Chapter IV

EXPULSION OF ALIENS

A. Introduction

30. At its fifty-sixth session (2004), the Commission decided to include the topic “Expulsion of aliens” in its programme of work and to appoint Mr. Maurice Kamto as Special Rapporteur for the topic.7 The General Assembly, in paragraph 5 of resolution 59/41 of 2 December 2004, endorsed the decision of the Commission to include the topic on its agenda.

31. At its fifty-seventh session (2005), the Commission considered the preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur.8

32. At its fifty-eighth session (2006), the Commission had before it the second report of the Special Rapporteur9 and a memorandum by the Secretariat.10 The Commission decided to consider the second report at its next session, in 2007.11

33. At its fifty-ninth session (2007), the Commission considered the second and third reports of the Special Rapporteur12 and referred to the Drafting Committee draft articles 1 and 2, as revised by the Special Rapporteur;13 and draft articles 3 to 7.14

34. At its sixtieth session (2008), the Commission considered the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur15 and decided to establish a Working Group, chaired by Mr. Donald McRae, in order to consider the issues raised by the expulsion of persons having dual or multiple nationality and by denationalization in relation to expulsion.16 During the same session, the Commission approved the Working Group’s conclusions and requested the Drafting Committee to take them into consideration in its work.17

35. At its sixty-first session (2009), the Commission considered the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur.18 At the Commission’s request, the Special Rapporteur then presented a new version of the draft articles on protection of the human rights of persons who have been or are being expelled, revised and restructured in the light of the plenary debate.19 He also submitted a new draft workplan with a view to restructuring the draft articles.20 The Commission decided to postpone its consideration of the revised draft articles to its sixty-second session.21

36. At its sixty-second session (2010), the Commission considered the draft articles on protection of the human rights of persons who have been or are being expelled, as revised and restructured by the Special Rapporteur,22 as well as chapters I to IV, section C, of the sixth report of the Special Rapporteur.23 The Commission referred to the Drafting Committee revised draft articles 8 to 15 on protection of the human rights of persons who have been or are being expelled;24 draft articles A and 9,25 as contained in the sixth report of the Special Rapporteur; draft articles B1 and C1,26 as contained in the first addendum to the sixth report; and draft articles B and A1,27 as revised by the Special Rapporteur during the sixty-second session.

37. At its sixty-third session (2011), the Commission considered chapters IV, section D, to VIII contained in the second addendum to the sixth report and the seventh report of the Special Rapporteur.28 It also had before it comments received from Governments up to that point.29 The Commission referred to the Drafting Committee draft articles D1, E1, G1, H1, I1 and J1, as contained in the second addendum to the sixth report;30 draft article F1, also contained in that addendum and revised

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13 Ibid., vol. II (Part Two), footnotes 326–327.

14 Ibid., footnotes 321–325.


16 Ibid., vol. II (Part Two), para. 170.

17 Ibid., para. 171.


19 Ibid., document A/CN.4/617.

20 Ibid., document A/CN.4/618.

21 Ibid., vol. II (Part Two), para. 91.

22 See footnote 19 above.


24 Ibid., vol. II (Part Two), footnotes 1272–1279.

25 Ibid., footnotes 1285 and 1288.

26 Ibid., footnotes 1293–1294.

27 Ibid., footnotes 1290 and 1300.


by the Special Rapporteur during the session;\textsuperscript{31} and
draft article 8, in the revised version introduced by the
Special Rapporteur during the sixty-second session.\textsuperscript{32}
At its sixty-third session, the Commission also referred
to the Drafting Committee the structured summary of the
draft articles contained in the seventh report of the
Special Rapporteur. At the same session, it took note of an interim report by the Chairperson of the Drafting
Committee informing the Commission of the progress
of work on the set of draft articles on the expulsion of
aliens, which was being finalized with a view to being
submitted to the Commission at its sixty-fourth session
for adoption on first reading.\textsuperscript{33}

B. Consideration of the topic at the present session

38. At the present session, the Commission had before it
the eighth report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/651),
which it considered at its 3129th meeting, on 8 May 2012.

39. The eighth report first provided a survey of the
comments made by States and the European Union on
the topic of expulsion of aliens during the debate in the
Sixth Committee, at the sixty-sixth session of the General
Assembly, on the report of the Commission on the work
of its sixty-third session;\textsuperscript{34} it then set out some final
observations by the Special Rapporteur. In introducing
his report, the Special Rapporteur said that, as he saw it,
most of those comments were the result of the time lag
between the progress that the Commission had made in
considering the topic and the submittal of information
on that progress to the Sixth Committee during its con-
sideration of the Commission’s previous annual reports.
The Special Rapporteur had attempted, then, to dispel the
misunderstandings created by that time lag, while taking
into account, where necessary, certain suggestions or
proposing certain adjustments to the wording of the draft
articles. Since the draft articles had already been referred
to the Drafting Committee by the Commission, it was in
that context that those suggestions, largely of a drafting
nature in any case, would be considered, as appropriate.

40. The eighth report also raised the question of the final
form that the Commission’s work on the topic would take,
a question that had arisen during the debates in both the
Commission and the Sixth Committee. In that regard, the
Special Rapporteur remained convinced that there were
few topics that lent themselves as well to codification as
did expulsion of aliens. He hoped therefore that, when the
time came, the Commission would transmit the results
of its work on the topic of expulsion of aliens to the
General Assembly in the form of draft articles, entrusting
the Assembly with deciding what final form they should
ultimately take.

41. At its 3134th and 3135th meetings, on 29 May 2012,
the Commission considered the report of the Drafting
Committee and, at its 3135th meeting, adopted on first
reading a set of 32 draft articles on the expulsion of aliens
(see sect. C.1 below).

42. At its 3152nd to 3155th meetings, on 30 and 31 July
2012, the Commission adopted the commentaries to the
draft articles on the expulsion of aliens adopted on first
reading (see sect. C.2 below).

43. At its 3155th meeting, on 31 July 2012, the
Commission decided, in accordance with articles 16 to
21 of its statute, to transmit the draft articles (see sect.
C below), through the Secretary-General, to Governments
for comments and observations, with the request that such
comments and observations be submitted to the Secretary-
General by 1 January 2014.

44. At its 3155th meeting, on 31 July 2012, the Commis-
sion expressed its deep appreciation for the outstanding con-
tribution that the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Maurice Kamto,
had made to the treatment of the topic through his scholarly
research and vast experience, thus enabling the Commission
to bring to a successful conclusion its first reading of the
draft articles on the expulsion of aliens.

C. Text of the draft articles on the expulsion of
aliens adopted by the Commission on first reading

1. TEXT OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES

45. The text of the draft articles adopted by the
Commission on first reading at its sixty-fourth session is
reproduced below.

EXPULSION OF ALIENS

PART ONE

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Scope

1. The present draft articles apply to the expulsion by a State
of aliens who are lawfully or unlawfully present in its territory.

2. The present draft articles do not apply to aliens enjoying
privileges and immunities under international law.

Article 2. Use of terms

For the purposes of the present draft articles:

(a) “expulsion” means a formal act, or conduct consisting of
an action or omission, attributable to a State, by which an alien is
compelled to leave the territory of that State; it does not include
extradition to another State, surrender to an international criminal
court or tribunal, or the non-admission of an alien, other than a
refugee, to a State;

(b) “alien” means an individual who does not have the nation-
ality of the State in whose territory that individual is present.

Article 3. Right of expulsion

A State has the right to expel an alien from its territory.
Expulsion shall be in accordance with the present draft articles and
other applicable rules of international law, in particular those relat-
ing to human rights.

Article 4. Requirement for conformity with law

An alien may be expelled only in pursuance of a decision reached
in accordance with law.

Article 5. Grounds for expulsion

1. Any expulsion decision shall state the ground on which it
is based.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, footnote 566.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, footnote 572.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 214.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}, in particular chap. VIII.
2. A State may only expel an alien on a ground that is provided for by law, including, in particular, national security and public order.

3. The ground for expulsion shall be assessed in good faith and reasonably, taking into account the gravity of the facts and in the light of all of the circumstances, including the conduct of the alien in question and, where relevant, the current nature of the threat to which the facts give rise.

4. A State shall not expel an alien on a ground that is contrary to international law.

PART TWO

CASES OF PROHIBITED EXPULSION

Article 6. Prohibition of the expulsion of refugees

1. A State shall not expel a refugee lawfully in its territory on grounds of national security or public order.

2. Paragraph 1 shall also apply to any refugee unlawfully present in the territory of the State who has applied for recognition of refugee status, while such application is pending.

3. A State shall not expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to a State or to the frontiers of territories where the person’s life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, unless there are reasonable grounds for regarding the person as a danger to the security of the country in which he or she is, or if the person, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

Article 7. Prohibition of the expulsion of stateless persons

A State shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in its territory on grounds of national security or public order.

Article 8. Other rules specific to the expulsion of refugees and stateless persons

The rules applicable to the expulsion of aliens provided for in the present draft articles are without prejudice to other rules on the expulsion of refugees and stateless persons provided for by law.

Article 9. Deprivation of nationality for the sole purpose of expulsion

A State shall not make its national an alien, by deprivation of nationality, for the sole purpose of expelling him or her.

Article 10. Prohibition of collective expulsion

1. For the purposes of the present draft articles, collective expulsion means expulsion of aliens as a group.

2. The collective expulsion of aliens, including migrant workers and members of their families, is prohibited.

3. A State may expel concomitantly the members of a group of aliens, provided that the expulsion takes place after and on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual member of the group.

4. The present draft article is without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable to the expulsion of aliens in the event of an armed conflict involving the expelling State.

Article 11. Prohibition of disguised expulsion

1. Any form of disguised expulsion of an alien is prohibited.

2. For the purposes of these draft articles, disguised expulsion means the forcible departure of an alien from a State resulting indirectly from actions or omissions of the State, including situations where the State supports or tolerates acts committed by its nationals or other persons, with the intention of provoking the departure of aliens from its territory.

Article 12. Prohibition of expulsion for purposes of confiscation of assets

The expulsion of an alien for the purpose of confiscating his or her assets is prohibited.

Article 13. Prohibition of the resort to expulsion in order to circumvent an extradition procedure

A State shall not resort to expulsion in order to circumvent an ongoing extradition procedure.

PART THREE

PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS SUBJECT TO EXPULSION

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 14. Obligation to respect the human dignity and human rights of aliens subject to expulsion

1. All aliens subject to expulsion shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person at all stages of the expulsion process.

2. They are entitled to respect for their human rights, including those set out in the present draft articles.

Article 15. Obligation not to discriminate

1. The State shall exercise its right to expel aliens without discrimination of any kind on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, birth or other status, or any other ground impermissible under international law.

2. Such non-discrimination shall also apply to the enjoyment by aliens subject to expulsion of their human rights, including those set out in the present draft articles.

Article 16. Vulnerable persons

1. Children, older persons, persons with disabilities, pregnant women and other vulnerable persons who are subject to expulsion shall be considered as such and treated and protected with due regard for their vulnerabilities.

2. In particular, in all actions concerning children who are subject to expulsion, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

CHAPTER II

PROTECTION REQUIRED IN THE EXPELLING STATE

Article 17. Obligation to protect the right to life of an alien subject to expulsion

The expelling State shall protect the right to life of an alien subject to expulsion.

Article 18. Prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

The expelling State shall not subject an alien subject to expulsion to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 19. Detention conditions of an alien subject to expulsion

1. (a) The detention of an alien subject to expulsion shall not be punitive in nature;
Article 20. Obligation to respect the right to family life

1. The expelling State shall respect the right to family life of an alien subject to expulsion.

2. The expelling State shall not interfere with the exercise of the right to family life, except where provided by law and on the basis of a fair balance between the interests of the State and those of the alien in question.

CHAPTER III
PROTECTION IN RELATION TO THE STATE OF DESTINATION

Article 21. Departure to the State of destination

1. The expelling State shall take appropriate measures to facilitate the voluntary departure of an alien subject to expulsion.

2. In cases of forcible implementation of an expulsion decision, the expelling State shall take the necessary measures to ensure, as far as possible, the safe transportation to the State of destination of the alien subject to expulsion, in accordance with the rules of international law.

3. The expelling State shall give the alien subject to expulsion a reasonable period of time to prepare for his or her departure, having regard to all circumstances.

Article 22. State of destination of aliens subject to expulsion

1. An alien subject to expulsion shall be expelled to his or her State of nationality or any other State that has the obligation to receive the alien under international law, or to any State willing to accept him or her at the request of the expelling State or, where appropriate, of the alien in question.

2. Where the State of nationality or any other State that has the obligation to receive the alien under international law has not been identified and no other State is willing to accept the alien, that alien may be expelled to any State where he or she has a right of entry or stay or, where applicable, to the State from where he or she has entered the expelling State.

Article 23. Obligation not to expel an alien to a State where his or her life or freedom would be threatened

1. No alien shall be expelled to a State where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, birth or other status, or any other ground impermissible under international law.

2. A State that does not apply the death penalty shall not expel an alien to a State where the life of that alien would be threatened with the death penalty, unless it has previously obtained an assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if already imposed, will not be carried out.

Article 24. Obligation not to expel an alien to a State where he or she may be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

A State shall not expel an alien to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

CHAPTER IV
PROTECTION IN THE TRANSIT STATE

Article 25. Protection in the transit State of the human rights of an alien subject to expulsion

The transit State shall protect the human rights of an alien subject to expulsion, in conformity with its obligations under international law.

PART FOUR
SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL RULES

Article 26. Procedural rights of aliens subject to expulsion

1. An alien subject to expulsion enjoys the following procedural rights:

(a) the right to receive notice of the expulsion decision;

(b) the right to challenge the expulsion decision;

(c) the right to be heard by a competent authority;

(d) the right of access to effective remedies to challenge the expulsion decision;

(e) the right to be represented before the competent authority; and

(f) the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter or, where he or she cannot understand or speak the language used by the competent authority.

2. The rights listed in paragraph 1 are without prejudice to other procedural rights or guarantees provided by law.

3. An alien subject to expulsion has the right to seek consular assistance. The expelling State shall not impede the exercise of this right or the provision of consular assistance.

4. The procedural rights provided for in this article are without prejudice to the application of any legislation of the expelling State concerning the expulsion of aliens who have been unlawfully present in its territory for less than six months.

Article 27. Suspensive effect of an appeal against an expulsion decision

An appeal lodged by an alien subject to expulsion who is lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State shall have a suspensive effect on the expulsion decision.

Article 28. Procedures for individual recourse

An alien subject to expulsion shall have access to any available procedure involving individual recourse to a competent international body.

PART FIVE
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXPULSION

Article 29. Readmission to the expelling State

1. An alien lawfully present in the territory of a State, who is expelled by that State, shall have the right to be readmitted to the expelling State if it is established by a competent authority that the
expulsion was unlawful, save where his or her return constitutes a threat to national security or public order, or where the alien otherwise no longer fulfils the conditions for admission under the law of the expelling State.

2. In no case may the earlier unlawful expulsion decision be used to prevent the alien from being readmitted.

Article 30. Protection of the property of an alien subject to expulsion

The expelling State shall take appropriate measures to protect the property of an alien subject to expulsion, and shall, in accordance with the law, allow the alien to dispose freely of his or her property, even from abroad.

Article 31. Responsibility of States in cases of unlawful expulsion

The expulsion of an alien in violation of international obligations under the present draft articles or any other rule of international law entails the international responsibility of the expelling State.

Article 32. Diplomatic protection

The State of nationality of an alien subject to expulsion may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of the alien in question.

2. TEXT OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES WITH COMMENTARIES THERETO

46. The text of the draft articles and commentaries thereto, adopted by the Commission on first reading at its sixty-fourth session, is reproduced below.

EXPULSION OF ALIENIS

General commentary

(1) The present draft articles, dealing with the expulsion of aliens, are divided into five parts. Part One, entitled “General provisions”, delimits the scope of the draft articles, defines the two key terms “expulsion” and “alien” for the purposes of the draft articles and then sets forth a few general rules relating to the right of expulsion, the requirement for conformity with law and the grounds for expulsion. Part Two of the draft articles deals with various cases of prohibited expulsion. Part Three addresses the question of the protection of the rights of aliens subject to expulsion, first from a general standpoint (chap. I), then by dealing more specifically with the protection required in the expelling State (chap. II), protection in relation to the State of destination (chap. III) and protection in the transit State (chap. IV). Part Four of the draft articles concerns specific procedural rules, while Part Five sets out the legal consequences of expulsion.

(2) The formulation “alien[s] subject to expulsion” used throughout the draft articles is sufficiently broad in meaning to cover, according to context, any alien facing any phase of the expulsion process. That process generally begins when a procedure is instituted that could lead to the adoption of an expulsion decision, in some cases followed by a judicial phase; it ends, in principle, with the implementation of the expulsion decision, whether that involves the voluntary departure of the alien concerned or the forcible implementation of the decision. In other words, the formulation covers the situation of the alien not only in relation to the expulsion decision adopted in his or her regard but also in relation to the various stages of the expulsion process that precede or follow the adoption of the decision and may in some cases involve the taking of restrictive measures against the alien, including possible detention for the purpose of expulsion.

PART ONE

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Scope

1. The present draft articles apply to the expulsion by a State of aliens who are lawfully or unlawfully present in its territory.

2. The present draft articles do not apply to aliens enjoying privileges and immunities under international law.

Commentary

(1) The purpose of draft article 1 is to delimit the scope of the draft articles. While paragraph 1 defines the scope in general terms, paragraph 2 excludes certain categories of individuals who would otherwise be covered by virtue of paragraph 1.

(2) In stating that the draft articles apply to the expulsion by a State of aliens who are lawfully or unlawfully present in its territory, paragraph 1 defines the scope of the draft articles both ratione materiae and ratione persona. With regard to scope ratione materiae, which relates to the measures covered by the draft articles, reference is made simply to the “expulsion by a State”, without further elaboration, since “expulsion” is defined in draft article 2, subparagraph (a), below. With regard to scope ratione persona, that is, the persons covered by the draft articles, it follows from paragraph 1 that the draft articles apply to the expulsion of aliens present in the territory of the expelling State, whether their presence there is lawful or unlawful. The term “alien” is defined in draft article 2, subparagraph (b). The category of aliens unlawfully present in the territory of the expelling State covers both aliens who have entered the territory unlawfully and aliens whose presence in the territory has subsequently become unlawful, primarily because of a violation of the laws of the expelling State governing conditions of stay.15

(3) Since the inception of the Commission’s work on the topic “Expulsion of aliens”, Commission members have generally been of the view that the draft articles should cover both aliens lawfully present and those unlawfully present in the territory of the expelling State. Paragraph 1 of the present draft article clearly reflects that position. However, it should be noted at the outset that some provisions of the draft articles do draw distinctions between the two categories of aliens, particularly with respect to the rights to which they are entitled.16 It should also be

15 On these questions, see the Special Rapporteur’s second report (footnote 9 above), paras. 50–56.
16 See draft articles 6, 7, 26, 27 and 29 and commentaries thereto below.
noted that the inclusion within the scope of the draft articles of aliens whose presence in the territory of the expelling State is unlawful is to be understood in conjunction with the phrase in draft article 2, subparagraph (a), in fine, which excludes from the scope of the draft articles questions concerning non-admission of an alien to the territory of a State. The view was expressed, however, that these draft articles should only address aliens lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State, given that the restrictions on expulsion contained in relevant global and regional treaties are limited to such aliens.\(^{38}\)

(4) Paragraph 2 of draft article 1 excludes from the scope of the draft articles certain categories of aliens, namely, aliens enjoying privileges and immunities under international law. The purpose of the provision is to exclude aliens whose enforced departure from the territory of a State is governed by special rules of international law, such as diplomats, consular officials, staff members of international organizations and other officials or military personnel on mission in the territory of a foreign State, including, as appropriate, members of their families. In other words, such aliens are excluded from the scope of the draft articles because of the existence of special rules of international law governing the conditions under which they can be compelled to leave the territory of the State in which they are posted for the exercise of their functions and exempting them from the normal expulsion procedure.\(^{39}\)

(5) On the other hand, some other categories of aliens who enjoy special protection under international law, such as refugees, stateless persons and migrant workers and their family members,\(^{40}\) are not excluded from the scope of the draft articles. It is understood, however, that the application of the provisions of the draft articles to those categories of aliens is without prejudice to the application of the special rules that may govern one aspect or another of their expulsion from the territory of a State.\(^{41}\) Displaced persons, in the sense of relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,\(^{42}\) are also not excluded from the scope of the draft articles.

\(^{37}\) See paragraph (5) of the commentary to draft article 2 below.


\(^{39}\) The rules of international law concerning the presence and departure of these categories of aliens are briefly set out in the memorandum by the Secretariat on the expulsion of aliens (footnote 10 above), paras. 28–35.

\(^{40}\) For an analysis of the legal rules that provide additional protection to certain categories of aliens, see the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), chap. X, in particular paras. 756–891. For a discussion of the various categories of aliens, see also the Special Rapporteur’s second report (footnote 9 above), paras. 45–122.

\(^{41}\) In this sense, see the “without prejudice” clause concerning refugees and stateless persons contained in draft article 8.

\(^{42}\) See, for example, General Assembly resolution 59/170 of 20 December 2004, para. 10; see also the Special Rapporteur’s second report (footnote 9 above), para. 72, and the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 160–162.

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**Article 2. Use of terms**

For the purposes of the present draft articles:

(a) “expulsion” means a formal act, or conduct consisting of an action, omission, attributable to a State, by which an alien is compelled to leave the territory of that State; it does not include extradition to another State, surrender to an international criminal court or tribunal, or the non-admission of an alien, other than a refugee, to a State;

(b) “alien” means an individual who does not have the nationality of the State in whose territory that individual is present.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft article 2 defines two key terms, “expulsion” and “alien”, for the purposes of the present draft articles.

(2) Subparagraph (a) provides a definition of “expulsion”. The definition reflects the distinction between, on the one hand, a formal act by which a State compels an alien to leave its territory (regardless of what that act may be called under internal law) and, on the other hand, conduct attributable to that State that produces the same result.\(^{43}\) The Commission thought it appropriate to include both types of cases in the definition of “expulsion” for purposes of the draft articles. It should also be clarified that draft article 2 merely provides a definition of “expulsion” and does not preclude in any way the question of the lawfulness of the various means of expulsion to which it refers. Means of expulsion that do not take the form of a formal act are included in the definition of expulsion within the meaning of the draft articles but fall under the regime of prohibition of “disguised expulsion” set out in draft article 11. In other words, conduct attributable to a State that produces the same result as a formal expulsion decision is defined as expulsion, but it constitutes a prohibited form of expulsion because it is disguised and thus does not allow the alien concerned to enjoy the rights associated with an expulsion done on the basis of a formal act.

(3) The proviso that the formal act or conduct constituting expulsion must be attributable to the State is to be understood in the light of the criteria of attribution to be found in chapter II of Part One of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.\(^{44}\)

(4) Conduct—other than the adoption of a formal decision—that could result in expulsion may take the form of either actions or omissions on the part of the State. Omission might in particular consist of tolerance towards conduct directed against the alien by individuals or private entities; such would be the case, for example, if the State

\(^{43}\) On the distinction between expulsion as a formal act and expulsion as conduct, see the Special Rapporteur’s second report (footnote 9 above), paras. 188–192.

\(^{44}\) See Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, pp. 58–54. The articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session are reproduced in the annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001.
failed to protect an alien from hostile acts emanating from non-State actors.\textsuperscript{45} What appears to be the determining element in the definition of expulsion is that, as a result of either a formal act or conduct—active or passive—attributable to the State, the alien in question is compelled to leave the territory of that State.\textsuperscript{46} In addition, in order to conclude that there has been expulsion as a result of conduct (that is, without the adoption of a formal decision), it is essential to establish that it was the intention of the State in question, by means of that conduct, to bring about the departure of the alien from its territory.\textsuperscript{47}

(5) For the sake of clarity, the Commission thought it useful to specify, in the second clause of subparagraph (a), that the concept of expulsion within the meaning of the draft articles did not cover extradition of an alien to another State, transfer to an international criminal court or tribunal or the non-admission of an alien, other than a refugee, to a State. With respect to non-admission, it should be explained that the exclusion relates to the refusal by the authorities of a State—usually the authorities responsible for immigration and border control—to allow an alien to enter the territory of that State. However, the measures taken by a State to compel an alien already present in its territory, even if unlawfully present, to leave it are covered by the concept of “expulsion” as defined in draft article 2, subparagraph (a).\textsuperscript{48} This distinction should be understood in the light of the definition of the scope ratione personae of the draft articles, which, as draft article 1, paragraph 1, expressly states, includes both aliens lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State and those unlawfully present. Moreover, as draft article 2, subparagraph (a), expressly indicates, the exclusion of matters relating to non-admission from the scope of the draft articles does not apply to refugees. That reservation is explained by draft article 6, paragraph 3, which sets forth the prohibition against return (refoulement) within the meaning of article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, and hence inevitably touches on questions of admission.

(6) Draft article 2, subparagraph (b), defines an “alien” as an individual who does not have the nationality of the State in whose territory the individual is present. The definition covers both individuals with the nationality of another State and individuals without the nationality of any State, that is, stateless persons.\textsuperscript{49} Based on that definition, it follows that an individual who has the nationality of the State in whose territory the individual is present cannot be considered an alien with regard to that State, even if he or she possesses one or more other nationalities, and even if it happens that one of those other nationalities can be considered predominant, in terms of an effective link, \textit{vis-à-vis} the nationality of the State in whose territory the individual is present.

(7) The definition of “alien” for the purposes of the draft articles is without prejudice to the right of a State to accord certain categories of aliens special rights with respect to expulsion by allowing them, under its internal law, to enjoy in that regard a regime similar to or the same as that enjoyed by its nationals.\textsuperscript{50} Nonetheless, any individual who does not have the nationality of the State in whose territory that individual is present should be considered an alien for the purposes of the draft articles, and his or her expulsion from that territory is subject to the present draft articles.

\textbf{Article 3. Right of expulsion}

A State has the right to expel an alien from its territory. Expulsion shall be in accordance with the present draft articles and other applicable rules of international law, in particular those relating to human rights.

\textbf{Commentary}

(1) The first sentence of draft article 3 sets out the right of a State to expel an alien from its territory. That right is uncontested in practice as well as in case law and legal writings.\textsuperscript{51} The right to expel has been recognized in particular in a number of arbitral awards and decisions of claims commissions\textsuperscript{52} and in various decisions of regional courts and commissions.\textsuperscript{53} Moreover, it is enshrined in the internal law of most States.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{45} On these questions, see the Special Rapporteur’s second report (footnote 9 above), paras. 124–152.

\textsuperscript{46} On the uncontested nature of the right of expulsion, see the Special Rapporteur’s third report (footnote 12 above), paras. 1–25, and the discussion in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 185–200.


\textsuperscript{49} On this point, see the memorandum by the Secretariat (A/ CN.4/565 and Corr.1, mimeographed; available from the Commission’s
(2) The second sentence of draft article 3 is a reminder that the exercise of this right of expulsion is regulated by the present draft articles and by other applicable rules of international law. The specific mention of human rights is justified by the importance that respect for human rights assumes in the context of expulsion, an importance also underlined by the many provisions of the draft articles devoted to various aspects of the protection of the human rights of aliens subject to expulsion. Among the “other applicable rules of international law” to which a State’s exercise of its right to expel aliens is subject and which are not addressed in specific provisions of the draft articles, it is worth mentioning in particular some of the “traditional” limitations that derive from the rules governing the treatment of aliens, including the prohibitions against arbitrariness, abuse of rights and denial of justice.55 Other applicable rules also include rules in human rights instruments concerning derogation in times of emergency.

Article 4. Requirement for conformity with law

An alien may be expelled only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 4 sets out a fundamental condition to which a State’s exercise of its right to expel aliens from its territory is subject. That condition is the adoption of an expulsion decision by the expelling State in accordance with the law.

(2) The requirement that an expulsion decision must be made has, first of all, the effect of prohibiting a State from engaging in conduct intended to compel an alien to leave its territory without notifying the alien of a formal decision in that regard. Such conduct would, in fact, fall under the prohibition of any form of disguised expulsion contained in draft article 11, paragraph 1.

(3) The requirement of conformity with the law is, first and foremost, a logical conclusion, since expulsion is supposed to be exercised within the framework of law.56 It is thus not surprising to note the wide agreement in the legislation of many States on the minimum requirement that the expulsion procedure must conform to the provisions of law.57 Moreover, the requirement is well established in international human rights law, both universal and regional. At the universal level, it appears in article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights58 (with respect to aliens lawfully present on the territory of the expelling State); in article 22, paragraph 2, of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families;59 in article 32, paragraph 2, of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees;60 and in article 31, paragraph 2, of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.61 At the regional level, it is relevant to mention article 12, paragraph 4, of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;62 article 22, paragraph 6, of the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”;63 article 1, paragraph 1, of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights);64 and article 26, paragraph 2, of the Arab Charter on Human Rights;65 all these laid down the same requirement with respect to aliens lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State.

(4) The Commission is of the view that the requirement for conformity with law shall apply to any expulsion decision, irrespective of whether the presence of the alien in question in the territory of the expelling State is lawful or not. It is understood, however, that domestic legislation may provide for different rules and procedures for expulsion depending on the lawful or unlawful nature of that presence.66

(5) The requirement for conformity with law is quite general, since it applies to both the procedural and the substantive conditions for expulsion.67 In consequence, its scope is wider than the similar requirement set out in draft article 5, paragraph 2, with regard to the grounds for expulsion.

(6) In its judgment of 30 November 2010 in the case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), the International Court of Justice confirmed the requirement for conformity with law as a condition for the lawfulness of an expulsion from the standpoint of international law. Referring, in that

55 The provision reads as follows: “Migrant workers and members of their families may be expelled from the territory of a State Party only in pursuance of a decision taken by the competent authority in accordance with law.”

56 The provision states, in particular, that the expulsion of a refugee lawfully in the territory of a Contracting State “shall only be in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law”.68

57 This provision has essentially the same wording, mutatis mutandis, as the provision quoted in the preceding footnote concerning refugees.

58 The provision reads as follows: “A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law.”

59 The provision reads as follows: “An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State Party to this Convention may be expelled from it only pursuant to a decision reached in accordance with law.”

60 The provision reads as follows: “An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law”.69

61 The provision reads as follows: “No State party may expel a person who does not hold its nationality but is lawfully in its territory, other than in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law”.70

62 In this sense, see draft article 26, paragraph 4, below.

63 See, in this sense, the opinion of the Steering Committee for Human Rights of Europe when it states, in connection with article 1, paragraph 1, of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights, that expulsion decisions must be taken “by the competent authority in accordance with the provisions of substantive law and with the relevant procedural rules” (Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Strasbourg, 1985), para. 11; see also www.coe.int/en/web/conventions).
context, to article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to article 12, paragraph 4, of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Court observed as follows:

It follows from the terms of the two provisions cited above that the expulsion of an alien lawfully in the territory of a State which is a party to these instruments can only be compatible with the international obligations of that State if it is decided in accordance with “the law”, in other words the domestic law applicable in that respect. Compliance with international law is to some extent dependent here on compliance with internal law.86

(7) Although the requirement for conformity with law is a condition for the lawfulness of any expulsion measure under international law, the question might arise as to the extent of an international body’s power of review of compliance with internal law rules in a context like that of expulsion. An international body is likely to be somewhat reticent in that regard. As an example, one might mention the position taken by the Human Rights Committee with respect to the expulsion by Sweden in 1977 of a Greek political refugee suspected of being a potential terrorist. That individual argued before the Committee that the expulsion decision had not been taken “in accordance with law” and therefore was not in compliance with the provisions of article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Human Rights Committee took the view that the interpretation of internal law was essentially a matter for the courts and authorities of the State party concerned, and that “it [was] not within the powers or functions of the Committee to evaluate whether the competent authorities of the State party in question [had] interpreted and applied the internal law correctly in the case before it … unless it [was] established that they [had] not interpreted and applied it in good faith or that it [was] evident that there [had] been an abuse of power.”

The International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights took a similar approach to their own power to assess whether a State had complied with its internal law in a case of expulsion.70

**Article 5. Grounds for expulsion**

1. Any expulsion decision shall state the ground on which it is based.

2. A State may only expel an alien on a ground that is provided for by law, including, in particular, national security and public order.

3. The ground for expulsion shall be assessed in good faith and reasonably, taking into account the gravity of the facts and in the light of all of the circumstances, including the conduct of the alien in question and, where relevant, the current nature of the threat to which the facts give rise.

4. A State shall not expel an alien on a ground that is contrary to international law.

**Commentary**

(1) The question of the grounds for expulsion encompasses a number of aspects having to do with statement of the ground for expulsion, existence of a valid ground and assessment of that ground by the competent authorities. Draft article 5 deals with those issues.

(2) Draft article 5, paragraph 1, sets out an essential condition under international law, namely, the statement of the ground for the expulsion decision. The duty of the expelling State to indicate the grounds for an expulsion appears to be well-established in international law.71 As early as 1892, the Institute of International Law was of the view that an act ordering expulsion must “être motivé en fait et en droit” [be reasoned in fact and in law].72 In its judgment in the Diallo case, the International Court of Justice found that the Democratic Republic of the Congo had failed to fulfil this obligation to give reasons and that, throughout the proceedings, it had failed to adduce grounds that might provide “a convincing basis” for Mr. Diallo’s expulsion; the Court therefore concluded that the arrest and detention of Mr. Diallo with a view to his expulsion had been arbitrary. In that regard, the Court could not but find not only that the decree itself was not reasoned in a sufficiently precise way … but that throughout the proceedings, the [Democratic Republic of the Congo] has never been able to provide grounds which might constitute a convincing basis for Mr. Diallo’s expulsion … Under these circumstances, the arrest and detention aimed at allowing such an expulsion measure, one without any defensible basis, to be effected can only be characterized as arbitrary within the meaning of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] and Article 6 of the African Charter [on Human and Peoples’ Rights].73

In the Amnesty International v. Zambia case, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that Zambia had violated the right of the alien concerned to

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86 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 639, at p. 663, para. 65. With reference to the procedural guarantees conferred on aliens by Congolese law and aimed at protecting the persons in question against the risk of arbitrary treatment, the Court concluded that the expulsion of Mr. Diallo had not been decided “in accordance with law” (p. 666, para. 73).


70 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Merits, Judgment (see footnote 68 above) and Bozano v. France, 18 December 1986, para. 58, Series A no. 111: “Where the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] refers directly back to domestic law, as in Article 5, compliance with such law is an integral part of Contracting States’ ‘engagements’ and the Court is accordingly competent to satisfy itself of such compliance where relevant (Article 19); the scope of its task in this connection, however, is subject to limits inherent in the logic of the European system of protection, since it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see, inter alia ad mutandis, the Winterwerp judgment of 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, p. 20, § 46).”

71 See, in this sense, the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), para. 73. See also, more generally, the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 309–318. See also reproduced in H. Wehberg, ed., Tableau général des résolutions (1873–1956) (Basel, Switzerland, Éditions juridiques et sociologiques, 1957), pp. 51 et seq., at p. 56; also available for consultation from the website of the Institute (www.justitiaetpace.org).

receive information by failing to inform him of the reasons for his expulsion. According to the Commission, the fact “that neither Banda nor Chinula were supplied with reasons for the action taken against them means that the right to receive information was denied to them (Article 9(1)).”

(3) Draft article 5, paragraph 2, sets out the fundamental requirement that the ground for expulsion must be provided for by law. The reference to “law” here is to be understood as a reference to the internal law of the expelling State. In other words, international law makes the lawfulness of an expulsion decision dependent on the condition that the decision is based on a ground provided for in the law of the expelling State. The Commission considers that this requirement is implied by the general requirement of conformity with law, set forth in draft article 4. The express mention, in this context, of national security and public order is justified by the inclusion of these grounds for expulsion in the legislation of many States and the frequency with which they are invoked to justify an expulsion. However, the Commission is of the view that public order and national security are not the only grounds for expulsion permitted under international law; the words “including, in particular” preceding the mention of those two grounds are intended to underline that point. For example, violation of internal law on entry and stay (immigration law) constitutes a ground for expulsion in the legislation of many States and, in the Commission’s view, is a permissible ground under international law; in other words, the unlawfulness of the presence of an alien in the territory of a State can in itself constitute a sufficient ground for expulsion. That being the case, it would be futile to search international law for a list of valid grounds of expulsion that would apply to aliens in general; it is for the internal law of each State to provide for and define the grounds for expulsion, subject to the reservation stated in paragraph 4 of the draft article, namely, that the grounds must not be contrary to international law. In this regard, the Commission notes that internal laws provide for a rather wide variety of grounds for expulsion.

(4) Paragraph 3 sets out general criteria for the expelling State’s assessment of the ground for expulsion. The assessment shall be made in good faith and reasonably, taking into account the gravity of the facts and in the light of all the circumstances. The conduct of the alien in question and the current nature of the threat to which the facts give rise are mentioned as among the factors to be taken into consideration by the expelling State. The criterion of “the current nature of the threat” mentioned in fine is particularly relevant when the ground for expulsion is a threat to national security or public order.

(5) The purpose of draft article 5, paragraph 4, is simply to recall the prohibition against expelling an alien on a ground contrary to international law. The prohibition would apply, for example, to expulsion based on a ground that was discriminatory in the sense of draft article 15, paragraph 1, below.

PART TWO

CASES OF PROHIBITED EXPULSION

Article 6. Prohibition of the expulsion of refugees

1. A State shall not expel a refugee lawfully in its territory save on grounds of national security or public order.

2. Paragraph 1 shall also apply to any refugee unlawfully present in the territory of the State who has applied for recognition of refugee status, while such application is pending.

3. A State shall not expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to a State or to the frontiers of territories where the person’s life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, unless there are reasonable grounds for regarding the person as a danger to the security of the country in which he or she is, or if the person, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 6 deals with the expulsion of refugees, which is subject to restrictive conditions by virtue of the relevant rules of international law.

(2) The term “refugee” should be understood not only in the light of the general definition contained in article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by article 1 of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967, which eliminated the geographic and temporal limitations of the 1951 definition, but also having regard to subsequent developments in the matter. In that regard, the broader definition of “refugee” adopted in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention governing the specific

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79 See paragraph (5) of the commentary to draft article 4 above.

80 For an analysis of the content of these two grounds of expulsion and the criteria for assessing them, see the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 78–118, and the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 340–376.

81 See, however, draft article 6, para. 1, and draft article 7 below, which limit the grounds for expulsion of refugees and stateless persons to “grounds of national security or public order”, thus reproducing the rules contained in the relevant treaty instruments.

82 For a survey of grounds for expulsion, see the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 325–422, and the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 73–209.

83 On the lawfulness of grounds for expulsion under international law, see the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 320–324. In this context, mention is made of the prohibition of racial discrimination (paras. 322 and 425–429) and reprisals (para. 416).

84 See also draft article 12 (Prohibition of expulsion for purposes of confiscation of assets) and draft article 13 (Prohibition of the resort to expulsion in order to circumvent an extradition procedure) below.

85 On this matter see in particular the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 146–159, and the Special Rapporteur’s second report (footnote 9 above), paras. 57–61.

86 See para. 3 above, para. 23 above, paras. 78–118, and the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 340–376.

87 See, however, draft article 6, para. 1, and draft article 7 below, which limit the grounds for expulsion of refugees and stateless persons to “grounds of national security or public order”, thus reproducing the rules contained in the relevant treaty instruments.

88 For a survey of grounds for expulsion, see the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 325–422, and the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 73–209.
aspects of refugee problems in Africa of 10 September 1969 merits particular mention.81

(3) Draft article 6, paragraph 1, reproduces the wording of article 32, paragraph 1, of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951. The rule contained in that paragraph, which applies only to refugees lawfully in the territory of the expelling State, limits the grounds for expulsion of such refugees to those relating to reasons of national security or public order.

(4) Draft article 6, paragraph 2, which has no equivalent in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, aims at extending the protection recognized in paragraph 1 to a refugee who is unlawfully present in the territory of the receiving State but who has applied for recognition of refugee status. As the last clause of paragraph 2 indicates, that protection can be envisaged only for so long as the application is pending. The protection provided for in paragraph 2, which reflects a trend in the legal literature and finds support in the practice of some States,82 would constitute a departure from the principle whereby the unlawfulness of the presence of an alien in the territory of a State can in itself justify expulsion of the alien. The Commission debated whether it should set aside the additional protection provided for in paragraph 2 in cases where the manifest intent of the application for refugee status was to thwart an expulsion decision likely to be handed down against the individual concerned. After intense debate, it concluded that it was not necessary to provide for such an exception, since paragraph 2 concerned only individuals who, while not enjoying the status of refugee in the State in question, did meet the definition of “refugee” within the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or, in some cases, other relevant instruments, such as the 1969 OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa, and should therefore be regarded as refugees under international law. A majority of the Commission members considered that in such a case it should not matter what motives had inspired the individual to apply for recognition of his or her refugee status or whether the application was specifically intended to prevent expulsion. On the other hand, any individual who does not correspond to the definition of refugee within the meaning of the relevant legal instruments is ineligible to enjoy the protection recognized in draft article 6 and can be expelled on grounds other than those stipulated in paragraph 1, including on the sole ground of the unlawfulness of his or her presence in the territory of the expelling State. From that standpoint, paragraph 2 should be interpreted as being without prejudice to the right of a State to expel, for reasons other than those mentioned in draft article 6, an alien whose application for refugee status is manifestly abusive.

(5) Draft article 6, paragraph 3, which deals with the obligation of non-refoulement, combines paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Unlike the other provisions of the draft articles, which do not cover the situation of non-admission of an alien to the territory of a State,83 article 6, paragraph 3, does cover that situation as well, as indicated by the opening phrase: “A State shall not expel or return (refouler)”. Moreover, unlike the protection stipulated in paragraph 1, the protection provided for in paragraph 3 applies to all refugees, regardless of whether their presence in the receiving State is lawful or unlawful. It should also be emphasized that the mention of this specific obligation of non-refoulement of refugees is without prejudice to the application to them of the general rules prohibiting expulsion to certain States as contained in draft articles 23 and 24.

(6) Other matters relating to the expulsion of refugees, including the elements mentioned in article 32, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, are covered by the “without prejudice” clause contained in draft article 8.84

81 Article 1 of the Convention reads as follows:

“Article 1 – Definition of the term ‘Refugee’

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘Refugee’ shall mean every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

2. The term ‘Refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

3. In the case of a person who has several nationalities, the term ‘a country of which he is a national’ shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of which he is a national if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

4. This Convention shall cease to apply to any refugee if:

(a) he has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality,

(b) having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it,

(c) he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality,

(d) he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution, or

(e) he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he was recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality,

(f) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside his country of refuge after his admission to that country as a refugee, or

(g) he has seriously infringed the purposes and objectives of this Convention.

5. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom the country of asylum has serious reasons for considering that:

(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes,

(b) he committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refugee prior to his admission to that country as a refugee,

(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Organization of African Unity,

(d) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

6. For the purposes of this Convention, the Contracting State of asylum shall determine whether an applicant is a refugee.”

82 On this issue, see the Special Rapporteur’s third report (footnote 12 above), paras. 69–74.

83 See draft article 2, subparagraph (a), above, in fine.

84 See the explanations given in the commentary to draft article 8 below.
Article 7. Prohibition of the expulsion of stateless persons

A State shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in its territory save on grounds of national security or public order.

Commentary

(1) As is the case for refugees, stateless persons are protected under the relevant rules of international law by a favourable regime that places limits on their expulsion. Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28 September 1954, defines the term “stateless person” as “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law”. 85

(2) By analogy with paragraph 1 of draft article 6 concerning refugees, draft article 7 is patterned after article 31, paragraph 1, of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Here, too, the limitation on the grounds for expulsion applies only to stateless persons lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State.

(3) Draft article 7 does not contain a parallel provision to paragraph 3 of draft article 6 concerning refugees, which refers to the obligation of non-refoulement. Stateless persons, like any other alien subject to expulsion, are entitled to the protection recognized by draft articles 23 and 24 below, which apply to aliens in general.

(4) As it did with refugees, 86 the Commission preferred not to address in draft article 7 other matters relating to the expulsion of stateless persons, which are covered by the “without prejudice” clause contained in draft article 8. 87

85 This provision reads as follows:

“Article 1 – Definition of the term ‘stateless person’

1. For the purpose of this Convention, the term ‘stateless person’ means a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.

2. This Convention shall not apply:

(i) To persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance so long as they are receiving such protection or assistance;

(ii) To persons who are recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which they have taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country;

(iii) To persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

(a) They have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provisions in respect of such crimes;

(b) They have committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of their residence prior to their admission to that country;

(c) They have been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”

Regarding the definition of the term “stateless person”, see also the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 173–175, as well as the Special Rapporteur’s second report (footnote 9 above), p. 247, paras. 100–104. 86

87 See paragraph (6) of the commentary to draft article 6 above.

Article 8. Other rules specific to the expulsion of refugees and stateless persons

The rules applicable to the expulsion of aliens provided for in the present draft articles are without prejudice to other rules on the expulsion of refugees and stateless persons provided for by law.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 8 is a “without prejudice” clause designed to ensure the application of other rules concerning the expulsion of refugees and stateless persons provided for by law but not mentioned in draft articles 6 and 7, respectively.

(2) The term “law” as used in draft article 8 is to be understood as referring to the other relevant rules of international law applicable to refugees and stateless persons, as well as to any relevant rule of the expelling State’s internal law, provided that it is not incompatible with that State’s obligations under international law.

(3) This “without prejudice” clause applies in particular to the rules concerning procedural requirements for the expulsion of a refugee or a stateless person, which are set forth, respectively, in article 32, paragraph 2, of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 88 and in article 31, paragraph 2, of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 89 It also applies to the provisions of article 32, paragraph 3, of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 90 and article 31, paragraph 3, of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 91

88 The provision reads as follows: “The expulsion of such a refugee [that is, a refugee lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State] shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.”

89 The provision reads as follows: “The expulsion of such a stateless person [that is, a stateless person lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State] shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the stateless person shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.”

90 The provision reads as follows: “The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee [that is, a refugee lawfully in their territory] a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.”

91 The provision reads as follows: “The Contracting States shall allow such a stateless person [that is, a stateless person lawfully in their territory] a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.”
Commentary

1. Draft article 9 addresses the specific situation in which a State might deprive a national of his or her nationality, and thus making that national an alien, for the sole purpose of expelling him or her. The Commission is of the view that such a deprivation of nationality, insofar as it has no other justification than the State’s desire to expel the individual, would be abusive, indeed arbitrary, within the meaning of article 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For this reason, the Commission decided to set forth in draft article 9 the prohibition of the deprivation of nationality for the sole purpose of expulsion.

2. It would no doubt have been simpler to state, for example, “a State may not deprive a national of his or her nationality for the sole purpose of expulsion”. However, the Commission preferred the current wording because the phrase “shall not make its national an alien, by deprivation of nationality”, in addition to linking the specific situation covered in the draft article to the topic of the expulsion of aliens, is expository in nature: it describes how a national of a State may become an alien in that State by means of deprivation of his or her nationality when the sole aim of that State is to expel the person concerned.

3. It should be clarified, however, that draft article 9 does not purport to limit the normal operation of legislation relating to the grant or loss of nationality; consequently, it should not be interpreted as affecting a State’s right to deprive an individual of its nationality on a ground that is provided for in its legislation.

4. Furthermore, draft article 9 does not address the issue of the expulsion by a State of its own nationals, which the Commission regarded as falling outside the scope of the draft articles, which deal solely with the expulsion of aliens.

Article 10. Prohibition of collective expulsion

1. For the purposes of the present draft articles, collective expulsion means expulsion of aliens as a group.

2. The collective expulsion of aliens, including migrant workers and members of their families, is prohibited.

3. A State may expel concomitantly the members of a group of aliens, provided that the expulsion takes place after and on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual member of the group.

4. The present draft article is without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable to the expulsion of aliens in the event of an armed conflict involving the expelling State.

Commentary

1. Paragraph 1 of draft article 10 contains a definition of collective expulsion for the purposes of the draft articles. According to this definition, collective expulsion is understood to mean the expulsion of aliens “as a group”. Only the “collective” aspect is addressed in this definition, which must be understood in the light of the general definition of expulsion contained in draft article 2, subparagraph (a).

2. Paragraph 2 sets out the prohibition of the collective expulsion of aliens, including migrant workers and members of their families. The Commission could not fail to include in the draft articles a prohibition that is expressly embodied in several international human rights treaties. At the universal level, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families expressly prohibits the collective expulsion of these persons, providing, in article 22, paragraph 1, that “[m]igrant workers and members of their families shall not be subject to measures of collective expulsion. Each case of expulsion shall be examined and decided individually”. At the regional level, the American Convention on Human Rights provides in article 22, paragraph 9, that “[t]he collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited”. Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that “[c]ollective expulsion of aliens is prohibited”. Similarly, article 12, paragraph 5, of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides that “[t]he mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited” and in the same provision defines this form of expulsion as “that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups”. Lastly, in article 26, paragraph 2, in fine, the Arab Charter on Human Rights states that “[c]ollective expulsion is prohibited under all circumstances”.

3. Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly prohibit collective expulsion. However, the Human Rights Committee expressed the opinion that such a form of expulsion would be contrary to the procedural guarantees to which aliens subject to expulsion are entitled. In its general comment No. 15 (1986) on the position of aliens under the Covenant, the Committee stated the following:

Article 13 directly regulates only the procedure and not the substantive grounds for expulsion. However, by allowing only those carried out “in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with
law”, its purpose is clearly to prevent arbitrary expulsions. On the other hand, it entitles each alien to a decision in his own case and, hence, article 13 would not be satisfied with laws or decisions providing for collective or mass expulsions. * This understanding, in the opinion of the Committee, is confirmed by further provisions concerning the right to submit reasons against expulsion and to have the decision reviewed by and to be heard before the competent authority or body designated by it. An alien must be given full facilities for pursuing his remedy against expulsion so that this right will in all the circumstances of his case be an effective one. The principles of article 13 relating to appeals against expulsion and the entitlement to review by a competent authority may only be departed from when “compelling reasons of national security” so require. Discrimination may not be made between different categories of aliens in the application of article 13.97

(4) The prohibition of the collective expulsion of aliens set out in paragraph 2 of the present draft article should be read in the light of paragraph 3, which elucidates it by specifying the conditions on the basis of which the members of a group of aliens may be expelled concomitantly without such a measure being regarded as a collective expulsion. The provisions of the draft article in question make it explicit that the term “collective expulsion” is used in this context for the term “constructive expulsion”. The purpose of the “disguised” clauses is to prevent any form of disguised expulsion of an alien. The right to bring a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of expulsion, ensures that the alien may appeal to this court in order to obtain a decision by which his request for a decision on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group is rejected. A decision by the court, even when in effect, will enable the alien to bring an action against the administrative decision by which the suspicion of expulsion was taken.

(5) The principle of the right to be heard has thus been included in the present draft article in order to ensure that the right to be heard is fully respected in the application of the provisions on collective expulsion. The draft article on collective expulsion thus makes provision for a right of appeal against expulsion when each person concerned has been given the opportunity to submit reasons against expulsion and to have the decision reviewed. The right of appeal is afforded sufficient guarantees demonstrating that the personal circumstances of each of those concerned had been genuinely and individually taken into account.”


98 See Andric v. Sweden (dec.), no. 45917/99, para. 1, 23 February 1999: “The Court finds that collective expulsion is to be understood as any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group. Moreover, the fact that a number of aliens receive similar decisions does not lead to the conclusion that there is a collective expulsion when each person concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments against his expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis”. See also Conka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, para. 59, ECHR 2002-I: “The Court reiterates its case-law whereby collective expulsion, within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 [to the European Convention on Human Rights], is to be understood as any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group (see Andric, cited above). That does not mean, however, that where the latter condition is satisfied the background to the execution of the expulsion ordre plays no further role in determining whether there has been compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No.4”; and para. 63: “In short, at no stage in the period between the service of the notice on the aliens to attend the police station and their expulsion did the procedure afford sufficient guarantees demonstrating that the personal circumstances of each of those concerned had been genuinely and individually taken into account.”

99 In it, the Special Rapporteur states the following: “Any measure that compels non-citizens, as a group, to leave a country is prohibited except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual non-citizen in the group.” The rights of non-citizens: final report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. David Weissbrodt, submitted in accordance with Sub-Commission decision 2000/103, Commission resolution 2000/104 and Economic and Social Council decision 2000/283 (E/ CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23), 26 May 2003, para. 11 (citing the European Court of Human Rights, Conka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99 (see footnote 98 above)).

98 For an analysis of the rules applicable, in times of armed conflict, to the expulsion of aliens who are nationals of an enemy State, see the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 93–106, 917–956 and 1020. See also the discussion of the subject in the following reports by the Special Rapporteur: second report (footnote 9 above), paras. 112–115; third report (footnote 12 above), paras. 116–134; and sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 19–28.

100 On the notion of “disguised expulsion”, see the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 29–43. See also the discussion of the notion of “constructive expulsion” in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 68–73.

Article 11. Prohibition of disguised expulsion

1. Any form of disguised expulsion of an alien is prohibited.

2. For the purposes of these draft articles, disguised expulsion means the forcible departure of an alien from a State resulting indirectly from actions or omissions of the State, including situations where the State supports or tolerates acts committed by its nationals or other persons, with the intention of provoking the departure of aliens from its territory.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 11 is intended to indicate that a State does not have the right to utilize disguised or indirect means or techniques in order to bring about the same result that it could obtain through the adoption of a formal expulsion decision, namely to compel an alien to depart from its territory.101 In the legal literature in English,102 the term “constructive expulsion” is sometimes used to designate methods of expulsion other than the adoption of a formal decision as such. The Commission considered, however, that it was difficult to find a satisfactory equivalent of the term “constructive expulsion” in other languages, particularly French, as the term might carry an undesirable positive connotation. Consequently, the Commission opted in this context for the term “disguised expulsion”.

Paragraph 1 of draft article 11 sets out the prohibition of any form of disguised expulsion, thus expressing the Commission’s conviction that such conduct is prohibited under international law regardless of the form it takes or the methods employed. This is because, in essence, disguised expulsion infringes the human rights of the alien in question, including the procedural rights referred to in Part Four of the draft articles.

(3) Draft article 11, paragraph 2, contains a definition of disguised expulsion that focuses on what characterizes it. The specificity lies in the fact that the expelling State, without adopting a formal expulsion decision, engages in conduct intended to produce and actually producing the same result, namely the forcible departure of an alien from its territory. The element of détournement is conveyed by the adverb “indirectly”, which qualifies the occurrence of an alien’s departure as a result of the conduct of the State. The last phrase of paragraph 2 is intended to indicate that the notion of “disguised expulsion” covers only situations in which the forcible departure of an alien is the intentional result of actions or omissions attributable to the State. The State’s intention to provoke an alien’s departure from its territory, which is inherent in the definition of expulsion in general, thus remains a decisive factor when expulsion occurs in a disguised form.

(4) The definition of disguised expulsion, based on the elements of “compulsion” and “intention”, appears consistent with the criteria applied in this regard by the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, which had before it a number of claims relating to situations of the same nature as those envisaged in draft article 11. The two essential elements of the notion of “disguised expulsion” that emerge from the relevant decisions of the Tribunal have been summarized as follows:

Such cases would seem to presuppose at least (1) that the circumstances in the country of residence are such that the alien cannot reasonably be regarded as having any real choice, and (2) that behind the events or acts leading to the departure there is an intention of having the alien ejected and these acts, moreover, are attributable to the State in accordance with principles of state responsibility.

(5) The approach taken by the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission seems to follow the same lines. The Claims Commission considered the claim of Ethiopia that Eritrea was responsible for “indirect” or “constructive” expulsions of Ethiopians that were contrary to international law. The Claims Commission rejected certain claims after finding that the Ethiopians in question had not been expelled by the Government of Eritrea or made to leave by government policy; instead, they had left the country for other reasons, such as economic factors or upheavals brought about by events for which Eritrea could not be held responsible. The Claims Commission noted that free consent seemed to have prevailed in these situations:

91. Ethiopia contended that Eritrea was internationally responsible for the damages suffered by every Ethiopian who left Eritrea during the period covered by its claims, including those not expelled by direct government action. Many departures were claimed to be “indirect” or “constructive” expulsions resulting from unlawful Eritrean Government actions and policies causing hostile social and economic conditions aimed at Ethiopians. Ethiopia also contended that the physical conditions of departures often were unnecessarily harsh and dangerous. Eritrea denied that it was legally responsible for the Ethiopians’ departures, contending that they reflected individual choices freely made by the persons concerned.

92. The great majority of Ethiopians who left Eritrea did so after May 2000; claims regarding the conditions of their departures are analysed below. As to those who departed earlier, the evidence indicates that an initial wave of 20,000 to 25,000 departures in 1998 largely resulted from economic factors. Many were port workers, most from Assab, unemployed after Eritrean ports stopped handling cargo to and from Ethiopia. A 1999 Amnesty International report estimated that the closing of Assab port cost 30,000 jobs; Amnesty reported that none of the returnees it interviewed in Ethiopia during this period said that he or she had been expelled. A few thousand more Ethiopians left Eritrea during 1999; the evidence indicates that these too were mostly economically motivated. A second Amnesty report cited more than 3,000 Ethiopians who returned to Ethiopia in early 1999 due to unemployment, homelessness or reasons related to the war. Amnesty felt these did not appear to have been expelled by the Eritrean Government or due to government policy. The December 2001 [United Nations Children’s Fund][Women’s Association of Tigray] Study in Ethiopia’s evidence also highlights the economic motivation of departures during this period.

93. The Commission appreciates that there was a spectrum of “voluntariness” in Ethiopian departures from Eritrea in 1999 and early 2000. Ethiopian declarants described growing economic difficulties, family separations, harassment and sporadic discrimination and even attacks at the hands of Eritrean civilians. However, the Commission is also struck that only about 70 declarations and claim forms specifically described leaving in 1998 and 1999, and of these, fewer than 20 declarants seemed to consider themselves “expelled or deported”.

94. The Commission concludes from the evidence that departures of Ethiopians before May 2000 in very large measure resulted from economic or other causes, many reflecting economic and social dislocation due to the war, for which the Government of Eritrea was not legally responsible.

95. The evidence suggests that the trip back to Ethiopia or to other destinations for those who elected to depart during this period could be harsh, particularly for those who left Assab to return to Ethiopia across the desert. However, the evidence does not establish that this was the result of actions or omissions by Eritrea for which it is responsible. Accordingly, Ethiopia’s claims in this respect are dismissed.

In considering subsequent expulsions, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission emphasized the high legal threshold for responsibility based on the jurisprudence of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal. The Claims Commission concluded that Ethiopia had failed to meet the high legal threshold for proof of such claims as follows:


126. Ethiopia also contended that those who left between May 2000 and December 2000 were victims of unlawful indirect or constructive expulsion. The Parties expressed broadly similar understanding of the law bearing on these claims. Both cited the jurisprudence of the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal, which establishes a high threshold for liability for constructive expulsion. That Tribunal’s constructive expulsion awards require that those who leave a country must have experienced dire or threatening conditions so extreme as to leave no realistic alternative to departure. These conditions must result from actions or policies of the host government, or be clearly attributable to that government. Finally, the government’s actions must have been taken with the intention of causing the aliens to depart.

127. The evidence does not meet these tests. Post-war Eritrea was a difficult economic environment for Ethiopians and Eritreans both, but the Eritrean Government did not intentionally create generalized economic adversity in order to drive away Ethiopians. The Commission notes that the Government of Eritrea took actions in the summer of 2000 that were detrimental to many Ethiopians’ economic interests and that there was anti-Ethiopian public opinion and harassment. Nevertheless, many Ethiopians in Eritrea evidently saw alternatives to departure and elected to remain or to defer their departures. Given the totality of the record, the Commission concludes that the claim of widespread constructive expulsion does not meet the high legal threshold for proof of such a claim.105

(6) The Commission considered whether, among the acts of a State that might constitute disguised expulsion within the meaning of draft article 11, it should also include support or tolerance shown by the State towards acts committed individually or collectively by private persons.106 Some members of the Commission were of the view that it would be problematic to include that kind of situation in the definition of disguised expulsion. However, the Commission considered that support or tolerance shown by a State towards acts committed by private persons could fall within the scope of the prohibition of disguised expulsion if such support or tolerance constituted “actions or omissions of the State … with the intention of provoking the departure of aliens from its territory”. In other words, such support or tolerance on the part of the expelling State must be assessed according to the criterion of the specific intention to which the last phrase of paragraph 2 refers. It is understood that a particularly high threshold should be set for this purpose when it is a matter of mere tolerance unaccompanied by definitive actions of support on the part of the State for the acts of private persons.

(7) The Commission considers that the situation of support or tolerance towards acts of private persons could involve acts committed by either nationals of the State in question or aliens present in the territory of that State. That is what is meant by the phrase “its nationals or other persons”, which, moreover, covers both natural and legal persons.

Article 12. Prohibition of expulsion for purposes of confiscation of assets

The expulsion of an alien for the purpose of confiscating his or her assets is prohibited.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 12 sets out the prohibition of confiscatory expulsions, that is, expulsions with the aim of unlawfully depriving an alien of his or her assets.107 The unlawful confiscation of property may well be the undeclared aim of an expulsion. “For example, the ‘right’ of expulsion may be exercised … in order to expropriate the alien’s property … In such cases the exercise of the power cannot remain untainted by the ulterior and illegal purposes.”108 The Commission considers that such expulsions, to which some States have resorted in the past,109 are unlawful from the perspective of contemporary international law. Aside from the fact that the grounds for such expulsions appear unsound,110 it must be said that they are incompatible with the fundamental principle set out in the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, adopted by the General Assembly in 1985, which states, “[n]o alien shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her lawfully acquired assets”.111

(2) In addition, an expulsion for the sole purpose of confiscation of the assets of the alien in question implicates the right to property as recognized in various human rights treaties.112

Article 13. Prohibition of the resort to expulsion in order to circumvent an extradition procedure

A State shall not resort to expulsion in order to circumvent an ongoing extradition procedure.


106 The International Law Association answered that question in its Declaration of Principles of International Law on Mass Expulsion. As noted in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 72, the definition of the term “expulsion” contained in the Declaration also covers situations in which the forcible departure of individuals is achieved by means other than a formal decision by the authorities of the State. It encompasses situations in which a State aids, abets or tolerates acts committed by its citizens with the intention of provoking the departure of individuals from the territory of the State. According to the Declaration, “‘expulsion’ in the context of the present Declaration may be defined as an act, or a failure to act, by a State with the intended effect of forcing the departure of persons against their will from its territory for reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; … a ‘failure to act’ may include situations in which authorities of a State tolerate, or even aid and abet, acts by its citizens with the intended effect of driving groups or categories of persons out of the territory of that State, or where the authorities create a climate of fear resulting in panic flight, fail to assure protection to those persons or obstruct their subsequent return” (International Law Association, Declaration of Principles of International Law on Mass Expulsion, Report of the Sixty-second Conference, Seoul, 1986 (London, 1987), p. 13).

107 See, in this regard, the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 524–526. See also the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 444 and 479–481.


109 For some examples, see the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 524–526.


111 General Assembly resolution 40/144 of 13 December 1985, annex, art. 9.

112 See, in this regard, draft article 30 below concerning the protection of the property of an alien subject to expulsion.
Draft article 13 sets out in general terms the prohibition against resorting to expulsion in order to circumvent an extradition procedure. One could speak of “disguised extradition” in this context. As the wording of draft article 13 clearly indicates, the prohibition in question applies only as long as the extradition procedure is ongoing, in other words, from the moment at which the State in whose territory the alien is present receives from another State a request for extradition in respect of the alien until a definitive decision is taken and enforced by the competent authorities of the first State on the request for extradition.

The Commission considered whether the content of draft article 13 should be made more specific by stating, for example, that when a State requested a person’s extradition, the person could not be expelled either to the requesting State or to a third State with an interest in extraditing the person to the requesting State as long as the extradition process had not been completed, except for reasons of national security or public order. While some members were in favour of such wording, others considered that it would be better if the draft article focused on the element of circumvention without setting out in absolute terms a prohibition against expelling the alien in question throughout the entire extradition procedure. The point was also made in that context that reasons other than national security, such as a breach of immigration law, could in some cases justify the expulsion of an alien subject to a request for extradition without necessarily leading to the conclusion that the expulsion was intended to circumvent an extradition procedure.

Draft article 14, paragraph 1, sets out the obligation of the expelling State to treat all aliens subject to expulsion with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person at all stages of the expulsion process. The wording of this paragraph is taken from article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which deals with the situation of persons deprived of their liberty. The addition in fine of the phrase “at all stages of the expulsion process” is intended to underline the general nature of the obligation in question, which covers all stages of the process that can lead to the adoption of an expulsion decision and its implementation, including, in some cases, the imposition of restrictive or custodial measures.

Divergent views were expressed by members of the Commission as to whether human dignity was a specific human right in addition to being the foundation or source of inspiration for human rights in general. The Commission deemed it appropriate to set out in draft article 14 the general principle of respect for the dignity of any alien subject to expulsion, also taking into account the fact that aliens were not infrequently subjected to humiliating treatment in the course of the expulsion process that was offensive to their dignity as human beings, without necessarily amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

(1) Draft article 14, paragraph 1, sets out the obligation of the expelling State to treat all aliens subject to expulsion with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person at all stages of the expulsion process.

Part Three

Protection of the Rights of Aliens Subject to Expulsion

Chapter I

General Provisions

Article 14. Obligation to respect the human dignity and human rights of aliens subject to expulsion

1. All aliens subject to expulsion shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person at all stages of the expulsion process.

2. They are entitled to respect for their human rights, including those set out in the present draft articles.

Commentary

Draft article 14, paragraph 1, sets out the obligation of the expelling State to treat all aliens subject to expulsion with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person at all stages of the expulsion process. The wording of this paragraph is taken from article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which deals with the situation of persons deprived of their liberty. The addition in fine of the phrase “at all stages of the expulsion process” is intended to underline the general nature of the obligation in question, which covers all stages of the process that can lead to the adoption of an expulsion decision and its implementation, including, in some cases, the imposition of restrictive or custodial measures.

(2) Divergent views were expressed by members of the Commission as to whether human dignity was a specific human right in addition to being the foundation or source of inspiration for human rights in general. The Commission deemed it appropriate to set out in draft article 14 the general principle of respect for the dignity of any alien subject to expulsion, also taking into account the fact that aliens were not infrequently subjected to humiliating treatment in the course of the expulsion process that was offensive to their dignity as human beings, without necessarily amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

(3) The phrase “the inherent dignity of the human person”, drawn from article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is intended to make it clear that the dignity referred to in this draft article is to be understood as an attribute that is inherent in every human being, as opposed to a subjective notion of dignity, which

113 For a more general analysis of the issue of expulsion in connection with extradition, see the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 44–72. See also the memorandum of the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 430–443.

114 See European Court of Human Rights, Bozano v. France, 18 December 1986 (footnote 70 above), paras. 52–60, especially the Court’s conclusion in paragraph 60 of its judgment: “Viewing the circumstances of the case as a whole and having regard to the volume of material pointing in the same direction, the Court consequently concludes that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty in the night of 26 to 27 October 1975 was neither ‘lawful’, within the meaning of article 5 § 1 (f) …, nor compatible with the ‘right to security of person’. Depriving Mr. Bozano of his liberty in this way amounted in fact to a disguised form of extradition designed to circumvent the negative ruling of 15 May 1979 by the Indictment Division of the Limoges Administrative Court, and not to ‘detention’ necessary in the ordinary course of ‘action … taken with a view to deportation’. The findings of the presiding judge of the Paris tribunal de grande instance—even if obiter—and of the Limoges Administrative Court, even if that court had only to determine the lawfulness of the order of 17 September 1979, are of the utmost importance in the Court’s view; they illustrate the vigilance displayed by the French courts. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the [European] Convention on Human Rights.”

115 The draft article on this issue originally proposed by the Special Rapporteur in paragraph 72 of his sixth report (footnote 23 above) read as follows:

“Prohibition of extradition disguised as expulsion

“Without prejudice to the standard extradition procedure, an alien shall not be expelled without his or her consent to a State requesting his or her extradition or to a State with a particular interest in responding favourably to such a request.”

At the sixty-second session of the Commission (2010), the Special Rapporteur proposed a revised version of that draft article (Yearbook … 2010, vol. II (Part Two), footnote 1299), which read as follows:

“Expulsion in connection with extradition

“Expulsion of a person to a requesting State or to a State with a particular interest in the extradition of that person to the requesting State may be carried out only where the conditions of expulsion are met in accordance with international law [or with the provisions of the present draft article].”

116 Concerning respect for the dignity of all aliens subject to expulsion, see the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report (footnote 18 above), paras. 68–72.
might depend on the preferences or sensitivity of a particular person or vary according to cultural factors.

(4) Draft article 14, paragraph 2, simply recalls that all aliens subject to expulsion are entitled to respect for their human rights.\(^{117}\) The word “including”, which precedes the reference to the rights mentioned in the draft articles, is intended to make it clear that the specific mention of some rights in the draft articles is justified only because of their particular relevance in the context of expulsion; their mention should not be understood as implying in any way that respect for those rights is more important than respect for other human rights not mentioned in the draft articles. It goes without saying that the expelling State is required, in respect of an alien subject to expulsion, to meet all the obligations incumbent upon it concerning the protection of human rights, both by virtue of the international conventions to which it is a party and by virtue of general international law. That said, mention should be made, in particular in this context, of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December 1985.\(^{118}\)

**Article 15. Obligation not to discriminate**

1. The State shall exercise its right to expel aliens without discrimination of any kind on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, birth or other status, or any other ground impermissible under international law.

2. Such non-discrimination shall also apply to the enjoyment by aliens subject to expulsion of their human rights, including those set out in the present draft articles.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft article 15 concerns the obligation not to discriminate in the context of the expulsion of aliens.\(^{119}\) The obligation not to discriminate is set out, in varying formulations, in the major universal and regional human rights instruments.\(^{120}\) This obligation has also been recognized in case law concerning expulsion. It was, for example, stated in general terms by the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal in the *Rankin* case:

A claimant alleging expulsion has the burden of proving the wrongfulness of the expelling State’s action, in other words that it was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in breach of the expelling State’s treaty obligations.\(^{121}\)

Also noteworthy is the *Mauritian Women* case, in which the Human Rights Committee considered that there had been a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the law in question introduced discrimination on the ground of sex by protecting the wives of Mauritian men against expulsion while not affording such protection to the husbands of Mauritian women.\(^{122}\)

The European Court of Human Rights took the same position that the Human Rights Committee had taken in the aforementioned *Mauritian Women* case in its judgment of 28 May 1985 in the *Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali* case.\(^{123}\) The Court held unanimously that article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated by reason of discrimination against each of the applicants on the ground of sex: unlike male immigrants settled in the United Kingdom, the applicants did not have the right, in the same situation, to obtain permission for their non-national spouses to enter or remain in the country for settlement. After having stated that “advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe”, the Court held that “very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention”.\(^{124}\) It also emphasized that article 14 was concerned with the “avoidance of discrimination in the enjoyment of the Convention rights in so far as the requirements of the Convention as to those rights can be complied with in different ways”.\(^{125}\) On the other hand, it held that in the current case, the fact that applicable rules affected “fewer white people than others” was not “a sufficient reason to consider them as racist in character” as they “did not contain regulations differentiating between persons or groups on the ground of their race or ethnic origin”.\(^{126}\)

(2) Draft article 15, paragraph 1, sets out the prohibition of discrimination in the exercise by a State of its right to expel aliens. As the prohibition of discrimination applies to the exercise of the right of expulsion, it covers both the decision to expel or not to expel and the procedures relating to the adoption of an expulsion decision and its possible implementation. Moreover, the general scope of the obligation not to discriminate is confirmed by the content of paragraph 2 of the draft article, which indicates that the non-discrimination shall also apply to the enjoyment by aliens subject to expulsion of their human rights, including the rights mentioned in the present draft articles.

(3) The list of prohibited grounds for discrimination contained in draft article 15 is based on the list included in article 2, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on

\(^{117}\) Concerning the impact of human rights on the exercise of the right of expulsion, see the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report (footnote 18 above) and the discussion in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 251–255 and 445–448.

\(^{118}\) See footnote 111 above.

\(^{119}\) See, in this regard, the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report (footnote 18 above), paras. 148–156, and the discussion in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 256–286 and 482–487.

\(^{120}\) See, in this regard, the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report (footnote 18 above), paras. 149–151.

\(^{121}\) *Rankin v. the Islamic Republic of Iran*, Award of 3 November 1987 (see footnote 103 above), p. 135, at p. 142, para. 22.


\(^{123}\) *Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom*, 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94; relevant parts of the judgment are recal-

\(^{124}\) On the other hand, it held that in the current case, the fact that applicable rules affected “fewer white people than others” was not “a sufficient reason to consider them as racist in character” as they “did not contain regulations differentiating between persons or groups on the ground of their race or ethnic origin”.

\(^{125}\) *Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom* (see previous footnote), para. 78.

\(^{126}\) *Ibid.*, para. 82.

Civil and Political Rights, with the addition of the ground of "ethnic origin" and a reference to "any other ground impermissible under international law". In the view of the Commission, the express mention of "ethnic origin" in the draft article is justified because of the undisputed nature of the prohibition in contemporary international law of discrimination on this ground and in view of the particular relevance of ethnic issues in the context of the expulsion of aliens. The reference to "any other ground impermissible under international law" clearly indicates the non-exhaustive nature of the list of prohibited grounds for discrimination included in draft article 15.

(4) Whereas some Commission members proposed to expand the list of grounds for discrimination to include sexual orientation and/or belonging to a minority, other members were opposed. It was noted in particular that an express reference to certain additional grounds might be interpreted as an implicit exclusion of other grounds.

(5) Some Commission members were of the view that the prohibition of any discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation was already established under positive international law or that there was at the very least a trend in that direction in international practice and case law\(^\text{127}\) that would justify as a matter of progressive development the inclusion of sexual orientation among the prohibited grounds for discrimination. Other Commission members considered that the issue remained controversial and that the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation was not universally recognized, particularly in view of the practice of a number of States that punished, sometimes quite severely, homosexual behaviour, and the absence of the mention of such a ground for discrimination in the texts of universal and regional instruments for the protection of human rights. In any case, insofar as, according to the interpretation by the Human Rights Committee of the reference to "sex" in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the notion includes sexual orientation,\(^\text{128}\) some members were of the view that it was not necessary to mention sexual orientation as a distinct ground among the discriminatory grounds based on sex, as this would be likely to lead to confusion or redundancy.

(6) The need to recognize possible exceptions to the obligation not to discriminate based on nationality was mentioned by some members of the Commission. They referred in that regard to associations of States such as the European Union, which are characterized by the establishment of a regime of freedom of movement by their citizens.

(7) On reflection, the Commission considered that the reference in the draft article to "any other ground impermissible under international law" took sufficient account of those various concerns. On the one hand, the formulation adopted makes it possible to capture any legal development concerning prohibited grounds for discrimination that might have occurred since the adoption of the Covenant. On the other hand, it also preserves the possibility for States to establish among themselves special legal regimes based on the principle of freedom of movement for their citizens, such as the regime of the European Union.

**Article 16. Vulnerable persons**

### 1. Children, older persons, persons with disabilities, pregnant women and other vulnerable persons who are subject to expulsion shall be considered as such and treated and protected with due regard for their vulnerabilities.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft article 16 sets out the particular requirements concerning the expulsion of vulnerable persons such as children, older persons, persons with disabilities and pregnant women.

(2) Draft article 16, paragraph 1, is general in scope. It sets out the obligation of the expelling State to treat and protect vulnerable persons who are subject to expulsion with due regard for their vulnerabilities and special needs. By first setting out the requirement that the individuals in question “shall be considered as such”, the Commission wished to indicate the importance of due recognition by the expelling State of their vulnerabilities, as it is that recognition that would justify granting these individuals special treatment and protection.

(3) The Commission considers that it is hardly possible to list in a draft article all categories of vulnerable persons that might merit special protection in the context of an expulsion procedure. Aside from the categories of persons explicitly mentioned, there might be other individuals, such as those suffering from incurable diseases or an illness requiring particular care which, ex hypothesi, could not be provided—or would be difficult to provide—in the possible State or States of destination. The addition of the phrase "and other vulnerable persons" clearly indicates that the list included in paragraph 1 is not exhaustive.

(4) Draft article 16, paragraph 2, deals with the specific case of children and faithfully reproduces the wording of article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the rights of the child.\(^\text{129}\) While not excluding consideration of other relevant factors, paragraph 2 sets out the requirement that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all decisions concerning children who are subject to expulsion.\(^\text{130}\)

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\(^\text{127}\) In particular, the Human Rights Committee considered that the reference to "sex" in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must be understood to include reference to "sex" in articles 1, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the notion includes sexual orientation, according to the interpretation by the Human Rights Committee of the reference to "sex" in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the notion includes sexual orientation.

\(^\text{128}\) See previous footnote.
CHAPTER II
PROTECTION REQUIRED IN THE EXPELLING STATE

Article 17. Obligation to protect the right to life of an alien subject to expulsion

The expelling State shall protect the right to life of an alien subject to expulsion.

Commentary

Draft article 17 recalls the obligation of the expelling State to protect the right to life of an alien subject to expulsion. This right, which is “inherent” in “every human being” according to article 6, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is proclaimed, admittedly in various ways, in core international instruments for the protection of human rights, both universal and regional.

Article 18. Prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

The expelling State shall not subject an alien subject to expulsion to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 18 recalls, in the context of expulsion, the general prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This is an obligation enshrined in various treaty instruments for the protection of human rights, both universal and regional. The obligation not to subject aliens to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is also set forth in General Assembly resolution 40/144. In its judgment of 30 November 2010 in the Diallo case, the International Court of Justice recalled in connection with an expulsion case that the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment derives from a rule of general international law.

(2) Draft article 18 concerns only the obligation of the expelling State itself not to subject an alien to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. On the other hand, the obligation not to expel an alien to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she risks being subjected to such treatment is set out in draft article 24 below.

(3) On reflection, the Commission preferred not to tackle in the draft articles the question of the extent to which the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment also covers cases in which such treatment is inflicted, not by de jure or de facto State organs but by persons or groups acting in a private capacity. It considered that it would be better to leave that issue to the relevant monitoring bodies to assess or, where appropriate, to the courts that might be called upon to rule on the exact extent of the obligations arising from one instrument or another for the protection of human rights.

Article 19. Detention conditions of an alien subject to expulsion

1. (a) The detention of an alien subject to expulsion shall not be punitive in nature;

(b) an alien subject to expulsion shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be detained separately from persons sentenced to penalties involving deprivation of liberty.

2. (a) The duration of the detention shall not be unrestricted. It shall be limited to such period of time as is reasonably necessary for the expulsion to be carried out. All detention of excessive duration is prohibited;

(b) the extension of the duration of the detention may be decided upon only by a court or a person authorized to exercise judicial power.

3. (a) The detention of an alien subject to expulsion shall be reviewed at regular intervals on the basis of specific criteria established by law;

(b) subject to paragraph 2, detention shall end when the expulsion cannot be carried out, except where the reasons are attributable to the alien concerned.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 19, paragraph 1, sets out the non-punitive nature of detention to which aliens facing expulsion may be subject. Subparagraph (a) establishes the general principle that such detention must not be punitive in nature, whereas subparagraph (b) sets out one of the consequences of that principle. Subparagraph (b) provides that, save in exceptional circumstances, an alien who is detained in the course of an expulsion procedure must be held separately from persons sentenced to penalties involving deprivation of liberty. Such a
safeguard is granted to accused persons, in their capacity as unconvicted persons, under article 10, paragraph 2 (a), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Commission considers that, in view of the non-punitive nature of detention for the purpose of expulsion, there is all the more reason to provide the safeguard set out in article 10, paragraph 2 (a), of the Covenant to aliens subjected to that form of detention. This view seems to be in harmony with the position expressed by the Human Rights Committee in its comments on article 13 of the Covenant in relation to expulsion. The Committee noted that, if expulsion procedures entail arrest, the safeguards of the Covenant relating to deprivation of liberty (arts. 9 and 10) may also be applicable. The same requirement is set out in principle 8 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment in the annex to General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988. This principle, which also covers detention for the purpose of expulsion, stipulates that “[p]ersons in detention shall be subject to treatment appropriate to their unconvicted status. Accordingly, they shall, whenever possible, be kept separate from imprisoned persons”.

(2) The reference to “exceptional circumstances” that could justify non-compliance with the rule set out in paragraph 1 (b) is drawn from article 10, paragraph 2 (a), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

(3) In the view of the Commission, the rule set out in paragraph 1 (b) does not necessarily require the expelling State to put in place facilities specially set aside for the detention of aliens with a view to their expulsion; the detention of aliens could occur in a facility in which persons sentenced to custodial penalties are also detained, provided, however, that the aliens in question are placed in a separate section of the facility.

140 Article 9 of the Covenant provides as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. 3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement. 4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”

141 Article 10 of the Covenant provides as follows: “1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons; (b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication. 3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status.”

142 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 15 (1986) on the position of aliens under the Covenant (see footnote 97 above), para. 9.

(4) It should be clarified that the safeguards mentioned above apply only to detention for the purpose of ensuring the implementation of an expulsion decision; they are without prejudice to the case of aliens subject to expulsion who have been convicted of a criminal offence, including those situations in which the expulsion of an alien might be ordered as an additional measure or as an alternative to prison.

(5) The important issue of the length of detention, which poses difficult problems in practice, is the subject of draft article 19, paragraph 2, which comprises two subparagraphs. Subparagraph (a) is general in scope and sets out the principle that the detention of an alien with a view to his or her expulsion is subject to time limits. It must be limited to such period of time as is reasonably necessary for the expulsion decision to be carried out and cannot be of excessive duration. Such requirements are confirmed in international case law, the legislation of various States and a significant number of judicial findings of national courts. The words “reasonably necessary” that appear in the second sentence of paragraph 2 (a) are intended to provide administrative authorities and, if necessary, a judicial authority with a standard to assess the necessity and the duration of the detention of an alien for the purpose of expulsion.

(6) Paragraph 2 (b) states that the extension of the duration of the detention may be decided upon only by a court or a person authorized to exercise judicial power. Despite the doubts expressed by some members concerning the applicability of such a requirement in the context of the implementation of immigration rules, the Commission considered it necessary to retain the requirement in order to prevent possible abuses by the administrative authorities with respect to the length of the detention of an alien subject to expulsion. The content of paragraph 2 (b) is inspired by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

143 See, in this regard, the discussion in the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 262–273.

144 The prohibition of excessive duration of detention was affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights with respect to article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights; see in particular Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, para. 113 (footnote 53 above): “The Court recalls, however, that any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1 (a) will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5 § 1 (a) ... It is thus necessary to determine whether the duration of the deportation proceedings was excessive.”

See also Migrant Workers (E/CN.4/2003/85) (footnote 139 above), para. 35 (“Administrative deprivation of liberty should last only for the time necessary for the deportation/expulsion to become effective. Deprivation of liberty should never be indefinite”), and para. 75 (g) ([the recommendation of] “[e]nsuring that the law sets a limit on detention pending deportation and that under no circumstance is detention indefinite”).

145 See, in this regard, the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 249–250 and 262–270. See also the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 726–727.

146 See the many references in the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 252–261, and the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 728–737.

147 See in particular Shamsa v. Poland, nos. 45355/99 and 45357/99, para. 59, 27 November 2003. The Court referred to “the right of habeas corpus” contained in article 5, paragraph 4, of the Convention to “support the idea that detention extended beyond the initial period as envisaged in paragraph 5 calls for the intervention of a ‘court’ as a guarantee against arbitrariness”.

148 See, in this regard, the discussion in the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 726–727.
(7) Draft article 19, paragraph 3, is inspired by a recommendation put forward by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants.\(^{148}\) Paragraph 3 (a) sets out the requirement of regular review of the detention of an alien for the purpose of expulsion on the basis of specific criteria established by law. According to paragraph 3 (a), it is detention as such, as opposed to the initial decision concerning placement in detention, which should be subject to regular review. While some Commission members considered that the safeguards set out in paragraph 3 (a) were of the nature of lex ferenda, others considered that they derived from principles of contemporary human rights law. It was also emphasized that such safeguards flowed from the non-punitive nature of the detention of aliens for the purpose of expulsion.

(8) Paragraph 3 (b) sets out the principle that detention in connection with expulsion shall end when the expulsion cannot be carried out, except where the reasons are attributable to the alien concerned. While the principle was not contested in the Commission, the exception to it gave rise to lively debate. Some members thought that as soon as the enforcement of an expulsion decision became impossible, the reason for the detention vanished and an end must be put to the detention. Other members were of the view that an explicit exception should be made for cases in which the reasons for such an impossibility were attributable to the alien in question. The Commission opted in the end for recognizing such an exception, while indicating clearly in an introductory phrase in paragraph 3 (b) that the entire paragraph should be understood in the light of paragraph 2. This means, in particular, that, under paragraph 2 (a), even in the event that the impossibility of carrying out an expulsion decision is attributable to the alien in question, the alien cannot be kept in detention for an excessive length of time.

**Article 20. Obligation to respect the right to family life**

1. The expelling State shall respect the right to family life of an alien subject to expulsion.

2. The expelling State shall not interfere with the exercise of the right to family life, except where provided by law and on the basis of a fair balance between the interests of the State and those of the alien in question.

**Commentary**

(1) Draft article 20 establishes the obligation of the expelling State to respect the right to family life of an alien subject to expulsion. The Commission considers it necessary to mention this right explicitly in the draft articles because of the particular relevance that it assumes in the context of the expulsion of aliens.\(^{149}\) By the mere fact of compelling an alien to leave the territory of a State, expulsion may undermine the unity of the alien’s family in the event that, for various reasons, family members are not able to follow the alien to the State of destination. It is not surprising, therefore, that the legislation and case law of various States recognize the need to take into account family considerations as a limiting factor in the expulsion of aliens.\(^ {150}\)

(2) The right to family life is enshrined both in universal instruments and in regional conventions for the protection of human rights. At the universal level, article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states the following:

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,\(^ *\) home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Similarly, under the terms of article 5, paragraph 1 (b), of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, aliens enjoy “[t]he right to protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence”.\(^ {151}\)

(3) At the regional level, article 8, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life”. Article 7 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union reproduces this provision in extenso. Under section III (c) of the Protocol to the European Convention on Establishment, the contracting States, in exercising their right of expulsion, must in particular take due account of family ties and the period of residence in their territory of the person concerned. While the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not contain this right, in other respects it is deeply committed to the protection of the family (see art. 18). Article 11, paragraph 2, of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes this right in the same terms as the above-cited article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 21 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights\(^ {152}\) also sets out the right.

(4) The need to respect the family life of an alien subject to expulsion, set out in draft article 20, paragraph 1, does not accord the alien absolute protection against expulsion. Draft article 20, paragraph 2, recognizes that this right may be subject to limitations and sets out the conditions to which such limitations are subjected. In this regard, two cumulative conditions must be met for interference in the exercise of the right to family life resulting from expulsion to be considered as justified.

(5) The first condition, which appears explicitly in article 8, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights and implicitly in article 17, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 21, paragraph 1, of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, ensures that the compartments to which the alien is assigned during the exercise of the right to family life are not cumulative.

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\(^{148}\) Migrant Workers (E/CN.4/2003/85) (see footnote 139 above), para. 75 (g). This recommendation states, “(g) … The decision to detain should be automatically reviewed periodically on the basis of clear legislative criteria. Detention should end when a deportation order cannot be executed for other reasons that are not the fault of the migrant”.

\(^{149}\) See the discussion of this right in the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report (footnote 18 above), paras. 128–147 and the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 446–467.

\(^{150}\) See, in this regard, the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 466–467.

\(^{151}\) See footnote 111 above.

\(^{152}\) See footnote 38 above.
Rights, is that such interference should take place only “in accordance with the law”. That means that the expulsion measure must have an appropriate basis in the law of the expelling State; in other words, it must be taken on the basis of and in accordance with the law of that State.153

(6) The second condition relates to the “fair balance” that must be achieved between the interests of the State and those of the alien in question. The notion of “fair balance” is inspired by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, more specifically, the requirement that “interference” in family life must be “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of paragraph 2 of that article.154 In Moustaquim v. Belgium, the Court concluded that the expulsion of Mr. Moustaquim did not satisfy that requirement.155 Given the circumstances of the case, in particular the long period of time during which Mr. Moustaquim had resided in Belgium, the ties of his close relatives with Belgium as well as the relatively long interval between the latest offence committed by Mr. Moustaquim and the deportation order, the Court came to the conclusion that the measure was not “necessary in a democratic society” since “a proper balance was not achieved between the interests involved, and … the means employed was therefore disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.156 The Court considered on several occasions whether expulsion measures were in conformity with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly in the cases Nasri v. France,157 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden158 and Boultif v. Switzerland.159 In this last case, the Court set forth a list of criteria to be applied in order to determine whether the interference in family life resulting from an expulsion is “necessary in a democratic society”.160

The Court has only a limited number of decided cases where the main obstacle to expulsion was that it would entail difficulties for the spouses to stay together and, in particular, for one of them and/or the children to live in the other’s country of origin. It is therefore called upon to establish guiding principles in order to examine whether the measure in question was necessary in a democratic society.

In assessing the relevant criteria in such a case, the Court will consider the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant; the duration of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he is going to be expelled; the time which has elapsed since the commission of the offence and the applicant’s conduct during that period; the nationalities of the various persons concerned; the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage; other factors revealing whether the couple lead a real and genuine family life; whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship; and whether there are children in the marriage and, if so, their age. Not least, the Court will also consider the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse would be likely to encounter in the applicant’s country of origin, although the mere fact that a person might face certain difficulties in accompanying her or his spouse cannot in itself preclude expulsion.161

(7) The criterion of “fair balance” mentioned in paragraph 2 of draft article 20 also seems compatible with the approach taken by the Human Rights Committee for the purpose of assessing whether expulsion measures are in conformity with article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.162

Chapter III
PROTECTION IN RELATION TO THE STATE OF DESTINATION

Article 21. Departure to the State of destination

1. The expelling State shall take appropriate measures to facilitate the voluntary departure of an alien subject to expulsion.

2. In cases of forcible implementation of an expulsion decision, the expelling State shall take the necessary measures to ensure, as far as possible, the safe transportation to the State of destination of the alien subject to expulsion, in accordance with the rules of international law.

3. The expelling State shall give the alien subject to expulsion a reasonable period of time to prepare for his or her departure, having regard to all circumstances.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 21 concerns in general the protection that an expelling State must accord an alien subject to expulsion in relation to his or her departure to a State of destination.163 The draft article covers the possibility of both voluntary departure and forcible implementation of the expulsion decision.

(2) Draft article 21, paragraph 1, provides that the expelling State shall take appropriate measures to facilitate the voluntary departure of an alien subject to expulsion.164

153This requirement is set out in general terms in draft article 4 above.
154For a detailed discussion of this case law, see the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report (footnote 18 above), paras. 133–147.
156Ibid., paras. 41 and 46.
159Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, ECHR 2001-IX.
160See the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 460.
161Boultif v. Switzerland (footnote 159 above), para. 48.
162According to the Committee, “the separation of a person from his family by means of his expulsion could be regarded as an arbitrary interference with the family and as a violation of article 17 if in the circumstances of the case the separation of the author from his family and its effects on him were disproportionate to the objectives of removal” (communication No. 558/1993, Giosue Canepa v. Canada, Views adopted on 3 April 1997, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 40, vol. II (A/52/40 Vol. II), pp. 115 et seq., at pp. 121–122, para. 11.4). In a previous case, the Committee found the following: “The Committee is of the opinion that the interference with Mr. Stewart’s family relations that will be the inevitable outcome of his deportation cannot be regarded as either unlawful or arbitrary when the deportation order was made under law in furtherance of a legitimate state interest and due consideration was given in the deportation proceedings to the deportee’s family connections. There is therefore no violation of articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant” (communication No. 538/1993, Charles E. Stewart v. Canada, Views adopted on 1 November 1996, ibid., p. 47, at p. 59, para. 12.10).
163See, in this regard, the discussion in the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 403–417.
164Concerning voluntary departure, see the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), para. 404, and the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 697–701.
Even though it aims to a certain extent to make voluntary
departure of the alien the preferred solution, the provision
cannot be interpreted as authorizing the expelling State
to exert undue pressure on the alien to opt for voluntary
departure rather than forcible implementation of an expul-
sion decision.

(3) Paragraph 2 concerns cases of forcible implementa-
tion of an expulsion decision. It provides that in such a case the
expelling State shall take the necessary measures to ensure,
as far as possible, the safe transportation to the State of
destination of the alien subject to expulsion, in accordance
with the rules of international law. It should be clarified in
this regard that the expression “safe transportation … in
accordance with the rules of international law” refers not
only to the requirement to ensure the protection of the rights
of the alien subject to expulsion and avoid any excessive
use of force against the alien but also to the need to ensure,
if necessary, the safety of persons other than the alien in
question, for example the passengers on an aeroplane taken
by the alien to travel to the State of destination.

(4) This requirement was implicit in the arbitral award
rendered in the Lacoste case, although it was held that the
claimant had not been subjected to harsh treatment:

Lacoste further claims damages for his arrest, imprisonment, harsh
and cruel treatment, and expulsion from the country … The expulsion
does not, however, appear to have been accompanied by harsh treat-
ment, and at his request the claimant was allowed an extension of the
term fixed for his leaving the country.165

Similarly, in the Boffolo case, the umpire indicated in gen-
eral terms that

[...]expulsion … must be accomplished in the manner least injurious to
the person affected.166

In the Maal case, the umpire stressed the sacred character of the human person and the requirement that an expulsion
should be accomplished without unnecessary indignity or
hardship:

[H]ad the exclusion of the claimant been accomplished without
unnecessary indignity or hardship to him the umpire would feel
constrained to disallow the claim.

…

From all the proof he came here as a gentleman and was entitled
throughout his examination and deportation to be treated as a gentleman,
and whether we are to consider him as a gentleman or simply as a man
his right to his own person and to his own undisturbed sensibilities is
one of the first rights of freedom and one of the priceless privileges of
liberty. The umpire has been taught to regard the person of another as
one of the first rights of freedom and one of the priceless privileges of
his right to his own person and to his own undisturbed sensibilities is
throughout his examination and deportation to be treated as a gentleman,
and at his request the claimant was allowed an extension of the
term fixed for his leaving the country.165

(5) When transportation of the alien to the State of
destination takes place, for example, by aeroplane, refer-
tence to the rules of international law also covers the
rules relating to air transportation, particularly the regula-
tions adopted in the framework of the International Civil
Aviation Organization. The Convention on International
Civil Aviation and annex 9 thereto should be mentioned in
particular in this respect. The annex states, inter alia, the following:

5.2.1 During the period when … a person to be deported is under
their custody, the state Officers concerned shall preserve the dignity of
such persons and take no action likely to infringe such dignity.

(6) In both situations considered in draft article 21—vol-
untary departure of the alien or forcible implementation of
the expulsion decision—paragraph 3 requires the expelling
State to give the alien a reasonable period of time to prepare
for his or her departure, taking into account all circum-
cstances. The circumstances to be taken into account for the
purpose of determining what seems in the case in question
to be a reasonable period of time vary in nature. They can
relate to, inter alia, ties (social, economic or other) that the
alien subject to expulsion has established with the expelling
State, the conduct of the alien in question, including, where
applicable, the nature of the threat to the national security or
public order of the expelling State that the presence of the
alien in its territory could constitute or the risk that the alien
would evade the authorities of the State in order to avoid
expulsion. The requirement of granting a reasonable period
of time to prepare for departure must also be understood in
the light of the need to permit the alien subject to expulsion
to protect adequately his or her property rights and other
interests in the expelling State.168

Article 22. State of destination of aliens
subject to expulsion

1. An alien subject to expulsion shall be expelled
to his or her State of nationality or any other State that
has the obligation to receive the alien under interna-
tional law, or to any State willing to accept him or her
at the request of the expelling State or, where appro-
priate, of the alien in question.

2. Where the State of nationality or any other
State that has the obligation to receive the alien under
international law has not been identified and no other
State is willing to accept the alien, that alien may be
expelled to any State where he or she has a right
of entry or stay or, where applicable, to the State from
where he or she has entered the expelling State.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 22 concerns the determination of the
State of destination of aliens subject to expulsion.169 In
this context, paragraph 1 refers first of all to the alien’s
State of nationality, since it is undisputed that that State
has an obligation to receive the alien under international
law.170 However, paragraph 1 also recognizes the exist-
ence of other potential States of destination, distinguishing

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165 Lacoste v. Mexico (Mexican Commission), Award of 4 September 1875 (see footnote 52 above), pp. 3347–3348.
166 Boffolo, Mixed Claims Commission (Italy–Venezuela), 1903 (see footnote 52 above), p. 528 (Ralston, Umpire).
168 See paragraph (3) of the commentary to draft article 30 below.
169 See, in this regard, the discussion in the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 462–518, and in the memoran-
dum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 489–532.
170 See, on this point, the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report
(footnote 23 above), paras. 492–498.
between States that might be obliged, under international law, to receive the alien and those that are not obliged to do so. This distinction reflects, with regard to the expulsion of aliens, the uncontested principle that a State is not required to receive aliens in its territory, save where obliged to do so by a rule of international law. While this is a fundamental distinction, it does not necessarily result in an order of priority in determining the State of destination of an expelled alien; in other words, the fact that a State of nationality has been identified and that there is, hypothetically, no legal obstacle to the alien’s expulsion to that State in no way precludes the possibility of expelling the alien to another State that has the obligation to receive the alien under international law, or to any other State willing to accept him or her. In this regard, the Commission is of the view that the expelling State, while retaining a margin of appreciation in the matter, should take into consideration, as far as possible, the preferences expressed by the expelled alien for the purposes of determining the State of destination.\textsuperscript{171}

(2) The wording “or any other State that has the obligation to receive the alien under international law”\textsuperscript{172}\textsuperscript{173} is intended to cover situations where a State other than the State of nationality of the expelled alien would be required to receive that person under a rule of international law, whether a treaty rule binding on that State or a rule of customary international law.\textsuperscript{174} One should also mention, in this context, the position expressed by the Human Rights Committee in relation to article 12, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The scope of “his own country” is broader than the concept “country of his nationality”. It is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or by conferral; it embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or her special ties to or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien. This would be the case, for example, of nationals of a country who have there been stripped of their nationality in violation of international law, and of individuals whose country of nationality has been incorporated into or transferred to another national entity whose nationality is being denied them. The language of article 12, paragraph 4, moreover, permits a broader interpretation that might embrace other categories of long-term residents, including but not limited to stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence. Since other factors may in certain circumstances result in the establishment of close and enduring connections between a person and a country, States parties should include in their reports information on the rights of permanent residents to return to their country of residence.\textsuperscript{175}

(3) Draft article 22, paragraph 2, addresses the situation where it has not been possible to identify either the State of nationality or any other State that has the obligation to receive the alien under international law. In such cases, it is stated that the alien may be expelled to any State where he or she has a right of entry or stay or, where applicable, to the State from where he or she has entered the expelling State. The last phrase (“the State from where he or she has entered the expelling State”) should be understood primarily to mean the State of embarkation, although the chosen wording is sufficiently general also to cover situations where an alien has entered the territory of the expelling State by a mode of transport other than air transport. The content and wording of this paragraph were the subject of intense debate within the Commission. One view expressed was that if no State of destination could be identified in accordance with paragraph 1, the expelling State should authorize the alien subject to expulsion to remain in its territory, since no other State could be forced to receive him or her. Moreover, opinion within the Commission was divided on the issue of whether certain States, such as a State that has issued the alien in question with a travel document, entry permit or residence permit, or the State of embarkation, would have an obligation to receive the alien under international law, in which case paragraph 1 of the draft article would apply. While some members of the Commission considered that a State that had issued an entry permit or residence permit to an alien would have such an obligation, other members believed that by issuing an entry permit or residence permit to an alien a State did not assume any international obligation to receive the alien \textit{vis-à-vis} other States, including a State that had expelled the alien in question from its territory. In that regard, it was argued within the Commission that the State that had issued such a permit would still be entitled to refuse to allow the alien in question to return to its territory, citing reasons of public order or national security. Different views were also expressed regarding the position of the State of embarkation. While the point was made that expulsion to the State of embarkation was a common practice that should be mentioned in the draft articles, the view was also expressed that the State of embarkation has no legal obligation to receive the expelled alien.\textsuperscript{176}

(4) The Commission is aware of the role played by readmission agreements in determining the State of destination of an expelled alien. These agreements fall within the extremely broad scope of international cooperation, in which States exercise their sovereignty in the light of variable considerations that in no way lend themselves to normative standardization through codification. That being the case, the Commission considered that such agreements should not be the subject of a specific draft article. That said, it is important to note that such agreements should be implemented in compliance with the relevant rules of international law, particularly those aimed at protecting the human rights of the alien subject to expulsion.

(5) Determination of the State of destination of the alien subject to expulsion under draft article 22 must be done in compliance with the obligations contained in draft article 6, paragraph 3 (prohibition of refoulement), and in draft articles 23 and 24, which prohibit expulsion of an alien to a State where his or her life or freedom would be threatened or to a State where the alien could be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

\textsuperscript{171} See, in this regard, the discussion in the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 477 and 488.

\textsuperscript{172} For examples of the first hypothesis, see \textit{ibid.}, paras. 506–509.


\textsuperscript{174} There appear to be different views as to whether the expelling State incurs international responsibility for an internationally wrongful act by expelling an alien to a State that has no obligation—and refuses—to receive him or her; see, in this regard, the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 595, and the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 513–518.
Article 23. Obligation not to expel an alien to a State where his or her life or freedom would be threatened

1. No alien shall be expelled to a State where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, birth or other status, or any other ground impermissible under international law.

2. A State that does not apply the death penalty shall not expel an alien to a State where the life of that alien would be threatened with the death penalty, unless it has previously obtained an assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if already imposed, will not be carried out.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 23 deals with protection of the life or freedom of an alien subject to expulsion in relation to the situation in the State of destination. Paragraph 1 prohibits the expulsion of an alien “to a State where his or her life or freedom would be threatened” on one of the grounds set out in draft article 15, which establishes the obligation not to discriminate. The wording referring to a State “where his or her life or freedom would be threatened”, which delimits the scope of this prohibition of expulsion, corresponds to the content of article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, which establishes the prohibition of return (refoulement).

(2) The prohibited grounds of discrimination set out in draft article 15 and reproduced in draft article 23 are those contained in article 2, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Commission considers that there is no valid reason why the list of discriminatory grounds in draft article 23 should be less broad in scope than the list contained in draft article 15. In particular, the Commission was of the view that the list of grounds contained in article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was too narrow for the present draft article, which addressed the situations not only of persons who could be defined as “refugees”, but also of aliens in general, and in a wide range of possible situations.

(3) As is the case of draft article 15, the Commission discussed whether sexual orientation should be included in the prohibited grounds of discrimination. Since divergent views were expressed by members of the Commission on this point, the approach taken in draft article 15 and in the commentary to that draft article was adopted here as well.

(4) Paragraph 2 of draft article 23 concerns the specific situation where the life of an alien subject to expulsion would be threatened in the State of destination by the imposition or execution of the death penalty, unless an assurance has previously been obtained that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if already imposed, will not be carried out.175 The Human Rights Committee has taken the position that, under article 6 of the Covenant, States that have abolished the death penalty may not expel a person to another State in which he or she has been sentenced to death, unless they have previously obtained an assurance that the penalty will not be carried out.176 While it may be considered that, within these precise limits, this prohibition now corresponds to a distinct trend in international law, it would be difficult to state that international law goes any further in this area.177

(5) Consequently, paragraph 2 of draft article 23 constitutes progressive development in two respects: first, because the prohibition established in paragraph 2 covers not only States that have abolished the death penalty, but also States that retain the penalty in their legislation but do not apply it in practice: this is the meaning of the phrase, “[a] State that does not apply the death penalty”; second, because the scope of protection has been extended to cover not only situations where the death penalty has already been imposed but also those where there is a real risk that it will be imposed.

Article 24. Obligation not to expel an alien to a State where he or she may be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

A State shall not expel an alien to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Commentary

(1) The wording of draft article 24, which obliges the expelling State not to expel an alien to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,178 is based on article 3 of the 1984 Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.119 However, draft article 24 broadens the scope of the protection afforded by this provision of the Convention, since the obligation not to expel contained in the draft article

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175 On the issue of the death penalty in the context of expulsion, see the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report (footnote 18 above), paras. 56–67.
176 See, in this regard, Human Rights Committee, communication No. 829/1998, Judge v. Canada, Views adopted on 5 August 2003, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/58/40), vol. II, annex VI, sect. G, para. 10.6: “For these reasons, the Committee considers that Canada, as a State party which has abolished the death penalty, irrespective of whether it has not yet ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, violated the author’s right to life under article 6, paragraph 1, by deporting him to the United States, where he is under sentence of death, without ensuring that the death penalty would not be carried out. The Committee recognizes that Canada did not itself impose the death penalty on the author. But by deporting him to a country where he was under sentence of death, Canada established the crucial link in the causal chain that would make possible the execution of the author.”
177 See, in this regard, the explanations given in the Special Rapporteur’s fifth report (footnote 18 above), para. 66.
178 See, with regard to this obligation, ibid., paras. 73–120, and the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 540–573.
179 Article 3 of the Convention states,

“1. No State party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”

“2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”
covers not only torture, but also other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This broader scope of the prohibition reflects, \textit{inter alia}, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.\footnote{See, in particular, \textit{Chahal v. the United Kingdom}, 15 November 1996 (footnote 53 above), paras. 72–107. In paragraph 80, the Court states, “The prohibition provided by Article 3 ... against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases. Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ... if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the event of expulsion ... In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 ... is thus wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention [relating to the Status of Refugees].” See also the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 567–571.}\footnote{See the recommendation of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to “[e]nsure that non-citizens are not returned or removed to a country or territory where they are at risk of being subject to serious human rights abuses, including torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (general recommendation No. 30 on discrimination against non-citizens, \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 18} (A/59/18), p. 93, para. 27).}

(2) With regard to determining the existence of “substantial grounds” within the meaning of draft article 24, attention should be drawn to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which states that the competent authorities shall take into account “all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights”. This provision has been interpreted on many occasions by the Committee against Torture established pursuant to the Convention, which has considered a number of communications alleging that the expulsion of aliens to particular States was contrary to article 3.\footnote{For a list of relevant communications, see the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 541.}

(3) The Committee against Torture has adopted guidelines concerning the implementation of article 3 in its general comment No. 1.\footnote{Committee against Torture, general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, adopted on 21 November 1997 (\textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 44} (A/53/44), annex IX, pp. 52–53).} These guidelines indicate the information that may be relevant in determining whether the expulsion of an alien to a particular State is consistent with article 3:

The following information, while not exhaustive, would be pertinent:

(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights (see art. 3, para. 2)?

(b) Has the author been tortured or maltreated by or at the instigation of or with the consent of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity in the past? If so, was this the recent past?\footnote{See, on this point, general comment No. 1 (1997) of the Committee against Torture (footnote 183 above), para. 2: “The Committee is of the view that the phrase ‘another State’ in article 3 refers to the State to which the individual concerned is being expelled, returned or extradited, as well as to any State to which the author may subsequently be expelled, returned or extradited”; and other findings of the Committee against Torture mentioned in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 562–564.}

(c) Is there medical or other independent evidence to support a claim by the author that he/she has been tortured or maltreated in the past? Has the torture had after-effects?\footnote{See paragraph (3) of the commentary to draft article 18 above.}

(d) Has the situation referred to in (a) above changed? Has the internal situation in respect of human rights altered?\footnote{See, however, the text of revised draft article 15 (\textit{Yearbook ... 2009}, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/617, p. 171), presented by the Special Rapporteur to the Commission following the debate, paragraph 2 of which contained the additional words “and when the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection”, in order to reflect the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in \textit{H.L.B. v. France}, 29 April 1997 (footnote 53 above).}

(e) Has the author engaged in political or other activity within or outside the State concerned which would appear to make him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger of torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited to the State in question?\footnote{See the findings of the Committee against Torture mentioned in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 562–564.}

(f) Is there any evidence as to the credibility of the author?\footnote{See, however, the text of revised draft article 15 (\textit{Yearbook ... 2009}, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/617, p. 171), presented by the Special Rapporteur to the Commission following the debate, paragraph 2 of which contained the additional words “and when the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection”, in order to reflect the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in \textit{H.L.B. v. France}, 29 April 1997 (footnote 53 above).}

(g) Are there factual inconsistencies in the claim of the author? If so, are they relevant?\footnote{See the findings of the Committee against Torture mentioned in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 562–564.}

The Committee has also indicated that substantial grounds for believing that there is a risk of torture require more than a mere theory or suspicion but less than a high probability of such a risk.\footnote{As was the case for draft article 18, the Commission preferred not to address, in the text of draft article 24, situations where the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment emanated from persons or groups of persons acting in a private capacity. In this regard, it should be recalled that in its general recommendations, the Committee has indicated that such situations would not amount to violation of article 3. See the Committee against Torture, general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, adopted on 21 November 1997 (\textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 44} (A/53/44), annex IX, pp. 52–53).}

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 53, para. 8.} Other elements on which the Committee against Torture has provided important clarifications are the existence of a personal risk of torture;\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 52, para. 6: “Bearing in mind that the State party and the Committee are obliged to assess whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of being subjected to torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited, the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable.” \textit{Ibid.}, p. 52, para. 1: “Article 3 is confined in its application to cases where there are substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of being subjected to torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention.” See also Committee against Torture, communication No. 13/1993, \textit{Mutombo v. Switzerland}, Views adopted on 27 April 1994, \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 44} (A/49/44), pp. 45 et seq., at p. 52, para. 9.3, and other findings of the Committee against Torture mentioned in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 546–548.}

these guidelines indicate the information that may be relevant in determining whether the expulsion of an alien to a particular State is consistent with article 3:

\footnote{See the findings of the Committee against Torture contained in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 549–555.}
comment No. 1, the Committee against Torture expressed the following view on this issue:

Pursuant to article 1, the criterion, mentioned in article 3, paragraph 2, of “a consistent pattern or gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights” refers only to violations by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”

For its part, the European Court of Human Rights has drawn from the absolute character of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights the conclusion that the said provision also covers cases where the danger emanates not from the State of destination itself but from “persons or groups of persons who are not public officials”, when the State of destination is not able to offer adequate protection to the individual concerned.

Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, the Court does not rule out the possibility that Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection.

CHAPTER IV

PROTECTION IN THE TRANSIT STATE

Article 25. Protection in the transit State of the human rights of an alien subject to expulsion

The transit State shall protect the human rights of an alien subject to expulsion, in conformity with its obligations under international law.

Commentary

The implementation of an expulsion order often involves the transit of the alien through one or more States before arrival in the State of destination. In draft article 25, the Commission therefore considered it essential to draw attention to the transit State’s obligation to protect the human rights of the alien subject to expulsion, in conformity with its obligations under international law. The chosen wording clearly indicates that the transit State is obliged to respect only its own obligations under international law. The chosen wording clearly indicates that the transit State is obliged to respect only its own obligations under international law. The chosen wording clearly indicates that the transit State is obliged to respect only its own obligations under international law.

PART FOUR

SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL RULES

Article 26. Procedural rights of aliens subject to expulsion

1. An alien subject to expulsion enjoys the following procedural rights:

(a) the right to receive notice of the expulsion decision;

(b) the right to challenge the expulsion decision;

(c) the right to be heard by a competent authority;

which his father and brother were executed, his sister raped and the rest of the family was forced to flee and constantly move from one part of the country to another in order to hide. Second, his case has received wide publicity and, therefore, if returned to Somalia the author could be subjected to extreme violence. Furthermore, the relative concludes that the said provision also covers cases where the danger emanates not from the State of destination itself but from “persons or groups of persons who are not public officials”, when the State of destination is not able to offer adequate protection to the individual concerned.

Committee against Torture, general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22 (footnote 183 above), para. 3. See also Committee against Torture, communication No. 258/2004, Mustafa Dauda v. Canada, decision adopted on 22 November 2005, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/61/44), pp. 233 et seq., at p. 241, para. 8.4; communication No. 177/2001, H.M.H.I. v. Australia, decision adopted on 1 May 2002, ibid., Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/57/44), pp. 156 et seq., at pp. 171–172, para. 6.4; and communication No. 191/2001, S.S. v. the Netherlands, decision adopted on 5 May 2003, ibid., Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/58/44), pp. 115 et seq., at p. 123, para. 6.4: “[T]he issue of whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention, unless the non-governmental entity occupies and exercises quasi-governmental authority over the territory to which the complainant would be returned.” See also communication No. 237/2003, M.C.M.V.F. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14 November 2005, ibid., Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/61/44), pp. 188 et seq., at p. 194, para. 6.4: “The Committee has not been persuaded that the incidents that concerned the complainant in 2000 and 2003 were linked in any way to her previous political activities or those of her husband, and considers that the complainant has failed to prove sufficiently that those incidents be attributable to State agents or to groups acting on behalf of or under the effective control of State agents” and communication No. 120/1998, Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Views adopted on 14 May 1999, ibid., Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/54/44), pp. 109 et seq., at pp. 119–120, paras. 6.5–6.8.

“... The Committee does not share the State party’s view that the Convention is not applicable in the present case since, according to the State party, the acts of torture the author fears he would be subjected to in Somalia would not fall within the definition of torture set out in article 1 (i.e. pain or suffering inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity, in this instance for discriminatory purposes). The Committee notes that for a number of years Somalia has been without a State party, the acts of torture the author fears he would be subjected to in Somalia would not fall within the definition of torture set out in article 1 (i.e. pain or suffering inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity, in this instance for discriminatory purposes). The Committee notes that for a number of years Somalia has been without a

Committee against Torture, Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 183 above), para. 32. See also Committee against Torture, Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 183 above), para. 32.

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Committee against Torture, Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 183 above), para. 32.`
(d) the right of access to effective remedies to challenge the expulsion decision;

(e) the right to be represented before the competent authority; and

(f) the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used by the competent authority.

2. The rights listed in paragraph 1 are without prejudice to other procedural rights or guarantees provided by law.

3. An alien subject to expulsion has the right to seek consular assistance. The expelling State shall not impede the exercise of this right or the provision of consular assistance.

4. The procedural rights provided for in this article are without prejudice to the application of any legislation of the expelling State concerning the expulsion of aliens who have been unlawfully present in its territory for less than six months.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 26, paragraph 1, sets out a list of procedural rights from which any alien subject to expulsion must benefit, irrespective of whether that person is lawfully or unlawfully present in the territory of the expelling State. The sole exception—to which reference is made in paragraph 4 of the draft article—is that of aliens who have been unlawfully present in the territory of that State for less than six months.

(2) Paragraph 1 (a) sets forth the right to receive notice of the expulsion decision. The expelling State’s respect for this essential guarantee is a conditio sine qua non for the exercise by an alien subject to expulsion of all of his or her procedural rights. This condition was explicitly embodied in article 22, paragraph 3, of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which stipulates that the expulsion decision “shall be communicated to them in a language they understand”. In 1892, the Institute of International Law already expressed the view that “[i]f acte ordonnant l’expulsion est notifié à l’expulsé” [“the expulsion order shall be notified to the expellee”]195 and also that “[s]i l’expulsé a la faculté de recourir à une haute cour judiciaire ou administrative, il doit être informé, par l’acte même, et de cette circonstance et du délai à observer” [“if the expellee is entitled to appear to a high judicial or administrative court, the expulsion order must indicate this and state the deadline for filing the appeal”].196 The legislation of a number of States contains a requirement that a decision on expulsion must be notified to the alien concerned.197

(3) Paragraph 1 (b) sets out the right to challenge the expulsion decision, a right well established in international law. At the universal level, article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides the individual facing expulsion with the right to submit the reasons against his or her expulsion, except where “compelling reasons of national security otherwise require”. It states that “[a]n alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant … shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion”.198 The same right is to be found in article 7 of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, annexed to General Assembly resolution 40/144 of 13 December 1985, which provides that “[a]n alien lawfully in the territory of a State … shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons why he or she should not be expelled”. At the regional level, article 1, paragraph 1 (a), of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights provides that an alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State and subject to an expulsion order shall be allowed “to submit reasons against his expulsion”. Article 3, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Establishment offers the same safeguard by providing that “[e]xcept where imperative considerations of national security otherwise require, a national of any Contracting Party who has been so lawfully residing for more than two years in the territory of any other Party shall not be expelled without first being allowed to submit reasons against his expulsion”. Lastly, the right of an alien to contest his or her expulsion is also embodied in internal law.199

(4) The Commission considers that the right to be heard by a competent authority, set out in paragraph 1 (c), is essential for the exercise of the right to challenge an expulsion decision, which forms the subject of paragraph 1 (b). Although article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly grant the alien the right to be heard, the Human Rights Committee has taken the view that a decision on expulsion adopted without the alien having been given an opportunity to be heard may raise questions under article 13 of the Covenant:

The Committee is also concerned that the Board of Immigration and the Aliens Appeals Board may in certain cases yield their jurisdiction to the Government, resulting in decisions for expulsion or denial of immigration or asylum status without the affected individuals having been given an appropriate hearing. In the Committee’s view, this practice may, in certain circumstances, raise questions under article 13 of the Covenant.200


196 Ibid., art. 31.

197 See the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 649.

198 See Human Rights Committee, communication No. 193/1985, Pierre Giry v. Dominican Republic, Views adopted on 20 July 1990, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/45/40), vol. II, annex IX, sect. C, para. 5.5. The Committee found that the Dominican Republic had violated article 13 of the Covenant by not taking its decision “in accordance with law” and by also omitting to afford the person concerned an opportunity to submit the reasons against his expulsion and have his case reviewed by a competent authority.

199 See the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 61.

The national laws of several States grant aliens the right to be heard during expulsion proceedings, as do many national tribunals.201 Given the divergence in State practice in this area, it cannot be said that international law gives an alien subject to expulsion the right to be heard in person by the competent authority. What is required is that an alien be furnished with an opportunity to explain his or her situation and submit his or her own reasons before the competent authority. In some circumstances, written proceedings may satisfy the requirements of international law. One writer, commenting on the decisions of the Human Rights Committee concerning cases related to articles 13 and 14 of the Covenant, expressed the opinion that “[e]ven though the reasons against a pending expulsion should, as a rule, be asserted in an oral hearing, Art. 13 does not, in contrast to Art. 14(3)(d), give rise to a right to personal appearance”.202

(5) Paragraph 1 (d) sets out the right of access to effective remedies to challenge the expulsion decision. While article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entitles an alien lawfully present in the expelling State to a review of the expulsion decision, it does not specify the type of authority which should undertake the review:

An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed … to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.203

The Human Rights Committee has drawn attention to the fact that the right to a review, as well as the other guarantees provided in article 13, may be departed from only if “compelling reasons of national security” so require. The Committee has also stressed that the remedy at the disposal of the alien expelled must be an effective one:

An alien must be given full facilities for pursuing his remedy against expulsion so that this right will in all the circumstances of his case be an effective one. The principles of article 13 relating to appeal against expulsion and the entitlement to review by a competent authority may only be departed from when “compelling reasons of national security” so require.204

The Human Rights Committee has also considered that protests lodged with the expelling State’s diplomatic or consular missions abroad are not a satisfactory solution under article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

In the Committee’s opinion, the discretionary power of the Minister of the Interior to order the expulsion of any alien, without safeguards, if security and the public interest so require poses problems with regard to article 13 of the Covenant, particularly if the alien entered Syrian territory lawfully and has obtained a residence permit. Protests lodged by the expelled alien with Syrian diplomatic and consular missions abroad are not a satisfactory solution in terms of the Covenant.205

Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights recognizes a right to an effective remedy with respect to a violation of any right or freedom set forth in the Convention, including in cases of expulsion:

Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.

In respect of a complaint based on article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning a case of expulsion, the European Court of Human Rights said the following about the effective remedy to which article 13 refers:

In such cases, given the irreversibility of the harm that might occur if the risk of ill-treatment materialised and the importance the Court attaches to Article 3, the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. This scrutiny must be carried out without regard to what the person may have done to warrant expulsion or to any perceived threat to the national security of the expelling State.206

Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights grants the alien subject to expulsion the right to have his or her case reviewed by a competent authority:

1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall be allowed:

   ... 

   b. to have his case reviewed, and

   ... 

   2. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under paragraph 1 a, b and c of this Article, when such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security.

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201 See the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 621–622.
203 Article cited in Human Rights Committee, communication No. 193/1985, Pierre Giry v. Dominican Republic (footnote 198 above), para. 5.5. (The Committee found that the Dominican Republic had violated article 13 of the Covenant by omitting to afford the person concerned an opportunity to have his case reviewed by a competent authority.)
204 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 15 (1986) on the position of aliens under the Covenant (see footnote 97 above), para. 10. In Eric Hammel v. Madagascar (communication No. 155/1983, Views adopted on 3 April 1987 (see footnote 202 above), para. 19.2), the Committee considered that the claimant had not been given an effective remedy to challenge his expulsion. See also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Merits, Judgment (see footnote 68 above), para. 74.
206 In contrast, the applicability of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in cases of expulsion is less clear. “When no right under the Convention comes into consideration, only the procedural guarantees that concern remedies in general are applicable. While Article 6 only refers to remedies concerning ‘civil rights and obligations’ and ‘criminal charges’, the Court has interpreted the provision as including also disciplinary sanctions. Measures such as expulsion that significantly affect individuals should also be regarded as covered” (Giorgio Gaja, “Exile, Expulsion and the European Convention on Human Rights”, see footnote 103 above), pp. 309–310.
207 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, para. 151 (footnote 53 above).
Similarly, article 3, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Establishment provides as follows:

Except where imperative considerations of national security otherwise require, a national of any Contracting Party who has been so lawfully residing for more than two years in the territory of any other Party shall not be expelled without first being allowed to submit reasons against his expulsion and to appeal to, and be represented for the purpose before, a competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.*

Article 83 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; article 32, paragraph 2, of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; article 31, paragraph 2, of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; article 9, paragraph 5, of the European Convention on the legal status of migrant workers; and article 26, paragraph 2, of the Arab Charter on Human Rights also require that there be a possibility of appealing against an expulsion decision. This right to a review procedure has also been recognized, in decisions which are identical to those of article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by the General Assembly in article 7 of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, annexed to General Assembly resolution 40/144:

An alien lawfully in the territory of a State may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons why he or she should not be expelled and to have the case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.*

In its general recommendation No. 30, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stressed the need for an effective remedy in the event of expulsion and recommended that States parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination should

[ensure that] … non-citizens have equal access to effective remedies, including the right to challenge expulsion orders, and are allowed effectively to pursue such remedies.205

The requirement that the alien subject to expulsion be provided with a review procedure has also been stressed by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with respect to illegal immigrants:

The Commission does not wish to call into question nor is it calling into question the right of any State to take legal action against illegal immigrants and deport them to their countries of origin, if the competent courts so decide. It is however of the view that it is unacceptable to deport individuals without giving them the possibility to plead their case before the competent national courts as this is contrary to the spirit and letter of the [African] Charter [on Human and Peoples’ Rights] and international law.206

Similarly, in another case, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that Zambia had violated the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by not giving an individual the opportunity to challenge an expulsion order:

36. Zambia has contravened Article 7 of the Charter in that it was not allowed to pursue the administrative measures, which were opened to him in terms of the Citizenship Act … By all accounts, Banda’s residence and status in Zambia had been accepted. He had made a contribution to the politics of the country. The provisions of Article 12 (4) have been violated.

…

38. John Lyson Chinula was in an even worse predicament. He was not given any opportunity to contest the deportation order. Surely, government cannot say that Chinula had gone underground in 1974 having overstayed his visiting permit. Chinula, by all account, was a prominent businessman and politician. If government wished to act against him they could have done so. That they did not, does not justify the arbitrary nature of the arrest and deportation on 31 August 1994. He was entitled to have his case heard in the Courts of Zambia. Zambia has violated Article 7 of the Charter.

…

52. Article 7 (1) (a) states that: “Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard.

…

(a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed …”

53. The Zambia government by denying Mr. Chinula the opportunity to appeal his deportation order has deprived him of a right to a fair hearing which contravenes all Zambian domestic laws and international human rights laws.211

(6) Paragraph 1 (e), the content of which is based on article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, gives an alien subject to expulsion the right to be represented before the competent authority. In the Commission’s opinion, from the standpoint of international law, this right does not necessarily encompass the right to be represented by a lawyer during expulsion proceedings.

(7) The Commission considers that the right of an alien to the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used by the competent authority, which is set out in paragraph 1 (f) and recognized in the legislation of a number of States, is an essential element of the right to be heard, which is set out in paragraph 1 (e). It is also of some relevance to the right to be notified of the expulsion decision and the right to challenge that decision, to which paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of this draft article refer. In this connection, it will be noted that the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concerns at reports of “ill-treatment of children by police during forced expulsion to the country of origin where, in some cases, they were deported without access

208 See footnote 38 above.


212 See the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 645.
to … interpretation”. The Commission takes the view that free interpretation is vital to the effective exercise by the alien in question of all of his or her procedural rights. In this context, the alien must inform the competent authorities of the language or languages which he or she is able to understand. However, the Commission considers that the right to the free assistance of an interpreter should not be construed as including the right to the translation of possibly voluminous documentation, or to interpretation into a language that is not commonly used in the region where the State is located or at the international level, provided that this can be done without impeding the fairness of the hearing. The wording of paragraph 1 (f) is based on article 14, paragraph 3 (f), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which makes provision for that right in the context of criminal proceedings.

(8) The Commission is of the view that under general international law the expelling State must respect the procedural rights set forth in draft article 26, paragraph 1. Nevertheless, paragraph 2 specifies that the procedural rights listed in paragraph 1 are without prejudice to other procedural rights or guarantees provided by law. This refers primarily to the rights or guarantees that the expelling State’s legislation offers aliens (for example, possibly a right to free legal assistance214), which that State would be bound to respect by virtue of its international legal obligation to comply with the law throughout the expulsion procedure.215 In addition, paragraph 2 should be understood to preserve any other procedural right to which an alien subject to expulsion is entitled under a rule of international law, in particular one laid down in a treaty, which is binding on the expelling State.

(9) Draft article 26, paragraph 3, deals with consular assistance, the purpose of which is to safeguard respect for the rights of an alien subject to expulsion. This paragraph refers to the alien’s right to seek consular assistance, which is not synonymous with a right to obtain that assistance. From the standpoint of international law, the alien’s State of nationality remains free to decide whether or not to furnish him or her with assistance, and the draft article does not address the question of the possible existence of a right to consular assistance under that State’s internal law. At the same time, the expelling State is bound, under international law, not to impede the exercise by an alien of his or her right to seek consular assistance or, as the case may be, the provision of such assistance by the sending State. The right of an alien subject to expulsion to seek consular assistance is also expressly embodied in some national legislation.216

(10) The consular assistance referred to in draft article 26, paragraph 3, encompasses the various forms of assistance that the alien subject to expulsion might receive from his or her State of nationality in conformity with the rules of international law on consular relations, most of which are reflected in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963. The right of the alien concerned to seek consular assistance and the obligations of the expelling State in that context must be ascertained in the light of those rules. Particular mention should be made of article 5 of the Convention, which lists consular functions, and of article 36, which concerns communication between consular officials and nationals of the sending State. Article 36, paragraph 1 (a), guarantees freedom of communication in very general terms, which suggests that it is a guarantee that applies fully in expulsion proceedings. Moreover the same guarantee is set forth in equally general terms in article 10 of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, annexed to General Assembly resolution 40/144.217 Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which concerns a person who has been committed to prison or to custody pending trial, or who has been detained in any other manner, requires the receiving State to inform the consular post if the person concerned so requests and to inform the person of his or her rights in that respect. Paragraph 1 (c) states that consular officials shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who has been placed in detention. The International Court of Justice has applied article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in contexts other than that of the expulsion of aliens, for example in the cases concerning LaGrand and Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.218 The Court noted that “Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the obligations the receiving State has towards the detained person and the sending State”219 and that “[t]he clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of no doubt”.220 The Court again examined this question in relation to detention for the purpose of expulsion in its judgment of 30 November 2010 in the Diallo case. In accordance with the precedent established in the case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals,221 the Court noted that it is for the authorities of the State which proceeded with the arrest to inform on their own initiative the arrested person of his right to ask for his consulate to be notified; the fact that the person did not make such a request not only fails to justify non-compliance with the obligation to inform which is incumbent on the arresting State, but could also be explained in some cases precisely by the fact that the person had not been informed of his rights in that respect … Moreover, the fact that the consular authorities of the national State of the arrested person have learned of the arrest through other channels does not remove any violation that may have been committed of the obligation to inform that person of his rights “without delay”.222

213 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Spain, 7 June 2002 (CRC/C/15/Add.185), para. 45 (a).
214 See the discussion of this issue in the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 641, and in the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 386–389.
215 See draft article 4 above and commentary thereto.
216 See the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 631. See also the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 373–378.
217 This provision reads, “Any alien shall be free at any time to communicate with the consulate or diplomatic mission of the State of which he or she is a national or, in the absence thereof, with the consulate or diplomatic mission of any other State entrusted with the protection of the interests of the State of which he or she is a national in the State where he or she resides”.
219 LaGrand (see previous footnote), para. 77.
220 Ibid.
221 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (see footnote 218 above), para. 76.
222 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Merits, Judgment (see footnote 68 above), para. 95.
Having noted that the Democratic Republic of the Congo had not provided “the slightest piece of evidence” to corroborate its assertion that it had orally informed Mr. Diallo of his rights, the Court found that there had been a violation by that State of article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.223

(11) Paragraph 4 concerns aliens who have been unlawfully present in the territory of the expelling State for less than six months. It takes the form of a “without prejudice” clause which, in such cases, seeks to preserve the application of any legislation of the expelling State concerning the expulsion of such persons. While some members contended that there was a hard core of procedural rights from which all aliens without exception must benefit, the Commission preferred to follow a realistic approach, because it could not disregard the fact that several States’ national laws make provision for simplified procedures for the expulsion of aliens unlawfully present in their territory. Under these procedures such aliens often do not even have the right to challenge their expulsion, let alone the procedural rights enumerated in paragraph 1, whose purpose is to give effect to that right. This being so, an exercise in the progressive development of international law, the Commission considered that even foreigners unlawfully present in the territory of the expelling State for a specified minimum period of time should have the procedural rights listed in paragraph 1. After analysing some national legislation,224 the Commission concluded that it was reasonable to set the duration of that period at six months. Some members thought that factors other than the duration of the alien’s unlawful presence in the expelling State’s territory ought to be borne in mind when determining the procedural rights that that alien should enjoy during expulsion proceedings. In that connection, reference was made to the level of (social, occupational, economic or family) integration of the alien in question. The Commission considered, however, that assessing and applying such criteria would be difficult, especially as national practice diverged in that respect.

Article 27. Suspensive effect of an appeal against an expulsion decision

An appeal lodged by an alien subject to expulsion who is lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State shall have a suspensive effect on the expulsion decision.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 27, which recognizes the suspensive effect of an appeal lodged against an expulsion decision by an alien lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State, is progressive development of international law. The Commission considers that State practice in the matter is not sufficiently uniform or convergent to form the basis, in existing law, of a rule of general international law providing for the suspensive effect of an appeal against an expulsion decision.225

(2) However, the Commission considered that the recognition of a suspensive effect in a draft article was warranted. One of the reasons militating in favour of a suspensive effect is certainly the fact that, unless the execution of the expulsion decision is stayed, an appeal might well be ineffective in view of the potential obstacles to return, including those of an economic nature, that might be faced by an alien who in the intervening period has had to leave the territory of the expelling State as a result of an expulsion decision, the unlawfulness of which was determined only after his or her departure.

(3) According to one point of view expressed within the Commission, positive law already recognized the suspensive effect of an appeal against an expulsion decision when an alien could reasonably plead that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the State of destination226 or that there was risk of being subjected to ill-treatment there227 as grounds for challenging the decision. In addition, with a view to progressive development, some members would have preferred the Commission to recognize the suspensive effect not only of an appeal lodged by an alien lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State, but also of an appeal lodged by certain categories of aliens who, although unlawfully present in its territory, had already been there for some time or met other conditions, such as a sufficient level of social, economic, family or other integration in the expelling State.

(4) In this context, it is interesting to note the position of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the effects of an appeal on the execution of the decision. While the Court recognized the discretion enjoyed by States parties in this respect, it indicated that measures whose effects are potentially irreversible should not be enforced before the national authorities have determined whether they are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. For example, in the case of Čonka v. Belgium, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of article 13 of the Convention:

The Court considers that the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires that the remedy may prevent the execution of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose effects are potentially irreversible … Consequently, it is inconsistent with Article 13 for such measures to be executed before the national authorities have examined whether they are compatible with the Convention, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision.228

(5) One might also mention that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recommended that aliens expelled from the territory of a member State of the Council of Europe should be entitled to a suspensive appeal, which should be considered within three months from the date of the decision on expulsion:

With regard to expulsion:

…

general rule regarding the suspensive effect of a remedy against an expulsion decision (footnote 23 above), paras. 453–457.

222 See draft article 23 above.

227 See draft article 24 above.

228 Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99 (see footnote 98 above), para. 79.
2. any decision to expel a foreigner from the territory of a Council of Europe member state should be subject to a right of suspensive appeal;

3. if an appeal against expulsion is lodged, the appeal procedure should be completed within three months of the original decision to expel.229

In this context, it is interesting to note that the Parliamentary Assembly also took the view that an alien who was not lawfully present also had this right of appeal:

An alien without a valid residence permit may be removed from the territory of a member state only on specified legal grounds which are other than political or religious. He shall have the right and the possibility of appealing to an independent appeal authority before being removed. It should be studied if also, or alternatively, he shall have the right to bring his case before a judge. He shall be informed of his rights. If he applies to a court or to a high administrative authority, no removal may take place as long as the case is pending.

A person holding a valid residence permit may only be expelled from the territory of a member state in pursuance of a final court order.230

The Commission did not go as far as this.

**Article 28. Procedures for individual recourse**

An alien subject to expulsion shall have access to any available procedure involving individual recourse to a competent international body.

**Commentary**

The purpose of draft article 28 is to make it clear that aliens subject to expulsion may, in some cases, be entitled to individual recourse to a competent international body. The individual recourse procedures in question are mainly those established under various universal and regional human rights instruments.

**Part Five**

**LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXPULSION**

**Article 29. Readmission to the expelling State**

1. An alien lawfully present in the territory of a State, who is expelled by that State, shall have the right to be readmitted to the expelling State if it is established by a competent authority that the expulsion was unlawful, save where his or her return constitutes a threat to national security or public order, or where the alien otherwise no longer fulfils the conditions for admission under the law of the expelling State.

2. In no case may the earlier unlawful expulsion decision be used to prevent the alien from being readmitted.

(1) Draft article 29 recognizes, as an exercise in progressive development and when certain conditions are met, that an alien who has had to leave the territory of a State owing to an unlawful expulsion has the right to re-enter the territory of the expelling State. Although recognition of such a right—on a variety of conditions—may be discerned in the legislation of some States231 and even at the international level,232 practice does not appear to converge enough for it to be possible to affirm the existence, in positive law, of a right to readmission, as an individual right of an alien who has been unlawfully expelled.

(2) Even from the standpoint of progressive development, the Commission was cautious about formulating any such right. Draft article 29 therefore concerns solely the case of an alien lawfully present in the territory of the State in question who has been expelled unlawfully and applies only when a competent authority has established that the expulsion was unlawful and when the expelling State cannot validly invoke one of the reasons mentioned in the draft article as grounds for refusing to readmit the alien in question.

(3) The adjective “unlawful” qualifying expulsion in the draft article refers to any expulsion in breach of a rule of international law. It must also, however, be construed in the light of the principle, set forth in article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and reiterated in draft article 4, that an alien may be expelled only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law, that is to say primarily in accordance with the internal law of the expelling State.

(4) Under draft article 29, a right of readmission is recognized only in situations where the authorities of the expelling State, or an international body such as a court or a tribunal that is competent to do so, have found in a binding determination that expulsion was unlawful. Such a determination is not present when an expulsion decision that was unlawful at the moment when it was taken is held by the competent authorities to have been cured in accordance with the law. The Commission considered that it would have been inappropriate to make the recognition of this right subject to the annulment of the unlawful expulsion decision, since in principle only the authorities of the expelling State are competent to annul such a decision. The wording of draft article 29 also covers situations where expulsion has occurred without the


adoption of a formal decision, in other words through conduct attributable to the expelling State. That said, by making the right of readmission subject to the existence of a prior determination by a competent authority as to the unlawfulness of the expulsion, draft article 29 avoids giving the alien, in this context, the right to judge for him or herself whether the expulsion to which he or she has been subject was lawful or unlawful.

(5) Draft article 29 should not be understood as conferring on the determinations of international bodies legal effects other than those for which provision is made in the instrument by which the body in question was established. It recognizes only, as a matter of progressive development, and on an independent basis, a right to readmission to the territory of the expelling State, the existence of which right is subject, inter alia, to a previous determination that the expulsion was unlawful.

(6) As this draft article clearly indicates, the expelling State retains the right to deny readmission to an alien who has been unlawfully expelled, if that determination constitutes a threat to national security or public order or if, for any other reason, the alien no longer fulfils the conditions for admission under the law of the expelling State. The Commission is of the view that it is necessary to allow such exceptions to readmission in order to preserve a fair balance between the rights of the unlawfully expelled alien and the power of the expelling State to control the entry of any alien to its territory in accordance with its legislation in force when a decision is to be taken on the readmission of the alien in question. The purpose of the final exception mentioned in draft article 29 is to take account of the fact that, in some cases, the circumstances or facts forming the basis on which an entry visa or residence permit was issued to the alien might no longer exist. A State’s power to assess the conditions for readmission must, however, be exercised in good faith. For example, the expelling State would not be entitled to refuse readmission on the basis of legislative provisions that made the mere existence of a previous expulsion decision a bar to readmission. This restriction is reflected in draft article 29, paragraph 2, which states, “In no case may the earlier unlawful expulsion decision be used to prevent the alien from being readmitted”. This formulation draws on the wording of article 22, paragraph 5, of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

(7) Lastly, recognition of a right to readmission under draft article 29 is without prejudice to the legal regime governing the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, to which reference is made in draft article 31. In particular, the legal rules governing reparation for an internationally wrongful act remain relevant in the context of the expulsion of aliens.

Article 30. Protection of the property of an alien subject to expulsion

The expelling State shall take appropriate measures to protect the property of an alien subject to expulsion, and shall, in accordance with the law, allow the alien to dispose freely of his or her property, even from abroad.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 30, which concerns the protection of the property of an alien subject to expulsion, establishes two obligations for the expelling State. The first relates to the adoption of measures to protect the property of the alien in question, while the second concerns the free disposal by the alien of his or her property.

(2) The wording of draft article 30 is sufficiently general to encompass all the guarantees relating to the protection of the property of an alien subject to expulsion under the applicable legal instruments. It should be recalled that article 17, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property”. Concerning expulsion more specifically, article 22 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families provides the following:

6. In case of expulsion, the person concerned shall have a reasonable opportunity before or after departure to settle any claims for wages and other entitlements due to him or her and any pending liabilities.

…

9. Expulsion from the State of employment shall not in itself prejudice any rights of a migrant worker or a member of his or her family acquired in accordance with the law of that State, including the right to receive wages and other entitlements due to him or her.

At the regional level, article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights states that

[The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.

The American Convention on Human Rights states, in article 21 on the right to property:

1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.

2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.

Similarly, article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights states:

Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

233 See, in this regard, the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 527–552.

234 See footnote 92 above.
Lastly, article 31 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights states:

Everyone has a guaranteed right to own private property, and shall not under any circumstances be arbitrarily or unlawfully divested of all or any part of his property.

(3) It may be considered that the obligation to protect the property of an alien subject to expulsion ought to involve allowing the individual a reasonable opportunity to protect his or her property rights and other interests that he or she may have in the expelling State. Failure to give an alien such opportunity has given rise to international claims. As early as 1892, the Institute of International Law adopted a resolution containing a provision indicating that aliens who are domiciled or resident, or have a commercial establishment in the expelling State, shall be given the opportunity to settle their affairs and interests before leaving the territory of that State:

L’expulsion d’étrangers domiciliés, résidants ou ayant un établissement de commerce, ne doit être prononcée que de manière à ne pas troubler la confiance qu’ils ont eue dans les lois de l’État. Elle doit leur laisser la liberté d’user, soit directement si c’est possible, soit par l’entremise de tiers par eux choisis, de toutes les voies légales pour liquider leur situation et leurs intérêts, tant actifs que passifs, sur le territoire.

[Deportation of aliens who are domiciled or resident or who have a commercial establishment in the territory shall only be ordered in a manner that does not betray the trust they have had in the laws of the State. It shall give them the freedom to use, directly where possible or by the mediation of a third party chosen by them, every possible legal process to settle their affairs and their interests, including their assets and liabilities, in the territory.]

More than a century later, the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal held, in Rankin, that an expulsion was unlawful if it denied the alien concerned a reasonable opportunity to protect his or her property interests:

The implementation of this policy could, in general terms, be violative of both procedural and substantive limitations on a State’s right to expel aliens from its territory, as found in the provisions of the Treaty of Amity,[ Economic Relations and Consular Rights] and in customary international law.

Similarly, with regard in particular to migrant workers, paragraph 18 (sect. VI) of the Migration for Employment Recommendation (Revised), 1949 (No. 86) adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organization, reads as follows:

(1) When a migrant for employment has been regularly admitted to the territory of a Member, the said Member should, as far as possible, refrain from removing such person or the members of his family from its territory on account of his lack of means or the state of the employment market, unless an agreement to this effect has been concluded between the competent authorities of the emigration and immigration territories concerned.

(2) Any such agreement should provide:

(c) that the migrant must have been given reasonable notice so as to give him time, more particularly to dispose of his property (emphasis added).

As has been pointed out, such considerations are taken into account in national laws, which, inter alia, may afford the alien a reasonable opportunity to settle any claims for wages or other entitlements before his or her departure or provide for the necessary actions to be taken in order to ensure the safety of the alien’s property while the alien is detained pending deportation. More generally, the need to protect the property of aliens subject to expulsion is also taken into account, to varying degrees and in different ways, by the laws of a number of States.

(4) According to draft article 30, an alien must be guaranteed the free disposal of his or her property “in accordance with the law”. This clarification should not be interpreted as allowing the expelling State to apply laws that would have the effect of denying or limiting arbitrarily the free disposal of property. However, it takes sufficient account of the interest that the expelling State may have in limiting or prohibiting, in accordance with its own laws, the free disposal of certain assets, particularly assets that were illegally acquired by the alien in question or that might be the proceeds of criminal or other unlawful activities. Furthermore, the clarification that the alien should be allowed to dispose freely of his or her property “even from abroad” is intended to address the specific needs, where applicable, of an alien who has already left the territory of the expelling State because of an expulsion decision concerning him or her. That point

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237 See footnote 38 above.
238 See, in this regard, the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), paras. 711–714.
239 In the Hollander case, the United States claimed compensation from Guatemala for the summary expulsion of one of its citizens and pointed out that Mr. Hollander “was literally hurled out of the country, leaving behind wife and children, business, property, everything dear to him and dependent upon him [and claimed that] [t]he Government of Guatemala, whatever its laws may permit, had not the right in time of peace and domestic tranquility to expel Hollander without notice or opportunity to make arrangements for his family and business, on account of an alleged offense committed more than three months before” (John Bassett Moore, A Digest of the International Law (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1906), vol. IV, p. 107). See also letter from the United States Department of State to Congressman, 15 December 1961 in Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 8 (1967), p. 861 (case of Dr. Breger): “As to Dr. Breger’s expulsion from the Island of Rhodes in 1938, it may be pointed out that under generally accepted principles of international law, a state may expel an alien whenever it wishes, provided it does not carry out the expulsion in an arbitrary manner, such as by using unnecessary force to effect the expulsion or by otherwise mistreating the alien or by refusing to allow the alien a reasonable opportunity to safeguard property. In view of Dr. Breger’s statement to the effect that he was ordered by the Italian authorities to leave the Island of Rhodes within six months, it appears doubtful that international liability of the Italian Government could be based on the ground that he was not given enough time to safeguard his property” (Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (footnote 103 above), p. 503).
243 See the memorandum by the Secretariat (footnote 10 above), para. 714.
244 For an overview, see ibid., para. 481.
was taken into account by the International Court of Justice in its 2010 judgment in the Diallo case, although the Court ultimately found that in the case in question Mr. Diallo’s direct rights as associé had not been violated by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, because “no evidence [had] been provided that Mr. Diallo would have been precluded from taking any action to convene general meetings from abroad, either as associé or as associé...”

(5) It is understood that the rules set forth in draft article 30 are without prejudice to the right any State has to expropriate or nationalize the property of an alien, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law.

(6) The issue of the property rights of enemy aliens in time of armed conflict is not specifically addressed in draft article 30, since the Commission’s choice, as mentioned in the commentary to draft article 10, is not to address aspects of the expulsion of aliens in time of armed conflict. It should, however, be noted that the issue of property rights in the event of armed conflict was the subject of extensive discussions in the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission.

**Article 31. Responsibility of States in cases of unlawful expulsion**

The expulsion of an alien in violation of international obligations under the present draft articles or any other rule of international law entails the international responsibility of the expelling State.

**Commentary**

(1) It is undisputed that an expulsion in violation of a rule of international law entails the international responsibility of the expelling State for an internationally wrongful act. In this regard, draft article 31 is to be read in the light of Part Two of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. Part Two sets out the content of the international responsibility of a State, including in the context of the expulsion of aliens.

(2) The fundamental principle of full reparation by the State of the injury caused by an internationally wrongful act is stated in article 31 of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, while article 34 sets out the various forms of reparation, namely restitution (art. 35), compensation (art. 36) and satisfaction (art. 37). The jurisprudence on reparation in cases of unlawful expulsion is particularly abundant.

(3) Restitution, in the form of the return of the alien to the expelling State, has sometimes been chosen as a form of reparation. In this regard, the first Special Rapporteur on international responsibility, Mr. Garcia Amador, stated, “In cases of arbitrary expulsion, satisfaction has been given in the form of the revocation of the expulsion order and the return of the expelled alien.” He was referring, in this context, to the Lampton and Wiltbank cases (concerning two United States citizens expelled from Nicaragua in 1894) and the case of four British subjects also expelled from Nicaragua. The right of return in case of unlawful expulsion has been recognized by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in connection with the arbitrary expulsion of a foreign priest.

(4) Compensation is a well-recognized means of reparation for the injury caused by an unlawful expulsion to the alien expelled or to the State of nationality. It is not disputed that the compensable injury includes both material and moral damage. A new approach was taken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the right to reparation by including interruption of the life plan in the category of harm suffered by victims of violations of human rights. Damages have been awarded...
awarded by a number of arbitral tribunals to aliens who had been victims of unlawful expulsions. In the *Paquet* case, the umpire held that, given the arbitrary nature of the expulsion, the Government of Venezuela should pay Mr. Paquet compensation for the direct damages he had suffered:

… the general practice among governments is to give explanations to the government of the person expelled if it asks them, and when such explanations are refused, as in the case under consideration, the expulsion can be considered as an arbitrary act of such a nature as to entail repair, which is aggravated in the present case by the fact that the attributes of the executive power, according to the Constitution of Venezuela, do not extend to the power to prohibit the entry into the national territory, or expelling therefrom the domiciled foreigners whom the Government suspects of being prejudicial to the public order;

That, besides, the sum demanded does not appear to be exaggerated—

Decides that this claim of N. A. Paquet is allowed for 4,500 francs.257

Damages were also awarded by the umpire in the *Oliva* case to compensate the loss resulting from the breach of a concession contract, although these damages were limited to those related to the expenditures that the alien had incurred and the time he had spent in order to obtain the contract.258 Commissioner Agnoli had considered that the arbitrary nature of the expulsion would by itself have justified a demand for damages:

[An indemnity of not less than 40,000 bolívares should be conceded, independently of any sum which might justly be found due him for losses resulting from the arbitrary rupture of the contract aforementioned, since there can be no doubt that, even had he not obtained the concession referred to, the sole fact of his arbitrary expulsion would furnish sufficient ground for a demand of indemnity.259

In other cases, it was the unlawful manner in which the expulsion had been carried out (including the duration and conditions of a detention pending deportation) that gave rise to compensation. In the *Maal* case, the umpire awarded damages to the claimant because of the harsh treatment he had suffered. Given that the individuals who had carried out the deportation had not been punished, the umpire considered that the sum awarded needed to be sufficient in order for the State responsible to “express its appreciation of the indignity” inflicted on the claimant:

The umpire has been taught to regard the person of another as something to be held sacred, and that it could not be touched even in the lightest manner, in anger or without cause, against his consent, and if so done it is considered an assault for which damages must be given commensurate with the spirit and the character of the assault and the quality of the manhood represented in the individual thus assaulted. … And since there is no proof or suggestion that those in discharge of this important duty of the Government of Venezuela have been reprimanded, punished or discharged, the only way in which there can be an expression of regret on the part of the Government and a discharge of its duty toward the subject of a sovereign and a friendly State is by making an indemnity therefor in the way of money compensation. This must be of a sufficient sum to express its appreciation of the indignity practised upon this subject and its high desire to fully discharge such obligation.

In the opinion of the umpire the respondent Government should be held to pay the claimant Government in the interest of and on behalf of the claimant, solely because of these indignities the sum of five hundred dollars in gold coin of the United States of America, or its equivalent in silver at the current rate of exchange at the time of the payment; and judgment may be entered accordingly.260

In the *Dillon* case, damages were awarded to compensate maltreatment inflicted on the claimant due to the duration and conditions of his detention:

The long period of detention, however, and the keeping of the claimant *incommunicado* and uninformed about the purpose of his detention, constitute in the opinion of the Commission a maltreatment and a hardship unwarranted by the purpose of the arrest and amounting to such a degree as to make the United Mexican States responsible under international law. And it is found that the sum in which an award should be made, can be properly fixed at $2500, U.S. currency, without interest.261

In the *Yeager* case, the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal awarded the claimant compensation for (a) the loss of personal property that he had to leave behind because he had not been given sufficient time to leave the country,262 and (b) for the money seized at the airport by the “Revolutionary Komitehs.”263 In some instances, the European Court of Human Rights has awarded a sum of money as compensation for non-pecuniary damages resulting from an unlawful expulsion. In *Moustaquim v. Belgium*, the Court disallowed a claim for damages based on the loss of earnings resulting from an expulsion in violation of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, citing the absence of a causal link between the violation and the alleged loss of earnings. However, the Court awarded the applicant, on an equitable basis, 100,000 Belgian francs as a compensation for non-pecuniary damages for the period that he had to live away from his family and friends, in a country where he had no ties.264 In the *Čonka v. Belgium* case, the European Court of Human Rights awarded the sum of 10,000 euros to compensate non-pecuniary damages resulting from a deportation that had violated article 5, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the European Convention on Human Rights (Right to liberty and security), article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to that Convention (Prohibition of collective expulsion), as well as article 13 of the Convention (Right to an effective remedy) taken in conjunction with article 4 of Protocol No. 4.265

(5) Satisfaction as a form of reparations is addressed in article 37 of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.266 It is likely to be applied

257 *Paquet* (Expulsion), Mixed Claims Commission (Belgium–Venezuela), 1903 (see footnote 52 above), p. 325 (Flitz, Umpire).

258 *Oliva* (Expulsion), Mixed Claims Commission (Belgium–Venezuela), 1903 (see footnote 52 above). See p. 607–609 (Rakston, Umpire).

259 *Oliva* (see footnote 52 above), p. 602 (Agnoli, Commissioner).


263 Ibid., p. 110, paras. 61–63.


265 *Čonka v. Belgium*, no. 51564/99 (see footnote 98 above), paras. 42 et seq.

266 *Yearbook ... 2001*, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, pp. 105–107.
in the case of an unlawful expulsion, particularly in situations where the expulsion decision has not yet been executed. In such cases, the European Court of Human Rights considered that a judgment determining the unlawfulness of the expulsion order was an appropriate form of satisfaction and therefore abstained from awarding non-pecuniary damages. Attention may be drawn in this respect to Beldjoudi v. France,267 Chahal v. the United Kingdom268 and Ahmed v. Austria.269 It is relevant to recall in this connection that the Commission itself, in its commentary to article 37 on State responsibility, stated, “One of the most common modalities of satisfaction provided in the case of moral or non-material injury to the State is a declaration of the wrongfulness of the act by a competent court or tribunal”.270 Again with respect to satisfaction as a form of reparation, it should be noted that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights does not limit itself to awarding compensation to victims of unlawful expulsion, considering that “the reparations that must be made by the State necessarily include effectively investigating the facts [and] punishing all those responsible”.271

(6) The question of reparation for internationally wrongful acts related to the expulsion of an alien was recently addressed by the International Court of Justice in its judgment of 30 November 2010 in the Diallo case:

Having concluded that the Democratic Republic of the Congo has breached its obligations under Articles 9 and 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 6 and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations …, it is for the Court now to determine, in light of Guinea’s final submissions, what consequences flow from these internationally wrongful acts giving rise to the DRC’s international responsibility.272

After recalling the legal regime governing reparation, based on the principle, established by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case concerning the Factory at Chorzów, that the reparation must, as far as possible, “wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”273 and the principle, recently recalled in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), that the reparation can take “the form of compensation or satisfaction, or even both”,274 the International Court of Justice stated as follows:

In the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the fundamental character of the human rights obligations breached and Guinea’s claim for reparation in the form of compensation, the Court is of the opinion that, in addition to a judicial finding of the violations, reparation due to Guinea for the injury suffered by Mr. Diallo must take the form of compensation.275 Subsequently, on 19 June 2012, the Court handed down a judgment on the question of compensation payable by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Guinea.276 It awarded Guinea compensation of US$85,000 for the non-material injury suffered by Mr. Diallo because of the wrongful acts attributable to the Democratic Republic of the Congo,277 and, on basis of equitable considerations, awarded US$10,000 dollars to compensate for Mr. Diallo’s alleged loss of personal property.278 The Court, however, rejected, for lack of evidence, requests for compensation for the loss of remuneration that Mr. Diallo had allegedly suffered during his detention and following his unlawful expulsion.279 The Court in its judgment addressed in a general way several points regarding the conditions and manner of compensation, including the causal link between the unlawful acts and the injury, the assessment of the injury—including the non-material injury—and the evidence for the latter.

Article 32. Diplomatic protection

The State of nationality of an alien subject to expulsion may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of the alien in question.

Commentary

(1) Draft article 32 refers to the institution of diplomatic protection, for which the legal regime is well established in international law.280 It is undisputed that the State of nationality of an alien subject to expulsion can exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its national, subject to the conditions specified by the rules of international law. Those rules are essentially reflected in the articles on diplomatic protection adopted by the Commission in 2006,281 the text of

267 Beldjoudi v. France, 26 March 1992, para. 86, Series A no. 234-A: “The applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damages, but the present judgment provides them with sufficient compensation in this respect.” The Court added that there would have been a violation of article 8 of the Convention if “the decision to deport Mr. Beldjoudi [had been] implemented” (operative para. 1).
268 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, para. 158 (see footnote 53 above): “In view of its decision that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 …, the Court makes no award for non-pecuniary damages in respect of the period of time Mr. Chahal has spent in detention. As to the other complaints, the Court considers that the findings that his deportation, if carried out, would constitute a violation of Article 3 and that there have been breaches of Articles 5 § 4, and 13 constitute sufficient just satisfaction.”
269 Ahmed v. Austria (see footnote 53 above). The Court disallowed a claim for compensation for loss of earnings because of the lack of a causal connection between the alleged damage and the Court’s conclusion with regard to article 3 of the Convention (para. 50). The Court then stated, “The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage but that the present judgment affords him sufficient compensation in that respect” (para. 51). The Court then held, “…for as long as the applicant faces a real risk of being subjected in Somalia to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention there would be a breach of that provision in the event of the decision to deport him there being implemented” (operative para. 1).
270 Yearbook ... 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, pp. 106–107, paragraph (6) of the commentary to article 37.
271 Bámaca-Kusue v. Guatemala, Judgment of 22 February 2002 (Reparations and Costs), Series C, No. 91, paras. 73 and 106.
272 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Merits, Judgment (see footnote 68 above), para. 160.
275 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Merits, Judgment (see footnote 68 above), para. 161.
276 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Compensation, Judgment (see footnote 235 above).
277 Ibid., paras. 18–25.
278 Ibid., paras. 26–36 and 55.
279 Ibid., paras. 37–50.
280 See the Special Rapporteur’s sixth report (footnote 23 above), paras. 572–577.
281 For the text of the articles on diplomatic protection and commentaries thereto, see Yearbook ... 2006, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 49–50.
which was essentially annexed by the General Assembly to its resolution 62/67 of 6 December 2007.

(2) In its decision of 2007 regarding the preliminary objections in the Diallo case, the International Court of Justice reiterated, in the context of the expulsion of aliens, two essential conditions for the exercise of diplomatic protection, namely the nationality link and the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies.\textsuperscript{282}