that must be distinguished from accession. Because it is a succession, it seems reasonable to presume that treaty obligations are transmitted to the successor State as modified by the reservation formulated by the predecessor State.

21. However, the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State is reversed, under article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, not only if a “contrary intention” is specifically expressed by the successor State when making the notification of succession, but also if that State formulates a reservation “which relates to the same subject matter” as the reservation formulated by the predecessor State. The exact wording of this second possibility was a subject of debate in the Commission when this provision was being drafted.

22. Sir Humphrey Waldock had proposed, in his third report on succession in respect of treaties, a different formulation that provided for the reversal of the presumption that the reservations of the predecessor State were maintained if the successor State formulated “reservations different from those applicable at the date of succession”. In its draft article 15 adopted on first reading in 1972, the Commission settled on a solution according to which the presumption that the reservations of the predecessor State were maintained was reversed if the successor State formulated a new reservation “which relates to the same subject matter and is incompatible with [the reservation formulated by the predecessor State]”.

26 “Additional point” No. 10 proposed in the International Law Association, Buenos Aires Conference (1968), cited in Yearbook... 1969, vol. II, p. 49, para. 17: “A successor State can continue only the legal situation brought about as a result of its predecessor’s signature or ratification. Since a reservation delimits that legal situation it follows that the treaty is succeeded to (if at all) with the reservation.”

27 See para. 11 above.

28 Yearbook... 1970, vol. II, p. 50, para. (12) of the commentary to art. 9; see also the elements of practice invoked in support of this solution, ibid., pp. 47–49.

29 Imbert, Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux, p. 309.

30 Ibid., p. 310. Imbert thus echoes the criticism (see footnote 26 above) put forward at the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties by the United Republic of Tanzania, who expressed a preference for a “clean slate” in regard to reservations and pointed out that reservations formulated by the predecessor State were not necessarily in the interest of the successor State. Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties..., vol. I (see footnote 26 above), 27th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 79; see also 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 37, and document A/CONF.80/14 (reproduced in vol. III; see footnote 26 above), para. 118 (c). A preference for the opposite presumption had also been expressed by other delegations; see vol. I, 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 13 (Romania), para. 18 (India) and para. 33 (Kenya).


34 O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, p. 229.

35 Gaja, “Reservations to treaties and the newly independent States”, p. 55. See also Ruda, “Reservations to treaties”, p. 206; and Menon, “The newly independent States and succession in respect of treaties”, p. 152.


23. The wording that was finally adopted by the Commission and reflected in the 1978 Vienna Convention has been criticized in the literature for omitting the test of “incompatibility” between a reservation formulated by the predecessor State and one formulated by the successor State. Nonetheless, in accordance with Sir Francis Vallat’s proposal, the Commission finally deleted this requirement from the final draft article for pragmatic reasons, which it explains in the commentary to the corresponding article adopted on second reading in 1974:

“[T]he test of incompatibility for which the paragraph provided might be difficult to apply and ... if the newly independent State were to formulate a reservation relating to the same subject-matter as that of the reservation made by the predecessor State, it could reasonably be presumed to intend to withdraw that reservation.”

24. While it may maintain—expressly or tacitly—reservations made by the predecessor State, a newly independent successor State is also empowered, under article 20, paragraph 2, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, to formulate reservations when making a notification of succession. This power is subject only to the general conditions laid down in article 19, subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Article 20, paragraph 3, of the 1978 Vienna Convention provides, further, that the rules set out in articles 20–23 of the 1969 Vienna Convention apply in respect of reservations formulated by a newly independent State when making a notification of succession.

25. In its commentary to draft article 19, the Commission noted that this power seemed to have been confirmed in practice. In support of this solution, Sir Humphrey Waldock, in his third report on succession in respect of treaties, based his views, inter alia, on the practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who, on several occasions, had acknowledged that newly independent States have this power, without prompting any objections from States to this assumption. The second Special Rapporteur was also in favour, for “practical” reasons, of acknowledging the right of a newly independent State to make new reservations when notifying its succession.

26. The view of the two Special Rapporteurs prevailed in the Commission, which, as indicated in the commentary to draft article 19 as finally adopted, had a choice between two alternatives:

(a) to decline to regard any notification of succession made subject to new reservations as a true instrument of succession and to treat it in law as a case of accession, or (b) to accept it as having the character of a succession but at the same time apply to it the law governing reservations as if it were a wholly new expression of consent to be bound by the treaty.

Drawing upon the practice of the Secretary-General and wishing to take a “flexible” approach in this regard, the Commission opted for the second alternative, noting also that it might ease the access of a newly independent State to a treaty that was not, “... for technical reasons, open to its participation by any other procedure than succession.”

27. At the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Austria challenged this solution—which, in purely logical terms, was somewhat incompatible with the preceding paragraph—and proposed the deletion of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the provision that would become article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. Austria contended that recognizing the capacity of a newly independent State to formulate new reservations when notifying its succession “seemed to be based on an erroneous concept of succession” and that “[i]f a newly independent State wished to make reservations, it should use the ratification or accession procedure provided for becoming a party to a multilateral treaty”. However, the amendment proposed by Austria was rejected by 39 votes to 4, with 36 abstentions.

28. Those States opposing the amendment of Austria at the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties put forth various arguments, including the desirability of ensuring that the newly independent State would “not be obliged to conform with more complicated ratification procedures than those provided for by the International Law Commission”, the alleged incompatibility of the amendment of Austria with the principle of self-determination or the principle of the “clean slate”, the need to be “realistic” rather than “puristic”, and the fact that a succession of States was not a “legal inheritance or a transmission of rights and obligations”. Some authors have echoed these criticisms, while others take the view that “the right to make reservations is not a right that is transmissible through inheritance, but a prerogative that is part of the set of supreme powers attributed by virtue of the protective principle to sovereign States” and that “the formal recognition of this capacity [on the part of a newly independent State] represents a

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38 See Gaja (footnote 35 above), pp. 59–60.
40 Ibid., p. 226, para. (18) of the commentary to art. 19.
41 Ibid., pp. 224–225, paras. (7)–(12).
29. In fact, the principles laid down in article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention are not overly rigid and are flexible enough to accommodate a wide variety of practices, as shown by a number of cases of succession to treaties deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

(a) In many cases, newly independent States have deposited a notification of succession to a particular treaty without making any mention of the question of reservations; in such cases, the Secretary-General has included the newly independent State in the list of States parties to the treaty concerned without passing judgement upon the status of reservations formulated by the predecessor State.

(b) Some newly independent States have expressly maintained the reservations formulated by the predecessor State.

(c) In other cases, the newly independent State has essentially reformulated the same reservations made by the predecessor State.

(d) There have been cases in which the newly independent State has maintained the reservations formulated by the predecessor State while adding new reservations.

(e) There have also been cases in which the newly independent State has "reworked" reservations made by the predecessor State.

(f) In a few cases, the newly independent State has withdrawn the reservations of the predecessor State while formulating new reservations.

All these possibilities are acceptable under the terms of article 20, whose flexibility is unquestionably one of its greatest virtues.

30. Thus, notwithstanding the less-than-Cartesian logic of article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, whose rules are based on considerations of principle that are hard to reconcile or in any case different (succession and/or sovereignty), and despite the criticisms that may be levelled against the specific wording of this provision, there is no good reason not to include it—as a guideline—in the Guide to Practice. As far back as 1995, following the discussion of the first report on reservations, the Commission decided that there should be no change in the relevant provisions of the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. Since then, it has been the consistent practice of the Commission to reflect systematically, to the extent possible, the wording of the relevant provisions of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions. The reasons for this practice have been sufficiently explained in the commentary to guideline 1.1, “Definition of reservations”. There is no reason not to extend the practice to the relevant provision—the only one, apart from the definition of reservations—of the 1978 Vienna Convention, placing it at the beginning of the fifth part of the Guide to Practice. The Commission may therefore wish to include the text of article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention as guideline 5.1.

31. Although article 20 of that Convention applies only to reservations formulated in respect of treaties between States, guideline 5.1 will also, like the other guidelines in the Guide to Practice, cover reservations to treaties between States and international organizations. Further adaptations are also necessary.

32. As indicated in the first report on reservations, this provision concerns only the status of reservations in cases where a newly independent State makes a notification of succession—in other words, it applies only to cases of decolonization. Accordingly, it is necessary, first, to mention this limitation in the title of the guideline and, second, to consider whether this solution should be extended to other modalities of State succession in other guidelines.

33. Further, article 20 expressly refers, in paragraphs 1 and 2, to articles 17 and 18 of the 1978 Vienna Convention itself and, in paragraphs 3 and 4, to all the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention that concern reservations. Given that the Guide to Practice reproduces the text of the articles on reservations contained in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, this second problem could easily be solved by the simple substitution of the guidelines corresponding to articles 19–23. This is perfectly feasible in relation to paragraph 2, which refers only to article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the text of...
which is reproduced in full in guideline 3.1 of the Guide to Practice. Conversely, it is not practical in relation to the reference in article 20, paragraph 3, to articles 20–23 of that Convention: while those articles are reflected in the Guide (often with formal modifications to adapt them to the structure and nature of the Guide), they are scattered in various parts of the text\(^{68}\) and it would be very impractical to spell them all out in guideline 5.1. It seems sufficient to refer in general to the relevant rules of procedure set out in the second part (Procedure) of the Guide to Practice, and the guidelines concerned can always be specified in the commentary.

34. At first glance, the question of how to refer to articles 17 and 18 of the 1978 Vienna Convention seems more problematic: these long, detailed provisions\(^{69}\) obviously have no counterpart in the Guide to Practice. However, as noted above,\(^{70}\) the basic principle—the *modus operandi*—of the present report consists of postulating that the relevant rules of the 1978 Vienna Convention apply; thus, it simply seems unnecessary to refer to (or to reproduce) specific provisions of that instrument in guideline 5.1.

35. In the light of these remarks, guideline 5.1 could read as follows:

**5.1 Newly independent States**

"1. When a newly independent State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty by a notification of succession, it shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation.

"2. When making a notification of succession establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty, a newly independent State may formulate a reservation unless the reservation is one the formulation of which is excluded by the provisions of subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of guideline 3.1 of the Guide to Practice.

"3. When a newly independent State formulates a reservation in conformity with paragraph 2, the relevant rules set out in the second part (Procedure) of the Guide to Practice apply in respect of that reservation."

36. As the rules established by this guideline relate only to newly independent States, as defined in article 2, paragraph 1 (f), of the 1978 Vienna Convention,\(^{71}\) the question arises as to whether they can be transposed as is to other forms of State succession or whether adaptations are needed.

37. At the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, it was suggested that, with respect to other cases of succession, a provision regulating the issue of reservations should be included. The delegation of India, for example, pointed out that there was a gap in the Convention in that respect and, accordingly, a need to add an article on reservations to the part of the Convention which dealt with the uniting and separating of States.\(^{72}\) Meanwhile, the delegation of the Federal

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\(^{a}\) The correspondences are as follows: Vienna Convention, Article 20: para. 1—guidelines 2.8.0 and 2.8.1 (with drafting changes); para. 2—guideline 2.8.2 (*idem*); para. 3—guideline 2.8.7 (*idem*); para. 4 (a)—the Commission has not yet adopted a corresponding guideline; para. 4 (b)—guideline 2.6.8 (with drafting changes); para. 5—guideline 2.8.1 (with drafting changes).

Article 21: the Commission has not yet adopted a corresponding guideline.

Article 22: para. 1—guideline 2.5.1 (*idem*); para. 2—guideline 2.7.1 (*idem*); para. 3 (a)—guidelines 2.5.8 and 2.5.9 (with drafting changes); para. 3 (b)—guideline 2.7.5 (*idem*).

Article 23: para. 1—guidelines 2.1.1, 2.6.7 and 2.8.4 (with drafting changes); para. 2—guideline 2.2.1 (*idem*); para. 3—guideline 2.8.6 (with drafting changes); para. 4—guidelines 2.5.2 and 2.5.7 (with drafting changes).

\(^{b}\) These provisions are worded as follows:

"Article 17. Participation in treaties in force at the date of the succession of States"

"1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, a newly independent State may, by a notification of succession, establish its status as a party to any multilateral treaty which at the date of the succession of States was in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates.

"2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the newly independent State would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.

"3. When, under the terms of the treaty or by reason of the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of the treaty, the participation of any other State in the treaty must be considered as requiring the consent of all the parties or of all the contracting States, the newly independent State may establish its status as a party to the treaty only with such consent.

"Article 18. Participation in treaties not in force at the date of the succession of States"

"1. Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4, a newly independent State may, by a notification of succession, establish its status as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty which is not in force if at the date of the succession of States the predecessor State was a contracting State in respect of the territory to which that succession of States relates.

"2. Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4, a newly independent State may, by a notification of succession, establish its status as a party to a multilateral treaty which enters into force after the date of the succession of States if at the date of the succession of States the predecessor State was a contracting State in respect of the territory to which that succession of States relates.

"3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 do not apply if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the newly independent State would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.

"4. When, under the terms of the treaty or by reason of the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of the treaty, the participation of any other State in the treaty must be considered as requiring the consent of all the parties or of all the contracting States, the newly independent State may establish its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty only with such consent.

"5. When a treaty provides that a specified number of negotiating States shall be necessary for its entry into force, a newly independent State which establishes its status as a contracting State to the treaty under paragraph 1 shall be counted as a contracting State for the purpose of that provision unless a different intention appears from the treaty, or is otherwise established."

See paragraph 7 above.

\(^{71}\) For the text of this definition see paragraph 10 above.

\(^{72}\) *Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties ...*, vol. 1 (footnote 26 above), A/CONF.80/16, 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 17.
Republic of Germany proposed a new article 36 bis\(^73\) that provided in particular for the transposition, to the cases of succession referred to in part IV of the Convention, of the rules on reservations applicable to newly independent States:

1. When under articles 30, 31, 33 and 35 a treaty continues in force for a successor State or a successor State participates otherwise in a treaty not yet in force for the predecessor State, the successor State shall be considered as maintaining:

\[(a)\] any reservation to that treaty made by the predecessor State in regard to the territory to which the succession relates; ...

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the successor State may however:

\[(a)\] withdraw or modify, wholly or partly, the reservation (paragraph 1, subparagraph (a)) or formulate a new reservation, subject to the conditions laid down in the treaty and the rules set out in articles 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.\(^74\)

That delegation considered that "... the situation with respect to succession, as distinct from accession, was identical for the States to which Parts III [Newly independent States] and IV [Uniting and separation of States] of the draft referred".\(^75\)

38. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany nonetheless withdrew its proposed amendment after a number of delegations objected to it.\(^76\) Those delegations considered that giving a successor State the right to formulate new reservations was inconsistent with the principle of ipso jure continuity of treaties set out by the Convention for cases involving the uniting or separation of States.\(^77\) On the other hand, regarding the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State, various delegations believed that this presumption was obvious in cases involving the uniting or separation of States, bearing in mind this same principle of continuity, which had been reflected in the Convention in relation to these kinds of succession.\(^78\)

39. A distinction should thus be made between the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations (a principle established for newly independent States by article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention) and the question of whether the power to formulate new reservations, recognized in paragraph 2 in the case of newly independent States, can be extended to cases involving the uniting or separation of States.

40. In fact, at least in principle, the extension of the presumption of continuity, which is explicitly provided for in article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention for newly independent States in the context of a notification of succession, and is reproduced in guideline 5.1 above, is indubitable. It seems to be even more justified in the case of successor States other than newly independent States. Under part IV of the 1978 Vienna Convention, the principle of continuity applies to treaties in force for the predecessor State at the date of a uniting or separation of States.\(^80\) The practice in this regard, though relatively scarce and sometimes ambiguous, tends to confirm this solution.

41. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the exercise of his functions as depositary, generally avoids taking a position on the status of reservations formulated by the predecessor State. However, some elements of the practice of other depositaries show a clear tendency to extend the presumption set out in article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention to cases of State succession other than those arising from decolonization. In practice, in cases involving the separation of States, in particular those of the States that emerged from the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,\(^80\) the reservations of the predecessor State have been maintained. It should be noted, in this regard, that the Czech Republic,\(^81\) Slovakia,\(^82\) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\(^83\) and, subsequently,

\(^{73}\) See articles 31 and 34 of the Convention, which indicate that, apart from exceptions concerning the express or tacit agreement of the parties, when two or more States unite and so form one successor State or when a part or parts of the territory of an existing State separate to form one or more States, any treaty in force prior to the succession of States continues in force in respect of each successor State so formed.

\(^{74}\) There appears to be virtually no relevant practice in relation to the successor States of the former Soviet Union.

\(^{81}\) Multilateral treaties ... (see footnote 56 above), chap. V.3. In a letter dated 16 February 1993, addressed to the Secretary-General and accompanied by a list of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, the Czech Republic communicated the following: "In conformity with the valid principles of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Czech Republic, as a successor State to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1 January 1993, i.e., the date of the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by multinational international treaties to which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party on that date, including reservations and declarations to their provisions made earlier by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The Government of the Czech Republic has examined multinational treaties that were deposited with the Secretary-General on 31 December 1992, and has decided to implement the provisions of the Vienna Convention by which a successor State may participate in a treaty not yet in force for the predecessor State. To this end, the Czech Republic has decided to adhere to all agreements to which it was party at the date of its adoption, including reservations and declarations made by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to those agreements, as a party to the agreements in question."

\(^{82}\) In a letter dated 19 May 1993 and also accompanied by a list of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, the Slovak Republic communicated the following: "In accordance with its principles (rules of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Slovak Republic, as successor State to the treaty of dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1 January 1993, i.e., the date on which the Slovak Republic assumed responsibility for its international relations, by multinational treaties to which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party as of 31 December 1992, including reservations and declarations made earlier by Czechoslovakia, as well as objections by Czechoslovakia to reservations formulated by other treaty-parties".\(^{81}\)

\(^{83}\) Ibid. By a notification dated 8 March 2001, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deposited an instrument, inter alia, confirming its intent to succeed to various multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General and confirming certain actions relating to such treaties: "The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia maintains the rights, reservations, declarations and objections made by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the treaties listed in the attached annex 1, prior to the date on which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed responsibility for its international relations."

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\(^73\) Ibid., vol. II (footnote 27 above), A/CONF./80/16/Add.1, 43rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 11.

\(^74\) Ibid., vol. III (footnote 26 above), A/CONF./80/30, reproduced in A/CONF.80/16/Add.2, paras. 118 and 119.

\(^75\) See footnote 73 above.

\(^76\) See footnote 74 above, para. 119.

\(^77\) Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties ..., vol. II (footnote 27 above), A/CONF.80/16/Add.1, 43rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 14 (Poland), para. 15 (United States of America), para. 18 (Nigeria), para. 19 (Malawi), para. 20 (Cyprus), para. 21 (Yugoslavia), para. 22 (Australia) and para. 24 (Swaziland, albeit in more nuanced terms.

\(^78\) See, in this regard, the statements made by the delegations of Poland (ibid., para. 13), France (ibid., para. 16), Cyprus (ibid., para. 20), Yugoslavia (ibid., para. 21) and Australia (ibid., para. 22).
Montenegro\footnote{Ibid. On 23 October 2006, the Secretary-General received a letter dated 10 October 2006 from Montenegro, accompanied by a list of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, informing him that: “The Government of the Republic of Montenegro does maintain the reservations, declarations and objections made by Serbia and Montenegro, as indicated in the Annex to this instrument; prior to the date on which the Republic of Montenegro assumed responsibility for its international relations.”} formulated general declarations whereby these successor States reiterated the reservations of the predecessor State.\footnote{See the case of other successors to the former Yugoslavia (apart from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), which appear in the list of successor States for a number of treaties deposited with the Secretary-General.} In addition, in some cases the reservations of the predecessor State have been expressly confirmed\footnote{Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, reservation formulated by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro) \textit{(ibid.), chap. IV.\footnotemark}} or reformulated\footnote{Convention on the Rights of the Child \textit{(ibid., chap. IV.11, under “Slovenia”).}} by the successor State in relation to a particular treaty. In the case of the Republic of Yemen (united), there was also a repetition of reservations by the successor State. In a letter dated 19 May 1990 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen communicated the following:

As concerns the treaties concluded prior to their union by the Yemen Arab Republic or the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Republic of Yemen (as now united) is accordingly to be considered as a party to those treaties as from the date when one of these States first became a party to those treaties. Accordingly the tables showing the status of treaties will now indicate under the designation “Yemen” the date of the formalities (signatures, ratifications, accessions, declarations and reservations, etc.) effected by the State which first became a party, those eventually effected by the other being described in a footnote.\footnote{Ibid., “Historical Information”, under “Yemen”.}

42. The practice in relation to treaties deposited with depositaries other than the Secretary-General of the United Nations provides little guidance on the question of reservations in the context of succession of States. However, the few elements that can be identified do not tend to contradict the lessons that can be drawn from the practice in relation to treaties for which the United Nations Secretary-General serves as depositary; on the contrary, the practice of these various depositaries seems to confirm the general presumption in favour of the maintenance of the reservations of the predecessor State.

43. Accordingly, the Czech Republic and Slovakia transmitted to a number of depositaries notifications of succession similar to those transmitted to the United Nations Secretary-General and providing for the maintenance of reservations formulated by the predecessor State.\footnote{See Mikulka, “The dissolution of Czechoslovakia and succession in respect of treaties”, pp. 111–112.} Neither the depositaries in question nor the other States parties to the treaties concerned raised any objections to this practice.

44. The Universal Postal Union’s reply to the Special Rapporteur’s questionnaire is also worthy of note.\footnote{Questionnaire prepared by the Special Rapporteur pursuant to a decision of the Commission reflected in its report on the work of its forty-seventh session (2 May–21 July 1995), \textit{Yearbook ... 1995}, vol. II (Part Two), p. 108, para. 489. For the text of the questionnaire, see \textit{Yearbook ... 1996}, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/477 and Add.1, p. 108.} That organization’s practice is to consider that valid reservations applicable to a member State are automatically transferred to the successor State; the same is true in the case of States that have become independent by separating from a member State.

45. The Council of Europe applied the same presumption with respect to Montenegro. In a letter dated 28 June 2006 addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, the Director General of Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe indicated that, in accordance with article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, the Republic of Montenegro was considered “as maintaining these reservations and declarations because the Republic of Montenegro’s declaration of succession does not express a contrary intention in that respect”.\footnote{J55/2006, PJ/D/EC. The Treaty Office of the Council of Europe regrets that it “is not in a position to provide... a copy of this letter which is part of the correspondence that [it] has with its member States”, but confirms that the original letter was in English.} That letter also included a list of reservations and declarations that had been revised in places to remove references to the Republic of Serbia. By a letter dated 13 October 2006, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Montenegro communicated his agreement on the wording of those reservations and declarations, as adapted by the depositary.

46. The practice followed by Switzerland as depositary of a number of multilateral treaties likewise does not reveal any fundamental contradiction with that of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is true that Switzerland had initially applied to a successor State that had made a reference to the status of the predecessor State’s reservations, the presumption that such reservations were not maintained. Today, however, Switzerland no longer applies any presumption, as its practice is to invite the successor State to communicate its intentions as to whether it is maintaining reservations formulated by the predecessor State.\footnote{See the letter dated 3 May 1996 from the Directorate of Public International Law addressed to an individual, describing changes in the practice of Switzerland as depositary State for the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims, in relation to the succession of States to treaties; reproduced in Caflisch, “La pratique suisse en matière de droit international public 1996”, pp. 683–685, in particular p. 684. This approach was confirmed in an opinion given on 6 February 2007 by the Directorate of Public International Law of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, entitled “Pratique de la Suisse en tant qu’État depositaire. Réserves aux traités dans le contexte de la succession d’États”, pp. 328–330.}

47. The principle of the presumption in favour of the maintenance of the reservations of the predecessor State—a presumption which, in any event, may be reversed by the simple expression of a contrary intention on the part of the successor State—seems to be a common-sense approach that is sufficiently well established in practice to warrant inclusion in the text as guideline 5.2, paragraph 1, as proposed below. While this provision establishes a general presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations, there are nonetheless exceptions to this presumption in...
48. As shown by the opposition to the amendment proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany at the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,93 there are serious doubts as to whether a successor State other than a newly independent State may formulate reservations. These doubts are echoed in the separate opinion annexed by Judge Tomka to the judgment of I.C.J of 26 February 2007 in the case Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro):

35. There can be no doubt that this decision to notify of the accession to the Genocide Convention, with a reservation to Article IX and not succession (where no reservation is allowed) was motivated by the considerations relating to the present case. ...

That single notification of accession, in my view, was totally inconsistent with the succession by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia— notified the very same day to the United Nations Secretary-General as accession to the Genocide Convention—to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,94 which in Article 34 provides that the treaties of the predecessor State continue in force in respect of each successor State. By the latter notification of succession, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became a contracting State of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties as of April 1992. That Convention entered into force on 6 November 1996. Although not formally applicable to the process of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, which occurred in the 1991–1992 period, in light of the fact that the former Yugoslavia consented to be bound by the Vienna Convention already in 1980, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been a contracting State to that Convention since April 1992, one would not expect, by analogy to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a State which, through notification of its accession, expresses its consent to be considered as bound by the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties to act in a singular case inconsistently with the rule contained in Article 34 of that Convention, while in a great number of other cases to acting in full conformity with that rule95. These considerations, taken together, lead me to the conclusion that the Court should not attach any legal effect to the notification of accession by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Genocide Convention, and should instead consider it bound by that Convention on the basis of the operation of the customary rule of ipso jure succession codified in Article 34 as applied to cases of the dissolution of a State.96

49. Indeed, if succession is considered to take place ipso jure in cases involving the uniting or separation of States, it is difficult to contend that a successor State may avoid or alleviate its obligations by formulating reservations.97

50. Also worth mentioning in this regard, in addition to the arguments made against this possibility during the drafting of the 1978 Vienna Convention, is the position taken by the Council of Europe in its letter of 28 June 2006 to Montenegro,98 to the effect that that State did “not have the possibility, at this stage, to make new reservations to the treaties already ratified” and to which it had notified its succession.99 This position seems to be consistent with the rule of ipso jure succession to treaties, as set out in the 1978 Vienna Convention for cases involving the uniting or separation of States. In such situations, succession to a treaty does not depend on an expression of intention by the successor State, which may legitimately be considered to have inherited all of the predecessor State’s rights and obligations under the treaty, without the possibility of avoiding or alleviating those obligations by formulating reservations. This solution also seems to have been confirmed in practice, as successor States other than newly independent States do not seem to have formulated new reservations upon succeeding to treaties.

51. The situation thus differs from that of newly independent States, for which a notification of succession is provided, whereas in principle this is not the case in situations involving the uniting or separation of States. By its notification of succession, a newly independent State establishes, in exercise of its freedom to choose whether or not to maintain the treaties of the predecessor State, its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty in question.100 In these circumstances, the notification of succession becomes a constitutive method of maintaining the treaties that were in force for the predecessor State at the date of the succession of States, along with other treaties to which that State was a contracting State. On the other hand, the 1978 Vienna Convention provides for a different regime for successor States other than newly independent States. Under part IV of the Convention, treaties in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of any of the predecessor States continue in force in respect of a State formed from the uniting of two or more States.101 The same solution is provided for, in the case of a State formed from the separation of parts of a State, with respect to treaties in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State, and also treaties in force in respect only of that part of the territory of the predecessor State which has become a successor State.102 Under the 1978 Vienna Convention, it is only in relation to treaties not in force for the predecessor State at the date of the succession of States, even though that State was a contracting State to the treaty, that a successor State (other than a newly independent State) may, if it so desires, establish by a notification its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty in question.103 In this regard, then, it is appropriate to treat successor States

93 See paras. 37–38 above.
95 Gaja, loc. cit. (footnote 35 above), pp. 64–65. According to this expert, the reasoning applicable to a newly independent State can be extended to other cases of succession: even if a newly independent State were considered not to be entitled to make a reservation when notifying its succession, one should take the view that such a State may achieve practically the same result by making a partial withdrawal (if such a withdrawal is permitted) to the same extent that may be covered by a reservation; these considerations also apply to cases in which succession is not dependent on the acceptance of the treaty by the successor State. In terms of the outcome, this reasoning is probably correct; however, it underestimates the fact that a withdrawal (although partial) from a treaty and a reservation are two different institutions governed by different legal regimes and by conditions that are not necessarily the same. Partial withdrawal is not covered by the Guide to Practice (see guideline 1.4 on “Unilateral statements other than reservations and interpretative declarations”, in Yearbook ... 1999, vol. II (Part Two), p. 112).
96 See footnote 91 above.
97 Memorandum of the Secretary-General (see footnote 4 above), p. 23, para. 69.
98 See articles 17 and 18 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, cited in footnote 69 above.
99 See article 31 of the Convention.
100 See article 34 of the Convention.
101 See articles 32 and 36 of the Convention.
other than newly independent States in the same way as newly independent States, given that, in both cases, succession to the treaty involves an expression of intention on the part of the State concerned.

52. But it is only in these circumstances that successor States formed from a uniting or separation of States should be deemed capable of making new reservations when notifying of their intention to become parties. In all other cases, it does not seem that the capacity to formulate new reservations should be recognized in respect of treaties that remain in force following a succession of States. Guideline 5.2, paragraph 2, as proposed below, establishes this principle (which contrasts with the one applicable to newly independent States) and this exception (i.e. acknowledgement of such capacity when the successor State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty by a notification). In other cases, the formulation of reservations by a successor State formed from a uniting or separation of States should be likened to the late formulation of a reservation, as proposed in guideline 5.9.

53. Thus, guideline 5.2, paragraph 2, is intended to fill a gap in the 1978 Vienna Convention. Given the general scope of this paragraph, which covers both cases involving the separation of parts of a State and cases involving the uniting of two or more States, the term “predecessor State” should be understood, in cases involving the uniting of States, to mean one or more of the predecessor States.

54. Guideline 5.2, which should be the “counterpart” of guideline 5.1 for cases involving the uniting or separation of States, could be worded as follows:

"5.2 Uniting or separation of States"

"1. Subject to the provisions of guideline 5.3, a successor State formed from a uniting or separation of States shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to a treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless it expresses a contrary intention at the time of the succession or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation.

"2. A successor State may not formulate a new reservation at the time of a uniting or separation of States unless it makes a notification whereby it establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but to which the predecessor State was a contracting State.

"3. When a successor State formulates a reservation in conformity with paragraph 2, the relevant rules set out in the second part (Procedure) of the Guide to Practice apply in respect of that reservation."

55. Unlike the separation of parts of a State, where succession to a treaty results in the application of a single reservations regime to that treaty, a uniting of States entails a risk that two or more reservations regimes that may be different or even contradictory will apply to the same treaty. Such cases are not merely hypothetical. Nonetheless, the relevant practice does not seem to provide satisfactory answers to the many questions raised by this situation. For example, the aforementioned letter of 19 May 1990 from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to the Secretary-General, in suggesting a solution to the technical problem of how the actions of the two predecessor States in relation to the same treaty should be recorded, referred to a time test whose legal scope appears uncertain in many respects and leaves unanswered the possible future question of the status of reservations formulated by the States concerned prior to the date of their union.

56. In the case of a treaty which, at the date of a uniting of States, was in force in respect of any of the uniting States and continues in force in respect of the State so formed, guideline 5.2, paragraph 1, establishes the principle that any reservations to such a treaty that were formulated by any of the uniting States continue in force in respect of the unified State unless the latter expresses a contrary intention. The application of this presumption raises no difficulty, provided that the uniting States were either parties or contracting States to the treaty. However, the situation is more complicated if one of those States was a party to the treaty and the other was a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force.

57. It is this situation that guideline 5.3 below, is intended to address: it provides for the exclusive maintenance of reservations formulated by the State that was a party to the treaty. This solution is based on the fact that a State—in this case, a State formed from a uniting of States—can have only one status in respect of a single treaty: in this instance, that of a State party to the treaty (principle of ipso jure continuity). Thus, for a treaty that continues in force in respect of a State formed from a uniting of States, it seems logical to consider that only those reservations formulated by the State or States in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the union may be maintained. Any reservations formulated by a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force become invalid.

58. Such is the purpose of guideline 5.3:

"5.3 Irrelevance of certain reservations in cases involving a uniting of States"

"When, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of any of them continues in force in respect of the State so formed, such reservations as may have been formulated by any such State which, at the date of the succession of States, was a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force shall not be maintained."
59. Guideline 5.3\(^{106}\) is worded so as to cover both the cases referred to in articles 31–33 of the 1978 Vienna Convention and other cases involving the uniting of States in which one of the uniting States retains its international legal personality (a situation not covered by these provisions of the 1978 Vienna Convention).

B. Territorial scope of reservations in the context of a succession of States

60. It seems self-evident that a reservation considered as being maintained following a succession of States retains the territorial scope that it had at the date of the succession of States. This is a logical consequence of the continuity inherent in the concept of succession to a treaty, whether it occurs *ipso jure* or by virtue of a notification of succession made by a newly independent State.

61. There are nevertheless exceptions to this principle in certain cases involving the uniting of two or more States. These exceptions, which raise rather complex issues, are dealt with in guideline 5.5 and are excluded from the scope of guideline 5.4 by the expression “subject to the provisions of guideline 5.5”.

62. In addition, there is a need to address separately the problems that arise in relation to reservations in cases of succession involving part of a territory. While these cases do not constitute an exception to the principle established in guideline 5.4, they nonetheless require more specific treatment, which guideline 5.6 is intended to afford.

63. In the light of these considerations, guideline 5.4 could be worded as follows:

“5.4 Maintenance of the territorial scope of reservations formulated by the predecessor State

“A reservation considered as being maintained in conformity with guideline 5.1, paragraph 1, or guideline 5.2, paragraph 1, shall retain the territorial scope that it had at the date of the succession of States, subject to the provisions of guideline 5.5.”

64. The principle set out in guideline 5.4, to the effect that the territorial scope of a reservation considered as being maintained following a succession of States remains unchanged, also applies to cases involving the uniting of two or more States, albeit with certain exceptions. As indicated earlier,\(^{107}\) specific problems can arise with respect to the territorial scope of reservations considered as being maintained following a uniting of two or more States. Such exceptions can occur when, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the unified State to which it did not apply at the date of the succession of States.

65. Two possible situations should be distinguished in this connection:

(a) Where, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of only one of the uniting States becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the successor State to which it did not apply previously; and

(b) Where a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of two or more of the uniting States—but not of the whole of what will become the territory of the successor State—becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the successor State to which it did not apply previously.

66. In the first of these cases, where a treaty in force, with reservations, at the date of the succession of States for *only one* of the States that unite to form the successor State becomes applicable to a part of the latter’s territory to which it did not apply at the date of the succession of States, the reservations in question may be extended to the whole of the territory of the unified State to which the treaty becomes applicable if that State so consents, either by a notification to that effect or by agreement with the other States parties.\(^{108}\) In these circumstances, there is every reason to believe that this extension concerns the treaty relationship as modified by the reservations formulated by the State in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the union. But there is in principle nothing to prevent the State so formed from expressing a contrary intention in this regard and electing not to extend the territorial scope of those reservations. In any event, whatever the successor State may decide, the other contracting parties would not be adversely affected because the treaty was not previously applicable to the territory thus excluded from the scope of the reservation. Guideline 5.5, paragraph 1 (a), establishes this possibility.

67. On the other hand, the reservation’s nature or purpose may rule out its extension beyond the territory to which it was applicable at the date of the succession of States. This could be the case, in particular, of a reservation whose application was already limited to a part of the territory of the State that formulated it, or a reservation that specifically concerns certain institutions belonging only to that State. Guideline 5.5, paragraph 1 (b), refers to this circumstance.

68. The second case in which the territorial scope of a prior reservation can be extended beyond the limits it had had before the succession of States may seem similar, but is in fact different. Whereas, in the situation described above, only one of the uniting States was bound by the treaty, in this case the treaty was in force at the date of the succession of States, in respect of at least two of the uniting States, but was not at that time applicable to the whole of what would become the territory of the unified State. The question, then, is whether reservations made by any of those States also become applicable to the parts of the territory of the unified State to which the treaty was not applicable at the date of the succession of States. In the absence of specific information from the successor State, it may be unclear whether and to what extent that State, in extending the territorial scope of the treaty, meant to extend the territorial scope of the reservations formulated by any or all of the States in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the succession of States.

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\(^{106}\) The same is true of guidelines 5.5 and 5.11.

\(^{107}\) See paragraph 61 above.

\(^{108}\) See article 31, paragraph 2, of the 1978 Vienna Convention.
69. Unless there are indications to the contrary, there seems to be no reason not to accept the presumption that such a reservation does not extend to the part or parts of the territory of the unified State to which the treaty was not applicable at the date of the succession of States. Nor, however, is there any reason to regard this presumption as absolute. Different approaches should be taken in different cases:

(a) When an identical reservation has been formulated by each of the States concerned, it should on the contrary be presumed that the unified State intends to maintain a reservation that is common to all its predecessors, and the logic reflected in guideline 5.5, paragraph 1, should be followed;

(b) In addition, in some cases it may become apparent from the circumstances that a State formed from a uniting of States intends to maintain reservations formulated by one of the States in particular. This is the case, for example, when a unified State, upon extending the territorial scope of a treaty, refers specifically to actions carried out in respect of the treaty, prior to the date of the union, by one of the States concerned;

(c) This becomes still more apparent if a State formed from a uniting of States, when it agrees to extend the territorial scope of a treaty, expresses a contrary intention by specifying the reservations that will apply to the territory to which the treaty has been extended.

70. In this last circumstance, however, the decision of a unified State to extend the scope of various reservations to the territory concerned is not acceptable unless such reservations, formulated by two or more of the uniting States, are compatible with each other. They may, after all, be contradictory. In this situation, such a notification cannot be regarded as having any effect if it would give rise to the application of mutually incompatible reservations.

71. The rules proposed above concern situations in which the treaty to which the reservation or reservations of the predecessor States relate was in force in respect of at least one of them at the date of the succession of States. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, they should apply mutatis mutandis to reservations considered as being maintained by a unified State that extends the territorial scope of a treaty to which, following the succession of States, it is a contracting State when the treaty was not in force, at the date of the succession of States, in respect of any of the predecessor States, even though one or more of them had the status of a contracting party.109

72. In the same vein, this solution should apply to situations—undoubtedly rare, but provided for in article 32, paragraph 2, of the 1978 Vienna Convention—in which a treaty to which one or more of the uniting States were contracting States at the date of the succession of States enters into force after that date because the conditions provided for in the relevant clauses of the treaty have been met; in such a case, the successor State would become a State party to the treaty.

73. It should also be recalled that the issue of the territorial scope of reservations formulated by such a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force at the date of the succession of States does not arise unless the treaty was not in force, on that date, for any of the uniting States; otherwise, the reservations formulated by that contracting State are not considered as being maintained.110

74. In the light of these observations, the Commission could adopt the following guideline 5.5:

“5.5 Territorial scope of reservations in cases involving a uniting of States

1. When, as a result of the uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of only one of the States forming the successor State becomes applicable to a part of the territory of that State to which it did not apply previously, any reservation considered as being maintained by the successor State shall apply to that territory unless:

(a) the successor State expresses a contrary intention at the time of the extension of the territorial scope of the treaty; or

(b) the nature or purpose of the reservation is such that the reservation cannot be extended beyond the territory to which it was applicable at the date of the succession of States.

2. When, as a result of a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of two or more of the uniting States becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the successor State to which it did not apply at the date of the succession of States, no reservation shall extend to that territory unless:

(a) an identical reservation has been formulated by each of those States in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the succession of States;

(b) the successor State expresses a different intention at the time of the extension of the territorial scope of the treaty; or

(c) a contrary intention otherwise becomes apparent from the circumstances surrounding that State’s succession to the treaty.”

3. A notification purporting to extend the territorial scope of reservations within the meaning of paragraph 2 (b) shall be without effect if such an extension would give rise to the application of contradictory reservations to the same territory.

4. The provisions of the foregoing paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis to reservations considered as being maintained by a successor State that is a contracting State, as a result of a uniting of States, to a treaty which was not in force for any of the uniting States at the date of...

109 See article 32 of the 1978 Vienna Convention.

110 See guideline 5.3 above.
of the succession of States but to which one or more of those States were contracting States at that date, when the treaty becomes applicable to a part of the territory of the successor State to which it did not apply at the date of the succession of States.

75. Article 15, “Succession in respect of part of territory”, of the 1978 Vienna Convention concerns cases involving the cession of territory or other territorial changes. It provides that, as from the date of the succession of States, treaties of the successor State are in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates, while treaties of the predecessor State cease to be in force in respect of that territory. This provision represents an extension of the rule, established in article 29 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, concerning flexibility in the territorial scope of treaties. Accordingly, guidelines 5.1 and 5.2 would not apply to situations falling under article 15 of the Convention because, in these cases, there is in principle no succession to treaties as such. While the State in question is referred to as a “successor State” within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1978 Vienna Convention, in a manner of speaking it “succeeds” itself, and its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty remains as it was when that State acquired it by expressing its own consent to be bound by the treaty in accordance with article 11 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

76. When this situation arises as a result of a succession involving part of a territory, the treaty of the successor State is extended to the territory in question. In this case, it seems logical to consider that the treaty’s application to that territory is subject, in principle, to the reservations which the successor State itself had formulated to the treaty.

77. Here again, however, this principle should be qualified by two exceptions, also based on the principle of consent so prevalent in the law of treaties in general and of reservations in particular. Accordingly, a reservation should not extend to the territory to which the succession relates:

(a) When the successor State expresses a contrary intention, as this case can be likened to a partial withdrawal of the reservation, limited to the territory to which the succession of States relates;¹¹¹ or

(b) When it appears from the reservation itself that its scope was limited to the territory of the successor State that was within its borders prior to the date of the succession of States, or to a specific territory.

78. These considerations could lead to the adoption of a guideline 5.6 worded as follows:

**5.6 Territorial scope of reservations of the successor State in cases of succession involving part of a territory**

“When, as a result of a succession of States involving part of a territory, a treaty to which the successor State is a party or a contracting State becomes applicable to that territory, any reservations to the treaty formulated previously by that State shall also apply to that territory as from the date of the succession of States unless:

“(a) the successor State expresses a contrary intention; or

“(b) it appears from the reservation that its scope was limited to the territory of the successor State that was within its borders prior to the date of the succession of States, or to a specific territory.”

79. Guideline 5.6 is worded so as to cover not only treaties that are in force for the successor State at the time of the succession of States, but also treaties that are not in force for the successor State on that date but to which it is a contracting State, a situation not covered by article 15 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. The verb “apply” in relation to such a treaty should be understood as encompassing both situations, which need not be distinguished from one another in relation to the issue of reservations.

80. This guideline also covers situations in which the predecessor State and the successor State are parties or contracting States—or one is a party and the other is a contracting State—to the same treaty, albeit with different reservations.

81. However, guideline 5.6 does not apply to “territorial treaties” (concerning a border regime or other regime relating to the use of a specific territory). If a succession occurs in relation to such a treaty,¹² the solutions provided for in guideline 5.2 concerning the uniting or separation of States apply mutatis mutandis to reservations formulated in respect of that treaty.

C. Timing of the effects of a reservation in the context of a succession of States

82. Article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention does not directly address the effects *ratione temporis* of a declaration whereby a newly independent State announces, when notifying its succession to a treaty, that it is not maintaining a reservation formulated by the predecessor State; much less does it clarify the issue in the context of a succession of States resulting from a unifying or separation of States, as the 1978 Vienna Convention does not specify the status of the predecessor State’s reservations in this context. Neither practice nor the literature seems to provide a clear answer to this question, which could nonetheless be of some practical importance.

83. Whether resulting from the expression of a “contrary intention” or from the successor State’s formulation of a reservation that “relates to the same subject matter” as a reservation formulated by the predecessor State,¹³ it seems reasonable, in relation to its effects *ratione temporis*, to treat the non-maintenance of a reservation following a succession of States as a withdrawal of the reservation

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¹¹¹ On the partial withdrawal of a reservation, see guidelines 2.5.10 and 2.5.11 and the commentary there to (Yearbook ... 2003, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 70, 87–92).

¹² Regarding international practice, see, inter alia, the PCIJ order of 6 December 1930 in the case Free zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 145.

¹³ See paragraph 1 of guidelines 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
in question and to consider it subject, as such, to the ordinary rules of the law of treaties, codified in article 22 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Under paragraph 3 (a) of that article, which is reproduced in guideline 2.5.8 of the Guide to Practice, “[u]nless the treaty otherwise provides, or it is otherwise agreed, the withdrawal of a reservation becomes operative in relation to another contracting State only when notice of it has been received by that State”.

84. This solution, which is particularly fitting when succession to the treaty (and to the reservation) takes place ipso jure, seems to lend itself to all types of succession: not until they are aware of the successor State’s intention (by means of a written notification)114 can the other parties take the withdrawal into account.

85. The guideline below thus reproduces mutatis mutandis the rule set out in article 22, paragraph 3 (a), of the 1969 Vienna Convention and reflected in guideline 2.5.8 concerning the effects ratiore temporis of the withdrawal of a reservation:

“5.7 Timing of the effects of non-maintenance by a successor State of a reservation formulated by the predecessor State

“The non-maintenance[, in conformity with guideline 5.1 or 5.2,] by the successor State of a reservation formulated by the predecessor State becomes operative in relation to another contracting State or contracting international organization or another State or international organization party to the treaty when notice of it has been received by that State or international organization.”

86. The phrase in square brackets introduces a detail that is not strictly necessary. It would perhaps be sufficient to link paragraph 2 of guidelines 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, on the one hand, to guideline 5.7, on the other, in the commentary to the latter.

87. Just as it does not address the effects ratiore temporis of the non-maintenance of a reservation of the predecessor State, the 1978 Vienna Convention makes no mention of the effects ratiore temporis of a reservation formulated by a successor State at the time of the succession of States.

88. For reasons comparable to those put forward above in support of the rule set out in guideline 5.7 for the non-maintenance of a reservation to become operative, it seems reasonable to provide that a reservation formulated by a successor State does not become operative until the date on which the other States or international organizations parties or contracting States or contracting international organizations have received notice of it, i.e. the date of the notification whereby the successor State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty.

89. It is true that this solution could give rise, in retrospect, to the establishment of two different legal regimes. The first would cover the period between the date of the succession of States and the date of the notification whereby the successor State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty, during which the successor State would be considered as bound by the treaty in the same way as the predecessor State, i.e. without the benefit of the new reservation. The second regime, in turn, would cover the period after the date of that notification, during which the successor State would have the benefit of the reservation.

90. It nonetheless seems preferable to abide by the principle to which the Commission itself referred in the commentary to its draft article 19 (which became article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention): while it decided not to refer explicitly to that point in the text of the draft itself, as had been proposed by Sir Francis Vallat,115 it nevertheless referred to “the general position that a reservation can only be effective at the earliest from the date when it is made”.116

91. This solution takes account of the legitimate interest of the other States in having a basic level of legal certainty and ensures that they will not be surprised by the formulation—possibly long after the date of the succession of States—of reservations to which the successor State intends to give retroactive effect. Conversely, there do not seem to be any grounds for delaying the effects of the reservation beyond the date of the notification whereby the successor State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty.117

92. Guideline 5.8, which is necessary in order to fill a gap in the 1978 Vienna Convention, could be worded as follows:

“5.8 Timing of the effects of a reservation formulated by a successor State

“A reservation formulated by a successor State[, in conformity with guideline 5.1 or 5.2,] when notifying its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty becomes operative as from the date of such notification.”

93. Here again,118 the phrase in square brackets would probably best be transposed to and explained in the commentary.

94. Even though the capacity of a newly independent State to formulate reservations to a treaty to which it intends to succeed is not in doubt,119 it ought not to be unlimited over time.

95. In this connection, it seems reasonable to consider that a newly independent State should exercise this capacity when notifying its succession. This is moreover clearly implied by the very definition of reservations contained in guideline 1.1 of the Guide to Practice, which, like article 2 (j) of the 1978 Vienna Convention—and unlike article 2 (a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention—mentions

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114 See guideline 2.5.2 on the form of withdrawal of a reservation and the commentary thereto (Yearbook ... 2003, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 74–76).
115 The provision proposed by Vallat, which reflected a request to that effect by the United States of America (reproduced in Vallat’s first report, Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II (Part One), p. 1), was worded as follows: “A new reservation established under paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not have any effect before the date of the making of the notification of succession” (Ibid., p. 55, para. 298).
116 Ibid, p. 227, para. (22) of the commentary to article 19.
117 See, in this regard, Gaja (footnote 35 above), p. 68.
118 See paragraph 86 above concerning a similar bracketed phrase in guideline 5.7.
119 See paragraphs 24–28 and 35 above.
among the temporal elements included in the definition of reservations the time “when [a State is] making a notification of succession to a treaty.”

It seems legitimate to conclude from this that reservations formulated by a newly independent State after that date should be subject to the legal regime for late reservations, as set out in guidelines 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.5 provisionally adopted by the Commission.

96. For similar reasons, it seems that the regime for late reservations should apply to reservations formulated by a successor State other than a newly independent State after the date on which it has established, by a notification to that effect, its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but in respect of which the predecessor State was a contracting State, in line with the conditions stipulated in guideline 5.2, paragraph 2. As in that provision, the term “predecessor State” should be understood, in cases involving a uniting of States, to mean one or more of the predecessor States.

97. In fact, the same solution should also apply to any reservation formulated by a successor State other than a newly independent State to a treaty which, following the succession of States, continues in force for that State.

5.9 Reservations formulated by a successor State subject to the legal regime for late reservations

“A reservation shall be considered as late if it is formulated:

(a) by a newly independent State after it has made a notification of succession to the treaty;

(b) by a successor State other than a newly independent State after it has made a notification establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but in respect of which the predecessor State was a contracting State; or

(c) by a successor State other than a newly independent State in respect of a treaty which, following the succession of States, continues in force for that State.”

121 The full definition of reservations in guideline 1.1 reads as follows: ‘Reservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to that international organization. On the reasons for the inclusion of this reference to the succession of States in guideline 1.1, see Yearbook ... 1998, vol. II (Part Two), p. 100, paras. (5) and (6) of the commentary.

122 See Yearbook ... 2008, vol. II (Part Two), p. 73.

Chapter II
Status of acceptances of and objections to reservations in the case of succession of States

99. The 1978 Vienna Convention does not deal with the status of objections to or acceptances of reservations in the context of the succession of States. Apparently, no mention was made of acceptances in the travaux préparatoires.123 Regarding objections, the Commission decided to leave the issue open, despite a partial proposal by Sir Humphrey Waldock.124 Notwithstanding a request to that effect from the Netherlands125 and the concerns expressed at the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties about this gap in the Convention,126 the gap was allowed to remain.

123 With the exception of some passing references in Sir Humphrey Waldock’s third report on succession in respect of treaties (Yearbook... 1970, vol. II, p. 25); see paragraph 124 below.

124 See paragraph 104 below.

125 Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties ..., vol. I (see footnote 26 above), 27th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 70; 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 52; and 35th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 19.

126 See ibid., 27th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 85 (Madagascar).

100. That was a deliberate stance, as explained at the Conference by Mustafa Kamil Yasseen, Chairman of the Drafting Committee:

The Drafting Committee had paid particular attention to the question of objections to reservations and objections to such objections, which had been raised by the Netherlands representative. It had noted that, as was clear from the International Law Commission’s commentary to article 19, particularly paragraph (15) (A/CONF.80/4, p. 66),[127] the article did not deal with that matter, which was left to be regulated by general international law.128

101. In fact, the status of objections to reservations in relation to a succession of States raises four very different sets of questions:

(a) First, the question of what happens to objections made by the predecessor State to reservations formulated...
by other States or international organizations that are parties or contracting States or contracting organizations;

(b) Second, questions related to objections made by such other States or international organizations to reservations of the predecessor State;

(c) Third, the question of whether the successor State itself can object to existing reservations at the time of the succession;

(d) Fourth, the question of whether and in what conditions the other States and international organizations can object to reservations formulated by a successor State at the time of the succession.

A. Status of objections formulated by the predecessor State

102. Draft article 19 (the forerunner of article 20 of the 1978 Vienna Convention), adopted by the Commission on second reading in 1974, also did not address the question of objections to reservations in the context of succession of States. Here again, this omission was deliberate; in the commentary to this provision, the Commission noted:

that it would be better, in accordance with its fundamental method of approach to the draft articles, to leave these matters to be regulated by the ordinary rules applicable to acceptances and objections on the assumption that, unless it was necessary to make some particular provision in the context of the succession of States, the newly independent State would “step into the shoes of the predecessor State”.130

These last words could imply that the Commission considered that the transmission of objections should be the rule.130

103. In order to justify its silence on the question of objections to reservations, the Commission invoked an argument based on their legal effects: it noted, on the one hand, that unless the objecting State has definitely indicated that by its objection it means to stop the entry into force of the treaty as between the reserving State and the objecting State, the legal position created by an objection to a reservation is “much the same as if no objection had been lodged”;131 and, on the other, that if such an indication is given, the treaty will not have been in force at all between the predecessor State and the reserving State at the date of the succession.132 This also implies that the Commission considered that the previous (maximum-effect) objections of the predecessor State continued to apply.

104. This was, moreover, the position of Sir Humphrey Waldock, who, while highlighting the scarcity of practice in this regard, had suggested, again along the lines of the proposals put forward by D. P. O’Connell to the International Law Association,133 that the rules regarding reservations should apply mutatis mutandis to objections.134 In particular, this meant that the same presumption that the Commission would later make with respect to reservations formulated by newly independent States, in its draft article 19, paragraph 1, which was reproduced in article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, would apply to objections.135 The second Special Rapporteur on the subject, Sir Francis Vallat, also supported the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections formulated by the predecessor State: “[O]n the whole, the reasoning which supports the retention of the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations also supports the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections which is inherent in the present draft”, especially, he stressed, given that in any event it would “always be open to the successor State to withdraw the objection if it wishes to do so.” Nonetheless, Sir Francis considered that there seemed to be “no need to complicate the draft by making express provisions with respect to objections”.136

105. Already noted 35 years ago by Gaja,137 the dearth of practice in this area is still apparent. It should be noted, however, that certain elements of recent practice also seem to support the maintenance of objections.138 Mention should be made, in particular, of a number of cases in which a newly independent State confirmed, in notifying its succession, the objections made by the predecessor State to reservations formulated by States parties to the treaty.139 There have also been a few cases in which objections formulated by the predecessor State have been withdrawn and, at the same time, new objections have been formulated.140 With respect to successor States other than newly independent States, it may be noted, for example, that Slovakia explicitly maintained the objections made by Czechoslovakia to reservations formulated by other States

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130 Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II (Part One), p. 226, para. (15) of the commentary; see also p. 227, para. (23). This explanation was recalled at the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties by Sir Francis Vallat, acting as an expert consultant; see Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties ..., vol. I (see footnote 26 above), 27th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 83. In this regard, see Imbert (footnote 31 above), p. 320, note 126.

131 This is a little reductive; see the Special Rapporteur’s fifteenth report on reservations to treaties (document A/CN.4/624 and Add.1–2, reproduced in this volume) for a discussion of the effects of a minimum-effect objection on the treaty relationship.

132 Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II (Part One), p. 226, para. (14) of the commentary to article 19. This reasoning is supported by Klabbers (footnote 35 above), pp. 207–208. See, however, the critical remarks of Klabbers, “State succession and reservations to treaties”, pp. 109–110.

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131 See Yearbook ... 1969, vol. II, p. 49, para. 17, “additional point” No. 13: “Since a new State takes over the legal situation of its predecessor, it takes over the consequences of its predecessor’s objections to an incompatible reservation made to a multilateral convention by another party. Therefore the reservation would not be effective against the new State unless the latter formally waives the objection.”

132 See draft article 9, paragraph 2: “The rules laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 regarding reservations apply also, mutatis mutandis, to objections to reservations”; Yearbook ... 1970, vol. II, p. 47.

133 See paragraph 1 of guideline 5.1, above.


135 Gaja (footnote 35 above), p. 56.

136 See, on this subject, Szafarz, “Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties: a general analysis”, p. 96. Gaja, meanwhile, takes the view that practice does not contradict the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections formulated by the predecessor State, but also does not suffice to support this presumption (loc. cit., p. 57).

137 Multilateral treaties ... (footnote 56 above), chap. III.3, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: Malta repeated, upon succession, some of the objections formulated by the United Kingdom, and Tonga indicated that it “adopted” the objections made by the United Kingdom respecting the reservations and statements made by Egypt; chap. XXI.1, Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and chap. XXI.2, Convention on the High Seas (Fiji); chap. XXI.4, Convention on the Continental Shelf (Tonga).

138 Ibid., chap. XXI.2, Convention on the High Seas (Fiji).
106. It is not immediately clear how this recent practice should be interpreted: it leans in the direction of continuity but could also reflect the absence of a set rule; otherwise, such statements would have been unnecessary.

107. It nevertheless seems wise and logical to revert to the solution proposed by Sir Humphrey Waldock, who suggested that the rules regarding reservations should apply mutatis mutandis to objections, bearing in mind that, even though the Commission ultimately opted not to include in its draft articles a provision dealing specifically with objections to reservations, the solution proposed by the Special Rapporteur did not give rise to any substantive objections from the Commission.

108. Like the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations, established in article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections is warranted for both newly independent States and other successor States. However, there are exceptions to the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections in certain cases involving the uniting of two or more States, which are referred to in guideline 5.11.

109. Echoing paragraph 1 of guidelines 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, guideline 5.10 could be worded as follows:

“5.10 Maintenance by the successor State of objections formulated by the predecessor State

“Subject to the provisions of guideline 5.11, a successor State shall be considered as maintaining any objection formulated by the predecessor State to a reservation formulated by a contracting State or contracting international organization or by a State party or international organization party to a treaty unless it expresses a contrary intention at the time of the succession.”

110. Guideline 5.3, “Irrelevance of certain reservations in cases involving a uniting of States”, sets out the exceptions that must qualify the principle of the maintenance of the reservations of the predecessor State in certain situations that may arise in connection with the uniting of two or more States. As the same causes produce the same effects, guideline 5.10, which sets out the principle that the successor State is presumed to maintain the objections of the predecessor State to reservations formulated by other contracting States or contracting international organizations or parties to a treaty to which it has succeeded, should for the same reasons also be qualified by an exception when these situations arise.

111. Provision should also be made for another situation, one that is specific to objections, by establishing a second exception to the principle laid down in guideline 5.10. This exception, which is justified on logical grounds, relates to the fact that a successor State cannot maintain both a reservation formulated by one of the uniting States and, at the same time, objections made by another such State to an identical or equivalent reservation formulated by a party or contracting State to the treaty that is a third State in relation to the succession of States.

112. Guideline 5.11 sets out these two exceptions, which are specific to successions resulting from a uniting of two or more States.

“5.11 Irrelevance of certain objections in cases involving a uniting of States

1. When, following a uniting of two or more States, a treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of any of them continues in force in respect of the State so formed, such objections to a reservation as may have been formulated by any such State which, at the date of the succession of States, was a contracting State in respect of which the treaty was not in force shall not be maintained.

2. When, following a uniting of two or more States, the successor State is a party or a contracting State to a treaty to which it has maintained reservations [in conformity with guidelines 5.1 or 5.2], objections to a reservation made by another contracting State or contracting international organization or by a State or international organization party to the treaty shall not be maintained if the reservation is identical or equivalent to a reservation which the successor State itself has maintained.”

113. The phrase in square brackets introduces a detail that is not strictly necessary. It would perhaps be sufficient to link paragraph 2 of guideline 5.1 and paragraph 2 of guideline 5.2, on the one hand, to guideline 5.11, on the other, in the commentary to the latter.

B. Status of objections to reservations of the predecessor State

114. It would be difficult to explain why a party or a contracting State to a treaty should have to reiterate an objection it has already formulated with respect to a reservation of the predecessor State that applied to the territory to which the succession of States relates. Accordingly, the presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections formulated by a party or a contracting State to the treaty in relation to reservations of the predecessor State that are considered as being maintained by the successor State, in conformity with paragraph 1 of guideline 5.1 and paragraph 1 of guideline 5.2, seems to be called for.

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141 See footnote 82 above.
142 See footnote 83 above.
143 See footnote 84 above.
144 The same could be said of a number of the clarifications proposed under the fifth part of the Guide to Practice, but the case at hand is especially striking, owing to the extreme scarcity of precedents.
145 See paragraph 104 above.
146 See the preceding footnote.
147 See paragraphs 35 and 54 above.
148 See paragraph 58 above.
149 In this regard, see Gaja, loc. cit., p. 67.
115. The presumption in favour of the maintenance of objections to reservations of the predecessor State that are maintained by the successor State also finds support in the views expressed by certain delegations at the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. For example, Japan indicated that it could go along with the Commission’s text of draft article 19 on the understanding that “a State party which had objected to the original reservation which had been made by the predecessor State did not need to repeat the objection with regard to the successor State”. A similar view was expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany, who said, with respect to both newly independent States and other successor States, “[t]he successor State was bound ipso jure by the individual treaty relationship created by the predecessor State, including the reservations and other declarations made by that State and the objections thereto entered by its treaty partners”. 152

116. This perfectly reasonable presumption could be dealt with in guideline 5.12:

“5.12 Maintenance of objections formulated by another State or international organization to reservations of the predecessor State

“When a reservation formulated by the predecessor State is considered as being maintained by the successor State [in conformity with guideline 5.1 or 5.2], any objection to that reservation formulated by another contracting State or State party or by a contracting international organization or international organization party to the treaty shall be considered as being maintained in respect of the successor State.”

117. Once again, the bracketed phrase would probably best be transposed to and explained in the commentary.

C. Reservations of the predecessor State to which no objections have been made prior to the date of the succession of States

118. Another case that should be considered is that of a party or contracting State to a treaty that has not objected in time to a reservation formulated by a predecessor State and considered as being maintained by the successor State after the succession of States. In these circumstances, it would be difficult to explain why such a tacit acceptance of the reservation could be called into question merely because a succession of States has taken place. Accordingly, the capacity of a party or contracting State to a treaty to object, in respect of a successor State, to a reservation to which it had not objected in respect of the predecessor State, should in principle be ruled out.

119. An exception should be made, however, for cases in which the succession of States takes place prior to the expiry of the period during which a party or contracting State to a treaty could have objected to a reservation formulated by the predecessor State. In such a situation, the capacity of a contracting State or contracting international organization or of a State or international organization party to formulate an objection up until the expiry of that period should certainly be acknowledged.

120. The Commission could thus adopt the following guideline:

“5.13 Reservations of the predecessor State to which no objections have been made

“When a reservation formulated by the predecessor State is considered as being maintained by the successor State [in conformity with guideline 5.1 or 5.2], a contracting State or State party or a contracting international organization or international organization party to the treaty that had not objected to the reservation in respect of the predecessor State shall not have capacity to object to it in respect of the successor State unless the time period for formulating an objection has not yet expired at the date of the succession of States and the objection is made within that time period.”

121. As in the case of the foregoing guidelines, the bracketed phrase would probably best be transposed to and explained in the commentary.

D. Capacity of the successor State to object to prior reservations

122. The problem is more complex if the focus is shifted from the status of objections made prior to the succession of States to the question of whether the successor State may formulate objections to reservations made in respect of a treaty to which it becomes a party as a result of the succession of States. In this regard, it is once again necessary to distinguish between two different situations that call for different solutions:

(a) On the one hand, cases where a successor State is free to decide whether to succeed to a treaty and establishes its status as a contracting State or, where applicable, as a State party to the treaty when notifying its succession; and

(b) On the other hand, cases of “automatic succession” in which the successor State “inherits” an existing treaty without being called upon to give its express consent.

123. The first situation, in turn, encompasses two different cases: that of a newly independent State that makes a notification of succession and that of a successor State other than a newly independent State that establishes, “by making a notification” to that effect, its status as a party

150 See the statements made by Japan (Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties ..., vol. 1 (see footnote 26 above), A/CONF.80/16/Add.1, 43rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, paras. 15 and 16) and the Federal Republic of Germany (ibid., vol. II (footnote 27 above), A/CONF.80/16/Add.1, 43rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 11).

151 Ibid., vol. I (see footnote 26 above), A/CONF.80/16, 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, paras. 15 and 16.

152 Ibid., vol. II (see footnote 27 above), 43rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 11.

153 See paragraph 113 above on a similar bracketed phrase in guideline 5.11.

154 See guideline 2.6.13 (Time period for formulating an objection) and the commentary thereto, Yearbook ..., 2008, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 92–94.

155 See articles 17 and 18 of the 1978 Vienna Convention.
or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State. What these two scenarios have in common, and what allows them to be considered together, is that the successor State has a choice as to whether or not to become a party to the treaty.

124. Sir Humphrey Waldock had briefly considered this issue in his third report on succession in respect of treaties and took the view that,

whenever a successor State becomes a party not by inheritance but by an independent act establishing its consent to be bound, logic would indicate that it should be wholly responsible for its own reservations, acceptances and objections, and that its relation to any reservations, acceptances and objections of its predecessor should be the same as that of any other new party to the treaty.157

It does indeed seem logical to apply to objections the same reasoning that underlies guidelines 5.1, paragraph 2, or 5.2, paragraph 2, governing the formulation of reservations by a successor State: since, in the cases considered here, succession to a treaty takes place only by virtue of a deliberate act on the part of the successor State (a “notification of succession” or, in the case of successor States other than newly independent States, a “notification”), the successor State must be free to modify its treaty obligations, not only by formulating reservations, but also, if it so desires, by objecting to reservations formulated by other States even before the date of its succession to the treaty.158

125. While the practice in this area is scarce, there have been cases in which newly independent States have formulated new objections when notifying their succession to a treaty. For example, Fiji withdrew objections made by the predecessor State and formulated new objections upon notifying its succession to the Convention on the High Seas.159

126. There is thus no reason why a newly independent State or other successor State cannot formulate new objections in respect of a treaty that was not in force for the predecessor State or States160 upon establishing, by a notification within the meaning of guideline 5.1, paragraph 2 or guideline 5.2, paragraph 2, its status as a party or as a contracting State to the treaty.

127. As proposed by Sir Humphrey Waldock in his third report on succession in respect of treaties, this capacity must nonetheless be limited; article 9, paragraph 3, which established the principle that the same rules should apply to both objections and reservations, included a subparagraph (b), worded as follows:

(b) However, in the case of a treaty falling under Article 20, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention, no objection may be formulated by a new State to a reservation which has been accepted by all the parties to the treaty.163

128. This exception is intended to ensure that a successor State cannot, by formulating an objection, compel the reserving State to withdraw from such a treaty. It is also consistent with guideline 2.8.2, “Unanimous acceptance of reservations”:

In the event of a reservation requiring unanimous acceptance by some or all States or international organizations which are parties or entitled to become parties to the treaty, such an acceptance once obtained is final.162

129. This exception is set out in guideline 5.14, paragraph 3, for which the following wording is proposed:

“5.14 Capacity of a successor State to formulate objections to reservations

“1. When making a notification of succession establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty, a newly independent State may, in the conditions laid down in the relevant guidelines of the Guide to Practice and subject to paragraph 3 of the present guideline, object to reservations formulated by a contracting State or State party or by a contracting international organization or international organization party to the treaty, even if the predecessor State made no such objection.

“2. A successor State other than a newly independent State shall also have the capacity provided for in paragraph 1 when making a notification establishing its status as a party or as a contracting State to a treaty which, at the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but in respect of which the predecessor State was a contracting State.

“3. The capacity referred to in the foregoing paragraphs shall nonetheless not be recognized in the case of treaties falling under guidelines 2.8.2 and [4.X.X].”163

130. The summary reference, in paragraph 1 of this guideline, to “the conditions laid down in the relevant guidelines of the Guide to Practice” is warranted by the fact that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to give an exhaustive list in the draft guideline itself of all the guidelines applicable to the formulation of objections; this could, however, be done in the commentary.

131. Guideline 5.14 does not apply to a successor State other than a newly independent State when, following a uniting or separation of States, a treaty continues in force in respect of that State in the context of a succession that can be termed “automatic”, i.e., when a treaty continues in force, following a succession of States, in respect of a successor State other than a newly independent State even though there has been no expression of consent by

156 See articles 32 and 36 of the 1978 Vienna Convention.
157 Yearbook ... 1970, vol. II, p. 47, para. (2) of the commentary to draft article 9; see also paragraph 104 above.
158 In this regard, in the case of newly independent States, see Gaja (footnote 35 above), p. 66.
159 See footnote 140 above.
160 As in the situations covered by guidelines 5.2, para. 2, and 5.8 (see paragraphs 53 and 96 above), the term “predecessor State” should be understood, in cases involving the uniting of two or more States, to mean one or more of the predecessor States.
161 Yearbook ... 1970, vol. II, p. 47; see also the explanation of the grounds for this proposal, ibid., p. 52, para. (17) of the commentary to draft article 9.
162 Yearbook ... 2009, vol. II (Part Two), text and commentary, pp. 97–98.
163 The number of the guideline in the Guide to Practice that reproduces article 20, paragraph 2, of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions should be inserted in place of the brackets.
that State. Under part IV of the 1978 Vienna Convention, such a situation arises, in principle, in the case of a State formed from a uniting of two or more States in relation to treaties in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of any of the predecessor States. The same is true of a State formed from the separation of parts of a State in relation to treaties in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State, as well as treaties in force in respect only of that part of the territory of the predecessor State that corresponds to the territory of the successor State. In these circumstances, as succession to the treaty does not depend on an expression of volition on the part of the State formed from the uniting or separation of States, that State inherits all of the rights and obligations of the predecessor State under the treaty, including objections (or the lack thereof) that the predecessor State had (or had not) formulated in respect of a reservation to the treaty. In any event, it does not seem that successor States other than newly independent States have laid claim to such a capacity.

132. As one author has written, “When ... succession is considered to be automatic, the admissibility of objections on the part of the successor State must be ruled out ... If the predecessor State had accepted the reservation, such consent cannot be subsequently revoked either by the same State or by its successor”.

133. As in the case of guideline 5.13, “Reservations of the predecessor State to which no objections have been made”, an exception should nonetheless be made for cases in which a succession of States takes place prior to the expiry of the time period during which the predecessor State could have objected to a reservation formulated by another party or contracting State to the treaty. In such a situation, acknowledging the capacity of the successor State to formulate an objection to such a reservation up until the expiry of that period seems warranted.

134. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Special Rapporteur proposes that the Commission adopt the following guideline 5.15:

“5.15 Objections by a successor State other than a newly independent State in respect of which a treaty continues in force

“A successor State other than a newly independent State in respect of which a treaty continues in force following a succession of States shall not have capacity to formulate an objection to a reservation to which the predecessor State had not objected unless the time period for formulating an objection has not yet expired at the date of the succession of States and the objection is made within that time period.”

135. While it is probably self-evident, it may also be desirable, in the interest of completeness, for the Commission to adopt a final guideline on objections to reservations in the context of a succession of States, in the light of the evidence showing that, when a successor State formulates a reservation at the time of the succession of States, contracting States and contracting international organizations may object to it in the conditions laid down in articles 20–23 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, which are reflected and elaborated upon in the Guide to Practice.

136. This guideline could be worded as follows:

“5.16 Objections to reservations of the successor State

“Any contracting State or contracting international organization may formulate objections to any reservation formulated by the successor State in the conditions laid down in the relevant guidelines of the Guide to Practice.”

137. It should be noted that the term “any contracting State” included in this guideline also includes, where applicable, the predecessor State if it continues to exist.

138. As in guideline 5.14, the summary reference to “the conditions laid down in the relevant guidelines of the Guide to Practice” is warranted by the fact that it would be difficult if not impossible to give an exhaustive list in the guideline itself of all the guidelines applicable to the formulation of objections; this could, however, be done in the commentary.

F. Acceptances of reservations

139. In the context of the succession of States, the acceptance of reservations is problematic only in so far as it relates to the status of express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State. On the one hand, there is no reason to question the capacity of the successor State to formulate an express acceptance of a reservation formulated, prior to the date of succession to a treaty, by a State or international organization that is a party or a contracting party: the successor State can, of course, exercise this capacity, pursuant to guideline 2.8.3, as any State is entitled to do at any time. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, this point may be clarified in the commentary without the need for a specific guideline on the matter. On the other hand, the status of tacit acceptance by a predecessor State which did not object to a reservation in a timely manner prior to the date of the succession of States is governed by guidelines 5.14 and 5.15, proposed below.

138. See footnote 168 above.

139. See footnote 129 above.

140. A successor State’s express acceptance of a reservation formulated after the date of succession to the treaty, however, falls under the general regime of acceptances and need not be dealt with in the context of the succession of States to treaties.
140. As with reservations and objections, the question of the status of express acceptances formulated by a predecessor State calls for an approach that varies, at least in part, according to whether succession to the treaty occurs through notification by the successor State or ipso jure.

141. As has been noted repeatedly in this sixteenth report, in the case of newly independent States, succession occurs through notification of succession. In this context, article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, reproduced in the first paragraph of guideline 5.1, proposed above, establishes the presumption in favour of maintenance by the newly independent State of the reservations of the predecessor State unless, when making the notification of succession, the newly independent State expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation that relates to the same subject matter as the reservation of the predecessor State. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, while there appears to be no practice regarding express acceptances of reservations in connection with the succession of States, the presumption in favour of the maintenance of reservations should logically be transposed to express acceptances.

142. An analogy also seems appropriate in the case of the need to recognize the capacity of the newly independent State to express its intention not to maintain an express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State in respect of a reservation. That capacity does not constitute a derogation from the general rule regarding the final nature of acceptance of a reservation, set forth in guideline 2.8.12, the voluntary nature of succession to the treaty by the newly independent State justifies this apparent derogation, just as it justifies the capacity of the newly independent State to formulate new reservations when making its notification of succession to the treaty, recognized in article 20, paragraph 2, of the 1978 Vienna Convention, or the capacity of such a State to formulate objections to reservations that were formulated prior to the date of the notification of succession as recognized in guideline 5.14, proposed below.

143. However, the question of the time period within which the newly independent State may express its intention not to maintain an express acceptance by the predecessor State remains to be addressed. With respect to the non-maintenance of a reservation made by the predecessor State, article 20, paragraph 1, of the 1978 Vienna Convention requires that the newly independent State must express its intention to that effect when making its notification of succession to the treaty. Does the same requirement apply with respect to the non-maintenance of an express acceptance? In this case, logic suggests that, by analogy, the approach taken with regard to the formulation by a newly independent State of an objection to a reservation formulated prior to the date of the notification of succession should be followed. In fact, it appears that the potential effects of non-maintenance of an express acceptance can be likened to a great extent, to the formulation of a new objection. In that regard, guideline 5.14 on objections formulated by a successor State simply refers to “the conditions laid down in the relevant guidelines of the Guide to Practice”, including the temporal requirement set forth in article 20, paragraph 5, of the 1969 Vienna Convention and reproduced in guideline 2.6.13. In the case of the objection by a newly independent State to a reservation formulated prior to the date of the notification of succession, application of the general rule suggests that the newly independent State has 12 months as from the date of the notification of succession to formulate such an objection. However, while we cannot simply refer to the general rules in addressing the issue of the maintenance or non-maintenance by the successor State of an express acceptance of a reservation made by the predecessor State (an issue that arises only in the context of the succession of States), there is no reason not to take, mutatis mutandis, the same approach. Consequently, the wording of guideline 5.16 bis, on the maintenance by the newly independent State of express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State, should be based on the rule applicable to the formulation by the successor State of an objection, and the 12-month time period within which the newly independent State may express its intention not to maintain an express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State should be retained.

144. The expression by a newly independent State of its intention on this matter may be conveyed either through its explicit withdrawal of the express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State, or through its formulation of an objection to the reservation which had been expressly accepted by the predecessor State and the content of which would be incompatible, in whole or in part, with this acceptance.

145. In the light of these considerations, a guideline 5.16 bis, worded as follows, might be included in the Guide to Practice:

5.16 bis Maintenance by a newly independent State of express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State

“When a newly independent State establishes its status as a party or as a contracting State to a multilateral treaty, it shall be considered as maintaining any express acceptance by the predecessor State of a reservation formulated by a contracting State or contracting international organization unless it expresses a contrary intention within 12 months of the date of the notification of succession.”

146. In the case of successor States other than newly independent States, however, this question calls for different approaches depending on whether succession
occurs ipso jure or through notification. As we have seen in this report, the first situation arises, in cases involving the uniting or separation of States, with respect to treaties which, on the date of the succession of States, were in force for the predecessor State and remain in force for the successor State. Guideline 5.15, proposed above, provides that, in such a situation, the successor State may not formulate an objection to a reservation to which the predecessor State did not object in a timely manner. A fortiori, such a successor State may not call into question an express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State.

147. The situation is, however, different where succession to a treaty by States emerging from a uniting or separation of States occurs only through a notification to that effect—as in the case of treaties which, on the date of the succession of States, were not in force for the predecessor State but to which it was a contracting State. In this situation—as has, moreover, been said of the formulation of new reservations and new objections—the other successor States must be recognized as having the same capacity as newly independent States under guideline 5.16 bis above.

148. Guideline 5.17 might therefore read:

“5.17 Maintenance by a successor State other than a newly independent State of the express acceptances formulated by the predecessor State

“A successor State, other than a newly independent State, for which a treaty remains in force following a succession of States shall be considered as maintaining any express acceptance by the predecessor State of a reservation formulated by a contracting State or by a contracting international organization.

“When making a notification of succession establishing its status as a contracting State or as a party to a treaty which, on the date of the succession of States, was not in force for the predecessor State but to which the predecessor State was a contracting party, a successor State other than a newly independent State shall be considered as maintaining any express acceptance by the predecessor State of a reservation formulated by a contracting State or by a contracting international organization unless it expresses a contrary intention within 12 months of the date of the notification of succession.”

149. A related issue concerns the effects ratione temporis of a successor State’s non-maintenance of an express acceptance of a reservation by the predecessor State. On this point, there is no reason not to follow the approach taken in guideline 5.7, proposed above, concerning the timing of the effects of a successor State’s non-maintenance of a reservation formulated by the predecessor State.

150. It is therefore necessary to propose a guideline 5.18 with the following wording:

“5.18 Timing of the effects of non-maintenance by a successor State of an express acceptance formulated by the predecessor State

“The non-maintenance [, in accordance with guidelines 5.16 and 5.17, paragraph 2.] by the successor State of the predecessor State’s express acceptance of a reservation formulated by a contracting State or by a contracting international organization shall take effect for a contracting State or for a contracting international organization when that State or that organization has received the notification thereof.”

187 See paragraph 85 above.

Chapter III

Interpretative declarations

151. The succession of States to treaties may also raise questions with regard to interpretative declarations, on which the 1978 Vienna Convention is as silent as the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.

152. At the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, the Federal Republic of Germany proposed an amendment that would have expanded the scope of article 20, the only provision of the 1978 Vienna Convention in which the status of reservations is mentioned. The amendment would have preceded the rules concerning reservations, as proposed by the Commission, with a statement that “[...] any statement or instrument made in respect to the treaty in connection with its conclusion or signature by the predecessor State, shall remain effective for the newly independent State”. The Federal Republic of Germany later withdrew this proposed amendment, to which, for various reasons, several delegations had objected.

153. Although the text of the Convention is silent on this matter, two questions arise: the first concerns the status of

189 See paragraph 4 above.
interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State, while the second is whether the successor State has the capacity to formulate its own interpretative declarations at the time of succeeding to the treaty, or thereafter. In either case, it must be borne in mind that, according to guideline 2.4.3, “[w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of guidelines 1.2.1, 2.4.6 and 2.4.7, an interpretative declaration may be formulated at any time”.191

154. Practice provides no answer to the question of the status of interpretative declarations in the context of the succession of States to a treaty. Furthermore, interpretative declarations are extremely diverse, both in their intrinsic nature and in their potential effects. It is, moreover, these factors which explain, at least in part, the lack of detail in the rules governing interpretative declarations in the Guide to Practice. Under these conditions, the Commission will doubtless opt for prudence and pragmatism.

155. In this spirit, the Commission might simply suggest that States should, to the extent possible, clarify their position on the status of any interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State. Furthermore, it should be recognized that there are situations in which, in the absence of an explicit position taken by the successor State, the latter’s conduct might answer the question of whether it subscribes to an interpretative declaration formulated by the predecessor State. In such cases, this conduct would suffice to establish the status of the predecessor State’s interpretative declarations.

156. A guideline on this issue, if formulated in general terms, might cover all types of succession. The Commission might therefore include in the Guide to Practice the following guideline 5.19:

5.19 Clarification of the status of interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State

“A successor State should, to the extent possible, clarify its position concerning the status of interpretative declarations formulated by the predecessor State.

“The preceding paragraph is without prejudice to situations in which the successor State has demonstrated, by its conduct, its intention to maintain or to reject an interpretative declaration formulated by the predecessor State.”

157. Guideline 5.19 is formulated as a recommendation. On several occasions, the Commission has taken the view that such an approach was appropriate in the context of a Guide to Practice that was not intended to become a convention.192 This is all the more true in the case at hand since, in the absence of express treaty provisions, States have broad discretion as to whether and when to make such declarations.

158. The second question that arises with respect to interpretative declarations concerns the successor State’s capacity to formulate interpretative declarations, including declarations that the predecessor State did not formulate. There is little doubt that the existence of this capacity follows directly from guideline 2.4.3, which states that an interpretative declaration may, with some exceptions, be formulated at any time.193 Thus, there appears to be no valid reason to deprive any successor State of a capacity that the predecessor State could have exercised at any time. The Special Rapporteur sees no need to devote a guideline to this question, which can be clarified in the commentary to guideline 5.19.

191 Guidelines 1.2.1 and 2.4.7 concern conditional interpretative declarations, which appear to be subject to the legal regime applicable to reservations. Guideline 2.4.6 concerns the late formulation of an interpretative declaration where a treaty provides that an interpretative declaration may be made only at specified times, in which case this special rule takes precedence over the general rule.

192 See, inter alia, guidelines 2.1.9, 2.4.0, 2.4.3 bis, 2.6.10 and 2.9.3.

193 See also paragraph 153 above. For the commentary on guideline 2.4.3, see Yearbook ..., 2001, vol. II, (Part Two), pp. 192–193.