NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

References to the *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* are abbreviated to *Yearbook ...*, followed by the year (for example, *Yearbook ... 2005*).

The *Yearbook* for each session of the International Law Commission comprises two volumes:

Volume I: summary records of the meetings of the session;

Volume II (Part One): reports of special rapporteurs and other documents considered during the session†;

Volume II (Part Two): report of the Commission to the General Assembly.

All references to these works and quotations from them relate to the final printed texts of the volumes of the *Yearbook* issued as United Nations publications.

† The Memorandum of the Secretariat, which was originally issued in mimeographed form, is reproduced in the present volume, incorporating the corrigenda issued by the Secretariat and the editorial changes required for the presentation of the final text.
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Effect of armed conflict on treaties (agenda item 8)


Checklist of documents of the fifty-seventh session ........................................................................................................ 59
# THE EFFECT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON TREATIES

[Agenda item 8]

**DOCUMENT A/CN.4/550**

The effect of armed conflict on treaties: an examination of practice and doctrine

Memorandum by the Secretariat

[Original: English]

[1 February 2005]

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ABBREVIATIONS

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
RUF Revolutionary United Front

AFDI Annuaire français de droit international (Paris)
AJIL American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.)
BYBIL The British Year Book of International Law (London)
AD Annual Digest [and Reports] of Public International Law Cases
I.C.J. Reports International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. All the Court’s judgments, advisory opinions and orders are available on its website (www.icj-cij.org).
ILM International Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.)
ILR International Law Reports (Cambridge)
P.C.I.J., Series A Permanent Court of International Justice, Collection of Judgments (Nos. 1–24: up to and including 1930)
UNRIAA United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards
U.S. Stat. United States Statutes at Large

In the present volume, “International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” refers to the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.

NOTE CONCERNING QUOTATIONS

In quotations, words or passages in italics followed by an asterisk were not italicized in the original text.

Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from works in languages other than English have been translated by the Secretariat.

The Internet address of the International Law Commission is http://legal.un.org/ilc/.
Multilateral instruments cited in the present document

Treaty of Breda (Breda, 31 July 1667)  
Source  

Treaty between Great Britain, Russia and the Netherlands, relative to the Russian Dutch Loan (London, 19 May 1815)  
Source  

Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Free Hanseatic Republics of Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg (Washington, D.C., 20 December 1827)  
Source  

Treaty of Paris (Paris, 30 March 1856)  
Source  

Declaration respecting maritime law (Declaration of Paris) (Paris, 16 April 1856)  
Source  

Convention relative to the Navigation of the Rhine between Baden, Bavaria, France, Hesse-Damstadt, the Netherlands and Prussia (Mannheim, 17 October 1868)  
Source  

Declaration of London (London, 17 January 1871)  
Source  
Ibid., 1870–1871, vol. 61, p. 1198.

Treaty of London (London, 13 March 1871)  
Source  

Treaty establishing the General Postal Union (Berne, 9 October 1874), revised by the Convention establishing the Universal Postal Union (Paris, 1 June 1878)  
Source  

Treaty of Berlin (Berlin, 13 July 1878)  
Source  

First Treaty of Alliance between Austria–Hungary, Germany and Italy (Vienna, 20 May 1882)  
Source  

General Act of the Conference of Berlin (Berlin, 26 February 1885)  
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Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal (Constantinople, 29 October 1888)  
Source  

Convention concerning the Formation of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs (Brussels, 5 July 1890)  
Source  

Conventions respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land: Convention II (The Hague, 29 July 1899); Convention IV; Convention VI relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities (The Hague, 18 October 1907)  
Source  

Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (annexed to the Hague Conventions II of 1899 and IV of 1907)  
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Convention relating to conflicts of laws concerning marriage (The Hague, 12 June 1902)  
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Convention relating to conflicts of laws and jurisdictions as regards divorce and separation (The Hague, 12 June 1902)  
Source  
Ibid., p. 715.
Effect of armed conflict on treaties

Convention relating to the of minors (The Hague, 12 June 1902)

Convention relating to Civil Procedure (The Hague, 17 July 1905)

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field (Geneva, 6 July 1906)

Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associate Powers and Germany (Treaty of Versailles) (Versailles, 28 June 1919)

Treaty of Spitsbergen (Paris, 9 February 1920)

Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne) (Lausanne, 24 July 1923)

Protocol on Arbitration Clauses (Geneva, 24 September 1923)

International Labour Organization Convention (No. 17) concerning Workmen’s Compensation for Accidents (Geneva, 10 June 1925)

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare (Geneva, 17 June 1925)

Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Geneva, 26 September 1927)


International Load Line Convention (London, 5 July 1930)

Exchange of notes constituting an Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand and the Government of Iraq regarding the service of documents (Baghdad, 8 and 28 February 1939)

Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 7 December 1944)

Treaty of Peace with Italy (Paris, 10 February 1947)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Geneva, 30 October 1947)


Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims (1949 Geneva Conventions) (Geneva, 12 August 1949)

Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field (Convention I)

Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (Convention II)

Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (Convention III)

Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war (Convention IV)

Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I); and Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II) (Geneva, 8 June 1977)


Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco, 8 September 1951)

Source

Ibid., p. 724.


Ibid., vol. XXVIII, No. 701, p. 11.


Ibid., vol. XCII, No. 2096, p. 301.

Ibid., vol. XCIV, No. 2137, p. 57.

Ibid., vol. CXXXV, No. 3119, p. 301.

Ibid., vol. CXCVII, p. 378.


Ibid., vol. 49, No. 747, p. 3.


Ibid., vol. 78, No. 1021, p. 277.

Ibid., vol. 75, Nos. 970–973.

Ibid., vol. 75, No. 970, p. 31.

Ibid., vol. 75, No. 971, p. 85.

Ibid., vol. 75, No. 972, p. 135.

Ibid., vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287.

Ibid., vol. 1125, Nos. 17512 and 17513, pp. 3 and 609.

Ibid., vol. 213, No. 2889, p. 221.

Ibid., vol. 136, No. 1832, p. 45.
Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco, 8 September 1951)

International Convention between the United States of America, Canada and Japan for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (Tokyo, 9 May 1952)

Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India and Pakistan and the Government of Iraq regarding War Cemeteries, Graves and Memorials of the British Commonwealth in Iraq resulting from the War of 1939–1945, amending Agreement of 15 March 1935 (Baghdad, 18 February 1954)


State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (Vienna, 15 May 1955)


Antarctic Treaty (Washington, D.C., 1 December 1959)

Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris, 29 July 1960)

Indus Waters Treaty 1960 (Karachi, 19 September 1960)

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Vienna, 18 April 1961)

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna, 24 April 1963)

Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna, 21 May 1963)

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 16 December 1966)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966)


African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Algiers, 15 September 1968)


American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” (San José, 22 November 1969)

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, 29 November 1969)

Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar (Iran), 2 February 1971)

International Convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage (Brussels, 18 December 1971)

Convention for the prevention of marine pollution by dumping from ships and aircraft (Oslo, 15 February 1972)

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (London, Moscow and Washington, D.C., 10 April 1972)

Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (Paris, 16 November 1972)

Kuwait Regional Convention for cooperation on the protection of the marine environment from pollution (Kuwait, 24 April 1978)


Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution and Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by dumping from ships and aircraft (Barcelona, 16 February 1976)

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (New York, 10 December 1976)

Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources (London, 1 May 1977)

Vienna Convention on succession of States in respect of treaties (Vienna, 23 August 1978)

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn, 23 June 1979)

Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern, 23 September 1979)

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn, 23 June 1979)


United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992)

Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992)

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction (opened for signature at Paris on 13 January 1993)

Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction (Oslo, 18 September 1997)


Source


Ibid., vol. 1341, No. 22484, p. 3.

Ibid., vol. 1102, No. 16908, p. 27.

Ibid., vol. 1108, No. 17119, p. 151.


Ibid., vol. 1651, No. 28395, p. 333.

Ibid., vol. 1284, No. 21159, p. 209.

Ibid., vol. 1302, No. 21623, p. 217.

Ibid., vol. 1342, No. 22495, p. 137.


Ibid., vol. 2024, No. 22495, p. 163.

Ibid., vol. 2399, No. 22495, p. 100.

Ibid., vol. 1834, No. 31363, p. 3.

Ibid., vol. 1465, No. 24841, p. 85.

Ibid., vol. 1513, No. 26164, p. 293.

Ibid., vol. 1522, No. 26369, p. 3.


Ibid., vol. 1577, No. 27531, p. 3.

Ibid., vol. 2173, No. 27531, p. 222.


Ibid., vol. 1760, No. 30619, p. 79.

Ibid., vol. 1975, No. 33757, p. 3.

Ibid., vol. 2056, No. 35597, p. 211.

Ibid., vol. 2187, No. 38544, p. 3.
Summary

The present study attempts a comprehensive examination of the effect of armed conflict on treaties, a new topic on the agenda of the International Law Commission. It begins with a theoretical assessment of the issue, including a comprehensive review of previous consideration of the topic, and a discussion of the major difficulties inherent in the study of the topic. These difficulties include: (a) diversification of the meaning of the term “armed conflict”, making generalization difficult; (b) the increasingly informal nature of modern armed conflict and the resultant decrease in formal declarations by States about the effect on treaties; and (c) the delay between an armed conflict itself and when its effects are discussed by courts and political departments.

Two common tests have been developed by courts, commentators and political departments to determine the effect of armed conflict on treaties: (a) a subjective test of the intention of the parties towards the treaty and (b) an objective test of the compatibility of the treaty with national policy during the armed conflict. Modern consideration of the topic generally uses a combination of the two approaches. These analyses have come to three distinct conclusions. First, the traditional view held that treaties did not survive armed conflict. Second, a diametrically opposed view developed in the early twentieth century maintained that war does not affect treaties, subject to some exceptions. Third, the modern view is embodied in the general statement that armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend treaties. After an examination of the many exceptions to each view, however, they do not appear to differ drastically.

The study then engages in a comprehensive categorization of the effect of armed conflict on treaties on the basis of both State practice and doctrine. First, a large group of treaties exhibits a very high likelihood of applicability during armed conflict, including humanitarian law treaties; treaties with express provisions on wartime applicability; treaties regulating a permanent regime or status; treaties or treaty provisions codifying jus cogens rules; human rights treaties; treaties governing intergovernmental debt; and diplomatic conventions. Second, two kinds of treaties exhibit a moderately high likelihood of applicability: reciprocal inheritance treaties and multilateral “law-making” conventions. Third, a large group of treaties exhibits a varied, emerging or controversial likelihood of applicability, including international transport agreements; environmental treaties; extradition treaties; border-crossing treaties; treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation; intellectual property treaties; and penal transfer treaties. Fourth, two types of treaties have a low likelihood of applicability: treaties with express provisions stipulating that they do not apply and treaties which are incompatible in practice with the national policy during the armed conflict.

The effect of the Second World War on treaties is then considered. In addition to the type of treaty, another important factor in determining treaty applicability during armed conflict is the magnitude of the conflict. Thus, an examination of the effect of the Second World War on treaties helps to provide a ceiling of maximum potential effect. Presumably, the lower-magnitude armed conflicts of the modern era would have a correspondingly lesser effect on treaties. When the Second World War is examined in detail, however, it is surprising to note that many fewer treaties were suspended than one might imagine, and perhaps none was completely abrogated.

Publicly available material on modern State practice on the topic is quite limited, but not non-existent. First, there is significant evidence that domestic hostilities in a given State can affect inter-State treaties between that State and another, or potentially even between two or more completely different States. Other non-traditional forms of armed conflict have also been shown to affect treaties, such as the cold war and small bilateral conflicts. Second, although many other legal doctrines have effects that are substantially similar to that of armed conflict on treaties, a strong argument can be made that the latter is distinguishable on the basis that it occurs automatically, whereas doctrines such as rebus sic stantibus and impossibility must be invoked. Third, there is strong support for the proposition that operations carried out pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations will suspend or abrogate inconsistent treaties. Finally, whereas it was traditionally understood that armed conflict had a greater effect on bilateral treaties than on multilateral treaties, there is evidence that this distinction has diminished.
Although significant State practice and doctrine exist, they are inconsistent and in flux. Moreover, as traditional warfare gives way to modern non-traditional, domestic or informal armed conflicts, the parameters of the effect of armed conflict on treaties are left in a state of considerable uncertainty. With input from States as to current governmental views, codification by the Commission could greatly advance international understanding on the topic and update a doctrine that has been written largely for another age.

References, citations and quotations are provided in the present memorandum with sole regard to the issue of the effects of armed conflicts on treaties and have no bearing on the characterization of an armed conflict; the subject matter of the dispute, including the issue of the status of disputed territories; or any other similar issue.

Introduction

A. Nature of the topic

1. The effect of armed conflict on treaties has remained an unsettled, unclear area of international law for at least a century. Sir Cecil J.B. Hurst wrote in 1921 that “[t]here are few questions upon which people concerned with the practical application of the rules of international law find the text-books less helpful than that of the effect of war upon treaties in force between belligerents.” In the latest major research on the subject, Rapporteur Bengt Broms wrote in his report to the Institute of International Law that “[t]he effect of war on treaties has always belonged to the problem areas of international law. It has even been called an ‘obscure’ topic.”

2. Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the “1969 Vienna Convention”) is clear that it “shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from … the outbreak of hostilities between States.” The Commission excluded the topic from its draft articles on the law of treaties in 1963 because “[t]he Commission considered that the study of this topic would inevitably involve a consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Charter concerning the threat or use of force upon the legality of the recourse to the particular hostilities in question; and it did not feel that this question could conveniently be dealt with in the context of its present work upon the law of treaties.” Moreover, the Commission stated in its commentary on draft article 69, which became article 73 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, that it “considered that in the international law of today the outbreak of hostilities between States must be considered as an entirely abnormal condition, and that the rules governing its legal consequences should not be regarded as forming part of the general rules of international law applicable in the normal relations between States.” Although the article 73 savings clause is cast in very broad language—exempting any treaty question that may arise from the outbreak of hostilities—the present study does not deal with the question of the conclusion of treaties during armed conflict and is limited to the effect of armed conflict on existing treaties.

B. Difficulties inherent in the study of the topic

3. The question of the effect of armed conflict on treaties is a difficult one for several reasons. First, the term “armed conflict” has come to stand for a very diverse set of circumstances. Because each armed conflict involves vastly different circumstances in terms of the magnitude of the conflict, the strength of the treaties involved and the relations of the particular States concerned, it is difficult to formulate rules applicable to all situations. The result of these difficulties is a widely

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divergent State practice that courts and political departments have treated with justifiable caution.

4. Second, and related, the typical armed conflict has become significantly less formalized. As a result of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, States have moved away from formalized war in the traditional sense towards armed conflicts under the guise of police actions, limited acts of self-defence or humanitarian intervention. Traditional warfare was often accompanied by formal treaty denunciations and was concluded with a peace treaty, which one can use to infer the effect of armed conflict on treaties; modern armed conflict almost always lacks these official proclamations. The informal, lower-magnitude conflicts of the modern era have proved far less likely to generate commentary from courts and political departments than the wars of the past. For example, whereas the *Annaire français de droit international* included almost yearly entries of French practice on the topic in the aftermath of the Second World War, it has recorded no incident of French practice since 1957. The same is true of the *American Journal of International Law*, which included regular entries on United States practice after the Second World War, but nothing after 1957. Without official declarations from courts or political departments, it is extremely difficult to separate non-performance of a treaty during armed conflict—including potentially justifiable non-performance—from an actual legal effect of armed conflict on the treaty itself.

5. Third, it is very difficult to get a current assessment of the effect of armed conflict on treaties. Political departments are understandably reticent to announce the effect of armed conflicts on treaties when they are currently embroiled in a conflict, and considerable time often

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6 J. Delbrück, “War, effect on treaties”, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, vol. 4 (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2000), p. 1373 (citing the use of force in the first six months following World War II reveals a remarkable shift away from the traditional concept of war as a phenomenon characterized by the formal commencement of hostilities by declaration of war or other action clearly indicating the intention of a State to go to war with another State. Instead, the use of armed force has in many instances gradually developed into a state of war which, however, more often than not has been referred to by governments as a ‘police action’, a ‘limited act of self-defence’ or a ‘humanitarian intervention’, thereby indicating that a full-fledged war is not intended to be recognized. In the pre-1957 period it may well be asked whether such armed conflicts have the same effect on treaties as war does in the above more limited understanding of the traditional concept”); see also J. H. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, part VI, *Juridical Facts as Sources of International Rights and Obligations* (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1973), p. 387 (“The question of whether a particular bilateral treaty had lapsed as a consequence of the outbreak of war could sometimes be left on one side by the court on the ground that no technical state of war had existed between the parties” (citing ILR, vol. 21 (1954), p. 262: France–Austria (Heller v. La Soie de Paris, France, Commerical Tribunal of the Seine, 12 November 1954); ILR, vol. 28 (1959), p. 492: France–Romania (Ovize and Belard v. Gartenberg, France, Court of Cassation, 9 July 1959).

7 One can infer the effect of the armed conflict on pre-war treaties by examining whether the peace treaty provides that pre-war treaties are “principle, context it may be as well to ask whether such armed conflicts have the same effect on treaties as war does in the above more limited understanding of the traditional concept”); see also J. H. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, part VI, *Juridical Facts as Sources of International Rights and Obligations* (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1973), p. 387 (“The question of whether a particular bilateral treaty had lapsed as a consequence of the outbreak of war could sometimes be left on one side by the court on the ground that no technical state of war had existed between the parties” (citing ILR, vol. 21 (1954), p. 262: France–Austria (Heller v. La Soie de Paris, France, Commerical Tribunal of the Seine, 12 November 1954); ILR, vol. 28 (1959), p. 492: France–Romania (Ovize and Belard v. Gartenberg, France, Court of Cassation, 9 July 1959).

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10 See footnote 452 below and accompanying text.

11 In the case of non-performance, the treaty is unaffected by armed conflict and legally in force, but States do not perform their obligations under it either because no situation arises where the treaty applies, or because the State breaches its obligations. McIntyre discusses this problem: “In making the assumption that activities based on a treaty bear upon its legal validity, one must avoid inferring from this that the lack of operation necessarily means invalidation of the validity of the [treaty]. In *Artovskiy v. Boyle* (1952) Judge Hall stated that evidence indicating that no person had ever been extradited under the extradition treaty [between the United States and Serbia, signed at Belgrade on 25 October 1901] showed that the treaty was no longer valid. Representative Cannon referred in 1946 to the Permanent Court of Arbitration as ‘obsolete,’ ‘defunct,’ and ‘non-existent,’ since the United States had not made use of the machinery since 1932. But such statements are not well founded. If occasion does not arise for the application of a particular treaty, it cannot be said the treaty has therefore lost its legal validity” (McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 7. But McIntyre also cites a decision of the International Military Tribunal in 1946, which “refused to assess punishment against [admirals accused of violating rules of submarine warfare] ... in view of the widespread violation of the rules on both sides. The Tribunal regarded [the rules on submarine warfare] as continuing in force, nonetheless” (McIntyre (ibid.), p. 61). Similarly, “defendants before the International Military Tribunal did not argue that the Pact of Paris [General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg– Briand Pact)] had ceased to be binding at any time, but did deny that their interpretation of self-defense was in violation of it” (ibid., p. 84). See also ibid., p. 87 (“The existence of war may be sufficiently incompatible with the nature and purposes of a particular political treaty so that its enforcement during the war proves impossible, but the war may not prevent the continued legal existence of the treaty”); ibid., p. 134 (discussing labour treaties during the Second World War and noting that “[from a legal standpoint the obligations and rights of all the members continued as before, but from a practical standpoint some of them were difficult or impossible of [sic] enforcement”); ibid., pp. 156–157 (noting that many treaties “resulted in such a small degree of activity during World War II it might reasonably be assumed that they were regarded by the member States as in a state of suspension”); and ibid., p. 353 (“Even though the convention relating to the sovereignty of Norway over Spitsbergen [Spitsbergen Treaty] (1920) was violated in some respects in World War II, it remained in force and none of the parties lost their rights under it”).
passes before the effect of a given armed conflict on a treaty becomes an issue in the judiciary. For example, it was not until 1983 that the British Government declared that the Convention between Great Britain and Spain of 1790, which settled certain issues of fishing, navigation and trade in the Pacific Ocean and South Seas (Nootka Sound Convention), had been terminated in 1795 as a result of war between Britain and Spain, almost 200 years after the fact.12 Similarly, an Italian court did not rule on the effect of the Second World War on extradition treaties until 1970,13 and a British court did not assess the effect of the Second World War on the Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 until it became an issue in a 1976 case.14 This lag makes it difficult to assess the effect that new forms of armed conflict are having on treaty relations.

6. As a result, the effect of armed conflict on treaties remains as problematic an area of law as ever before. It has been suggested that codification, although no easy task, would benefit the international community significantly.15 To that end, the present study attempts a modern summary of doctrine and State practice on the effect of armed conflict on treaties, attempting either to flesh out reliable rules or conclude that none exist. It is meant to serve as a comprehensive summary of the existing public information on the topic. Because of the lack of such publicly available information, however, effective codification will also require submissions from Governments, particularly concerning their practice after the Second World War.

C. Past studies of the topic

7. Many studies on the effect of armed conflict on treaties have been carried out in the past, several of which have been accorded special significance by States and commentators. The first such study was that carried out by the Institute of International Law in 1912.16 Second, the Harvard Research on the Law of Treaties of 1935 included a significant analysis of the effect of armed conflict on treaties as part of its more general work on treaties.17 Third, the Institute of International Law attempted a major study of the topic from 1981 to 1985,18 culminating in a resolution in 1983.19 The British Institute of International and Comparative Law has proposed a comprehensive study, aimed at the production of a treatise of over 300 pages on the topic,20 but the project is temporarily on hold due to resource constraints.21

8. Books on the topic have been written by Robert Jacomet in 1909,22 Harold Tobin in 1933,23 Lambertus Erades in 1938,24 Richard Ránk in 1949,25 Stuart McIntyre in 1958,26 and Agostino Gialdino in 1959.27 Innumerable treatises discuss the topic,28 the most significant treatments of the subject appearing in Oppenheim’s International Law,29 The Encyclopedia


19 The effects of war on treaties”, proposed study by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (noting that the editors of the latest draft edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. II (Sir Arthur Watts and Christopher Greenwood) have not yet begun work on the topic and are content for the Institute to carry out the study).

20 E-mail exchange with Susan C. Breau, Dorset Fellow in Public International Law and Director of the Commonwealth Legal Advisory Service, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 22 March 2004.


23 L. Erades, De Invloed van Oorlog op de Geldigheid van Verdragen (Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden, 1939) (an exhaustive 400-page doctoral thesis on the effect of armed conflict on treaties surveying all available provisions governing the issue up to 1939, abundant data on State practice, official Government statements, and case law going back to the seventeenth century. Contrary to the title, the study relates more to the suspension/termination of treaties than to their validity).

24 R. Ránk, Einwirkung des Krieges auf die nichtpolitischen Staatsverträge (Uppsala, Svenska Institutet för Internationell Rätt, 1949).

25 McIntyre (footnote 7 above).


of Public International Law,\textsuperscript{30} Verzijl's International Law in Historical Perspective\textsuperscript{31} and Marjorie White-
man's Digest of International Law.\textsuperscript{32} Significant articles or chapters on the subject have been written by Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst in 1921,\textsuperscript{33} Richard Rank in 1953,\textsuperscript{34} Lord McNair in 1937\textsuperscript{35} and 1961\textsuperscript{36} and Christine Chinkin in 1981,\textsuperscript{37} among many others.\textsuperscript{38} The present study will attempt to add to this body of literature,\textsuperscript{39} both by incorporating these varied sources into one piece of research and by seeking modern examples not yet discussed elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{30} Delbrück (footnote 6 above), pp. 1367–1373.
\textsuperscript{31} Verzijl (footnote 6 above).
\textsuperscript{33} Hurst (footnote 1 above).

\section*{Chapter I}

\subsection*{Theoretical approaches to the topic}

\subsection*{A. Common tests}

9. Two general schools of thought have developed as to how to approach the effect of armed conflict on treaties. As explained by Starke, "[t]he first is a subjective test of intention—did the signatories of the treaty intend that it should remain binding on the outbreak of war? The second is an objective test—is the execution of the treaty incompatible with the conduct of war?"\textsuperscript{40} This section will address each of these schools of thought in turn.

10. First, the intention school holds that the effect of armed conflict on treaties should be determined by the intent—either express or implied—of the parties towards those treaties. Proposed by Sir Cecil Hurst in his influential 1922 treatment of the subject,\textsuperscript{41} the intention test has been espoused to various degrees by a number of other commentators, including McNair, Borchard, Garner, Rank, Lenoir and Hyde.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Starke, An Introduction to International Law (footnote 28 above), p. 409.
\textsuperscript{41} Hurst (footnote 1 above), p. 40 ("I submit that just as the duration of contracts between private persons depends on the intention of the parties, so also the duration of treaties between States must depend on the intention of the parties, and that the treaties will survive the outbreak of war or will then disappear, according as the parties intended when they made the treaty that they should so survive or disappear"). The doctrine of intention is also discussed in Rank, "Modern war and the validity of treaties: a comparative study (part I)\textsuperscript{35}" (footnote 34 above), pp. 325–333.
the emergency of war, and hence presumably intended to be limited to times of peace." 51 This approach was followed by the United States Supreme Court in Clark v. Allen, holding that "[w]here the relevant historical sources and the instrument itself give no plain indication that it is to become inoperative in whole or in part on the outbreak of war, we are left to determine as Tacht v. Hughes ... indicates, whether the provision under which rights are asserted is incompatible with national policy in time of war." 52 This combination of intention and compatibility has become the standard in the United States of America to measure the effect of armed conflict on treaties. 47

12. The compatibility doctrine was also espoused at the international level by the dissenting opinion in The S.S. "Wimbledon" case of 1923 in the Permanent Court of International Justice. 48 In that case, Judges Anzilotti and Huber argued that "if duties of national defence or neutrality conflict with those arising from conventions in fields such as commerce and communications, the intention of the parties must have been to treat the latter as being of lesser importance." 49 Finally, the compatibility doctrine has also received support from numerous commentators. 50

13. Modern thinking on the effect of armed conflict on treaties generally uses a combination of these two approaches. For example, Starke uses the two tests to distinguish six kinds of treaty categories. 51 Other commentators such as McNair, 52 Shearer 53 and Verzijl 54 have created even more classifications. It is one goal of the present study to synthesize all approaches into a comprehensive classification of the effect of armed conflict on treaties.

B. General conclusions

14. Analysis of the effect of armed conflict on treaties has progressed through three distinct conclusions. The traditional view among jurists, confirmed by a large body of traditional State practice, is that treaties did not survive armed conflict. 55 For example, Charles II, King of England and Scotland, informed Scottish judges in 1673 that war with the Dutch "certainly" voided the 1667 Treaty of Breda. 56 Similarly, in 1801 Lord Stowell "assumed without discussion" in The Frau Ilsabe that war between Great Britain and the Netherlands abrogated treaties between them. 57 In 1817, Lord Stowell said treaties "are perishable things, and their obligations are dissipated by the first hostility." 58 United States President Polk stated in 1847 that "[a] state of war abrogates treaties previously existing between the belligerents". 59

51 "(1) Treaties between the belligerent States which presuppose the maintenance of common political action or good relations between them, for example, treaties of alliance, are abrogated.

"(2) Treaties representing completed situations or intended to set up a permanent state of things, for example, treaties of cession or treaties fixing boundaries, are unaffected by war and continue in force.

"(3) Treaties to which the belligerents are parties relating to the conduct of hostilities, for example, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and other treaties prescribing rules of warfare, remain binding.

"(4) Multilateral Conventions of the ‘law-making’ type relating to health, drugs, protection of industrial property, etc., are not annulled on the outbreak of war but are either suspended, and revived on the termination of hostilities, or receive even in wartime a partial application.

"(5) Sometimes express provisions are inserted in treaties to cover the position on the outbreak of war. ... [These provisions will be honoured.]

"(6) With regard to other classes of treaties, e.g., extradition treaties in the absence of any clear expression of intention otherwise, prima facie these are suspended.”


52 McNair, The Law of Treaties (footnote 36 above).

53 Shearer (footnote 28 above), p. 493.

54 Verzijl (footnote 6 above).


Noting that “the farther back we go, the more sweeping and indiscriminately the assertions that all treaties are abrogated by the outbreak of war between the contracting parties”, McNair states that “[t]his is probably due to the ancient practice of diffidatio, whereby upon the outbreak of war it was customary for each belligerent to proclaim solemnly that all treaties existing between them had thereby ceased. ... The effect of this practice appears to have survived the practice itself” (p. 698, footnote 2 and accompanying text). See also Oppenheim (footnote 29 above), p. 302; and Delbrück (footnote 6 above), p. 1369.


57 Ibid., p. 699. For The Frau Ilsabe, see C. Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Admiralty, vol. IV (London, Butterworth and White, 1804), pp. 63 et seq.


59 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 34. But see decision of the Claims Commission established under the United States Act of 3 March 1849: “[A]s a general principle, the breaking out of war puts

(Continued on next page.)
an end to all treaties between the belligerents, yet it is not necessarily so... [The] expulsion of citizens of the United States from their places of residence and business in Mexico, during the existence of the late war, before the expiration of the period limited in the treaty, by the public authorities of Mexico, was in violation of their rights secured by treaty" (ibid.).


61 Ibid. 76.


64 For the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain, the United States, and Brazil, signed at Bogota on 18 April 1825, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1824–1825, vol. 12 (London, James Ridgway, 1846), p. 661. United States and, to a lesser extent, United Kingdom case law dealing with the performance of private rights is a major exception to the traditional view. As early as 1823, in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven and Wheeler, the United States Supreme Court said in dicta that "treaties stipulating for permanent rights, and general arrangements, and professing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as well as of peace, do not cease on the occurrence of war, but are, at most, only suspended while it lasts" (citing H. Wheat, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States: February Term, 1823, vol. VIII (New York, R. Donaldson, 1823), p. 464, at pp. 494–495 (discussed in McNair, The Law of Treaties (footnote 36 above), pp. 699–700)). A British court reached a similar result seven years later in Sutton v. Sutton (1830) (The English Reports, vol. 39 (London), pp. 493 and 494 (1830)), p. 255). These cases form the beginning of a long line of jurisprudence in those countries upholding treaties guaranteeing reciprocal private rights during armed conflict; rather than representative of the traditional view, they are the precursor to the modern view, and are discussed below. United States practice at the conclusion of the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain also differed from the traditional view. John Quincy Adams argued that the Treaty of 1783 between Great Britain and the United States had not been abrogated by the War of 1812. Lord Bathurst responded: "To a position of this novel nature Great Britain cannot accede. She knows of no exception to the rule, that all treaties are put an end to by a subsequent war between the same parties." Adams replied that there were "many exceptions" to the absolute termination doctrine, including all treaties which "are in the nature of a perpetual obligation". McIntyre argues that although "the United States may be said to have acquiesced in" the British position, strong evidence supports the proposition that the United States never abandoned its point of view and that United States practice in the early nineteenth century allowed for major exceptions to the absolute abrogation doctrine (McIntyre (footnote 7 above), pp. 29–30 and p. 30, footnote 1). For the Definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, signed at Paris on 3 September 1783, see H. Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 151.

65 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 34 (citing Valk v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 62 (1894), affirmed in 168 US 703 (1897)).

15. In the early twentieth century, a second, diametrically opposed view emerged that war does not affect treaties, subject to some exceptions. Proposed by N. Politis in his report to the Institute of International Law, the idea was incorporated into the draft regulations adopted by the Institute at its 1912 meeting in Christiania, which stated that war "does not affect the existence of treaties, conventions and agreements, whatever their title or object, between the belligerent States. The same holds for special obligations derived from these treaties, conventions and agreements." Similarly, the Harvard Research on the Law of Treaties in 1935 argued that war may suspend some treaties but does not abrogate any of them. This trend away from ipso facto abrogation also received support in an international tribunal of the early twentieth century. The arbitral tribunal in North Atlantic Coast Fisheries stated that "[i]nternational [l]aw in its modern development recognizes that a great number of treaty obligations are not annulled by war, but at most suspended by it." At first glance, this school may appear diametrically opposed to the traditional view that war ipso facto terminates treaties; after an examination of the many exceptions to each view, however, they do not appear to differ drastically.

16. The modern view espoused by the Institute of International Law in its 1985 study and resolution is that "armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties in force between the parties to the armed conflict." Although this broad statement is perhaps one of the only common denominators that can be drawn from the vastly divergent practice and doctrine, its overly general nature is unsatisfactory. The following chapter will attempt a detailed examination of different types of treaties, in an effort to determine whether any more specific standards can be drawn.

66 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 34.

67 Ibid., p. 37 (citing Yearbook of the Institute of International Law, vol. 24 (Session of Madrid, 1911), p. 200). McIntyre notes that the same view had been proposed three decades earlier in J. C. Bluntschi, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten, 3rd ed. (Nördlingen, C. H. Beck, 1878), pp. 538 and 402. The same year Politis made his report, Turkey declared war on Italy and proclaimed all bilateral treaties terminated (McIntyre, p. 37).


69 Harvard Research in International Law (J. W. Gardner, Reporter), "Law of Treaties" (footnote 17 above).

70 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), pp. 14–15.


72 Institute of International Law study and resolution of 1985 on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (footnotes 18–19 above), art. 2. Malanczuk made an interesting point as to the new view that armed conflict ipso facto terminates treaties, arguing that "[m]aybe it is not so much the rule which has changed, as the nature of the treaties to which the rule applies. It was sensible to say that war ended all treaties between belligerent States when most treaties were bilateral ‘contract treaties’; the rule has to be altered when many treaties are multilateral ‘law-making treaties’, to which neutrals as well as belligerents are parties" (Malanczuk (footnote 28 above), pp. 145–146).
CHAPTER II

Categorization of the effect of armed conflict on treaties

17. The modern view of the effect of armed conflict on treaties is that "the question of whether treaties survive the outbreak of hostilities is resolved according to the type of treaty involved." 71 The task of the modern jurist, therefore, has been to determine which types of treaties continue in force during and after armed conflict, which are suspended and which are abrogated. Judicial decisions in several countries support the categorization theory, 72 and multiple modern commentators have adopted the approach. 73 The present chapter, the main substantive analysis of the study, attempts a comprehensive examination to this effect.

A. Treaties exhibiting a very high likelihood of applicability

1. HUMANITARIAN LAW TREATIES

18. It is well established that armed conflict can have no effect on international humanitarian law, such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on land and the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims (1949 Geneva Conventions) and Additional Protocols, 74 those treaties dealing with the use of particular weapons 75 and other treaties dealing with aspects of armed conflict, 76 since all such treaties were specifically designed to deal with an aspect of armed hostilities. 77 Of all the kinds of treaties discussed in this study, international humanitarian law treaties have the highest record of continued vitality during armed conflict. As far back as 1785, article XXIV of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Prussia and the United States of America clearly stated that armed conflict had no effect on its humanitarian law provisions, 78 and throughout history even the weakest treaty regimes in international humanitarian law have been "relatively well observed" during armed conflicts. 79 The current view espoused in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States is that "[u]nder traditional international law, the outbreak of war between [S]ates terminated or suspended agreements between them. However, ... agreements governing the conduct of hostilities survived, since they were designed for application during war." 80 If this humanitarian exception existed even under the traditional understanding of the effect of armed conflicts (Protocol I); article 1 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II); and the Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on land (Convention IV) and annex of Regulations.

See, for example, Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, 1972; Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, 1980 (including its five optional protocols); Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, 1993; Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction, 1997.


Article XXIV of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce entered into by Prussia and the United States at the Hague, 10 September 1785: "Les deux Puissances Contractantes ont déclaré en outre, que ni le prétexte que la guerre rompt les Traités, ni tel autre motif quelconque, ne seront censés annuler ou suspendre cet Article et le précédent, mais qu’au contraire le temps de la guerre est précisément celui pour lequel ils ont été stipulé" (["the two Contracting Powers have declared, that neither the pretense that war dissolves all treaties, nor any other whatsoever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this and the preceding article, but on the contrary, that the state of war is precisely that for which they are provided"] (U.S. Stat., vol. VIII (1848), p. 84, at pp. 96 and 98) (cited in Verzijl (footnote 6 above), p. 371).

Tarasofsky (footnote 71 above), p. 56 (discussing the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare).

conflict on treaties, it is even more likely that it exists under the modern approach, which allows for more cases where treaties are unaffected by armed conflict.

19. A similarly significant test is the effect of world wars: whereas world wars have historically had the most significant effects on treaties, humanitarian law continued to operate in the First World War. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 regulating the conduct of war were treated as in force during the First World War; many Prize Court decisions, as well as the Declaration of Paris of 1856, gave effect to these Conventions. In 1923, the Government of the United Kingdom, responding to a query from another Government as to whether it regarded the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 6 July 1906 (Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field) as still in force between ex-belligerents of the First World War, replied: “[T]he view of His Majesty’s Government this convention, being of a class the object of which is to regulate the conduct of belligerents during war, was not affected by the outbreak of war.” Similarly, in 1925 the Government of the United Kingdom denounced the 1907 Hague Convention VI, which would not have been necessary if it had been abrogated by the First World War.

20. The vitality of international humanitarian law during armed conflict has also been underscored by the International Court of Justice. In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court cited international humanitarian law as the prime example of treaties applicable in armed conflict.

21. Despite this general applicability of international humanitarian law during armed conflict, even this law has a threshold of applicability. Because this threshold may prove relevant to the general question of the effect of armed conflict on treaties, it is discussed in some detail here. Meron explains these thresholds as they relate to international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict and lower-intensity violence not rising to the level of non-international armed conflict:

The Geneva Conventions distinguish between international conflicts, as defined in common Article 2, and conflicts not of an international character under common Article 3. Conflicts involving lower-intensity violence that do not reach the threshold of an armed conflict are implicitly distinguished from non-international armed conflicts to which the provisions of that article are applicable. Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, drawing on the language of Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II, makes this distinction explicit for the purposes of this statute by providing that paragraph 2(c), which tracks the language of common Article 3, applies to armed conflicts and not to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature. The Additional Protocols distinguish between international armed conflicts as defined in Article 1 of Protocol I, noninternational armed conflicts as defined in Article 1 of Protocol II, and “situations of internal disturbances and tensions,” which fall below the threshold of applicability of Protocol II. Article 8(2)(f) of the ICC statute has further complicated the question. It declares that the provisions in paragraph 2(e), which go beyond common Article 3 and include some additional Geneva and Hague law, apply to “armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is a protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.”

22. Because “[t]he characterization of the conflict … determines which rules of international humanitarian law, if any, will be applicable”, the door is open for Governments to characterize the conflict in the way most favourable to them, potentially decreasing the applicability of international humanitarian law. This problem is exacerbated by the extent of “ ‘mixed’ or ‘internationalized’ conflicts” characteristic of the current era. The non-applicability of the whole of international humanitarian law to non-international armed conflict is particularly problematic because the Protocol dealing specifically with non-international armed conflict, Protocol II, requires a very high threshold to trigger its applicability and has seldom been applied. Thus, the characterization of the armed conflict as a non-international one can have the effect of rendering all humanitarian law inapplicable.

23. This trend separating different thresholds of applicability of international humanitarian law appears to be dissipating. A recent study by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) “seeks a broader recognition that many rules are applicable to both international and non-international conflicts.” Most military manuals do not distinguish between the two, and the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff explicitly states that the “Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war during the conduct of all military operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts are characterized.” The regulations promulgated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the observance of international humanitarian law by United Nations forces also make no distinction between international and non-international conflicts. A growing number of new...
international humanitarian law conventions apply to non-
international conflicts. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has strongly questioned the distinction between international and non-international armed conflict:

Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted “only” within the territory of a sovereign State? If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight.98

24. Finally, Meron notes that “the codification in the [Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court] of the principles that crimes against humanity can be committed in all situations, without regard to the thresholds of armed conflicts, and that they can be committed not only in furtherance of state policy, but also in furtherance of the policy of non-state entities, is a signal achievement.”99 Thus, although international humanitarian law has historically enjoyed only limited applicability during non-international or non-State armed conflict, the recent trend is a clear break from this tradition.

25. Another area in which an examination of international humanitarian law can prove useful to the general question of the effect of armed conflict on treaties is in the distinction between treaty violation, on the one hand, and the legal effect of armed conflict on treaties, on the other. For example, although it is well established that international armed conflict has ostensibly no effect on international humanitarian law,94 and the extent to which international humanitarian law applies during non-international conflict is increasing,95 a review of State practice nevertheless reveals many cases where international humanitarian law, although it applied, was violated. In Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Congo, Somalia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Kuwait and elsewhere, the “contrast between the normative framework and the harsh, often barbaric reality of the battlefield” is bitterly apparent.99 The Secretary-General of the United Nations recognized this dichotomy in a recent report to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict:

Despite the adoption of the various conventions on international humanitarian and human rights law over the past 50 years, hardly a day goes by where we are not presented with evidence of the intimidation, brutalization, torture and killing of helpless civilians in situations of armed conflict. Whether it is mutilations in Sierra Leone, genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans or disappearances in Latin America, the parties to conflicts have acted with deliberate indifference to those conventions. Rebel factions, opposition fighters and Government forces continue to target innocent civilians with alarming frequency.100

Similarly, the ICRC states that “[s]adly, there are countless examples of violation of international humanitarian law.”101 Thus, a clear distinction exists between the effect of armed conflict on treaties, on the one hand, and treaty violation, on the other. Because international humanitarian law unquestionably applies during armed conflict, it is easy to separate a legal effect of armed conflict on international humanitarian law (there is none) from a violation of international humanitarian law by the parties to the conflict. With other treaties whose status during armed conflict is less clear, the two become more difficult to separate, and one should take care not to mistake treaty violation as evidence of an effect of armed conflict on that treaty.

2. TREATIES CONTAINING EXPRESS PROVISIONS ON WAR-TIME APPLICABILITY

26. Treaty provisions expressly confirming the applicability of the treaty during armed conflict or war will generally be honoured.102 For example, the British Government continued to pay Russia loan payments despite the outbreak of war between the two parties because the treaty establishing the loan, the Treaty of 19 May 1815, expressly provided that such payments should continue during times of war.103 A recent example of such an ex-

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94 Meron, “The humanization of humanitarian law” (footnote 86 above), p. 262 (citing Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, 1980, and its Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices, as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II); Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction, 1997; Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, 1972; Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, 1993; and the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1999).


96 Meron, “The humanization of humanitarian law” (footnote 86 above), p. 263.

97 See footnotes 77–85 above and accompanying text.

98 See footnotes 91–96 above and accompanying text.


102 See para. (4) of the commentary to article 21 of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, which explains that even a State acting under its inherent right to self-defence “is ‘totally restrained’ by an international obligation if that obligation is expressed or intended to apply as a definitive constraint even to States in armed conflict” (Yearbook … 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 75); see also Institute of International Law resolution of 1985 on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (footnote 19 above), art. 3 (“The outbreak of an armed conflict renders operative, in accordance with their own provisions, between the parties treaties which expressly provide that they are to be operative during an armed conflict or which by reason of their nature or purpose are to be regarded as operative during an armed conflict”), see likewise Oppenheim (footnote 29 above), p. 304; Briggs (ed.), The Law of Nations... (footnote 28 above), p. 942; Starke, An Introduction to International Law (footnote 28 above), p. 409.

103 McNair, The Law of Treaties (footnote 36 above), pp. 696–697. Sir William Molesworth, speaking for the British Government in the House of Commons on 1 August 1854, said: “[I]n consequence of our being at war with Russia, I hold that we are more bound in honour to pay this debt than if we were at peace” (ibid., p. 697). Attorney General Alexander Cockburn said in the House of Commons that if Britain ceased its payments, it “would stand before Europe in the position of a country which took advantage of war to violate engagements to which they were bound by the most solemn consideration of honour and good faith to adhere” (ibid.).
press provision is article 6 (1) of the 1986 Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France, which states: “In the event of any exceptional circumstances, such as ... armed conflict, or the threat thereof, each Government, after consultation with the other if circumstances permit, may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Treaty, its supplementary Protocols and arrangements, or the Concession.” Such cases of express provision are easy, because the intent of the parties that the treaty continue in force during armed conflict is clear.

3. TREATIES CREATING OR REGULATING A PERMANENT REGIME OR STATUS

27. There is broad consensus that treaties declaring, creating or regulating a permanent regime or status will be unaffected by the outbreak of armed conflict between some or all of the members thereof.105 This includes treaties providing sovereignty, ceding territory, creating servitudes, administering a territory,106 establishing a boundary107 and creating an international organization.108


105 See McNair (footnote 36 above), pp. 704 and 720; Delbrück (footnote 6 above), p. 1370; Aust (footnote 28 above), p. 244; Verzijl (footnote 6 above), pp. 371–372; Oppenheim (footnote 29 above), p. 304; Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd rev. ed. (Tucker, ed.) (footnote 28 above), p. 501; McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 53 (“[T]he practice of the United States indicates that treaties which are intended to create perpetual arrangements ... the exercise of which would not be inconsistent with national policy during the war) are generally regarded as surviving the outbreak of war between the parties”; Stone (footnote 2 above), p. 448; “Study of the legal validity of the undertakings concerning minorities” (E/CN.4/367 and Corr.1 and Add.1) (footnote 77 above), p. 9. But see Stone (footnote 2 above), p. 449 (arguing that “multilateral instruments of international legislation ... are at least suspended during the war between opposed belligerents” and that “State practice has ... tend[ed] ... to treat all inter-bel- ligerent treaty relations, including those of a multilateral and legislative character, as abrogated by war”); see also Starke, An Introduction to International Law (footnote 28 above), p. 409.

106 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), pp. 70–71 (“Since the inception of the trusteeship system, the United Nations has acted on the assumption that the Congo Basin treaty [see General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885] continued in force for all of the parties to it despite the war ... even though a political treaty ... . The multilateral character of the agreement undoubtedly contributed to the maintenance of this convention”).

107 Tobin (footnote 23 above), p. 50 (“There appears to be unanimous opinion that war has no effect on boundary provisions either during or subsequent to hostilities”); McNair, The Law of Treaties (footnote 36 above), p. 705; Restatement (Third), (footnote 80 above), sect. 336, reporters’ note 2; Stone (footnote 2 above), p. 448; Oppenheim (footnote 29 above), p. 304. See also K. Haikobab, “The Shatt-al-Arab river boundary: a legal reappraisal”, BYJIL 1985, vol. 56, p. 49, at pp. 67–69, 80–85 and 95. But see G. Ténèkédés, “La condition internationale de la République de Chypre”, AFDL, vol. 6 (1960), p. 133, at p. 140 (describing and criticizing Great Britain’s unilateral annexation of Cyprus in 1914 based on the proposition that the war between Great Britain and Turkey had rendered the treaty concerning Cyprus invalid).

108 Institute of International Law resolution of 1985 on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (footnote 19 above), art. 6 (“A treaty establishing an international organization is not affected by the existence of an armed conflict between any of its parties”); see also Briggs (ed.), The Law of Nations ... (footnote 28 above), p. 945. Practice and doctrine in this area have changed considerably. The traditional belief was that armed conflict had a more substantial effect on such treaties. See also Tobin (footnote 23 above), pp. 74–82.

28. For example, in In re Meyer’s Estate, an appellate court in the United States of America addressed the permanence of treaties dealing with territory—the so-called “transitory” or “dispositive” treaties—holding that “[t]he authorities appear to be in accord that there is nothing incompatible with the policy of the government, with the safety of its nation, or with the maintenance of war in the enforcement of dispositive treaties or dispositive parts of treaties. Such provisions are compatible with, and are not abrogated by, a state of war.”109

29. Similarly, “there can be no doubt that in the British view State rights of a permanent character, connected with sovereignty and status and territory, ... are not affected by the outbreak of war” 110 Reporting in 1900 on the effects of war on the treaties establishing the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, law officers Webster and Finlay stated that “in our opinion, the action of the Orange Free State in taking part in the present war has not, ipso facto, had the effect of putting an end to the instrument constituting its independence. The arrangement made by that instrument set up a state of things intended to be permanent by an act done once for all. Instruments of this kind are not, ipso facto, abrogated by war.”111

30. Finally, the Vienna Convention on succession of States in respect of treaties of 1978 reaches a similar conclusion about the resilience of boundary treaties, stating that “[a] succession of States does not as such affect: (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the régime of a boundary.”112 Although not directly relevant to the question of the effect of armed conflict on treaties, many cases of succession of States have come about through armed conflict.

4. TREATIES OR TREATY PROVISIONS CODIFYING JUS COGENS RULES

31. A jus cogens norm is defined as a “norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”.113 Thus, by definition, norms belonging to the category of jus cogens apply in all situations and are unaffected by the outbreak of armed conflict.114

114 Chinkin (footnote 15 above), p. 184 (“Even at times of severe crisis seriously threatening group values, humanitarian limits must restrict the options available to national elites. This policy underlies the principle of jus cogens”). Some commentators have made the same argument with respect to obligations erga omnes, or confused jus cogens norms with obligations erga omnes. See Tarasofsky (footnote 71 above), pp. 19–20; S. N. Simonds, “Conventional warfare and environmental protection: a proposal for international legal reform”, Stanford Journal of International Law, vol. 29 (1992), p. 165, at p. 190. Contrary to the above, an obligation is not necessarily jus cogens merely by virtue of being erga omnes.
5. Human rights treaties

32. Although the debate continues as to whether human rights treaties apply to armed conflict, it is now well established that non-derogable provisions of human rights treaties apply during armed conflict. First, the International Court of Justice stated in its advisory opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that “the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant wherein certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.” The nuclear weapons opinion is the closest that the Court has come to examining the effects of armed conflict on treaties, including significant discussion of the effect of armed conflict on both human rights and environmental treaties. Second, the Commission stated in its commentary to the articles on responsibilities of States for internationally wrongful acts that although the inherent right to self-defence may justify non-performance of certain treaties, “[a]s to obligations under international humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable human rights provisions, self-defence does not preclude the wrongfulness of conduct.” Finally, commentators are also in agreement that non-derogable human rights provisions are applicable during armed conflict. Because non-derogable human rights provisions codify jus cogens norms, the application of non-derogable human rights provisions during armed conflict can be considered a corollary of the rule expressed in the preceding section, that treaty provisions representing jus cogens norms must be honoured notwithstanding the outbreak of armed conflict.

115 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (footnote 85 above), para. 25. Several countries had advanced similar arguments in their written submissions to the Court. The United States argued that the “use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of legitimate self-defense would not be in any way inconsistent with the international human right to life, tacitly accepting its applicability in armed conflict (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, written submission of the United States, p. 43 (20 June 1995)). In the same way, the Russian Federation tacitly accepts the applicability of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and of human rights law to situations of armed conflict (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, written submission of the Russian Federation (19 June 1995), p. 9). France similarly tacitly accepted the applicability of human rights law to situations of armed conflict (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, written submission of France (20 June 1995), p. 38). The above written pleadings are available from www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95/written-proceedings.

116 One of the arguments in the case—that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal under international law because it would violate provisions of environmental or human rights treaties—is premised on the assumption that these treaties continue to apply in armed conflict. For an additional discussion of the opinion, see E. Kristjánssdóttir, “The legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under current international law: the arguments behind the World Court’s advisory opinion”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 30 (1997–1998), p. 291.

117 Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 74 (para. 3) of commentary to draft article 21.


119 The 1969 Vienna Convention, in article 53, defines jus cogens norms by their non-derogable character.
33. Although the effect of armed conflict on derogable human rights provisions is not as clear as with the non-derogable provisions, there is growing acceptance of the proposition that these provisions may also apply during armed conflict. First, as early as 1950, before the existence of the modern human rights conventions, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights concluded in a study on treaties concerning minorities—precursors to human rights treaties—that they were not terminated by war. 122 It reached its conclusion by arguing that such treaties fitted into the two classes of treaties then believed to withstand the outbreak of war, namely treaties “to which belligerents and neutral countries are parties … [and treaties creating] … permanent situations of general interest.” 123 Second, one of the 11 substantive articles of the resolution of the Institute of International Law is devoted to the subject, stating: “The existence of an armed conflict does not entitle a party unilaterally to terminate or to suspend the operation of treaty provisions relating to the protection of the human person, unless treaty otherwise provides.” 124 Finally, the International Court of Justice stated, in its advisory opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, that with regard to derogable provisions the test “falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.” 125 The Court thus left open the possibility that derogable human rights provisions could apply during armed conflict to the extent that international humanitarian law so provides.

34. In conclusion, it is well established that non-derogable human rights provisions apply during armed conflict, and there is a growing consensus that derogable provisions may apply as well. With these results in mind, a caveat is in order: a clear distinction must be drawn between the effect armed conflict has on human rights treaties—that is, the continued legal validity of the treaty provision itself—and the effect armed conflict has on State behaviour as measured by these treaties. While armed conflict often results in increased breaches of human rights treaties, this is distinct from the legal status of the treaty provisions themselves. As discussed previously with respect to humanitarian treaties, 126 an examination of the effect of armed conflict on human rights treaties makes clear the need to distinguish between the legal effect armed conflict has on the vitality of these treaties, which appears to be minimal, and violations of these treaties during armed conflict, which, unfortunately, may be quite significant.

6. TREATIES GOVERNING INTERGOVERNMENTAL DEBT

35. There is strong support for the proposition that treaties regulating intergovernmental debt continue to apply during armed conflict. According to McIntyre, it is “a well-established principle … that an intergovernmental debt based on treaty is not impaired by war between the parties.” 127 For example, the United States of America never regarded such treaties “as even suspended as a result of World War II, although actual payment may have been rendered impossible during the period of hostilities.” 128 Similarly, during the Spanish-American War of 1898, “[w]hile Spain did not make any payments on her debt to the United States while the war was in progress, she did resume payments, including the one for the year of actual hostilities, shortly after the return of peace.” 129 Finally, Great Britain continued loan payments to Russia during the Crimean War, thus honouring a treaty expressly providing for continued payments during war. 130 McIntyre concludes that “[t]his is perhaps the most outstanding example of what is now a well-established principle, namely that an intergovernmental debt based on treaty is not impaired by war between the parties.” 131

7. DIPLOMATIC CONVENTIONS

36. It is well established that armed conflict should have no effect on diplomatic conventions. In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), 132 the International Court of Justice issued a very clear opinion on the effect of conflict on treaties concerning diplomatic immunity, “resoundingly affirm[ing] the global importance of the protection of diplomats and of diplomatic communications for the maintenance of a minimum public order.” 133 In the words of Christine Chinkin, “[i]t appears from this unanimous decision that no degree of crisis between the States and no threat to internal group values would support derogation from the performance of [diplomatic conventions].” 134 Although the Court issued its decision in the context of undeclared hostilities, it extended its ruling to all forms of armed conflict, stating in the clearest possible terms that “[e]ven in the case of armed conflict or in the case of a breach in diplomatic relations, [the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and
B. Treaties exhibiting a moderately high likelihood of applicability

I. Reciprocal inheritance treaties

37. The present section outlines State practice with regard to reciprocal inheritance treaties, finding that although a strong line of cases in the United States supports their continued applicability during armed conflict, a significant body of jurisprudence in France holds them to be absolutely abrogated.

38. As part of the United States practice that treaties "which involve private rights (the exercise of which would not be inconsistent with national policy during the war) are generally regarded as surviving the outbreak of war between the parties", a large body of jurisprudence exists in the United States of America supporting the proposition that "the treaty right of acquiring real estates [sic] in the United States from a deceased American, either dying intestate or in virtue of his will, is not denied to heirs who have become enemy aliens as a consequence of the outbreak of war." In Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven and Wheeler in 1823, the United States Supreme Court said in dicta that "treaties stipulating for permanent rights, and general arrangements, and professing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as well as peace, do not cease on the occurrence of war, but are, at most, only suspended while it lasts".

39. In 1920, in the case of Techt v. Hughes, Judge Cardozo of the Court of Appeals of New York held that reciprocal inheritance provisions in the 1848 treaty between the United States and Austria-Hungary survived the outbreak of war between the two countries. In what has become the most celebrated passage in all of the commentary on the effect of armed conflict on treaties, Judge Cardozo wrote:

"International law to-day does not preserve treaties or annul them regardless of the effects produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving or annulling as the necessities of war exact. It establishes standards, but it does not fetter itself with rules. When it attempts to do more, it finds that there is neither unanimity of opinion nor uniformity of practice. … When I ask what that principle or standard is, and endeavour to extract it from the long chapters in the books, I get this, and nothing more, that provisions compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly terminated, will be enforced, and those incompatible rejected."138

40. Judge Cardozo concluded by finding nothing incompatible with the policy of the Government, with the safety of the nation or with the maintenance of the war in the enforcement of a mutual inheritance treaty, and held that the treaty was not abrogated.

41. In 1926, the Kansas Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Miner v. Reardon, also held that the reciprocity inheritance clause of the treaty of 1828 between the United States of America and Prussia survived the outbreak of war, stating "we regard the reciprocal privilege of inheritance as not so related to the carrying on of a war as to create a presumption of an intention it should operate only in time of peace."142 This conclusion was quite extraordinary in the light of the language of article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles, concluding the First World War, which stated that the United States of America must notify Germany of all treaties which it wished to revive, and that all other treaties "are and shall remain abrogated". The Court reasoned that the ability of the United States of America to revive treaties under article 289 was a privilege, not a requirement, and that "it is difficult to believe there was a purpose to withdraw the privilege of individuals to inherit, which is not incompatible with hostilities, and which the war itself had not disturbed."143

42. In 1947, the United States Supreme Court held, in Clark v. Allen, that the Second World War did not abrogate the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of 8 December 1923 granting certain reciprocal inheritance rights to American and German nationals regarding
property situated in the other country.\textsuperscript{144} The Court used the test of “compatibility with national policy” and held that provisions guaranteeing reciprocal inheritance rights would not be incompatible and that the treaty should be honoured.\textsuperscript{145} In 1951, a California Appeals Court held in \textit{In re Meyer’s Estate} that the First World War did not abrogate reciprocal inheritance provisions in the Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Free Hanseatic Republics of Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg of 1827; like the \textit{Reardon} court, this court argued that the clear language in article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles, stating that all treaties not subject to notification by the United States of America were abrogated, did not apply. Instead, it held that the language “all the others are and shall remain abrogated” in article 289 did not intend to “absolutely wipe out all former treaties between the United States and the German states.”\textsuperscript{146} The Court called the provision “equivocal and uncertain” and concluded that “[i]n the absence of express words to that effect, it is difficult to infer that it was the purpose of the contracting parties to withdraw the privilege of individuals to inherit, which was not incompatible with hostilities, and which the war had not disturbed.”\textsuperscript{147}

43. The Courts of other countries have reached similar conclusions. In the well-known English decision in \textit{Sutton v. Sutton}, Sir John Leach, the Master of the Rolls, held that the outbreak of the War of 1812 between Great Britain and the United States of America had no effect upon article 9 of the Jay Treaty of 19 November 1794 between the two countries, allowing for reciprocal rights to hold, sell, pass on and acquire title to land.\textsuperscript{148} The Master of Rolls said: “It is a reasonable construction that it was the intention of the Treaty that the operation of the Treaty should be permanent, and not depend upon the continuance of a state of peace.”\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{144} Clark v. Allen (see footnote 46 above). Similarly, in 1948 the Supreme Court of California held in \textit{Estate of Knutzen} that the Treaty of 1923 between the United States and Germany allowing reciprocal inheritance was in force and not abrogated or suspended by the outbreak of the Second World War (31 Cal. 2d 573, 191 P.2d 747 (1948)). See also Blank v. Clark, 79 F. Supp. 11 (1954) (E.D. Pa. 1948) (different court reaching same result as to same treaty). For the text of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Relations between Germany and the United States of America, signed at Washington, D.C., on 8 December 1923, see \textit{League of Nations, vol. LII, No. 1254, p. 133. Treaty Series States of America}, signed at Washington, D.C., on 8 December 1923, see \textit{League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. LI, No. 1254, p. 133.}

\textsuperscript{145} Rank, “Modern war and the validity of treaties (part II)” (footnote 34 above), p. 512.

\textsuperscript{146} In \textit{re Meyer’s Estate} (footnote 72 above), pp. 808–809.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 809. The United States’ position was also stated by Acting Secretary of State Grew in 1945 in response to an inquiry by Attorney General Biddle as to the effect of the Second World War on the reciprocal inheritance provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Relations between Germany and the United States of America (see footnote 144 above). After outlining much of the case law discussed above, the Acting Secretary of State concludes: “In the light of the foregoing the Department perceives no objection to the position which you are advancing to the effect that Article IV of the Treaty of December 8, 1923, with Germany remains in effect despite the outbreak of war” (Whiteman (ed.) (footnote 32 above), pp. 495–497 (citing letter of the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Attorney General (Biddle), 21 May 1945, MS. Department of State, file 740.00113 EW/4-1245).


\textsuperscript{149} Cited in McNair, \textit{The Law of Treaties} (footnote 36 above), p. 712. McNair emphasizes that because Sutton (see footnote 62 above) concerned proprietary rights accruing before the war, it cannot stand for the proposition that proprietary rights accruing after a war would also be protected, as does the United States decision in \textit{Techt} (see footnote 45 above). In this way, the United States decision in \textit{Techt} goes beyond both the United States decision in \textit{Propagation of the Gospel} (see footnote 62 above) and the English decision in \textit{Sutton}, because both of the latter cases concern only the effect of armed conflict on vested rights, not the treaties that created those vested rights.

\textsuperscript{145} Decision of 20 October 1922 (AD 1919–1922, case No. 169) and decision of 23 May 1923 (AD 1925–1926, case No. 331) (cited in Verzijl (footnote 6 above), pp. 382–383). See also Rank, “Modern war and the validity of treaties (part II)” (footnote 34 above), pp. 531–532, describing a split in the German decisions but noting that “[t]he general view of the German courts is that bilateral treaties, even those concerning private rights, are abrogated by war” (citing \textit{Neue jurisprudentielle Wochenschrift}, vol. 4 (1951), p. 831).


\textsuperscript{147} See, for example, a French court’s early decision in \textit{Inaard Blank v. Pezzales}, S. 1859, 2.606 (Aix, 8 December 1858) (supporting “modern view”) (cited in Castel (footnote 151 above), p. 568, footnote 13).

\textsuperscript{148} Rank, “Modern war and the validity of treaties (part II)” (footnote 34 above), p. 521.


\textsuperscript{145} Rank, “Modern war and the validity of treaties (part II)” (footnote 34 above), p. 524 (citing, for example, \textit{S. v. P.}, Peace Tribunal of Marseilles, 5th Canton (26 October 1943), reported in \textit{Gazette du Palais}, \textit{Supplément provincial} (1943), p. 170, holding that the First World War abrogated the Treaty on Establishment between France and Italy, signed at Rome on 3 June 1930, according Italian citizens resident in France national treatment concerning private rights without any requirement of reciprocity; and \textit{C. v. B.}, Civil Court of Toulouse (18 November 1943), reported in \textit{Gazette du Palais} (14 December 1943), reaching same result with respect to same treaty). For the text of the Treaty, see \textit{Journal officiel de la République française}, 20 January 1935, p. 643.
Chamber) in *Bussi v. Menetti*, holding that the Treaty of Establishment of 3 June 1930 between France and Italy was not abrogated by the First World War because "treaties of a purely private law nature, which do not involve any intercourse between the enemy Powers and which have no connection with the conduct of hostilities, ... are not, by the mere fact of war, suspended in their effects". Five years after the Social Chamber’s change of course in the *Bussi* decision, the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation opted for the absolute abrogation doctrine in *Artel v. Seymand*, stating that "the existence of a state of war renders null and void all reciprocal obligations assumed by the High Contracting Parties in a treaty concluded on matters of private law affecting relationships in times of peace." The same treaty, the Treaty of Establishment between France and Italy, was at issue, yet the Court provides no reasons for this dramatic reversal of doctrine. The Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, sitting in plenary assembly, upheld this conclusion, and settled the split between the Civil Chamber and the Social Chamber, with its definitive decision in *Lovera v. Rinaldi*, on 22 June 1949. The Court "finally settled the conflicting views of the French Supreme Court departments and established the old rule of absolute abrogation as the sole legal doctrine of France." 

46. In conclusion, there is a very significant line of cases in the United States of America, supported by case law in the United Kingdom, that reciprocal inheritance treaties continue to apply during armed conflict. This jurisprudence is consistent with the general thesis among many courts and commentators that treaties consistent with national policy during armed conflict should be upheld, since the treaties in question concern only private rights. However, the French Court of Cassation has come to the opposite conclusion, leaving this unsettled area of international law. Although the French decisions could be distinguished on the grounds that the treaty concerned is not reciprocal, this is unsatisfying; the most important characteristic of the treaties concerned in this section would not appear to be their reciprocity but rather the fact that they deal with private rights not incompatible with the maintenance of armed conflict. With respect to such treaties, the French abrogation doctrine is at odds with an otherwise strong trend favouring their continued vitality during armed conflict.

2. **Multilateral “law-making” conventions**

47. Some commentators on the effect of armed conflict on treaties make a distinction between treaties that attempt to create a general policy affecting a broad spectrum of international relations and those with a much narrower focus on resolving a specific problem, usually between a much smaller group of States. The former category includes mostly multilateral treaties.

48. In his analysis of the effect of armed conflict on treaties, McNair uses the term "law-making" treaties to mean "treaties which create rules of international law for regulating the future conduct of the parties without creating an international régime, status, or system." McNair argues that such law-making treaties "survive a war, whether all the contracting parties or only some of them are belligerents." Among such treaties, he specifically mentions "[c]onventions creating rules as to nationality, marriage, divorce, and reciprocal enforcement of judgments". Similarly, Starke states, "Multilateral conventions of the ‘law-making’ type relating to health, drugs, protection of industrial property, etc., are not annulled on the outbreak of war but are either suspended, and revived on the termination of hostilities, or receive even in wartime a partial application."
49. Although the term “law-making” is somewhat problematic—since all treaties create international law—State practice seems to confirm the premise that multilateral treaties governing specific areas are often given partial application during armed conflict, sometimes with considerable difficulty. For example, during the Second World War, treaties of public health, narcotics, labour, the control of liquor in Africa, slavery, the trade in white women, the suppression of obscene publications and the safety of life at sea continued in force. Multilateral maritime and air transport agreements, as well as communications conventions, were partially inoperative but received partial application. A Scottish court held in 1976 that “[i]t was an accepted principle of public international law that multipartite law-making treaties survived a war”. Similarly, Verzijl argues that treaties regulating labour rights do not lapse during armed conflict. Thus, although not as resilient as treaties creating a permanent regime or status, multilateral law-making treaties creating rules governing a particular substantive area are moderately likely to withstand armed conflict.

50. The issue of law-making treaties was discussed by the Commission in drafting the 1978 Vienna Convention on succession of States in respect of treaties. Article 16 establishes a general “clean-slate” principle to the effect that a newly independent State is not bound by treaties formerly in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates. In its commentary on the draft article, the Commission concluded, after an extensive review of State practice, that no exception to the clean-slate principle applies to general multilateral treaties and multilateral treaties of a law-making character. In the context of the clean-slate doctrine, therefore, the Commission refused to create a special exception for law-making treaties.

51. The issue resurfaced late in the Commission’s work when Commission member Mr. Ushakov proposed draft article 12 bis, entitled “Multilateral treaties of universal character”. This proposal defined such a treaty as “an international agreement which is by object and purpose of worldwide scale, open to participation by all States, concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” It stated that any such treaty “in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates shall remain in force between a newly independent State and the other States parties to the treaty until such time as the newly independent State gives notice of termination of the said treaty for that State.” Consideration of the draft article was suspended because there was not sufficient time to discuss its implications, and instead it was mentioned and reproduced in the introductory part of the report of the Commission to the General Assembly.

C. Treaties exhibiting a varied or emerging likelihood of applicability

52. The present section examines treaties which exhibit either a controversial, varied or emerging likelihood of applicability during armed conflict, including international transport agreements; environmental treaties; extradition treaties; border-crossing treaties; treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation; intellectual property treaties; and penal transfer treaties.

1. International transport agreements

53. The State practice related to international transport agreements is contradictory. Chinkin notes that “[u]nlike diplomatic relations between States, restrictions on any given route do not threaten the entire structure of interstate communications. If acceptable alternative routes exist, the demands of the transit States are more likely to be deemed reasonable.” She distinguishes a split in State practice between air agreements pertaining to overflight or landing rights, evincing a moderate or low applicability during armed conflict, and sea agreements pertaining to international oceanic canals, evincing a somewhat higher degree of applicability during armed conflict. Here each will be treated in turn.

(a) Air agreements

54. History is replete with examples of armed conflict causing the suspension of international air agreements. First, as a result of the 1967 Middle East war, the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, the Sudan and Egypt closed airports and seaports to the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Chinkin notes that although these actions cannot generally be justified on the grounds of military necessity, an argument could be made that they were justifiable as collective self-defence in their war against Israel. Second, airports in Senegal, Guinea and Canada were closed to Soviet aircraft bound for Havana in 1962 in response to the United States-led quarantine of Cuba. Third, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the continuing dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea caused Greece and Turkey to suspend overflight rights...
until September 1976, when they were formally reinstated. Fourth, India claimed that two multilateral aviation conventions and a bilateral treaty providing Pakistan with overflight and landing rights in India had been suspended in 1971 by the hostilities between India and Pakistan that began in 1965. Pointing to the periodic outbreaks of conflict between the two States since 1947, India argued that Pakistan could not possibly have legitimate expectations of continued air passage rights when further conflict would likely erupt. Pakistan claimed that India, as an aggressor, could not lawfully suspend the agreements. Chinkin argues that States may suspend the agreements when conflict threatens their security. The military hostilities of 1965, although limited both in purpose and arenas, were intense and severe. It would be disruptive and possibly even destructive to a State to insist that it must allow the enemy to fly over and land in its territory. While Pakistan did suffer considerable economic loss and severe inconvenience, the existence of alternative routes, even though expensive and much less direct, did make India’s action more reasonable.

55. Noting two other agreements that continued in effect, including a sea transport agreement, Chinkin concludes that “States might perceive air agreements as potentially more prejudicial to their security interests and thus expect that such agreements will be subject to special consideration.” In fact, the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation has a provision stipulating “[i]n case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals.”

56. The effect of armed conflict on agreements establishing inter-oceanic canals such as the Suez, Panama and Kiel Canals has varied. On the one hand, several examples exist supporting the proposition that conventions allowing access to canals withstand conflict situations. First, when Germany refused to allow passage through the Kiel Canal to a ship carrying munitions to Poland during the Polish–Prussian war of 1920, the Permanent Court of International Justice said in dicta that when a waterway has been “dedicated to international use”, the riparian can no longer exclude other States at its discretion. Second, the international community reacted unfavourably to Egypt’s closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping beginning in 1948, as closing the Canal was not necessary for Egypt’s defence. Chinkin (footnote 15 above), p. 205 (citing The S.S. “Wimbeldon” (1923) (see footnote 48 above). Chinkin notes, however, that the Court’s strong language may have been influenced by the fact that the Treaty of Versailles specifically declared the Canal “free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality” (ibid.) (citing the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, art. 380). She also believes that Germany would have been afforded greater freedom of action had it been at war, arguing that the riparian’s security interest should take priority.

57. On the other hand, Great Britain restricted the passage of enemy ships through the Suez Canal throughout the First and Second World Wars, and the United States of America partially or fully restricted the use of the Panama Canal during the two World Wars. Chinkin argues that sea transport agreements should be honoured during armed conflict because of “the need for reliable and secure communications for international trade and security”. In the modern world, however, air transport is also becoming increasingly important to trade and very relevant to security issues in the light of its connection with international terrorism.

2. Environmental treaties

58. Recent scholarly consideration of the applicability of peacetime environmental treaties during armed conflict has spawned the most significant discussion of the effect of armed conflict on treaties since the Second World War. This renewed interest can be attributed both to the

(b) Sea agreements

184 Ibid., pp. 198–199 (noting that the actions do not seem justifiable by the doctrine of military necessity).
185 Ibid., p. 200.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid., pp. 200–201 (footnotes omitted).
189 The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Agreement to submit the Rann of Kutch dispute to arbitration (Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan relating to a cease-fire and the restoration of the status quo as at 1 January 1965 in the area of Gujranwala/Pakistan border and concerning the arrangements for the determination of the border in that area, signed at New Delhi on 30 June 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 548, No. 7983, p. 277).
191 Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944, art. 89.
193 Chinkin (footnote 15 above), p. 203 (citing The S.S. “Wimbeldon” (1923) (see footnote 48 above). Chinkin notes, however, that the

(Continued on next page.)
considerable environmental destruction caused by the first Gulf war206 and to the growth and development of international environmental law itself.207 Whatever the cause, the effect of armed conflict on international environmental law has received more modern attention than the effect of armed conflict on any other kind of treaty and marks the most significant development in the topic since the 1985 study by the Institute of International Law.202

59. Reviewing the extensive body of new scholarly commentary on the effect of armed conflict on environmental treaties,203 it is clear that not all environmental treaties react to armed conflict in the same way, and one commentator has categorized them into four distinguishable groups. First, environmental treaties including express terms providing for their application during armed conflict will continue to apply, such as the small class of treaties protecting specific areas, including the Antarctic, the Spitsbergen archipelago and outer space.204 Although some commentators support this approach,205 others argue that to treat environmental treaties as objective regimes206 not subject to suspension during armed conflict would be contrary to the intention of the framers of those treaties.207 Second, a group of environmental treaties contains express language making them wholly or partly inapplicable in times of armed conflict. For example, a great number of conventions limiting ocean pollution do not apply to government ships or warships.208 Third, an intermediate group of treaties, although lacking express language on applicability, will generally apply during armed conflict because their terms will most likely be compatible with national policy during the armed conflict. In this group Simonds places environmental treaties containing general provisions encouraging environmental protection,209 treaties protecting certain sectors of the environment “not inherently necessary to war”,210 treaties the Antarctic Treaty and its supplementing Conventions fall into this category. Others deny this with the convincing arguments that it was not the intention of the Parties of the Antarctic Treaty to establish an order with effect erga omnes, and besides this the Antarctic Treaty expressly provides whether the rule of general international law that treaties providing for objective regimes bind belligerents is directly applicable to environmental treaties” (citing E. Klein, Statusverträge im Völkerrecht (Berlin, Springer, 1980), pp. 18, 62 et seq. and 116 et seq. (supporting objective regime theory for environmental treaties); A. Verdoess and B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3rd ed. (Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 1984), pp. 745 and 488 et seq. (supporting objective regime theory for environmental treaties); Tarasofsky (footnote 71 above), p. 126 (supporting objective regime theory for environmental treaties); R. Wolfrum, Die Internationalisierung staatsfreier Räume (Berlin, Springer, 1984), p. 96, footnote 253 (critical of theory); Klein (ibid.), pp. 111 et seq. and 122 et seq. (critical of theory)).

200 Footnote 199 continued.


201 For example, Professor Tarasofsky argues that the modern legal understanding of the environment, based on the interdependence of multiple ecosystems, makes it impossible to maintain “different rules of environmental protection for peacetime and wartime” (Tarasofsky (footnote 71 above), p. 21).

202 See footnote 18 above.

203 See works cited in footnote 199 above.

204 Simonds (footnote 114 above), p. 193 (citing the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, art. 1; the Treaty of Spitsbergen of 1920; and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967, art. 4. Also in this group, Simonds includes the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which reserves the high seas and the deep seabed exclusively for “peaceful purposes”, contradicting the traditional principle of freedom of warfare on the high seas (Simonds (footnote 114 above), p. 194, citing articles 88 and 141 of the Convention).

205 See, for example, Simonds (footnote 114 above), p. 190.

206 See discussion of permanent regimes in chapter II, section A, above.

207 See, for example, Vökey (footnote 120 above), p. 23: “Whether any peacetime environmental treaties create ‘objective regimes’ … is questionable. Treaties for the use and protection of areas beyond national jurisdiction—such as the high seas, the deep sea-bed, outer space and Antarctica—are similar to treaties providing for objective regimes, since they regulate State conduct in a certain territory as well. But only some commentators support the view that...
permitting derogation in times of emergency\textsuperscript{211} and treaties setting aside certain areas of the world for special environmental protection.\textsuperscript{212} Fourth, treaties which require “advance notification, consultation, or public environmental assessments before engaging in ... military actions are often incompatible with military secrecy”;\textsuperscript{213} despite the lack of express language to this effect.

60. The effect of armed conflict on environmental treaties was also a significant source of discussion in the course of the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, both in the submissions of the parties and in the opinion of the Court. The United States of America argued, on the basis of the language of the treaties, that “[n]o international environmental instrument is expressly applicable in armed conflict.”\textsuperscript{214} France similarly denied the applicability of environmental treaties.\textsuperscript{215} The United Kingdom did not comment on the effect of armed conflict on environmental treaties at all, instead arguing that such treaties would be inapplicable under their terms.\textsuperscript{216}

61. In a brief submitted to the Court by the Government of Solomon Islands, the question of the effects of armed conflict on treaties was examined thoroughly.\textsuperscript{217} After arguing on the basis of the Institute of International Law resolution that “the outbreak of an armed conflict ‘does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties in force between the parties to the armed conflict’”\textsuperscript{218} the brief argued that this rule was specifically applicable to environmental treaties. Considering the provisions of individual environmental treaties, Solomon Islands noted that although the vast majority of such treaties are silent on the question, there are exceptions. First, treaties such as those establishing rules on civil liability for damage “include provisions excluding the operation of their provisions to damage occurring as a result of war and armed conflict.”\textsuperscript{219} Second, some treaties permit their total or partial derogation.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{211} Simonds (footnote 114 above), p. 196 (citing the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, 1972, arts. 5–8). See also Vöître (footnote 120 above), pp. 30–31 (discussing the non-derogable core of obligations protecting the environment).

\textsuperscript{212} Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (see footnote 85 above), written submission of the United States (20 June 1995), pp. 34–42, at p. 34; the submission is available from www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95/written-proceedings.

\textsuperscript{213} Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (see footnote 85 above), written submission of France (20 June 1995), p. 38; the submission is available from www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95/written-proceedings.

\textsuperscript{214} For example, the United Kingdom argued that the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques would not apply, as it only protects against the deliberate manipulation of the environment as a method of war, not environmental degradation as a side-effect of warfare itself (Kristjánssdóttir (footnote 118 above), pp. 359–360, citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (see footnote 85 above), written submission of the United Kingdom (16 June 1995), para. 3.75 (referring to the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques)). Similarly, the United Kingdom argued that environmental treaty provisions were of an overly general nature, and that it is a fundamental principle of the law of treaties that a prohibitive rule, purporting to exclude a particular activity from the scope of permissible State practice, must be clearly stated. As a basic proposition, one cannot, therefore, infer from general words, or a treaty of general application, a prohibitive rule of specific content that would have the effect of limiting the scope of otherwise permissible State conduct. It would be neither sound practice nor sufficient to rely upon general provisions of international law on human rights or the environment for the purpose of conjuring up a rule prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons by way of legitimate self-defence (see written submission of the United Kingdom (footnote 215 above), paras. 3.89 et seq.; cf. McNair, The Law of T. (footnote 36 above), p. 463: “Treaties … are not to be understood as altering or restraining the Practice generally received, unless the Words do fully and necessarily infer an Alteration or Restriction”). Both of these arguments rely on the underlying premise that environmental treaties apply during armed conflict. The submission of the United Kingdom is available from www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95/written-proceedings.

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\textsuperscript{215} Solomon Islands brief (see footnote 217 above), para. 4.39 (citing the Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960, art. 9; the Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage, 1963, arts. IV (3) (a); the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, art. III (2) (a); the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, art. 4 (2) (a) (which also does not apply to oil from warships used in non-commercial service); the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, 1977, art. 3 (3); the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
partial suspension at the instigation of one of the parties.\textsuperscript{221} Third, some treaties apparently do not apply during armed conflict since their provisions do not apply to certain military operations in peacetime.\textsuperscript{222} Fourth and to the contrary, some environmental treaties specifically apply during armed conflict.\textsuperscript{223} Fifth, some such treaties implicitly apply during armed conflict.\textsuperscript{224} The Solomon Islands brief concludes that “[t]he silence of the great majority of treaties intended to protect human health and the environment allows the conclusion that they are designed to ensure environmental protection at all times, in peace and in war, unless expressly excluded.”\textsuperscript{225}

62. The International Court of Justice stated in its advisory opinion that the applicability of environmental treaties in times of armed conflict should be determined only in assessing what is necessary and proportionate:

[The issue is not whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are not applicable during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were intended to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict. The Court does not consider that the treaties in question could have intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its right of self-defence under international law because of its obligations to protect the environment. Nonetheless, States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality.]\textsuperscript{226}

63. In conclusion, the effect of armed conflict on environmental treaties has generated significant recent discussion by States, the International Court of Justice and commentators. While commentators are increasingly arguing that environmental treaties should be applicable during armed conflict, States are divided as to their applicability. The Court has skillfully drawn a middle ground, holding in its advisory opinion on \textit{Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons} that “States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.”\textsuperscript{227}

3. \textbf{Extradition treaties}

64. The effect of armed conflict on extradition treaties between belligerents is an unsettled area of law. On the one hand, extradition treaties primarily affect the rights of individuals, a characteristic generally favouring applicability during armed conflict as long as the treaty does not conflict with military strategy.\textsuperscript{228} On the other hand, the “subject matter … has clearly political aspects,”\textsuperscript{229} a characteristic which generally favours abrogation or at least suspension.\textsuperscript{230}

65. Commentary and State practice reflect this competing logic. On the one hand, the Netherlands Special Court of Cassation has held that the outbreak of the Second World War abrogated a pre-war extradition treaty,\textsuperscript{231} and a more recent decision of the Dutch Council of State reached the same result.\textsuperscript{232} An Italian court has also held an extradition treaty to be terminated by the Second World War.\textsuperscript{233} Courts in the United States of America, however, have held such treaties to be merely suspended,\textsuperscript{234} and even held that “where the offenses were committed during a period of suspension … extradition will be allowed when the treaty is revived.”\textsuperscript{235} The Supreme Court of Seychelles has also held that an extradition treaty was suspended and not abrogated.\textsuperscript{236}

Footnote 220 continued.

\textsuperscript{220} Solomon Islands brief (see footnote 217 above), para. 4.39 (citing the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, art. VII (4) (entered into force 30 August 1975) (non-applicability of Convention to vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international law)).

\textsuperscript{221} Solomon Islands brief (see footnote 217 above), para. 4.39 (citing the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, art. XIX (1) (allowing parties to suspend operation of the whole or part of the Convention in case of war or other hostilities if they consider themselves affected as a belligerent or as a neutral, upon notification to the Convention’s Bureau)).

\textsuperscript{222} Solomon Islands brief (see footnote 217 above), para. 4.39 (citing the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, art. VII (4) entered into force 30 August 1975 (non-applicability of Convention to vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international law)).

\textsuperscript{223} Solomon Islands brief (see footnote 217 above), para. 4.39 (citing the Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, 1976, annex I (generally prohibiting dumping of materials produced for biological and chemical warfare); and the Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping to the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, 1986, arts. 10 (1) and (2) and annex I (prohibiting special dumping permits from being granted in respect of materials produced for biological and chemical warfare)).

\textsuperscript{224} Solomon Islands brief (see footnote 217 above), para. 4.39 (citing the International Convention between the United States of America, Canada and Japan for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, 1952, art. IV (2) (providing that decisions of the International Commission representing the Parties should make allowance, \textit{inter alia}, for wars, which may introduce temporary declines in fish stocks)).

\textsuperscript{225} Solomon Islands brief (see footnote 217 above), para. 4.40 (footnote omitted).

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons}, Advisory Opinion (see footnote 85 above), para. 30.

\textsuperscript{227} ibid.

\textsuperscript{228} See footnotes 43–50 above and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{229} Verzijl (footnote 6 above), p. 386.

\textsuperscript{230} See, for example, Stone (footnote 2 above), p. 450 (arguing that “the only safe course is to assume that … extradition treaties … are abrogated on the outbreak of war”).

\textsuperscript{231} Verzijl (footnote 6 above), p. 386 (citing \textit{In re Flesche}, AD 1949, case No. 87 (27 June 1949)).


\textsuperscript{233} Italian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 1 (1975), p. 233 (citing \textit{In re Barnaton Levy} and Suster Brucker, Court of Appeal, Milan (see footnote 13 above)).


\textsuperscript{235} In re Ryan (see preceding footnote), p. 272, footnote 4 (2) (citing Gallina \textit{v. Fraser}, 177 F. Supp. 856, 864 (Dist. Conn. 1959)). The United States cases do sound a note of caution, generally holding that the decision between suspension and abrogation “can and must be decided against the background of the actual conduct of the two nations involved, acting through the political branches of their governments.” See, for example, Argento (footnotes 9 and 234 above), p. 262; Deaton (footnote 234 above), p. 766.

66. The views of commentators are also split between suspension and abrogation. McNair concluded that “in the absence of contrary provisions, express or implied, an extradition treaty between two States which find themselves at war with another is at least suspended for the duration of the war on the ground that the parties cannot have intended any other result; it may well be that it is automatically abrogated by the outbreak of war.”237 Stark agrees, stating that “extradition treaties in the absence of any clear expression of intention otherwise, prima facie … are suspended.”238

4. BORDER-CROSSING TREATIES

67. Like extradition treaties, treaties allowing nationals reciprocal passage over a land border also have the hybrid quality of applying to private rights but implicating political concerns. The security concerns raised by border-crossing treaties, however, are greater than those relating to extradition treaties, and courts have been more likely to hold them to be abrogated by armed conflict. For example, the United States Supreme Court held in Karnuth v. United States239 that a provision of the Jay Treaty of 1794, allowing reciprocal passage over the United States–Canadian border, was abrogated by the War of 1812.240 “the first time an American court had held a treaty provision terminated by war”.241 Although this decision is often cited as a break with the Court’s jurisprudence upholding reciprocal inheritance treaties,242 it is better to acknowledge the unique political challenges that a treaty allowing border crossing presents. The United States Supreme Court has thus distinguished three potential levels at which treaties upholding private rights affect national policy: reciprocal inheritance treaties affect national policy the least, and have been held to continue during armed conflict; extradition treaties occupy a middle ground and have been held to be merely suspended; and treaties guaranteeing the private right to cross an international border during armed conflict have the largest effect on national policy and security, and have therefore been held to be abrogated.243 The Exchequer Court of Canada reached the same result on similar facts, holding in Francis v. The Queen that the border-crossing provision of the Jay Treaty had been abrogated by the War of 1812.244

5. TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION

68. In certain countries, particularly the United States of America, the use of bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation has become a common method to establish “the ground-rules governing day-to-day intercourse between two countries … [and] secure reciprocal respect for their normal interests abroad, according to agreed rules of law.”245 The United States of America has entered into well over 100 such agreements, including 16 since 1946.246

69. Treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation merit special examination as a changing area of international law. It was traditionally understood that treaties of a political247 or commercial248 nature would be abrogated duties exemption, holding that “the duty exemption is logically dependent upon the free-passage provision. … Abolishing physical passage to prevent reasonable intercourse dictates by necessity the abrogation of the duty exemption for personal goods” (Akins v. United States, 551 F.2d 1222, 1229 (1977)).

240 Karnuth (footnote 72 above), p. 241. Compare McCandless v. United States, 25 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1928). Although the fact scenario in McCandless was similar to Karnuth, the border-crosser in question was an Indian of the Iroquois tribe of the Six Nations. The Court held that article II of the Jay Treaty of 19 November 1794 giving Indians and British subjects from Canada freedom to pass and re-pass into the United States to carry on trade there was not abrogated by the War of 1812, stating: “While it may be contended that in the nature of things treaties and treaty rights end by war, and if they are to again exist it must be by a new treaty, this reasoning does not apply to these Indians. If through the War of 1812 the Six Nations remained neutral, as they had through the Revolutionary War, there was no reason why either of the contending nations in 1812 should desire to change the status of the Six Nations and thereby anger and drive them into hostilities” (ibid., p. 72). The Exchequer Court in Canada later considered the difference between Karnuth and McCandless, arguing that “there was no authority which stated or indicated that any distinction must be made between the members of an Indian tribe and other immigrants: the Jay Treaty of 1794 was held to have been nullified by the War of 1812 in respect of both categories of persons since, although Indians were wards of the Canadian Government, they were certainly within the category of citizens or subjects” (Verzijl (footnote 6 above), p. 381 (In re Francis v. The Queen, ILR, vol. 22, p. 591, at p. 603, 4 DLR 760 (1955)); the Canadian Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on other grounds (discussed in Verzijl (footnote 6 above), pp. 378–381).
241 This logic is exemplified by the Court’s distinction between article III of the Jay Treaty, providing border passage rights, and article IX of the same treaty, concerned with permanently vested property rights. See Karnuth (footnote 72 above), p. 239.
242 Francis v. The Queen (footnote 240 above).
243 H. Walker, “Modern treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation”, Minnesota Law Review, vol. 42 (1957–1958), p. 805, at p. 805. Walker explains that “[i]n United States practice, although ‘friendship’ is attributed an honored place in the title and although the conclusion of a treaty presupposes friendliness and good-will between the signatories, these treaties are not political in character. Rather, they are fundamentally economic and legal. Moreover, though ‘commerce’ and ‘navigation’ complete the title and accurately describe part of their content, their concern nowadays is only secondarily with foreign trade and shipping. They are ‘commercial’ in the broadest sense of that term; and they are above-all treaties of ‘establishment,’ concerned with the protection of persons, natural and juridical, and of the property and interests of such persons. They define the treatment each country owes the nationals of the other; their rights to engage in business and other activities within the boundaries of the former, and the respect due them, their property and their enterprises” (ibid., p. 806).
244 Ibid.
245 See footnote 278 below.
246 Traditional commentators believed that “the effect of the outbreak of war upon a pre-war commercial treaty between opposing belligerents

(Continued on next page.)
The Treaty played an important part in the Court’s merits decision as well: the Court held that the United States of America did not owe reparations because the attacks did not adversely affect freedom of commerce between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America as stipulated in the Treaty, even though the actions were part of legitimate acts of self-defence under the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law.  

72. The International Court of Justice similarly based its jurisdiction on a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. Although a majority of the Court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter under the Statute of the Court itself, an even larger majority found jurisdiction proper under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956 between the United States of America and Nicaragua. As in the Oil Platforms case, the Court considered the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to be in force notwithstanding the armed conflict between the two parties and considered potential breaches of the Treaty in detail. Whereas the Court concluded that the United States of America had breached the Treaty in several respects and ordered it to pay reparations, the United States refused to participate in the case beyond the jurisdictional phase, did not comply with the repARATION order and denounced the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation under its terms. This exercise in treaty interpretation. Instead, the ICJ, in judging the legality of the U.S. actions, interpreted the applicable provisions of the 1955 Treaty … directly in the light of the international law on the use of force in self-defence embodied in the UN Charter and customary international law, sources of law lying outside the ambit of the Treaty’s specific jurisdictional grant.

70. A thorough examination of conflicts concerning treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, however, shows that they are often unaffected by armed conflict. For example, in the recent decision of the International Court of Justice in Oil Platforms, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran played a central role. Because the Islamic Republic of Iran’s application to the Court relied on the compromisory clause included in the Treaty, it argued extensively that the Treaty was still in force notwithstanding the incidents of hostile acts in 1979. First, it argued that under the terms of the Treaty, termination was proper only through one year’s written notice. Second, it cited a white paper prepared for the United States Congress in October 1983 by the Legal Adviser of the United States State Department, stating that “it has not been terminated in accordance with its terms of [sic] the provisions of international law, the Treaty of Amity remains in force between the United States and Iran.” Finally, the Islamic Republic of Iran pointed to multiple decisions of the Islamic Republic of Iran–United States of America Claims Tribunal, a decision of a United States federal district court and a decision of the International Court of Justice in a separate case that all held the Treaty to be in force after 1979.

71. The Court followed this precedent and took the Treaty as applicable in Oil Platforms. In fact, far from viewing the Treaty as abrogated or suspended, the Court based its very jurisdiction upon the Treaty of Amity.
denunciation is in itself significant: if the United States of America had been of the view that the armed conflict had terminated the Treaty, it would not have felt obligated to follow the terms of the Treaty on formal denunciation.

73. The vitality of treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation during wartime is not limited to the modern era or to decisions of international tribunals. As far back as 1794, the United States Attorney General concluded that an American-led ransacking by a French privateer fleet of the British colony of Sierra Leone violated the Treaty of Amity with Britain, and that the victims thus had a civil remedy against the American leader under the Alien Tort Claims Act, a domestic statute providing jurisdiction for violations of the “laws of nations”. Opinions during the Second World War, on the other hand, are conflicting. Although Germany believed that the treaty of friendship, commerce and consular relations signed between itself and the United States of America in 1923 had lapsed during the Second World War, the United States Supreme Court based its seminal ruling in Clark v. Allen on that treaty.

74. Because treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation were viewed as being in force during and after armed conflict in the overwhelming majority of cases outlined above, it is time to re-examine the traditional understanding that armed conflict abrogated all treaties of a political or commercial nature. In this regard, special attention should be paid to Oppenheim’s approach, which distinguishes political treaties not creating a permanent regime, which have a greater chance of suspension, and political treaties creating a permanent regime, which have a lower chance of suspension. Treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation are testament to Oppenheim’s more nuanced approach.

6. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TREATIES

75. The vast majority of literature regarding the effect of armed conflict on intellectual property treaties concerns the two World Wars. During the First World War, a majority of belligerents viewed industrial property conventions as being suspended during the hostilities, but continued to honour any parallel domestic law.

The view as to literary and artistic property was slightly more tempered, and such conventions even received several new signatories among belligerents during the war. This distinction is logical, because with the latter “there is less chance that protecting the originator of the work will be prejudicial to the national interest.” During the Second World War, conventions for the protection of intellectual property were regarded by the United States of America as in force “as far as its relations with the International Bureau were concerned”, but nationals of belligerent States were not able to use them as an effective protection of their intellectual property, especially when national policy demanded the use of a belligerent national’s works. At least two other countries during the Second World War viewed such conventions as being suspended. One could assume that lesser conflicts would not affect intellectual property rights of individuals as long as those rights were consistent with national policy during the armed conflict.

7. PENAL TRANSFER TREATIES

76. Like extradition treaties and border-crossing treaties, penal transfer treaties are yet another area of treaty law where private rights and government policy are simultaneously at issue. Related to extradition treaties, penal transfer treaties create a mechanism by which individuals already sentenced and imprisoned in a foreign country can be transferred to their home country for enforcement of the sentence. Although penal transfer treaties have not received significant commentary, Gregory Gelfand argues that

[under general rules of international law, war between parties to a treaty suspends only the operation of treaties … inconsistent with a state of war. A penal transfer treaty’s objectives, however, require that it remain in effect, at least retrospectively, during hostilities. Prospective operation of such a treaty is inconsistent with a state of war, as States at war avoid unnecessary intercourse. Because the treaty would require consent to each transfer, it could not remain fully effective during hostilities. Nonetheless, the treaty should at least provide certainty where international law is unclear. Thus, it should require continued operation of previously incurred responsibilities in the event of war.

266 See footnote 278 below.
267 For example, modern commentary by Professor Aust argues that commercial treaties are either merely suspended or completely unaffected (Aust (footnote 28 above), p. 244 (“Certain commercial treaties, such as air services agreements may not be suspended, given that their purpose is the mutual protection of nationals of the parties”)).
268 Tobin (footnote 23 above).
D. Treaties exhibiting a low likelihood of applicability

1. Treaties inapplicable through express provisions

77. Some treaties contain express provisions that armed conflict leads to the suspension or abrogation of some or all of their terms.274 For example, the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation has a provision stipulating that “[i]n case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals.”275 In such cases, the express terms of the treaty will be applied and suspension or abrogation will occur.276

2. Treaties incompatible in practice

78. It is generally accepted that treaties which are incompatible with armed conflict are suspended during the period of incompatibility.277 Formulating the parameters of incompatibility in the absence of an express provision is perhaps the most difficult question posed by the effect of armed conflict on treaties, but the present section can provide a few common examples to show the general trend. First, treaties of alliance not “concluded for the purpose of setting up a permanent condition of friendship and commerce or arbitration” are at least suspended during armed conflict.278

Second, a treaty “seeking to hold constant a dynamic power relationship … cannot remain effective during a war between the parties.”279

79. The present chapter considers the effect of the Second World War on treaties. Because of the sheer magnitude of the conflict, the Second World War certainly presents a unique case in the study of the effect of armed conflict on treaties.280 This creates a paradox in utilizing the scholarly literature on the subject: although the effects of armed conflict on treaties received more attention from commentators281 and courts282 after the Second World War than in any other era, it would be disingenuous to develop standards of State practice directly from this literature without acknowledging the extremely special situation that a war of this magnitude entails—a special situation that has, thankfully, never presented itself again.

Chapter III

The effect of the Second World War on treaties

274 See, for example, the treaties cited in Tobin (footnote 23 above), pp. 41–49.

275 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature 7 December 1944, art. 89.

276 See, for example, Verzijl (footnote 6 above), p. 374; Tobin (footnote 23 above), p. 49.

277 Delbrück (footnote 6 above), p. 1369. See also ibid., p. 1370 (arguing that “[t]here is also widespread agreement that certain treaties … [are] … suspended between the belligerents … [including treaties where] the belligerent parties [are] … unable to fulfill their obligations because of the impact of the war on the web of international intercourse”).

278 Oppenheim (footnote 29 above), pp. 303–304. See also Tobin (footnote 23 above), p. 69 (“There appears to be almost unanimous acceptance among writers, both early and modern, of the theory that war terminates alliances as between opposing belligerents”). Commentators have classified such treaties under the somewhat imprecise term “political treaties”. See, for example, McNair, The Law of Treaties (footnote 36 above), p. 703; Aust (footnote 28 above), p. 244; Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd rev. ed. (Tucker, ed.) (footnote 28 above), p. 501; McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 52 (“It cannot be doubted that political treaties have traditionally been generally regarded as terminated as a result of war”); Stone (footnote 2 above), p. 448 (“It is almost unnecessary to observe that [treaties of friendship and commerce or arbitration] are abrogated as between the belligerents from the outbreak of war”); O’Connell, “Legal aspects of the Peace Treaty…” (footnote 248 above), p. 429. For example, the Austro–Germano–Italian Dreibund treaty, a treaty of alliance, “could not possibly remain in force after Italy’s association with the warring Powers of the Entente against the Central Powers in 1915” (Verzijl (footnote 6 above), p. 371). McNair also includes treaties of neutrality, non-aggression, and disarmament in this group, noting that “if a neutral were a party, then the continued obligation of the treaty would probably depend upon other circumstances such as a change in conditions produced by the war” (McNair, The Law of Treaties (footnote 36 above), p. 703). Compare the treaties creating and guaranteeing the permanent neutralization of Switzerland, Luxembourg and Belgium, which are “certainly political but they were not abrogated by the outbreak of war because it is clear that their object was to create a permanent system or status” (ibid.). See also Delbrück (footnote 6 above), p. 1371 (arguing that “political treaties” are “generally considered to be terminated by the commencement of war” because they “depend on the existence of normal political and social relations between States for their proper functioning”); Karnaugh (footnote 72 above), p. 160 (“[T]reaties of amity, of alliance, and the like, having a political character, the object of which is to promote relations of harmony between nation and nation,” are generally regarded as belonging to the class of treaty stipulations that are absolutely annulled by war”); and McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 52. Oppenheim’s approach limiting the class of incompatibility to those treaties not setting up a permanent regime is consistent with the analysis above that treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation have often remained in force during armed conflict. See chapter II, section C above. This approach is superior to that of other commentators who view all treaties of alliance as a group.

279 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 85. See also Starke, An Introduction to International Law (footnote 28 above), p. 409 (“Treaties between the belligerent States which presuppose the maintenance of common political action or good relations between them, for example, treaties of alliance, are abrogated”).
80. Despite the above caveat about the atypical magnitude of the Second World War, an examination of treaty practice during that conflict yields some very surprising results: many fewer treaties were suspended than one might imagine, and, with respect to American practice, "[t]here is no instance in which the evidence is conclusive that the United States regarded any treaty as terminated by World War II." The French similarly held, at least with respect to multilateral treaties, that if the war had any effect it was suspension, not termination. The extensive commentary on the effect of the Second World War on treaties can be summarized as follows:

(a) After a thorough examination of multilateral treaties regarding "the conduct of war, public health, narcotics, labor, the control of liquor in Africa, slavery, the trade in white women, the suppression of obscene publications, and the safety of life at sea", McIntyre concludes that "it appears that none of [these treaties] were terminated by the war. On the contrary it appears that most of them, notably those for the conduct of war, narcotics control, labor, and the convention which created the International Office of Public Health, continued in force, perhaps in some respects even between the belligerents".

(b) Treaties guaranteeing private rights to inheritance remained operative, but other treaty-created private rights were suspended, including freedom of movement, freedom from confiscation without compensation, the right of access to the courts by non-resident enemy aliens and reciprocal visa fee agreements.

(c) The 1890 treaty providing for an international union for the publication of customs tariffs—the Convention concerning the Formation of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, the precursor treaty to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed by almost all of the States in the world—"may have been suspended in some respects between some of the parties to it during World War II, but it appears to have returned to full force with the cessation of hostilities".

(d) Finance conventions governing the payment of international debt were "never regarded … as even suspended as a result of World War II, although actual payment may have been rendered impossible during the period of hostilities".

(e) The view among States on intellectual property conventions was mixed, with the United States of America generally considering them still in force but with at least two other countries considering them suspended.

(f) Multilateral maritime and air transport agreements were rendered essentially inoperative but remained legally in force.

(g) Communications conventions also remained legally applicable, even if "some of their provisions [were] inoperative when direct relations with the enemy [were] called for".

(h) Multilateral humanitarian conventions remained in force.

(i) As to conventions on civil procedure, the Netherlands Supreme Court originally held that the 1905 Hague Convention on procedure in civil cases (Convention relating to Civil Procedure) was suspended by the war, but the Court of Cassation "later narrowed the scope of the effect of war on treaties of this kind by holding that they are suspended only in so far as, and as long as, their provisions cannot, in fact, be executed." The District Court of Stuttgart held that the Hague Convention continued to be applicable between Switzerland and Germany. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs viewed a bilateral agreement on civil procedure between itself and Italy to have been suspended by the Second World War.

(j) In the area of conflict of laws, courts in both the Netherlands and Luxembourg held the Hague Conventions of 1902 concerning conflicts of laws in matters of marriage, divorce and guardianship to be suspended but not abrogated; the Dutch Supreme Court later limited the suspension to provisions which had become unenforceable.

(k) Regarding economic treaties, McIntyre emphasizes that "there was no case in which an economic treaty
was definitely regarded by the United States as terminated by World War II” despite the widely held view that war abrogates treaties of commerce.297 Multilateral economic conventions creating unions with bureaux, such as the postal and telecommunications unions, continued in force throughout the war, with belligerent, allied and neutral States as parties;298

(l) With regard to commercial arbitration, the Italian Court of Cassation held in 1971 that the 1923 Protocol on Arbitration Clauses was not terminated by the Second World War because “[a] declaration of war only brought to an end those international conventions whose observance became absolutely and finally impossible as a result of the outbreak of hostilities and not those conventions whose observance only became temporarily impossible, which were merely suspended for the duration of the hostilities.”299 A United Kingdom court held in 1977 that the Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 was a “multipartite law-making treaty” and thus not terminated by the Second World War.300

(m) Germany made a general statement following the Second World War “to the effect that it considered treaties signed before the outbreak of hostilities as suspended between the belligerents”.301

(n) China, on the other hand, did not share the view held in Europe and the United States of America that treaties generally continued during the Second World War, or were at worst temporarily suspended. When China declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941, it formally declared “that all treaties with that country were abrogated”.302 The 1952 Peace Treaty concluding the war similarly emphasized that the war had rendered all treaties, conventions and agreements between China and Japan null and void.303

81. McIntyre concludes his analysis of the effect of the Second World War on treaties of the United States of America by highlighting the liberal attitude taken by the United States as to the effect of the war on its treaties, marking a partial reversal in the presumption that treaties were generally terminated by war.304 In conclusion, although both World Wars should be analysed with caution because of the more expansive magnitude of conflict they present, a detailed study of the effects of the Second World War on treaties reveals that surprisingly few were suspended, and arguably none, barring a few exceptions, were terminated by the conflict.

CHAPTER IV

Modern State practice

A. Selected countries

1. Greece

82. In one of the few examples of current State practice, the Greek High Administrative Court indirectly considered the effect of armed conflict on treaties on 5 October 2000 in the case Appeal Against the Appointment of the Religious Muslim Leader in the Region of Xanthi (Mufti) Mr. Mehmet Emin Sinicoglou.305 In that case, the Court upheld a 1991 law providing for the appointment of Muslim religious leaders (muftis), even though it contradicted a provision of the 1913 Treaty of Athens providing that muftis be elected. Treaties prevail over domestic laws in the Greek legal order, but the Court held that the Treaty of Athens was no longer in force. The primary reason for this holding is that the relevant provision of the Treaty of Athens had been abolished by the subsequent Lausanne Treaty of Peace of 1923. The Court considered that, among other things, the “substantial and unpredictable” change of circumstances—owing to the exceptional and important events, including the First World War, that took place between the signature of the Treaty of Athens and the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne—was an element of the determination of the intention of the contracting parties (Greece and Turkey) to abolish article 11 of the Treaty of Athens.306

2. France

83. According to a series of judicial opinions in France, it is not the effect of armed conflict itself but the mere declaration of war which can immediately affect treaty relations.307 This teleological approach appears at odds with both the resolution of the Institute of International

297 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), pp. 293–294.
298 Ibid., p. 295. See also ibid., p. 344 (“No State lost membership in any of the international unions or bureaux. When any of the conventions on which they were based came to an end, it was because they were replaced by a subsequent convention”).
300 Crawford (footnote 14 above), pp. 333–335 (citing Masinimport v. Scottish Mechanical Light Industries Ltd., 1976 (see footnotes 14 and 170 above)).
301 High Administrative Court (Third Section), on file with the Codification Division, United Nations.
305 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 340.
306 Ibid.
Law and the theory elaborated in chapter I above that treaties are affected by armed conflict only when they are incompatible with national policy during the conflict.

3. AUSTRIA AS PERMANENT NEUTRAL

84. Stephen Verosta reports to the Institute of International Law that

[b]etween its liberation in 1945 and the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 Austria has, in principle, during armed conflicts continued its treaty-relations with both sides of the armed conflict. Having adopted on 26 October 1955 the international status of permanent neutrality, which subsequently was recognized by all States including the five permanent members of the Security Council, Austria has fulfilled and certainly will fulfill, should an armed conflict occur, its obligations under multilateral as well as under bilateral treaties in relation to its treaty-partners on both sides of the conflict, until supervening circumstances would make the performance impossible (Art. 61, para. 1, [Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties]). One could say that for Austria as a permanently neutral State the outbreak of hostilities as a rule had no effect on treaties. The Austrian courts, generally speaking, act in conformity with the legal standpoint of the government.309

4. SPAIN

85. In 1993, Spain suspended visa-waiver treaties with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina while that area was embroiled in armed conflict.310 It remains to be confirmed if this action represents an effect of the Yugoslav conflict on these treaties or is better categorized as an effect of State succession on treaties.

5. AUSTRALIA

86. Treatment of the topic by Australia in 1966 is emblematic of the changing nature of the effect of armed conflict in an era of less formalized or alternative forms of conflict, in this case the effect of the cold war on treaties. In response to a question about the relationship between Australia and China, the Australian Ministry of External Affairs declared that “Australia is not in a state of hostilities with mainland China and we do not regard that country as being an enemy in that technical and legal sense”, but emphasized that imports and exports of strategic materials would be subject to control.311 If this control were carried out in the form of increased tariffs or duties, it would conflict with a trade treaty maintained by China and Australia at that time, which absolutely limited restrictive tariffs and duties.312 Thus, it appears that even the cold war, a most diffuse, non-traditional form of inter-State conflict, can affect treaties.

6. UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

87. In reply to a question regarding what obligations the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland still had under the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 towards former Spanish colonies, the United Kingdom Minister of State wrote in 1983 that “the convention was terminated in 1795 as a result of the war between Britain and Spain.”313 Although this declaration deals with an armed conflict which occurred almost 200 years earlier, it was made in the context of a current armed conflict, the 1982 war between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the control of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). After emphasizing that the 1795 war had terminated the Nootka Sound Convention, the United Kingdom statement related this to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas): “In 1811 Spain evacuated the Falkland Islands and abandoned them, so that, although the convention was revived in 1814, it could not then be taken to apply to the Falkland Islands.”314

7. SEYCHELLES

88. The Supreme Court of Seychelles considered the effect of armed conflict on treaties in a 1973 case involving the extradition of an Italian arrested in Seychelles. Counsel for the defendant argued that the relevant extradition treaty had been suspended by the Second World War and that on its revival it no longer applied to Seychelles, which had become a separate colony from Mauritius. The prosecution argued that the Second World War created an “automatic lapse” in the treaty, which revived as before at the war’s conclusion, still applicable to Seychelles. The Court combined these two arguments, holding that the treaty was suspended by the war, but continued to apply to Seychelles after being revived by the peace treaty at the conclusion of the Second World War.315

8. ITALY

89. The Italian Yearbook of International Law reports two relevant cases in the early 1970s. First, the Court of Cassation issued a judgment on the effects of armed conflict on treaties generally, holding that the effects of war are limited to suspending and not terminating treaties unless the treaty becomes “absolutely and finally impossible” to carry out.316 The judgment is also significant

308 Institute of International Law resolution of 1985 on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (footnote 19 above), art. 2 (“The outbreak of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties in force between the parties to the armed conflict”).
309 Institute of International Law study (footnote 18 above), vol. 59-4, pp. 255–256.
315 R. v. Meroni (see footnote 236 above).
316 The Court stated that “a declaration of war only brings to an end those international conventions, observance of which would become absolutely and finally impossible as a result of the outbreak of hostilities; if, on the other hand, what is involved is merely temporary incompatibility limited in time to the duration of the hostilities in progress, the result is a more limited one: the effectiveness of the said conventions is simply suspended pending cessation of the state of war and the resumption of normal international relations” (Italian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 1 (1975), p. 233, citing Lunifico Brandites v. Società Asia e Vidal (see footnote 299 above)).
because the court held that armed conflict “cannot bring about the extinction of treaties, but may contribute to a ‘supervening impossibility’ and perhaps to a change in the circumstances (rebus sic stansibus).”317 Second, an Italian court held an extradition treaty to be terminated by the Second World War.318

9. NETHERLANDS

90. The Netherlands Yearbook of International Law reports an incident of Dutch practice in 1982 in which civil strife in Suriname affected treaties between Suriname and the Netherlands, with the Netherlands suspending all such bilateral treaties under the doctrine of rebus sic stansibus.319 Like the Australian example discussed above, the circumstances of the Dutch action exemplify the changing nature of armed conflict; in this case, a limited internal conflict had an effect on inter-State treaty relations.

10. ISRAEL

91. The effect of armed conflict on the treaties of Israel was examined by Shabtai Rosemne, who reported to the Institute of International Law that

[a]s far as I can recall, the question [of the effect of armed conflict on treaties] has not really arisen for Israel, neither for the Courts nor for the Government. This is certainly a consequence of our position on the succession of Israel to the international treaties of Palestine, for that brought to an end from our point of view all possibility of the treaty relationships previously existing between Palestine and any of the Arab States with whom hostilities took place in 1948 and since, from becoming treaties of relationships of Israel. ... In 1958, the Knesset (Parliament) passed the Obsolete Enactments (Repeal) Law, and included among enactments of the Mandatory Government thus repealed was the Palestine-Syria and Palestine-Lebanon Customs Agreement (Validation) Ordinance, 1940. In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill, the Government simply states that the 1940 Ordinance was no longer applicable.320

B. Selected armed conflicts after the Second World War*

1. Korea, 1950 to 1953

92. In June 1953, forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea invaded the Republic of Korea, and in July of that year the United Nations Security Council, Republic of Korea invaded the Republic of Korea, and

93. In 1954, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Egypt concluded the Suez Canal Base Agreement, which provided that “in the event of attack on any member of the Arab League by an outside power, excluding Israel, Egypt would allow the return of British forces to the Suez Canal Base.”324 In 1956, the United Kingdom and France launched an aerial bombardment of Egypt, and eventually landed ground troops. Egypt later asserted that this attack violated the Base Agreement and denounced the treaty.325 Analysing this incident, Robert Layton concludes that Egypt’s denunciation of the treaty “rested upon the doctrine that breach by one state of the terms of an agreement affords the non-culpable state the right of denunciation. If the doctrine was correctly applied, the treaty came to an end because of the violation of its terms, rather than because of an inconsistency between its performance and the hostilities. It is therefore difficult to draw relevant conclusions from the incident.”326

317 Second, an Italian court held an extradition treaty to be terminated by the Second World War.318

318 In re Barnaton Levy and Suster Brucker, Court of Appeal, Milan (see footnote 13 above).


320 Institute of International Law study (footnote 18 above), vol. 59-I, p. 269.


322 In re Barnaton Levy and Suster Brucker, Court of Appeal, Milan (see footnote 13 above).

323 No treaty existed between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States which sent military forces to [Korea], the question whether [the Korean war] had any [effect] on their treaties needs a closer examination. One cannot assume, however, that there were any important effects.”323 No treaties existed between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America at the time the war broke out.324 Although the effect of armed conflict on human rights treaties is now receiving increasing scholarly interest,325 no binding human rights treaty had entered into force at the time of the Korean conflict.326

324 In 1956, the United Kingdom and France launched an aerial bombardment of Egypt, and eventually landed ground troops. Egypt later asserted that this attack violated the Base Agreement and denounced the treaty.325 Analysing this incident, Robert Layton concludes that Egypt’s denunciation of the treaty “rested upon the doctrine that breach by one state of the terms of an agreement affords the non-culpable state the right of denunciation. If the doctrine was correctly applied, the treaty came to an end because of the violation of its terms, rather than because of an inconsistency between its performance and the hostilities. It is therefore difficult to draw relevant conclusions from the incident.”326


3. China and India, 1962

94. A border dispute between China and India “led to a brief military conflict in 1962 and the occupation by Chinese forces of areas in the Himalayas claimed by both countries.”

Dietrich Schindler reported to the Institute of International Law with regard to this conflict that “since diplomatic relations between the two countries were not broken off there was probably no rupture of treaty relations either.”

4. India and Pakistan, 1965

95. In 1965, India and Pakistan became involved in “serious clashes along the border between West Pakistan and India in the Rann of Kutch Desert.” Schindler reported as to this conflict that “there was no effect on treaties in spite of Pakistan’s claim that she was ‘at war’ with India,” citing an arbitration award of the International Chamber of Commerce, which states:

[N]one of the treaties concluded by India and Pakistan before September 1965 seems to have been considered, on either side, as cancelled; at least no contention and no evidence to that effect has been forthcoming from the Defendant. On the contrary, evidence may be found to show that both countries have viewed their treaties as still in force. On the claimant’s side, reference was made to the fact that India continued to effect payments to Pakistan under the Indus River Treaty. It is common knowledge also that the Treaty concluded on June 30, 1965, in order to arbitrate the question of the Rann of Kutch, was finally implemented by both parties (if not actually during the hostilities, of course, but shortly after the Tashkent Declaration of January 10, 1966, i.e., on February 15, 1966). McNair writes on this point: “Both States apparently regarded the existing Kutch Arbitration Agreement between them as continuing in force, taking action under it in connection with the appointment of arbitrators.” Moreover, this view finds a confirmation in Article VI of the Tashkent Declaration, whereby the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed “to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan”—and not, for instance, to “revive” former agreements cancelled by a “war.”

96. Rather than taking this State practice to signify an evolution of the law away from the original premise that war ipso facto abrogates treaties, the arbitrator accepted this traditional premise and concluded that the absence of treaty abrogation could only mean that Pakistan and India did not, in fact, go to war.

5. India and Pakistan, 1971

97. India and Pakistan fought a 12-day war in December 1971 in which “Indian forces occupied East Pakistan, which became the independent state of Bangladesh.” Schindler reported as to this conflict that he “did not find any indications as to its effects on treaties. Different from the 1965 conflict, diplomatic relations were broken off in this conflict between the two countries.”

6. Viet Nam war, 1957 to 1975

98. The Viet Nam war was a military conflict fought in Viet Nam from 1959 to 1975 between South Viet Nam and the United States of America, on one side, and North Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front (NLF) on the other. As with Korea, Dietrich Schindler noted that “we can assume that there were hardly any treaty relations, particularly no bilateral treaties, between the Northern and the Southern parts of [Viet Nam] which could have been affected by the hostilities. As to the States which sent military forces to [Viet Nam], the question whether [the Viet Nam war] had any [effect] on their treaties needs a closer examination. One cannot assume, however, that there were any important effects.” No treaties existed between North Viet Nam and the United States of America at the time because the United States did not recognize the North Vietnamese Government. No binding human rights treaty had yet entered into force.

7. Turkey and Cyprus, 1974

99. Tensions between Greece and Turkey reached boiling point in 1974 when the Greek Cypriot organization Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakoú Agónos (EOKA) overthrew the Government of Cyprus. Turkey reacted by landing troops and occupying portions of the island, quickly overtaking the newly installed regime. Schindler reported as to this conflict that he was unable to find any “relevant information with regard to [the effect of armed conflict on treaties].”

8. Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1979 to 1989

100. In December 1978, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship. Ironically, in response to a request from the Afghan Government for military aid under the terms of that very Treaty, the Soviet Union sent 80,000 troops to Afghanistan, who ultimately supported the overthrow of the Afghan Government and occupied the country for 10 years. There is little doubt that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

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331 Institute of International Law study (footnote 18 above), vol. 59-I, pp. 267–268.
333 Institute of International Law study (footnote 18 above), vol. 59-I, p. 268.
335 Institute of International Law study (footnote 18 above), vol. 59-I, p. 268.
affected the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, which assured mutual “respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs”, and required the two States to “safeguard the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries”. 347

101. The United States Department of State reports that it suspended its Fulbright exchange programme as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,348 thus affecting the treaty governing that programme in Afghanistan, which lacks any provisions concerning armed conflict.349 It is unclear whether the suspension of the treaty was based on changed circumstances making it impossible to perform, or the armed conflict per se.

9. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN–IRAQ WAR, 1980 TO 1988

102. A border dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway separating the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq escalated into full-scale war in the 1980s, in which “both sides attacked civilian targets, Iraq repeatedly used chemical weapons, and commercial shipping in the Gulf was attacked”.350 The war brought “the abrogation of the various treaties establishing the border between the two antagonists”.351 Despite the unilateral abrogation of boundary treaties by both sides prior to and during the war,352 it is the overwhelming view of commentators that “boundary agreements are recognized as belonging to that category of treaties which are not annulled upon the occurrence of war between two or more States.”353

The more interesting legal question is what effect, if any, the war had on other treaties incidental to the boundary treaty, such as the Agreement concerning the use of frontier watercourses of 1975.354 In that context, there does not seem to be any evidence of cooperation under the terms of this treaty since the outbreak of the Islamic Republic of Iran–Iraq war.355 Nevertheless, at least one commentator has argued that it is still in force.356

103. A long-dormant territorial dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over control of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) erupted into a brief war in 1982 when “Argentina’s military government invaded and occupied the islands.”357 The United Kingdom reacted with military force, and Argentine forces surrendered several months after the initial invasion.358 The war over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) had an effect on trade treaties between Argentina and the United Kingdom as well as between Argentina and third countries. At the United Kingdom’s request, members of the European Economic Community, Australia, New Zealand and Canada adopted trade sanctions including “a temporary prohibition on all imports of Argentine products, which ran contrary to article XI:1 and possibly article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It was disputed whether the measures could be justified under the national security exception provided for in article XXI (b) (iii) of the Agreement. The embargo adopted by the European countries also constituted a suspension of Argentina’s rights under two sectoral agreements on trade in textiles and trade in mutton and lamb, for which security exceptions of the Agreement did not apply.”359 It might be argued, however, that such trade restrictions are not an effect of the armed conflict on treaties but rather sanctions imposed on Argentina for its action in the Falklands Islands (Malvinas).

104. In addition, it was in the context of the Falklands Islands (Malvinas) conflict that the United Kingdom argued that the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 regarding former Spanish colonies had been terminated by reiterates the continuing validity of the said agreement, or to conclude no agreement regarding boundaries at all” (Kaikobad, p. 102). See also H. H. G. Post, “Border conflicts between Iraq and Iran: review and legal reflections”, in I. F. Dekker and H. H. G. Post (eds.), The Gulf War of 1980–1988: The Iran–Iraq War in International Legal Perspective (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), p. 7, at pp. 33–34 (arguing that the treaty system of 1975 is still in force after the war). 354 Agreement between Iran and Iraq concerning the use of frontier watercourses, signed at Baghdad, 13 June 1975 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1017, No. 14903, p. 54), establishing the boundary; ibid., p. 102 (Baghdad Treaty has been “mutually transgressed” by both nations).


348 Art. 4.

349 “Washington File, Fulbright Program Reestablished in Afghanistan” (1 May 2003); see https://af.usembassy.gov/education-culture/educational-exchanges/.


347 See, for example, Kaikobad (footnote 107 above), p. 79 (Iran unilaterally abrogates the Shatt-al-Arab Boundary Treaty, signed at Tehran on 4 July 1937 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CXC, No. 4423, p. 241) in April 1969); ibid., p. 86 (Iraq abrogates the Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq, signed at Baghdad on 13 June 1975 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1017, No. 14903, p. 54), establishing the boundary); ibid., p. 102 (Baghdad Treaty has been “mutually transgressed” by both nations).


353 Art. 4.

348 “Washington File, Fulbright Program Reestablished in Afghanistan” (1 May 2003); see https://af.usembassy.gov/education-culture/educational-exchanges/.


352 See, for example, Kaikobad (footnote 107 above), p. 79 (Iran unilaterally abrogates the Shatt-al-Arab Boundary Treaty, signed at Tehran on 4 July 1937 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CXC, No. 4423, p. 241) in April 1969); ibid., p. 86 (Iraq abrogates the Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq, signed at Baghdad on 13 June 1975 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1017, No. 14903, p. 54), establishing the boundary); ibid., p. 102 (Baghdad Treaty has been “mutually transgressed” by both nations).


354 Agreement between Iran and Iraq concerning the use of frontier watercourses, signed at Baghdad, 13 June 1975 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1017, No. 14903, p. 54), establishing the boundary; ibid., p. 102 (Baghdad Treaty has been “mutually transgressed” by both nations).

355 Kaikobad (footnote 107), p. 93; see also the works cited in footnote 107 above. After reviewing the literature on the effect of armed conflict on treaties, Kaikobad, writing during the Islamic Republic of Iran–Iraq conflict, concludes that even though both belligerents mutually transgressed the Baghdad Treaty of 1975 establishing the boundary, this “will not affect the territory allocated by the Baghdad Treaty. At the end of the war, and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary the [boundary as established by the Baghdad Treaty] will once again become operational as the international boundary between the parties. Both States will be free to conclude an agreement which either modifies the Baghdad Treaty in terms of relocation of the frontier, or

356 Post (footnote 353 above), p. 33.


the war between Great Britain and Spain in 1795. After establishing that the Convention had been terminated, the United Kingdom argued that upon its revival in 1814, it no longer applied to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) because Spain had evacuated the Islands in 1811, during the period of suspension. Thus, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) conflict presents the unique case in which an armed conflict causes a State to argue that another armed conflict affected a treaty.


105. The Gulf war was a “military operation … conducted by an international force led by the United States, to put an end to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.” It is important to the topic of the effect of armed conflict on treaties for several reasons. First, a large number of opposing belligerents maintained treaties with Iraq. Second, the Gulf war created extensive scholarly debate as to the effect of armed conflict on environmental treaties, as discussed earlier in the present study. Third, because both the economic conflict on environmental treaties, as discussed earlier in the present study, created extensive scholarly debate as to the effect of armed conflict on treaties, as discussed earlier in the present study, created extensive scholarly debate as to the effect of armed conflict on treaties, as discussed earlier in the present study. This conflict affected a treaty.

106. There would seem to be little doubt that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which began the Gulf conflict, violated the treaty on friendly relations existing between the two nations. Under that treaty, Iraq “recognize[s] the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait” and agrees to “work towards reinforcing the fraternal relations subsisting between the two sister countries … [and to] work towards establishing cultural, commercial and economical co-operation between the two countries”. However, there is no evidence as to whether this treaty is considered suspended or terminated by the parties as a result of the armed conflict, and both the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have continued to refer to some of its provisions.

Security Council resolution 833 (1993), of 27 May 1993, fourth paragraph of the preamble (“Recalling … that through the demarcation process the [United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Boundary Demarcation] Commission was not reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq, but it was simply carrying out the technical task necessary to demarcate for the first time the precise coordinates of the boundary set out in the ‘Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters’ signed by them on 4 October 1963”); A/55/811, para. 4 (noting that the United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) used the boundary established in the treaty on friendly relations as its reference).


(Continued on next page.)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in areas as diverse as extradition, civil procedure, agriculture, air services, cooperation in education, science and culture, and economic and technical cooperation. France had nine bilateral treaties at the time of the outbreak of the conflict, including treaties on transport, trade, technical cooperation and cultural cooperation. Treaties existed between Australia and Iraq in areas including extradition, civil procedure, war cemeteries, and trade, economic and technical cooperation. The Netherlands and Iraq maintained a treaty on cultural cooperation. Egypt and Iraq maintained a treaty on air services. Canada and Iraq maintained a treaty on trade and a treaty on economic and technical cooperation. Czechoslovakia and Iraq maintained bilateral treaties on air transport and consular relations. It is difficult to imagine that such treaties could survive the conflict completely unaffected, but a thorough understanding of the effect of armed conflict on these treaties will be possible only with submissions from Governments. Yet a further relevant factor is to what extent any effects on these treaties were due not to the conflict itself but to the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the Security Council.

12. Sierra Leone civil war, 1991 to 2001

In 1991, a rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia and attacked two Sierra Leonean towns, beginning a conflict that would last a decade and result in tens of thousands of deaths. A power-sharing agreement was signed between the Government and RUF on 7 July 1999 at Lomé, but conflict resumed soon thereafter, and this of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand and the Government of Iraq regarding the service of documents, signed at Baghdad on 8–28 February 1939, entered into force on 8 February 1939.

Convention between the United Kingdom and Iraq regarding Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial Matters (see footnote 372 above), entered into force on 18 December 1936; Australia acceded on 7 October 1937.


Agreement on economic and technical cooperation, signed at Baghdad on 31 October 1983, entered into force on 1 September 1986, ibid., vol. 1458, No. 24622, p. 29.

Agreement (with annex) for the establishment of scheduled air services between and beyond their respective territories, signed at Cairo on 23 March 1955; entered into force on 7 June 1956, ibid., vol. 311, No. 4504, p. 199.

Agreement on trade, economic and technical cooperation, signed at Baghdad on 12 November 1982; entered into force on 6 April 1983, ibid., vol. 1471, No. 24954, p. 237.


See Security Council resolution 661 (1990) (authorizing sanctions). For a specific example, the air treaties discussed in this chapter may have been affected not by the conflict itself but by the sanctions. See Security Council resolution 670 (1990), of 25 September 1990 (authorizing suspension of air flights and landing rights as a mechanism to carry out the sanctions).

See Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, available from www.ucdp.uu.se.

raised questions about the continuing validity of the Locmé Agreement. 393 The President of Sierra Leone, in an address delivered on 22 June 2000 at a national conference organized by the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, commented on the status of the Locmé Peace Agreement. 394 He accused RUF of failing to abide by the Agreement. 395 He stated:

We have consistently maintained that the Agreement is a comprehensive document, and that it should be seen as a whole. It was not signed for the sole purpose of granting the RUF amnesty or for giving its members cabinet and other high-level posts. 396

The President then stated:

[We] have every reason to renounce our obligations under the Agreement and unilaterally declare them null and void. However, it would be irresponsible on our part to do so. In fact such a course of action would be detrimental to the safety and welfare of our people, and inconsistent with their desire, indeed their right to live in peace and security.

I would therefore take this opportunity to announce that while in principle we remain committed to the Locmé Peace agreement, we reserve the right not to be bound by all its provisions. However, because it is an instrument for sustainable peace, and because it contains, generally speaking, strategies for achieving some of the principal objectives of our post-conflict programmes, we shall take a selective approach towards its implementation. From now on, we shall unilaterally, but carefully make our own assessment of the situation and determine which of the provisions are still valid, those that have been rendered obsolete by recent developments and those that should, in the best interest of this nation be implemented.

We shall also set our own priorities. The security and humanitarian provisions of the Agreement will be our primary concern. For instance we attach special importance to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants—an activity which we had already launched long before the Locmé Peace Agreement, under the National Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstitution Programme (NRRRP). In this regard, we have left the door open for ex-combatants, especially those of the RUF, who want real peace, to come forward now and take advantage of the [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] programme before it is too late. Their safety is assured. I should add here that we shall faithfully abide by the relevant provisions in the document for national reconciliation.

Implementation of article XVII of the Agreement, namely, the provision on the restructuring and training of a truly loyal national armed force is also at the top of the agenda.

... There was nothing really wrong with the Locmé Peace Agreement, per se. The problem was the lack of commitment on the part of Mr. Foday Sankoh and some members of the RUF leadership to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement. 397

109. It is not clear whether the President’s comments were a response to the resumption of armed conflict by RUF in violation of the Agreement or whether he was referring to a broader change of circumstances, including the introduction of United Nations peacekeeping troops. The President noted that:

[T]he Agreement was reached in the context of certain subregional, regional and international imperatives. In other words, while it was an agreement between the Government and the RUF, it had international implications. Some of these have manifested themselves in actions already taken or now being contemplated by the international community, including the United Nations Security Council. 398

13. GUINEA-BISSAU CIVIL WAR, 1998

110. In 1998, government loyalists staged a successful coup in Guinea-Bissau. 399 The United States of America reported that it had suspended its Peace Corps programme in 1998 “as the result of fighting in the capital between rebel soldiers and government troops” 400 thus affecting the bilateral treaty governing the programme. 401 The Peace Corps is a United States government programme established in 1961, which funds American volunteerism in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Central and South America, Europe and the Middle East 402 As discussed in relation to this and other conflicts, 403 Peace Corps programmes are often suspended as a result of armed conflict, perhaps due to the nature of the Peace Corps, in which the United States of America provides a free aid programme to States; because the United States of America has funded and provided the programme, it does not hesitate to revoke it when its interests or the safety of its citizens are threatened.

14. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1998

111. With respect to the armed conflict in Croatia and Serbia beginning in 1991, 404 the Commission reported:

In the autumn of 1991, in response to resumption of fighting within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, European Community members suspended and later denounced the 1983 Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia. This led to a general repeal of trade preferences on imports and thus went beyond the weapons embargo ordered by the Security Council in resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991. The reaction was incompatible with the terms of the Cooperation Agreement, which did not provide for the immediate suspension but only for denunciation upon six months’ notice. Justifying the suspension, European Community member States explicitly mentioned the threat to peace and security in the region. But … they relied on fundamental change of circumstances, rather than asserting a right to take countermeasures. 405

112. With respect to the internal armed conflict in Kosovo beginning in February 1998, 406 the Inter Commission reported:

393 Ibid., p. 4.
402 See www.peacecorps.gov.
403 See footnotes 421 (Morocco), 422 (Jordan) and 425 (Eritrea and Ethiopia) and accompanying text below.
404 The Peace Corps is a United States government programme established in 1961, which funds American volunteerism in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Central and South America, Europe and the Middle East 402 As discussed in relation to this and other conflicts, 403 Peace Corps programmes are often suspended as a result of armed conflict, perhaps due to the nature of the Peace Corps, in which the United States of America provides a free aid programme to States; because the United States of America has funded and provided the programme, it does not hesitate to revoke it when its interests or the safety of its citizens are threatened.

See Uppsala Conflict Data Program (see footnote 393 above).
407 See Uppsala Conflict Data Program (see footnote 393 above).
408 See Uppsala Conflict Data Program (see footnote 393 above).
410 See www.peacecorps.gov.
411 See footnotes 421 (Morocco), 422 (Jordan) and 425 (Eritrea and Ethiopia) and accompanying text below.
412 See Uppsala Conflict Data Program (see footnote 393 above).
In response to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, the member States of the European Community adopted legislation providing for the freezing of Yugoslav funds and an immediate flight ban. For a number of countries, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the latter measure implied the non-performance of bilateral aviation agreements. Because of doubts about the legitimacy of the action, the British Government initially was prepared to follow the one-year denunciation procedure provided for in article 17 of its agreement with Yugoslavia. However, it later changed its position and denounced flights with immediate effect.407

113. Both of these examples exemplify situations where internal armed conflict can have an effect on treaties with third States. What is not clear is to what extent the effects could be explained as the result of “fundamental change of circumstances” or “countermeasures” rather than the effect of armed conflict per se.

15. AFGHANISTAN, 2001

114. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the Taliban’s refusal to hand over terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, the United States of America and the United Kingdom led air strikes against Afghanistan in 2001.408 At the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States of America and Afghanistan maintained bilateral treaties relating to agriculture; cultural relations; defence; economic and technical cooperation; educational exchange; private investments; general relations; information media guarantees; narcotic drugs; the United States Peace Corps programme; exchange of official publications; relief supplies and packages; telecommunications; and rural health and development.409 Notably, the treaty on private investments expressly provided for its continued applicability during war.410 The treaty on educational exchange (Fulbright programme) had already been suspended because of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in 1979, but it was officially reinstated soon after the close of the 2001 hostilities.411

115. Several United States allies also maintained multiple treaties with Afghanistan.412 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Afghanistan maintained treaties in the areas of financial and development assistance413 and cultural relations.414 It is difficult to imagine how the Cultural Convention—which promotes bilateral exchanges, for example, of researchers, scientists, scholars, youth, professors and athletic groups415—could have continued unaffected by the war in Afghanistan. A similar cultural agreement existed between Japan and Afghanistan.416 Both Germany and Turkey maintained bilateral treaties with Afghanistan in the potentially incompatible area of air transport; neither treaty makes provision for the outbreak of armed conflict.417 France and Afghanistan maintained a potentially incompatible treaty on road transport.418 Canada and Afghanistan maintained a trade agreement guaranteeing reciprocal most-favoured-nation status.419

116. Although one could speculate that the above-mentioned treaties may have been affected, there is no evidence to support this speculation, and input from the reparations received from enemy countries, that the Government of Afghanistan may make or pay for losses incurred by reason of war; if the Government of the United States of America makes payment in U.S. dollars to any national of the United States of America under a guarantee for losses by reason of war, the Government of Afghanistan will recognize the transfer to the United States of America of any right, privilege, or interest, or any part thereof, that such nationals may be granted or become entitled to as a result of the aforementioned treatment by the Government of Afghanistan”.

[407 Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 138 (para. (3) of the commentary to art. 54 of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts) (footnotes omitted).

408 Encyclopedia of the United Nations... (footnote 321 above), vol. 1, p. 17.

409 United States Department of State, Treaties in Force (2003), Part 1, p. 1, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/24227.pdf. The United Nations Treaty Series online search engine lists additional subsequent and additional treaties; see https://treaty.s.un.org. Some of these treaties, although technically “in force”, were lists additional subsequent and additional treaties; see https://treaty.s.un.org. Some of these treaties, although technically “in force”, were

410 Exchange of notes constituting an Agreement relating to the guarantees of private investments, signed at Kabul on 5 and 9 June 1957; entered into force 9 June 1957, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 307, No. 4445, p. 97, para. (3) (c) (“If the Government of the United States of America issues guarantees to cover losses by reason of war with respect to investments in Afghanistan, the Government of Afghanistan agrees that nationals of the United States of America to whom such guarantees have been issued, will be accorded by the Government of Afghanistan treatment no less favourable than that accorded, in like circumstances, to its nationals or nationals of third countries, with reference to any reimbursement, compensation, indemnification, or any other payment, including the distribution of

411 See footnote 348 above.

412 The Uppsala conflict database lists the following as United States allies: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, available from www.ucdp.uu.se.


415 Arts. II, IV, V, VII and VIII.


419 Trade Agreement, signed at Kabul on 27 November 1974; entered into force on 27 December 1974, ibid., vol. 978, No. 14217, p. 151.
relevant States would be necessary before further conclusions could be drawn. An additional problem is that many of these treaties are old and could have been affected not by the 2001 invasion but rather by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

16. IRAQ WAR, 2003

117. Although the United States of America and its two principal allies in the 2003 invasion of Iraq—the United Kingdom and Australia—were all involved in the 1991 Iraq war, there is little evidence of substantial changes in the treaty relations between these countries and Iraq between the two conflicts. It is of interest to note, however, that the war in Iraq caused the United States of America to suspend Peace Corps programmes in at least two other countries—Morocco and Jordan—thus affecting the treaties establishing these programmes. This is an example of how the situation created by an armed conflict can sometimes affect treaties, even though the armed conflict itself may have no direct effect.

17. ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA, 1998 TO THE PRESENT

118. Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war in 1998 “after Ethiopia accused Eritrea of invading the border town of Badme; at least 80,000 people were reported to have died in this war, which intensified in May 2000 when Ethiopian troops entered western Eritrea.” The United States of America reported that it had suspended the Peace Corps programme in Eritrea in 1998 and Ethiopia in 1999 as a result of this conflict, thus potentially having an effect on the bilateral treaties governing those programmes.

18. ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA, PRESENT

119. Professor Schindler reported that he was unable to find any “relevant information with regard to the armed conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia at present.”

Chapter V

Relationship of the topic to other legal doctrines

120. Some commentators have questioned whether the effect of armed conflict on treaties is, in fact, a distinct legal problem. The present chapter will confront this question by examining several related doctrines: rebus sic stantibus; State responsibility; necessity and proportionality; neutrality; impossibility; and the Martens clause.

A. Rebus sic stantibus

121. Several commentators and at least one court have argued that the effect of armed conflict on treaties is similar or even identical to the doctrine of changed circumstances (rebus sic stantibus). First, Benedetto Conforti has long maintained that “the effects of war on treaties are not of independent significance but instead constitute an application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus.”

Second, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States reported that “since the traditional effect of war on treaties derived from the fact that continuing treaty relations generally were deemed inconsistent with the state of war, perhaps as a special application of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, it is arguable that major hostilities are ‘changed circumstances’ providing a basis for suspending or terminating a treaty, regardless of whether there is a lawful state of war.” Third, McIntyre argues that “[t]he question of the legal effect of war on treaties is one aspect of the general

420 See Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, available from www.ucdp.uu.se.

421 “Peace Corps suspends program in Morocco”, Peace Corps press release (3 April 2003), available from www.peacecorps.gov/news (stating that the programme was suspended “to evaluate the political and public climate in Morocco as a result of the events in Iraq”). The programme was renewed in 2004. See Peace Corps press release, “Morocco welcomes new Peace Corps volunteers to work in health and environment” (3 June 2004), available from www.peacecorps.gov/news.


424 See also Tarasofsky (footnote 71 above), pp. 65–66.


426 See also 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 62.
122. The rebus sic stantibus doctrine has been applied by States to armed conflict on at least three occasions. First, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that war constituted a changed circumstance sufficient to terminate its adhesion to the obligatory jurisdiction clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1939. Second, the Court of Paris held that hostilities create a changed circumstance creating special rights and duties for the belligerent State. Third, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt invoked the rebus sic stantibus doctrine to suspend American obligations under the International Load Line Convention of 1930. Because that case has been the subject of extensive commentary, it is discussed in more detail below to test the theory of the above commentators that rebus sic stantibus is applicable to situations of armed conflict.

123. The International Load Line Convention was a bilateral convention ratified or acceded to by 36 States that aimed “to promote safety of life and property at sea by establishing ... limits to which ships on international voyages may be loaded.” Faced with increased shipping needs during wartime, President Roosevelt acted on the advice of acting Attorney General Frances Biddle and declared that the Second World War constituted changed circumstances and that the Convention was “suspended or inoperative ... for the duration of the present emergency.” Although “[t]he action by the United States was followed in the war period by a number of other parties to the treaty”, it has been heavily criticized by commentators. Herbert Briggs argued that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, if it exists at all, is “clearly based juridically upon the intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the treaty”, and that according to the terms of the International Load Line Convention, the parties’ intentions were not to allow suspension due to war per se, but only as a result of notification of all other parties and subject to a one-year waiting period. Briggs wrote: “It is clear that no provision of the treaty authorizes the action taken by the United States Government, which was neither a denunciation subject to one year’s notice, nor a proposed modification in the line of an improvement, subject to unanimous acceptance”. He noted that the Harvard Research Draft on the Law of Treaties, a principal source used by acting Attorney General Biddle to support suspension, clearly states that “[t]he dangers inherent in a general resort by States to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus for release from inconvenient treaty obligations could be no better illustrated than in the reasoning and methods employed by the Attorney General in this case.”

124. Professor Richard Rank also argued that the rebus sic stantibus doctrine does not justify the United States’ action:

War might lead to changes that would justify invoking the theory of changed conditions. These changes, however, must meet the same requirements as any other changes in conditions. First, the change in conditions must be fundamental, that is to say, those conditions on which the very existence of the treaty was based must have disappeared. Second, the doctrine applies only to treaties of indefinite or perpetual duration which the very existence of the treaty was based must have disappeared. Third, the party wishing to invoke the doctrine to terminate the obligations of the treaty cannot denounce the treaty unilaterally, but must seek the consent of the other party or parties to its release. Fourth, without this consent, the party must submit his case to a competent international authority in order to secure recognition of the validity of his claim.

125. In this case, Rank’s third and fourth requirements were expressly contradicted by acting Attorney General Biddle, who argued that the United States of America
could unilaterally declare the Convention suspended, without consulting the other parties involved.447

126. Amid this criticism, however, Rank did accept that the rebus sic stantibus doctrine could apply to armed conflict if all of the conditions of the doctrine are met, emphasizing that this doctrine could never result in automatic termination of treaties.448 Applying Rank’s conditions for the rebus sic stantibus doctrine to the situation of armed conflict yields interesting results. His first criterion for the rebus sic stantibus doctrine, that the very conditions on which the treaty was based have disappeared, seems quite consistent with the modern view on the effect of armed conflict on treaties “that provisions compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly terminated, will be enforced, and those incompatible rejected”449. Rank’s second criterion is consistent with the view, examined in chapter II, sections A.2 and D.1, above, that express provisions in treaties as to the outbreak of armed conflict will be honoured. An analysis of the true similarity between the effect of armed conflict on treaties and rebus sic stantibus should thus centre upon Rank’s third and fourth criteria, prohibiting unilateral suspension and requiring the party to submit the case to a competent international authority for review. If the effect of armed conflict on treaties differs from the rebus sic stantibus doctrine and does not include these two requirements—if it is automatic rather than invokable—then it is of very great legal significance, making this question one of the most important of all the questions that a study of the effect of armed conflict on treaties presents. Ironically, the question of whether the effect of armed conflict is invokable or automatic is one that has generated surprisingly little discussion among commentators.450

B. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the law of State responsibility

127. The chapter on circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the Commission’s articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts codifies several doctrines which could also apply with regard to treaties during armed conflict, including self-defence (art. 21), countermeasures (art. 22), force majeure (art. 23), distress (art. 24) and necessity (art. 25). Yet the Commission’s commentary on those articles is very clear that all such circumstances “do not annul or terminate the obligation; rather they provide a justification or excuse for non-performance while the circumstances in question subsist.”452 Thus, the articles on circumstances precluding wrongfulness constitute a body of law dealing with responsibility for non-performance, not a law of treaties dealing with the status of treaties.453

128. Despite this fundamental difference, the doctrines codified in the articles are examined briefly here because of their potential to provide guidance regarding the types of considerations that come into play when a State takes an action in violation of a treaty obligation. First, article 21 states that “[t]he wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.” The Commission’s commentary on that article begins by establishing that “a State exercising its inherent right of self-defence as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter is not, even potentially, in breach of Article 2, paragraph 4 [of the Charter].”454 The commentary goes on, of relevance to the present study, to state that “[s]elf-defence may [also] justify non-performance of certain obligations other than that under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, provided that such non-performance is related to the breach of that provision.”455 As the commentary notes, this justification for non-performance creates a slippery slope because “[i]n the Charter period, declarations of war are exceptional and military actions proclaimed as self-defence by one or both parties occur between States formally at ‘peace’ with each other.”456 Although legitimate self-defence may justify non-performance of certain treaty obligations, it cannot be assumed that a claim of self-defence alone is a licence to cease any inconvenient treaty obligations.

447 Acting Attorney General Biddle argued that “it may well be that ordinarily the procedure would call for the Government to inform the other parties to the treaty with respect to the matter and request agreement for termination or suspension of the treaty. The matter of procedure, however, does not affect the right of termination or suspension. Since a number of the contracting States have been overrun by military power, and normal international procedures, so far as here pertinent, are no longer available but are submerged in the swiftly changing conditions inherent in the world situation, the procedure by prior notification and consent preferred by some of the authorities need not be followed” (Opinion of Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle on Suspension of the International Load Line Convention (see footnotes 438–439 above and accompanying text), p. 123).

448 Rank, “Modern war and the validity of treaties: a comparative study (part I)” (footnote 34 above), pp. 340–341. For a discussion of whether the effect of armed conflict on treaties is automatic, see section F in this chapter, below.

449 TECHT (see footnote 45 above), p. 241. See also Conforti and Labella, “Invalidity and termination of treaties…” (footnote 430 above), pp. 57–58.

450 The one notable exception is the article by Conforti and Labella, “Invalidity and termination of treaties…” (footnote 430 above), which argues that in fact all causes of treaty termination operate automatically. In order to establish that the rebus sic stantibus doctrine operates automatically, they first argue that the effect of armed conflict on treaties is automatic, and then argue that because the effect of armed conflict on treaties is merely a manifestation of rebus sic stantibus, then this latter doctrine must operate automatically as well (pp. 57–63).

451 Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, pp. 74–84. This study does not discuss consent (art. 20) or compliance with peremptory norms (art. 26) because there would appear to be little occasion for these remaining two circumstances precluding wrongfulness to become relevant to armed conflict.

452 Ibid., p. 71, paras. (2)–(3) of the commentary to chapter V of Part One of the articles (citing Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project: “Even if a state of necessity is found to exist, it is not a ground for the termination of a treaty. It may only be invoked to exonerate from its responsibility a State which has failed to implement a treaty. Even if found justified, it does not terminate a Treaty; the Treaty may be ineffective as long as the condition of necessity continues to exist; it may in fact be dormant, but—unless the parties by mutual agreement terminate the treaty—it continues to exist. As soon as the state of necessity ceases to exist, the duty to comply with treaty obligations reverts” (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, at p. 63, para. 101)). See also Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 128, para. (4) of the commentary to chapter II of Part Three of the articles (“Countermeasures are to be clearly distinguished from the termination or suspension of treaty relations on account of the material breach of a treaty by another State”); ibid., p. 71, para. (4) of the commentary to chapter V of Part One of the articles (force majeure is an excuse for non-performance and cannot terminate or suspend treaties); ibid., p. 75, para. (4) of the commentary to article 22 (“Where countermeasures are taken in accordance with article 22, the underlying obligation is not suspended, still less terminated”).

453 Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 74, para. (1) of the commentary to article 21.

454 Ibid., para. (2).

455 Ibid.
129. Second, as to countermeasures (art. 22), the Commission’s commentary to chapter II of Part Three of the articles is clear that this doctrine does not apply to cases of armed conflict. Nevertheless, the structure of the countermeasures chapter could be instructive in relation to a formulation of the effect of armed conflict on treaties, particularly the following elements:

(a) Countermeasures must be “taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question”.

(b) Countermeasures must not violate the obligation embodied in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force, human rights obligations, humanitarian obligations prohibiting reprisals, or peremptory norms of general international law.

(c) Countermeasures must not interfere with any dispute settlement procedures or interrupt any diplomatic channels.

(d) Countermeasures must be proportionate with the injury suffered.

(e) Countermeasures must cease immediately when the internationally wrongful act has ceased.

130. Although the law of countermeasures itself is inapplicable to situations of armed conflict, the above characteristics could prove relevant to the effect of armed conflict on treaties.

131. Third, regarding force majeure (art. 23), although the Commission’s commentary indicates the applicability of the doctrine in some contexts of armed conflict, it again reiterates that force majeure operates as an excuse for non-performance, not as an effect on treaties. In this regard, the commentary distinguishes force majeure from the doctrine of impossibility:

While the same facts may amount, for example, to force majeure under article 23 and to a supervening impossibility of performance under article 61 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the two are distinct. Force majeure justifies non-performance of the obligation for so long as the circumstance exists; supervening impossibility justifies the termination of the treaty or its suspension in accordance with the conditions laid down in article 61. The former operates in respect of the particular obligation, the latter with respect to the treaty which is the source of that obligation. Just as the scope of application of the two doctrines is different, so is their mode of application. Force majeure excuses non-performance for the time being, but a treaty is not automatically terminated by supervening impossibility: at least one of the parties must decide to terminate it.

132. Thus, the force majeure doctrine can operate automatically but serves merely as an excuse for non-performance; the impossibility doctrine must be invoked, but serves to justify termination or suspension of the treaty itself. The question remaining with regard to the effect of armed conflict on treaties is whether it fits one of these two paradigms, or whether it could both operate automatically and justify termination or suspension.

133. Fourth, distress (art. 24) is a narrow doctrine applying only to “the specific case where an individual whose acts are attributable to the State is in a situation of peril” and is “limited to cases where human life is at stake”. Distress generally involves “aircraft or ships entering State territory under stress of weather or following mechanical or navigational failure”. The only case outside this area discussed in the Commission’s commentary was the Rainbow Warrior arbitration involving the health concerns of two detained agents of France. The doctrine thus seems quite distinct from the effect of armed conflict on treaties.

134. Fifth, the doctrine of necessity (art. 25) precludes “the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation … [when it] is the only way to safeguard an essential interest against grave and imminent peril … and does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.” Although the doctrine has been applied in the context of armed conflict, it appears distinct from the effect of armed conflict on treaties because it applies in cases where “the peril has … not yet … occurred”. With the effect of armed conflict on treaties, by contrast, it is submitted that treaties are affected by either the past outbreak of hostilities or a present reality of the hostilities that is incompatible with national policy during the armed conflict.

460 Ibid., p. 128, para. (3) (“[T]raditionally the term ‘reprisals’ was used to cover otherwise unlawful action, including forcible action, taken by way of self-help in response to a breach. More recently the term ‘reprisals’ has been limited to action taken in time of international armed conflict; i.e., it has been taken as equivalent to belligerent reprisals. The term ‘countermeasures’ covers that part of the subject of reprisals not associated with armed conflict, and in accordance with modern practice and judicial decisions the term is used in that sense in this chapter” (footnotes omitted)).
461 Ibid., p. 129, art. 49, para. 3.
462 Ibid., p. 131, art. 50, para. 1.
463 Ibid., art. 50, para. 2.
464 Ibid., p. 134, art. 51.
465 Ibid., p. 135, art. 52, para. 3, and p. 137, art. 53.
466 Ibid., p. 76, para. (3) of the commentary to article 23 (stating that the doctrine applies in cases of “human intervention (e.g. loss of control over a portion of the State’s territory as a result of an insurrection or devastation of an area by military operations carried out by a third State)
467 Ibid., para. (4).
468 Ibid., p. 71, para. (4) of the commentary to chapter V of Part One of the articles.
469 Ibid., p. 78, para. (1) of the commentary to article 24.
470 Ibid., p. 79, para. (6). The commentary goes on to state that “more general cases of emergencies … are more a matter of necessity than distress” (ibid., p. 80, para. (7)).
471 Ibid., p. 78, para. (2).
473 Yearbook … 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigeendum, p. 80, art. 25, para. 1.
474 Ibid., p. 81, paras. (4) and (5) of the commentary to article 25 (describing application of the doctrine in the context of the Anglo–Portuguese dispute of 1832 and the Caroline incident of 1837).
475 Ibid., p. 83, para. (16). The Commission’s commentary also makes clear that the doctrine of necessity codified in article 25 is distinct from the doctrine of military necessity (ibid., p. 84, para. (20)). This latter doctrine is discussed in the next chapter.
476 See paragraphs 11–12 above.
the necessity doctrine could prove relevant to the study of the effect of armed conflict on treaties, particularly the use of negative language by the Commission in framing its parameters to signal the rarity of its use.473

135. In conclusion, many of the provisions regarding circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the Commission’s articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts raise issues somewhat similar to the question of the effect of armed conflict on treaties. This has led at least one commentator to conclude that the “most important approach to modify [treaties during armed conflict] is to rely on the justifications recognized in the general international law of State responsibility.”474

Adopting this approach, however, would deny any separate legal effect of armed conflict on treaties. This should be considered carefully, because the circumstances precluding wrongfulness do not directly affect (suspend or abrogate) the treaty itself, but rather serve as “a justification or excuse for non-performance while the circumstance in question persists”.475 Hence, the relevance of circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the law of State responsibility to situations of treaties in armed conflict should be viewed with caution.

C. Necessity and proportionality

136. As discussed above,476 the International Court of Justice has stated with respect to environmental treaties that “the issue is not whether the treaties … are or are not applicable during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were intended to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict.”477

Unable to accept the proposition that an environmental treaty could bar a State of its right to self-defence, the Court concluded that self-defence is a right notwithstanding the contradiictory environmental treaties, but that “[r]espect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality.”478 The Court’s reasoning with regard to environmental treaties incompatible with military objectives could be expanded to all treaties that are incompatible with the maintenance of armed conflict. Under such a paradigm, treaties compatible with armed conflict would continue in force, and treaties incompatible with the conflict would continue to apply as an element in determining military necessity and proportionality.

D. Neutrality

137. The principle of neutrality has long been considered an important consideration when codifying the effect of armed conflict on treaties. For example, the Harvard Research on the Law of Treaties concluded that “[w]riters on international law are in substantial agreement that, in the case of multipartite treaties to which neutral States … are parties, the outbreak of war between some of the parties does not ipso facto or otherwise terminate or even suspend the operation of such treaties as between the belligerent and neutral parties, nor, of course, as between the neutral parties themselves.”479 This view was reiterated by the United Nations after the Second World War in its study of the legal validity of undertakings concerning minorities. That study concluded that whereas most multilateral treaties are terminated by armed conflict, the presence of neutral States parties leads to mere suspension of multilateral treaties during an armed conflict, with automatic renewal at its conclusion.480 McNair reached a similar conclusion with regard to the treaties of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland during the Second World War.481 The relevance of neutrality law to the effect of armed conflict on treaties was also acknowledged by Schwarzenberger in 1967:

While, in the relations between belligerents, the less stringent prohibitions of the laws of war replace those of the law of peace, the changes in relations between belligerent and non-belligerent Powers are less drastic. In principle, the law of peace continues to govern their relations. It is modified, however, by the law of neutrality: a set of enabling rules which give greater freedom to belligerent States and impose considerable duties of abstention on non-belligerent Powers. In the case of treaties between States which, subsequently, change into belligerent and neutral Powers, the typical intention of parties is that such treaties, especially those in the field of international economic law, should continue to apply, but subject to any overriding interests which arise from the position of the contracting parties as belligerent or neutral States.482

138. More recent commentary continues to acknowledge the importance of neutrality when studying the effect of armed conflict on treaties, but does not reach conclusive results. For example, the resolution of the Institute of International Law acknowledged the importance of neutrality without specifically dealing with it, stating “[t]his Resolution does not prejudice rights and duties arising from neutrality.”483 Similarly, the International Court of Justice emphasized the importance of neutrality law in its advisory opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, stating that “as in the case of the principles of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, international law leaves no doubt that the principle of neutrality, whatever its content, which is of a fundamental character similar to that of the humanitarian

474 Study of the legal validity of the undertakings concerning minorities” (E/CN.4/367 and Corr.1 and Add.1) (see footnote 77 above), p. 8. See also Delbrück (footnote 6 above), p. 1370 (concluding that “treaties between belligerent and neutral States remain in force as a matter of course, since the commencement of war does not directly affect the legal relations between a belligerent and a neutral State”).
476 Institute of International Law resolution of 1985 on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (footnote 19 above), art. 10. This is unfortunate because article 5 of the resolution essentially codifies the earlier findings contained in the “Study of the legal validity of the undertakings concerning minorities” (E/CN.4/367 and Corr.1 and Add.1) (see footnote 77 above) and the Harvard Research in International Law (J. W. Garner, Reporter), “Law of treaties” (footnote 17 above). According to the second paragraph of article 5 of the resolution, “[t]he outbreak of an armed conflict between some of the parties to a multilateral treaty does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of that treaty between other contracting States or between them and the States parties to the armed conflict.”

479 Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 80, art. 25, para. 1 (“Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless …”).
480 Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 71, para. (2) of the commentary to chapter V of Part One of the articles.
481 See paragraph 62 above.
482 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (footnote 85 above), para. 30.
483 Ibid.
principles and rules, is applicable (subject to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter), to all international armed conflict." The principle of neutrality thus remains an important consideration in any formulation of the effects of armed conflict on treaties.

E. Impossibility of performance

139. The doctrine of impossibility of performance, as codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention, article 61, allows a State to terminate a treaty in the case of a "permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty" or to suspend a treaty in the case of a temporary impossibility. Like the rebus sic stantibus doctrine discussed above, the impossibility doctrine closely parallels the developing rules on the effects of armed conflict on treaties. For example, in his provisional report to the Institute of International Law on the effects of armed conflict on treaties, Rapporteur Bengt Broms concluded that "[i]n so far as bilateral treaties are concerned the basic rule to be recommended seems to be that for the execution of the treaty" or to suspend a treaty in the case of a temporary impossibility. Similarly, Sonnenfeld stated that when armed conflict affects a treaty, it "is not so much 'the fact that a war has broken out, but rather ... the impossibility to implement the treaty, owing to the change in the conditions which presided over its conclusion...'" which affects the treaty.

But, as with rebus sic stantibus, it is submitted that the impossibility doctrine must be invoked; it is not automatic. It is still an open question whether the effect of armed conflict on treaties operates automatically—thus distinguishing it from these other doctrines—or whether it must also be invoked by the States parties concerned.

F. Martens clause

140. Originally appearing in the preamble to the Hague Convention II of 1899 with respect to the laws and customs of war on land, and restated in all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, their 1977 Additional Protocols, and the preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the Martens clause provides that the "dictates of the public conscience" as they may have developed in customary law create additional protection for populations and belligerents which "will still apply for States no longer bound by the Geneva Conventions as treaty law." Other scholars argue that the Martens clause should not be given an overextended interpretation.

141. The Nuremberg Tribunal confirmed the legal significance of the clause and emphasized that it was "much more than a pious declaration." The International Court of Justice has stated that the clause itself forms part of customary international law. Some scholars argue that the "dictates of the public conscience" provision of the Martens clause includes environmental concerns as codified in environmental treaties. Other scholars and Governments, however, argue that the Martens clause should not be given an overextended interpretation.

142. The International Court of Justice made clear in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua that "even if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even armed conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1 (2); and Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II), fourth paragraph of the preamble.

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, 10 October 1980, fifth paragraph of the preamble.

The 1899 Martens clause reads: "Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience" (reproduced in Tarasofsky (footnote 71 above), p. 33). A few words are changed in the 1907 version, but the meaning is essentially unaltered. See T. Meron, "The Martens Clause: principles of humanity, and dictates of public conscience", AJIL, vol. 94 (2000), p. 78, at p. 79. In the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Optional Protocols, the goal of the clause is focused on ensuring that humanitarian law applies as customary international law even to a State which attempts to denounce humanitarian law conventions. See Meron (ibid.), pp. 80–81.


Ibid. (citing In re Krupp and others, 15 A.D. 620, 622 (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948)).

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (footnote 85 above), para. 84.

Tarasofsky (footnote 71 above), p. 35; Simonds (footnote 114 above), p. 188; Bothe (footnote 199 above), p. 56.

For a forceful critique of the Martens clause, see A. Cassese, "The Martens Clause: half a loaf or simply pie in the sky?", European Journal of International Law, vol. 11, No. 1 (2000), p. 187. See also Meron, "The Martens Clause..." (footnote 492 above), p. 88 ("Nevertheless, the Martens clause does not allow one to build castles of sand. ... [P]rohibitions of particularly objectionable weapons and methods of war can better be attained by applying such generally accepted principles of humanitarian law as the requirements of distinction and proportionality and the prohibition of unnecessary suffering than by pushing the Martens clause beyond reasonable limits").

if the States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence.⁴⁹² For the purposes of the present study, the question is whether the Martens clause actually has a legal effect on treaties representing the “dictates of the public conscience”—making the treaties themselves apply during armed conflict⁴⁹⁵—or if it merely influences the extent to which these treaties will become customary international law applicable during armed conflict, a unique source of law, without actually applying themselves. The wording of the Martens clause in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols supports the view that its purpose is to clarify that customary international humanitarian law applies during an armed conflict,⁵⁰¹ guiding the jurist to look for this law in the “dictates of public conscience”, but what is the resultant effect on treaties codifying this public conscience? Even though environmental and human rights law would apply, they would do so as customary international law; the question of whether the treaties themselves apply during armed conflict would remain unanswered.

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**CHAPTER VI**

**Other contemporary issues**

A. Armed conflict within operations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations

143. Treaty obligations existing between Member States of the United Nations which are “inconsistent with enforcement measures taken pursuant to a Security Council decision need not be observed by cooperating Member States.”⁵⁰² Jessup wrote that “[i]t cannot be doubted that action taken by a Member [State of the United Nations] in compliance with [a decision of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations] would constitute justification for any incidental breach of a treaty obligation calling for freedom of commercial intercourse or of communications.”⁵⁰³ Similarly, Goodrich and Hambro have noted that it may happen that … other international agreements such as trade agreements and postal conventions will be violated by the action required to give effect to the Council’s decision [under Chapter VII] … The … situation is squarely faced by the Charter. Article 103 provides that in case of conflict between the obligations of Members under the Charter and under international agreements, the former will prevail.⁵⁰⁴

144. An examination of the travaux préparatoires for the Charter of the United Nations indicates without doubt that the drafters intended Article 103 to apply not only to the Charter itself, but also to applications of the Charter, such as under Chapter VII. When Norway, at the San Francisco Conference, introduced a proposed addition to the section which eventually became Article 41, clarifying that action taken under it “takes precedence over the execution of stipulations contained in commercial or other


⁴⁹³ This appears to be the position of Solomon Islands and Australia in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (see footnote 85 above). Both States invoked the Martens clause and used both international human rights treaties and environmental treaties to argue for the illegality of nuclear weapons from an environmental and human rights standpoint. See footnotes 217–225 above and accompanying text (discussing the written submission of Solomon Islands); see also Meron, “The Martens Clause…” (footnote 492 above), p. 84, citing International Court of Justice—Requests for Advisory Opinions on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons—Australian Statement, Australian Year Book of International Law, vol. 17 (1996), pp. 685, 699 and 703 (discussing the oral statement by Australia).

⁵⁰⁴ Meron, “The Martens Clause…” (footnote 492 above), p. 87 (“It is generally agreed that the clause means, at the very least, that the adoption of a treaty regulating particular aspects of the law of war does not deprive the affected persons of the protection of those norms of customary humanitarian law that were not included in the codification”).


⁵⁰⁸ Layton notes that Article 103 does not provide for automatic abrogation of conflicting treaties, but rather that Charter obligations “shall prevail”. The Committee on Legal Problems, drafting Article 103, “decided that it would be inadvisable to provide for the automatic abrogation by the Charter of obligations inconsistent with the terms thereof. It has been deemed preferable to have the rule depend upon and be linked with the case of a conflict between the two categories of obligations. In such a case, the obligations of the Charter would be pre-eminent and would exclude any others” (Layton (footnote 39 above), pp. 111–112 (citing “Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2” (footnote 507 above), p. 707)).

⁵⁰⁹ Layton notes, however, that “[a] significant problem with the Charter formula lies in the determination of when a ‘conflict’ between the two sets of obligations arises” (Layton (footnote 39 above), p. 113).
of the United Nations [under Chapter VII of the Charter] shall either terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty which would be incompatible with such resolution. Against this background, it has been recently argued that because Chapter VII operations are intended to restore the legal order, they are considered as suspending treaty obligations only in cases where the use of force renders their execution impossible in fact.”

B. Domestic hostilities

146. If the effect of armed conflict on treaties remains a vague area of international law, the effect of domestic hostilities on treaties is even more so. But, in the light of the “staggering increase in civil wars”, which now make up the vast majority of all armed conflicts in the world, any complete study of the effects of armed conflict on treaties cannot ignore domestic hostilities.

147. The most important point to be established is that domestic hostilities can and do affect international treaties. Although scholars regularly consider both the application of international humanitarian law and human rights law to domestic hostilities, it would be a mistake to end the enquiry here; domestic conflicts can have a significant effect on all classes of treaties by altering other circumstances necessary to the performance of the treaty in the country host to the domestic hostilities, or even neighbouring countries. For example, Graham argued that if two countries

510 Institute of International Law resolution of 1985 on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (see footnote 19 above), art. 8.
511 Delbrück (footnote 6 above), p. 1372. See also Encyclopedia of the United Nations... (footnote 321 above), vol. 3, p. 2141 (describing the suspension of Chapter VII operations in Somalia as a result of overwhelming interference with United Nations activities at the hands of Somali rebels. Thus, in this case domestic hostilities presumably had an effect on the treaty establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation).

C. The distinction between bilateral and multilateral treaties

150. In discussing the effect of armed conflict on treaties, commentators have attempted to distinguish between bilateral treaties, as more susceptible to suspension or abrogation, and multilateral treaties, as more resilient. For example, Jenks argued that “[i]t is now generally admitted that war has not the same effect on multilateral legislative treaties as upon bilateral contractual ones.” Similarly, Robert Tucker argued that:

The more difficult problem will arise where the treaty is not directly but only indirectly affected by the revolution. For example, if [countries] A and B agree to aid each other in case of attack by a foreign power and A is using all its military strength to fight a revolution at home, is this sufficient grounds for repudiation of the treaty? It would form a very strong argument for A, if it were to claim that the treaty presupposed that it would have a surplus of military strength and the existence of a revolutionary situation at home had materially altered that fact.

148. Thus, domestic hostilities can operate in much the same way as international conflict, affecting the whole gamut of treaty types discussed in chapter II above. Graham proceeded to consider the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in relation to domestic hostilities in much the same way it is considered in chapter V, section A, above, in relation to international conflicts.

149. Several concrete examples of the effect of domestic conflicts exist. First, Bernard Firestone notes that the civil war in Yemen had effects on the entire Middle East. Second, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim used his power under Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations to raise the matter of the 1975 Lebanese civil war in the Security Council, arguing that “further deterioration in the Lebanese situation carried implications extending beyond that country’s boundaries”. Although this reference is broad, it is possible that some of these implications included effects on treaties. Third, the Guinea-Bissau civil war caused the United States of America to suspend its Peace Corps aid programme in that country. Fourth, the Netherlands suspended bilateral treaties with Suriname because of domestic hostilities occurring in Suriname in 1982. Finally, domestic hostilities in the former Yugoslavia affected multiple treaties between Yugoslavia and several European countries. There is thus little doubt that internal conflicts can have a significant effect on inter-State treaty relations.
In considering the effects of war on treaties it is useful, and probably necessary, to distinguish between those treaties having a large number of States other than the belligerents as parties and bilateral treaties having as signatories only the belligerents. With respect to the latter category, recent practice appears to indicate that, apart from those treaties especially intended to operate in time of war, the outbreak of war cannot be seen to result in the abrogation of treaties that include as parties States not participating in war (for example, the treaty establishing the International Postal Union, the safety of navigation at sea, etc.). Such bilateral treaties remain binding not only between those States not participating in war but between the belligerents and the nonparticipants. Between the belligerents, they may be suspended in whole or in part as the necessities of war require.\(^{524}\)

151. In the practice of States, however, this neat dichotomy between bilateral and multilateral treaties appears to be diminishing, as evidenced by a comparison of the peace treaties of the Second World War with those following the First World War:

The language of the 1947 [Treaty of Peace with Italy] and 1951 [Treaty of Peace with Japan] apparently reflects the increasing tendency to regard most treaties as surviving the outbreak of war. That is certainly true with respect to a number of bilateral treaties. After World War II the wording of the article for the revival of bilateral treaties was changed so as to include either the phrase “keep in force or revive” or the phrase “continue in force or revive” rather than just “revive” as was the case in the peace treaties after World War I. Also, where the World War I peace treaties had stated that unrevived treaties “are and shall remain abrogated,” the World War II peace treaties stated that treaties not the subject of notification “shall be regarded as abrogated.”\(^{525}\)

152. Thus, although following both world wars multilateral treaties were still viewed as more resilient than bilateral ones,\(^{526}\) an increased resilience of bilateral treaties was acknowledged. This trend seems to have continued. Rather than adopting the former multilateral/bilateral distinction, several modern commentators on the effect of armed conflict on treaties adopt a more nuanced approach, looking to the actual subject matter of the treaty rather than the number of parties.\(^{527}\) This approach shows that although many of the most resilient treaties are multilateral, one cannot assume that a multilateral treaty will always be more likely than a bilateral treaty to withstand armed conflict. For example, a bilateral treaty establishing a permanent regime could prove more resilient than a multilateral environmental treaty which is inconsistent with the principle of proportionality. Similarly, a bilateral treaty on reciprocal inheritance rights could easily prove more resilient than a multilateral extradition treaty which conflicts with national policy on the armed conflict. A thorough classification scheme is thus superior to generalizations about treaties based on the number of parties to them.

D. Separability of particular articles

153. Under the general law of treaties as codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention, article 44, treaty suspension or termination applies only to the treaty as a whole, “unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.”\(^{528}\) An exception is made with respect to grounds for termination or suspension that relate to particular clauses, but only if “the said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application … those clauses are not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole; and … continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not be unjust.”\(^{529}\) One commentator has noted that “[s]ince ‘these three conditions are cumulative,’ the principle of the integrity of the treaty overwhelmingly prevails in case of a fundamental change of circumstances.”\(^{530}\) Similarly, Aust commented in his recent treatise on treaties that the second condition alone would be quite difficult to meet “and would require an examination of the subject matter of the clauses, their relationship to the other clauses, and perhaps also the travaux and the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty.”\(^{531}\)

154. Since, in accordance with article 73 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the Convention “shall not prejudice any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from … the outbreak of hostilities between States”, the question arises as to what extent the separability doctrine established in article 44 of the Convention holds true. Influenced by the principle of pacta sunt servanda, it appears that courts and commentators examining the question of the effect of armed conflict on treaties have been more willing to allow separability of treaty provisions than the framers of the Convention. For example, McIntyre reports that in the Second World War,


\(^{525}\) McIntyre (footnote 7 above), pp. 332–333 (noting that “there is no way of knowing for sure whether the abrogation took place at the time of the outbreak of war, the time of entry into force of the treaty of peace, or at the end of the period within which revival was permitted”). See also ibid., p. 349.

\(^{526}\) O’Connell writes that at the conclusion of both world wars “[t]he general principle has been to regard all bilateral treaties as abrogated save such of them as each of the Allied Powers notifies the defeated signatory it wishes to continue in force or revive … [whereas] multilateral conventions remain unaffected by war except in so far as the belligerents may suspend their execution in relation to themselves if the necessities of war compel them so to do” (O’Connell, “Legal aspects of the Peace Treaty….”) (footnote 248 above), p. 429) (footnotes omitted).

\(^{527}\) See, for example, the 1982 approach of Delbrück (footnote 6 above) and the 1961 approach of McNair in The Law of Treaties… (footnote 36 above). Similarly, the Institute of International Law resolution makes no distinction between the effect of armed conflict on a bilateral treaty between a belligerent and a neutral and the effect of armed conflict on a multilateral treaty between belligerents and neutrals (Institute of International Law resolution of 1985 on the effect of armed conflicts on treaties (footnote 19 above), art. 5).

\(^{528}\) Article 44, para. 1; see also Aust (footnote 28 above), p. 248.

\(^{529}\) The full text of the exception states that if the ground for termination or suspension “relates solely to particular clauses, it may be invoked only with respect to those clauses where: (a) The said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application; (b) It appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole; and (c) Continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not be unjust” (art. 44, para. 3).


\(^{531}\) Aust (footnote 28 above), p. 248.
the practice of the United States accepts the separability of the articles of a treaty unless they form part of an indissoluble whole which depends for its validity upon the continued operation of each of its components. This principle is now widely accepted by text writers as well as practitioners, and differs sharply from the view earlier held by writers, such as Vattel. The recent practice of the executive and the courts indicates that the principle of separability may be carried even one step further: that where the particular parts of a specific article are not closely interdependent, it is possible to consider the effect of war on the individual parts.532

155. Similarly, in the landmark United States decision on the effect of armed conflict on treaties in *Techt v. Hughes*, Judge Cardozo stated:

> It is not for them to denounce treaties generally, en bloc. Their part it is, as one provision or another is involved in some actual controversy before them, to determine whether, alone, or by force of connection with an inseparable scheme, the provision is inconsistent with the policy or safety of the nation in the emergency of war, and hence presumably intended to be limited to times of peace. The mere fact that other portions of the treaty are suspended or even abrogated is not conclusive. The treaty does not fall in its entirety unless it has the character of an indivisible act.533

156. Although these two examples could merely embody an earlier understanding on separability of treaty provisions generally which has since evolved, or may only represent the view of one State, there is reason to believe they signify a greater willingness to sever treaties when the effect of armed conflict on treaties is concerned. In its commentary on what became article 44 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the Commission said:

> The separability of treaty provisions was until comparatively recently considered almost exclusively in connection with the right to terminate a treaty on the ground of a breach of the other party. Certain modern authorities, however, have advocated recognition of the principle of separability ... in determining the effect of war upon treaties. They have urged that in some cases one provision of a treaty may be struck out or suspended without necessarily disturbing the balance of the rights and obligations established by the other provisions of the treaty. These authorities cite in support of their contentions certain pronouncements of the Permanent Court of International Justice in regard to the interpretation of self-contained parts of treaties.534

157. It is thus possible that the separability of treaty provisions in the case of an effect of armed conflict on treaties is different from that found in general international law codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention. The opinions of States parties will be required to make this determination.

E. Length of treaty suspension

158. Another question related to treaty suspension in the case of armed conflict is its length. In his analysis of the effects of the First World War on treaties, Tobin included a thorough review of this question. He concluded that although there existed a tendency towards complete resumption of suspended treaty obligations as soon as possible, the nature of the treaty was also a factor: whereas treaties of a technical nature will generally resume immediately, treaties whose drafting “involved political bargaining [are] apt to be revalued in the light of the changes brought about by the war, and either modified or terminated.”535 In his comprehensive analysis of the effect of the Second World War on treaties, McIntyre concluded that “[a] general rule suspended bipartite treaties did not appear to revive automatically with the cessation of hostilities. Most returned to full effectiveness as a result of a special agreement or revival action under the peace treaties, and usually the latter procedure was the one which was followed.”536 Multilateral treaties did not require this express revival; when they were suspended at all, it is submitted that they automatically revived at the conclusion of the hostilities.537 Thus, the general practice following the Second World War is that suspended multilateral treaties revive automatically after armed conflict, whereas suspended bilateral treaties require express renewal.538

159. Modern practice regarding the length of treaty suspension no longer focuses on the distinction between bilateral and multilateral treaties. Delbrück has written that “[t]he suspension will be considered to end, and treaty obligations to revive, at the earliest possible date after any such use of force has ended, the formal termination of the armed conflict not being a legal prerequisite to ending the suspension. It should be noted, however, that this forms a guiding principle for the States concerned rather than a hard and fast rule of international law.”539 The Institute of International Law resolution agreed with this result, declaring that “[a]t the end of an armed conflict and unless otherwise agreed, the operation of a treaty which has been suspended should be resumed as soon as possible.”540 Thus, whereas the number of parties to the treaty traditionally had a bearing on the length of treaty suspension in cases of armed conflict, modern practice avoids this distinction and aims for all treaties to resume as soon as possible following the close of hostilities.

532 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 22 (footnotes omitted).
533 *Techt* (footnote 45 above), p. 243 (followed for this proposition by the United States Supreme Court in *Clark* (footnote 46 above), pp. 509–510).
536 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), p. 298.
537 Ibid., p. 306. The peace treaties concluding the Second World War provide the prime example of this phenomenon: whereas the provisions with regard to pre-war bilateral treaties in the Second World War peace treaties were similar to those at the conclusion of the First World War, requiring each revived bilateral treaty to be individually enumerated, the treatment of pre-war multilateral treaties was very different. “Rather than list the multilateral treaties which were to be applied again by the former enemy powers as the World War I peace treaties had done, the 1947 treaties made no mention of the pre-war multilateral treaties” (ibid., p. 322). See also Sonnenfeld (footnote 265 above), p. 109 (“As a rule multilateral treaties have been treated differently from bilateral ones, the former being considered as remaining in force, even though their implementation between the belligerent countries was suspended during the war, while the latter, in principle, have required revival by express legal action”).
538 McIntyre (footnote 7 above), pp. 322–323. But see ibid., p. 328 (“The experience of the peace treaties would seem to indicate that non-political or technical multilateral conventions do revive automatically, but it is not clear what happens to the political multilateral conventions”)
539 Delbrück (footnote 6 above), p. 1371.
540 Institute of International Law resolution of 1985 on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (see footnote 19 above), art. 11.
CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

160. Just as the effect of armed conflict on treaties has always been a difficult and uncertain area of international law, so it remains today. The present study has attempted a comprehensive categorization of treaties considering their ability to withstand traditional war, and in this effort quite a few trends can be identified. First, armed conflict will rarely if ever affect humanitarian law treaties, treaties with express provisions as to their applicability during armed conflict, treaties creating a permanent status or regime, treaty provisions codifying jus cogens norms, non-derogable human rights treaties, treaties governing intergovernmental debt, and diplomatic conventions. Second, a smaller group of treaties exhibits a moderately high likelihood of applicability during armed conflict, including reciprocal inheritance treaties and multilateral “law-making” conventions. Third, a large group of treaties remains with an emerging, controversial or varied likelihood of applicability. This group includes international transport agreements; environmental treaties; extradition treaties; treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation; intellectual property treaties; and penal transfer treaties. Finally, two kinds of treaties have a decidedly low likelihood of applicability during armed conflict: those treaties inapplicable through express provision and those treaties inapplicable in practice.

161. Yet, despite this seemingly neat set of rules, the question of the effect of armed conflict on treaties continues to be ridden with pitfalls. The norms stated above were generally developed in relation to traditional warfare, and it is unclear how relevant they will be in the new era of less formal, non-traditional and often domestic armed conflicts. These questions are complicated by the fact that courts and political departments often do not comment on the effect of a given armed conflict on treaties until significant time has passed, in some cases as much as 200 years.541

162. Even in this new and uncertain era, however, some trends can be identified. First, there is significant evidence that domestic hostilities in a given State can affect inter-State treaties between that State and another, or potentially even between two or more completely different States; other non-traditional forms of armed conflict, such as the cold war and small bilateral conflicts, have also been shown to affect treaties. Second, although many other legal doctrines are substantially similar to the effect of armed conflict on treaties, a strong argument can be made that the latter is distinguishable on the basis that it occurs automatically, whereas doctrines such as rebus sic stantibus and impossibility must be invoked. Third, there is strong support for the proposition that operations carried out pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations will suspend or abrogate inconsistent treaties. Finally, whereas it was traditionally understood that armed conflict had a greater effect on bilateral treaties than on multilateral treaties, there is strong evidence that this distinction has diminished.

163. One important policy consideration in the law governing the effect of armed conflict on treaties is the vital role of treaties in the system of international law and the time and effort necessary for their negotiation and adoption. From the perspective of international law, armed conflict is a disruption, for a limited period of time, of the normal situation, which is peace. Therefore, as a policy matter, there are advantages to trying to make treaties resistant to intermittent armed conflict and, when that cannot be achieved, treating the effect of war per se on treaties as suspensive rather than terminative so that the treaties can return quickly to operation upon the cessation of armed conflict.

164. In conclusion, although significant State practice and doctrine exist, they are inconsistent and in flux. As traditional warfare gives way to modern non-traditional, domestic or informal armed conflicts, the parameters of the effect of armed conflict on treaties are left in a considerable state of uncertainty. With input from States as to current governmental views, codification could greatly advance international understanding on the topic and update a doctrine that has been written largely for another age.

541 See footnote 12 above.
ANNEX

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