YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

2013

Volume II
Part Two

Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its sixty-fifth session

UNITED NATIONS
New York and Geneva, 2018
NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

References to the *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* are abbreviated to *Yearbook*, followed by the year (for example, *Yearbook* ..., 2012).

The *Yearbook* for each session of the International Law Commission comprises two volumes:

Volume I: summary records of the meetings of the session;

Volume II (Part One): reports of special rapporteurs and other documents considered during the session;

Volume II (Part Two): report of the Commission to the General Assembly.

All references to these works and quotations from them relate to the final printed texts of the volumes of the *Yearbook* issued as United Nations publications.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
OAS Organization of American States
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISDR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
WCO World Customs Organization
WTO World Trade Organization

ECHR European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions. All judgments and decisions of the Court, including those not published in the official series, can be consulted in the database of the Court (HUDOC), available from the Court’s website (www.echr.coe.int).

I.C.J. Reports International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. All judgments, advisory opinions and orders of the Court are available from the Court’s website (www.icj-cij.org).

ILM International Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.)
ILR International Law Reports
ITLOS Reports International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders
UNRIAA United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards

In the present volume, “International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” refers to the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991; and “International Tribunal for Rwanda” refers to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

NOTE CONCERNING QUOTATIONS

In quotations, words or passages in italics followed by an asterisk were not italicized in the original text.

Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from works in languages other than English have been translated by the Secretariat.

The Internet address of the International Law Commission is http://legal.un.org/ilc/. 
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Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (Geneva, 26 June 1936)

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (New York, 30 March 1961)

Convention on psychotropic substances (Vienna, 21 February 1971)

United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 20 December 1988)

Source


International trade and development

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva, 30 October 1947)

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States (ICSID Convention) (Washington, D.C., 18 March 1965)


Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994)

General Agreement on Trade in Services (Annex 1B to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization)

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization)

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) (Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization)

Civil aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (The Hague, 16 December 1970)

Protocol supplementary to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (Beijing, 10 September 2010)

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (Montreal, 23 September 1971)

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (Montreal, 24 February 1988)

Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing, 10 September 2010)

Penal matters

International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency (Geneva, 20 April 1929)

Convention on Extradition (Montevideo, 26 December 1933)
European Convention on Extradition (Paris, 13 December 1957)

General Convention on Judicial Cooperation (Convention générale de coopération en matière de justice) (Antananarivo, 12 September 1961)

Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity (New York, 26 November 1968)

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents (New York, 14 December 1973)

Organization of African Unity Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa (Libreville, 3 July 1977)

International Convention against the taking of hostages (New York, 17 December 1979)

Inter-American Convention on extradition (Caracas, 25 February 1981)

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation (Rome, 10 March 1988)

International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (New York, 4 December 1989)

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Extradition (Abuja, 6 August 1994)


Inter-American Convention against Corruption (Caracas, 29 March 1996)


Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Strasbourg, 27 January 1999)


Convention on cybercrime (Budapest, 23 November 2001)

London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth (Kingstown, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 21 November 2002)


**Fight against international terrorism**

Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Geneva, 16 November 1937)
Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance (Washington, D.C., 2 February 1971)

European Convention on the suppression of terrorism (Strasbourg, 27 January 1977)

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (Kathmandu, 4 November 1987)

Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (Islamabad, 6 January 2004)


International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 December 1999)


Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (Warsaw, 16 May 2005)

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Convention on Counter-Terrorism (Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007)

Law of the sea


Law of treaties


Assistance

Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (Vienna, 26 September 1986)

Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance (Santiago, 7 June 1991)

Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (Sochi, 15 April 1998)

Framework Convention on civil defence assistance (Geneva, 22 May 2000)

ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (Vientiane, 26 July 2005)

Telecommunications

Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (Tampere, 18 June 1998)

Law applicable in armed conflict

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on land: Convention I of 1899 and 1907 for the pacific settlement of international disputes; Convention II (The Hague, 29 July 1899) and Convention IV (The Hague, 18 October 1907) respecting the laws and customs of war on land

Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (London, 8 August 1945)
Multilateral instruments

Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims (1949 Geneva Conventions) (Geneva, 12 August 1949)

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Convention I)

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Convention II)

Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III)

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV)

Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I); and Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II) (Geneva, 8 June 1977)


**Disarmament**

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (London, Moscow and Washington, D.C., 10 April 1972)

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction (opened for signature at Paris, 13 January 1993)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Oslo, 18 September 1997)

Inter-American Convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials (Washington, D.C., 14 November 1997)

Convention on Cluster Munitions (Dublin, 30 May 2008)

Arms Trade Treaty (New York, 2 April 2013)

**Environment**

Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (Helsinki, 17 March 1992)


**General international law**

General Act of the International Conference of Algeciras (Algeciras, 7 April 1906)

Convention on Private International Law (Havana, 20 February 1928)

Agreement on German external debts (London, 27 February 1953)

Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material (Vienna, 26 October 1979, opened for signature Vienna and New York, 3 March 1980)

Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (Brussels, 2 February 2012)

Source


Chapter I

ORGANIZATION OF THE SESSION

1. The International Law Commission held the first part of its sixty-fifth session from 6 May to 7 June 2013 and the second part from 8 July to 9 August 2013 at its seat at the United Nations Office at Geneva. The session was opened by Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Chairperson of the sixty-fourth session of the Commission.

A. Membership

2. The Commission consists of the following members:

- Mr. Mohammed Bello ADOKE (Nigeria)
- Mr. Ali Mohsen Fetais AL-MARRI (Qatar)
- Mr. Lucius CAFLISCH (Switzerland)
- Mr. Enrique J. A. CANDIOTI (Argentina)
- Mr. Pedro COMISSARIO AFONSO (Mozambique)
- Mr. Abdelrazeg EL-MURTADI SULEIMAN GOUIDER (Libya)
- Ms. Concepción ESCOBAR HERNANDEZ (Spain)
- Mr. Mathias FORTEAU (France)
- Mr. Kirill GEORGIAN (Russian Federation)
- Mr. Juan Manuel GÓMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico)
- Mr. Hussein HASSOUNA (Egypt)
- Mr. Mahmoud D. HMoud (Jordan)
- Mr. Huikang HUANG (China)
- Ms. Marie G. JACOBSSON (Sweden)
- Mr. Maurice KAMTO (Cameroon)
- Mr. Kriangsak KITTICHAI SAREE (Thailand)
- Mr. Ahmed LARABA (Algeria)
- Mr. Donald M. MCRAE (Canada)
- Mr. Shinya MURASE (Japan)
- Mr. Sean D. MURPHY (United States of America)
- Mr. Bernd H. NIEHAUS (Costa Rica)
- Mr. Georg NOLTE (Germany)
- Mr. Ki Gab PARK (Republic of Korea)
- Mr. Chris Maina PETER (United Republic of Tanzania)
- Mr. Ernest PETRIČ (Slovenia)
- Mr. Gilberto Vergne SABOIA (Brazil)
- Mr. Narinder SINGH (India)
- Mr. Pavel ŠTURMA (Czech Republic)
- Mr. Dire D. TLADI (South Africa)
- Mr. Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA (Colombia)
- Mr. Marcelo VÁZQUEZ-BERMÚDEZ (Ecuador)¹
- Mr. Amos S. WAKO (Kenya)
- Mr. Nugroho WISNUMURTI (Indonesia)
- Sir Michael WOOD (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

B. Casual vacancy

3. On 6 May 2013, the Commission elected Mr. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez to fill the casual vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Mr. Stephen C. Vasciannie.

C. Officers and the Enlarged Bureau

4. At its 3159th meeting, on 6 May 2013, the Commission elected the following officers:

- Chairperson: Mr. Bernd Niehaus (Costa Rica)
- First Vice-Chairperson: Mr. Pavel Šturma (Czech Republic)
- Second Vice-Chairperson: Mr. Narinder Singh (India)
- Chairperson of the Drafting Committee: Mr. Dire Tladi (South Africa)
- Rapporteur: Mr. Mathias Forteau (France)

5. The Enlarged Bureau of the Commission was composed of the officers of the present session, the previous Chairpersons of the Commission² and the Special Rapporteurs.³

6. The Commission set up a Planning Group composed of the following members: Mr. Pavel Šturma (Chairperson), Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Mr. Pedro Comissário Afonso, Mr. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman Gouider, Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández, Mr. Hussein Hassouna, Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud, Ms. Marie Jacobsson, Mr. Maurice Kamto, Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaissaree, Mr. Ahmed Laraba, Mr. Donald McRae, Mr. Shinya Murase, Mr. Sean Murphy, Mr. Georg Nolte, Mr. Ki Gab Park, Mr. Ernest Petrič, Mr. Gilberto Vergne Saboia, Mr. Narinder Singh, Mr. Dire Tladi, Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Mr. Marcelo

¹ See paragraph 3.
² Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Mr. Enrique Candioti, Mr. Maurice Kamto, Mr. Ernest Petrič and Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti.
³ Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández, Mr. Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo, Ms. Marie Jacobsson, Mr. Maurice Kamto, Mr. Georg Nolte, Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina and Sir Michael Wood.
Vázquez-Bermúdez, Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti, Sir Michael Wood and Mr. Mathias Forteau (ex officio).

D. Drafting Committee

7. At its 3163rd, 3170th and 3180th meetings, on 14 and 24 May and 16 July 2013, the Commission established a Drafting Committee, composed of the following members for the topics indicated:

(a) Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties: Mr. Dire Tladi (Chairperson), Mr. Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández, Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud, Ms. Marie Jacobsson, Mr. Maurice Kamto, Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Mr. Shinya Murase, Mr. Sean Murphy, Mr. Ki Gab Park, Mr. Ernest Petrić, Mr. Gilberto Vergne Saboia, Mr. Pavel Štúrna, Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Mr. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez, Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti, Sir Michael Wood and Mr. Mathias Forteau (ex officio);

(b) Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction: Mr. Dire Tladi (Chairperson), Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud, Ms. Marie Jacobsson, Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Mr. Shinya Murase, Mr. Sean Murphy, Mr. Georg Nolte, Mr. Ki Gab Park, Mr. Ernest Petrić, Mr. Gilberto Vergne Saboia, Mr. Narinder Singh, Mr. Pavel Štúrna, Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Mr. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez, Mr. Amos Wako, Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti, Sir Michael Wood and Mr. Mathias Forteau (ex officio);

(c) Protection of persons in the event of disasters: Mr. Dire Tladi (Chairperson), Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Special Rapporteur), Mr. Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo, Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud, Ms. Marie Jacobsson, Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Mr. Shinya Murase, Mr. Sean Murphy, Mr. Ki Gab Park, Mr. Ernest Petrić, Mr. Gilberto Vergne Saboia, Mr. Narinder Singh, Mr. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez, Sir Michael Wood and Mr. Mathias Forteau (ex officio);

8. The Drafting Committee held a total of 20 meetings on the three topics indicated above.

E. Working groups and study groups

9. At its 3161st and 3169th meetings, on 8 and 23 May 2013, the Commission reconstituted the following working groups and study groups:

(a) Open-ended Working Group on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare): Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree (Chairperson);

(b) Study Group on the most-favoured-nation clause: Mr. Donald McRae (Chairperson), Mr. Lucius Callisch, Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández, Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud, Mr. Shinya Murase, Mr. Sean Murphy, Mr. Ki Gab Park, Mr. Narinder Singh, Mr. Pavel Štúrna, Mr. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez, Sir Michael Wood and Mr. Mathias Forteau (ex officio).

10. The Planning Group reconstituted the following working group:

Working Group on the long-term programme of work for the quinquennium: Mr. Donald McRae (Chairperson), Mr. Lucius Callisch, Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández, Mr. Kirill Gevorgian, Mr. Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo, Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud, Ms. Marie Jacobsson, Mr. Maurice Kamto, Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Mr. Ahmed Laraba, Mr. Shinya Murase, Mr. Sean Murphy, Mr. Georg Nolte, Mr. Ki Gab Park, Mr. Ernest Petrić, Mr. Narinder Singh, Mr. Pavel Štúrna, Mr. Dire Tladi, Mr. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez, Mr. Amos Wako, Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti, Sir Michael Wood and Mr. Mathias Forteau (ex officio).

F. Secretariat

11. Ms. Patricia O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, represented the Secretary-General, Mr. George Korontzis, Director of the Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs, acted as Secretary to the Commission and, in the absence of the Legal Counsel, represented the Secretary-General. Mr. Trevor Chimimba and Mr. Arnold Pronto, Senior Legal Officers, served as Senior Assistant Secretaries to the Commission. Mr. Gionata Buzzini, Ms. Hanna Dreifeldt-Lainé, Legal Officers, and Mr. Noah Bialostosky, Associate Legal Officer, served as Assistant Secretaries to the Commission.

G. Agenda

12. At its 3159th meeting, on 6 May 2013, the Commission adopted a provisional agenda for its sixty-fifth session. The agenda, as modified in the light of the decision taken by the Commission at its 3171st meeting, on 28 May 2013, consisted of the following items:

1. Organization of the work of the session.
2. Filling of a casual vacancy.
3. The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare).
4. Protection of persons in the event of disasters.
5. Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction.
7. Provisional application of treaties.
8. Formation and evidence of customary international law.
10. The most-favoured-nation clause.
12. Date and place of the sixty-sixth session.
13. Cooperation with other bodies.
14. Other business.

— See below, chap. XII, sect. A.1.
— The Commission decided at its 3180th meeting, on 25 July 2013, to change the title of the topic to “Identification of customary international law”. See below, chap. VII, sect. B.
SUMMARY OF THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION AT ITS SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION

13. With regard to the topic “Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties”, the Commission had before it the first report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/660), which, inter alia, contained four draft conclusions relating to the general rule and means of treaty interpretation; subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as means of interpretation; the definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice as means of treaty interpretation; and attribution of a treaty-related practice to a State. Following the debate in plenary, the Commission decided to refer the four draft conclusions to the Drafting Committee. Upon consideration of the report of the Drafting Committee, the Commission provisionally adopted five draft conclusions, together with commentaries thereto (chap. IV).

14. Concerning the topic “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction”, the Commission had before it the second report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/661), in which, inter alia, six draft articles were presented, following an analysis of (a) the scope of the topic and of the draft articles; (b) the concepts of immunity and jurisdiction; (c) the distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae; and (d) the identification of the normative elements comprising the regime of immunity ratione personae. Following the debate in plenary, the Commission decided to refer the six draft articles to the Drafting Committee. Upon consideration of the report of the Drafting Committee, the Commission provisionally adopted three draft articles, together with commentaries thereto (chap. V).

15. As regards the topic “Protection of persons in the event of disasters”, the Commission had before it the sixth report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/662), dealing with aspects of prevention in the context of the protection of persons in the event of disasters, including disaster risk reduction, prevention as a principle of international law, and international cooperation on prevention. Following the debate in plenary, the Commission decided to refer the two draft articles proposed by the Special Rapporteur to the Drafting Committee.

16. The Commission provisionally adopted seven draft articles, together with commentaries, namely draft articles 5 bis and 12 to 15, of which it had taken note at its sixty-fourth session (2012), dealing with forms of cooperation, offers of assistance, conditions on the provision of external assistance, facilitation of external assistance and termination of external assistance, respectively, as well as draft articles 5 ter and 16, concerning cooperation for disaster risk reduction and the duty to reduce the risk of disasters, respectively (chap. VI).

17. In relation to the topic “Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts” in its programme of work and appointed Ms. Marie Jacobsson as Special Rapporteur (chap. XII, sect. A.1). The Special Rapporteur presented the Commission with a series of informal working papers with a view to initiating an informal dialogue with members of the Commission on a number of issues that could be relevant to the development and consideration of work on the topic. Issues addressed in the informal consultations included, inter alia, scope and methodology, the possible outcome of the Commission’s work and a number of substantive issues relating to the topic (chap. IX).

18. In connection with the topic “The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)”, the
Commission reconstituted the Working Group on the topic, which continued the evaluation of work on the topic, particularly in the light of the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),\(^6\) of 20 July 2012. The Commission took note of the report of the Working Group, which is annexed to the present report (chap. X and annex I).

21. Concerning the topic “The most-favoured-nation clause”, the Commission reconstituted the Study Group on the topic, which, inter alia, continued to examine the various factors that seemed to influence investment tribunals in interpreting most-favoured-nation clauses, on the basis, inter alia, of contemporary practice and jurisprudence, in particular Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic\(^7\) and Kılıç İnşaat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan\(^8\) (chap. XI).

22. The Commission established a Planning Group to consider its programme, procedures and working methods (chap. XII, sect. A). The Commission decided to include the topic “Protection of the atmosphere” in its programme of work and to appoint Mr. Shinya Murase as Special Rapporteur for the topic (chap. XII, sect. A.1). The Commission also decided to include the topic “Crimes against humanity” in its long-term programme of work (chap. XII, sect. A.2, and annex II).

23. The Commission continued its traditional exchanges of information with the International Court of Justice, the Asian–African Legal Consultative Organization, the European Committee on Legal Co-operation and the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law of the Council of Europe, and the Inter-American Juridical Committee. The Commission likewise had an exchange of information with the African Union Commission on International Law. Members of the Commission also held informal meetings with other bodies and associations on matters of mutual interest (chap. XII, sect. C).

24. The Commission decided that its sixty-sixth session would be held in Geneva from 5 May to 6 June and from 7 July to 8 August 2014 (chap. XII, sect. B).

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\(^6\) Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422.

\(^7\) Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award dispatched to the parties on 22 August 2012 (available from https://icsid.worldbank.org/).

\(^8\) Kılıç İnşaat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Award dispatched to the parties on 2 July 2013 (available from https://icsid.worldbank.org/).
Chapter III

SPECIFIC ISSUES ON WHICH COMMENTS WOULD BE
OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE COMMISSION

A. Immunity of State officials from
foreign criminal jurisdiction

25. The Commission requests States to provide in-
formation, by 31 January 2014, on the practice of their
institutions, and in particular on judicial decisions, with
reference to the meaning given to the phrases “official
acts” and “acts performed in an official capacity” in the
context of the immunity of State officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction.

B. Formation and evidence of
customary international law

26. The Commission requests States to provide infor-
mation, by 31 January 2014, on their practice relating
to the formation of customary international law and the
types of evidence suitable for establishing such law in a
given situation, as set out in:

(a) official statements before legislatures, courts and
international organizations; and

(b) decisions of national, regional and subregional
courts.

C. Provisional application of treaties

27. The Commission requests States to provide infor-
mation, by 31 January 2014, on their practice concerning
the provisional application of treaties, with examples, in
particular in relation to:

(a) the decision to provisionally apply a treaty;

(b) the termination of such provisional application;

and

(c) the legal effects of provisional application.

D. Protection of the environment
in relation to armed conflicts

28. The Commission would like to have information
from States on whether, in their practice, international or
domestic environmental law has been interpreted as ap-
plicable in relation to international or non-international
armed conflict. The Commission would particularly
appreciate receiving examples of:

(a) treaties, particularly relevant regional or bilateral
treaties;

(b) national legislation relevant to the topic, including
legislation implementing regional or bilateral treaties;

and

(c) case law in which international or domestic envir-
onmental law was applied to disputes arising from situ-
ations of armed conflict.
Chapter IV

SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE IN RELATION TO THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

A. Introduction

29. The Commission, at its sixtieth session (2008), decided to include the topic “Treaties over time” in its programme of work and to establish a study group on the topic at its sixty-first session. At its sixty-first session (2009), the Commission established the Study Group on treaties over time, chaired by Mr. Georg Nolte. At that session, the Study Group focused its discussions on identifying the issues to be covered, the working methods of the Study Group and the possible outcome of the Commission’s work on the topic.

30. From the sixty-second to the sixty-fourth sessions (2010–2012), the Study Group was reconstituted under the chairpersonship of Mr. Georg Nolte. The Study Group examined three reports presented informally by the Chairperson, which addressed, respectively, the relevant jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and of the arbitral tribunals of ad hoc jurisdiction; the jurisprudence under special regimes relating to subsequent agreements and subsequent practice; and the subsequent agreements and subsequent practice of States outside judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.

31. At the sixty-third session (2011), the Chairperson of the Study Group presented nine preliminary conclusions, reformulated in the light of discussions in the Study Group. At the sixty-fourth session (2012), the Chairperson presented the text of six additional preliminary conclusions, also reformulated in the light of discussions in the Study Group. The Study Group also discussed the format in which further work on the topic should proceed and the possible outcome of the work. A number of suggestions were formulated by the Chairperson and agreed upon by the Study Group.

32. At the sixty-fourth session, the Commission, on the basis of a recommendation from the Study Group, also decided (a) to change, with effect from its sixty-fifth session (2013), the format of work on this topic as suggested by the Study Group; and (b) to appoint Mr. Georg Nolte as Special Rapporteur for the topic “Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties”.

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

33. At the present session, the Commission had before it the first report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/660), which it considered at its 3159th to 3163rd meetings, from 6 to 8 and on 10 and 14 May 2013.

34. In his first report, the Special Rapporteur, after addressing the scope, aim and possible outcome of work on this topic (paras. 4–7), considered the general rule and means of treaty interpretation (paras. 8–28); subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as means of interpretation (paras. 29–64); the definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice as means of treaty interpretation (paras. 65–118); and the attribution of a treaty-related practice to a State (paras. 119–144). The report also contained some indications as to the future programme of work (para. 145). The Special Rapporteur proposed a draft conclusion corresponding to each of the four issues addressed in paragraphs 8 to 144.

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9 At its 2997th meeting, on 8 August 2008 (see Yearbook ... 2008, vol. II (Part Two), para. 353). For the syllabus of the topic, see ibid., annex I. The General Assembly, in paragraph 6 of its resolution 63/123 of 11 December 2008, took note of the decision.

10 See Yearbook ... 2009, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 220–226.

11 See Yearbook ... 2010, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 345–354; and Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), para. 337.


14 For the text of the preliminary conclusions by the Chairperson of the Study Group, see Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), para. 344.

15 For the text of the preliminary conclusions by the Chairperson of the Study Group, see Yearbook ... 2012, vol. II (Part Two), para. 240.

16 Ibid., paras. 235–239.

17 Ibid., paras. 226 and 239.

18 Ibid., para. 227.

19 The four draft conclusions proposed by the Special Rapporteur read as follows:

“Draft conclusion 1. General rule and means of treaty interpretation

“Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as treaty obligation and as reflection of customary international law, sets forth the general rule on the interpretation of treaties.

“The interpretation of a treaty in a specific case may result in a different emphasis on the various means of interpretation contained in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, in particular on the text of the treaty or on its object and purpose, depending on the treaty or on the treaty provisions concerned.

“Draft conclusion 2. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of interpretation

“Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice between the parties to a treaty are authentic means of interpretation which shall be taken into account in the interpretation of treaties.

“Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice by the parties may guide an evolutive interpretation of a treaty.

“Draft conclusion 3. Definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice as means of treaty interpretation

“For the purpose of treaty interpretation a ‘subsequent agreement’ is a manifested agreement between the parties after the conclusion of a treaty regarding its interpretation or the application of its provisions.

“For the purpose of treaty interpretation ‘subsequent practice’ consists of conduct, including pronouncements, by one or more parties to the treaty after its conclusion regarding its interpretation or application.
35. At its 3163rd meeting, on 14 May 2013, the Commission referred draft conclusions 1 to 4, as contained in the Special Rapporteur’s first report, to the Drafting Committee.

36. At its 3172nd meeting, on 31 May 2013, the Commission considered the report of the Drafting Committee and provisionally adopted five draft conclusions (see section C.1 below).

37. At its 3191st to 3193rd meetings, on 5 and 6 August 2013, the Commission adopted the commentaries to the draft conclusions provisionally adopted at the current session (see section C.2 below).

C. Text of the draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties, as provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-fifth session

1. Text of the draft conclusions

38. The text of the draft conclusions provisionally adopted so far by the Commission is reproduced below.

Conclusion 1. General rule and means of treaty interpretation

1. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set forth, respectively, the general rule of interpretation and the rule on supplementary means of interpretation. These rules also apply as customary international law.

2. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

3. Article 31, paragraph 3, provides, inter alia, that there shall be taken into account, together with the context, (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; and (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.

4. Recourse may be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32.

5. The interpretation of a treaty consists of a single combined operation, which places appropriate emphasis on the various means of interpretation indicated, respectively, in articles 31 and 32.

Conclusion 2. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of interpretation

Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), being objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty, are authentic means of interpretation, in the application of the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in article 31.

Conclusion 3. Interpretation of treaty terms as capable of evolving over time

Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may assist in determining whether or not the presumed intention of the parties upon the conclusion of the treaty was to give a term used a meaning which is capable of evolving over time.

Conclusion 4. Definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice

1. A “subsequent agreement” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31, paragraph 3 (a), is an agreement between the parties, reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.

2. A “subsequent practice” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), consists of conduct in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty.

3. Other “subsequent practice” as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 consists of conduct by one or more parties in the application of the treaty, after its conclusion.

Conclusion 5. Attribution of subsequent practice

1. Subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may consist of any conduct in the application of a treaty which is attributable to a party to the treaty under international law.

2. Other conduct, including by non-State actors, does not constitute subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32. Such conduct may, however, be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of parties to a treaty.

2. Text of the draft conclusions and commentaries thereto provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-fifth session

39. The text of the draft conclusions, together with commentaries, provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-fifth session is reproduced below.

Introduction

(1) The following draft conclusions are based on the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (1969 Vienna Convention), which constitutes the framework for work on the topic “Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties”. The Commission considers that the relevant rules of the 1969 Vienna Convention today enjoy general acceptance.20

(2) The first five draft conclusions are general in nature. Other aspects of the topic, in particular more specific points, will be addressed at a later stage of the work.

Conclusion 1. General rule and means of treaty interpretation

1. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set forth, respectively, the general rule of interpretation and the rule on supplementary

20 See draft conclusion 1, para. 1, and accompanying commentary.
means of interpretation. These rules also apply as customary international law.

2. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

3. Article 31, paragraph 3, provides, *inter alia*, that there shall be taken into account, together with the context, (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; and (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.

4. Recourse may be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32.

5. The interpretation of a treaty consists of a single combined operation, which places appropriate emphasis on the various means of interpretation indicated, respectively, in articles 31 and 32.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft conclusion 1 situates subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as a means of treaty interpretation within the framework of the rules on the interpretation of treaties set forth in articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The title “General rule and means of treaty interpretation” signals two points. First, article 31 of the Vienna Convention, as a whole, is the “general rule” of treaty interpretation. Second, articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention together list a number of “means of interpretation” which must (art. 31) or may (art. 32) be taken into account in the interpretation of treaties.

(2) Paragraph 1 of draft conclusion 1 emphasizes the interrelationship between articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, as well as the fact that these provisions, together, reflect customary international law. The reference to both articles 31 and 32 clarifies from the start the general context in which subsequent agreements and subsequent practice are addressed in the draft conclusions.

(3) Whereas article 31 sets forth the general rule and article 32 deals with supplementary means of interpretation, both rules must be read together as they constitute an integrated framework for the interpretation of treaties. Article 32 includes a threshold between the primary means of interpretation according to article 31, all of which are to be taken into account in the process of interpretation, and the “supplementary means of interpretation” to which recourse may be had when the interpretation according to article 31 leaves the meaning of the treaty or its terms ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

(4) The second sentence of paragraph 1 of draft conclusion 1 confirms that the rules enshrined in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention reflect customary international law. International courts and tribunals have acknowledged the customary character of these rules. This is true, in particular, for the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), inter-State arbitrations, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Court of

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21 Title of article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
24 An example is the use of rules of interpretation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that is not specifically referred to in the Vienna Convention. The DSU implies that article 32 reflects rules of customary international law, and has resorted to them by reference to article 31, paragraph 2 of the DSU.
29 *Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes provides that it “serves ... to clarify the existing provisions of [the] agreements [covered by WTO] in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”, but does not specifically refer to articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. However, the Appellate Body has consistently acknowledged that article 31 and article 32 reflect rules of customary international law, and has resorted to them by reference to article 31, paragraph 2, of the Understanding. See, for example, WTO, Appellate Body
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties

Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and tribunals established by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States. Hence, the rules contained in articles 31 and 32 apply as treaty law in relation to those States which are parties to the Vienna Convention for treaties which fall within the scope of the Convention, and as customary international law between all States.

The Commission also considered referring to article 33 of the Vienna Convention in draft conclusion 1 and whether this provision also reflected customary international law. Article 33 may be relevant for draft conclusions on the topic of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation. A “subsequent agreement” under article 31, paragraph 3 (a), for example, could be formulated in two or more languages, and there could be questions regarding the relationship of any subsequent agreement to different language versions of the treaty itself. The Commission nevertheless decided not to address such questions for the time being, but left open the possibility to do so should this issue come up in future work on the topic.

The Commission, in particular, considered whether the rules set forth in article 33 reflected customary international law. Some members thought that all the rules in article 33 reflected customary international law, while others wanted to leave open the possibility that only some, but not all, rules set forth in this provision qualified as such. The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals has not yet fully addressed the question. The International Court of Justice and the WTO Appellate Body have considered parts of article 33 to reflect rules of customary international law: in LaGrand, the Court recognized that paragraph 4 of article 33 reflects customary international law. It is less clear whether the Court in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case considered that paragraph 3 of article 33 reflected a customary rule. The WTO Appellate Body has held that the rules in paragraphs 3 and 4 reflect customary law. The Arbitral Tribunal in the German External Debts case found that paragraph 1 “incorporated” a “principle”. ITLOS and the European Court of Human Rights have gone one step further and stated that article 33 as a whole reflects customary law. Thus, there are significant indications in the case law that article 33, in its entirety, indeed reflects customary international law.

Paragraph 2 of draft conclusion 1 reproduces the text of article 31, paragraph 1, given its importance for the topic. Article 31, paragraph 1, is the point of departure for any treaty interpretation according to the general rule contained in article 31 as a whole. This is intended to contribute to ensuring balance in the process of interpretation between an assessment of the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose, on the one hand, and the considerations regarding subsequent agreements and subsequent practice, on the other hand, in the following draft conclusions. The reiteration of article 31, paragraph 1, as a separate paragraph is not, however, meant to suggest that this paragraph and the means of interpretation mentioned therein possess a primacy in substance within the context of article 31 itself. All means of interpretation in article 31 are part of a single integrated rule.

Paragraph 3 reproduces the language of article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), of the Vienna Convention, in order to situate subsequent agreements and subsequent practice, as the main focus of the topic, within the general legal framework of treaty interpretation. Accordingly, the
of the treaty” should be dealt with, in the present draft conclusions, as a supplementary means of interpretation. Such practice may, however, under certain circumstances, be a relevant supplementary means of interpretation as well.46 But such practice is beyond what the Commission now addresses under the present topic, except insofar as it may contribute to “assessing” relevant subsequent practice in the application of a treaty (see draft conclusion 5 and accompanying commentary). Thus, paragraph 4 of draft conclusion 1 requires that any subsequent practice be “in the application of the treaty”, as does paragraph 3 of draft conclusion 4, which defines “other ‘subsequent practice’.”

(12) The Commission considered it important to complete draft conclusion 1 by emphasizing in paragraph 546 that, notwithstanding the structure of draft conclusion 1, moving from the general to the more specific, the process of interpretation is a “single combined operation”, which requires that “appropriate emphasis” is placed on various means of interpretation.47 The expression “single combined operation” is drawn from the Commission’s commentary to the 1966 draft articles on the law of treaties.48 There, the Commission also stated that it intended “to emphasize that the process of interpretation is a unity”.49

(13) Paragraph 5 of draft conclusion 1 also explains that appropriate emphasis must be placed, in the course of the process of interpretation as a “single combined operation”, on the various means of interpretation that are referred to in articles 31 and 32. The Commission did not, however, consider it necessary to include a reference, by way of example, to one or more specific means of interpretation in the text of paragraph 5 of draft conclusion 1.50 This avoids a possible misunderstanding that any one of the different means of interpretation has priority over others, regardless of the specific treaty provision or the case concerned.

(14) Paragraph 5 uses the term “means of interpretation”. This term captures not only the “supplementary means of interpretation”, which are referred to in article 32, but also

41 Yasseen (see footnote 24 above), p. 79.
44 Yasseen (see footnote 24 above), p. 52: “… la Convention de Vienne ne retient pas comme élément de la règle générale d‘interprétation la pratique ultérieure en général, mais une pratique ultérieure spécifique, à savoir une pratique ultérieure non seulement concordante, mais également commune à toutes les parties. Ce qui reste de la pratique ultérieure peut être un moyen complémentaire d‘interprétation, selon l‘article 32 de la Convention de Vienne”*; Sinclair (see footnote 24 above), p. 138: “… paragraph 3(b) of Article 31 of the Convention [covers] only a specific form of subsequent practice—that is to say, concordant subsequent practice common to all the parties. Subsequent practice which does not fall within this narrow definition may nonetheless constitute a supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of Article 32 of the Convention”*; S. Touboul, “Interpretation of treaties by the International Court of Justice following the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in G. Hafner, G. Loibl, A. Rest, L. Sucharipa, L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Subsequent practice, practices, and ‘family resemblance’: Towards embedding subsequent practice in its operative milieu”, in Nolet (ed.) (see footnote 29 above), p. 53, at pp. 59–62.
45 First report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660); “Introductory report for the ILC Study Group on treaties over time”, in Nolet (ed.) (see footnote 29 above), pp. 171 and 177.
46 On the different function of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to other means of interpretation, see first report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660), paras. 42–57; see also “Introductory report for the ILC Study Group on treaties over time”, in Nolet (ed.) (see footnote 29 above), p. 183.
48 Ibid.
49 This had been proposed by the Special Rapporteur: see first report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660), para. 28 (“General rule and means of treaty interpretation … The interpretation of a treaty in a specific case may result in a different emphasis on the various means of interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 [of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties], in particular on the text of the treaty or on its object and purpose, depending on the treaty or on the treaty provisions concerned”). See also the analysis in ibid., paras. 8–27.

41 Yasseen (see footnote 24 above), p. 79.
44 Yasseen (see footnote 24 above), p. 52: “… la Convention de Vienne ne retient pas comme élément de la règle générale d‘interprétation la pratique ultérieure en général, mais une pratique ultérieure spécifique, à savoir une pratique ultérieure non seulement concordante, mais également commune à toutes les parties. Ce qui reste de la pratique ultérieure peut être un moyen complémentaire d‘interprétation, selon l‘article 32 de la Convention de Vienne”*; Sinclair (see footnote 24 above), p. 138: “… paragraph 3(b) of Article 31 of the Convention [covers] only a specific form of subsequent practice—that is to say, concordant subsequent practice common to all the parties. Subsequent practice which does not fall within this narrow definition may nonetheless constitute a supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of Article 32 of the Convention”*; S. Touboul, “Interpretation of treaties by the International Court of Justice following the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in G. Hafner, G. Loibl, A. Rest, L. Sucharipa, L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Subsequent practice, practices, and ‘family resemblance’: Towards embedding subsequent practice in its operative milieu”, in Nolet (ed.) (see footnote 29 above), p. 53, at pp. 59–62.
45 First report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660); “Introductory report for the ILC Study Group on treaties over time”, in Nolet (ed.) (see footnote 29 above), pp. 171 and 177.
46 On the different function of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to other means of interpretation, see first report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660), paras. 42–57; see also “Introductory report for the ILC Study Group on treaties over time”, in Nolet (ed.) (see footnote 29 above), p. 183.
48 Ibid.
49 This had been proposed by the Special Rapporteur: see first report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660), para. 28 (“General rule and means of treaty interpretation … The interpretation of a treaty in a specific case may result in a different emphasis on the various means of interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 [of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties], in particular on the text of the treaty or on its object and purpose, depending on the treaty or on the treaty provisions concerned”). See also the analysis in ibid., paras. 8–27.
the elements mentioned in article 31.51 Whereas the Commission, in its commentary on the draft articles on the law of treaties, sometimes used the terms “means of interpretation” and “elements of interpretation” interchangeably, for the purpose of the present topic the Commission retained the term “means of interpretation” because it also describes their function in the process of interpretation as a tool or an instrument.52 The term “means” does not set apart from each other the different elements mentioned in articles 31 and 32. Rather, it indicates that these means each have a function in the process of interpretation, which is a “single” and at the same time a “combined” operation.53 Just as courts typically begin their reasoning by looking at the terms of a treaty, and then continue, in an interactive process,54 to analyse those terms in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty,55 the precise relevance of different means of interpretation must first be identified in any case of treaty interpretation before they can be “thrown into the crucible”56 in order to arrive at a proper interpretation, by giving them appropriate weight in relation to each other.

(15) The obligation to place “appropriate emphasis on the various means of interpretation” may, in the course of the interpretation of a treaty in specific cases, result in a different emphasis on the various means of interpretation depending on the treaty or on the treaty provisions concerned.57 This is not to suggest that a court or any other interpreter is more or less free to choose how to use and apply the different means of interpretation. What guides the interpretation is the evaluation by the interpreter, which consists in identifying the relevance of different means of interpretation in a specific case and in determining their interaction with the other means of interpretation in the case by placing a proper emphasis on them in good faith, as required by the rule to be applied. This evaluation should include, if possible and practicable, consideration of relevant prior assessments and decisions in the same and possibly also in other relevant areas.58

51 See also the commentary to draft conclusion 1, para. 1; Villiger, “The 1969 Vienna Convention ...” (see footnote 22 above), p. 129; Daillier, Forteau and Pellet (see footnote 25 above), pp. 284–289.
52 See the summary record of the 3172nd meeting, held on 31 May 2013.
54 Ibid.
57 First report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660), para. 28 (draft conclusion 1, para. 2), and, generally, paras. 10–27.
58 The first report (see previous footnote) refers to the jurisprudence of different international courts and tribunals as examples of how the weight of a means in an interpretation exercise is to be determined in specific cases, and demonstrates how given instances of

The Commission debated whether it would be appropriate to refer, in draft conclusion 1, to the “nature” of the treaty as a factor which would typically be relevant to determining whether more or less weight should be given to certain means of interpretation.59 Some members considered that the subject matter of a treaty (e.g. whether provisions concern purely economic matters or rather address the human rights of individuals; and whether the rules of a treaty are more technical or more value-oriented), as well as its basic structure and function (e.g. whether provisions are more reciprocal in nature or more intended to protect a common good), may affect its interpretation. They indicated that the jurisprudence of different international courts and tribunals suggests that this is the case.60 It was also mentioned that the concept of the “nature” of a treaty is not alien to the 1969 Vienna Convention (see e.g. art. 56, para. (1) (b))61 and that the concept of the “nature” of the treaty and/or of treaty provisions had been included in other work of the Commission, in particular on the topic of the effects of armed conflicts on treaties.62 Other members, however, considered that the draft conclusion should not refer to the “nature” of the treaty in order to preserve the unity of the interpretation process and to avoid any categorization of treaties. The point was also made that the notion of the “nature of the treaty” was unclear and that it would be difficult to distinguish it from the object and purpose of the treaty.63

59 See first report (footnote 57 above), draft conclusion 1, para. 2, and analysis at paras. 8–28.
60 The WTO Panels and the Appellate Body, for example, seem to emphasize more the terms of the respective agreement covered by WTO (e.g. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft—Recourse by Canada to Article 21.3 of the DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 45), whereas the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights highlight the character of the European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, respectively, as human rights treaties (e.g. Mamakhalov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005-I, para. 111; and The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due-Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 October 1999, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 16, para. 58); see also Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), chapter XI, sect. B.3, and “Second report for the ILC Study Group on treaties over time”, in Nolte (ed.) (see footnote 29 above), p. 210, at pp. 216, 244–246, 249–262 and 270–275.
62 Articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (art. 6 (a)), General Assembly resolution 66/99 of 9 December 2011, annex. See the draft articles adopted by the Commission and the commentaries thereto reproduced in Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 100–101; see also the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, ibid., vol. II (Part Three) (guideline 4.2.5 refers to the nature of obligations under a treaty, rather than the nature of the treaty as such).
63 According to the commentary to guideline 4.2.5 of the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, it is difficult to distinguish between the nature of treaty obligations and the object and purpose of the treaty (Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Three), paragraph (3) of the commentary to guideline 4.2.5). On the other hand, article 6 of the articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties suggests “a series of factors pertaining to the nature of the treaty, particularly in its subject matter, object and purpose, its content and the number of parties to the treaty” (ibid., vol. II (Part Two), para. 101, at paragraph (3) of the commentary to article 6).
The Commission ultimately decided to leave the question open and to make no reference in draft conclusion 1 to the nature of the treaty for the time being.

Conclusion 2. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of interpretation

Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), being objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty, are authentic means of interpretation, in the application of the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in Article 31.

Commentary

(1) By characterizing subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), of the Vienna Convention as “authentic means of interpretation” the Commission indicates the reason why these means are significant for the interpretation of treaties. The Commission thereby follows its 1966 commentary on the draft articles on the law of treaties, which described subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), as “authentic means of interpretation” and which underlined that

[t]he importance of such subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, as an element of interpretation, is obvious; for it constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty.

(2) Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), are, however, not the only “authentic means of interpretation”. Analysing the ordinary meaning of the text of a treaty, in particular, is also such a means. As the Commission has explained,

...the Commission’s approach to treaty interpretation was on the basis that the text of the treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties... making the ordinary meaning of the terms, the context of the treaty, its object and purpose, and the general rules of international law, together with authentic interpretations by the parties, the primary criteria for interpreting a treaty.

The term “authentic” thus refers to different forms of “objective evidence”, or “proof” of conduct of the parties which reflects the “common understanding of the parties” as to the meaning of the treaty.

(3) By describing subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), as “authentic” means of interpretation, the Commission recognizes that the common will of the parties, from which any treaty results, possesses a specific authority regarding the identification of the meaning of the treaty, even after the conclusion of the treaty. The 1960 Vienna Convention thereby accords the parties to a treaty a role which may be uncommon for the interpretation of legal instruments in some domestic legal systems.

(4) The character of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice of the parties under Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), as “authentic means of interpretation” does not, however, imply that these means necessarily possess a conclusive, or legally binding, effect. According to the chapeau of Article 31, paragraph 3, subsequent agreements and subsequent practice shall, after all, only “be taken into account” in the interpretation of a treaty, which consists of a “single combined operation” with no hierarchy among the means of interpretation that are referred to in Article 31. For this reason, and contrary to the view of some commentators, subsequent agreements and subsequent practice that establish the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty are not necessarily conclusive, or legally binding. Thus, when the Commission characterized a “subsequent agreement” as representing “an authentic interpretation by the parties which must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation”, it did not go quite as far as to say that such an interpretation is necessarily conclusive in the sense that it overrides all other means of interpretation.

(5) This does not exclude that the parties to a treaty, if they wish, may reach a binding agreement regarding the interpretation of a treaty. The Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, Sir Humphrey Waldock, stated in his third report on the law of treaties that it may be difficult to distinguish subsequent practice of the parties under which became Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b)—which is only


to be taken into account, among other means, in the process of interpretation—and a later agreement which the parties consider to be binding:

Subsequent practice when it is consistent and encompasses all the parties would appear to be decisive of the meaning to be attached to the treaty, at any rate when it indicates that the parties consider the interpretation to be binding upon them. In these cases, subsequent practice as an element of treaty interpretation and as an element in the formation of a tacit agreement overlap and the meaning derived from the practice becomes an authentic interpretation established by agreement.\(^71\)

Whereas Waldock’s original view that (simple) agreed subsequent practice “would appear to be decisive of the meaning” was ultimately not adopted in the 1969 Vienna Convention, subsequent agreements and subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty must be conclusive regarding such interpretation when “the parties consider the interpretation to be binding upon them”. It is, however, always possible that provisions of domestic law prohibit the government of a State from arriving at a binding agreement in such cases without satisfying certain—mostly procedural—requirements under its constitution.\(^72\)

(6) The possibility of arriving at a binding subsequent interpretative agreement by the parties is particularly clear in cases in which the treaty itself so provides. Article 1131, paragraph 2, of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, provides that “[a]n interpretation by the [inter-governmental] Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section”. The existence of such a special procedure or an agreement regarding the authoritative interpretation of a treaty which the parties consider binding may or may not preclude additional recourse to subsequent agreements or subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b).\(^73\)

(7) The Commission has continued to use the term “authentic means of interpretation” in order to describe the not necessarily conclusive, but more or less authoritative, character of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b). The Commission has not employed the terms “authentic interpretation” or “authoritative interpretation” in draft conclusion 2 since these concepts are often understood to mean a necessarily conclusive, or binding, agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty.\(^74\)

(8) The term “authentic means of interpretation” encompasses a factual and a legal element. The factual element is indicated by the expression “objective evidence”, whereas the legal element is contained in the concept of “understanding of the parties”. Accordingly, the Commission characterized a “subsequent agreement” as representing “an authentic interpretation by the parties which must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation”.\(^75\) and subsequently stated that subsequent practice “similarly … constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty”.\(^76\) Given the character of treaties as embodiments of the common will of their parties, “objective evidence” of the “understanding of the parties” possesses considerable authority as a means of interpretation.\(^77\)

(9) The distinction between any “subsequent agreement” (art. 31, para. 3 (a)) and “subsequent practice … which establishes the agreement of the parties” (art. 31, para. 3 (b)) does not denote a difference concerning their authentic character.\(^78\) The Commission considers rather that a “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” ipso facto has the effect of constituting an authentic interpretation of the treaty, whereas a “subsequent practice” only has this effect if it “shows the common understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the terms”.\(^79\) Thus, the difference between a “subsequent agreement between the parties” and a “subsequent practice … which establishes the agreement of the parties” lies in the manner of establishing the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty, with the difference being in the greater ease with which an agreement is established.\(^80\)

(10) Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of treaty interpretation are not to be confused with interpretations of treaties by international courts, tribunals or treaty bodies in specific cases. Subsequent agreements or subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), are “authentic” means of interpretation because they are expressions of the understanding of the treaty by the States parties themselves. The authority of international courts, tribunals and treaty bodies derives rather from other sources, most often from the treaty which is to be interpreted. Judgments and other

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\(^{72}\) This issue will be addressed at a later stage of work on the topic.


\(^{76}\) Ibid., para. (15).

\(^{77}\) Gardiner (see footnote 23 above), pp. 32 and 354–355; Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (see footnote 74 above), pp. 152–153.

\(^{78}\) First report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660), para. 69.


\(^{80}\) Kasikili/Sedudu Island (see footnote 26 above), p. 1087, para. 63; see also draft conclusion 4 and the accompanying commentary.
pronouncements of international courts, tribunals and treaty bodies, however, may be indirectly relevant for the identification of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of interpretation if they reflect or trigger such subsequent agreements and practice of the parties themselves.81

(11) Draft conclusions 1 and 4 distinguish between “subsequent practice” establishing the agreement of the parties under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention, on the one hand, and other subsequent practice (in a broad sense) by one or more, but not all, parties to the treaty, which may be relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32.82 Such “other” subsequent interpretative practice which does not establish the agreement of all the parties cannot constitute an “authentic” interpretation of a treaty by all its parties and thus will not possess the same weight for the purpose of interpretation.83

(12) The last part of draft conclusion 2 makes it clear that any reliance on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of interpretation should occur as part of the application of the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

Conclusion 3. Interpretation of treaty terms as capable of evolving over time

Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may assist in determining whether or not the presumed intention of the parties upon the conclusion of the treaty was to give a term a meaning which is capable of evolving over time.

Commentary

(1) Draft conclusion 3 addresses the role which subsequent agreements and subsequent practice may play in the context of the more general question of whether the meaning of a term of a treaty is capable of evolving over time.

(2) In the case of treaties, the question of the so-called intertemporal law84 has traditionally been put in terms of whether a treaty should be interpreted in the light of the circumstances and the law at the time of its conclusion (“contemporaneous” or “static” interpretation), or in the light of the circumstances and the law at the time of its application (“evolutive”, “evolutionary” or “dynamic” interpretation).85 Arbitrator Max Huber’s dictum in the Island of Palmas case, according to which “the judicial fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it”,86 led many international courts and tribunals, as well as many writers, to generally favour contemporaneous interpretation.87 At the same time, the Tribunal in the Iron Rhine case asserted that there was “general support among the leading writers today for evolutive interpretation of treaties”.88

(3) The Commission, in its commentary to the draft articles on the law of treaties, considered in 1966 that “to attempt to formulate a rule covering comprehensively the temporal element would present difficulties”, and it therefore “concluded that it should omit the temporal element”.89 Similarly, the debates within the Commission’s Study Group on the fragmentation of international law led to the conclusion in 2006 that it is difficult to formulate and to agree on a general rule which would give preference either to a principle of contemporaneous interpretation or to one which generally recognizes the need to take account of an “evolving meaning” of treaties.90

(4) Draft conclusion 3 should not be read as taking any position regarding the appropriateness of a more contemporaneous or a more evolutive approach to treaty interpretation in general. Draft conclusion 3 emphasizes rather that subsequent agreements and subsequent practice, like any other means of treaty interpretation, can support both a contemporaneous and an evolutive interpretation (or, as it is often called, evolutionary interpretation), where appropriate. The Commission, therefore, concluded that these means of treaty interpretation “may assist in determining...”

Footnotes

81 This aspect will be addressed in more detail at a later stage of work on the topic; see, for example, “Third report for the ILC Study Group on treaties over time”, in Nolte (ed.) (see footnote 29 above), p. 307, at pp. 381 et seq., para. 17.3.1.
82 See in particular paragraphs (22)–(36) of the commentary to draft conclusion 4.
83 See in more detail paragraph (34) of the commentary to draft conclusion 4.
85 Fitzmaurice, “Dynamic (evolutive) interpretation of treaties ...” (see previous footnote).
86 Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. USA), Award, 4 April 1928, UNRIAA, vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 829, at p. 845.
90 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission—Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi (A/CN.4/L.682 and Corr.1 and Add.1.), para. 478; available from the Commission’s website, documents of the fifty-eighth session (the final text will be published as an addendum to Yearbook ... 2006, vol. II (Part One)).
whether or not” an evolutive interpretation is appropriate with regard to a particular treaty term.

(5) This approach is confirmed by the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. The various international courts and tribunals which have engaged in evolutive interpretation—albeit to varying degrees—appear to have followed a case-by-case approach in determining, through recourse to the various means of treaty interpretation which are referred to in articles 31 and 32, whether a treaty term should be given a meaning capable of evolving over time.

(6) The International Court of Justice, in particular, is seen as having developed two strands of jurisprudence, one tending towards a more “contemporaneous” and the other towards a more “evolutionary” interpretation, as Judge ad hoc Guillaume has pointed out in his Declaration in Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights.1 The decisions that favour a more contemporaneous approach mostly concern specific treaty terms (“water-parting”; “main channel/Thalweg”; names of places; “mouth” of a river). On the other hand, the cases that support an evolutive interpretation seem to relate to more general terms. This is true, in particular, for terms which are “by definition evolutionary”, such as “the strenuous conditions of the modern world” or “the well-being and development of such peoples” in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The International Court of Justice, in Namibia, has given those terms an evolving meaning by referring to the evolution of the right of peoples to self-determination after the Second World War.2 The “generic” nature of a particular term in a treaty3 and the fact that the treaty is designed to be “of continuing duration”4 may also give rise to an evolving meaning.

(7) Other international judicial bodies sometimes also employ an evolutive approach to interpretation, though displaying different degrees of openness towards such interpretation. The WTO Appellate Body has only occasionally resorted to evolutive interpretation. In a well-known case it has, however, held that “the generic term ‘natural resources’ in article XX (g) is not ‘static’ in its content or reference, but is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary’.”5 The ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber has held that the meaning of certain “obligations to ensure”6 “may change over time”,7 and has emphasized that the rules of State liability in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are apt to follow developments in the law and are “not considered to be static”.8 The European Court of Human Rights has held more generally “that the Convention is a living instrument which … must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.9 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also more generally follows an evolutive approach to interpretation, in particular in connection with its so called pro homine approach.10 In the Iron Rhine case, the continued viability and effectiveness of a multi-dimensional, cross-border railway arrangement was an important reason for the Tribunal to accept that even rather technical rules may have to be given an evolutive interpretation.11

(8) In the final analysis, most international courts and tribunals have not recognized evolutive interpretation as a separate form of interpretation, but instead have arrived at such an evolutive interpretation in the application of the various means of interpretation which are mentioned in articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, by considering certain criteria (in particular those mentioned in paragraph (6) above) on a case-by-case basis. Any evolutive interpretation of the meaning of a term over

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3Kassólí/Seduju Island (see footnote 26 above), paras. 21 and 25.


8Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (see footnote 26 above), p. 243, para. 66.


10United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 153, para. 4, and art. 4, para. 4, in annex III.

11Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area (see footnote 27 above), para. 117.

12Ibid., para. 211.


14The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (see footnote 60 above), para. 114 (“This guidance is particularly relevant in the case of international human rights law, which has made great headway thanks to an evolutive interpretation of international instruments of protection. That evolutive interpretation is consistent with the general rules of treaty interpretation established in the 1969 Vienna Convention. Both this Court, in the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1989), and the European Court of Human Rights, in Tyrer v. United Kingdom (1978), Murray v. Belgium (1979), Loizidou v. Turkey (1995), among others, have held that human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must consider the changes over time and present-day conditions.” (footnotes omitted)).

15Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (“Izèren Rijn”) Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (see footnote 28 above), para. 80: “In the present case it is not a conceptual or generic term that is in issue, but rather new technical developments relating to the operation and capacity of the railway”; see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (footnote 97 above), p. 32, para. 77; see also Case concerning the delimitation of maritime boundary between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Award, 23 July 1989, UNRIAA, vol. XX (Sales No. E/F.93.V.3), p. 119, at pp. 151–152, para. 85.
time must therefore result from the ordinary process of treaty interpretation.\footnote{26}

(9) The Commission considers that this state of affairs confirms its original approach to treaty interpretation:

... the Commission’s approach to treaty interpretation was on the basis that the text of the treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties, and that the elucidation of the meaning of the text rather than an investigation ab initio of the supposed intentions of the parties constitutes the object of interpretation .... making the ordinary meaning of the terms, the context of the treaty, its object and purpose, and the general rules of international law, together with authentic interpretations by the parties, the primary criteria for interpreting a treaty.\footnote{27}

Accordingly, draft conclusion 3, by using the phrase “presumed intention”, refers to the intention of the parties as determined through the application of the various means of interpretation which are recognized in articles 31 and 32. The “presumed intention” is thus not a separately identifiable original will, and the travaux préparatoires are not the primary basis for determining the presumed intention of the parties but are only, as article 32 indicates, a supplementary means of interpretation. And although interpretation must seek to identify the intention of the parties, this must be done by the interpreter on the basis of the means of interpretation which are available at the time of the act of interpretation, and which include subsequent agreements and subsequent practice of parties to the treaty. The interpreter thus has to answer the question of whether parties can be presumed to have intended, upon the conclusion of the treaty, to give a term used a meaning that is capable of evolving over time.

(10) Draft conclusion 3 does not take a position regarding the question of the appropriateness of a more contemporaneous or a more evolutive approach to treaty interpretation in general (see commentary above, at paragraph (4)). This draft conclusion should, however, be understood as indicating the need for some caution with regard to arriving at a conclusion in a specific case as to whether to adopt an evolutive approach. For this purpose, draft conclusion 3 points to subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as means of interpretation which may provide useful indications to the interpreter for assessing, as part of the ordinary process of treaty interpretation, whether the meaning of a term is capable of evolving over time.\footnote{28}

(11) This approach is based on and confirmed by the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and other international courts and tribunals. In Namibia, the Court referred to the practice of United Nations organs and of States in order to specify the conclusions which it derived from the inherently evolutive nature of the right to self-determination.\footnote{109} In the Aegean Sea case, the Court found it “significant” that what it had identified as the “ordinary, generic sense” of the term “territorial status” was confirmed by the administrative practice of the United Nations and by the behaviour of the party which had invoked the restrictive interpretation in a different context.\footnote{110} In any case, the decisions in which the Court has undertaken an evolutive interpretation have not strayed from the possible meaning of the text and from the presumed intention of the parties to the treaty, as they had also been expressed in their subsequent agreements and subsequent practice.\footnote{111}

On the one hand, the subsequent practice of the parties, within the meaning of article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention, can result in a departure from the original intent on the basis of a tacit agreement between the parties. On the other hand, there are situations in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of the treaty was ... to give the terms used ... a meaning content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other things, developments in international law.\footnote{112}

The Court then found that the term “comercio” was a “generic term” of which “the parties necessarily” had “been aware that the meaning ... was likely to evolve over time” and that “the treaty has been entered into for a very long period”, and concluded that “the parties must have intended ... to have intended” this term to “have an evolving meaning”.\footnote{113} Judge Skotnikov, in a separate opinion, while disagreeing with this reasoning, ultimately arrived at the same result by accepting that a more recent subsequent practice of Costa Rica related to tourism on the San Juan river “for at least a decade”, against which Nicaragua “never protested” but rather “engaged in consistent practice of allowing tourist navigation”, and concluded that this “suggests that the Parties have established an agreement regarding its interpretation”.\footnote{114}

\footnote{106} As the 2006 report of the Study Group on the fragmentation of international law puts it, “the starting-point must be ... the fact that deciding [the] issue [of evolutive interpretation] is a matter of interpreting the treaty itself” (A/CN.4/L.682 and Corr.1 and Add.1 (see footnote 90 above), para. 478).

\footnote{107} Yearbook ... 1964, vol. II, document A/5809, pp. 204–205, para. (15); see also ibid., pp. 203–204, para. (13). (“Paragraph 3 specifies as further authentic elements of interpretation: (a) agreements between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty, and (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which clearly established the understanding of all the parties regarding its interpretation”); on the other hand, Waldock, in his third report on the law of treaties, explained that travaux préparatoires are not, as such, an authentic means of interpretation (ibid., document A/CN.4/167 and Add.1–3, pp. 58–59, para. (21)).


\footnote{110} Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (see footnote 97 above), p. 31, para. 74.

\footnote{111} See also Case concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (footnote 105 above), paras. 151–152, para. 85.

\footnote{112} Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (see footnote 26 above), p. 242, para. 64. See also Treaty of Territorial Limits between Costa Rica and Nicaragua (“Cañas–Jerez Treaty”), San José de Costa Rica, 15 April 1858, Treaty Collection, San José, Ministry of Foreign Relations, 1907, p. 159.

\footnote{113} Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (see footnote 26 above), paras. 66–68.

\footnote{114} Ibid., separate opinion of Judge Skotnikov, p. 283, at p. 285, paras. 9–10.
(13) The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Faruqatieja, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of 10 December 1998, [special assembly], paras. 130–133 and 137.

(14) The “living instrument” approach of the European Court of Human Rights is also based, inter alia, on different forms of subsequent practice. While the Court does not generally require “the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” in the sense of article 31, paragraph 3 (b), the decisions in which it adopts an evolutive approach are regularly supported by an elaborate account of subsequent (state, social and international legal) practice.

(15) The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, despite its relatively rare mentioning of subsequent practice, frequently refers to broader international developments, an approach which falls somewhere between subsequent practice and other “relevant rules” under article 31, paragraph 3 (c). In the case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, for example, the Court pointed out that human rights treaties are live instruments (“instrumentos vivos”) whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times and, specifically, to current living conditions.

(16) The Human Rights Committee also on occasion adopts an evolutive approach, which is based on developments in State practice. Thus, in Judge v. Canada, the Committee abandoned its Kinder v. Canada jurisprudence, elaborating:

The Committee is mindful of the fact that the above-mentioned jurisprudence was established some 10 years ago, and that since that time there has been a broadening international consensus in favour of abolition of the death penalty, and in States which have retained the death penalty, a broadening consensus not to carry it out. In Yoon and Choi, the Committee stressed that the meaning of any right contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights evolved over time and concluded that article 18, paragraph 3, now provided at least some protection against being forced to act against genuinely held religious beliefs. The Committee reached this conclusion since “an increasing number of those States parties to the Covenant which have retained compulsory military service have introduced alternatives to compulsory military service”.

(17) Finally, tribunals of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes have emphasized that subsequent practice can be a particularly important means of interpretation for such provisions as the parties to a treaty intended to evolve in the light of their subsequent treaty practice. In the case of Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, for example, the Tribunal stated as follows:

Neither party asserted that the [Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States] contains any precise a priori definition of “investment”. Rather, the definition was left to be worked out in the subsequent practice of States, thereby preserving its integrity and flexibility and allowing for future progressive development of international law on the topic of investment.

(18) The jurisprudence of international courts, tribunals, and other treaty bodies thus confirms that subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 “may assist in determining” whether a “term” shall be given a meaning which is capable of evolving over time. The expression “term” is not limited to specific words (like “commerce”, “territorial status”, “rape”) or
“investment”), but may also encompass more interrelated or cross-cutting concepts (such as “by law” (art. 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) or “necessary” (art. 18 of the Covenant), as they exist, for example, in human rights treaties). Since the “terms” of a treaty are elements of the rules which are contained therein, the rules concerned are covered accordingly.

Conclusion 4. Definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice

1. A “subsequent agreement” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31, paragraph 3 (a), is an agreement between the parties, reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.

2. A “subsequent practice” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), consists of conduct in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty.

3. Other “subsequent practice” as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 consists of conduct by one or more parties in the application of the treaty, after its conclusion.

Commentary

(1) Draft conclusion 4 defines the three different “subsequent” means of treaty interpretation which are mentioned in draft conclusion 1, paragraphs 3 and 4, namely “subsequent agreement” under article 31, paragraph 3 (a), “subsequent practice” under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), and other “subsequent practice” under article 32.

(2) In all three cases the term “subsequent” refers to acts occurring “after the conclusion of a treaty”. This point in time is often earlier than the moment when the treaty enters into force (art. 24). Various provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention (e.g. art. 18) show that a treaty may be “concluded” before its actual entry into force. For the purposes of the present topic, “conclusion” is whenever the text of the treaty has been established as definite. It is after conclusion, not just after entry into force, of a treaty when subsequent agreements and subsequent practice can occur. Indeed, it is difficult to identify a reason why an agreement or practice which takes place between the moment when a treaty has been established as definite and the entry into force of that treaty should not be relevant for the purpose of interpretation.

(3) Article 31, paragraph 2, of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides that the “context” of the treaty includes certain “agreements” and “instruments” that are “made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty”. The phrase “in connection with the conclusion of the treaty” should be understood as including agreements and instruments which are made in a close temporal and contextual relation with the conclusion of the treaty. If they are made after this period, then such “agreements” and agreed upon “instruments” constitute “subsequent agreements” or subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3.

(4) Paragraph 1 of draft conclusion 4 provides the definition of “subsequent agreement” under article 31, paragraph 3 (a).

(5) Article 31, paragraph 3 (a), uses the term “subsequent agreement” and not the term “subsequent treaty”. A “subsequent agreement” is, however, not necessarily less formal than a “treaty”. Whereas a treaty within the meaning of the 1969 Vienna Convention must be in written form (art. 2, para. 1 (a)), the customary international law on treaties knows no such requirement. The term “agreement” in the Vienna Convention and in customary international law does not imply any particular degree of formality. Article 39 of the Vienna Convention, which lays down the general rule according to which “[a] treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties”, has been explained by the Commission to mean that “[a]n amending agreement may take whatever form the parties to the original treaty may choose”. In the same way, the Vienna Convention does not envisage any particular formal requirements for agreements and practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b).

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127 See, for example, Declaration on the European Stability Mechanism, agreed on by the Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 27 September 2012.
128 See Yearbook ... 1966, vol. II, document A/6309/Rev.1 (Part II), p. 221, para. (13). The German Federal Constitutional Court has held that this term may include unilateral declarations if the other party did not object to them: see German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE, vol. 40, p. 141, at p. 176. See generally Gardiner (footnote 23 above), pp. 215–216.
129 Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention, contained the word “understanding”, which was changed to “agreement” at the Vienna
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135 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (see footnote 26 above), pp. 34 et seq., paras. 66 et seq.

136 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), the International Court of Justice left open the question of whether the use of a particular map could constitute a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice. WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have also not always distinguished between a subsequent agreement and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b).

(8) The NAFTA Tribunal in Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, however, has squarely addressed this distinction. In that case, the United States asserted that a number of unilateral actions by the three NAFTA parties could, if considered together, constitute a subsequent agreement. In a first step, the Panel did not find that the evidence was sufficient to establish such a subsequent agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a). In a second step, however, the Tribunal concluded that the very same evidence constituted a relevant subsequent practice, which established an agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation:

The question remains: is there “subsequent practice” that establishes the agreement of the NAFTA Parties on this issue within the meaning of article 31 (3) (b)? The Tribunal concludes that there is. Although there is, to the Tribunal, insufficient evidence on the record to demonstrate a “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions,” the available evidence cited by the Respondent demonstrates to us that there is nevertheless a “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its applications ....

(9) This reasoning suggests that one difference between a “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent practice” lies in the context in which the evidence was obtained. Indeed, by distinguishing between the two concepts, a “subsequent agreement” and a “subsequent practice” that establishes the agreement of the parties under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the Commission did not intend to denote a difference concerning their possible legal effect. The difference between the two concepts, rather, lies in the fact that a “subsequent agreement between the parties” ipso facto has the effect of constituting an authentic means of interpretation of the treaty, whereas a “subsequent practice” only has this effect if its different elements, taken together, show “the common understanding of the parties to the meaning of the terms”.

(10) Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, are hence distinguished based on whether an agreement of the parties can be identified as such, in a common act, or whether it is necessary to identify an agreement through individual acts which in their combination demonstrate a common position. A “subsequent agreement” under article 31, paragraph 3 (a), must therefore be “reached” and presupposes a single common act by the parties by which they manifest their common understanding regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.


139 Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States (see previous footnote), paras. 174–177.

140 Ibid., paras. 184–187.


(11) “Subsequent practice” under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), on the other hand, encompasses all (other) relevant forms of subsequent conduct by the parties to a treaty which contribute to the identification of an agreement, or “understanding”, of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty. It is, however, possible that “practise” and “agreement” coincide in specific cases and cannot be distinguished. This explains why the term “subsequent practice” is sometimes used in a more general sense which encompasses both means of interpretation that are referred to in article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b).145

(12) A group of separate subsequent agreements, each between a limited number of parties, but which, taken together, establish an agreement between all the parties to a treaty regarding its interpretation, is not normally “a” subsequent agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a). The term “subsequent agreement” under article 31, paragraph 3 (a), should, for the sake of clarity, be limited to a single agreement between all the parties. Different later agreements between a limited number of parties which, taken together, establish an agreement between all the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty constitute subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b). Different such agreements between a limited number of parties, which, even taken together, do not establish an agreement between all the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty, may have interpretative value as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 (see below, paras. (22)–(23)). Thus, the use of the term “subsequent agreement” is limited to agreements between all the parties to a treaty which are manifested in one single agreement—or in a common act in whatever form—that reflects the agreement of all parties.146

(13) A subsequent agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a), must be an agreement “regarding” the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions. The parties must therefore purport, possibly among other aims, to clarify the meaning of a treaty or how it is to be applied.147

(14) Whether an agreement is one “regarding” the interpretation or application of a treaty can sometimes be determined by some reference which links the “subsequent agreement” to the treaty concerned. Such reference may also be comprised in a later treaty. In the Jan Mayen case between Denmark and Norway, for example, the International Court of Justice appears to have accepted that a “subsequent treaty” between the parties “in the same field” could be used for the purpose of the interpretation of the previous treaty. In that case, however, the Court ultimately declined to use the subsequent treaty for that purpose because it did not in any way “refer” to the previous treaty.148 In Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Judge Guillaume referred to the actual practice of tourism on the San Juan River in conformity with a Memorandum of Understanding between the two States.149 It was not clear, however, whether this particular Memorandum was meant by the parties to serve as an interpretation of the boundary treaty under examination.

(15) Paragraph 2 of draft conclusion 4 does not intend to provide a general definition for any form of subsequent practice that may be relevant for the purpose of the interpretation of treaties. Paragraph 2 is limited to subsequent practice as a means of authentic interpretation, which establishes the agreement of all the parties to the treaty, as formulated in article 31, paragraph 3 (b). Such subsequent practice (in a narrow sense) is distinguishable from other “subsequent practice” (in a broad sense) by one or more parties which does not establish the agreement of the parties, but which may nevertheless be relevant as a subsidiary means of interpretation according to article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.150

(16) Subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), may consist of any “conduct”. The word “conduct” is used in the sense of article 2 of the articles, adopted by the Commission, on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.151 It may thus include not only acts but also omissions, including relevant silence, which contribute to establishing agreement.152 The question of under which circumstances omissions, or silence, can contribute to an agreement of all the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty will be addressed at a later stage of the work.

(17) Subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), must be conduct “in the application of the treaty”. This includes not only official acts at the international or at the internal level which serve to apply the treaty, including to respect or to ensure the fulfilment of treaty obligations, but also, inter alia, official statements regarding its interpretation, such as statements at a diplomatic conference, statements in the course of a legal dispute or judgments of domestic courts; official communications to which the treaty gives rise; or the

144 The word “understanding” had been used by the Commission in the corresponding draft article 27, paragraph 3 (b), on the law of treaties (see footnote 134 above).

145 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 112, at pp. 127–128, para. 53: in this case, even an explicit subsequent verbal agreement was characterized by one of the parties as “subsequent practice”.

146 See WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, para. 371. This aspect will be addressed further at a later stage of work on this topic.

147 Ibid., paras. 366–378, in particular para. 372; Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (see footnote 74 above), pp. 164 et seq.


149 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (see footnote 26 above), Declaration of Judge ad hoc Guillaume, p. 290, at pp. 298–299, para. 16.

150 On the distinction between the two forms of subsequent practice, see below, paras. (22)–(23) of the commentary.


enactment of domestic legislation or the conclusion of international agreements for the purpose of implementing a treaty even before any specific act of application takes place at the internal or at the international level.

(18) It may be recalled that, in one case, a NAFTA Panel denied that internal legislation can be used as an interpretative aid:

Finally, in light of the fact that both Parties have made references to their national legislation on land transportation, the Panel deems it appropriate to refer to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, which states that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”. This provision directs the Panel not to examine national laws but the applicable international law. Thus, neither the internal law of the United States nor the Mexican law should be utilized for the interpretation of NAFTA. To do so would be to apply an inappropriate legal framework.153

Whereas article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention is certainly valid and important, this rule does not signify that national legislation may not be taken into account as an element of subsequent State practice in the application of the treaty. There is a difference between invoking internal law as a justification for a failure to perform a treaty and referring to internal law for the purpose of interpreting a provision of a treaty law. Accordingly, international adjudicatory bodies, in particular the WTO Appellate Body and the European Court of Human Rights, have recognized and regularly distinguish between internal legislation (and other implementing measures at the internal level) which violates treaty obligations, and national legislation and other measures which can serve as a means to interpret the treaty.154 It should be noted, however, that an element of *bona fides* is implied in any “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty”. A manifest misapplication of a treaty, as opposed to a *bona fide* application (even if erroneous), is therefore not an “application of the treaty” in the sense of articles 31 and 32.

(19) The requirement that subsequent practice in the application of a treaty under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), must be “regarding its interpretation” has the same meaning as the parallel requirement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) (see above, paras. (13)-(18)). It may often be difficult to distinguish between subsequent practice which specifically and purposefully relates to a treaty, i.e. is “regarding its interpretation”, and other practice “in the application of the treaty”. The distinction, however, is important because only conduct that the parties undertake “regarding the interpretation of the treaty” is able to contribute to an “authentic” interpretation, whereas this requirement does not exist for other subsequent practice under article 32.

(20) The question of under which circumstances an “agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty” is actually “established” will be addressed at a later stage of work on the topic.

(21) Article 31, paragraph 3 (b), does not explicitly require that the practice must be conduct of the parties to the treaty themselves. It is, however, the parties themselves, acting through their organs,155 or by way of conduct which is attributable to them, who engage in practice in the application of the treaty which may establish their agreement. The question whether other actors can generate relevant subsequent practice is addressed in draft conclusion 5.156

(22) Paragraph 3 of draft conclusion 4 addresses “other” subsequent practice, i.e. practice other than that referred to in article 31, paragraph 3 (b). This paragraph concerns “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32”, as mentioned in paragraph 4 of draft conclusion 1. This form of subsequent practice, which does not require the agreement of all the parties, was originally referred to in the commentary of the Commission as follows:

But, in general, the practice of an individual party or of only some parties as an element of interpretation is on a quite different plane from a concordant practice embracing all the parties and showing their common understanding of the meaning of the treaty. Subsequent practice of the latter kind evidences the agreement of the parties as to the interpretation of the treaty and is analogous to an interpretative agreement. For this reason the Commission considered that subsequent practice establishing the common understanding of all the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty should be included in paragraph 3 (of what became article 31, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention) as an authentic means of interpretation alongside interpretative agreements. The practice of individual States in the application of a treaty, on the other hand, may be taken into account only as one of the “further” means of interpretation mentioned in article 70.157

(23) Paragraph 3 of draft conclusion 4 does not enunciate a requirement, as contained in article 31, paragraph 3 (b), that the relevant practice be “regarding the interpretation” of the treaty. Thus, for the purposes of the third paragraph, any practice in the application of the treaty that may provide indications as to how the treaty should be interpreted may be a relevant supplementary means of interpretation under article 32.

(24) This “other” subsequent practice, since the adoption of the Vienna Convention, has been recognized and applied by international courts and other adjudicatory bodies as a means of interpretation (see below, paras. (25)-(33)). It should be noted, however, that the WTO Appellate Body, in *Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II*,158 has formulated a definition of subsequent

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155 Karl (see footnote 79 above), pp. 115 et seq.

156 See draft conclusion 5, para. 2.


practice for the purpose of treaty interpretation which seems to suggest that only such “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” “which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” can at all be relevant for the purpose of treaty interpretation, and not any other form of subsequent practice by one or more parties:

Subsequent practice in interpreting a treaty has been recognized as a “concordant, common and consistent” sequence of acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.\(^\text{159}\)

However, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and of other international courts and tribunals, and ultimately even that of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body itself (see below, paras. (32)–(33)), demonstrate that subsequent practice which fulfils all the conditions of article 31, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention is not the only form of subsequent practice by parties in the application of a treaty which may be relevant for the purpose of treaty interpretation.

(25) In the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, for example, the International Court of Justice held that a report by a technical expert which had been commissioned by one of the parties and which had “remained at all times an internal document”,\(^\text{160}\) while not representing subsequent practice which establishes the agreement of the parties under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), could “nevertheless support the conclusions” which the Court had reached by other means of interpretation.\(^\text{161}\)

(26) Tribunals of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes have also used subsequent State practice as a means of interpretation in a broad sense.\(^\text{162}\) For example, when addressing the question whether minority shareholders can acquire rights from investment protection treaties and have standing in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes procedures, the tribunal in CMS Gas v. Argentina noted as follows:

State practice further supports the meaning of this changing scenario … Minority and non-controlling participations have thus been included in the protection granted or have been admitted to claim in their own right. Contemporary practice relating to lump-sum agreements, … among other examples, evidence increasing flexibility in the handling of international claims.\(^\text{163}\)

(27) The European Court of Human Rights held in Loizidou v. Turkey that its interpretation was “confirmed by the subsequent practice of the Contracting Parties”,\(^\text{164}\) i.e. “the evidence of a practice denoting practically universal agreement amongst Contracting Parties that Articles 25 and 46 … of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] do not permit territorial or substantive restrictions”.\(^\text{165}\) More often the European Court of Human Rights has relied on—not necessarily uniform—subsequent State practice by referring to national legislation and domestic administrative practice, as a means of interpretation. In the case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, for example, the Court held that “as to the practice of European States, it can be observed that, in the vast majority of them, the right for public servants to bargain collectively with the authorities has been recognised”\(^\text{166}\) and that “the remaining exceptions can be justified only by particular circumstances”.\(^\text{167}\)

(28) The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, when taking subsequent practice of the parties into account, has also not limited its use to cases in which the practice established the agreement of the parties. Thus, in the case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al v. Trinidad and Tobago, the Court held that the mandatory imposition of the death penalty for every form of conduct which resulted in the death of another person was incompatible with article 4, paragraph 2, of the American Convention on Human Rights (imposition of the death penalty only for the most serious crimes). In order to support this interpretation, the Court held that it was “useful to consider some examples in this respect, taken from the legislation of those American countries that maintain the death penalty”.\(^\text{168}\)

(29) The Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is open to arguments based on subsequent practice in a broad sense when it comes to the justification of interferences with the rights set forth in the Covenant.\(^\text{169}\) Interpreting the rather general terms contained in article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant (permissible restrictions on the freedom of expression), the Committee observed that “similar restrictions can be found in many jurisdictions”,\(^\text{170}\) and concluded that the aim pursued by the contested law did not, as such, fall outside the legitimate aims of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.\(^\text{171}\)

(30) ITLOS has on some occasions referred to the subsequent practice of the parties without verifying whether such practice actually established an agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty. In M/V SAIGA” (No. 2),\(^\text{172}\) for example, the Tribunal reviewed

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161 Ibid., p. 1096, para. 80.
163 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (see footnote 154 above), para. 47.
164 Loizidou v. Turkey (see footnote 43 above), para. 79.
165 Ibid., para. 80; it is noteworthy that the Court described “such a State practice” as being “uniform and consistent”, despite the fact that it had recognized that two States possibly constituted exceptions (Cyprus and the United Kingdom; “whatever their meaning”), paras. 80 and 82.
166 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC] (see footnote 30 above), para. 52.
167 Ibid., para. 151; similarly Jorge v. Germany, no. 74613/01, ECHR 2007-III, para. 69.
168 Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al v. Trinidad and Tobago (see footnote 31 above), reasoned concurring opinion of Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez, para. 12.
170 Ibid., para. 8.3.
171 Ibid.; see also Yoon and Choi v. the Republic of Korea (footnote 123 above), para. 8.4.
State practice with regard to the use of force to stop a ship according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.\(^{173}\) Relying on the “normal practice used to stop a ship”, the Tribunal did not specify the respective State practice but rather assumed that a certain general standard existed.\(^{174}\)

(31) The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, referring to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, noted in the Jelisić judgment that the Trial Chamber ... interprets the Convention’s terms in accordance with the general rules of interpretation of treaties set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ... The Trial Chamber also took account of subsequent practice grounded upon the Convention. Special significance was attached to the judgments rendered by the Tribunal for Rwanda ... The practice of States, notably through their national courts, and the work of international authorities in this field have also been taken into account.\(^{175}\)

(32) The WTO dispute settlement bodies also occasionally distinguish between “subsequent practice” that satisfies the conditions of article 31, paragraph 3 (b), and other forms of subsequent practice in the application of a treaty which they also recognize as being relevant for the purpose of treaty interpretation. In United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act\(^{176}\) (not appealed), for example, the Panel had to determine whether a “minor exceptions doctrine” concerning royalty payments applied.\(^{177}\) The Panel found evidence in support of the existence of such a doctrine in several member States’ national legislation and noted as follows:

We recall that Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention provides that together with the context (a) any subsequent agreement, (b) subsequent practice, or (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties, shall be taken into account for the purposes of interpretation. We note that the parties and third parties have brought to our attention several examples from various countries of limitations in national laws based on the minor exceptions doctrine. In our view, State practice as reflected in the national copyright laws of Berne Union members before and after 1948, 1967 and 1971, as well as of WTO Members before and after the date that the TRIPS Agreement became applicable to them, confirms our conclusion about the minor exceptions doctrine.\(^{178}\)

And the Panel added the following cautionary footnote:

By enunciating these examples of State practice we do not wish to express a view on whether these are sufficient to constitute “subsequent practice” within the meaning of Article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention.\(^{179}\)

(33) In EC—Computer Equipment, the Appellate Body criticized the Panel for not having considered decisions by the Harmonized System Committee of the World Customs Organization (WCO) as relevant subsequent practice:

A proper interpretation also would have included an examination of the existence and relevance of subsequent practice. We note that the United States referred, before the Panel, to the decisions taken by the Harmonized System Committee of the WCO in April 1997 on the classification of certain LAN equipment as ADP machines. Singapore, a third party in the panel proceedings, also referred to these decisions. The European Communities observed that it had introduced reservations with regard to these decisions ... However, we consider that in interpreting the tariff concessions in Schedule LXXX, decisions of the WCO may be relevant.\(^{180}\)

Thus, on closer inspection, the WTO dispute settlement bodies also recognize the distinction between “subsequent practice” under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), and a broader concept of subsequent practice which does not presuppose an agreement between all the parties to a treaty.\(^{181}\)

(34) In using subsequent practice by one or more, but not all, parties to a treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32, one must, however, always remain conscious of the fact that “the view of one State does not make international law”.\(^{182}\) In any case, the distinction between agreed subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), as an authentic means of interpretation and other subsequent practice (in a broad sense) under article 32 implies that a greater interpretative value should be attributed to the former.

(35) The distinction between subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), and subsequent practice under article 32 also contributes to answering the question whether subsequent practice requires repeated action with some frequency\(^{183}\) or whether a one-time application of the treaty may be enough.\(^{184}\) In the WTO framework, the Appellate Body has found that [an] isolated act is generally not sufficient to establish subsequent practice; it is a sequence of acts establishing the agreement of the parties that is relevant.\(^{185}\)

If, however, the concept of subsequent practice as a means of treaty interpretation is distinguished from a possible agreement between the parties, frequency is not

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\(^{174}\) M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) (see footnote 172 above), at paras. 155–156; see also “Tomimaru” (Japan v. Russian Federation), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2005–2007, p. 74, at para. 72; Southern Bluefin Tuna (see footnote 43 above), paras. 45 and 50.


\(^{176}\) WTO, Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (see footnote 154 above).

\(^{177}\) See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 9.1.

\(^{178}\) WTO, Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (see footnote 154 above), para. 6.55.

\(^{179}\) Ibid., footnote 68.


\(^{181}\) See also WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (see footnote 43 above), para. 452.

\(^{182}\) Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September 2007, para. 385; see also Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P., v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 2007, para. 337; WTO, Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (see footnote 64 above), footnote 2420 in para. 7.953.

\(^{183}\) Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention ... (footnote 44 above), p. 431, para. 22.

\(^{184}\) Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (footnote 74 above), p. 166.

\(^{185}\) WTO, Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (see footnote 29 above), sect. E, p. 16.
a necessary element of the definition of the concept of “subsequent practice” in the broad sense (under art. 32).\textsuperscript{186}

(36) Thus, “subsequent practice” in the broad sense (under art. 32) covers any application of the treaty by one or more parties. It can take various forms.\textsuperscript{187} Such “conduct by one or more parties in the application of the treaty” may, in particular, consist of a direct application of the treaty in question, conduct which is attributable to a State party as an application of the treaty, or a statement or judicial pronouncement regarding its interpretation or application. Such conduct may include official statements concerning the treaty’s meaning, protests against non-performance, or tacit acceptance of statements or acts by other parties.\textsuperscript{188}

**Conclusion 5. Attribution of subsequent practice**

1. Subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may consist of any conduct in the application of a treaty which is attributable to a party to the treaty under international law.

2. Other conduct, including by non-State actors, does not constitute subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32. Such conduct may, however, be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of parties to a treaty.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft conclusion 5 addresses the question of possible authors of subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32. The phrase “under articles 31 and 32” makes it clear that this draft conclusion applies both to subsequent practice as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), and to subsequent practice as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Paragraph 1 of draft conclusion 5 defines positively whose conduct in the application of the treaty may constitute subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32, whereas paragraph 2 states negatively which conduct does not, but which may nevertheless be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of parties to a treaty.

(2) Paragraph 1 of draft conclusion 5, by using the phrase “any conduct ... which is attributable to a party to the treaty under international law”, borrows language from article 2 (a) of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.\textsuperscript{189} Accordingly, the term “any conduct” encompasses actions and omissions and is not limited to the conduct of State organs, but also covers conduct which is otherwise attributable, under international law, to a party to a treaty. The reference to the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts does not, however, extend to the requirement that the conduct in question be “internationally wrongful” (see below, para. (8)).

(3) An example of relevant conduct which does not directly arise from the conduct of the parties, but nevertheless constitutes an example of State practice, has been identified by the International Court of Justice in the **Kasikili/Sedudu Island** case. There the Court considered that the regular use of an island on the border between Namibia (former South-West Africa) and Botswana (former Bechuanaland) by members of a local tribe, the Masubia, could be regarded as subsequent practice in the sense of article 31, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention if it was linked to a belief on the part of the Caprivi authorities that the boundary laid down by the 1890 Treaty followed the Southern Channel of the Chobe; and, second, that the Bechuanaland authorities were fully aware and accepted this as a confirmation of the treaty boundary.\textsuperscript{190}

(4) By referring to any conduct in the application of a treaty which is attributable to a party to the treaty, however, paragraph 1 does not imply that any such conduct necessarily constitutes, in a given case, subsequent practice for the purpose of treaty interpretation. The use of the phrase “may consist” is intended to reflect this point. This clarification is particularly important in relation to conduct of State organs which might contradict an officially expressed position of the State with respect to a particular matter, and thus contribute to an equivocal conduct by the State.

(5) The Commission debated whether draft conclusion 5 should specifically address the question of under which conditions the conduct of lower State organs would be relevant subsequent practice for purposes of treaty interpretation. In this regard, several members of the Commission pointed to the difficulty of distinguishing between lower and higher State organs, particularly given the significant differences in the internal organization of State governance. The point was also made that the relevant criterion should not be so much the position of the organ in the hierarchy of the State as its actual role in interpreting and applying any particular treaty. Given the complexity and variety of scenarios that could be envisaged, the Commission concluded that this matter should not be addressed in the text of draft conclusion 5 itself, but rather in the commentary.

(6) Subsequent practice of States in the application of a treaty may certainly be performed by the high-ranking government officials mentioned in article 7 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Yet, since most treaties typically are not applied by such high officials, international courts and tribunals have recognized that the conduct of lower authorities may also, under certain conditions, constitute relevant subsequent practice in the application of a treaty. Accordingly, the International Court of Justice recognized, in the **Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco**, that article 95 of the Act of Algeciras had to be interpreted flexibly in the light of the inconsistent practice of local customs authorities.\textsuperscript{191} The jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals confirms that relevant subsequent practice may emanate from lower

\textsuperscript{186} Kolb (see footnote 108 above), pp. 506–507.

\textsuperscript{187} Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (see footnote 88 above), p. 239.

\textsuperscript{188} Karl (see footnote 79 above), pp. 114 et seq.

\textsuperscript{189} Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 35, paragraph (4) of the commentary; the question of the attribution of relevant subsequent conduct to international organizations for the purpose of treaty interpretation will be addressed at a later stage of work on the topic.

\textsuperscript{190} Kasikili/Sedudu Island (see footnote 26 above), p. 1094, para. 74.

\textsuperscript{191} Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 176, at p. 211.
officials. In the German External Debts Decision, the Arbitral Tribunal considered a letter from the Bank of England to the German Federal Debt Administration as relevant subsequent practice.\(^{192}\) And in the case of Tax regime governing pensions paid to retired UNESCO officials residing in France, the Arbitral Tribunal accepted, in principle, the practice of the French tax administration of not collecting taxes on the pensions of retired United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) employees as being relevant subsequent practice. Ultimately, however, the Arbitral Tribunal considered some contrary official pronouncements by a higher authority, the French Government, to be decisive.\(^{193}\)

(7) It thus appears that the practice of lower and local officials may be subsequent practice “in the application of a treaty” if this practice is sufficiently unequivocal and if the government can be expected to be aware of this practice and has not contradicted it within a reasonable time.\(^{194}\)

(8) The Commission did not consider it necessary to limit the scope of the relevant conduct by adding the phrase “for the purpose of treaty interpretation”.\(^{195}\) This had been proposed by the Special Rapporteur in order to exclude from the scope of the term “subsequent practice” such conduct as may be attributable to a State but which does not serve the purpose of expressing a relevant position of the State regarding the interpretation of a treaty.\(^{196}\) The Commission, however, considered that the requirement that any relevant conduct must be “in the application of the treaty” would sufficiently limit the scope of possibly relevant conduct. Since the concept of “application of the treaty” requires conduct in good faith, a manifest misapplication of a treaty falls outside this scope.\(^{197}\)

(9) **Paragraph 2 of draft conclusion 5** comprises two sentences. The first sentence indicates that conduct other than that envisaged in paragraph 1, including by non-State actors, does not constitute subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32. The phrase “other conduct” was introduced in order to clearly establish the distinction between the conduct contemplated in paragraph 2 and that contemplated in paragraph 1. At the same time, the Commission considered that conduct not covered by paragraph 1 may be relevant when “assessing” the subsequent practice of parties to a treaty.

(10) “Subsequent practice in the application of a treaty” will be brought about by those who are called to apply the treaty, which are normally the States parties themselves. The general rule has been formulated by the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal as follows:

> It is a recognized principle of treaty interpretation to take into account, together with the context, any subsequent practice in the application of an international treaty. This practice must, however, be a practice of the parties to the treaty and one which establishes the agreement of parties regarding the interpretation of that treaty. Whereas one of the participants in the settlement negotiations, namely Bank Markazi, is an entity of Iran and thus its practice can be attributed to Iran as one of the parties to the Algiers Declarations, the other participants in the settlement negotiations and in actual settlements, namely the United States banks, are not entities of the Government of the United States, and their practice cannot be attributed as such to the United States as the other party to the Algiers Declarations.\(^{198}\)

(11) The first sentence of the second paragraph of draft conclusion 5 is intended to reflect this general rule. It emphasizes the primary role of the States parties to a treaty who are the masters of the treaty and are ultimately responsible for its application. This does not exclude the possibility that conduct by non-State actors may also constitute a form of application of the treaty if it can be attributed to a State party.\(^{199}\)

(12) “Other conduct” in the sense of paragraph 2 of draft conclusion 5 may be that of different actors. Such conduct may, in particular, be practice of parties which is not “in the application of the treaty”, or statements by a State, which is not party to a treaty, about the latter’s interpretation,\(^{200}\) or a pronouncement by a treaty monitoring body or a dispute settlement body in relation to the interpretation of the treaty concerned,\(^{201}\) or acts of

\(^{192}\) Case concerning the question whether the re-evaluation of the German Mark in 1961 and 1969 constitutes a case for application of the clause in article 2 (c) of Annex I A of the 1953 Agreement on German External Debts between Belgium, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the one hand and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other (see footnote 37 above), pp. 103–104, para. 31.


\(^{195}\) See first report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation (A/CN.4/660), para. 144 (draft conclusion 4, para. 1).

\(^{196}\) Ibid., para. 120.

\(^{197}\) See above, paragraph (18) of the commentary to draft conclusion 4.


\(^{200}\) See, for example, Observations of the United States of America on the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 33: the Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is neither a party nor a contracting State, its state constitutes “other conduct” under draft conclusion 5, para. 2.

technical bodies which are tasked by conferences of the States parties to advise on the implementation of treaty provisions, or different forms of conduct or statements by non-State actors.

(13) The phrase “assessing the subsequent practice” in the second sentence of paragraph 2 should be understood in a broad sense as covering both the identification of the existence of a subsequent practice and the determination of its legal significance. Statements or conduct of other actors, such as international organizations or non-State actors, can reflect, or initiate, relevant subsequent practice of the parties to a treaty. Such reflection or initiation of subsequent practice of the parties by the conduct of other actors should not, however, be conflated with the practice by the parties to the treaty themselves, including practice which is attributable to them. Activities of actors that are not States parties, as such, may only contribute to assessing subsequent practice of the parties to a treaty.

(14) Decisions, resolutions and other practice by international organizations can be relevant for the interpretation of treaties in their own right. This is recognized, for example, in article 2, paragraph 1 (j), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (1986 Vienna Convention), which mentions the “established practice of the organization” as one form of the “rules of the organization.” Draft conclusion 5 only concerns the question whether the practice of international organizations may be indicative of relevant practice by States parties to a treaty.

(15) Reports by international organizations at the universal level, which are prepared on the basis of a mandate to provide accounts on State practice in a particular field, may enjoy considerable authority in the assessment of such practice. For example, the Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is an important work that reflects and thus provides guidance for State practice. The same is true for the so-called 1540 Matrix, which is a systematic compilation, by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), of implementation measures taken by Member States. As far as the Matrix relates to the implementation of the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, as well as of the 1993 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, it constitutes evidence for and an assessment of State practice subsequent to those treaties.

(16) Other non-State actors may also play an important role in assessing subsequent practice of the parties in the application of a treaty. A pertinent example is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Apart from fulfilling a general mandate conferred on it by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and by the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the ICRC occasionally provides interpretative guidance on the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols on the basis of a mandate from the Statutes of the Movement. Article 5, paragraph 2 (g), of the Statutes provides as follows:

The role of the International Committee, in accordance with its Statutes, is in particular: … (g) to work for the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof.

On the basis of this mandate, the ICRC, for example, published the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law in 2009. The Guidance is the outcome of an “expert process” based on an analysis of State treaty and customary practice and it “reflect[s] the ICRC’s institutional position as to how existing international humanitarian law should be interpreted”. In this context it is, however, important to note that States have reaffirmed their primary role in the development of international humanitarian law. Resolution 1 of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 2011, while recalling “the important roles” of the ICRC, “emphasiz[es] the primary role of States in the development of international humanitarian law”.

(17) Another example for conduct of non-State actors which may be relevant for assessing the subsequent practice of States parties is the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, a joint initiative of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition. The Monitor acts as “a de facto monitoring regime” for the

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202 See Gardiner (footnote 23 above), p. 239.
203 This aspect of subsequent practice to a treaty will be addressed at a later stage of work on the topic.
205 Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, operative para. 8 (c); according to the 1540 Committee’s website, “the 1540 Matrix has functioned as the primary method used by the 1540 Committee to organize information about implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 by Member States” (www.un.org/en/sc/1540-national-implementation/1540-matrices.shtml).
206 See generally Gardiner (footnote 23 above), p. 239.
208 Ibid., para. 25.
211 Ibid., p. 9.
213 See www.the-monitor.org/.

(18) The examples of the ICRC and of the Monitor show that non-State actors can provide valuable evidence of subsequent practice by parties, contribute to assessing this evidence, and even solicit its coming into being. However, non-State actors can also pursue their own goals, which may be different from those of States parties. Their assessments must therefore be critically reviewed.

(19) The Commission considered whether it should also refer, in the text of draft conclusion 5, to “social practice” as an example of “other conduct … [which] may … be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of parties to a treaty”.215 Taking into account the concerns expressed by several members regarding the meaning and relevance of that notion, the Commission considered it preferable to address the question of the possible relevance of “social practice” in the commentary.

(20) The European Court of Human Rights has occasionally considered “increased social acceptance”216 and “major social changes”217 to be relevant for the purpose of treaty interpretation. The invocation of “social changes” or “social acceptance” by the Court, however, ultimately remains linked to State practice.218 This is true, in particular, for the important cases of *Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom*219 and *Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom*.220 In *Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom*, the Court found that there was an “increased tolerance of homosexual behaviour” by pointing to the fact “that in the great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question as in themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the criminal law should be applied”, and that it could therefore not “overlook the marked changes which have occurred in this regard in the domestic law of the member States”.221 The Court further pointed to the fact that “in Northern Ireland itself, the authorities have refrained in recent years from enforcing the law”.222 And in *Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom*, the Court attached importance “to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals”.223

(21) The European Court of Human Rights thus verifies whether social developments are actually reflected in State practice. This was true, for example, in cases concerning the status of children born outside marriage224 and in cases that concerned the alleged right of certain Roma (“Gypsy”) people to have a temporary place of residence assigned by municipalities in order to be able to pursue their itinerant lifestyle.225

(22) It can be concluded that mere (subsequent) social practice, as such, is not sufficient to constitute relevant subsequent practice in the application of a treaty. Social practice has, however, occasionally been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights as contributing to the assessment of State practice.

216 *Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom* [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI, para. 85.
217 Ibid., para. 100.
218 See also *I. v. the United Kingdom* [GC], no. 25680/94, 11 July 2002, para. 65; *Burden and Burden v. the United Kingdom*, no. 13378/05, 12 December 2006, para. 57; *Shackell v. the United Kingdom* (dec.), no. 45851/99, 27 April 2000, para. 1; *Schalk and Kopff v. Austria*, no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010, para. 58.
219 *Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom*, 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, in particular para. 60.
220 *Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom* [GC] (see footnote 216 above), in particular para. 85.
221 *Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom* (see footnote 219 above), para. 60.
222 Ibid.
223 *Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom* [GC] (see footnote 216 above), para. 85; see also para. 90.
Chapter V

IMMUNITY OF STATE OFFICIALS FROM FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

A. Introduction

40. The Commission, at its fifty-ninth session (2007), decided to include the topic “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction” in its programme of work and appointed Mr. Roman A. Kolodkin as Special Rapporteur.226 At the same session, the Commission requested the Secretariat to prepare a background study on the topic, which was made available to the Commission at its sixtieth session.227

41. The Special Rapporteur submitted three reports. The Commission received and considered the preliminary report at its sixtieth session (2008) and the second and third reports at its sixty-third session (2011).228 The Commission was unable to consider the topic at its sixty-first session (2009) and at its sixty-second session (2010).229

42. The Commission, at its sixty-fourth session (2012), appointed Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández as Special Rapporteur to replace Mr. Kolodkin, who was no longer with the Commission. The Commission received and considered the preliminary report of the newly appointed Special Rapporteur at the same session (2012).230

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

43. The Commission had before it the second report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/661). The Commission considered the report at its 3164th to 3168th and 3170th meetings, on 15 to 17, 21, 22 and 24 May 2013.

44. In the second report, the Special Rapporteur built upon the methodological approaches and general workplan set out in her preliminary report, taking into account the debates, in 2012, in the Commission and in the Sixth Committee. The report considered (a) the scope of the topic and of the draft articles; (b) the concepts of immunity and jurisdiction; (c) the difference between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae; and (d) the identification of the normative elements of the regime of immunity ratione personae. On the basis of the analysis, six draft articles were presented for the consideration of the Commission. These draft articles addressed the scope of the draft articles (draft article 1);231 immunities not included in the scope of the draft articles (draft article 2);232 definitions of criminal jurisdiction, immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction, immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae (draft article 3);233 the subjective scope of immunity ratione personae (draft article 4);234 the material scope of immunity ratione

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226 At its 2940th meeting, on 20 July 2007 (see Yearbook ... 2007, vol. II (Part Two), para. 376). The General Assembly, in paragraph 7 of its resolution 62/66 of 6 December 2007, took note of the decision of the Commission to include the topic in its programme of work. The topic had been included in the long-term programme of work of the Commission during its fifty-eighth session (2006), on the basis of the proposal contained in annex I to the report of the Commission (Yearbook ... 2006, vol. II (Part Two), para. 257, and pp. 191–200).

227 Yearbook ... 2007, vol. II (Part Two), para. 386. For the memorandum on the topic prepared by the Secretariat, see A/CN.4/596 and Corr.1 (mimeographed; available from the Commission’s website, documents of the sixtieth session).


229 See Yearbook ... 2009, vol. II (Part Two), para. 207; and Yearbook ... 2010, vol. II (Part Two), para. 343.


231 Draft article 1 read as follows:

“Scope of the draft articles

“Without prejudice to the provisions of draft article 2, these draft articles deal with the immunity of certain State officials from the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by another State.”

232 Draft article 2 read as follows:

“Immunities not included in the scope of the draft articles

The following are not included in the scope of the present draft articles:

(a) criminal immunities granted in the context of diplomatic or consular relations or during or in connection with a special mission;

(b) criminal immunities established in headquarters agreements or in treaties that govern diplomatic representation to international organizations or establish the privileges and immunities of international organizations and their officials or agents;

(c) immunities established under other ad hoc international treaties;

(d) any other immunities granted unilaterally by a State to the officials of another State, especially while they are in its territory.”

233 Draft article 3 read as follows:

“Definitions

For the purposes of the present draft articles:

(a) The term ‘criminal jurisdiction’ means all of the forms of jurisdiction, processes, procedures and acts which, under the law of the State that purports to exercise jurisdiction, are needed in order for a court to establish and enforce individual criminal responsibility arising from the commission of an act established as a crime or misdemeanour under the applicable law of that State. For the purposes of the definition of the term ‘criminal jurisdiction’, the basis of the State’s competence to exercise jurisdiction is irrelevant;

(b) ‘Immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction’ means the protection from the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the judges and courts of another State that is enjoyed by certain State officials;

(c) ‘Immunity ratione personae’ means the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction that is enjoyed by certain State officials by virtue of their status in their State of nationality, which directly and automatically assigns them the function of representing the State in its international relations;

(d) ‘Immunity ratione materiae’ means the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction that is enjoyed by State officials on the basis of the acts which they perform in the discharge of their mandate and which can be described as ‘official acts’.”

234 Draft article 4 read as follows:

“The subjective scope of immunity ratione personae

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personae (draft article 5);\textsuperscript{235} and the temporal scope of immunity ratione personae (draft article 6).\textsuperscript{236}

45. Following its debate on the second report of the Special Rapporteur, the Commission, at its 3170th meeting, on 24 May 2013, decided to refer the six draft articles contained therein to the Drafting Committee, on the understanding that it would take into account the views expressed in the plenary debate.

46. At its 3174th meeting, on 7 June 2013, the Commission received the report of the Drafting Committee and provisionally adopted three draft articles (see section C.1 below).

47. At its 3193rd to 3196th meetings, on 6 and 7 August 2013, the Commission adopted the commentaries to the draft articles provisionally adopted at the present session (see section C.2 below).

C. Text of the draft articles on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction provisionally adopted so far by the Commission

1. Text of the draft articles

48. The text of the draft articles provisionally adopted so far by the Commission is reproduced below.

\textbf{PART ONE}

\textbf{INTRODUCTION}

Article 1. Scope of the present draft articles

1. The present draft articles apply to the immunity of State officials\textsuperscript{237} from the criminal jurisdiction of another State.

2. The present draft articles are without prejudice to the immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed under special rules of international law, in particular by persons connected with diplomatic missions, consular posts, special missions, international organizations and military forces of a State.

\textbf{PART TWO}

\textbf{IMMUNITY RATIONE PERSONAE}

Article 3. Persons enjoying immunity ratione personae

Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity ratione personae from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction.

Article 4. Scope of immunity ratione personae

1. Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity ratione personae only during their term of office.

2. Such immunity ratione personae covers all acts performed, whether in a private or official capacity, by Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs during or prior to their term of office.

3. The cessation of immunity ratione personae is without prejudice to the application of the rules of international law concerning immunity ratione materiae.

2. Text of the draft articles and commentaries thereto provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-fifth session

49. The text of the draft articles, together with commentaries, provisionally adopted by the Commission at the sixty-fifth session is reproduced below.

\textbf{PART ONE}

\textbf{INTRODUCTION}

Article 1. Scope of the present draft articles

1. The present draft articles apply to the immunity of State officials\textsuperscript{238} from the criminal jurisdiction of another State.

2. The present draft articles are without prejudice to the immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed under special rules of international law, in particular by persons connected with diplomatic missions, consular posts, special missions, international organizations and military forces of a State.

..."Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity from the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by States of which they are not nationals."

235 Draft article 5 read as follows:

"The material scope of immunity ratione personae

1. The immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction that is enjoyed by Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs covers all acts, whether private or official, that are performed by such persons prior to or during their term of office.

2. Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs do not enjoy immunity ratione personae in respect of acts, whether private or official, that they perform after they have left office. This is understood to be without prejudice to other forms of immunity that such persons may enjoy in respect of official acts that they perform in a different capacity after they have left office."\textsuperscript{239}

236 Draft article 6 read as follows:

"The temporal scope of immunity ratione personae

1. Immunity ratione personae is limited to the term of office of a Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs and expires automatically when it ends.

2. The expiration of immunity ratione personae is without prejudice to the fact that a former Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs may, after leaving office, enjoy immunity ratione materiae in respect of official acts performed while in office."\textsuperscript{240}

237 The use of the term “officials” will be subject to further consideration.

238 Idem.

239 See the Special Rapporteur’s second report (A/CN.4/661), draft articles 1 and 2. See also paras. 19–34 of the same report.

240 In the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, adopted by the Commission at its forty-third session (Continued on next page.)
but in this case it has thought it preferable to combine both dimensions in a single provision, especially since this presents the advantage of facilitating the simultaneous treatment of both dimensions under a single title. It also avoids the use of expressions such as “do not apply”, “exclude” and “do not affect” in the title of a different article, which some members of the Commission see as not entirely compatible with the “without prejudice” clause.

(2) Paragraph 1 establishes the scope of the draft articles in its positive dimension. To this end, in the paragraph, the Commission has decided to use the phrase “the present draft articles apply to”, which is the wording used recently in other draft articles adopted by the Commission that contain a provision referring to their scope.241

On the other hand, the Commission considered that the scope of the draft articles should be defined as simply as possible, so that it could frame the rest of the draft articles and not affect or prejudge the other issues to be addressed later in other provisions in the text. Accordingly, the Commission decided to make a descriptive reference to the scope, listing the elements comprising the title of the topic itself. For the same reason, the phrase “from the exercise of”, initially proposed by the Special Rapporteur, has been left out of the definition of the scope. This phrase was interpreted by various members of the Commission in different and even contradictory ways, in terms of the consequences for the definition of the scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction. Account was also taken of the fact that the phrase “exercise of” is used in other draft articles formulated by the Special Rapporteur.242 The Commission was therefore of the view that the phrase was not needed to define the general scope of the draft articles and has reserved it for use in other parts of the draft articles in which it will have a better place.243

(3) Paragraph 1 covers the three elements defining the purpose of the draft articles, namely (a) who are the persons enjoying immunity? (State officials); (b) what type of jurisdiction is affected by immunity? (criminal jurisdiction); and (c) in what domain does such criminal jurisdiction operate? (the criminal jurisdiction of another State).

(4) As to the first element, the Commission has chosen to confine the draft articles to the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction that may be enjoyed by those persons who represent or act on behalf of a State. In the Commission’s previous work, the persons enjoying immunity have been referred to using the term “officials”.244 However, the use of this term, and its equivalents in the other language versions, has raised certain problems to which the Special Rapporteur has drawn attention in her reports,245 and which have also been pointed out by some members of the Commission. It should be noted, first, that the terms used in the various language versions are neither interchangeable nor synonymous. It should also be taken into account that these terms are not necessarily suitable for referring to each and every person to whom the present draft articles apply. The Commission consequently considers that the definition of “official” (and its equivalents in the various language versions), as well as decisions on the terms to be used to refer to the persons to whom immunity applies, are matters requiring detailed consideration, which, the Special Rapporteur has proposed, should be undertaken at a later stage, particularly in connection with the analysis of immunity ratione materiae. Consequently, at the present stage of the work, the Commission has decided to continue to use the original terminology, on the understanding that it will be given consideration later. This is reflected by the footnote in the text of draft article 1, paragraph 1. The use of the term “official” in the commentaries must be understood to be subject to the same reservation.

(5) Secondly, the Commission has decided to confine the scope of the draft articles to immunity from criminal jurisdiction. The present draft article is not intended to define the concept of criminal jurisdiction, which is being considered by the Commission in relation to another draft article.246 Nevertheless, the Commission has debated the scope of “criminal jurisdiction” in relation to the acts that would be covered by the concept, particularly with reference to the extension of immunity to certain acts that are closely linked to the concept of personal inviolability, such as the arrest or detention of an individual. With this in mind, and subject to later developments in the Commission’s treatment of this issue, for the purposes of defining the scope of the present draft articles, the reference to foreign criminal jurisdiction should be understood as meaning the set of acts linked to judicial processes whose purpose is to determine the criminal responsibility of an individual, including coercive acts that can be carried out against persons enjoying immunity in this context.

(Footnote 240 continued)

(Yearbook ... 1991, vol. II (Part Two), para. 28), the Commission chose to deal with the dual dimension of the scope in two separate draft articles, and this was ultimately reflected in the Convention adopted in 2004 (see United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, General Assembly resolution 59/38 of 2 December 2004, annex, articles 1 and 3). On the other hand, in the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character (1975), and in the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997) (General Assembly resolution 51/229 of 21 May 1997, annex), the various aspects of the scope are defined in a single article, which also refers to special regimes. Although the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens, adopted by the Commission on first reading in 2012 (Yearbook ... 2012, vol. II (Part Two), para. 45), also dealt with the scope in a single article consisting of two paragraphs, the same draft articles include other separate provisions whose purpose is to keep certain special regimes within a specific scope.

241 This wording has been used, for example, in draft article 1 of the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens.

242 See, in particular, draft articles 3 (b) and 4, as originally proposed by the Special Rapporteur in her second report (A/CN.4/661, paras. 46 and 67).

243 See draft article 3, as adopted by the Commission (Persons enjoying immunity ratione personae).

244 The words used in the various language versions are as follows: “المسؤولون” (Arabic), “représentants” (French), “должностные лица” (Russian) and “funcionarios” (Spanish).

245 See the Special Rapporteur’s preliminary report, Yearbook ... 2012, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/654, para. 66; see also her second report (A/CN.4/661), para. 32.

246 It must be kept in mind that the Special Rapporteur formulated a draft definition of criminal jurisdiction in her second report in the context of a draft article on definitions (A/CN.4/661, draft art. 3. See also paras. 36–41 of the same report). This draft article has been referred to by the Drafting Committee, which, after extensive discussion, decided to take it up progressively throughout the quinquennium, and not to take a decision on it now.
(6) Thirdly, the Commission decided to confine the scope of the draft articles to immunity from “foreign” criminal jurisdiction, i.e. that which reflects the horizontal relations between States. This means that the draft articles will be applied solely with respect to immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of “another State”. Consequently, the immunities enjoyed before international criminal tribunals, which are subject to their own legal regime, will remain outside the scope of the draft articles. This exclusion must be understood to mean that none of the rules that govern immunity before such tribunals are to be affected by the content of the present draft articles.

Nevertheless, the need to consider the special problem presented by so-called mixed or internationalized criminal tribunals has been raised. Similarly, a question has been raised regarding the effect that existing international obligations imposed on States to cooperate with international criminal tribunals would have on the present draft articles. Although diverse views were expressed with regard to both subjects, it is not possible at this stage to definitively address these aspects.

(7) It must be emphasized that paragraph 1 refers to “immunity … from the criminal jurisdiction of another State”. The use of the term “from” creates a link between the concepts of “immunity” and “foreign criminal jurisdiction” (or jurisdiction “of another State”) that must be duly taken into account. On this point, the Commission is of the view that the concepts of immunity and foreign criminal jurisdiction are closely interrelated: it is impossible to view immunity in abstract terms, without relating it to a foreign criminal jurisdiction which, although it exists, will not be exercised by the forum State precisely because of the existence of immunity. Or, as the International Court of Justice put it, “it is only where a State has jurisdiction under international law in relation to a particular matter that there can be any question of immunities in regard to exercise of that jurisdiction”.247

(8) The Commission regards immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction as being procedural in nature. Consequently, immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction cannot constitute a means of exempting the criminal responsibility of a person enjoying immunity from the substantive rules of criminal law, a responsibility which accordingly is preserved, independently of the fact that a State cannot, through the exercise of its jurisdiction, determine that such responsibility exists at a specific moment and with regard to a given person. On the contrary, immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction is strictly a procedural obstacle or barrier to the exercise of a State’s criminal jurisdiction against the officials of another State. This position was affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case,248 which is followed in the majority of State practice and in the literature.

(9) Paragraph 2 refers to cases in which there are special rules of international law relating to immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction. This category of special rules has its most well-known and frequently cited manifestation in the regime of privileges and immunities granted under international law to diplomatic agents and consular officials.249 However, there are other examples in contemporary international law, both treaty-based and custom-based, which in the Commission’s view should likewise be taken into account for the purposes of defining the scope of the present draft articles. Concerning those special regimes, the Commission considers that these are legal regimes that are well-established in international law and that the present draft articles should not affect their content and application. It should be recalled that during the preparation of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, the Commission acknowledged the existence of special immunity regimes, albeit in a different context, and specifically referred to them in article 3, entitled “Privileges and immunities not affected by the present articles”.250

The relationship between the regime for immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction set out in the draft articles and the special regimes just mentioned was established by the Commission with the inclusion of a saving clause in paragraph 2, according to which the provisions of the present draft articles are “without prejudice” to what is set out in the special regimes; here the Commission has followed the wording it used before, in the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property.

(10) The Commission has used the term “special rules” as a synonym for the words “special regimes” in its earlier work. Although the Commission has not defined the concept of “special regime”, attention should be drawn to the conclusions of the Study Group on the fragmentation of international law, particularly conclusions 2 and 3.251 For the purposes of the present draft articles, the Commission understands “special rules” to mean those international rules, whether treaty- or custom-based, that regulate the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction of persons connected with activities in specific fields of international relations. The Commission sees such “special rules” as coexisting with the regime defined in the present draft articles, the special regime being applied in the event of any conflict between the two regimes.252 In any event, the Commission considers that the special regimes in question are only those established by “rules of international law”, this reference to international law


248 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see previous footnote), para. 60. The International Court of Justice has taken the same position regarding State immunity: see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99, at paras. 58 and 100.

249 See the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), art. 31, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963), art. 43.


252 In its commentary to draft article 3 of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, the Commission referred to this aspect in the following terms: “The article is intended to leave existing special regimes unaffected, especially with regard to persons connected with the missions listed” (Yearbook … 1991, vol. II (Part Two), p. 22, paragraph (5) of the commentary). See also paragraph (1) of the same commentary.
being essential for the purpose of defining the scope of the “without prejudice” clause.\textsuperscript{253}

(11) The special regimes included in paragraph 2 relate to three areas of international practice in which norms regulating immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction have been identified, namely (a) the presence of a State in a foreign country through diplomatic missions, consular posts and special missions; (b) the various representational and other activities connected with international organizations; and (c) the presence of a State’s military forces in a foreign country. Although in all three areas treaty-based norms establishing a regime of immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction may be identified, the Commission has not thought it necessary to include in paragraph 2 an explicit reference to such international conventions and instruments.\textsuperscript{254}

The first group includes special rules relating to the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by persons connected with carrying out the functions of representation, or protection of the interests of the State in another State, whether on a permanent basis or otherwise, while connected with a diplomatic mission, consular post or special mission. The Commission takes the view that the rules contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and the Convention on special missions, as well as the relevant rules of customary law, fall into this category.

The second group includes special rules applicable to the immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by persons connected with an activity in relation to or in the framework of an international organization. In this category are included the special rules applicable to persons connected with missions to an international organization or delegations to organs of international organizations or to international conferences.\textsuperscript{255} The Commission’s understanding is that it is unnecessary to include in this group of special rules those that apply in general to the international organizations themselves. However, it considers that this category does include norms applicable to the agents of an international organization, especially in cases when the agent has been placed at the disposal of the organization by a State and continues to enjoy the status of State official during the time when he or she is acting on behalf of and for the organization. Regarding this second group of special regimes, the Commission has taken into account the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character, the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations and the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the specialized agencies, as well as other treaty-based and customary norms applicable in this area.

The third group of special rules includes those according immunity from criminal jurisdiction to persons connected with the military forces of a State located in a foreign State. This category includes the whole set of rules regulating the stationing of troops in the territory of a third State, even those included in status-of-forces agreements and those included in headquarters agreements or military cooperation accords envisaging the stationing of troops. Also included in this category are agreements made in connection with the short-term activities of military forces in a foreign State.

(12) The list of the special rules described in paragraph 2 is qualified by the words “in particular” to indicate that the clause does not exclusively apply to these special rules. In this connection, various members of the Commission drew attention to the fact that special rules in other areas may be found in practice, particularly in connection with the establishment in a State’s territory of foreign institutions and centres for economic, technical, scientific and cultural cooperation, usually on the basis of specific headquarters agreements. Although the Commission has accepted in general terms the existence of these special regimes, it has considered that there is no need to mention them in paragraph 2.

(13) Lastly, it should be noted that the Commission considered the possibility of including in paragraph 2 the practice whereby a State unilaterally grants a foreign official immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction. However, the Commission decided against such inclusion. This issue may be revisited at a later stage in the consideration of the work on the topic.

(14) On the other hand, the Commission has considered that the formulation of paragraph 2 should parallel the structure of paragraph 1 of the draft article. It must thus be borne in mind that the present draft articles refer to the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction of certain persons described as “officials” and that consequently, this subjective element should also be reflected in the “without prejudice” clause. This is why paragraph 2 refers expressly to “persons connected with”. The phrase “persons connected with” has been used in line with the terminology in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (art. 3). The scope of the term “persons connected with” will depend on the content of the rules defining the special regime that applies to them; it is therefore not possible \textit{a priori} to draw up a single definition for this category. This is also true for civilian personnel connected with the military forces of a State, who will be included in the special regime only to the extent that the legal instrument applicable in each case so establishes.

(15) The combination of the terms “persons connected with” and “special rules” is essential in determining the scope and meaning of the saving or “without prejudice” clause in paragraph 2. The Commission considers that the persons covered in this paragraph (diplomatic agents, consular officials, members of special missions, agents of

\textsuperscript{253} The Commission also included a reference to international law in the above-mentioned draft article 3 of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property. It should be noted that the Commission drew special attention to this formulation in its commentary to the draft article, particularly in paragraphs (1) and (3) thereof.

\textsuperscript{254} It must be kept in mind that the Commission also did not list such conventions in the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property. However, the commentary to draft article 3 (paragraph (2) thereof) referred to the areas in which there are such special regimes and expressly mentioned some of the conventions establishing those regimes.

\textsuperscript{255} This list corresponds to the one already formulated by the Commission in draft article 3, paragraph 1 (c), of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property.
international organizations and members of the military forces of a State) are automatically excluded from the scope of the present draft articles, not by the mere fact of belonging to that category of officials, but by the fact that one of the special regimes referred to in draft article 1, paragraph 2, applies to them under certain circumstances. In such circumstances, the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction that these persons may enjoy under the special regimes applicable to them will not be affected by the provisions of the present draft articles.

PART TWO

IMMUNITY RATIONE PERSONAE

Article 3. Persons enjoying immunity ratione personae

Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity ratione personae from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 3 lists the State officials who enjoy immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction, namely the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The draft article confines itself to identifying the persons to whom this type of immunity applies, making no reference to its substantive scope, which will be dealt with in other draft articles.

(2) The Commission considers that there are two reasons, representational and functional, for granting immunity ratione personae to Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs. First, under the rules of international law, these three office holders represent the State in its international relations simply by virtue of their office, directly and with no need for specific powers to be granted by the State. Second, they must be able to discharge their functions unhindered. It is irrelevant whether those officials are nationals of the State in which they hold the office of Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(3) The statement that the Heads of State enjoy immunity ratione personae is not subject to dispute, given that this is established in existing rules of customary international law. In addition, various conventions contain provisions referring directly to the immunity from jurisdiction of the Head of State. In this connection, mention must be made of article 21, paragraph 1, of the Convention on special missions, which expressly accords the Head of State the immunities accorded under international law to Heads of State. The immunity of the Head of State has also been recognized in case law as grounds for their decisions on substance and their findings that criminal proceedings cannot be brought against an incumbent Head of State. In this regard, see *Re Honecker*, Federal Supreme Court (Second Chamber) (Federal Republic of Germany), Judgment of 14 December 1984 (Case No. 2 ARs 252/84), reproduced in ILR, vol. 80, pp. 365–366; *Rey de Marruecos*, National High Court, Criminal Division (Spain), decision of 23 December 1998; *Kadhafi*, Court of Cassation (Criminal Division) (France), Judgment No. 1414 of 13 March 2001, reproduced in Revue générale de droit international public, vol. 105 (2001), p. 473 (English version in ILR, vol. 125, pp. 508–510); *Fidel Castro*, National High Court, Criminal Division (Spain), decision of 13 December 2007 (the tribunal had already made a similar ruling in two other cases against Fidel Castro, in 1998 and 2005); and *Case against Paul Kagame*, National High Court, Central Investigation Court No. 4 (Spain), Judgment of 6 February 2008. Again in the context of criminal proceedings, but this time as obiter dicta, various courts have on numerous occasions recognized immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction in general. In those cases, the national courts have not referred to the immunity of a specific Head of State, either because the person had completed his or her term of office and was no longer an incumbent Head of State or because the person was not and had never been a Head of State. See: *Pinochet (solicitud de extradición)*, National High Court, Central Investigation Court No. 5 (Spain), request for extradition of 3 November 1998; *Regina v. Bartle* and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolitan and Others Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (*Pinochet No. 3*), House of Lords (United Kingdom), Judgment of 24 March 1999, reproduced in ILM, vol. 38 (1999), pp. 581–663; *H.S.A.*, et al. v. S.A., et al. (decision related to the indictment of Ariel Sharon, Amos Yaron and others), Court of Cassation (Belgium), Judgment of 12 February 2003 (P02.1139F), reproduced in ILM, vol. 42, No. 3 (2003), pp. 596–605; *Scilingo*, National High Court, Criminal Division, third section (Spain), Judgment of 27 June 2003; *Association Fédération nationale des victimes d'accidents collectifs “FENVAC SOS Catastrophe”; Association des familles des victimes du Joola et al.*, Court of Cassation, Criminal Division (France), Judgment of 19 January 2010 (09-84.818); *Khurts Bat v. Investigating..."

257 The International Court of Justice has stated that “it is a well-established rule of international law that the Head of State, the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs are deemed to represent the State merely by virtue of exercising their functions” (*Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo* (New application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6, at p. 27, para. 46).

258 See *Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000* (footnote 247 above), paras. 53–54, in which the International Court of Justice particularly emphasized the second element in respect to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The Commission considers that the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction ratione personae of the Head of State is accorded exclusively to persons who actually hold that office, and that the title given to the Head of State in each State, the conditions under which he or she acquires the status of Head of State (as a sovereign or otherwise) and the individual or collegial nature of the office are irrelevant for the purposes of the present draft article.261

(4) The recognition of immunity ratione personae in favour of the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs is a result of the fact that, under international law, their representative functions of the State have become recognized as approximate to those of the Head of State. Examples of this may be found in the recognition of full powers for the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the conclusion of treaties262 and the equality of the three categories of officials in terms of their international protection263 and their involvement in the representation of the State.264 The immunity of Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs has been referred to in the Convention on special missions, the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character, and, implicitly, in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.265 The inclusion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents, is particularly significant, since in its own draft articles on the subject, the Commission decided not to include government officials in the list of persons internationally protected,266 but the Minister for Foreign Affairs was nevertheless included in the final Convention adopted by States.

All of the above-mentioned examples have emerged from the work of the Commission, which has on several occasions dealt with the question of whether expressly to include Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs in international instruments. In this connection, it was noted that there was specific mention of the Head of State in article 3 of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property while excluding any express reference to the Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, there is very little reason to conclude that these examples mean that in the present draft article, the Commission must treat Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs differently. It is even less reasonable to conclude that the Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs must be excluded from draft article 3. A number of factors must be taken into account here. First, the present draft articles refer solely to the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction of State officials, whereas the Convention on special missions and the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character refer to all the immunities that Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs may enjoy. Second, the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property refers to the immunities of States, while immunity from criminal jurisdiction remains outside their competence.

Footnote 260 continued)

Judge of the German Federal Court, High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court (United Kingdom), Judgment of 27 February 2011 (EW 2011 024); reproduced in ILR, vol. 147, p. 633; and Nezzar, Federal Criminal Tribunal (Switzerland), Judgment of 25 July 2012 (BB.2011.140). It should be emphasized that national courts have never stated that a Head of State does not have immunity from criminal jurisdiction, and that this immunity is ratione personae. It must also be kept in mind that civil jurisdiction, under which there is a greater number of judicial decisions, consistently recognizes the immunity ratione personae from jurisdiction of Heads of State. For example, see: Kline v. Kaneko, Supreme Court of the State of New York (United States), Judgment of 31 October 1988 (141 Misc.2d 787); Mbuta v. S4 Cottoni, Civil Court of Brussels, Judgment of 29 December 1988; Ferdinand et Imelda Marcos c. Office fédéral de la police, Federal Tribunal (Switzerland), Judgment of 2 November 1989 (ATF 115 Ib 496), reproduced in part in Revue suisse de droit international et de droit européen (1991), pp. 534–537 (English version in ILR, vol. 102, pp. 198–205); Lafontant v. Arístide, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (United States), Judgment of 27 January 1994; W. v. Prince of Liechtenstein, Supreme Court (Austria), Judgment of 14 February 2001 (7 Ob 316/00c); Tachiona v. Mugabe (“Tachiona I”), District Court for the Southern District of New York (United States), Judgment of 30 October 2001 (169 F. Supp. 2d 259); Fotso v. Republic of Cameroon, District Court of Oregon (United States), Judgment of 22 February 2013 (6:12CV 1415-TG).

261 In this connection, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character (art. 50, para. 1) and the 1969 Convention on special missions (art. 21, para. 1), which refer to the case of collegial bodies acting as Head of State, are of interest. On the other hand, the Commission did not see any need to include a reference to this category in the draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons (see Yearbook ... 1972, vol. II, document A/8710/Rev.1, pp. 312–313, paragraph (2) of the commentary to draft article 1), and no reference was accordingly made in the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents.

262 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 7, para. 2 (a). The International Court of Justice has made a similar statement on the capacity of the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs to make a commitment on behalf of the State through unilateral acts (armed activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application, 2002) (see footnote 256 above), para. 46).

263 Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents (1973), art. 1, para. 1 (a).

In this connection, see the Convention on special missions, art. 21, and the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character, art. 50.
its scope;\textsuperscript{267} in addition, far from rejecting the immunities that might be enjoyed by the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Commission actually recognized them, but simply did not mention these categories specifically in article 3, paragraph 2, “since it would be difficult to prepare an exhaustive list, and any enumeration of such persons would moreover raise the issues of the basis and of the extent of the jurisdictional immunity exercised by such persons”.\textsuperscript{268} And third, it must also be borne in mind that all the examples mentioned above preceded the judgment by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case.

(5) In its judgment in the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice expressly stated that “in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal”.\textsuperscript{269} This statement was later reiterated by the Court in the case concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.\textsuperscript{270} Both of these judgments were discussed extensively by the Commission, particularly with regard to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. During the discussion, most members expressed the view that the Arrest Warrant case reflects the current state of international law and that it must accordingly be concluded that there is a customary rule under which the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction ratione personae of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is recognized. In the view of these members, the position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the special functions he or she carries out in international relations constitute the basis for the recognition of such immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction. On the other hand, some members of the Commission pointed out that the Court’s judgment does not constitute sufficient grounds for concluding that a customary rule existed, as it did not contain a thorough analysis of the practice and several judges expressed opinions that differed from the majority view.\textsuperscript{271} One member of the Commission who considers that the Court’s judgment does not show that there is a customary rule nevertheless said that, in view of the fact that the Court’s judgment in that case has not been opposed by States, the absence of a customary rule does not prevent the Commission from including that official among the persons enjoying immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction, as a matter of progressive development of international law.

(6) As to the practice of national courts, the Commission has also found that, while there are very few rulings on the immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction of the Head of Government and almost none in respect of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the national courts that have had occasion to comment on this subject have nevertheless always recognized that those high-ranking officials do have immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction during their term of office.\textsuperscript{272}

(7) As a result of the discussion, the Commission found that there are sufficient grounds in practice and in international law to conclude that the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction. Consequently, it has been decided to include them in draft article 3.

(8) The Commission has also looked into whether other State officials could be included in the list of the persons enjoying immunity ratione personae. This has been raised as a possibility by some members of the Commission in the light of the evolution of international relations, particularly the fact that high-ranking officials other than the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs are becoming increasingly involved in international forums and making frequent trips outside the national territory. Some members of the Commission have supported the view that other high-ranking officials should be included in draft article 3 with a reference to the Arrest Warrant case, stating that the use of the words “such as” should be interpreted to extend the regime of immunity ratione personae to high-ranking State officials, other than the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who have major responsibilities within the State and who are involved in representation of the State in the fields of their activity. In this connection, some members of the Commission have suggested that immunity ratione personae is enjoyed by a minister of defence or a minister of international trade. Other members of the Commission, however, see the use of the words “such as” as not widening the circle of the persons who enjoy this category of immunity, since the Court uses the words in the context of a specific dispute, the subject of which is the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction of a Minister for Foreign Affairs. Lastly, several members of the Commission have drawn attention to the difficulty inherent in determining which persons should be deemed to be “other high-ranking officials”, since this will depend to a large extent on each country’s

\textsuperscript{267} The statement that the Convention “does not cover criminal proceedings” was proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee set up on the subject by the General Assembly and was ultimately included in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 59/38 of 2 December 2004, by which the Convention was adopted.

\textsuperscript{268} Paragraph (7) of the commentary to article 3 of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property (Yearbook... 1997, vol. II [Part Two], para. 28).

\textsuperscript{269} Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 247 above), para. 51.

\textsuperscript{270} Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (see footnote 259 above), para. 170.

\textsuperscript{271} See in particular, in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 case (footnote 247 above), the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal; the dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh; and the dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert.

organizational structure and method of conferring powers, which differ from one State to the next.\footnote{This problem has already been raised by the Commission itself, in paragraph (7) of its commentary to article 3 of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property (Yearbook ... 1991, vol. II (Part Two), para. 28). The Commission drew attention to the same problems in paragraph (3) of the commentary to article 1 of the draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons (Yearbook ... 1972, vol. II, document A/8710/Rev.1, p. 313), and in paragraph (3) of the commentary to article 21 of the draft articles on special missions adopted by the Commission at its nineteenth session (Yearbook ... 1967, vol. II, document A/6709/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1, p. 359).}

(9) In the case concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the International Court of Justice reverted to the subject of the immunity of high-ranking officials other than the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court dealt separately with the immunity of the Head of State of Djibouti and of the other two high-ranking officials, namely the Attorney-General (procureur de la République) and the Head of National Security. With regard to the Head of State, the Court made a very clear pronouncement that in general, he or she enjoys immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction ratione personae, although that was not applicable in the specific case, since the invitation to testify issued by the French authorities was not a measure of constraint.\footnote{Ibid., para. 191.} With regard to the other high-ranking officials, the Court argued that the acts attributed to them were not carried out within the scope of their duties;\footnote{Ibid., para. 194. See, in general, paras. 181–197.} it considered that Djibouti did not make it sufficiently clear whether it was claiming State immunity, personal immunity or some other type of immunity; and it concluded that “[t]he Court notes first that there are no grounds in international law upon which it could be said that the officials concerned were entitled to personal immunities, not being diplomats within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and the Convention on Special Missions of 1969 not being applicable in this case”.\footnote{In this connection, see the case Re General Shaul Mofaz (Minister of Defence of Israel), Bow Street Magistrates’ Court (United Kingdom), Judgment of 12 February 2004, reproduced in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 53, part 3 (2004), p. 771; and the case Re Bo Xilai (Minister for International Trade of China), Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, Judgment of 8 November 2005 (reproduced in ILR, vol. 128, p. 713), in which the immunity of Mr. Bo Xilai is acknowledged, not just because he was considered to be a high-ranking official, but particularly because he was on special mission in the United Kingdom. A year later, in a civil case, a United States court recognized Mr. Bo Xilai’s immunity, again because he was on special mission in the United States: Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States, District Court for the District of Columbia, Judgment of 24 July 2006 (Civ. No. 04-0649). In the Association Fédération nationale des victimes d’accidents collectifs “FENVAC SOS Catastrophe”; Association des familles des victimes du Joola et al. case, Judgment of 19 January 2010 (see footnote 260 above), the court acknowledged in general terms that an incumbent minister of defence enjoys immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction, but in the specific case recognized only immunity ratione materiae, since the person on trial no longer held that office. In the Nezzar case, Judgment of 25 July 2012 (see footnote 260 above), the tribunal stated in general that an incumbent minister of defence enjoyed immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction, but in the case in question, it did not recognize immunity because Mr. Nezzar had completed his term of office, and the acts carried out constituted international crimes, depriving him also of immunity ratione materiae.} An example of this is the case of Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court (see footnote 260 above), in which the court admitted, based on the International Court of Justice’s Judgment in the Arrest Warrant case (see footnote 247 above), that “in customary international law certain holders of high-ranking office are entitled to immunity ratione personae during their term of office” (para. 55) as long as they belong to a narrow circle of specific individuals because “[h]e or she must be able to attach to the individual in question a similar status” (para. 59) to that of the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to in the above-mentioned judgment. After analysing the functions carried out by Mr. Khurts Bat, the court concluded that he “falls outwith that narrow circle” (para. 61). Earlier, the Paris Court of Appeal also failed to recognize the immunity of Mr. Ali Reza Reza because, although he was Minister of State of Saudi Arabia, he was not the Minister for Foreign Affairs (see Ali Reza v. Grimpel (footnote 272 above)). In the United States of America v. Manuel Antonio Noriega case, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in its Judgment of 7 July 1997 (appeals Nos. 92-4687 and 96-4471), stated that Mr. Noriega, former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Panama, could not be included in the category of persons who enjoy immunity ratione personae, dismissing Mr. Noriega’s allegation that at the time of the events, he had been Head of State, or de facto leader, of Panama (see ILR, vol. 121, pp. 591 et seq.). Another court, in the Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos case (District Court of the Northern District of California (United States), Judgment of 11 February 1987 (665 F. Supp. 793)), indicated that the Attorney-General of the Philippines did not enjoy immunity ratione personae. In the case I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (United States), Judgment of 16 December 2003 (351 F.3d 1184), the court did not recognize the immunity of the Minister of Agriculture of Panama, without recognizing him as a person belonging to the narrow circle of officials who deserve such treatment, not belonging to a position which the court denied immunity to the President of Montenegro before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in the case of Prosecutor v. Milorad Dodik et al. (Third Criminal Section) (Italy), Judgment of 28 December 2004, in which the court denied immunity to the President of Montenegro before it became an independent State (see Rivista di diritto internazionale, vol. 89 (2006), p. 568). Finally, in Evgeny Adamov v. Federal Office of Justice, Federal Tribunal (Switzerland), Judgment of 22 December 2005 (IA 288/2005), the court denied immunity to a former Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation in an extradition case; however, it acknowledged in an obiter dictum that it was possible for high-ranking officials, without stating that they do enjoy immunity (available from http://opil.ouplaw.com, International Law in Domestic Courts (ILDC) 339 (CH 2005)).}
of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs who can indisputably be deemed to enjoy immunity *ratione personae*. It should also be pointed out, however, that in some of these decisions, the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction of a high-ranking official is analysed from various perspectives (*immunity *ratione personae*, immunity *ratione materiae*, state immunity, immunity deriving from a special mission), reflecting the uncertainty in determining precisely what might be the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction that is enjoyed by high-ranking officials other than the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs.279

(11) On another level, it must be recalled that the Commission has already referred to the immunity of other high-ranking officials in its draft articles on special missions and its draft articles on the representation of States in their relations with international organizations.280 It must be recalled that these instruments only establish a regime under which such persons continue to enjoy the immunities accorded to them under international law beyond the framework of those instruments. However, neither in the text of the draft articles nor in the Commission’s commentaries thereto is it clearly indicated what these immunities are and whether they do or do not include immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction *ratione personae*. It must also be emphasized that although these high-ranking officials may be deemed to be included in the category of “representatives of the State” mentioned in article 2, paragraph 1 (b) (iv), of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, that instrument—as previously mentioned—does not apply to “criminal proceedings”. Nevertheless, some members of the Commission stated that high-ranking officials do benefit from the immunity regime of special missions, including immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction, when they are on an official visit to a third State as part of their fulfilment of the functions of representing the State in the framework of their substantive duties. It was said that this offers a means of ensuring the proper fulfilment of the sectoral functions of this category of high-ranking officials at the international level.

(12) In view of the foregoing, the Commission considers that “other high-ranking officials” do not enjoy immunity *ratione personae* for the purposes of the present draft articles, but that this is without prejudice to the rules pertaining to immunity *ratione materiae*, and on the understanding that when they are on official visits, they enjoy immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction based on the rules of international law relating to special missions.

(13) The phrase “from the exercise of” has been used in the draft article with reference both to immunity *ratione personae* and to foreign criminal jurisdiction. The Commission decided not to use the same phrase in draft article 1 (Scope of the present draft articles) so as not to preclude the substantive aspects of immunity, in particular its scope, that will be taken up in other draft articles.281 In the present draft article, the Commission has decided to retain the phrase “from the exercise of”, since it illustrates the relationship between immunity and foreign criminal jurisdiction and emphasizes the essentially procedural nature of the immunity that comes into play in relation to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction with respect to a specific act.282

**Article 4. Scope of immunity *ratione personae***

1. Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity *ratione personae* only during their term of office.

2. Such immunity *ratione personae* covers all acts performed, whether in a private or official capacity, by Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs during or prior to their term of office.

3. The cessation of immunity *ratione personae* is without prejudice to the application of the rules of international law concerning immunity *ratione materiae*.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft article 4 deals with the scope of immunity *ratione personae* from both the temporal and material standpoints. The scope of immunity *ratione personae* must be understood by looking at the temporal aspect (para. 1) in conjunction with the material aspect (para. 2). Although each of these aspects is conceptually distinct, the Commission has chosen to cover them in a single article, since this offers a more comprehensive view of the meaning and scope of the immunity enjoyed by Heads of State,

279 The decision in the Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court case (see footnote 260 above) is a good example of this. In the Association Éducative et Sociale des victimes d’accidents collectifs “VENIAC SOS Catastrophe”: Association des familles des victimes du Joola et al. case, Judgment of 19 January 2010 (see footnote 260 above), the court ruled simultaneously, and without sufficiently differentiating its ruling, on immunity *ratione personae* and immunity *ratione materiae*. In the Nezzar case (see footnote 260 above), after making a general statement about immunity *ratione personae*, the Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal also considered whether immunity *ratione materiae* or the diplomatic immunity claimed by the person concerned could be applied. The arguments used by national courts in other cases are even more imprecise, as in the case of Kilroy v. Windsor, District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division (United States), which, in its Judgment of 7 December 1978 in a civil case (Civ. No. C-78-291), recognized the immunity *ratione personae* of the Prince of Wales because he was a member of the British royal family and was heir apparent to the throne, but also because he was on official mission to the United States. Noteworthy in the Bo Xilai case (see footnote 277 above) was the fact that, while both the British and United States courts recognized the immunity from jurisdiction of the Chinese Minister of Commerce, they did so because he was on an official visit and enjoyed the immunity derived from special missions.

280 Draft articles on the representation of States in their relations with international organizations, adopted by the Commission at its twenty-third session, *Yearbook ... 1971*, vol. II (Part One), document A/8410/Rev.1, pp. 284 et seq. On other occasions the Commission has used the expressions “personnalité officielle” ("official") (draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons, art. 1, *Yearbook ... 1972*, vol. II, document A/8710/Rev.1) and “other persons of high rank” (draft articles on special missions, art. 21, *Yearbook ... 1967*, vol. II, document A/6709/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1, p. 359).

281 See above, paragraph (2) of the commentary in question.

282 See *Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000* (footnote 247 above), para. 60, and Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) (footnote 248 above), para. 58.
Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The Commission has decided to cover the temporal aspect first, since this gives a better understanding of the material scope of immunity ratione personae, which is limited to a specific period of time.

(2) With regard to the temporal scope of immunity ratione personae, the Commission has thought it necessary to include the term “only” so as to emphasize the point that this type of immunity applies to Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs exclusively during the period when they hold office. This is consistent with the very reason for according such immunity, which is the special position held by such officials within the State’s organizational structure and which, under international law, places them in a special situation of having a dual representational and functional link to the State in the ambit of international relations. Consequently, immunity ratione personae loses its significance when it ceases to hold one of those posts.

This position has been upheld by the International Court of Justice, which stated in the Arrest Warrant case that “after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity”.

Although the Court was referring to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the same reasoning applies, a fortiori, to the Head of State and the Head of Government. Moreover, the limitation of immunity ratione personae to the period of time in which the persons enjoying such immunity hold office is also recognized in the conventions establishing special regimes of immunity ratione personae, particularly the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Convention on special missions.

The Commission itself, in its commentaries to the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, stated, “The immunities ratione personae, unlike immunities ratione materiae which continue to survive after the termination of the official functions, will no longer be operative once the public offices are vacated or terminated.” The strict temporal scope of immunity ratione personae is also confirmed by various national court decisions.

Consequently, the Commission considers that after the term of office of the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs has ended, immunity ratione personae ceases. The Commission has not thought it necessary to indicate the specific criteria to be taken into account in order to determine when the term of office of the persons enjoying such immunity begins and ends, since this depends on each State’s legal order, and practice in this area varies.

(3) During—and only during—the term of office, immunity ratione personae extends to all the acts carried out by the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, both those carried out in a private capacity and those performed in an official capacity. In this way, immunity ratione personae is configured as “full immunity” with reference to any act carried out by any of the individuals just mentioned. This configuration reflects State practice.


283 The International Court of Justice refers to the material scope of immunity ratione personae as “full immunity” (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 247 above), para. 54). The Commission itself, for its part, has stated with reference to the immunity ratione personae of diplomatic agents that “[t]he immunity from criminal jurisdiction is complete” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, vol. II, document A/3589, p. 98, paragraph (4) of the commentary to article 29 of the draft articles on diplomatic intercourse and immunities).


285 Such decisions have often arisen in the context of civil cases, where the same principle of a temporal limitation for the immunity applies. See, for example, Mellerio c. Isabel de Bourbon, ex-Reine d’Espagne, Paris Court of Appeal (France), 3 June 1872, reproduced in Recueil général des lois et des arrêts 1872, vol. II, p. 293; Seyyid Ali Ben Hamond, Prince Rashid c. Wiercinski, Tribunal civil de la Seine (France), 25 July 1916, reproduced in Revue de droit international...
to the exercise of those official functions are equally serious … regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an ‘official’ capacity or a ‘private’ capacity”.289 Thus, “no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an ‘official’ capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a ‘private capacity’”.290 The same reasoning must apply, a fortiori, to the Head of State and Head of Government.

(4) As regards the terminology used to refer to acts covered by immunity ratione personae, it must be borne in mind that no single, uniform wording is actually in use. For example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations makes no express distinction between acts carried out in a private or official capacity in referring to acts to which the immunity from criminal jurisdiction of diplomatic agents extends, although it is understood to apply to both categories.291 Moreover, the terminology in other instruments, documents and judicial decisions, as well as in the literature, also lacks consistency, with the use, among others, of the terms “official acts and private acts”, “acts performed in the exercise of their functions”, “acts linked to official functions” and “acts carried out in an official or private capacity”. In the present draft article, the Commission has found it preferable to use the phrase “acts performed, whether in a private or official capacity”, following its use by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case.

However, the Commission has not found it necessary to take a position at the present time on what types of acts should be considered “acts performed in an official capacity”, since this is a category of acts which will be taken up at a later stage, in connection with the analysis of immunity ratione materiae, and which should not be prejudged now.

It should also be pointed out that, in adopting paragraph 2, the Commission has not concerned itself with the issue of possible exceptions to immunity, a subject that will be taken up at a later stage.

(5) The Commission understands the term “acts” to refer both to acts and to omissions. Although the terminology to be employed has been the subject of debate, the Commission has chosen to use the term “acts” in line with the English text of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, article 1 of which uses the term “acts” in the sense that an act “may consist in one or more actions or omissions or a combination of both”.292 In addition, the term “act” is commonly used in international criminal law to define conduct (active and passive) from which criminal responsibility is established. In

the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the term “acts” has been used in a general sense in articles 6, 7 and 8, without having elicited questions about whether both acts and omissions are included under that term, since this depends solely on each specific criminal offence. The statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia287 and the International Tribunal for Rwanda294 use the term “act” to refer to conduct, both active and passive, constituting an offence falling within the competence of those tribunals. The term “act” has also been used in various international treaties that are designed to impose obligations upon States but nevertheless specify conduct that may give rise to criminal responsibility. This is the case, for example, with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (art. 2) and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 1).

(6) The acts to which immunity ratione personae extends are those that a Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs has carried out during or prior to their term of office. The reason for this is the purpose of immunity ratione personae, which relates both to protection of the sovereign equality of the State and to guarantees that the persons enjoying this type of immunity can perform their functions of representation of the State unimpeded throughout their term of office. In this sense, there is no need for further clarification regarding the applicability of immunity ratione personae to the acts performed by such persons throughout their term of office. As regards acts performed prior to the term of office, it must be noted that immunity ratione personae applies to them only if the criminal jurisdiction of a third State is to be exercised during the term of office of the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs. This is because, as the International Court of Justice stated in the Arrest Warrant case, “no distinction can be drawn a fortiori between acts performed before the person concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her office. The consequences of such impediment to the exercise of those official functions are equally serious, regardless of whether … the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before the person became the Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in office”.

In any event, it must be noted that, as the International Court of Justice has also stated in the same case, immunity ratione personae is procedural in nature and must be interpreted, not as exonerating a Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs from criminal responsibility for acts committed during or prior to their term of office, but solely as suspending the exercise of foreign jurisdiction during the term of office of those

289 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 247 above), para. 55.
290 Ibid.
291 This is the conclusion to be drawn from reading article 31, paragraph 1, in conjunction with article 39, paragraph 2, of the Convention. Articles 31, paragraph 1, and 43, paragraph 2, of the Convention on special missions must be construed in the same way.
292 Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 32, paragraph (1) of the commentary to draft article 1. It should be pointed out that although the Spanish and French versions use different terms to refer to the same category of acts ("hecho" and "fait", respectively), in the part of the Commission’s commentary cited above, the three language versions coincide.
293 Report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808 (1993) (S/25704), annex.
295 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 247 above), para. 55.
high-ranking officials. Consequently, when the term of office ends, the acts carried out during or prior to the term of office cease to be covered by immunity *ratione personae* and may, in certain cases, be subject to the criminal jurisdiction that cannot be exercised during the term of office.

Lastly, it should be noted that immunity *ratione personae* does not in any circumstances apply to acts carried out by a Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs after their term of office. Since they are now considered “former” Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs, such immunity would have ceased when the term of office ends.

(7) Paragraph 3 addresses what happens with respect to acts carried out in an official capacity while in office by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs after their term of office ends. Paragraph 3 proceeds on the principle that immunity *ratione personae* ceases when the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs leaves office. Consequently, immunity *ratione personae* no longer exists after their term of office ends. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that a Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs may, during their term of office, have carried out acts in an official capacity which do not lose that quality merely because the term of office has ended and may accordingly be covered by immunity *ratione materiae*. This matter has not been disputed in substantive terms, although it has been expressed variously in State practice, treaty practice and judicial practice.297

Thus paragraph 3 sets forth a “without prejudice” clause on the potential applicability of immunity *ratione materiae* to such acts. This does not mean that immunity *ratione personae* is prolonged past the end of term of office of persons enjoying such immunity, since that is not in line with paragraph 1 of the draft article. Nor does it mean that immunity *ratione personae* is transformed into a new form of immunity *ratione materiae* which applies automatically by virtue of paragraph 3. The Commission considers that the “without prejudice” clause simply leaves open the possibility that immunity *ratione materiae* might apply to acts carried out in an official capacity and during their term of office by a former Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs when the rules governing that category of immunity make this possible. Paragraph 3 does not prejudge the content of the immunity *ratione materiae* regime, which will be developed in Part Three of the draft articles.

296 “Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility” (ibid., para. 60).

297 Thus, for example, with reference to the immunity of members of diplomatic missions, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations expressly states that “with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist” (art. 39, para. 2); the formulation is repeated in the Convention on special missions (art. 43, para. 1). In the judicial practice of States, this has been expressed in a wide variety of ways: reference is sometimes made to “residual immunity”, the “continuation of immunity in respect of official acts” or similar wording. On this aspect, see the analysis by the Secretariat in its 2008 memorandum (A/CN.4/596 and Corr.1; mimeographed; available from the Commission’s website, documents of the sixtieth session, paras. 137 et seq.).
Chapter VI

PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN THE EVENT OF DISASTERS

A. Introduction

50. The Commission, at its fifty-ninth session (2007), decided to include the topic “Protection of persons in the event of disasters” in its programme of work and appointed Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina as Special Rapporteur.299 At the same session, the Commission requested the Secretariat to prepare a background study, initially limited to natural disasters, on the topic.299

51. At its sixtieth session (2008), the Commission had before it the preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur,300 tracing the evolution of the protection of persons in the event of disasters and identifying the sources of the law on the topic, as well as the previous efforts towards codification and development of the law in the area. It also presented in broad outline the various aspects of the general scope with a view to identifying the main legal questions to be covered and advancing tentative conclusions without prejudice to the outcome of the discussion that the report aimed to trigger in the Commission. The Commission also had before it a memorandum by the Secretariat,301 focusing primarily on natural disasters and providing an overview of existing legal instruments and texts applicable to a variety of aspects of disaster prevention and relief assistance, as well as of the protection of persons in the event of disasters.

52. The Commission considered, at its sixty-first session (2009), the second report of the Special Rapporteur,302 analysing the scope of the topic ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione temporis and issues relating to the definition of “disaster” for the purposes of the topic, as well as undertaking a consideration of the basic duty to cooperate. The report contained proposals for three draft articles. The Commission also had before it written replies submitted by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to the questions addressed to them by the Commission in 2008.

53. At its sixty-second session (2010), at the 3057th meeting, held on 4 June 2010, the Commission provisionally adopted draft articles 1 (Scope), 2 (Purpose), 3 (Definition of disaster), 4 (Relationship with international humanitarian law) and 5 (Duty to cooperate), which had been considered at the previous session. The Commission also had before it the third report of the Special Rapporteur,303 providing an overview of the views of States on the work undertaken by the Commission, a consideration of the principles that inspire the protection of persons in the event of disasters, and a consideration of the question of the responsibility of the affected State. Proposals for three further draft articles were made in the report.

54. At its sixty-third session (2011), at the 3102nd meeting, held on 11 July 2011, the Commission provisionally adopted draft articles 6 (Humanitarian principles in disaster response), 7 (Human dignity), 8 (Human rights) and 9 (Role of the affected State), which had been considered at the previous session. The Commission also had before it the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur,304 containing, inter alia, a consideration of the responsibility of the affected State to seek assistance where its national response capacity is exceeded, the duty of the affected State not to arbitrarily withhold its consent to external assistance and the right to offer assistance in the international community. Proposals for a further three draft articles were made in the report. The Commission provisionally adopted draft articles 10 (Duty of the affected State to seek assistance) and 11 (Consent of the affected State to external assistance) at the 3116th meeting, held on 2 August 2011, but was unable to conclude its consideration of draft article 12 owing to a lack of time.

55. At its sixty-fourth session (2012), the Commission had before it the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur,305 providing an overview of the views of States on the work undertaken by the Commission, a brief discussion of the Special Rapporteur’s position on the Commission’s question in Chapter III, section C, of its 2011 annual report,306 and further elaboration of the duty to cooperate. The report also contained a discussion of the conditions for the provision of assistance and the question of the termination of assistance. Proposals for an additional three draft articles were made in the report. At its 3152nd meeting, on 30 July 2012, the Commission took note of draft articles 5 bis and 12 to 15, as provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee.307

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299 Yearbook ... 2007, vol. II (Part Two), para. 375. The General Assembly, in paragraph 7 of its resolution 62/66 of 6 December 2007, took note of the decision of the Commission to include the topic in its programme of work. The topic had been included in the long-term programme of work of the Commission during its fifty-eighth session (2006), on the basis of the proposal contained in annex III to the report of the Commission (see Yearbook ... 2006, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 206–216).
300 Yearbook ... 2007, vol. II (Part Two), para. 386.
302 A/CN.4/590 and Add.l–3 (mimeographed; available from the Commission’s website, documents of the sixtieth session).
307 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two).
308 A/CN.4/L.812 (mimeographed; available from the Commission’s website, documents of the sixty-fourth session).
B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

56. At the present session, the Commission had before it the sixth report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/662), dealing with aspects of prevention in the context of the protection of persons in the event of disasters, including disaster risk reduction, prevention as a principle of international law and international cooperation on prevention. The report further provided an overview of national policy and legislation. Proposals for the following two draft articles were made in the report: draft articles 5 ter (Cooperation for disaster risk reduction)\(^{308}\) and 16 (Duty to prevent).\(^{309}\)

57. The Commission considered the sixth report at its 3175th to 3180th meetings, from 8 to 16 July 2013.

58. At its 3180th meeting, on 16 July 2013, the Commission referred draft articles 5 ter and 16 to the Drafting Committee.

59. At the 3162nd meeting, on 10 May 2013, the Commission adopted the report of the Drafting Committee on draft articles 5 bis and 12 to 15, which had been considered at the previous session. The Commission further adopted the report of the Drafting Committee on draft articles 5 ter and 16 at the 3187th meeting, held on 26 July 2013 (sect. C.1 below).

60. At its 3190th and 3191st meetings, on 2 and 5 August 2013, the Commission adopted the commentaries to draft articles 5 bis, 5 ter and 12 to 16 (sect. C.2 below).

C. Text of the draft articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters provisionally adopted so far by the Commission

1. Text of the draft articles

61. The text of the draft articles provisionally adopted so far by the Commission is reproduced below.\(^{310}\)

PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN THE EVENT OF DISASTERS

Article 1. Scope

The present draft articles apply to the protection of persons in the event of disasters.

Article 2. Purpose

The purpose of the present draft articles is to facilitate an adequate and effective response to disasters that meets the essential needs of the persons concerned, with full respect for their rights.

\(^{308}\) Draft article 5 ter read as follows:

“Cooperation for disaster risk reduction

“Cooperation shall extend to the taking of measures intended to reduce the risk of disasters.”

\(^{309}\) Draft article 16 read as follows:

“Duty to prevent

“1. States shall undertake to reduce the risk of disasters by adopting appropriate measures to ensure that responsibilities and accountability mechanisms be defined and institutional arrangements be established, in order to prevent, mitigate and prepare for such disasters.

“2. Appropriate measures shall include, in particular, the conduct of multi-hazard risk assessments, the collection and dissemination of loss and risk information and the installation and operation of early warning systems.”

\(^{310}\) For the commentaries to draft articles 1 to 5, see Yearbook ... 2010, vol. II (Part Two), para. 331. For the commentaries to draft articles 6 to 11, see Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), para. 289.

Article 3. Definition of disaster

“Disaster” means a calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, or large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society.

Article 4. Relationship with international humanitarian law

The present draft articles do not apply to situations to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable.

Article 5. Duty to cooperate

In accordance with the present draft articles, States shall, as appropriate, cooperate among themselves, and with the United Nations and other competent intergovernmental organizations, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross, and with relevant non-governmental organizations.

Article 5 bis. Forms of cooperation

For the purposes of the present draft articles, cooperation includes humanitarian assistance, coordination of international relief actions and communications, and making available relief personnel, relief equipment and supplies, and scientific, medical and technical resources.

Article 5 ter. Cooperation for disaster risk reduction

Cooperation shall extend to the taking of measures intended to reduce the risk of disasters.

Article 6. Humanitarian principles in disaster response

Response to disasters shall take place in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, and on the basis of non-discrimination, while taking into account the needs of the particularly vulnerable.

Article 7. Human dignity

In responding to disasters, States, competent intergovernmental organizations and relevant non-governmental organizations shall respect and protect the inherent dignity of the human person.

Article 8. Human rights

Persons affected by disasters are entitled to respect for their human rights.

Article 9. Role of the affected State

1. The affected State, by virtue of its sovereignty, has the duty to ensure the protection of persons and provision of disaster relief and assistance on its territory.

2. The affected State has the primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of such relief and assistance.

Article 10. Duty of the affected State to seek assistance

To the extent that a disaster exceeds its national response capacity, the affected State has the duty to seek assistance from among other States, the United Nations, other competent intergovernmental organizations and relevant non-governmental organizations, as appropriate.

Article 11. Consent of the affected State to external assistance

1. The provision of external assistance requires the consent of the affected State.

2. Consent to external assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily.

3. When an offer of assistance is extended in accordance with the present draft articles, the affected State shall, whenever possible, make its decision regarding the offer known.
Article 12. Offers of assistance

In responding to disasters, States, the United Nations, and other competent intergovernmental organizations have the right to offer assistance to the affected State. Relevant non-governmental organizations may also offer assistance to the affected State.

Article 13. Conditions on the provision of external assistance

The affected State may place conditions on the provision of external assistance. Such conditions shall be in accordance with the present draft articles, applicable rules of international law, and the national law of the affected State. Conditions shall take into account the identified needs of the persons affected by disasters and the quality of the assistance. When formulating conditions, the affected State shall indicate the scope and type of assistance sought.

Article 14. Facilitation of external assistance

1. The affected State shall take the necessary measures, within its national law, to facilitate the prompt and effective provision of external assistance regarding, in particular:
   (a) civilian and military relief personnel, in fields such as privileges and immunities, visa and entry requirements, work permits, and freedom of movement; and
   (b) goods and equipment, in fields such as customs requirements and tariffs, taxation, transport, and disposal thereof.

2. The affected State shall ensure that its relevant legislation and regulations are readily accessible, to facilitate compliance with national law.

Article 15. Termination of external assistance

The affected State and the assisting State, and as appropriate other assisting actors, shall consult with respect to the termination of external assistance and the modalities of termination. The affected State, the assisting State, or other assisting actors wishing to terminate shall provide appropriate notification.

Article 16. Duty to reduce the risk of disasters

1. Each State shall reduce the risk of disasters by taking the necessary and appropriate measures, including through legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters.

2. Disaster risk reduction measures include the conduct of risk assessments, the collection and dissemination of risk and past loss information, and the installation and operation of early warning systems.

Article 17. (Draft) Duty to provide assistance

1. Each State shall provide assistance, in fields such as personnel, emergency response equipment and supplies, scientific and technical expertise and humanitarian assistance.

2. The list of the forms of cooperation in draft article 5 bis—humanitarian assistance, coordination of international relief actions and communications, and making available relief personnel, relief equipment and supplies, and scientific, medical and technical resources—is loosely based on the second sentence of paragraph 4 of draft article 17 of the final draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers, adopted by the Commission at its sixtieth session (2008), which expands upon the general obligation to cooperate in article 7 of those draft articles by describing the cooperation necessary in emergency situations. The second sentence of paragraph 4 of draft article 17 reads as follows:

Cooperation may include coordination of international emergency actions and communications, making available emergency response personnel, emergency response equipment and supplies, scientific and technical expertise and humanitarian assistance.

As this provision had been specifically drafted with reference to a related context—namely, the need for cooperation in the event of an emergency affecting a transboundary aquifer—the Commission felt that its language was a useful starting point for the drafting of draft article 5 bis. However, the text of article 5 bis was tailored to appropriately reflect the context and purpose of the present draft articles, and to ensure that it took into account the major areas of cooperation dealt with in international instruments addressing disaster response. Similar language is contained in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters, of 26 June 1976, which states that “Member Countries shall, within their respective capabilities, cooperate in the—(a) improvement of communication channels among themselves as regards disaster warnings; (b) exchange of experts and trainees; (c) exchange of information and documents; and (d) dissemination of medical supplies, services and relief assistance”. In a similar vein, in explaining the areas in which it would be useful for the United Nations to adopt a coordinating role and encourage cooperation, General Assembly resolution 46/182 calls for coordination with regards to “specialized personnel and teams of technical specialists, as well as relief supplies, equipment and services …”.

3. The beginning of draft article 5 bis states that the forms of cooperation are outlined “[f]or the purposes of the present draft articles”. Therefore, draft article 5 bis, which is to be read in the light of the other draft articles, is oriented towards the purpose of the topic as a whole as stated in draft article 2, namely “to facilitate an adequate

Commentary

(1) Draft article 5 bis seeks to clarify the various forms that cooperation between affected States, assisting States, and other assisting actors may take in the context of the protection of persons in the event of disasters. Cooperation

312 Ibid., p. 22.
313 ASEAN, Documents Series 1976.
314 General Assembly resolution 46/182, 19 December 1991, annex, para. 27.
and effective response to disasters that meets the essential needs of the persons concerned, with full respect for their rights". In the context of the present topic, the ultimate goal of the duty to cooperate, and therefore of any of the forms of cooperation referred to in draft article 5 bis, is the protection of persons affected by disasters.

(4) While the draft article highlights specific forms of cooperation, the list is not meant to be exhaustive, but is instead illustrative of the principal areas in which cooperation may be appropriate according to the circumstances. The non-exhaustive nature of the list is emphasized by the use of the word “includes”, and its equivalent in the other official languages. The Commission determined that the highlighted forms are the main areas in which cooperation may be warranted, and that the forms are broad enough to encapsulate a wide variety of cooperative activities. Cooperation may, therefore, include the activities mentioned, but is not limited to them; other forms of cooperation not specified in the present draft article are not excluded, such as financial support; technological transfer covering, among other things, satellite imagery; training; information-sharing; and joint simulation exercises and planning.

(5) As draft article 5 bis is illustrative of possible forms of cooperation, it is not intended to create additional legal obligations for either affected States or assisting actors to engage in certain activities. The forms which cooperation may take will necessarily depend upon a range of factors, including, inter alia, the nature of the disaster, the needs of the affected persons and the capacities of the affected State and assisting actors involved. As with the principle of cooperation itself, the forms of cooperation in draft article 5 bis are meant to be reciprocal in nature, as cooperation is not a unilateral act, but rather one that involves the collaborative behaviour of multiple parties. The draft article is therefore not intended to be a list of activities in which an assisting State may engage, but rather areas in which harmonization of efforts through consultation on the part of both the affected State and assisting actors may be appropriate.

(6) Moreover, cooperation in the areas mentioned must be in conformity with the other draft articles. For example, as with draft article 5, the forms of cooperation touched upon in draft article 5 bis must be consistent with draft article 9, which grants the affected State, “by virtue of its sovereignty”, the primary role in disaster relief assistance. Cooperation must also be in accordance with the requirement of consent of the affected State to external assistance (draft art. 11), as well as the recognition that the affected State may place appropriate conditions on the provision of external assistance, particularly with respect to the identified needs of persons affected by a disaster and the quality of the assistance (draft art. 13). Cooperation is also related to draft article 14, which recognizes the role of the affected State in facilitating prompt and effective assistance to persons affected by a disaster. As such, and since draft article 5 bis does not create any additional legal obligations, the relationship between the affected State, assisting State, and other assisting actors with regards to the above forms of cooperation will be in accordance with the other provisions of the present draft articles.

(7) Humanitarian assistance is intentionally placed first among the forms of cooperation mentioned in draft article 5 bis, as the Commission considers this type of cooperation of paramount importance in the context of disaster relief. The second category—coordination of international relief actions and communications—is intended to be broad enough to cover most cooperative efforts in the disaster relief phase, and may include the logistical coordination, supervision and facilitation of the activities and movement of disaster response personnel and equipment and the sharing and exchange of information pertaining to the disaster. Though information exchange is often referred to in instruments that emphasize cooperation in the pre-disaster phase as a preventive mode to reduce the risk of disasters, communication and information are also relevant in the disaster relief phase to monitor the developing situation and to facilitate the coordination of relief actions among the various actors involved. A number of instruments deal with communication and information sharing in the disaster relief context. The mention of “making available relief personnel, relief equipment and supplies, and scientific, medical and technical resources” refers to the provision of any and all resources necessary for disaster response operations. The reference to “personnel” may entail the provision of and cooperation between medical teams, search and rescue teams, engineers and technical specialists, translators and interpreters, or other persons engaged in relief activities on behalf of one of the relevant actors—affected State, assisting State or other assisting actors. The term “resources” covers scientific, technical and medical expertise and knowledge, as well as equipment, tools, medicines or other objects that would be useful for relief efforts.

(8) Draft article 5 bis presents a list of the possible forms of cooperation in the disaster relief, or post-disaster, phase. As such, the content of the draft article is without prejudice to any applicable rule on cooperation in the pre-disaster phase, including disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation.

Article 5 ter. Cooperation for disaster risk reduction

Cooperation shall extend to the taking of measures intended to reduce the risk of disasters.

Commentary

(1) While draft article 5 bis concerns the various forms which cooperation may take in the disaster relief or

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315 Yearbook ... 2010, vol. II (Part Two), para. 331, at paragraph (6) of the commentary to draft article 5.

316 See, for example, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, 26 July 2005, art. 18, para. 1.

317 See, for example, Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, art. 3 (calling for “the deployment of terrestrial and satellite telecommunication equipment to predict, monitor and provide information concerning natural hazards, health hazards and disasters”, and “the sharing of information about natural hazards, health hazards and disasters among the States Parties and with other States, non-State entities and intergovernmental organizations, and the dissemination of such information to the public, particularly to at-risk communities”); and the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (“Oslo Guidelines”), para. 54 (United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Revision 1.1, November 2007). See also the discussion in the memorandum by the Secretariat on the protection of persons in the event of disasters (A/CN.4/590 [and Add.1–3]) (footnote 301 above), paras. 158–173.
post-disaster phase of the disaster cycle, draft article 5 ter indicates that the scope of application ratione temporis of the duty to cooperate, enshrined in general terms in draft article 5, also covers the pre-disaster phase. Thus, while draft article 5 bis deals with the response to a disaster, draft article 5 ter addresses the reduction of disaster risk.

(2) This provision qualifies the cooperation referred to as being related to the “taking of measures intended to reduce the risk of disasters”. This phrase is to be understood in the light of both paragraphs of draft article 16, in particular its paragraph 2, which envisages a series of measures that are specifically aimed at the reduction of disaster risk.

(3) Draft article 5 ter has been provisionally adopted on the understanding that adoption was without prejudice to its final location in the set of draft articles, including, in particular, its being incorporated at the same time as draft article 5 bis into a newly revised draft article 5. These are matters that have been left in abeyance for adjustment during the finalization of the first reading of the draft articles.

Article 12. Offers of assistance

In responding to disasters, States, the United Nations, and other competent intergovernmental organizations have the right to offer assistance to the affected State. Relevant non-governmental organizations may also offer assistance to the affected State.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 12 acknowledges the interest of the international community in the protection of persons in the event of disasters, which is to be viewed as complementary to the primary role of the affected State enshrined in draft article 9. It is an expression of the principle of solidarity underlying the whole set of draft articles on the topic and, in particular, of the principle of cooperation embodied in draft articles 5 and 5 bis.

(2) Draft article 12 is only concerned with “offers” of assistance, not with the actual “provision” thereof. Such offers, whether made unilaterally or in response to a request, are essentially voluntary and should not be construed as recognition of the existence of a legal duty to assist. Nor does an offer of assistance create for the affected State a corresponding obligation to accept it. In line with the fundamental principle of sovereignty informing the whole set of draft articles, an affected State may accept in whole or in part, or not accept, offers of assistance from States or non-State actors in accordance with article 11.318

(3) Offers of assistance which are consistent with the present draft articles cannot be regarded as interference in the affected State’s internal affairs. This conclusion accords with the statement of the Institute of International Law in its 1989 resolution on the protection of human rights and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States:

An offer by a State, a group of States, an international organization or an impartial humanitarian body such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, of food or medical supplies to another State in whose territory the life or health of the population is seriously threatened cannot be considered an unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of that State.319

(4) Draft article 12 addresses the question of offers of assistance to affected States made by third actors by mentioning in two separate sentences those most likely to be involved in such offers after the occurrence of a disaster. States, the United Nations and other competent intergovernmental organizations are listed in the first sentence while the second concerns non-governmental organizations. The Commission decided to use different wording in each of the two sentences. In the first sentence it opted for the phrasing “have the right to offer assistance” for reasons of emphasis. States, the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations are not only entitled but also encouraged to make offers of assistance to the affected State. When referring to non-governmental organizations in the second sentence, the Commission adopted instead the wording “may also offer assistance” to stress the distinction, in terms of nature and legal status, that exists between the position of those organizations and that of States and intergovernmental organizations.

(5) The second sentence of draft article 12 recognizes the important role played by those non-governmental organizations which, because of their nature, location and expertise, are well placed to provide assistance in response to a particular disaster. The position of non-governmental, and other, actors in carrying out relief operations is not a novelty in international law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 already provided that, in situations of armed conflict:

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.320

Similarly, Protocol II additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides as follows:

Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. The civilian population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.321

318 For the views expressed on draft article 12, see Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 278–283. See also ibid., para. 44, and the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur, Yearbook ... 2012, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/652, paras. 55–78.


320 See, for example, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Convention I), art. 3, para. 2.

321 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II), art. 18, para. 1.
The important contribution of non-governmental organizations, working with strictly humanitarian motives, in disaster response was stressed by the General Assembly in its resolution 43/131 of 8 December 1988, entitled “Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations”, in which the Assembly, inter alia, invited all affected States to “facilitate the work of [such] organizations in implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of food, medicines and health care, for which access to victims is essential” (para. 4) and appealed “to all States to give their support to [those] organizations working to provide humanitarian assistance, where needed, to the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations” (para. 5).

Article 13. Conditions on the provision of external assistance

The affected State may place conditions on the provision of external assistance. Such conditions shall be in accordance with the present draft articles, applicable rules of international law, and the national law of the affected State. Conditions shall take into account the identified needs of the persons affected by disasters and the quality of the assistance. When formulating conditions, the affected State shall indicate the scope and type of assistance sought.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 13 addresses the establishment of conditions by affected States on the provision of external assistance on their territory. It affirms the right of affected States to place conditions on such assistance, in accordance with the present draft articles and applicable rules of international and national law. The article indicates how such conditions are to be determined. The identified needs of the persons affected by disasters and the quality of the assistance guide the nature of the conditions. It also requires the affected State, when formulating conditions, to indicate the scope and type of assistance sought.

(2) The draft article furthers the principle enshrined in draft article 9, which recognizes the primary role of the affected State in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of disaster relief and assistance on its territory. By using the phrasing “may place conditions”, which accords with the voluntary nature of the provision of assistance, draft article 13 acknowledges the right of the affected State to establish conditions for such assistance, preferably in advance of a disaster’s occurrence but also in relation to specific forms of assistance by particular actors during the response phase. The Commission makes reference to “external” assistance because the scope of the provision covers the assistance provided by third States or other assisting actors, such as international organizations, but not assistance provided from internal sources, such as domestic non-governmental organizations.

(3) The draft article places limits on an affected State’s right to condition assistance, which must be exercised in accordance with applicable rules of law. The second sentence outlines the legal framework within which conditions may be imposed, which comprises “the present draft articles, applicable rules of international law, and the national law of the affected State”. The Commission included the phrase “the present draft articles” to stress that all conditions must be in accordance with the principles reflected in previous and subsequent articles, there being no need to repeat an enumeration of the humanitarian and legal principles already addressed elsewhere, notably, good faith, sovereignty and the humanitarian principles dealt with in draft article 6, that is, humanity, neutrality, impartiality and non-discrimination.

(4) The reference to national law emphasizes the authority of domestic laws in the particular affected area. It does not, however, imply the prior existence of national law geared to the specifics of the conditions brought forth by an affected State in the event of a disaster. Although there is no requirement of specific national legislation before conditions can be fixed, they must be in accordance with any relevant domestic legislation in existence in the affected State.

(5) The affected State and the assisting actor must both comply with the applicable rules of national law. The affected State can only impose conditions that are in accordance with such laws, and the assisting actor must comply with such laws at all times throughout the duration of assistance. This reciprocity is not made explicit in the draft article, since it is inherent in the broader principle of respect for national law. Existing international agreements support the assertion that assisting actors must comply with national law. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, for example, provides in article 13, paragraph 2, that “[m]embers of the assistance operation shall respect and abide by all national laws and regulations”. Several other international agreements also require assisting actors to respect national law or to act in accordance with the law of the affected State.322

(6) The duty of assisting actors to respect national law implies the obligation to require that members of the relief operation observe the national laws and regulations of the affected State, the head of the relief operation take all appropriate measures to ensure the observance of the national laws and regulations of the affected State and assisting personnel cooperate with national authorities.326

322 See, for example, the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance (1991), arts. VIII and XI (d); and the Convention on assistance in case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (1986), art. 8, para. 7.
323 Ibid.; Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) on Cooperation in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (1998), arts. 5 and 9
324 See, for example, Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, 17 March 1992, annex X (1): “The personnel involved in the assisting operation shall ... cooperate with the designated competent authority of the receiving State”.
325 See, for example, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, art. 13, para. 2: “The Head of the assistance operation shall take all appropriate measures to ensure observance of national laws and regulations.”
326 See, for example, P. Macalister-Smith, International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Heidelberg, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1991), para. 22 (b): “At all times during humanitarian assistance operations, the assisting personnel shall ... cooperate with the designated competent authority of the receiving State.”
The obligation to respect the national law and to cooperate with the authorities of the affected State accords with the overarching principle of the sovereignty of the affected State and the principle of cooperation.

(7) The right to condition assistance is the recognition of a right of the affected State to deny unwanted or unneeded assistance and to determine what assistance is appropriate and when. The third sentence of the draft article gives an explanation of what is required of conditions set by affected States, namely that they must “take into account” not only the identified needs of the persons affected by disasters but also the quality of the assistance. Nevertheless, the phrase “take into account” does not denote that conditions relating to the identified needs and the quality of assistance are the only ones which States can place on the provision of external assistance.

(8) The Commission included the word “identified” to signal that the needs must be apparent at the time conditions are set and that the needs can change as the situation on the ground changes and more information becomes available. It implies that conditions should not be arbitrary, but should be formulated with the goal of protecting those affected by a disaster. “Identified” indicates there must be some process by which needs are made known, which can take the form of a needs assessment, preferably also in consultation with assisting actors. However, the procedure to identify needs is not predetermined, and it is left to the affected State to follow the most suitable one. This is a flexible requirement that may be satisfied according to the circumstances of a disaster and the capacities of the affected State. In no instance should identifying needs hamper or delay prompt and effective assistance. The provision of the third sentence is meant to meet “the essential needs of the persons concerned” in the event of a disaster, as expressed in draft article 2, and should be viewed as further protection of the rights and needs of persons affected by disasters. The reference to “needs” in both draft articles is broad enough to encompass the special needs of women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and vulnerable or disadvantaged persons and groups.

(9) The inclusion of the word “quality” is meant to ensure that affected States have the right to reject assistance that is not necessary or that may be harmful. Conditions may include restrictions based on, inter alia, safety, security, nutrition and cultural appropriateness.

(10) Draft article 13 contains a provision on the “scope and type of assistance sought”. This is in line with previous international agreements that contain a similar provision. By the use of the words “shall indicate” the draft article puts the onus on the affected State to specify the type and scope of assistance sought when placing conditions on assistance. At the same time, it implies that once fixed, the scope and type of such assistance will be made known to the third actors that may provide it, which would facilitate consultations. This will increase the efficiency of the assistance process and will ensure that appropriate assistance reaches those in need in a timely manner.

(11) The Commission considered several possibilities for the proper verb to modify the word “conditions”. The Commission’s decision to use two different words, “place” and “formulate”, is a stylistic choice that does not imply differentiation of meaning between the two uses.

**Article 14. Facilitation of external assistance**

1. The affected State shall take the necessary measures, within its national law, to facilitate the prompt and effective provision of external assistance regarding, in particular:

   (a) civilian and military relief personnel, in fields such as privileges and immunities, visa and entry requirements, work permits, and freedom of movement; and

   (b) goods and equipment, in fields such as customs requirements and tariffs, taxation, transport, and disposal thereof.

2. The affected State shall ensure that its relevant legislation and regulations are readily accessible, to facilitate compliance with national law.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft article 14 addresses the facilitation of external assistance. Its purpose is to ensure that national law accommodates the provision of prompt and effective assistance. To that effect, it further requires the affected State to ensure that its relevant legislation and regulations are readily accessible to assisting actors.

(2) The draft article provides that affected States “shall take the necessary measures” to facilitate the prompt and effective provision of assistance. The phrase “take the necessary measures, within its national law” may include, inter alia, legislative, executive and administrative measures. Measures may also include actions taken under emergency legislation, as well as permissible temporary adjustment or waiver of the applicability of particular national legislation or regulations, where appropriate. In formulating the draft article in such a manner, the Commission encourages States to allow for temporary non-applicability of their national laws in the event of disasters, and for appropriate provisions to be included within their national law so as not to create any legal uncertainty in the critical period following a disaster when such emergency provisions become necessary.

(3) The draft article outlines examples of areas of assistance in which national law should enable the taking of appropriate measures. The words “in particular” before the examples indicate that this is not an exhaustive list, but rather an illustration of the various areas that may need to be addressed by national law to facilitate prompt and effective assistance.

(4) Subparagraph (a) envisages relief personnel. Specific mention of both civilian and military relief personnel indicates the Commission’s recognition that the military often plays a key role in disaster response actions. Military relief personnel are those involved in the provision
of humanitarian assistance. The areas addressed in the subparagraph provide guidance as to how personnel can be better accommodated. Granting of privileges and immunities to assisting actors is an important measure included in many international agreements to encourage the help of foreign aid workers.\(^{328}\) Waiver or expedition of visa and entry, requirements and work permits is necessary to ensure prompt assistance.\(^{329}\) Without a special regime in place, workers may be held up at borders or unable to work legally during the critical days after a disaster, or forced to exit and re-enter continually so as not to overstay their visas. Freedom of movement means the ability of workers to move freely within a disaster area in order to properly perform their specifically agreed-upon functions.\(^{330}\) Affected States can restrict access to certain sensitive areas while still allowing for freedom within the area concerned. Unnecessary restriction of movement of relief personnel inhibits workers’ ability to provide flexible assistance.

(5) Subparagraph (b) addresses goods and equipment, which encompass any and all supplies, tools, machines, foodstuffs, medicines and other objects necessary for relief operations. The Commission intends that this category also include search dogs, which are normally regarded as goods and equipment, rather than creating a separate category for animals. Goods and equipment are essential to the facilitation of effective assistance, and national laws must be flexible to address the needs of persons affected by disasters and to ensure prompt delivery. Custom requirements and tariffs, as well as taxation, should be waived or lessened in order to reduce costs and prevent delay of goods.\(^{331}\) Goods and equipment that are delayed can quickly lose their usefulness, and normal procedures in place aiming at protecting the economic interests of a State can become an obstacle in connection with aid equipment that can save lives or provide needed relief.

(6) The second paragraph of the draft article requires that all relevant legislation and regulations be readily accessible to assisting actors. By using the words “readily accessible”, what is required is ease of access to such laws without creating the burden on the affected State to physically provide this information separately to all assisting actors.

\(^{328}\) See, for example, the Framework Convention on civil defence assistance, of 22 May 2000, art. 4 (5): “The Beneficiary State shall, within the framework of national law, grant all privileges, immunities, and facilities necessary for carrying out the assistance”.

\(^{329}\) The League of Red Cross Societies has long noted that entry requirements and visas serve as a “time-consuming procedure which often delays the dispatch of such delegues and teams”, thus delaying the vital assistance the affected State has a duty to provide (resolution adopted by the League of Red Cross Societies Board of Governors at its 33rd session, Geneva, 28 October–1 November 1975).

\(^{330}\) See M. El Baradei, Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations (New York, United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.XV.PE/8), annex A, rule 16, which states that an affected State must permit “the designated relief personnel freedom of access to, and freedom of movement within, disaster-stricken areas that are necessary for the performance of their specifically agreed functions”.

\(^{331}\) This is stressed in various international treaties. See, for example, Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, art. 9 (4); see also ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, art. 14 (6).

### Article 15. Termination of external assistance

The affected State and the assisting State, and as appropriate other assisting actors, shall consult with respect to the termination of external assistance and the modalities of termination. The affected State, the assisting State, or other assisting actors wishing to terminate shall provide appropriate notification.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft article 15 deals with the question of termination of external assistance. The provision comprises two sentences. The first sentence concerns the requirement that the affected State, the assisting State, and as appropriate other assisting actors consult each other as regards the termination of the external assistance, including the modalities of such termination. The second sentence sets out the requirement that parties wishing to terminate assistance provide appropriate notification.

(2) When an affected State accepts an offer of assistance, it retains control over the duration for which that assistance will be provided. Draft article 9, paragraph 2, explicitly recognizes that the affected State has the primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of disaster relief and assistance on its territory. For its part, draft article 11 requires the consent of the affected State to external assistance, with the caveat that consent shall not be withheld arbitrarily. The combined import of the foregoing provisions is that the affected State can withdraw consent, thereby terminating external assistance and bringing to an end the legal regime under which the assistance was being provided.

(3) Draft article 15 seeks to strike a balance between the right of the affected State to terminate external assistance and the position of assisting actors, with a view to providing adequate protection to persons affected by disasters. Accordingly, the provision does not recognize the right of only the affected State to unilaterally terminate assistance. Instead, the Commission acknowledges that assisting States and other assisting actors may themselves need to terminate their assistance activities. Draft article 15 thus preserves the right of any party to terminate the assistance being provided, on the understanding that this is done in consultation with the other States or actors, as appropriate.

(4) The words “assisting actors” are drawn from existing instruments\(^{332}\) to describe international organizations and non-governmental organizations which provide disaster relief and assistance, on the understanding that they will be defined in an article on use of terms. Draft article 15 is drafted in bilateral terms, but it does not exclude the scenario of multiple assisting actors providing external assistance.

\(^{332}\) Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance, adopted at the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 26–30 November 2007 (30IC/07/R4, annex, and annotations thereto); or see International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (Geneva, 2008), p. 15.
The requirement to consult reflects the spirit of solidarity and cooperation implicit throughout the draft articles and the principle of cooperation enshrined in draft articles 5 and 5 bis. The Commission anticipates that termination may become necessary for a variety of reasons and at different stages during the provision of assistance. The relief operations may reach a stage where it would be only logical either for the affected State or for one or more of the assisting parties to cease operations. Circumstances leading to termination may include instances in which the resources of assisting actors are depleted, or where the occurrence of another disaster makes the diversion of resources necessary. Draft article 15 is flexible, allowing for adjusting the duration of assistance according to the circumstances, while implying that parties should consult in good faith. In any event, draft article 15 should be read in the light of the purpose of the draft articles, as indicated in draft article 2; thus, decisions regarding the termination of assistance are to be made taking into consideration the needs of the persons affected by disaster, namely whether and how far such needs have been met.

The word “modalities” refers to the procedures to be followed in terminating assistance. Even though termination on a mutual basis may not always be feasible, consultation in relation to the modalities would enable the relevant parties to facilitate an amicable and efficient termination.

The second sentence establishes a requirement of notification by the party wishing to terminate the external assistance. Appropriate notification is necessary to ensure a degree of stability in the situation, so that no party is adversely affected by an abrupt termination of assistance. The provision is drafted flexibly so as to anticipate notification before, during or after the consultation process. No procedural constraints have been placed on the notification process. However, notification should be “appropriate” according to the circumstances, including the form and timing, preferably early, of the notification.

Article 16. Duty to reduce the risk of disasters

1. Each State shall reduce the risk of disasters by taking the necessary and appropriate measures, including through legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters.

2. Disaster risk reduction measures include the conduct of risk assessments, the collection and dissemination of risk and past loss information, and the installation and operation of early warning systems.

Commentary

Draft article 16 deals with the duty to reduce the risk of disasters. The draft article is composed of two paragraphs. Paragraph 1 establishes the basic obligation to reduce the risk of disasters by taking certain measures, and paragraph 2 provides an indicative list of such measures.

Draft article 16 represents the acknowledgement of the need to cover in the draft articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters not only the response phase of a disaster, but also the pre-disaster duties of States. The concept of disaster risk reduction has its origins in a number of General Assembly resolutions and has been further developed through the 1994 World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in Yokohama, Japan, from 23 to 27 May 1994,333 the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015,334 and four sessions of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, the latest of which took place in May 2013.

As stated in the 2005 Hyogo Declaration, a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, and associated pre-disaster strategies, which are sound investments, must be fostered at all levels, ranging from the individual to the international levels … Disaster risks, hazards, and their impacts pose a threat, but appropriate response to these can and should lead to actions to reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the future.355

At the fourth session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2013, the concluding summary by the Chair drew attention to the growing recognition that the prevention and reduction of disaster risk is a legal obligation, encompassing risk assessments, the establishment of early warning systems, and the right to access risk information.356

The rule embodied in draft article 16 draws inspiration from among the sources of law identified by Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Commission bases itself on the fundamental principles of State sovereignty and non-intervention and, at the same time, draws on principles emanating from international human rights law, including the States’ obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, in particular the right to life. Protection not only relates to actual violations of human rights but also entails an affirmative obligation on States to take the necessary and appropriate measures which are designed to prevent the occurrence of such violations, no matter the source of the threat. This is confirmed by the decisions of international tribunals, notably the European Court of Human Rights judgments in the Öneryıldız v. Turkey338 and Budayeva and Others v. Russia339 cases, which affirmed the duty to take preventive measures. In addition, draft article 16 draws from a number of international environmental law principles, including the “due diligence” principle.

An important legal foundation for draft article 16 is the widespread practice of States reflecting their commitment to reduce the risk of disasters. Many States

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335 Ibid., resolution 1.


337 Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, ECHR 2004-XII.

338 Budayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 15339/02 and 4 others, ECHR 2008 (extracts).
have entered into multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements concerned with reducing the risk of disasters, including the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response;\(^{539}\) the Beijing Action for Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia (2005);\(^{540}\) the Delhi Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia (2007);\(^{241}\) the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia (2008);\(^{342}\) the outcomes of the Fourth Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, held in Incheon, Republic of Korea, from 25 to 28 October 2010, i.e. the Incheon Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia and the Pacific 2010, the Incheon Regional Roadmap and Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction through Climate Change Adaptation in Asia and the Pacific, reaffirming the Framework for Action and proposing Asian initiatives for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction considering vulnerabilities in the region;\(^{343}\) the African Union Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2004), which was followed by a programme of action for its implementation (originally for the period 2005–2010, but later extended to 2015);\(^{344}\) the outcomes of four sessions of the Africa Regional Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, the most recent in 2013;\(^{345}\) the Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2020, adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment at its twenty-second session, in December 2010;\(^{346}\) and, lastly, the Nayarit Communique on Lines of Action to Strengthen Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americas (2011).\(^{347}\)

(6) Recognition of this commitment is further shown by the States’ incorporation of disaster risk reduction measures into their national policies and legal frameworks. A compilation of national progress reports on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework\(^{348}\) indicates that 64 States or areas reported having established specific policies on disaster risk reduction, evenly spread throughout all continents and regions, including the major hazard-prone locations. They are Algeria, Anguilla, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Vanuatu and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). More recently, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction has identified 76 States that have adopted national platforms, defined as a “coordinating mechanism for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development policies, planning and programmes”, to implement disaster risk reduction strategies.\(^{349}\) Several countries have adopted legislation specifically addressing disaster risk reduction, either as stand-alone legislation or as part of a broader legal framework concerning both disaster risk management and disaster response, including Algeria,\(^{350}\) Cameroon,\(^{351}\) China,\(^{352}\) Dominican Republic,\(^{353}\) El Salvador,\(^{354}\) Estonia,\(^{355}\) France,\(^{356}\) Guatemala,\(^{357}\) Haiti,\(^{358}\) Hungary,\(^{359}\) India,\(^{360}\) Indonesia,\(^{361}\) Italy,\(^{362}\) Madagascar,\(^{363}\) Namibia,\(^{364}\) New Zealand,\(^{365}\) Pakistan,\(^{366}\) and so on.

\(^{539}\) The Agreement is the first international treaty concerning disaster risk reduction to have been developed after the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action.

\(^{540}\) Adopted at the Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Beijing, 27–29 September 2005.

\(^{541}\) Adopted at the Second Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, held in New Delhi, 7–8 November 2007.


\(^{543}\) For the text of the Declaration, see www.preventionweb.net/files/16327_finalincheondeclaration1028.pdf. See also www.unisdr.org/files/16172_roadmapfinalexversion08272350.pdf.


\(^{547}\) For the text of the Communique, see www.unisdr.org/files/18633_communiqueynayarit.pdf.

Peru,\textsuperscript{367} Philippines,\textsuperscript{368} Republic of Korea,\textsuperscript{369} Slovenia,\textsuperscript{370} South Africa,\textsuperscript{371} Thailand\textsuperscript{372} and United States.\textsuperscript{373}

(7) Draft article 16 is to be read together with the rules of general applicability adopted thus far, including those principally concerned with the response to a disaster. Its ultimate placing in the set of draft articles will be decided at the time that the first reading is completed.

Paragraph 1

(8) Paragraph 1 starts with the words “Each State”. The Commission opted for this formula over “States”, for the sake of consistency with the draft articles previously adopted, where care had been taken to identify the State or States which bore the legal duty to act. In contrast to those draft articles dealing directly with disaster response where a distinction exists between an affected State or States and other States, in the pre-disaster phase the obligation in question applies to every State. Furthermore, as is evident from paragraph 2, the obligation to reduce risk implies measures primarily taken at the domestic level. Any such measures requiring interaction between States or with other international actors are meant to be covered by article 5 ter. In other words, the obligation applies to each State individually. Hence the Commission decided against using the word “States” also to avoid any implication of a collective obligation.

(9) The word “shall” signifies the existence of the international legal obligation to act in the manner described in the paragraph and is the most succinct way to convey the sense of that legal obligation. This is confirmed by the title of the draft article, which refers to the “duty” to reduce the risk of disasters. While each State bears the same obligation, the question of different levels of capacity among States to implement the obligation is dealt with under the phrase “by taking the necessary and appropriate measures”.

(10) The obligation is to “reduce the risk of disasters”.\textsuperscript{374} The Commission adopted the present formula in recognition of the fact that the contemporary view of the international community, as reflected in several major pronouncements, most recently in the Hyogo Declaration issued at the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction,\textsuperscript{375} was that the focus should be placed on the reduction of the risk of harm caused by a hazard, as distinguished from the prevention of disasters themselves. Accordingly, the emphasis in paragraph 1 is placed on the reduction of the risk of disasters. This is achieved by taking certain measures so as to prevent, mitigate and prepare for such disasters.

(11) The phrase “by taking the necessary and appropriate measures” indicates the specific conduct being required. In addition to the further specification about legislation and regulations explained in paragraph (13) below, the “measures” to be taken are qualified by the words “necessary” and “appropriate”, which accord with common practice. What might be “necessary and appropriate” in any particular case is to be understood in terms of the stated goal of the measures to be taken, namely “to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters” so as to reduce risk. This is to be evaluated within the broader context of the existing capacity and availability of resources of the State in question, as has been noted in paragraph (8) above. The fundamental requirement of due diligence is inherent to the concept of “necessary and appropriate”. It is further understood that the question of the effectiveness of the measures is implied in that formula.

(12) The paragraph indicates by means of the phrase “including through legislation and regulations” the specific context in which the corresponding measures are to be taken. The envisaged outcome consists of a number of concrete measures which are typically taken within the context of a legislative or regulatory framework. Accordingly, for those States that do not already have such framework in place, the general obligation to reduce the risk of disasters would also include an obligation to put such legal framework into place so as to allow for the taking of the “necessary and appropriate” measures. The phrase “legislation and regulations” is meant to be understood in broad terms to cover as many manifestations of law as possible, it being generally recognized that such law-based measures are the most common and effective way for facilitating (hence the word “through”) the taking of disaster risk reduction measures at the domestic level.

(13) The qualifier “including” indicates that while “legislation and regulations” may be the primary methods, there may be other arrangements under which such measures could be taken. The word “including” was chosen in order to avoid the interpretation that the adoption and implementation of specific legislation and regulations would always be required. This allows a margin of discretion for each State to decide on the applicable legal framework, it being understood that having in place a legal framework which anticipates the taking of “the necessary and appropriate measures” is a \textit{sine qua non} for disaster risk reduction. The use of the definite article “the” before “necessary”, therefore, serves the function of specifying that it is not just any general measures which are being referred to, but rather, specific, and concrete, measures aimed at prevention, mitigation and preparation for disasters.

(14) The phrase “through legislation and regulations” imports a reference to ensuring that mechanisms for implementation and accountability for non-performance
are defined within domestic legal systems. Since such issues, though important, are not the only ones which could be the subject of legislation and regulations in the area of disaster risk reduction, singling them out in the text of paragraph 1 could have led to a lack of clarity.

(15) The last clause, namely “to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters”, serves to describe the purpose of the “necessary and appropriate” measures which States are to take during the pre-disaster phase, with the ultimate goal of reducing their exposure to the risk of disasters. The phrase tracks the now well-accepted formula used in major disaster risk reduction instruments. The Commission was cognizant of the fact that adopting a different formulation could result in unintended a contrario interpretations as to the kinds of activities being anticipated in the draft article.

(16) To illustrate the meaning of each of the three terms used—prevention, mitigation and preparedness—the Commission deems it appropriate to have recourse to the Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction prepared by UNISDR in 2009, according to which:

(a) Prevention is

[the outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters …

Prevention (i.e. disaster prevention) expresses the concept and intention to completely avoid potential adverse impacts through action taken in advance … Very often the complete avoidance of losses is not feasible and the tasks transform to that of mitigation. Partly for this reason, the terms prevention and mitigation are sometimes used interchangeably in casual use;776

(b) Mitigation is

[the lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters …

The adverse impacts of hazards often cannot be prevented fully, but their scale or severity can be substantially lessened by various strategies and actions … It should be noted that in climate change policy “mitigation” is defined differently, being the term used for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that are the source of climate change;777

(c) Preparedness is

[the knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions …

Preparedness action is carried out within the context of disaster risk management and aims to build the capacities needed to efficiently manage all types of emergencies and achieve orderly transitions from response through sustained recovery. Preparedness is based on a sound analysis of disaster risks and good linkages with early warning systems … [The measures to be taken] must be supported by formal institutional, legal and budgetary capacities.778

Paragraph 2

(17) Paragraph 2 lists three categories of disaster risk reduction measures: the conduct of risk assessments; the collection and dissemination of risk and past loss information; and the installation and operation of early warning systems. As noted in paragraph (3), these three measures were singled out in the Chair’s summary at the conclusion of the fourth session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, held in May 2013.779 The Commission decided to refer expressly to the three examples listed as reflecting the most prominent types of contemporary disaster risk reduction efforts. The word “include” serves to indicate that the list is non-exhaustive. The listing of the three measures is without prejudice to other activities aimed at reducing the risk of disasters which are being undertaken at present, or which may be undertaken in the future.

(18) The practical measures that can be adopted are innumerable and depend on social, environmental, financial, cultural and other relevant circumstances. Practice in the public and private sectors provides a wealth of examples. Among them may be cited community-level preparedness and education; the establishment of institutional frameworks; contingency planning; setting up monitoring mechanisms; land-use controls; construction standards; ecosystems management; drainage systems; funding; and insurance.

(19) The three consecutive measures selected in paragraph 2 share a particular characteristic: they are instrumental to the development and applicability of many, if not all, other measures, for instance in decision-making, concerning definitions of priorities or investment planning, both in the public and in the private sector.

(20) The first measure—risk assessments—is about generating knowledge concerning both hazards and vulnerabilities. As such, it is the first step towards any sensible measure to reduce the risk of disasters. Without a sufficiently solid understanding of the circumstances surrounding disasters and their characteristics, no effective measure can be enacted. Risk assessments also compel a closer look at local realities and the engagement of local communities.

(21) The second measure—the collection and dissemination of risk and past loss information—is the next step. Reducing disaster risk requires action by all actors in the public and private sectors and civil society. Collection and dissemination should result in the free availability of risk and past loss information, which is an enabler of effective action. It allows all stakeholders to assume responsibility for their actions and to make a better determination of priorities for planning purposes; it also enhances transparency in transactions and public scrutiny and control. The Commission wishes to emphasize the desirability of the dissemination and free availability of risk and past loss information, as it is the reflection of the prevailing trend focusing on the importance of public access to such information. The

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777 Ibid., pp. 19–20. The Commission is conscious of the discrepancy in the concordance between the English and French versions of the official United Nations use of the term “mitigation”.
778 Ibid., p. 21.
779 See footnote 336 above.
Commission, while recognizing the importance of that trend, felt that it was best dealt with in the commentary and not in the body of paragraph 2, since making it a uniform legal requirement could prove burdensome for States.

(22) The third measure concerns *early warning systems*, which are instrumental both in initiating and implementing contingency plans, thus limiting the exposure to a hazard; as such, they are a prerequisite for effective preparedness and response.

(23) As has been explained in paragraph (11), paragraph 2 concerns the taking of the envisaged measures within the State. Any inter-State component would be covered by the duty to cooperate in article 5, read together with article 5 ter. Accordingly, the extent of any international legal duty relating to any of the listed and not listed measures that may be taken in order to reduce the risk of disasters is to be determined by way of the relevant specific agreements or arrangements each State has entered into with other actors with which it has the duty to cooperate.
Chapter VII

FORMATION AND EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Introduction

63. The Commission, at its sixty-fourth session (2012), decided to include the topic “Formation and evidence of customary international law” in its programme of work and appointed Sir Michael Wood as Special Rapporteur. At the same session, the Commission had before it a note by the Special Rapporteur. Also at the same session, the Commission requested the Secretariat to prepare a memorandum identifying elements in the previous work of the Commission that could be particularly relevant to this topic.

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

64. At the present session, the Commission had before it the first report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/663), as well as a memorandum on the topic by the Secretariat (A/CN.4/659). The Commission considered the report at its 3181st to 3186th meetings, from 17 to 25 July 2013.

65. At its 3186th meeting, on 25 July 2013, the Commission decided to change the title of the topic to “Identification of customary international law”.

1. Introduction by the Special Rapporteur of the First Report

66. The first report, which was introductory in nature, aimed to provide a basis for future work and discussions on the topic, and set out in general terms the Special Rapporteur’s proposed approach to it. The report presented, inter alia, a brief overview of the previous work of the Commission relevant to the topic and highlighted some views expressed by delegates in the context of the Sixth Committee during the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly. It also discussed the scope and possible outcomes of the topic and considered some issues concerning customary international law as a source of law. It proceeded to describe the range of materials to be consulted and to outline a proposed programme for the Commission’s future work on the topic.

67. In introducing his report, the Special Rapporteur noted the importance of taking into account the practice of States from all legal systems and regions of the world while considering this topic, as well as the usefulness of exchanges of views between the Commission and other bodies and with the wider academic community. The Special Rapporteur also considered that the memorandum prepared by the Secretariat, which described elements in the previous work of the Commission that could be particularly relevant to the topic, would be of substantial assistance. In particular, the memorandum’s observations and explanatory notes would constitute important points of reference for the Commission’s future work.

68. The Special Rapporteur was fully aware of the complexities involved in the topic and the need to approach it with caution so as to ensure, in particular, that the flexibility of the customary process was preserved. He recalled that the intention was neither to consider the substance of customary international law nor to resolve purely theoretical disputes about the basis of customary law. Instead, the Special Rapporteur proposed that the Commission should focus on the elaboration of conclusions, with accompanying commentaries, on the identification of rules of customary international law. It was envisaged that such an outcome would be of practical assistance to judges and lawyers, particularly those who may not be well versed in public international law.

69. In the light of the proposed focus on the method of identifying customary rules, and since the title of the topic’s reference to “formation” had given rise to some confusion regarding the scope of the topic, the Special Rapporteur suggested changing the title to the “Identification of customary international law”. Even if the title were changed, the proposed work of the Commission would nevertheless include an examination of the requirements for the formation of rules of customary international law, as well as the material evidence of such rules, both being necessary to the determination of whether a rule of customary international law existed. The Special Rapporteur further reiterated his preference not to deal with jus cogens as part of the scope of the present topic.

70. Concerning customary international law as a source of international law, the Special Rapporteur first turned to Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, on the basis that it was an authoritative statement of sources of international law. The Special Rapporteur then addressed the relationship between customary international law and other sources of international law. While observing that the relationship of customary international law with treaties was a matter of great practical importance, he also noted that it was a relatively well-understood question. Less obvious, in his
view, was the relationship between customary international law and general principles of law, which required a careful examination by the Commission. In drawing attention to the importance of consistent terminology, he further proposed to include a conclusion on use of terms.

71. The report also provided an illustrative list of materials relevant for the consideration of the topic. Although not intended to be exhaustive, the materials identified were thought to reflect the general approach to the formation and evidence of customary international law. Upon an initial examination of certain materials on State practice, as well as the case law of the International Court of Justice and of other courts and tribunals, the Special Rapporteur preliminarily noted that, although there were some inconsistencies, virtually all of the materials reviewed stressed that both State practice and opinio juris were required for the formation of a rule of customary international law. He further observed that the work of other bodies on this topic, such as the International Law Association, the Institute of International Law and the ICRC, along with ensuing debates and writings, would be of interest.

72. While the Special Rapporteur observed that the inclusion of two draft conclusions in the report confirmed his intention concerning the form of the outcome of the Commission’s work, he considered it premature to refer them to the Drafting Committee. Instead, his intention was to conduct informal consultations in order to reach agreement on the title of the topic and whether to deal with jus cogens.

2. SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE

(a) General comments

73. There was general agreement that the work of the Commission could usefully shed light on the process of identifying rules of customary international law. Broad support was expressed for the development of a set of conclusions with commentaries, a practical outcome which would serve as a guide to lawyers and judges who were not experts in public international law. It was underscored that customary international law remained highly relevant despite the proliferation of treaties and the codification of several areas of international law. At the same time, it was the general view of the Commission that work on this topic should not be unduly prescriptive, as the flexibility of the customary process remained fundamental. It was also emphasized that the process of formation of customary international law is a continuing one, which does not stop when a rule has emerged.

74. Some members commented on the need to identify the added value that the Commission could offer on this topic and to distinguish work on this topic from the prior work of the Commission and of other entities. In this regard, it was suggested that it was important to distinguish the work of the Commission from similar work undertaken by the International Law Association, and to clarify which gaps in treatment the Commission would address.

75. A number of members noted the complexity and difficulty inherent in the topic. The view was expressed that the ambiguities surrounding the identification of customary international law had given rise to legal uncertainty and instability, as well as opportunistic or bad faith arguments regarding the existence of a rule of customary international law. The proposed effort to clarify the process by which a rule of customary international law is identified was therefore generally welcomed.

(b) Scope of the topic

76. A preliminary matter that raised issues relating to scope was the title of the topic. Several members agreed with the Special Rapporteur’s proposal to change the title from “Formation and evidence of customary international law” to “Identification of customary international law”, though several members also expressed support for maintaining the current title. Other members suggested alternative titles, including “The evidence of customary international law” and “The determination of customary international law”. The view was also expressed that it would not be appropriate for the Commission to address the theoretical aspects relating to “formation”, and it should therefore be removed from the title. Ultimately, there was a general view that, even if the title were changed, it remained important to include both the formation and evidence of customary international law within the scope of the topic.

77. There was general agreement that the main focus of the Commission’s work should be to clarify the common approach to identifying the formation and evidence of customary international law. The relative weight to be accorded to the consideration of “formation” and “evidence” was, however, the subject of debate. Some members were sceptical that the largely academic or theoretical questions relating to the formation of customary international law were necessary or relevant to the Commission’s work on the topic. A view was expressed that formation and evidence are diametrically opposed concepts, as the former refers to dynamic processes that occur over time, while the latter refers to the state of the law at a particular moment. Several other members were of the view that it was impossible to distinguish the process of formation from the evidence required to identify the existence of a rule.

78. Several members agreed with the proposal not to undertake a study of jus cogens within the scope of the topic. A number of members observed that jus cogens presented its own peculiarities in terms of formation and evidence. The identification of the existence of a rule of customary international law was a different question from whether such a rule also possessed the additional characteristic of not being subject to derogation by way of treaty. It was also noted that a proposal had been made for a possible new topic on jus cogens. Other members suggested that jus cogens should be dealt with as part of this topic, as the interrelation between the two concepts is substantial and should be studied. Some members indicated that it would be useful to address the issue of the hierarchy of sources of international law, including treaty law and jus cogens.

79. Several members agreed with the Special Rapporteur’s proposal to study the relationship between customary international law and general principles of international law and general principles of law. It was
suggested that the Commission should endeavour to clarify the complex and unclear relationship between the concepts. In this regard, some members noted that distinguishing between general principles of international law and customary international law is not always possible. A similar point was made as to general principles of law and customary international law. At the same time, some members were of the view that broad questions relating to general principles and to general principles of international law that are unrelated to customary international law should be excluded, as any study of such matters would unduly broaden this topic.

80. General support was expressed for an examination of the relationship between customary international law and treaty law. It was recalled in this context that it is generally recognized that treaties may codify, crystallize or generate rules of customary international law. The point was also made that a rule of customary international law may operate in parallel to an identical treaty provision. Support was also expressed for the study of the effects on customary international law of multilateral treaties with very few States parties. It was suggested that any examination of the relationship between treaty law should be reserved for a later stage of work on the topic, as a thorough analysis of the constituent elements of customary international law was first required.

81. Consideration of the relationship between customary international law and other sources of international law, including unilateral declarations, was also recommended. Some members suggested an analysis of the interplay between non-binding instruments or norms and the formation and evidence of customary international law.

82. Some members expressed support for the study of regional customary international law, with particular emphasis on the relationship between regional and general customary international law. As part of its consideration of this relationship, it was suggested that the Commission look at regional practice, including relevant judicial decisions, agreements and regulations. It was noted in this context that it can be difficult to distinguish between the practice of regional organizations and that of individual States.

(c) Methodology

83. Broad support was expressed for the Special Rapporteur’s proposal to consider both the formative elements of customary international law, i.e. the elements that give rise to the existence of a rule of customary international law, and the requisite criteria for proving the existence of such elements. General support was also expressed for the proposed focus on the practical process of identifying rules of customary international law, rather than on the content of such rules. It was suggested, however, that it would be impossible to fully distinguish the substance of primary rules from the analysis of applicable secondary rules. According to another view, the emphasis on the approach to the identification of rules would need to be supported by illustrative examples of primary rules.

84. Broad support was also expressed for the Special Rapporteur’s proposal carefully to examine State practice and *opinio juris sive necessitas*, the two widely accepted constituent elements of customary international law. Several members noted that the identification of rules of customary law must be based on an assessment of State practice, and due regard should be given to the generality, continuity and representativeness of such practice. It was agreed that not all international acts bear legal significance in this regard, particularly acts of comity or courtesy. Some members similarly suggested that certain State positions may not reflect *opinio juris*, particularly where a State indicates as much. Several members commented that identifying the existence of the requisite State practice and/or *opinio juris* was a difficult process. It was also noted that *opinio juris* may be revealed in both acts and omissions.

85. Attention was drawn to the need to study carefully the temporal aspects of the “two-elements” approach, in particular whether *opinio juris* may precede State practice, and whether a rule of customary international law may emerge in a short period of time. The utility of determining the relative weight accorded to State practice and *opinio juris* was also mentioned. In this regard, it was suggested that the Commission’s work on the topic could be critical to bridging the gap between the “traditional” and “modern” approaches to customary international law. According to the view of other members, while it was important to analyze varying approaches to customary international law, classifying such approaches with terms such as “traditional” and “modern” was unnecessary or misleading.

86. Several members agreed that the Commission should aspire towards the elaboration of a common, unified approach to the identification of rules of customary international law, as such rules arise in a single, interconnected international legal system. According to the view of several other members, a system-wide or unitary approach should not be assumed, as the approach to the identification of rules may vary according to the substantive area of international law. The view was expressed that the relative weight to be accorded to the evidence of State practice or *opinio juris* may vary depending on the field. In this regard, it was suggested that differing weight was accorded to certain materials in different fields of international law. In particular, it was suggested that “soft law” may play a greater role in the formation of customary international law in certain areas.

87. A view was expressed that the approach proposed by the Special Rapporteur did not take sufficient account of the distinction between formal and material sources of customary international law. It was also suggested that the Special Rapporteur’s proposal to incorporate the definition of international custom contained in the Statute of the International Court of Justice may be misguided. Some members indicated that a definition of customary international law should consider Article 38, paragraph 1 (b), of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, particularly as the constituent elements identified therein are widely cited and accepted, but any definition produced by the Commission should focus primarily on the core elements that give customary international law its binding nature.

88. Some members also stressed the importance of addressing the process by which a rule of customary international law becomes obsolete.
89. A number of members recommended that the Commission should examine the role of other actors in the formation of customary international law. In particular, it was suggested that the potential jurisdictional value of determinations of *sui generis* subjects of international law, such as the ICRC, should be examined. A view was expressed that such actors and interest groups play a significant role in the development, and the pace of development, of customary international law in certain fields. According to another view, determinations of certain non-governmental organizations should be accorded lesser weight than the practice or pronouncements of States.

(d) **Range of materials to be consulted**

90. There was general support for the range of materials the Special Rapporteur proposed to consult. It was suggested, however, that a distinction should be made in the relative weight accorded to different materials.

91. There was broad support for a careful examination of the practice of States. A view was expressed that materials on State practice should be examined from all areas of the world, though it was also noted that, regrettably, not all States publish a survey of State practice. It was suggested that State practice in some areas may be limited as not all States have participated in the formation of certain rules of customary international law. Several members suggested that the Commission should research the decisions of national courts, statements of national officials and State conduct. The view was expressed that the Commission should carefully consider the actual behaviour of States, particularly where it conflicted with national statements. Attention was also drawn to States’ arguments before international courts and tribunals, as they may usefully indicate positions on the formation and evidence of customary international law. In addition, where available, it was suggested that the Commission should consider the analysis of legal advisers to governments, and also the relevance of confidential exchanges of views between States.

92. With regard to the jurisprudence of national courts, several members agreed that such cases should be approached cautiously and carefully scrutinized for consistency. It was suggested that the manner in which national courts apply customary international law is a function of internal law, and domestic judges may not be well versed in public international law.

93. There was general support for the proposal to examine the jurisprudence of international, regional and subregional courts. Several members expressed particular support for an analysis of the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. Some members expressed the view that the jurisprudence of the Court may be considered the primary source of material on the formation and evidence of rules of customary international law, as it constitutes the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and its authoritative status on such matters is widely recognized. The view was expressed that advisory opinions, while not binding, may also deserve consideration. Several members also stressed the importance of analysing the jurisprudence of other international courts and tribunals, particularly as it appeared that certain courts and tribunals adopted varying approaches to the assessment of customary international law.

94. The view was expressed that the Commission should be careful not to place too much emphasis on jurisprudence, as courts and tribunals are charged with the resolution of specific disputes, and not with the development of uniform international legal criteria or procedures. Some members also indicated that the apparent difference in approaches among courts and tribunals may, in actuality, simply constitute variance in drafting.

95. The general view was that the role of the practice of international and regional organizations merited consideration. Attention was drawn to the value of resolutions, declarations, recommendations and decisions of such organizations as potential evidence of both State practice and *opinio juris*. It was suggested, however, that greater weight should be accorded to the practice of the intergovernmental organs of international organizations.

96. Some members were of the view that the Commission should not have an overly restrictive conception of the “law” relevant to its work on this topic. In particular, it was noted that “soft law” norms have played a role in the emergence of rules of customary international law.

97. The point was also made that writings of publicists would usefully shed light on the topic. Attention was drawn to the widespread support among writers for the “two-elements” approach to customary international law, as well as to the existence of critics advocating other approaches.

(e) **Future work on the topic**

98. The general view was that the Commission should produce a practical outcome that would be useful to practitioners and judges. It was recalled, however, that any outcome of the Commission should not prejudice the flexibility of the customary process or future developments concerning the formation and evidence of customary international law.

99. General support was also expressed for the plan of work for the quinquennium proposed by the Special Rapporteur. Several members were, however, of the view that the plan of work was overly ambitious and might not be feasible, given the difficulties inherent in the topic, though it was also noted that the proposed focus on practical issues could make the workplan feasible. In addition, the suggestion that the Commission ask States to respond to a request for information on their practice relating to the topic by no later than 31 January 2014 was generally welcomed. A view was expressed that the lack of practice provided so far by States was regrettable.

100. Several members expressed support for the proposed effort to build common understanding and usage of terminology by developing a glossary of terms in all languages. The potential practical utility of such an endeavour was emphasized. According to the view of some other members, a rigid lexicon of terms was not advisable since a general phrase such as “rules of international law” might not adequately reflect the spectrum of customary international law, which includes principles and norms as well as rules. According to another view, a lexicon or glossary of terms might not result in the desired
clarity, as it would be difficult to suggest that certain terms have been consistently used while others have not. Attention was also drawn to the varying use of terms and standards by the Commission itself in its identification of rules of customary international law.

3. **Concluding remarks of the Special Rapporteur**

101. The Special Rapporteur observed that there was general agreement that the outcome of work on this topic should be of an essentially practical nature. In that regard, there was broad support for the elaboration of a set of “conclusions” with commentaries. He also noted the general support among members for the “two-elements” approach, that is to say, that the identification of customary international law requires an assessment of both State practice and *opinio juris*, while recognizing that the two elements might sometimes be “closely entangled”, and that the relative weight to be given to each might vary depending on the context.

102. There also seemed to be support among members for a unified or common approach to the identification of customary international law.

103. With regard to the scope of the topic, there seemed to be broad support for examining the relationship between customary international law and other sources of international law, including treaty law and general principles of law. There was also widespread interest in considering regional customary international law. As to *jus cogens*, the Special Rapporteur observed that there was general agreement that it should not be dealt with in detail as part of the present topic.

104. With regard to the concerns expressed about his emphasis on terminological clarity, the Special Rapporteur indicated that his underlying intention was to promote a degree of clarity in reasoning. He added that the Commission had, over the years, been able to bring a degree of terminological clarity and uniformity to many areas of international law. At the same time, there was a balance to be struck between clarity and flexibility.

105. The Special Rapporteur was aware that his proposal to conclude work on the topic by 2016 might not be feasible; there had to be adequate time for research, study and reflection within the Commission, the Sixth Committee and the international community more generally. He explained that the proposed date should be understood simply as a target date, and not as suggesting an intention to rush ahead with undue speed.

106. With respect to the proposal to change the title of the topic, the Special Rapporteur noted that the issue had also been discussed in informal consultations. Consensus had been reached on the title in all official languages, including “Identification of customary international law” in English and “*Détermination du droit international coutumier*” in French. The Special Rapporteur recommended that the title be changed accordingly.

107. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the important discussion on the matter of the publication of State practice and indicated that a good first step would be to draw up a comprehensive list of existing digests and publications. There was also general support for a renewed call to States for information on their approach to the identification of customary international law.
Chapter VIII

PROVINCIAL APPLICATION OF TREATIES

A. Introduction

108. At its sixty-fourth session (2012), the Commission decided to include the topic “Provisional application of treaties” in its programme of work and appointed Mr. Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo as Special Rapporteur for the topic. At the same session, the Commission took note of an oral report, presented by the Special Rapporteur at the 3151st meeting, on 27 July 2012, on the informal consultations held on the topic under his chairpersonship. The Commission also decided to request a memorandum from the Secretariat on previous work undertaken by the Commission on the subject in the context of its work on the law of treaties, and on the travaux préparatoires of the relevant provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The General Assembly subsequently, in resolution 67/92 of 14 December 2012, noted with appreciation the decision of the Commission to include the topic in its programme of work.

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

109. At the present session, the Commission had before it the first report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/664), which sought to establish, in general terms, the principal legal issues that arose in the context of the provisional application of treaties by considering doctrinal approaches to the topic and briefly reviewing the existing State practice. The Commission also had before it a memorandum by the Secretariat (A/CN.4/658), which traced the negotiating history of article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, both within the Commission and at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties of 1968–1969, and included a brief analysis of some of the substantive issues raised during its consideration.

110. The Commission considered the first report at its 3185th to 3188th meetings, from 24 to 30 July 2013.

1. Introduction by the Special Rapporteur of the First Report

111. The Special Rapporteur explained that the object of his preliminary report was to establish the main parameters of provisional application, so as to encourage greater recourse to it by States. The 1969 Vienna Convention was the logical point of departure. He indicated a provisional preference for not considering the question of the provisional application of treaties by international organizations, as envisaged in the 1986 Vienna Convention.

112. In providing an overview of his report, the Special Rapporteur pointed to the terminological discrepancy between the draft article adopted by the Commission in 1966, which referred to “provisional entry into force”, and article 25, which had been modified at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties so as to refer to “provisional application”. While the record showed that the two phrases had been used somewhat interchangeably, he noted that, upon closer scrutiny, they were distinct legal concepts. The Special Rapporteur further recalled the possible reasons which motivated States to resort to provisional application, as outlined in his report.

113. Concerning the legal effects of provisional application, the Special Rapporteur noted that, as a general matter, such effects could depend on the content of the substantive rule of international law being provisionally applied. The secondary consequences of the breach of an obligation arising from a rule being provisionally applied arose not from the fact of provisional application, but from the normal application of the secondary rules of international law pertaining to breaches of obligations. It was also suggested that the provisional application of treaties had to be considered within the general context of article 31, paragraph 2, of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

114. While it was his intention to consider the question of the legal effects in greater detail at a later stage, the Special Rapporteur recalled that both Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Sir Humphrey Waldock, the previous Special Rapporteurs, had been of the view that the provisional application of a treaty gave rise to the same obligations that would arise upon the entry into force of the treaty. He pointed, in that regard, to the relevance of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, as reflected in article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. He furthermore recalled the view which had emerged from the informal consultations, held in 2012, that the provisional application of a treaty gave rise to obligations which extended beyond that not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force (article 18 of the Vienna Convention).

115. He pointed to the key features of the legal regime applicable to the provisional application of treaties, namely that it may be envisaged expressly in a treaty or provided...
for by means of a separate agreement between the parties; that States may express their intention to provisionally apply a treaty either expressly or tacitly; and that termination of provisional application may be undertaken unilaterally or by agreement between the parties.

116. The Special Rapporteur expressed his preliminary view that the topic was best suited to the development of guidelines or model clauses aimed at providing guidance to governments.

2. SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE

117. The Commission joined the Special Rapporteur in expressing appreciation to the Secretariat for preparing the memorandum.

118. The view was expressed that it was inappropriate, as a matter of legal policy, for the Commission to seek to promote the provisional application of treaties. Examples were cited where the provisional application of treaties had discouraged their ratification. Other members pointed out that it was not the task of the Commission to encourage or discourage recourse to provisional application, since such decision was essentially a policy matter for States. From the perspective of international law, States were free to decide to provisionally apply a treaty or not. It was also noted that the significance of the possibility of provisional application was confirmed by its frequent use by States. Far from being a means of undermining treaties, the drafters of article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention had viewed it as a practical way of ensuring legal security, e.g. in the case of successive treaties, by providing an expedited path for States to begin cooperation with regard to a treaty.

119. A further concern was expressed that the provisional application of treaties raised serious questions about the circumvention of established domestic procedures, including constitutional requirements, for participation in treaties. Other members did not share such concerns. It was observed that States were free to establish rules, under their respective internal legal systems, on how to engage at the international level. The Commission had to proceed from the assumption that the provisional application of treaties was undertaken in conformity with the internal laws of the State in question (subject to the applicability of article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). The Commission’s task was simply to consider the extent to which contemporary international law was required to take into account limitations under domestic laws, without considering those limitations themselves. From the perspective of international law, the consent of a contracting State was decisive. Once such consent to provisionally apply a treaty had been given, whether in the treaty itself or by means of a separate agreement, the State could not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to perform its international obligations (article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). It was also suggested that concerns about the circumvention of domestic rules could be met by clarifying that the “provisional application” of a treaty carried with it the consequence that the obligations under the treaty would become binding on the State. This would help States decide whether they were constitutionally empowered to provisionally apply a treaty.

120. It was observed that the Commission’s task was to develop a practical guide for States when they negotiated new clauses on provisional application, or when they interpreted and applied existing clauses, especially since the 1966 commentaries on the law of treaties did not deal with important aspects of the text of article 25 as adopted in Vienna.

121. The view was expressed that determining the legal effect of provisional application was the central task at hand. Several members were of the opinion that, unless the parties agreed otherwise, agreement to provisionally apply a treaty implied that the parties concerned were bound by the rights and obligations under the treaty in the same way as if it were in force. The view was expressed that the Commission ought not to ascribe legal significance to the shift in terminology from “provisional entry into force” to “provisional application”. Another suggestion was that a distinction could be drawn between treaties being provisionally applied and “provisional” or “interim” agreements. The Special Rapporteur was further encouraged to consider the relationship with other provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention, including articles 18, 26, 27 and 46. Different views were expressed on the advisability of considering questions of State responsibility within the topic.

122. It was suggested that the Special Rapporteur could seek to ascertain whether the rules in article 25 were applicable, as rules of customary international law or otherwise, in cases where the 1969 Vienna Convention did not apply. A further suggestion was to consider the extent to which the fact that a treaty was being provisionally applied might contribute to the formation of rules of customary international law.

123. Other suggestions for possible discussion included determining whether there existed procedural requirements for the provisional application of treaties; considering the relationship between parties provisionally applying a treaty and third parties; analysing the requirement that the intention to provisionally apply a treaty should be clear and unambiguous; considering the applicability of the rules on reservations to treaties; analysing the distinction between provisional application and the necessary application of certain provisions of a treaty from the time of the adoption of its text (article 24, paragraph 4, of the 1969 Vienna Convention); considering the applicability of the rules on interpretation of treaties; studying the question of the termination of provisional application (including the effect on the legal position of third parties); considering the position of non-signatory or acceding States wishing to provisionally apply a multilateral treaty; considering whether certain provisions of a treaty, such as those establishing monitoring mechanisms, would, by definition, fall outside provisional application; clarifying the temporal scope of provisional application, including the possibility of indefinite provisional application; and considering the question of the retroactivity of obligations once a treaty which had been applied provisionally entered into force. It was further suggested that a general distinction be drawn between provisional application in the context of bilateral and of multilateral treaties.
124. A preference was expressed for including article 25 of the 1986 Vienna Convention within the scope of the topic, since international organizations could also be involved in the provisional application of treaties.

125. Some members were of the view that it was too early to take a position on the eventual outcome of the topic, while several stated that conclusions with commentaries could be a useful way of clarifying various aspects related to the provisional application of treaties.

3. CONCLUDING REMARKS OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR

126. The Special Rapporteur indicated that the Commission should be guided by the practice of States during the negotiation, implementation and interpretation of treaties being provisionally applied. He stressed his support for the view that the Commission should not be seen as encouraging or discouraging recourse to provisional application. The objective was to provide greater clarity to States when negotiating and implementing provisional application clauses. On the question of terminology, he indicated that, notwithstanding the reference to “provisional entry into force” in the Commission’s earlier work, the focus should be on the terminology used in article 25, that is “provisional application”. He was also of the view that the question of the customary international law character of the provisional application of treaties merited consideration in the situation where two or more States seeking to provisionally apply a treaty were not parties to the 1969 Vienna Convention and no separate agreement existed. He further supported the view that it was not for the Commission to embark on an analysis of the internal rules of States. References to domestic legislation, therefore, were to be viewed as merely illustrative of the position taken by States, and it was solely for States to ascertain the implications, for their internal legal systems, of resorting to provisional application.

127. He confirmed that he intended to consider the relationship between article 25 and other provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention, including those on the expression of consent, the entering of reservations, the effects on third States, the applicability of the rules on interpretation, application and termination of treaties, and the invalidity of treaties. He also noted the necessity of considering the temporal component of provisional application, including whether it could last indefinitely. Furthermore, he suggested that the legal effect of provisional application in the context of treaty rules establishing the rights of individuals should be analysed. A further distinction worth exploring was that between multilateral and bilateral treaties.

128. The Special Rapporteur concurred with those members who preferred not to embark on an analysis of the applicable rules of State responsibility in the context of the provisional application of treaties. In his view, it was sufficient to indicate that the breach of an obligation arising from a treaty being provisionally applied triggered the legal consequences arising from the established rules on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. He also took note of the interest of some members in including the 1986 Vienna Convention within the scope of the topic.

129. The Special Rapporteur indicated that he considered the development of guidelines with commentaries to be an appropriate outcome of consideration of the topic.
Chapter IX

PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN RELATION TO ARMED CONFLICTS

A. Introduction

130. The Commission, at its sixty-third session (2011), decided to include the topic “Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts” in its long-term programme of work,\(^{386}\) on the basis of a proposal that was reproduced in annex V to the report of the Commission on the work of that session.\(^{387}\) The General Assembly, in paragraph 7 of its resolution 66/98 of 9 December 2011, took note of the inclusion of the topic in the Commission’s long-term programme of work.

131. At its 3171st meeting, on 28 May 2013, the Commission decided to include the topic “Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts” in its programme of work and to appoint Ms. Marie Jacobsson as Special Rapporteur for the topic.

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

132. At its 3188th meeting, on 30 July 2013, the Special Rapporteur presented the following oral report to the Commission in the informal consultations held on the topic, under her chairpersonship, on 6 June and 9 July 2013. At the same meeting, the Commission took note of the report.

\[\text{REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS HELD ON THE TOPIC}\]

133. The purpose of the informal consultations had been to initiate an informal dialogue with members of the Commission on a number of issues that could be of relevance to the consideration of this topic during the present quinquennium. To facilitate the consultations, the Special Rapporteur had prepared two informal papers setting forth some preliminary elements, which were to be read together with the syllabus reproduced in annex V to the Commission’s 2011 report containing the initial proposal for the topic.

134. The initial consultations had offered members of the Commission an opportunity to reflect and comment on the road ahead. The elements of the work discussed included its scope and methodology, the general direction of work and the timetable for future work.

135. With respect to the questions of scope and methodology, the Special Rapporteur had proposed that the topic could be addressed from a temporal perspective, rather than from the perspective of various areas of international law, such as international environmental law, the law of armed conflict and international human rights law, so as to make the topic more manageable and easier to delineate. The temporal phases would address legal measures taken to protect the environment before, during and after an armed conflict (respectively, Phase I, Phase II and Phase III). Such an approach was encouraged, as it would allow the Commission to identify specific legal issues relating to the topic that arose at different stages relating to an armed conflict. The identification of such issues could then facilitate the development of concrete conclusions or guidelines.

136. The Special Rapporteur further proposed that the focus of work would be on Phase I, that is obligations of relevance to a potential armed conflict, and Phase III, post-conflict measures. Phase II, that is the phase during which the laws of war apply, would be given less focus, as it was suggested that it was not the task of the Commission to modify the existing legal regimes. It was proposed that work on Phase II would also focus on non-international armed conflicts.

137. The approach of addressing the topic in temporal phases was generally welcomed by members of the Commission. Several members emphasized that Phase II was the most important phase. Other members were of the opinion that the most important phase was either Phase I or Phase III, or both. Ultimately, there was general agreement with the view of the Special Rapporteur that, although the work was to be divided into temporal phases, there could not be a strict dividing line between the different phases. Such a dividing line would be artificial and would not correspond with the way in which the relevant legal rules operated. The law of armed conflict, for example, consisted of rules applicable before, during and after an armed conflict.

138. The informal consultations also addressed whether the Commission should consider the effects of certain weapons on the environment. The Special Rapporteur proposed that the effect of particular weapons should not be the focus of the topic. Some members agreed, cautioning against consideration of the issue of weapons, while a few members took the view that it should be addressed.

139. In order to facilitate a discussion on the road ahead, the Special Rapporteur had circulated an outline for future work on the topic, including the proposed focus of her first report. A three-year timetable for the work was proposed, with one report to be submitted for the Commission’s consideration each year.

140. The Special Rapporteur indicated that she intended to present her first report to the Commission for

\(^{386}\) Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 365–367.

\(^{387}\) Ibid., p. 211.
consideration at its sixty-sixth session in 2014. The focus of the first report would be on Phase I, namely obligations of relevance to a potential armed conflict. It would not address post-conflict measures per se, even if preparation for post-conflict measures needed to be undertaken before an armed conflict had broken out. The Special Rapporteur also indicated that she planned to identify, for the purposes of her first report, the issues previously considered by the Commission that could be of relevance to the present topic.

141. It was proposed that the second report, to be submitted in 2015, would be on the law of armed conflict, including non-international armed conflict, and would contain an analysis of existing rules. The third report would focus on post-conflict measures, including reparation for damage, reconstruction, responsibility, liability and compensation, with particular attention being given to the consideration of case law. All three reports would contain conclusions or draft guidelines to be discussed in the Commission, with the possibility of referral to the Drafting Committee.

142. To assist with her work on the topic, the Special Rapporteur indicated that it would be important to gather information from a variety of sources. In that regard, the Special Rapporteur indicated that it would be useful if the Commission could ask States to provide examples of when international environmental law, including regional and bilateral treaties, had continued to apply in times of international or non-international armed conflict. Members of the Commission had also encouraged consultations with other United Nations organs or international organizations involved in the protection of the environment, such as the United Nations Environment Programme, UNESCO, UNHCR and the ICRC. Consultations with regional bodies, such as the African Union, the European Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of American States, had also been generally welcomed.

143. With respect to the final outcome of the Commission’s work on the topic, the Special Rapporteur indicated that the topic was more suited to the development of non-binding draft guidelines than to a draft convention. Some members considered it premature to decide on the final form of the work.

144. Attention was also drawn to a discrepancy in the prior translation of the title of the topic into certain official languages, which had been the source of confusion. The title of the topic should read “Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts”. The phrase “in relation to” had to be included in all languages so as to indicate that the topic covered the three temporal phases and was not limited to the armed conflict phase.
Chapter X

THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE (AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE)

A. Introduction

145. The Commission, at its fifty-seventh session (2005), decided to include the topic “The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)” in its programme of work and appointed Mr. Zdzisław Galicki as Special Rapporteur.\(^\text{388}\)

146. The Special Rapporteur submitted four reports. The Commission received and considered the preliminary report at its fifty-eighth session (2006), the second report at its fifty-ninth session (2007), the third report at its sixtieth session (2008) and the fourth report at its sixty-third session (2011).\(^\text{389}\)

147. At the sixty-first session (2009), an open-ended Working Group was established under the chairpersonship of Mr. Alain Pellet,\(^\text{390}\) and from its discussions, a proposed general framework for consideration of the topic, specifying the issues to be addressed by the Special Rapporteur, was prepared.\(^\text{391}\) At the sixty-second session (2010), the Working Group was reconstituted and, in the absence of its Chairperson, was chaired by Mr. Enrique Candioti.\(^\text{392}\) The Working Group had before it a survey of multilateral conventions that might be of relevance to the topic, prepared by the Secretariat.\(^\text{393}\) At the sixty-fourth session (2012), the Commission established an open-ended Working Group on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), under the chairpersonship of Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, to evaluate progress in the Commission’s work on the topic and to explore possible future options to be taken by the Commission.\(^\text{394}\)

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

148. At the present session, the Commission reconstituted the open-ended Working Group on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) under the chairpersonship of Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree. The Working Group continued to evaluate work on this topic, particularly in the light of the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) case,\(^\text{395}\) of 20 July 2012. The Working Group held seven meetings, on 8, 14, 16 and 28 May, 5 June and 18 and 24 July 2013.

149. At its 3189th meeting, on 31 July 2013, the Commission took note of the report of the Working Group, which appears as annex I to the present report.

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\(^{388}\) At its 2865th meeting, on 4 August 2005 (see Yearbook ... 2005, vol. II (Part Two), para. 500). The General Assembly, in paragraph 5 of resolution 60/22 of 23 November 2005, endorsed the decision of the Commission to include the topic in its programme of work. The topic had been included in the long-term programme of work of the Commission at its fifty-sixth session (2004), on the basis of the proposal annexed to that year’s report (Yearbook ... 2004, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 362–363).


\(^{390}\) During its sixthtieth session, at its 2989th meeting, on 31 July 2008, the Commission decided to establish a working group on the topic under the chairpersonship of Mr. Alain Pellet, with a mandate and membership to be determined at the sixty-first session (see Yearbook ... 2008, vol. II (Part Two), para. 315, and Yearbook ... 2009, vol. II (Part Two), para. 198).

\(^{391}\) For the proposed general framework prepared by the Working Group, see Yearbook ... 2009, vol. II (Part Two), para. 204.

\(^{392}\) At its 3071st meeting, on 30 July 2010, the Commission took note of the oral report of the temporary Chairperson of the Working Group (Yearbook ... 2010, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 336–340).

\(^{393}\) Ibid., vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/630.

\(^{394}\) At its 3152nd meeting, on 30 July 2012, the Commission took note of the oral report of the Chairperson of the Working Group (Yearbook ... 2012, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 207–221).

\(^{395}\) Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422.
THE MOST-FAVOURED-NATION CLAUSE

A. Introduction

150. The Commission, at its sixtieth session (2008), decided to include the topic “The most-favoured-nation clause” in its programme of work and to establish, at its sixty-first session, a study group on the topic.\(^{396}\)

151. The Study Group, co-chaired by Mr. Donald McRae and Mr. A. Rohan Perera, was established at the sixty-first session (2009),\(^{397}\) and reconstituted at the sixty-second (2010) and sixty-third (2011) sessions, under the same co-chairpersonship.\(^{398}\) At the sixty-fourth session (2012), the Commission reconstituted the Study Group on the most-favoured-nation clause, under the chairmanship of Mr. Donald McRae.\(^{399}\)

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

152. At the present session, the Commission reconstituted the Study Group on the most-favoured-nation clause under the chairmanship of Mr. Donald McRae. In his absence, Mr. Mathias Forteau served as Chairperson. The Study Group held four meetings, on 23 May and 10, 15 and 30 July 2013.

153. At its 3189th meeting, on 31 July 2013, the Commission took note of the report of the Study Group.

1. WORK OF THE STUDY GROUP

154. It should be recalled that the overall objective of the Study Group is to seek to safeguard against fragmentation of international law and to stress the importance of greater coherence in the approaches taken in the arbitral decisions in the area of investment, particularly in relation to most-favoured-nation provisions. The Study Group continues to work towards making a contribution to assuring greater certainty and stability in the field of investment law. It intends to formulate an outcome that would be of practical use to those involved in the investment field and to policymakers. It is not the intention of the Study Group to prepare any draft articles or to revise the Commission’s 1978 draft articles on most-favoured-nation clauses.\(^{400}\)

155. In seeking to throw further light on the contemporary challenges posed by the most-favoured-nation clause in investment law, the Study Group had prepared and considered several background working papers since 2010. In particular, it had examined (a) a typology of existing most-favoured-nation provisions, which is an ongoing exercise; (b) the 1978 draft articles adopted by the Commission and areas of their continuing relevance; (c) aspects concerning how the most-favoured-nation clause had developed and was developing in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO; (d) other developments in the context of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); (e) contemporary issues concerning the scope of application of the most-favoured-nation clause, such as those arising in the Maffezini award;\(^{401}\) (f) how the most-favoured-nation clause had been interpreted by investment tribunals, Maffezini and post-Maffezini; and (g) the effect of the mixed nature of investment tribunals on the application of most-favoured-nation clauses to procedural provisions.\(^{402}\)

156. The Study Group had also undertaken work to identify the arbitrators and counsel in investment cases involving most-favoured-nation clauses, together with the types of most-favoured-nation provisions interpreted. Additionally, to identify further the normative content of most-favoured-nation clauses in the field of investment,

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\(^{396}\) At its 2997th meeting, on 8 August 2008 (see Yearbook ... 2008, vol. II (Part Two), para. 354). For the syllabus of the topic, see ibid., annex II. The General Assembly, in paragraph 6 of its resolution 63/123 of 11 December 2008, took note of the decision.

\(^{397}\) At its 3029th meeting, on 31 July 2009, the Commission took note of the oral report of the Co-Chairpersons of the Study Group on the most-favoured-nation clause (see Yearbook ... 2009, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 211–216). The Study Group considered, inter alia, a framework that would serve as a road map for future work and agreed on a work schedule involving the preparation of papers intended to shed additional light on questions concerning, in particular, the scope of most-favoured-nation clauses and their interpretation and application.

\(^{398}\) At its 3071st meeting, on 30 July 2010, the Commission took note of the oral report of the Co-Chairpersons of the Study Group (see Yearbook ... 2010, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 359–373). The Study Group considered and reviewed the various papers prepared on the basis of the 2009 framework to serve as a road map for future work and agreed upon a programme of work for 2010. At its 3119th meeting, on 8 August 2011, the Commission took note of the oral report of the Co-Chairpersons of the Study Group (see Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 348–362). The Study Group considered and reviewed additional papers prepared on the basis of the 2009 framework.

\(^{399}\) At its 3151st meeting, on 27 July 2012, the Commission took note of the oral report of the Chairperson of the Study Group (see Yearbook ... 2012, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 244–265). The Study Group considered and reviewed additional papers prepared on the basis of the 2009 framework.

\(^{400}\) Yearbook ... 1978, vol. II (Part Two), para. 74.

\(^{401}\) Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the tribunal on objections to jurisdiction, 25 January 2000 (available from https://icsid.worldbank.org/).

\(^{402}\) Catalogue of MFN provisions” (Donald McRae and A. Rohan Perera); “The 1978 draft articles of the International Law Commission” (Shinya Murase) (this paper was further revised in 2013); “MFN in the GATT and the WTO” (Donald McRae); “The work of OECD on MFN” (Mahmoud Hmoud); “The work of UNCTAD on MFN” (Stephen Vasciannie); “The Maffezini problem under investment treaties” (A. Rohan Perera); “Interpretation and application of MFN clauses in investment agreements” (Donald McRae); “Interpretation of MFN clauses by investment tribunals” (Donald McRae); and “Effect of the mixed nature of investment tribunals on the application of MFN clauses to procedural provisions” (Mathias Forteau).
it considered an informal paper on model most-favoured-nation clauses post Maffezini, examining the various ways in which States have reacted to the Maffezini decision, including by specifically stating that the most-favoured-nation clause does not apply to dispute resolution provisions or by specifically enumerating the fields to which the most-favoured-nation clause applies. It had also considered an informal working paper providing an overview of most-favoured-nation-type language in headquarters agreements, conferring on representatives of States to an organization the same privileges and immunities as those granted to diplomats in the host State. Those informal working papers, together with an informal working paper on bilateral taxation treaties and the most-favoured-nation clause, are still a work in progress.

157. The Study Group had previously identified the need to study further the question of most-favoured-nation clauses in relation to trade in services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and investment agreements, the relationship between most-favoured-nation, fair and equitable treatment, and national treatment standards, as well as regional economic integration agreements and free trade agreements, to assess whether any application of most-favoured-nation clauses in such areas might provide some insight for the work of the Study Group. Attention was also drawn to the need to consider the relationship between bilateral and multilateral treaties and how the most-favoured-nation clause had operated in a more varied and complex environment since the adoption by the Commission of the 1978 draft articles on most-favoured-nation clauses, and the question of reciprocity in the application of most-favoured-nation clauses, particularly in agreements between developed and developing countries.

158. It was generally understood that the end goal would be to put together an overall report that systematically analysed the various issues identified as relevant. It was envisaged that the final report would provide a general background to the work within the broader framework of general international law, in the light of subsequent developments, including following the adoption of the 1978 draft articles on most-favoured-nation clauses, and the question of reciprocity in the application of most-favoured-nation clauses, particularly in agreements between developed and developing countries.

The working paper by Mr. Shinya Murase addressed an aspect previously discussed by the Study Group in 2012 in relation to a working paper by Mr. Mathias Forteau on the “Effect of the mixed nature of investment tribunals on the application of MFN clauses to procedural provisions”, which analysed the phenomenon of mixed tribunals by offering an explanation of the mixed nature of arbitration in relation to investment; assessing the peculiarities of the application of the most-favoured-nation clause in mixed arbitration; studying the impact of such arbitration on the application of the most-favoured-nation clause to procedural provisions; considering that the mixed nature of investment arbitration operated on two levels, because the parties to the proceedings, being a private claimant and a respondent State, were not of the same nature; and arguing that the tribunal in such instances was a functional substitute for an otherwise competent domestic court of the host State. Accordingly, a mixed arbitration was situated between the domestic plane and the international plane, with affinities in relation to investment to both international commercial arbitration and public international arbitration, having both a private and a public element to it. The working paper by Mr. Shinya Murase sought to bring a historical perspective to the development of law in this area. It recalled that the process of “internationalization” of “concession agreements” concluded between an investor company and the host State had emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Those agreements were considered to be “private law contracts” or “public law (or administrative) contracts” regulated by the domestic law of either the investor’s home State or the host State. After the Second World War, the exclusion of domestic law and domestic jurisdiction became an evident trend in such agreements, giving rise, in the doctrine, to considerations that such agreements were regulated by “the general principles recognized by civilized nations” rather than the domestic law of either State and that such agreements were “economic development agreements” governed neither by domestic law nor by international law but by the lex contractus, even though case law rejected such characterizations. It was asserted that these concession agreements or economic development

2. DISCUSSIONS OF THE STUDY GROUP AT THE PRESENT SESSION

159. The Study Group had before it a working paper entitled “A BIT on mixed tribunals; legal character of investment dispute settlements”, by Mr. Shinya Murase, together with a working paper entitled “Survey of MFN language and Maffezini-related jurisprudence”, by Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud. The Study Group also continued to examine contemporary practice and jurisprudence relevant to the interpretation of most-favoured-nation clauses. In that connection, it had before it recent awards and dissenting and separate opinions addressing the issues under consideration by the Study Group.

160. The working paper by Mr. Shinya Murase addressed an aspect previously discussed by the Study Group in 2012 in relation to a working paper by Mr. Mathias Forteau on the “Effect of the mixed nature of investment tribunals on the application of MFN clauses to procedural provisions”, which analysed the phenomenon of mixed tribunals by offering an explanation of the mixed nature of arbitration in relation to investment; assessing the peculiarities of the application of the most-favoured-nation clause in mixed arbitration; studying the impact of such arbitration on the application of the most-favoured-nation clause to procedural provisions; considering that the mixed nature of investment arbitration operated on two levels, because the parties to the proceedings, being a private claimant and a respondent State, were not of the same nature; and arguing that the tribunal in such instances was a functional substitute for an otherwise competent domestic court of the host State. Accordingly, a mixed arbitration was situated between the domestic plane and the international plane, with affinities in relation to investment to both international commercial arbitration and public international arbitration, having both a private and a public element to it. The working paper by Mr. Shinya Murase sought to bring a historical perspective to the development of law in this area. It recalled that the process of “internationalization” of “concession agreements” concluded between an investor company and the host State had emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Those agreements were considered to be “private law contracts” or “public law (or administrative) contracts” regulated by the domestic law of either the investor’s home State or the host State. After the Second World War, the exclusion of domestic law and domestic jurisdiction became an evident trend in such agreements, giving rise, in the doctrine, to considerations that such agreements were regulated by “the general principles recognized by civilized nations” rather than the domestic law of either State and that such agreements were “economic development agreements” governed neither by domestic law nor by international law but by the lex contractus, even though case law rejected such characterizations. It was asserted that these concession agreements or economic development
agreements were a precursor leading to the subsequent conclusion of numerous bilateral investment treaties, which are inter-State agreements, the substantive rules of which are governed by international law. Procedurally, however, it was argued that, no matter the extent to which mixed tribunals may resemble inter-State tribunals, the Study Group ought to treat them with care and differently from, for instance, WTO dispute cases.

161. The working paper by Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud provided a compilation of relevant treaty provisions that had been the subject of examination in awards and addressed the Maffezini-related issue of whether a most-favoured-nation clause extended to dispute settlement clauses, together with relevant excerpts from the awards in question.

162. With regard to the Daimler and the Kılıç awards before it, the Study Group noted that they dealt with similar issues of contention as the Maffezini case and that the various elements raised in the awards could be of relevance to its work, as in 2012 the Study Group had addressed the various factors that tribunals take into account in the interpretation of most-favoured-nation clauses. In particular, the Study Group recognized that the arbitral tribunals’ interpretative approaches to the most-favoured-nation clause and the relevance of the 1969 Vienna Convention for this purpose were of particular interest. The awards highlighted several important aspects of treaty interpretation, such as the text and contextual framework of the treaty, including the treaty practice of the States concerned, the object and purpose of the treaty, and consent and contemporaneity. The Study Group also took note of the fact that the arbitral tribunal in the Daimler case had examined the meaning of the concept “more” or “less” favourable treatment as it related to the various dispute settlement procedures available to the parties under a treaty. It further considered that the overview of relevant jurisprudence in the Kılıç award could be useful in the development of its final report.

163. It had been anticipated that at the present session the Study Group would begin consideration of its draft final report, which was to be prepared by the Chairperson, taking into account the various working papers that had been presented to the Study Group. In the absence of the Chairperson, the Study Group nevertheless exchanged further views on the broad outlines of its final report, recognizing once more that, while the focus of its work was in the area of investment, the issues under discussion would best be located within a broader framework, namely against the background of general international law and the prior work of the Commission. The report would address such issues as the origins and purpose of the work of the Study Group; the 1978 draft articles and their relevance; developments since 1978; the contemporary relevance of most-favoured-nation provisions, including the 1978 draft articles; the consideration of most-favoured-nation provisions in other bodies, such as UNCTAD and the OECD; the contextual considerations, such as the phenomenon of mixed arbitrations, as highlighted, for example, in the paper by Mr. Shinya Murase; and the conflicting approaches to the interpretation of most-favoured-nation provisions in the case law.

164. In further addressing the interpretation of most-favoured-nation provisions in investment agreements, with the 1969 Vienna Convention serving as a point of departure, the Study Group noted the possibility of developing guidelines and model clauses for its final report. It nevertheless recognized the risks of any outcome being overly prescriptive. Instead, it was noted that it might be useful to catalogue examples that had arisen in practice relating to treaties and to draw the attention of States to the interpretation that various awards had given to a variety of provisions. It was considered that the survey commenced by Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud would be helpful when the Study Group eventually addressed the question of guidelines and model clauses in relation to the issues raised in the Maffezini award. The Study Group once more recalled that it had previously identified the need to study further the question of most-favoured-nation clauses in relation to trade in services under GATS and investment agreements, as well as the relationship between most-favoured-nation, fair and equitable treatment, and national treatment standards. All those aspects would continue to be monitored by the Study Group as its work progressed. The Study Group was at the same time mindful that it should not overly broaden the scope of its work.
Chapter XII

OTHER DECISIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION

A. Programme, procedures and working methods of the Commission and its documentation

165. At its 3160th meeting, on 7 May 2013, the Commission established a Planning Group for the current session.

166. The Planning Group held three meetings. It had before it section I of the topical summary of the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its sixty-seventh session (A/CN.4/657), entitled “Other decisions and conclusions of the Commission”; General Assembly resolution 67/92 of 14 December 2012 on the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third and sixty-fourth sessions, in particular paragraphs 23 to 28; General Assembly resolution 67/1 of 24 September 2012 containing the declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels; and General Assembly resolution 67/97 of 14 December 2012 on the rule of law at the national and international levels.

1. INCLUSION OF NEW TOPICS ON THE PROGRAMME OF WORK OF THE COMMISSION

167. At its 3171st meeting, on 28 May 2013, the Commission decided to include the topic “Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts” in its programme of work and to appoint Ms. Marie Jacobsson as Special Rapporteur for the topic.

168. At its 3197th meeting, on 9 August 2013, the Commission decided to include the topic “Protection of the atmosphere” in its programme of work and to appoint Mr. Shinya Murase as Special Rapporteur for the topic.

The Commission included the topic in its programme on the understanding that:

(a) work on the topic will proceed in a manner so as not to interfere with relevant political negotiations, including on climate change, ozone depletion and long-range transboundary air pollution. The topic will not deal with, but is also without prejudice to, questions such as liability of States and their nationals, the polluter-pays principle, the precautionary principle, common but differentiated responsibilities and the transfer of funds and technology to developing countries, including intellectual property rights;

(b) the topic will also not deal with specific substances, such as black carbon, tropospheric ozone and other dual-impact substances, which are the subject of negotiations among States. The project will not seek to “fill” gaps in the treaty regimes;

(c) questions relating to outer space, including its delimitation, are not part of the topic;

(d) the outcome of work on the topic will be draft guidelines that do not seek to impose on current treaty regimes legal rules or legal principles not already contained therein.

The Special Rapporteur’s reports would be based on such an understanding.

2. WORKING GROUP ON THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMME OF WORK

169. At its first meeting, on 7 May 2013, the Planning Group decided to reconstitute for the current session the Working Group on the long-term programme of work. In the absence of its Chairperson, Mr. Donald McRae, the Working Group was chaired by Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud. Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud submitted an oral interim report to the Planning Group at its second meeting, on 6 June 2013, and another report at its third meeting, on 25 July 2013. The Working Group recommended the inclusion of the topic “Crimes against humanity” in the long-term programme of work of the Commission on the basis of a proposal prepared by Mr. Sean Murphy. The Working Group was guided by the recommendation made by the Commission at its fiftieth session (1998) regarding the criteria for the selection of topics, namely that:

(a) the topic should reflect the needs of States in respect of the progressive development and codification of international law;

(b) the topic should be sufficiently advanced in stage in terms of State practice to permit progressive development and codification;

(c) the topic is concrete and feasible for progressive development and codification.

The Commission also agreed that it should not restrict itself to traditional topics, but could also consider those that reflect new developments in international law and pressing concerns of the international community as a whole.

170. The Commission endorsed the recommendation to include the topic “Crimes against humanity” in its long-term programme of work. The view was expressed that consideration of the topic in the syllabus should have taken a broader perspective, including the coverage of all core crimes. The syllabus for the topic included by the

405 Yearbook ... 1998, vol. II (Part Two), para. 553.
Commission in its long-term programme of work at the present session appears in annex II to the present report.

3. CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 67/97 OF 14 DECEMBER 2012 ON THE RULE OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS

171. The General Assembly, in resolution 67/97 of 14 December 2012 on the rule of law at the national and international levels, inter alia, reiterated its invitation to the Commission to comment, in its report to the General Assembly, on its current role in promoting the rule of law. The Commission has commented annually on its role in promoting the rule of law since its sixty-sixth session (2008). The Commission notes that the substance of the comprehensive comments contained in paragraphs 341 to 346 of its 2008 report remains relevant and reiterates the comments in paragraph 231 of its 2009 report, paragraphs 389 to 393 of its 2010 report, paragraphs 392 to 398 of its 2011 report and paragraphs 274 to 279 of its 2012 report.

172. The Commission welcomes the Declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels contained in General Assembly resolution 67/1 and shares the commitment shown in the Declaration to an international order based on the rule of law, and the recognition that the rule of law applies to all States equally and to international organizations. The Commission also notes the appreciation expressed for the work of the International Law Commission in advancing the rule of law at the international level through the progressive development of international law and its codification.

173. The Commission recalls that the rule of law constitutes the essence of the Commission, for its basic mission is to work for the progressive development of international law and its codification, bearing in mind its implementation at the national level.

174. The Commission wishes to reiterate that its work has led to the adoption by States of a significant number of conventions. For such conventions to serve their full purpose they need to be ratified and implemented. In addition to formulating draft articles, the Commission’s output takes other forms, which also contribute to the progressive development of international law and its codification. Keeping in mind the principle of the rule of law in all its work, the Commission is fully conscious of the importance of the implementation of international law at the national level and aims to promote the rule of law as a principle of governance at the international level.

175. The Commission welcomes the positive contribution of the General Assembly, as the chief deliberative and representative organ of the United Nations, to the rule of law in all its aspects through policymaking and standard setting, and through the progressive development of international law and its codification.

176. The Commission, as an organ established by the General Assembly and in keeping with the mandate set out in Article 13, paragraph (1) (a), of the Charter of the United Nations, and in its statute, and in line with views expressed by States in the declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels, will continue to advance the rule of law through the progressive development of international law and its codification.

177. The Commission welcomes the decision of the General Assembly to select “The rule of law and the peaceful settlement of international disputes” as the thematic subject for debate in the Sixth Committee this year.

178. Bearing in mind the close interrelation between the rule of law at the national level and that at the international level, the Commission, in fulfilling its mandate concerning the progressive development of international law and its codification, considers that its work should take into account, where appropriate, the principles of human rights that are fundamental to the rule of law as reflected in the preamble and in Article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations and in the declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels.

179. Accordingly, the Commission has promoted awareness of the rule of law at the national and international levels, including, in particular, through its work on such topics as expulsion of aliens, protection of persons in the event of disasters, the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) and immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction.

180. The Commission reiterates its commitment to the rule of law in all of its activities.

4. HONORARIA

181. The Commission reiterates once more its views concerning the question of honoraria, resulting from the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 56/272 of 27 March 2002, which have been expressed in previous reports of the Commission. The Commission emphasizes that the above resolution particularly affects special rapporteurs, as it compromises support for their research work.

5. DOCUMENTATION AND PUBLICATIONS

182. The Commission reiterates its recognition of the particular relevance and significant value to its work of the legal publications prepared by the Secretariat.

410 Yearbook ... 2012, vol. II (Part Two), p. 87.

was able to expedite the issuance of its publications significantly through the continuation and expansion of its desktop publishing initiative, which has greatly enhanced the timeliness and relevance of those publications to the Commission’s work.

183. The Commission noted with satisfaction that the summary records of the Commission, constituting crucial travaux préparatoires in the progressive development and codification of international law, would not be subject to arbitrary length restrictions. Given, however, that a shortage of staff in the units responsible for drafting summary records might have an impact on the integrity and quality of the records, a number of experimental measures to streamline the processing of the Commission’s summary records were introduced following exchanges between the secretariat of the Commission and the drafting units. The new arrangements entail more expeditious transmission of the provisional records to members of the Commission for timely correction and prompt release of the final texts. It is hoped that this will result in a more rational use of resources and facilitate the preparation of the definitive records in all languages, without compromising their integrity.

184. The Commission is aware that, in the present financial situation, the continuation of several of the Codification Division’s publications may be in jeopardy.

185. In view of the extreme usefulness of the following publications to its work, the Commission decided to recommend that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to continue these publications:

(a) The Work of the International Law Commission in all six official languages at the beginning of each quinquennium;

(b) Reports of International Arbitral Awards in English or French; and

(c) Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the International Court of Justice in all six official languages every five years.

186. The Commission expressed its gratitude to all services involved in document processing, both in Geneva and in New York, for their timely and efficient processing of the Commission’s documents, often under narrow time constraints, which contributes to the smooth conduct of the Commission’s work.

187. The Commission expressed its appreciation to the United Nations Office at Geneva Library, which assists its members very efficiently and competently.

6. TRUST FUND ON THE BACKLOG RELATING TO THE YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

188. The Commission reiterated that the Yearbook was critical to the understanding of the Commission’s work in the progressive development of international law and its codification, and in strengthening the rule of law in international relations. The Commission took note that the General Assembly, in resolution 67/92, had expressed its appreciation to Governments that had made voluntary contributions to the trust fund on the backlog relating to the Yearbook of the International Law Commission and had encouraged further contributions to the fund.

7. YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

189. The Commission decided to recommend that the General Assembly express its satisfaction with the remarkable progress achieved in the last few years in catching up with the backlog of the Yearbook of the International Law Commission in all six languages and welcome the efforts made by the Division of Conference Management, especially its Editing Section in the United Nations Office at Geneva, in effectively implementing relevant resolutions of the General Assembly calling for the backlog to be reduced; encourage the Division of Conference Management to provide continuous necessary support to the Editing Section in advancing the Yearbook; and request that updates on progress in this respect be provided to the Commission on a regular basis.

8. ASSISTANCE OF THE CODIFICATION DIVISION

190. The Commission expressed its appreciation for the valuable assistance of the Codification Division of the Secretariat in its substantive servicing of the Commission and its involvement in research projects on the Commission’s work. In particular, the Commission expressed its appreciation to the Secretariat for preparing two memoranda on the topics “Provisional application of treaties” (A/CN.4/658) and “Formation and evidence of customary international law” (A/CN.4/659). The Commission reiterated the particular relevance and significant value of the legal publications prepared by the Codification Division to its work and reiterated its request that the Codification Division continue to provide it with those publications.

9. WEBSITES

191. The Commission once again expressed its appreciation for the results of the activity of the Secretariat in continuously updating and managing its website on the International Law Commission. The Commission reiterated that this and other websites maintained by the Codification Division constitute an invaluable resource for the Commission and for those in the wider community researching the work of the Commission, thereby contributing to the overall strengthening of the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law. The Commission welcomed the fact that the website on the Commission’s work includes information on the current status of the topics on its agenda, as well as advance edited versions of the summary records of its meetings.

B. DATE AND PLACE OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION

192. The Commission decided that its sixty-sixth session would be held in Geneva from 5 May to 6 June and from 7 July to 8 August 2014.

413 http://legal.un.org/cod/.

C. Cooperation with other bodies

193. At the 3182nd meeting, on 18 July 2013, Judge Peter Tomka, President of the International Court of Justice, addressed the Commission and briefed it on the recent judicial activities of the Court, while also drawing attention to recent efforts to encourage acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with its Statute. An exchange of views followed.

194. The Asian–African Legal Consultative Organization was represented at the present session of the Commission by its Secretary-General, Mr. Rahmat Mohamad, who addressed the Commission at the 3176th meeting, on 9 July 2013. He focused on the views of member States of the Organization, on the basis of their statements in other international forums, on three topics on the programme of work of the Commission: “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction”; “Protection of persons in the event of disasters”; and “Formation and evidence of customary international law”. An exchange of views followed.

195. The European Committee on Legal Co-operation and the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law of the Council of Europe were represented at the present session of the Commission by the Chair of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law, Ms. Liesbeth Lijnzaad, and the Head ad interim of the Public International Law Division of the Council of Europe, Ms. Christina Olsen, both of whom addressed the Commission at the 3177th meeting, on 10 July 2013. They focused on the current activities of the Committee on a variety of legal matters, and on the activities of the Council of Europe. An exchange of views followed.

196. The Inter-American Juridical Committee was represented at the present session of the Commission by Mr. Miguel Pichardo Olivier, who addressed the Commission at the 3180th meeting, on 16 July 2013. He gave an overview of the activities of the Committee as contained in its annual report and those planned for 2013. An exchange of views followed.

197. The African Union Commission on International Law was represented at the present session of the Commission by its Chairperson, Mr. Adelardus Kilangi, who addressed the Commission at the 3189th meeting, on 31 July 2013. He gave an overview of the activities of the African Union Commission on International Law. An exchange of views followed.

198. On 16 July 2013, an informal exchange of views was held between members of the Commission and the ICRC on topics of mutual interest. Presentations were given on the activities of the ICRC Legal Division and on the Arms Trade Treaty and its humanitarian objective, as well as on topics on the programme of work of the Commission, including the topic “Formation and evidence of customary international law”.

D. Representation at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly

199. The Commission decided that it should be represented at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly by its Chairperson, Mr. Bernd Niehaus.

200. In view of the fact that the debate in the Sixth Committee on the topic “Reservations to treaties” was postponed to the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Commission reiterated the desire it had expressed at its previous session (2012) for the former Special Rapporteur on the topic, Mr. Alain Pellet, to be invited by the Sixth Committee in order to attend the debate in the Sixth Committee on the chapter of the 2011 report of the Commission that relates to this topic.

E. Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture

201. On 17 July 2013, members of the Commission, participants in the International Law Seminar and other experts on international law attended the Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture, entitled “Contemporary trends on opinio juris and the material evidence of customary international law”, which was delivered by Professor Paulo Borba Casella of the University of São Paulo. A discussion followed.

F. International Law Seminar

202. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/92, the forty-ninth session of the International Law Seminar was held at the Palais des Nations from 8 to 26 July 2013, during the present session of the Commission. The Seminar is intended for advanced students specializing in international law and for young professors or government officials pursuing an academic or diplomatic career or in posts in the civil service of their country.

203. Twenty-one participants of different nationalities, from all the regions of the world, took part in the session. The participants attended plenary meetings of

415 This statement is recorded in the summary record of that meeting.
416 Idem.
417 Idem.
418 Idem.
419 Idem.
420 Mr. Laurent Colassis, Deputy Head, Legal Division, ICRC, provided an overview of the work of the ICRC Legal Division, and Ms. Nathalie Weizmann, Legal Adviser, Arms Unit, ICRC, gave a presentation on the Arms Trade Treaty and its humanitarian objective. Mr. Sean Murphy provided an overview of the topics on the programme of work of the Commission, including the topic “Formation and evidence of customary international law”.
421 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), chap. IV, and ibid., vol. II (Part Three).
422 The following persons participated in the Seminar: Mr. Hatem Alabd (Egypt), Ms. Makiko Asami (Japan), Mr. Jonas Attenhofner (Switzerland), Ms. Danai Azaria (Greece), Mr. Eduardo Cagnoni (Argentina), Mr. Jorge Luis Cepero Aguilar (Cuba), Ms. Rasmane Congo (Burkina Faso), Ms. Fiona Devlin (Ireland), Ms. Athikarn Dilogwathana (Thailand), Ms. Alicia Gauto Vázquez (Paraguay), Ms. Hyun Jung Kim (Republic of Korea), Ms. Pamela López-Ruiz Montes (Peru), Mr. Brian McGarry (United States of America), Ms. Ha Thi Ngoc Nguyen (Viet Nam), Ms. Siham Sebbar (Morocco), Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregón (Nicaragua), Ms. Sarala Subramaniam (Singapore), Mr. Aleksey Nikolayevich Trofimenkov (Russian Federation), Mr. Zoilo Velasco (Philippines), Mr. Maxwuse Vornavorn (Ghana) and Ms. Olga Voronovitch (Belarus). The Selection Committee, chaired by Mr. Marco Sassoli, Professor and Director of the Department of Public International Law of the University of Geneva, met on 22 April 2013 at the Palais des Nations and selected 24 candidates out of 86 applications to participate in the Seminar. At the last minute, three of the candidates selected were unable to attend.
the Commission and specially arranged lectures and participated in working groups on specific topics.

204. The Seminar was opened by Mr. Bernd Niehaus, Chairperson of the Commission. Mr. Markus Schmidt, Senior Legal Adviser of the United Nations Office at Geneva, was responsible for the administration, organization and conduct of the Seminar. The substantive coordination of the Seminar was ensured by the University of Geneva. Mr. Vittorio Mainetti, international law expert from the University of Geneva, acted as coordinator, assisted by Mr. Martin Denis, legal assistant.


206. A lecture was also given by Ms. Iris Müller, Legal Adviser to the ICRC, on “Customary international humanitarian law”.

207. Seminar participants attended a special external brainstorming session organized by the University of Geneva on the topic “The protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts”. During this session, Ms. Marie Jacobsson, a member of the Commission and Special Rapporteur on this topic, introduced the topic. Her introduction was followed by presentations and comments by Professor Marco Sassoli, University of Geneva; Professor Robert Kolb, University of Geneva; Professor Makane Mbengue, University of Geneva; Dr. Mara Tignino, Senior Researcher, University of Geneva; Ms. Marie-Louise Tougas, ICRC; Ms. Karen Hulme, Senior Lecturer, University of Essex; Ms. Britta Sjostedt, Researcher, University of Lund; and Mr. David Jensen, Head of Environment Cooperation for Peacebuilding, United Nations Environment Programme.

208. Seminar participants also attended the Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture, delivered on 17 July 2013, followed by a reception offered by Brazil.

209. Seminar participants had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the work of other international organizations based in Geneva. A visit to the International Telecommunication Union was organized, and a presentation was given by Mr. Alexander Beck, Senior Legal Adviser at UNHCR.

210. Three seminar working groups, on “Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation”, “Protection of persons in the event of disasters” and “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction”, were organized. Each participant of the Seminar was assigned to one of them. Three members of the Commission, Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández, Mr. Georg Nolte and Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, supervised and provided expert guidance to the working groups. Each group prepared a report and presented its findings to the Seminar in a special session. The reports were compiled and distributed to all participants, as well as to members of the Commission.

211. The Republic and Canton of Geneva offered the participants a guided tour of the Geneva Town Hall and the Alabama Room.

212. Mr. Bernd Niehaus, Chairperson of the Commission, Mr. Markus Schmidt, Director of the Seminar, and Ms. Pamela López-Ruiz Montes (Peru), on behalf of the participants of the Seminar, addressed the Commission and the participants during the closing ceremony of the Seminar. Each participant was presented with a certificate attesting to his or her participation in the forty-ninth session of the Seminar.

213. The Commission noted with particular appreciation that, since 2010, the Governments of Argentina, Austria, China, Finland, India, Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland had made voluntary contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for the International Law Seminar. The financial situation of the Fund allowed a sufficient number of fellowships to be awarded to deserving candidates, especially from developing countries, in order to achieve adequate geographical distribution of participants. This year, 15 fellowships for travel and subsistence allowance were awarded.

214. Since 1965, 1,115 participants, representing 170 nationalities, have taken part in the Seminar. Of them, 684 have received a fellowship.

215. The Commission stresses the importance it attaches to the Seminar, which enables young lawyers, especially from developing countries, to familiarize themselves with the work of the Commission and the activities of the many international organizations based in Geneva. The Commission recommends that the General Assembly should again appeal to States to make voluntary contributions in order to secure the organization of the Seminar in 2014 with the broadest participation possible, especially in the light of the forthcoming 50th anniversary of the Seminar.

G. Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the International Law Seminar

216. The Commission expressed its satisfaction that in 2014 the International Law Seminar would hold its 50th session and recognized the valuable contribution that the Seminar has made in allowing successive generations of young international lawyers to follow the debates and better understand the functioning of the Commission.
217. It was decided that the Commission, in cooperation with the Legal Liaison Office of the United Nations Office at Geneva, would organize an appropriate commemoration of the 50th anniversary, if possible inviting former participants of the Seminar, including those who later became members of the Commission and of the International Court of Justice.

218. This commemoration could coincide with the visit to the Commission by the President of the International Court of Justice.
Annex I

REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE (AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE)

A. Introduction

1. Purpose. This report is intended to summarize and to highlight particular aspects of the work of the Commission on the topic “The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)”, in order to assist States and to facilitate discussion on the topic in the Sixth Committee.

2. Obligation to fight impunity in accordance with the rule of law. States have expressed their desire to cooperate among themselves, and with competent international tribunals, in the fight against impunity for crimes, in particular offences of international concern, and in accordance with the rule of law. In the declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels, Heads of State and of Government and heads of delegations attending the meeting on 24 September 2012 committed themselves to “ensuring that impunity is not tolerated for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and for violations of international humanitarian law and gross violations of human rights law, and that such violations are properly investigated and appropriately sanctioned, including by bringing the perpetrators of any crimes to justice, through national mechanisms or, where appropriate, regional or international mechanisms, in accordance with international law”.

The obligation to cooperate in combating such impunity is given effect in numerous conventions, inter alia, through the obligation to extradite or prosecute. The view that the obligation to extradite or prosecute plays a crucial role in the fight against impunity is widely shared by States; the obligation applies in respect of a wide range of crimes of serious concern to the international community and has been included in all sectoral conventions against international terrorism concluded since 1970.

3. The role the obligation to extradite or prosecute plays in supporting international cooperation to fight impunity has been recognized at least since the time of Hugo Grotius, who postulated the principle of aut dedere aut punire (either extradite or punish): “When appealed to, a State should either punish the guilty person as he deserves, or it should entrust him to the discretion of the party making the appeal.” The modern terminology replaces “punishment” with “prosecution” as the alternative to extradition in order to reflect better the possibility that an alleged offender may be found not guilty.

4. The importance of the obligation to extradite or prosecute in the work of the International Law Commission. The topic may be viewed as having been encompassed by the topic “Jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside national territory”, which was on the provisional list of 14 topics at the first session of the Commission in 1949. It is also addressed in articles 8 (Establishment of jurisdiction) and 9 (Obligation to extradite or prosecute) of the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the Commission at its

The fourth report by Mr. Zdzislaw Galicki, Special Rapporteur (Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/648, paras. 26–33), dealt at length with the issue of the duty to cooperate in the fight against impunity. He cited the following examples of international instruments that provide a legal basis for the duty to cooperate: Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations; the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, annex); the preamble to the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; and guideline XII of the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 March 2011 (Council of Europe, CM/Del./Dec(2011)1110, 4 April 2011).

For example, Belgium (Yearbook ... 2009, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/612, p. 182, para. 20); Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, Sixth Committee, 26th meeting, A/C.6/66/SR.26, para. 10); Switzerland (ibid., para. 18); El Salvador (ibid., para. 24); Italy (ibid., para. 42); Peru (ibid., para. 64); Belarus (ibid., 27th meeting, A/C.6/66/SR.27, para. 41); Russian Federation (ibid., para. 64); and India (ibid., para. 81).


1 See, for example, General Assembly resolution 2840 (XXVI) of 18 December 1971, entitled “Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity”; General Assembly resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973 on “Principles of international cooperation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity”; and principle 18 of the Principles on the effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions, annexed to Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989, entitled “Effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions”.

2 General Assembly resolution 67/1 of 24 September 2012.

3 Ibid., para. 22.

4 See sect. C below. In Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), the International Court of Justice states, “Extradition and prosecution are alternative ways to combat impunity in accordance with article 7, paragraph 1 [of the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of 1984]” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 443, para. 50). The Court adds that the States parties to the Convention against torture have “a common interest to ensure, in view of their shared values, that acts of torture are prevented and that, if they occur, their authors do not enjoy impunity” (ibid., p. 449, para. 68). The Court reiterates that the object and purpose of the Convention are “to make more effective the struggle against torture by avoiding impunity for the perpetrators of such acts” (ibid., p. 451, para. 74, and cf. also para. 75).
forty-eighth session (1996). Article 9 of the draft Code stipulates an obligation to extradite or prosecute for genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, and war crimes.8 The principle aut dedere aut judicare is said to have derived from "a number of multilateral conventions" that contain the obligation. An analysis of the draft Code's history suggests that draft article 9 is driven by the need for an effective system of criminalization and prosecution of the said core crimes, rather than by actual State practice and opinio juris.10 The article is justified on the basis of the grave nature of the crimes involved and the desire to combat impunity for individuals who commit these crimes.11 While the draft Code's focus is on core crimes,12 the material scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute covers most crimes of international concern, as mentioned in paragraph 2 above.

5. Use of the Latin terminology “aut dedere aut judicare”. In the past, some members of the Commission, including Mr. Zdzisław Galicki, Special Rapporteur, doubted the use of the Latin formula “aut dedere aut judicare”, especially in relation to the term “judicare”, which they considered as not reflecting precisely the scope of the term “prosecute”. However, the Special Rapporteur considered it premature at that time to focus on the precise definition of terms, leaving them to be defined in a future draft article on “Use of terms”.13 The report of the Working Group proceeds on the understanding that whether the mandatory nature of “extradition” or that of “prosecution” has priority over the other depends on the context and applicable legal regime in particular situations.

B. Summary of the Commission’s work since 2006

6. The Commission included the topic “The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)” in its programme of work at the fifty-seventh session (2005) and appointed Mr. Zdzisław Galicki as Special Rapporteur.14 This decision was endorsed by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.15 From its fifty-eighth session (2006) to its sixty-third session (2011), the Commission received and considered four reports and four draft articles submitted by the Special Rapporteur.16 A Working Group on the topic was established in 2009 under the chairmanship of Mr. Alain Pellet to draw up a general framework for consideration of the topic, with the aim of specifying the issues to be addressed and establishing an order of priority.17 The Commission took note of the oral report of the Chairperson of the Working Group and reproduced the proposed general framework for consideration of the topic, prepared by the Working Group, in its annual report of the sixty-first session (2009).18

7. Pursuant to section (a) (ii) of the proposed general framework, which refers to “The obligation to extradite or prosecute in existing treaties”, the Secretariat conducted a “Survey of multilateral conventions which may be of relevance for the work of the International Law Commission on the topic ‘The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)’”19 (Secretariat’s Survey (2010)). The study identified multilateral instruments at

8. Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, the State Party in the territory of which an individual alleged to have committed a crime set out in article 17 [Genocide], 18 [Crimes against humanity], 19 [Crimes against United Nations and associated personnel] or 20 [War crimes] is found shall extradite or prosecute that individual.” See also the Commission’s commentary on this draft article (Yearbook ... 1996, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 31–32).

9. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, with commentaries, article 8, paragraph (3) of the commentary (ibid., p. 28).


11. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, with commentaries, article 8, paragraphs (3), (4) and (8) of the commentary, and article 9, paragraph (2) of the commentary (Yearbook ... 1996, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 28–29 and 31).

12. At the first reading, in 1991, the draft Code comprised the following crimes: aggression; threat of aggression; intervention; colonial domination and other forms of alien domination; genocide; apartheid; systematic or mass violations of human rights; exceptionally serious war crimes; recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries; international terrorism; illicit traffic in narcotic drugs; and willful and severe damage to the environment (see Yearbook ... 1991, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 94 et seq., para. 176). At its sessions in 1995 and 1996, the Commission reduced the number of crimes in the final draft Code to four crimes: aggression; genocide; war crimes; and crimes against humanity, adhering to the Nuremberg legacy as the criterion for the choice of the crimes covered by the draft Code (see Yearbook ... 1995, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 16 et seq., paras. 37 et seq.; and Yearbook ... 1996, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 16 et seq., paras. 43 et seq.). The primary reason for this approach appeared to have been the unfavourable comments by 24 Governments to the list of 12 crimes proposed in 1991 (see Yearbook ... 1993, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/448 and Add.1, pp. 62 et seq.). A fifth crime, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, was added at the last moment on the basis of its magnitude, the seriousness of the problem of attacks on such personnel and its centrality to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The crime of aggression was not subject to the provision of article 9 of the draft Code. In the Commission’s opinion, “[t]he determination by a national court of one State of the question of whether another State had committed aggression would be contrary to the fundamental principle of international law par in pax imperium non habet ... [and] the exercise of jurisdiction by the national court of a State which entails consideration of the commission of aggression by another State would have serious implications for international relations and international peace and security” (draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, with commentaries, article 8, paragraph (14) of the commentary (Yearbook ... 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 30)).
the universal and regional levels that contain provisions combining extradition and prosecution as alternatives for the punishment of offenders.

8. In June 2010, the Special Rapporteur submitted a working paper entitled “Bases for discussion in the Working Group on the topic ‘The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)”’ 20 making observations and suggestions on the 2009 proposed general framework and drawing upon the Secretariat’s Survey (2010). In particular, the Special Rapporteur drew attention to questions concerning (a) the legal bases of the obligation to extradite or prosecute; (b) the material scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute; (c) the content of the obligation to extradite or execute; and (d) the conditions for the triggering of the obligation to extradite or prosecute.

9. In 2010, the Working Group, under the acting chairpersonship of Mr. Enrique Candioti, recognized that the Secretariat’s Survey (2010) helped to elucidate aspects of the proposed general framework of 2009. It was noted that, in seeking to throw light on the questions agreed upon in the proposed general framework, the multilateral treaty practice on which the Secretariat’s Survey (2010) had focused needed to be complemented by a detailed consideration of other aspects of State practice (including, but not limited to, national legislation, case law and official statements of governmental representatives). In addition, it was pointed out that, as far as the duty to cooperate in the fight against impunity seemed to underpin the obligation to extradite or prosecute, a systematic assessment of State practice in that regard was necessary. This would clarify the extent to which that duty influenced, as a general rule or in relation to specific crimes, the Commission’s work on the topic, including work in relation to the material scope, the content of the obligation to extradite or prosecute and the conditions for the triggering of the obligation.

10. At its sixty-fourth session (2012), the Commission established an open-ended Working Group under the chairpersonship of Mr. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree to evaluate the progress of work on the topic in the Commission and to explore future possible options for the Commission to undertake. 21 At that juncture, no Special Rapporteur was appointed to replace Mr. Zdzislaw Galicki, who was no longer a member of the Commission. The Chairperson of the Working Group submitted four informal working papers at the sixty-fourth session (2012) and another four informal working papers at the sixty-fifth session (2013). The Working Group’s discussion of those informal working papers forms the basis of this report.

C. Consideration by the Working Group in 2012 and 2013

11. The Working Group considered the Secretariat’s Survey (2010) and the judgment of 20 July 2012 of the International Court of Justice in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) 22 useful in its work.

12. Typology of provisions in multilateral instruments. The Secretariat’s Survey (2010) proposed a description and a typology of the relevant instruments in the light of these provisions and examined the preparatory work of certain key conventions that had served as models in the field. For some provisions, it also reviewed any reservations made. It pointed out the differences and similarities between the provisions reviewed in different conventions and their evolution, and offered overall conclusions as to (a) the relationship between extradition and prosecution in the relevant provisions; (b) the conditions applicable to extradition under the various conventions; and (c) the conditions applicable to prosecution under the various conventions. The survey classified conventions that included such provisions into four categories: (a) the 1929 International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, and other conventions that have followed the same model; (b) regional conventions on extradition; (c) the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 additional Protocol I; and (d) the 1970 Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, and other conventions that have followed the same model.

13. The 1929 International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, and other conventions that have followed the same model 23 typically (a) criminalize the relevant offence, which the States parties undertake to make punishable under their domestic laws; (b) make provision for prosecution and extradition which takes into account the divergent views of States with regard to the extradition of nationals and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the latter being permissive rather than compulsory; (c) contain provisions which impose an obligation to extradite, with prosecution coming into play once there is a refusal of extradition; (d) establish an extradition regime by which States undertake, under certain conditions, to consider the offence as extraditable; (e) contain a provision providing that a State’s attitude on the general issue of criminal jurisdiction as a question of international law is not affected by its participation in the convention; and (f) contain a non-prejudice clause with regard to each State’s criminal legislation and administration. While some of the instruments under this model contain terminological differences of an editorial nature, others modify the substance of the obligations undertaken by States Parties.

14. Numerous regional conventions and arrangements on extradition also contain provisions that combine the options of extradition and prosecution, 24 although those instruments typically emphasize the obligation to

21 Yearbook ... 2012, vol. II (Part Two), para. 206.
22 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (see footnote 4 of the present annex above).
23 For example: (a) the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs; (b) the 1957 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism; (c) the 1950 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others; (d) the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; and (e) the 1971 Convention on psychotropic substances.
24 These instruments include (a) the 1928 Convention on Private International Law, also known as the Bustamante Code, under Book IV (International Law of Procedure), Title III (Extradition); (b) the 1933 Convention on Extradition; (c) the 1981 Inter-American Convention on extradition; (d) the 1957 European Convention on Extradition; (e) the 1961 General Convention on Judicial Cooperation (Convention générale de coopération en matière de justice); (f) the 1994 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Extradition; and (g) the 2002 London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth.
extradite (which is regulated in detail) and only contemplate submission to prosecution as an alternative to avoid impunity in the context of that cooperation. Under that model, extradition is a means to ensure the effectiveness of criminal jurisdiction. States parties have a general duty to extradite unless the request fits within a condition or exception, including mandatory and discretionary grounds for refusal. For instance, extradition of nationals could be prohibited or subject to specific safeguards. Provisions in subsequent agreements and arrangements have been subject to modification and adjustment over time, particularly in respect of conditions and exceptions.25

15. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain the same provision whereby each High Contracting Party is obligated to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, grave breaches, and to bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. However, it may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with its domestic legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided that the latter has established a prima facie case.26 Therefore, under that model, the obligation to search for and submit to prosecution an alleged offender is not conditional on any jurisdictional consideration, and that obligation exists irrespective of any request for extradition by another party.27 Nonetheless, extradition is an available option subject to a condition that the prosecuting State has established a prima facie case. That mechanism is made applicable to the 1977 additional Protocol I by renvoi.28

16. The 1970 Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft stipulates in article 7 that “[t]he Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged ... to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”. This “Hague formula” is a variation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions formula and has served as a model for several subsequent conventions aimed at the suppression of specific offences, principally in the field of the fight against terrorism, but also in many other areas (including torture, mercenarism, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, transnational crime, corruption and enforced disappearance).29 However, many of those subsequent instruments have modified the original terminology, which sometimes affects the substance of the obligations contained in the Hague formula.

17. In his separate opinion in the judgment of 20 July 2012 of the International Court of Justice in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite Judge Yusuf also addressed the typography of “treaties containing the formula aut dedere aut judicare” and divided them into two broad categories.30 The first category comprised clauses which impose an obligation the safety of civil aviation; (c) the 1973 Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; (d) the 1977 European Convention on the suppression of terrorism; (e) the 1977 Organization of African Unity for the Suppression of Terrorism; (f) the 1979 International Convention against the taking of hostages; (g) the 1979 Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material; (h) the 1984 Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (i) the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; (j) the 1996 United Nations Convention against the Taking of Hostages; (k) the 1980 United Nations Convention against the Taking of Hostages; (l) the 1997 Protocol to the 1988 Convention on the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation; (m) the 1997 Protocol to the 1988 Convention on the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation; (n) the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; (o) the International Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law; (p) the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons; (q) the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and its 2005 Optional Protocol; (r) the 1996 Inter-American Convention against Corruption; (s) the 1997 Inter-American Convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials; (t) the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions; (u) the 1997 International Convention for the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law; (v) the 1999 International Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law; (w) the 1999 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; (x) the 1999 International Convention on the Suppression offuncs of, in particular, outlawing torture, mercenarism, corruption, terrorism and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials.

25 It may also be recalled that the General Assembly has adopted the Model Treaty on Extradition (resolution 45/116 of 14 December 1990, annex) and the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (resolution 45/117 of 14 December 1990, annex).

26 Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146, respectively, of Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV. The reason these Geneva Conventions use the term “hand over” instead of “extradite” is explained in the Secretariat’s Survey (2010) (A/CN.4/630 (see footnote 19 of the present annex above), para. 54).

According to Claus Kreß (“Reflection on the iudicature limb of the grave breaches regime”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 7 (2009), p. 789), what the iudicature limb of the grave breaches regime actually entails is a duty to investigate and, where so warranted, to prosecute and convict.


28 Article 85, paragraphs (1) and (3), and article 88, paragraph (2), of additional Protocol I of 1977.

29 These include, inter alia, (a) the 1971 Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance; (b) the 1971 Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against
to extradite, and in which submission to prosecution becomes an obligation only after the refusal of extradition. Those conventions are structured in such a way as to give priority to extradition to the State in whose territory the crime is committed. The majority of those conventions do not impose any general obligation on States parties to submit to prosecution the alleged offender, and such submission by the State on whose territory the alleged offender is present becomes an obligation only if a request for extradition has been refused, or some factors such as nationality of the alleged offender exist. Examples of the first category can be found in article 9, paragraph 2, of the 1929 International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, article 15 of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and article 5 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

The second category of international conventions comprises clauses that impose an obligation to submit to prosecution, with extradition being an available option, as well as clauses that impose an obligation to submit to prosecution, with extradition becoming an obligation if the State fails to do so. Clauses in the latter category can be found in, for example, the relevant provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, article 7 of the 1970 Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, and article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

19. Although the Working Group finds that the scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute under the relevant conventions should be analysed on a case-by-case basis, it acknowledges that there may be some general trends and common features in the more recent conventions containing the obligation to extradite or prosecute. One of the most relevant trends appears to be the Hague formula that serves as a model for most of the contemporary conventions for the suppression of specific offences.22 Of the conventions drafted in or after 1970, approximately three quarters follow the Hague formula. In those post-1970 conventions, there is a common trend that the custodial State shall, without exception, submit the case of the alleged offender to the relevant competent authority for the purpose of prosecution. To a lesser extent, there is also a trend of stipulating that, absent prosecution by the custodial State, the alleged offender must be extradited without exception whatsoever.

20. The Working Group observes that there are important gaps in the present conventional regime governing the obligation to extradite or prosecute which may need to be closed. Notably, there is a lack of international conventions with this obligation in relation to most crimes against humanity,23 war crimes other than grave breaches and war crimes in non-international armed conflict.24 In relation

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22 Ibid., para. 91.
23 Ibid., para. 109.
24 The 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance follows the Hague formula, and refers to the “extreme seriousness” of the offence, which it qualifies, when widespread or systematic, as a crime against humanity. However, outside of this, there appears to be a lack of international conventions with the obligation to extradite or prosecute in relation to crimes against humanity.
25 The underlying principle of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 is the establishment of universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Conventions. Each Convention contains an article describing what acts constitute grave breaches, which follows immediately after the extradite-or-prosecute provision.
26 For Geneva Conventions I and II, this article is identical (arts. 50 and 51, respectively); “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”
27 Article 130 of Geneva Convention III stipulates as follows: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.”
28 Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV provides as follows: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”
to genocide, the international cooperation regime could be strengthened beyond the rudimentary regime under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. As explained by the International Court of Justice in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), article VI of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide only obliges the Contracting Parties to institute and exercise territorial criminal jurisdiction, as well as to cooperate with an “international penal tribunal” under certain circumstances.  

D. Implementation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute

21. The Hague formula. The Working Group views the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite to be helpful in elucidating some aspects relevant to the implementation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute. The judgment confines itself to an analysis of the mechanism to combat impunity under the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, the judgment focuses on the relationship between the different articles on the establishment of jurisdiction (art. 5), the obligation to engage in a preliminary inquiry (art. 6) and the obligation to prosecute or extradite (art. 7). While the Court’s reasoning relates to the specific implementation and application of issues surrounding that Convention, since the relevant prosecute-or-extradite provisions of the Convention against torture are modelled upon those of the Hague formula, the Court’s ruling may also help to elucidate the meaning of the prosecute-or-extradite regime under the 1970 Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, and other conventions which have followed the same formula.  

As the Court has also held that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm (jus cogens), the prosecute-or-extradite formula under the Convention against torture could serve as a model for new prosecute-or-extradite regimes governing prohibitions covered by peremptory norms (jus cogens), such as genocide, crimes against humanity and serious war crimes.

22. The Court determined that States parties to the Convention against torture have obligations to criminalize torture, establish their jurisdiction over the crime of torture so as to equip themselves with the necessary legal tool to prosecute that offence and make an inquiry into the facts immediately from the time the suspect is present in their respective territories. The Court declares, “These obligations, taken as a whole, might be regarded as elements of a single conventional mechanism aimed at preventing suspects from escaping the consequences of their criminal responsibility, if proven”. The obligation under article 7, paragraph 1, “to submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”, which the Court calls the “obligation to prosecute”, arises regardless of the existence of a prior request for the extradition of the suspect. However, national authorities are left to decide whether to initiate proceedings in the light of the evidence before them and the relevant rules of criminal procedure. In particular, the Court rules that “[e]xtradition is an option offered to the State by the Convention, whereas prosecution is an international obligation under the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State”. The Court also notes that both the 1970 Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft and the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment emphasize “that the authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of the State concerned”.  

23. Basic elements of the obligation to extradite or prosecute to be included in national legislation. The effective fulfilment of the obligation to extradite or prosecute requires undertaking necessary national measures to criminalize the relevant offences, establish jurisdiction over the offences and the person present in the territory of the State, investigate or undertake primary inquiry, apprehend the suspect, and submit the case to the prosecuting authorities (which may or may not result in the institution of proceedings) or extradition, if an extradition request is made by another State with the necessary jurisdiction and capability to prosecute the suspect.

24. Establishment of the necessary jurisdiction. Establishing jurisdiction is “a logical prior step” to the implementation of an obligation to extradite or prosecute
an alleged offender present in the territory of a State.\textsuperscript{44} For the purposes of the present topic, when the crime was allegedly committed abroad with no nexus to the forum State, the obligation to extradite or prosecute would necessarily reflect an exercise of universal jurisdiction,\textsuperscript{45} which is “the jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events”\textsuperscript{46} where neither the victims nor alleged offenders are nationals of the forum State and no harm was allegedly caused to the forum State’s own national interests. However, the obligation to extradite or prosecute can also reflect an exercise of jurisdiction on other bases. Thus, if a State can exercise jurisdiction on another basis, universal jurisdiction may not necessarily be invoked in the fulfillment of the obligation to extradite or prosecute.

Universal jurisdiction is a crucial component for prosecuting alleged perpetrators of crimes of international concern, particularly when the alleged perpetrator is not prosecuted in the territory where the crime was committed.\textsuperscript{47} Several international instruments, such as the very widely ratified four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, require the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the offenses covered by these instruments, or, alternatively, the extradition of alleged offenders to another State for the purpose of prosecution.\textsuperscript{48} The State’s obligation extends beyond merely enacting national legislation. The State must also actually exercise its jurisdiction over a suspect, starting by establishing the facts.\textsuperscript{49}

26. Obligation to investigate. According to the Court in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, the obligation to investigate consists of several elements:

- As a general rule, the obligation to investigate must be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the applicable treaty, which is to make more effective the fight against impunity.\textsuperscript{50}

- The obligation is intended to corroborate the suspicions regarding the person in question.\textsuperscript{51} The starting point is the establishment of the relevant facts, which is an essential stage in the process of the fight against impunity.\textsuperscript{52}

- As soon as the authorities have reason to suspect that a person present in their territory may be responsible for acts subject to the obligation to extradite or prosecute, they must investigate. The preliminary inquiry must be immediately initiated. This point is reached, at the latest, when the first complaint is filed against the person,\textsuperscript{53} at which stage the establishment of the facts becomes imperative.\textsuperscript{24}

- However, simply questioning the suspect in order to establish his/her identity and inform him/her of the charges cannot be regarded as performance of the obligation to conduct a preliminary inquiry.\textsuperscript{55}

- The inquiry is to be conducted by the authorities who have the task of drawing up a case file and collecting facts and evidence (for example, documents and witness statements relating to the events at issue and to the suspect’s possible involvement). These authorities are those of the State where the alleged crime was committed or of any other State where complaints have been filed in relation to the case. In order to fulfill its obligation to conduct a preliminary inquiry, the State in whose territory the suspect is present should seek cooperation of the authorities of the aforementioned States.\textsuperscript{56}

- An inquiry taking place on the basis of universal jurisdiction must be conducted according to the same standards in terms of evidence as when the State has jurisdiction by virtue of a link with the case in question.\textsuperscript{57}

27. Obligation to prosecute. According to the Court in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, the obligation to prosecute consists of certain elements:

\textsuperscript{44} Report of the African Union–European Union Technical ad hoc Expert Group on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (8672/1/09/ Rev.1), annex, para. 11. The International Court of Justice in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (see footnote 4 of the present annex above) holds that the performance by States parties to the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, require the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the offences covered by these instruments, or, alternatively, the extradition of alleged offenders to another State for the purpose of prosecution.\textsuperscript{48} The State’s

\textsuperscript{45} According to one author, “The principle of aut dedere aut judicare overlaps with universal jurisdiction when a State has no other nexus to the alleged crime or to the suspect other than the mere presence of the person within its territory” (M. Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005), p. 122).

\textsuperscript{46} Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3; see, in particular, the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, p. 75, para. 42.

\textsuperscript{47} It should be recalled that the “Obligation to extradite or prosecute” in draft article 9 of the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind is closely related to the “Establishment of jurisdiction” under draft article 8 of the draft Code, which requires each State party thereto to take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, and war crimes, irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were committed. The Commission’s commentary to article 8 makes it clear that universal jurisdiction is envisaged (Yearbook – 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 29, paragraph (7)).

\textsuperscript{48} Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (see footnote 4 of the present annex above), paras. 76–77.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., para. 84.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., para. 86.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., para. 83.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., paras. 85–86.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., para. 88.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., para. 86.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., para. 85.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., para. 83.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., para. 84.
28. **Obligation to extradite.** With respect to the obligation to extradite:

- Extradition may only be to a State that has jurisdiction in some capacity to prosecute and try the alleged offender pursuant to an international legal obligation binding on the State in whose territory the person is present.

- Fulfilling the obligation to extradite cannot be substituted by deportation, extraordinary rendition or other informal forms of dispatching the suspect to another State. Formal extradition requests entail important human rights protections which may be absent from informal forms of dispatching the suspect to another State, such as extraordinary renditions. Under extradition law of most, if not all, States, the necessary requirements to be satisfied include double criminality, *ne bis in idem, nullem crimen sine lege*, speciality, and non-extradition of the suspect to stand trial on the grounds of ethnic origin, religion, nationality or political views.

29. **Compliance with object and purpose.** The steps to be taken by a State must be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the relevant international instrument or other sources of international obligation binding on that State, rendering the fight against impunity more effective. It is also worth recalling that, by virtue of article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, which reflects customary international law, a State party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Besides, the steps taken must be in accordance with the rule of law.

30. In cases of serious crimes of international concern, the purpose of the obligation to extradite or prosecute is to prevent alleged perpetrators from going unpunished by ensuring that they cannot find refuge in any State.

31. **Temporal scope of the obligation.** The obligation to extradite or prosecute under a treaty applies only to facts having occurred after the entry into force of the said treaty for the State concerned, “unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established”. After a State becomes party to a treaty containing the obligation to extradite or prosecute, it is entitled, with effect from the date of its becoming party to the treaty, to request another State party’s compliance with the obligation to extradite or prosecute. Thus, the obligation to criminalize and establish necessary jurisdiction over acts proscribed by a treaty containing the obligation to extradite or prosecute is to be implemented as soon as the State is bound by that treaty. However, nothing prevents the State from investigating or prosecuting acts committed before the entry into force of the treaty for that State.

32. **Consequences of non-compliance with the obligation to extradite or prosecute.** In Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, the Court found that the violation of an international obligation under the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a wrongful act...
engaging the responsibility of the State.71 As long as all measures necessary for the implementation of the obligation have not been taken, the State remains in breach of its obligation.72 The Commission’s articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts stipulate that the commission of an internationally wrongful act attributable to a State involves legal consequences, including cessation and non-repetition of the act (art. 30), reparation (arts. 31 and 34–39) and countermeasures (arts. 49–54).73

33. Relationship between the obligation and the “third alternative”. With the establishment of the International Criminal Court and various ad hoc international criminal tribunals, there is now the possibility that a State, faced with an obligation to extradite or prosecute an accused person, might have recourse to a third alternative—that of surrendering the suspect to a competent international criminal tribunal.74 This third alternative is stipulated in article 11, paragraph 1, of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance of 2006.75

34. In her dissenting opinion in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, Judge Xue opines that had Senegal surrendered the alleged offender to an international tribunal constituted by the African Union to try him, it would not have breached its obligation to prosecute under article 7 of the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, because such a tribunal would have been created to fulfil the purpose of the Convention, and this is not prohibited by the Convention itself or by State practice.76 Of course, if “a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established”77 so as not to permit the surrender of an alleged offender to an international criminal tribunal, such surrender would not discharge the obligation of the States parties to the treaty to extradite or prosecute the person under their respective domestic legal systems.

35. It is suggested that, in the light of the increasing significance of international criminal tribunals, new treaty provisions on the obligation to extradite or prosecute should include this third alternative, as should national legislation.

36. Additional observation. A State might also wish to fulfil both parts of the obligation to extradite or prosecute, for example, by prosecuting, trying and sentencing an offender and then extraditing or surrendering the offender to another State for the purpose of enforcing the judgment.78

71 Ibid., para. 95.
72 Ibid., para. 117.
74 Draft article 9 of the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind stipulates that the obligation to extradite or prosecute under that article is “without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court” (Yearbook … 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 30).
75 “The State party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed an offence of enforced disappearance is found shall, if it does not extradite that person or surrender him or her to another State in accordance with its international obligations or surrender him or her to an international criminal tribunal whose jurisdiction it has recognized, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”
76 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (see footnote 4 of the present annex above), dissenting opinion of Judge Xue, at para. 42 (dissenting on other points).
77 Article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties.
78 This possibility was raised by Mr. Zdzislaw Galicki in his preliminary report (Yearbook … 2006, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/571, pp. 267–268, paras. 49–50).
Annex II

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

(Mr. Sean D. Murphy)

A. Introduction

1. In the field of international law, three core crimes have emerged: war crimes; genocide; and crimes against humanity.1 While all three crimes have been the subject of jurisdiction within the major international criminal tribunals established to date, only two of them have been addressed through a global treaty that requires States to prevent and punish such conduct and to cooperate among themselves towards those ends. War crimes have been codified by means of the “grave breaches” provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions2 and additional Protocol I.3 Genocide has been codified by means of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Yet no comparable treaty exists concerning crimes against humanity, even though the perpetration of such crimes remains an egregious phenomenon in numerous conflicts and crises worldwide.

2. For example, the mass murder of civilians perpetrated as part of an international armed conflict would fall within the grave breaches regime of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but the same conduct arising as part of an internal armed conflict (as well as internal action below the threshold of armed conflict) would not. Such mass murder might meet the special requirements of the Genocide Convention, but often will not, as was the case with respect to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Consequently, when mass murder or other atrocities occur, there will often be no applicable treaty that addresses inter-State cooperation.4

3. As such, a global convention on crimes against humanity appears to be a key missing piece in the current framework of international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international human rights law. The objective of the International Law Commission on this topic, therefore, would be to draft articles for what would become a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity (crimes against humanity convention).

B. Emergence of the concept of “crimes against humanity”

4. The “Martens Clause” of the 1899/1907 Hague Conventions respecting the laws and customs of war on land made reference to the “laws of humanity and the … dictates of public conscience” in the crafting of protections for persons in time of war.5 Thereafter, further thought was given to a prohibition on “crimes against humanity”, with the central feature being a prohibition upon a Government from inflicting atrocities upon its own people, and not necessarily in time of war. The tribunals established at Nuremberg and Tokyo in the aftermath of the Second World War included as a component of their jurisdiction “crimes against humanity”, characterizing them as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.6

5. The principles of international law recognized in the Nuremberg Charter were reaffirmed in 1946 by the General Assembly,7 which also directed the International Law Commission to “formulate” those principles. The Commission then studied and distilled the Nuremberg Principles in 1950, defining crimes against humanity as

[...]

6. Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, annex, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 1945, art. 6 (c); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946, art. 5 (c), amended 26 April 1946 (see C. I. Bevans (ed.), Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, vol. 4 (Washington, D.C., Department of State, 1968), p. 20, at p. 28). No persons, however, were convicted of this crime at the Tokyo Tribunal.

7. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, General Assembly resolution 95 (I), 11 December 1946.
political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.¹

6. The Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity, adopted by the General Assembly in 1968, called upon States to criminalize nationally “crimes against humanity” as defined in the Nuremberg Charter and to set aside statutory limitations on prosecuting the crime.⁹ Consisting of just four substantive articles, that convention is narrowly focused on statutory limitations; while it does call upon parties to take steps “with a view to making possible” extradition for the crime, the convention does not expressly obligate a party to exert jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. The convention has, to date, attracted adherence by 54 States.

7. In 1993, the statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia included “crimes against humanity” as part of its jurisdiction,¹⁰ as did the statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994.¹¹ In 1996, the Commission defined “crimes against humanity” as part of its 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,¹² a formulation that would heavily influence the incorporation of the crime within the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Among other things, the Rome Statute defined the crime as being “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”.¹³

C. Key elements to be considered for a convention

8. There are several possible elements of a crimes against humanity convention, which would need to be studied carefully by the Commission in the course of its work. The key elements that would appear necessary are as follows:

- To define the offence of “crimes against humanity” for purposes of the convention as it is defined in article 7 of the Rome Statute;
- To require the parties to criminalize the offence in their national legislation, not just with respect to acts on their territory or by their nationals, but also with respect to acts by non-nationals committed abroad who then turn up in the party’s territory;
- To require robust inter-State cooperation by the parties for investigation, prosecution and punishment of the offence, including through mutual legal assistance and extradition, and recognition of evidence; and
- To impose an aut dedere aut judicare obligation when an alleged offender is present in a party’s territory.

Many conventions on other crimes have focused only on these core elements and the Commission could decide that a streamlined convention is also best in this instance.¹⁴ In the course of its work on this topic, however, the Commission might identify additional elements that should be addressed.

D. Relationship between the convention and the International Criminal Court

9. A natural question is how a crimes against humanity convention would relate to the International Criminal Court. Certainly the drafting of the convention would benefit considerably from the language of the Rome Statute and associated instruments and jurisprudence. At the same time, adoption of the convention would advance key initiatives not addressed in the Rome Statute, while simultaneously supporting the mission of the Court.

10. First, the Rome Statute regulates relations between its States Parties and the Court, but does not regulate matters among the Parties themselves (nor among Parties and non-Parties). At the same time, Part IX of the Rome Statute, on “International cooperation and judicial assistance”, implicitly acknowledges that inter-State cooperation on crimes within the scope of the Court will continue to operate outside the Rome Statute. The convention would help promote general inter-State cooperation in the investigation, apprehension, prosecution and punishment of persons who commit crimes against humanity, an objective fully consistent with the Rome Statute’s object and purpose.

11. Second, while the Court will remain a key international institution for prosecution of high-level persons who commit this crime, it was not designed (nor given the resources) to prosecute all persons who commit crimes against humanity. Rather, the Court is predicated on the notion that national jurisdiction is, in the first instance, the proper place for prosecution, in the event that appropriate national laws are in place (the principle of complementarity). In the view of many, given that the Court does not have the capacity to prosecute all persons who commit crimes against humanity, effective prevention and prosecution of such crimes are necessary through the active cooperation among, and enforcement by, national jurisdictions.

12. Third, the convention would require the enactment of national laws that prohibit and punish crimes against humanity, which many States so far have not done.¹⁵ As

¹ See, for example, Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents (1973). Drafted by the Commission at its twenty-fourth session in 1972 (see Yearbook ... 1972, vol. II, document A/8710/Rev.1, p. 312), the Convention was opened for signature in 1973, entered into force in 1977, and at present has 176 States Parties.

such, the convention would help fill a gap, and in doing so might encourage all States to ratify or accede to the Rome Statute. For States that have already adopted national laws on crimes against humanity, those laws often only allow for national prosecution of crimes committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory; the convention would also require the State Party to extend its law to cover other offenders who are present in its territory (non-nationals who commit the offence in the territory of another Party to the convention).

13. Fourth, in the event that a State Party to the Rome Statute receives a request from the International Criminal Court for the surrender of a person to the Court and also receives a request from another State for extradition of the person pursuant to the convention, the Rome Statute provides, in article 90, for a procedure to resolve the competing requests. The convention can be drafted to ensure that States Parties to both the Rome Statute and the convention may continue to follow that procedure.

E. Whether the topic meets the Commission’s standards for topic selection

14. The Commission has previously determined that any new topic should (a) reflect the needs of States in respect of the progressive development and codification of international law; (b) be sufficiently advanced in stage in terms of State practice to permit progressive development and codification; and (c) be concrete and feasible for progressive development and codification.16

15. With respect to (b) and (c), this topic is sufficiently advanced in terms of State practice, given the emergence of national laws addressing crimes against humanity in approximately half of United Nations Member States and the considerable attention given to this crime over the past twenty years in the constituent and associated instruments and jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal Court, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Further, the drafting of a convention appears technically feasible at this time, given the large number of analogous conventions covering other types of crimes. The drafting of the convention would build upon the Commission’s prior work in this area, such as its reports and the Secretariat’s study concerning aut dedere aut judicare,17 and the Commission’s 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,18 which sought to promote, inter alia, cooperation among States in the criminalization, prosecution and extradition of persons who commit crimes against humanity.

16. With respect to (a), States have shown a considerable interest in promoting measures that would punish serious international crimes, as is evident in the establishment of the International Criminal Court, as well as in concluding global instruments that define international criminal offences and call upon States to prevent and punish offenders. At present, there is considerable interest in developing national capacity to address serious international crimes, especially to ensure a well-functioning principle of complementarity. In the light of these trends, States may wish to adopt a well-crafted convention on crimes against humanity. Further, the possibility of a convention of this type has received support in recent years from numerous judges and prosecutors of the International Criminal Court and of other international criminal tribunals, from former United Nations and government officials and from those in the academic community.19

F. Possible timetable

17. If the Commission were to add this topic to its long-term programme of work during its sixty-fifth session, it then could seek the views of States in the Sixth Committee in late 2013. If those reactions are favourable, the Commission could proceed during its sixty-sixth session with the topic as appropriate, perhaps through the appointment of a special rapporteur and the submission of a first report. Thereafter, completion of the project would depend on many factors, but the existence of analogous conventions, as well as a considerable foundation derived from the existing international criminal tribunals, suggests that the Commission may be able to adopt a full set of draft articles on first reading before the end of the current quinquennium.

G. Background materials

INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION


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16 See footnote 12 of the present annex above.
CASE LAW

International Criminal Court
Various cases, including Bemba Gombo, Gbagbo and Katanga & Ngudjolo (see www.icc-cpi.int/).

International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Various cases, including Blaškić, Milutinović, Kordić, Kunarac, Kupreškić, Martić, Šešelj, Sikirica, Simić, Stakić, Stanković, Strugar, Tadić and Vasiļjević (see www.icty.org/).

International Tribunal for Rwanda
Various cases, including Akayesu, Bagilishema, Bagosora, Bisengimana, Bikindi, Bucyibaruta, Gacumbitsi, Kajelijeli, Kambanda, Kamuhanda, Kavemera, Karera, Kayishema & Ruzindana, Mpamba, Muhimana and Musema (see http://unictr.unmict.org/).

Special Court for Sierra Leone
Various cases, including Brima, Fofana and Kondewa, Sesay and Taylor (see www.rscsl.org/index.html).

Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor
Various cases, including decisions available from http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/ET-special-panels-docs.htm.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
Various cases, including Kaing Guek Eav and Nuon Chea et al. (see www.eccc.gov.kh/en/).

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2013

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