

# EFFECTS OF ARMED CONFLICTS ON TREATIES

[Agenda item 4]

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## Note on draft article 5 and the annex to the draft articles, by Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Special Rapporteur

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#### A. Introduction

1. At the sixty-second session of the International Law Commission, in 2010, the Drafting Committee left open the issue of the list of categories of treaties that exhibit a very high likelihood of applicability on the basis of implication from their subject matter.<sup>1</sup> In the present note, the Special Rapporteur will make some observations and suggestions in this regard.

2. A number of solutions are possible in relation to the current version of article 5 and the annex to the draft articles. One solution, first advanced by the preceding Special Rapporteur, would be to incorporate the list into the draft articles as article 7.2. The list and the commentary thereto could also be placed at the end of the draft articles.<sup>2</sup> This was done in the 2008 version of the draft. A third solution would be to incorporate the list and the commentary thereto into article 5. Lastly, a fourth solution would be to include it as an annex to article 5.

3. Of these solutions, the last two are undeniably the most attractive and most realistic. The present Special Rapporteur tends to prefer the fourth solution, as indicated previously in his first report,<sup>3</sup> for several reasons. First, there is a

significant body of practice on the subject, which is in itself a justification for taking account of it in some form other than an annex to the draft articles. Second, including the list as an annex to article 5 facilitates the implementation of this provision. The article highlights the criterion of the treaty's subject matter as potentially implying that it continues in operation, though without establishing an irreversible presumption; or, as stated in the memorandum by the Secretariat, the list encompasses the categories of treaties that exhibit a "very high likelihood of applicability".<sup>4</sup> This likelihood must be considered in detail, in part because the name of a treaty does not always correspond to its subject matter, meaning that treaties nominally belonging to one of the categories on the list may not in fact come under that heading; it is therefore preferable to describe the list as "indicative". In other cases, a treaty that does in fact meet the conditions for appearing on the list includes provisions that do not come under the category concerned and thus do not benefit from the likelihood implied by the list.

4. The solution recommended above is in the nature of a "compromise" in relation to the other possibilities. In the debates in the Commission's plenary meetings in 2010, it seemed to have garnered a substantial majority. This is another reason to prefer it, even though adjustments to the contents of the list and/or the commentaries thereto may be called for. A third reason is the one adduced by the present Special Rapporteur in his first report, namely that this solution offers a greater degree of normativity than if the list were consigned to the commentary to article 5.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The effect of armed conflict on treaties: an examination of practice and doctrine, memorandum by the Secretariat, A/CN.4/550 and Corr.1–2 (available from the Commission's website, documents of the fifty-seventh session; the final text will be published as an addendum to *Yearbook ... 2005*, vol. II (Part One)), paras. 18–36.

<sup>2</sup> Third report on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, by Mr. Ian Brownlie, *Yearbook ... 2007*, vol. II (Part One), p. 55, document A/CN.4/578.

<sup>3</sup> *Yearbook ... 2010*, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/627, paras. 52–70.

<sup>4</sup> Memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 1 above), para. 18.

<sup>5</sup> *Yearbook ... 2010*, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/627, para. 64.

## B. Difficulties inherent in the contents of the annex

5. In paragraph 3 above, reference was made to the difficulty that may arise from the fact that a treaty's title may not correspond—or not correspond completely—to its subject matter. It goes without saying that the characterization of a treaty, i.e. the process of determining whether it may be classified in one particular category or another, must be done on the basis of the real subject matter of the treaty and its provisions. This process may well show that certain treaty provisions come under one of the categories appearing on the list, while other provisions do not come under any of them. This diversity may be accounted for, to some extent, by the separability of treaty provisions envisaged in article 10 of the draft articles.

6. Another difficulty is the fact that the draft articles aspire to regulate the effects on treaties of not only international but also internal armed conflicts. Some have criticized this ambition, asserting that the Commission should not have ventured into this territory or that it should have done so in a different way. This view, in turn, has prompted the objection that today the problems caused by non-international armed conflicts are much more significant than those arising from international armed conflicts and that it would be regrettable if the Commission were to ignore them. It is true, however, as noted by Graham, that “[t]he problem of the effect of a revolution [sic] on treaties ... has not received adequate discussion ... there remains a void in International Law in this respect”.<sup>6</sup> Even if there were no legal void, contrary to Graham's statement, the practice in this area would in any case be sparse and difficult to identify. This being the case, there is no harm in extending the scope of the draft articles to situations of this type; but it must be understood that in so doing the Commission will be introducing into the draft articles a significant element of development, rather than codification, of international law.

7. The issue of the continued operation of treaties is sometimes considered without regard to whether it was in fact raised by an armed conflict, be it international or internal. This was the case, for example, when the Netherlands suspended all bilateral treaties during the turmoil in Suriname in 1982.<sup>7</sup> In the *Case Concerning Oil Platforms*, ICJ found that the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 15 August 1955 between the United States and Iran (Islamic Republic of) was still in force and could therefore serve as a basis for its jurisdiction,<sup>8</sup> but was there really an armed conflict between the two countries? In the case of *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua*, ICJ considered that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua was still in force;<sup>9</sup> and this was confirmed by the fact that the

<sup>6</sup> A. M. Graham, “The effects of domestic hostilities on public and private international agreements: a tentative approach”, *Western Law Review*, vol. 3, 1964, pp. 128–149.

<sup>7</sup> Memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 1 above), para. 90.

<sup>8</sup> *Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, Judgment*, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161. The treaty, signed in Tehran on 15 August 1955, is available from United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 284, No. 4132, p. 93. See also the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 1 above), paras. 70–71.

<sup>9</sup> *Nicaragua v. United States of America, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment*, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 392 and 442. See also the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 1 above), para. 72. For

United States subsequently denounced the Treaty under its terms.<sup>10</sup> But was there really an armed conflict between the two States? In many cases, it may thus be wondered which factor gave rise to the problem of an agreement's survival: was it in fact an armed conflict or, on the contrary, other grounds for termination or suspension (such as temporary or permanent impossibility of performance or a fundamental change of circumstances)?

8. Another difficulty is that, according to traditional practice and doctrine, the issue was essentially whether a treaty (or parties to a treaty) continued in operation or became automatically invalid in case of international armed conflict. Today a treaty's lack of continuity may take two forms: abrogation or mere suspension, a far less dramatic consequence of the outbreak of armed conflict and one that facilitates a return to the *status quo ante* when the conflict has ended.

9. These questions, including the determination of the exact scope of existing doctrine and practice and of how their value should be assessed, are compounded by the question of how these elements have been presented; they have been based on doctrine and, with regard to practice, on that of English-speaking countries (the United Kingdom and the United States). Some Commission members have criticized this presentation and called on the Special Rapporteur to include supplementary elements, including judicial elements, and to ensure that this imbalance is removed from the commentaries to the relevant articles.

## C. The way forward

10. In drafting the commentaries, the Special Rapporteur will heed this call as far as possible, in part by putting the role of doctrine in perspective. Doctrine is (or should be) only a reflection, systematization and synthesis of practice, but often it mainly reflects the personal opinions and preferences of its authors. At the same time, it is not possible to ignore doctrine completely, in view of the role it plays in the area dealt with by the draft articles.

11. With the help of the Secretariat and a number of colleagues, the Special Rapporteur will undertake supplementary research concerning, *inter alia*, the decisions of national jurisdictions, so as to accentuate the draft articles' basis in jurisprudence. It should, however, be noted that the memorandum by the Secretariat, in particular, seems to be quite comprehensive, so that criticisms concerning the insufficiency of references to practice, particularly in case law, may be aimed more at the presentation than at the basis of the draft articles. At this stage of the work, the Special Rapporteur does not believe that the supplementary research to be undertaken will yield dramatic results. In any event, these results will be integrated into the commentaries to the articles to which they relate.

12. As to the different categories of treaties listed in the annex, the Special Rapporteur has no wish to make any changes except, possibly, to add treaties embodying rules of

the text of the treaty, signed in Managua on 21 January 1956, see United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 367, No. 5224, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Nicaragua v. United States of America, Judgment*, I.C.J. Reports 1986, dissenting opinion from Judge Jennings, pp. 528, 538 and 539. See also the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 1 above), para. 72.

*jus cogens*. In his first report, he had nonetheless dismissed this idea, explaining that peremptory norms in a treaty

will survive in time of armed conflict, as will rules of *jus cogens* that are not embodied in treaty provisions; otherwise they would not be rules of *jus cogens*. Thus the inclusion of this category of treaties does not seem essential.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> *Yearbook ... 2010*, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/627, para. 67.

13. What has just been said is undoubtedly still true: the proposed addition is not essential. But it would perhaps make it possible to spell out a point that is worth clarifying: that rules of *jus cogens*, whether treaty-based or customary, will survive anything, even armed conflicts. It should nonetheless be specified that as a general rule such treaties will contain, alongside peremptory norms, other provisions that will not necessarily continue in operation.