

ARTICLE 11

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TEXT OF ARTICLE 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

1. Constitutional discussions on the scope of the various provisions of Article 11 are covered in sections A and B of the Analytical Summary of this study. Section A deals with the question of the relationship between the responsibilities of the General Assembly and the primary responsibility of the Security Council with respect to matters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. Section B deals with the question of the meaning and scope of the term "action" as used in Article 11 (2).

2. The practice of the General Assembly with respect to disarmament and the regulation of armaments is dealt with in the General Survey which also contains a brief summary of the main features of the constitutional discussions on the various paragraphs of Article 11 and an explanation of the criteria applied in the preparation of annexes I and II. Annex III contains a tabulation of the decisions of the General Assembly with respect to disarmament and the regulation of armaments, with references to the meetings at which the resolu-

tions were adopted, the results of the votes and the numbers of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

3. As in the *Repertory* and its *Supplements Nos. 1* and 2, the annexes to this study were prepared with the sole purpose of giving the reader a general view of the range and types of activities of the General Assembly bearing upon Article 11. Consequently, no constitutional significance should be attached to them.

4. In the presentation of material in the Analytical Summary, the need has arisen in two instances to combine the précis of proceedings and the précis of constitutional discussions in order to make the entry a more coherent unit.¹ Where such need has not arisen, the division of each case history into (a) précis of proceedings and (b) précis of relevant constitutional discussions is maintained in this study, as in the *Repertory* and its *Supplement No. 2*.

¹ See paras. 46–51 and 52–59 below.

I. GENERAL SURVEY

5. During the period under review, the General Assembly adopted no decision expressly interpreting any of the provisions of Article 11.

6. However, it adopted a number of resolutions containing recommendations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security, or drawing the attention of the Security Council to situations considered as endangering or likely to endanger international peace and security and request-

ing the Security Council to take certain measures to deal with such matters.² In one of those resolutions, the General Assembly drew the attention of the Security Council to a situation by an explicit refer-

² G A resolutions 1596 (XV), para. 7; 1622 (S-III), 4th preamb. para. and para. 3; 1663 (XVI), para. 4; 1702 (XVI), para. 5; 1742 (XVI), para. 10; 1761 (XVII), para. 8; 1807 (XVII), para. 8; 1819 (XVII), para. 9; 1899 (XVIII), para. 6; 1913 (XVIII), para. 1; 1979 (XVIII), para. 2; 2022 (XX),

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ence to Article 11 (3).³ Another resolution contained a preambular paragraph recalling the authority of the General Assembly "to consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security" without, however, including any explicit reference to Article 11 (1).⁴ In one instance, the General Assembly rejected a paragraph in a draft resolution containing a reference to Article 11 (2) and decided not to vote on the draft resolution as a whole.⁵ In another instance, the General Assembly decided not to vote on a similar draft resolution.⁶

7. At its twentieth session the General Assembly adopted the three following resolutions concerning the maintenance of international peace and security which contained provisions claimed by some representatives to have gone beyond the competence of the General Assembly: resolution 2054 (XX) entitled "The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa",⁷ resolution 2074 (XX) entitled "Question of South West Africa"⁸ and resolution 2107 (XX) entitled "Question of Territories under Portuguese administration".⁹

8. During the period under review, Article 11 was also invoked or referred to in communications and debates on certain items without, however, giving rise to further constitutional discussions. It was mentioned in particular in a cable from the Government of the Kingdom of Laos relating to an alleged act of aggression¹⁰ and in a number of replies

(Continued)

paras. 12 and 13; 2023 (XX), para. 11; 2024 (XX), para. 3; 2054 A (XX), para. 6; 2074 (XX), para. 13; 2077 (XX), para. 3; and 2107 (XX), para. 11.

³ G A resolution 1663 (XVI), para. 4.

⁴ G A resolution 1815 (XVII), tenth preamb. para.

⁵ See paras. 36–39 below.

⁶ G A (XV), Annexes, a.i. 72, A/4728 and Corr.1, p. 6, draft resolution I. The Special Political Committee recommended the adoption of the draft resolution, but the General Assembly decided at its 981st plenary meeting not to vote on it. See also G A (XV/2), Plen., 981st mtg., paras. 136 and 137.

⁷ For text of relevant statements concerning the constitutionality of certain provisions of this resolution, see G A (XX), Spec. Pol. Com., 472nd mtg.: United Kingdom, para. 17; 480th mtg.: Netherlands, para. 19; 481st mtg.: Italy, paras. 22 and 37; Plen., 1395th mtg.: Denmark, para. 153; Italy, para. 180; Netherlands, para. 194; Norway, paras. 141 and 142; Sweden, paras. 160, 161, 165 and 168.

⁸ For text of relevant statements concerning the constitutionality of certain provisions of this resolution, see G A (XX), 4th Com., 1582nd mtg.: Brazil, para. 30; Chile, para. 71; Colombia, para. 61; Denmark, para. 42; Ireland, para. 35; Italy, para. 45; Mexico, para. 69; Norway, para. 43; Portugal, para. 66; Sweden, para. 26; United Kingdom, para. 53; United States, para. 40.

⁹ For texts of relevant statements concerning the constitutionality of certain provisions of this resolution, see G A (XX), 4th Com., 1590th mtg.: Portugal, paras. 18, 23 and 26; 1591st mtg.: Canada, para. 1; 1592nd mtg.: Argentina, para. 80; Australia, para. 71; Bolivia, para. 45; Brazil, para. 63; Chile, para. 74; Costa Rica, para. 73; Denmark, para. 30; Italy, para. 33; Japan, para. 78; Netherlands, para. 79; Norway, para. 36; South Africa, para. 41; Sweden, para. 22; United Kingdom, para. 24; United States, para. 10.

¹⁰ In the cable, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Laos noted that foreign troops had been crossing the Laotian frontier and had launched several attacks, including one in which elements from the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam had taken part, against Laotian army units on the Laotian frontier. "In the face of this flagrant aggression", Laos requested the assistance of the United Nations under Article 1, paragraph 1 and Article 11, paragraph 2, of the

from Member States on the question of the comprehensive review of peace-keeping operations.¹¹ References to Article 11 were made in the General Assembly during consideration of the following items: "United Nations Emergency Force: (a) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force; (b) Progress report of the Force" at the fifteenth session (a.i. 27);¹² "United Nations operations in the Congo: cost estimates and financing" at the sixteenth session (a.i. 55);¹³ "Obligations of Members, under the Charter of the United Nations, with regard to the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and the Organization's operations in the Congo: advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice" at the seventeenth session (a.i. 64);¹⁴ "Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" (a.i. 71);¹⁵ "United Nations Emergency Force: (a) Report of the Force; (b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force" (a.i. 19)¹⁶ and "United Nations Operations in the Congo: cost estimates" (a.i. 59),¹⁷ the last three at the eighteenth session. There were also references to Article 11 in the Security Council in connexion with the item entitled "Situation in the Republic of the Congo" considered in February 1961.¹⁸

9. References were made occasionally to other Articles of the Charter, particularly to Articles 10, 12, 14, 15, 24, 35, 39, 41 and 42, as well as to those of Chapter VII in general in constitutional discussions bearing on the competence of the General Assembly in the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 11. Consequently, the studies of those Articles should also be consulted for a more comprehensive treatment of the constitutional issues bearing on the competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Charter. In particular, the Royal Government requested that an emergency force should be dispatched at a very early date "in order to halt the aggression and prevent it from spreading". S C, 14th yr., Suppl. for July–Sept. p. 7, S/4212. For further discussion, see this *Supplement* under Article 99.

¹¹ See replies from Member States to a communication from the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session asking their views on certain guidelines for future peace-keeping operations. G A (XX), Annexes, a. i. 101, A/6026, Annex I: Byelorussian SSR, p. 12; Cameroon, p. 13; Canada, p. 14; Jamaica, p. 17; Somalia, p. 23; Ukrainian SSR, p. 10; Zambia, p. 15.

¹² For text of the relevant statement, see G A (XV), 5th Com., 822nd mtg.: USSR, para. 16.

¹³ For text of the relevant statement, see G A (XVI), 5th Com., 862nd mtg.: USSR, paras. 25 and 61.

¹⁴ For text of relevant statements, see G A (XVII), 5th Com., 961st mtg.: Denmark, para. 13; 965th mtg.: Romania, para. 4; 968th mtg.: Albania, para. 41; Byelorussian SSR, para. 1. See also G A (XVII), Annexes, a.i. 64, p. 2. A/C.5/957.

¹⁵ For text of relevant statements, see G A (XVII), 6th Com., 802nd mtg.: USSR, para. 26; 817th mtg.: Australia, para. 14; 822nd mtg.: Peru, para. 16.

¹⁶ For text of the relevant statement, see G A (XVII), 5th Com., 1053rd mtg.: USSR, para. 34.

¹⁷ For text of relevant statements, see G A (XVIII), 5th Com., 1009th mtg.: USSR, para. 3; 1010th mtg.: Cuba, para. 35; Ukrainian SSR, para. 26.

¹⁸ For text of the relevant statement, see S C, 16th yr., 932nd mtg.: Ecuador, para. 104.

A. Criteria applied in the preparation of annexes I, II and III

10. Annexes I and II have been prepared with the sole purpose of giving the reader a comprehensive view of the range and types of activities of the General Assembly in the field of international peace and security; they should, therefore, not be considered as an attempt to subsume General Assembly resolutions under various areas of application of Article 11, and still less as an attempt to interpret their significance with regard to the application of Article 11.

11. The resolutions listed in annexes I and II include those dealing with questions bearing upon the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security (section A); with questions bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (section B), and with questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security treated in the Analytical Summary as well as other questions brought to the attention of the General Assembly by express or implicit reference to Article 35 (2) of the Charter and having, consequently, a possible bearing on Article 11 (2). Some of the resolutions in section C of annex II were discussed in the Fourth and Fifth Committees; they are included either because constitutional discussions relating to them were treated in this study, or because they included provisions which drew the attention of the Security Council to questions which the General Assembly had considered, requested the Security Council to consider them, or recommended to the Security Council specific measures to deal with them. The entries in annex II are confined to those resolutions considered as having a likely bearing on the provisions of Article 11.

12. Annex III contains a tabulation of the decisions of the General Assembly with respect to disarmament and the regulation of armaments indicating the proposals on which the decisions were based, the dates and results of the votes.

B. Addresses of recommendations of the General Assembly

13. Recommendations of the General Assembly dealing with the general principles of international co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security were addressed to all countries and to States,¹⁹ to Member States²⁰ or to specific Governments.²¹ Those dealing with specific questions in the maintenance of international peace and security were addressed to Member States,²² to speci-

¹⁹ G A resolutions 1495 (XV), para. 1; and 2131 (XX), paras. 1-6.

²⁰ G A resolutions 1495 (XV), para. 4; and 2053 A (XX), para. 4.

²¹ G A resolution 2129 (XX), para. 3.

²² G A resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), paras. 4 and 5 (b); 1616 (XV), oper. para.; 1742 (XVI), paras. 7 and 8; 1761 (XVII),

fic Member States,²³ to all States,²⁴ to Governments,²⁵ to specific authorities,²⁶ to the people of a specific Member State,²⁷ to the parties concerned,²⁸ to subsidiary organs or specialized agencies²⁹ or to the Security Council.³⁰ Some of the resolutions were also addressed to the Secretary-General.³¹

C. The practice of the General Assembly with respect to disarmament and the regulation of armaments

14. During the period under review, the resolutions of the General Assembly continued to be the basis for United Nations efforts towards disarmament and the regulation of armaments. In those resolutions, the relevant provisions of which are summarized in annex II section B, the General Assembly addressed itself to specific Members of the United Nations;³² all Members of the United Nations;³³ all States;³⁴ the Disarmament Commission and other United Nations bodies;³⁵ other *ad hoc* disarmament negotiating bodies linked to, but not an integral part of,

paras. 4, 6 and 7; 1819 (XVII), paras. 6 and 7; 1881 (XVIII), para. 3; 2023 (XX), para. 10 and 2107 (XX), para. 7.

²³ G A resolutions 1454 (XIV), para. 2; 1497 (XV), paras. 1 and 3; 1599 (XV), para. 1; 1603 (XV), para. 1; 1622 (S-III), para. 3; 1650 (XVI), oper. para.; 1661 (XVI), oper. para.; 1663 (XVI), para. 9; 1819 (XVII), paras. 4 and 5; 2022 (XX), paras. 7, 8 and 11; and 2023 (XX), para. 8.

²⁴ G A resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), paras. 5 (a), 6; 1599 (XV), para. 3; 1663 (XVI), para. 5; 1899 (XVIII), para. 7; 1978 A (XVIII), para. 1; 2022 (XX), paras. 6, 9 and 10; 2054 A (XX), para. 8; 2074 (XX), para. 11; 2077 (XX), para. 2; 2079 (XX), para. 5; and 2107 (XX), paras. 3, 6 and 8.

²⁵ G A resolutions 1628 (XVI), para. 5; and 2054 B (XX), para. 6.

²⁶ G A resolutions 1455 (XIV), para. 3; 1600 (XV), paras. 2 and 7; 1855 (XVII), para. 2; 1964 (XVIII), para. 2; and 2132 (XX), para. 2.

²⁷ G A resolution 1474 (ES-IV), para. 3.

²⁸ G A resolution 1724 (XVI), oper. para.

²⁹ G A resolutions 1455 (XIV), para. 3; and 2107 (XX), para. 9.

³⁰ G A resolutions 1742 (XVI), para. 10; 1761 (XVII), para. 8; 1819 (XVII), para. 9; 1913 (XVIII), para. 1; 1979 (XVIII), para. 2; 2024 (XX), para. 3; 2074 (XX), para. 13; and 2077 (XX), para. 3.

³¹ G A resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), para. 2; 1759 (XVII), para. 3; 1857 (XVII), para. 1; 1874 (S-IV), para. 3; 1881 (XVIII), para. 4; 1899 (XVIII), para. 5; 1978 B (XVIII), para. 1; and 2006 (XIX), para. 1.

³² G A resolutions 1379 (XIV), paras. 1 and 2; 1617 (XV), para. 1; 1632 (XVI), oper. para. 1648 (XVI), paras. 1-4; 1660 (XVI), paras. 1-3; 1664 (XVI), para. 3; 1722 (XVI), section I para. 1, section II para. 1; 1762 A (XVII), para. 2; 1837 (XVII), para. 8; 1884 (XVIII), para. 1; 1911 (XVIII), para. 2; and 2033 (XX), paras. 2 and 6-8.

³³ G A resolutions 1516 (XV), para. 3; 1652 (XVI), oper. para. 1653 (XVI), para. 2; 1664 (XVI), para. 1; and 1837 (XVII), paras. 6 and 9.

³⁴ G A resolutions 1378 (XIV), para. 1; 1576 (XV), para. 1; 1649, para. 4; 1665 (XVI), paras. 1 and 2; 1837 (XVII), para. 1; 1884 (XVIII), para. 2, 1910 (XVIII), para. 1; 1911 (XVIII), para. 3; 2028 (XX), para. 1; 2032 (XX), para. 2; and 2033 (XX), paras. 1 and 3-5.

³⁵ G A resolutions 1403 (XIV), paras. 1 and 3; 1516 (XV), para. 5; 1664 (XVI), para. 2; and 1837 (XVII), paras. 6 and 7.

the United Nations³⁶ and the Secretary-General.³⁷ 15. These resolutions touched upon various aspects of disarmament and regulation of armaments, including the question of disarmament;³⁸ general and complete disarmament;³⁹ limited measures of disarmament;⁴⁰ specific limited measures of disarmament;⁴¹ economic and social consequences of disarmament;⁴² guiding principles for disarmament negotiations⁴³ and disarmament bodies.⁴⁴ On a few occasions, the General Assembly asked a particular country to refrain from a specific action.⁴⁵

16. The General Assembly on occasion reaffirmed, explicitly or implicitly, the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament and the regulation of armaments and provided guidance on how to pursue efforts in that field.⁴⁶ This was done particularly when disarmament negotiations took place outside the formal framework of the United Nations.⁴⁷

17. The concern of the United Nations with disarmament negotiations during the period under review was expressed in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission and in statements made by the Secretary-General. By resolutions of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, the United Nations

³⁶ G A resolutions 1378 (XIV), paras. 2 and 3; 1380 (XIV), paras. 1 and 2; 1402 A (XIV), paras. 1-4; 1402 B (XIV), paras. 1-4; 1577 (XV), paras. 1-3; 1578 (XV), paras. 1-3; 1649 (XVI), paras. 2 and 3; 1722 (XVI), Section II, paras. 2 and 3; 1762 A (XVII), paras. 3 and 5-7; 1762 B (XVII), paras. 1 and 2; 1767 (XVII), paras. 2-4; 1908 (XVIII), Sections I, II and III, para. 1; 1909 (XVIII), para. 1; 1910 (XVIII), paras. 2 and 3; 2028 (XX), paras. 2 and 4; 2031 (XX), paras. 1-3; and 2032 (XX), para. 3.

³⁷ G A resolutions 1378 (XIV), para. 2; 1403 (XIV), para. 3; 1516 (XV), paras. 1, 2 and 4; 1653 (XVI), para. 2; 1664 (XVI), para. 1; 1722 (XVI), Section II, para. 4; 1762 B (XVII), para. 4; 1767 (XVII), para. 5; 1801 (XVII), oper. para.; 1837 (XVII), paras. 4, 7 and 8; 1908 (XVIII), Section III, para. 2; 1909 (XVIII), para. 2; 1910 (XVIII), para. 4; 1911 (XVIII), para. 4; and 2033 (XX), para. 9.

³⁸ G A resolutions 1617 (XV); 1660 (XVI); 1664 (XVI) and 1722 (XVI).

³⁹ G A resolutions 1378 (XIV); 1722 (XVI) 1767 (XVII); 1908 (XVIII), and 2031 (XX).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ G A resolutions 1379 (XIV); 1380 (XIV); 1402 (XIV); 1576 (XV); 1577 (XV); 1578 (XV); 1632 (XVI); 1648 (XVI); 1649 (XVI); 1652 (XVI); 1653 (XVI); 1664 (XVI); 1665 (XVI); 1762 (XVII); 1801 (XVII); 1884 (XVIII); 1909 (XVIII); 1910 (XVIII); 1911 (XVIII); 2028 (XX); 2032 (XX); and 2033 (XX).

⁴² G A resolutions 1516 (XV), 1837 (XVII), 1931 (XVIII), and 2092 (XX). For resolutions of the Economic and Social Council relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament, see E S C resolutions 891 (XXXIV); 982 (XXXVI) and 1087 (XXXIX).

⁴³ G A resolutions 1649 (XVI), 1653 (XVI), 1664 (XVI), 1722 (XVI), 1762 (XVII), 1767 (XVII), 1801 (XVII), 1908 (XVIII), 1911 (XVIII) and 2028 (XX).

⁴⁴ G A resolutions 1403 (XIV), 1660 (XVI), 1722 (XVI) and 2030 (XX).

⁴⁵ G A resolutions 1379 (XIV), 1652 (XVI) and 2033 (XX).

⁴⁶ For explicit reaffirmations of such responsibility, see G A resolutions 1653 (XVI), 1722 (XVI), 1767 (XVII), 1908 (XVIII), 2028 (XX), 2030 (XX) and 2031 (XX); See also Disarmament Commission resolutions DC/146, DC/182 and DC/225.

⁴⁷ See foot-note 36 above.

continued to give support to disarmament negotiations conducted outside its direct control.

18. Thus, between 1958 and 1962, when the tripartite Conference on the discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests was held in Geneva with the participation of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, the General Assembly adopted resolutions ranging from those welcoming the holding of the conference and the subsequent progress made by it, to those urging the States concerned to make every effort to reach an early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control and a voluntary suspension of nuclear weapons tests while the negotiations were in progress.⁴⁸

19. Similarly, when a session of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament was held in Geneva in 1960,⁴⁹ the Disarmament Commission in resolution DC/146⁵⁰ expressed the hope that the results of the conference would provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations. The General Assembly, in turn, noted with approval⁵¹ the report of the Disarmament Commission containing that resolution. In 1961, the General Assembly urged the Governments of the USSR and the United States to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world could regard as satisfactory.⁵² When agreement was reached on the composition of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,⁵³ the General Assembly, in resolution 1722 (XVI), endorsed that agreement and requested the Committee to submit reports to the General Assembly and to the Disarmament Commission on the

⁴⁸ G A resolutions 1252 (XIII), 1402 (XIV), 1577 (XV), 1578 (XV); and 1649 (XVI). The tripartite conference was convened in Geneva on 31 October 1958 by agreement of the three nuclear Powers and met until 29 January 1962.

⁴⁹ The Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament was established following an agreement among the Governments of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States; it met in Geneva between 15 March and 28 June 1960, with the participation of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR on one side, and Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States on the other. In a communiqué attached to a letter of 7 September 1959 addressed to the Secretary-General the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States noted, with regard to the establishment of the committee that "The setting up of the Disarmament Committee in no way diminishes or encroaches upon the responsibilities of the United Nations in this field. In setting up the committee the special responsibility resting on the great powers to find a basis for agreement is taken into account... It is the hope of our four Governments that the results achieved will provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations". Disarmament Commission, Suppl. for Jan. - Dec. 1959, DC/144, annex.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, DC/146.

⁵¹ G A resolution 1403 (XIV), second preamb. para.

⁵² G A resolution 1660 (XVI), para. 1.

⁵³ The following countries were appointed members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom and United States. The Government of France subsequently decided not to participate in the work of the Committee.

progress of negotiations. Similar requests were made in later resolutions.⁵⁴

20. During the period under review, the General Assembly also adopted various resolutions concerning disarmament and the regulation of armaments. They contained recommendations on both the general principles on which disarmament negotiations should be based and the procedures to be followed with a view to reaching early agreements on the various aspects of disarmament. The recommendations outlined below are illustrative of the scope and nature of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly.

21. At its sixteenth session, during consideration of the question of the urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1649 (XVI)⁵⁵ in which, *inter alia*, it urged the States negotiating at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests at Geneva to renew their efforts to conclude, at the earliest possible time, a treaty on the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests on the following basis: (a) the treaty should have as its objective the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all environments under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms; (b) international control machinery should be organized so as to be representative of all parties to the treaty and should be staffed and operated to guarantee its objectivity and effectiveness, under procedures which would ensure that its facilities would be used exclusively for purposes of effective control; (c) the day-to-day executive and administrative operations of the control system should not be susceptible to obstruction by the exercise of a veto and administrative responsibility should be concentrated in the hands of a single Administrator functioning under the supervision of a commission composed of representatives of parties to the treaty.⁵⁶ At the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1665 (XVI) calling upon all States, in particular upon the States possessing nuclear weapons, to endeavour to seek the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.⁵⁷ Also at its sixteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1722 (XVI) in which, after welcoming the joint statement of the Governments of the USSR and the United States of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, it recommended that the disarmament negotiations which were to be conducted at the Eighteen-Nation

Committee on Disarmament⁵⁸ be based upon those principles.⁵⁹

22. The joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of the Governments of the USSR and the United States, issued in July 1961, following an exchange of views between the two Governments, read as follows:⁶⁰

“Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced to the General Assembly on 30 March 1961,

“Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

“Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959,

“Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means,

“The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles:

“1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

(a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

(b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

“2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

“3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

⁵⁴ G A resolutions 1767 (XVII), para. 4; 1908 (XVIII), Section III, para. 1; and 2031 (XX), para. 3.

⁵⁵ For the results of the vote on this and the other resolutions cited in paras. 21 to 31 inclusive, see annex II, section B, below.

⁵⁶ G A resolution 1649 (XVI), para. 2 (a) to (c).

⁵⁷ G A resolution 1665 (XVI), para. 1.

⁵⁸ For membership of the committee, see foot-note 53 above.

⁵⁹ G A resolution 1722 (XVI), section I, paras. 1 and 2.

⁶⁰ G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 19, p. 1, A/4879.

(b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

(d) The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of all military training institutions;

(e) The discontinuance of military expenditures.

“4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

“5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

“6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

“7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation

of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

“8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.”

23. By the same resolution,⁶¹ the General Assembly recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.⁶²

24. At its seventeenth session, after a review of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament relating to the suspension of nuclear weapons tests, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1762 A (XVII), in which, *inter alia*, it endorsed a joint memorandum of 16 April 1962⁶³ submitted by eight members of the Committee as a basis for negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests.⁶⁴ The eight-nation memorandum suggested, *inter alia*, that the feasibility be considered of establishing by agreement a system of continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions, or on certain of the existing observation posts designated by agreement for that purpose, together with new posts established by agreement. Another possibility it suggested was the establishment of an international commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries. By the same resolution, the General Assembly recommended that, if the parties concerned did not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum and taking into consideration other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international

⁶¹ G A resolution 1722 (XVI), section II, para. 2.

⁶² The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament first met at Geneva on 14 March 1962 and continued to hold its sessions there.

⁶³ Joint memorandum submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic. Disarmament Commission, Suppl. for Jan. 1961 to Dec. 1962, p. 197, DC/203, Annex J.

⁶⁴ G A resolution 1762 A (XVII), para. 4.

scientific commission.⁶⁵ At the same session, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 1767 (XVII) in which it recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should give urgent attention to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate the reaching of general and complete disarmament.⁶⁶

25. At the eighteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1910 (XVIII), calling upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water — which had been signed on 5 August 1963 by the USSR, United Kingdom and United States, and subsequently by a great number of other countries — and to abide by the spirit and provisions of the treaty.⁶⁷ At the same session, it adopted resolution 1884 (XVIII) calling upon all States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner.⁶⁸

26. At the twentieth session, during consideration of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2028 (XX) calling upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons based upon the following principles: (a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form; (b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; (c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament; (d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty; (e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.⁶⁹ At the same session, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 2030 (XX) by which it endorsed the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in 1964, on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which “all countries would be invited”, and urged that the necessary consultations be conducted with all countries to establish a widely representative preparatory committee for the convening of a world disarmament conference not later than 1967.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

⁶⁶ G A resolution 1767 (XVII), para. 3.

⁶⁷ G A resolution 1910 (XVIII), para. 1.

⁶⁸ G A resolution 1884 (XVIII), para. 2 (a).

⁶⁹ G A resolution 2028 (XX), paras. 2 (a) to (e).

⁷⁰ G A resolution 2030 (XX), paras. 1 and 2.

27. Further guidance for disarmament negotiations conducted outside the framework of the United Nations was provided by the General Assembly, whenever necessary, by resolutions in which it suggested or requested certain steps towards achieving disarmament objectives.⁷¹ On several occasions, the General Assembly asked for reports.⁷²

28. In debates on disarmament in the General Assembly, particularly at the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions, frequent references were made to the need for establishing a link between the Organization and the disarmament conference machinery established on an *ad hoc* basis outside the formal framework of the United Nations. Attention was drawn, in that connexion, to the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament and the regulation of armaments, the need for a United Nations representative to be present at the disarmament conferences in question and the need for the General Assembly to lay down principles and guidelines for disarmament negotiations and to receive reports.⁷³

29. In his statements on disarmament efforts pursued outside the United Nations framework, the Secretary-General, during the period under review, stressed the link between those efforts and the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Thus, in addressing the Conference of the

⁷¹ Among the many G A resolutions of this kind, those listed under foot-note 36 above provide significant examples.

⁷² See G A resolutions 1380 (XIV), 1402 (XIV), 1577 (XV), 1578 (XV), 1649 (XVI), 1722 (XVI), 1762 A (XVII), 1767 (XVII), 1908 (XVIII), 1909 (XVIII), 1910 (XVIII), 2028 (XX), 2031 (XX) and 2032 (XX).

⁷³ For text of relevant statements, see G A (XIV), 1st Com., 1028th mtg.: Brazil, para. 32; 1029th mtg.: United Kingdom, para. 11; 1030th mtg.: Cuba, paras. 29 and 30; Greece, para. 8; 1031st mtg.: Italy, para. 34, Netherlands, para. 40; 1032nd mtg.: Brazil, para. 1; Liberia, para. 33; South Africa, para. 20; 1034th mtg.: Afghanistan, para. 3; Bulgaria, para. 13; Ghana, para. 17; Portugal, para. 22; 1035th mtg.: Belgium, para. 24; Brazil, para. 34; Iceland, para. 27; Turkey, para. 11; United Arab Republic, para. 12; 1036th mtg.: France, para. 6; Pakistan, para. 7; 1037th mtg.: Indonesia, para. 27; Israel, para. 48; 1038th mtg.: Iraq, paras. 8 and 9; 1039th mtg.: Libya, para. 4; 1040th mtg.: Federation of Malaya, para. 47; Guatemala, para. 40; New Zealand, para. 26; Spain, para. 1; Venezuela, para. 56; 1041st mtg.: Canada, para. 32; Ceylon, para. 5; Nepal, para. 17; Poland, para. 15; 1042nd mtg.: India, paras. 17 and 21; 1060th mtg.: Greece, para. 5; G A (XV), 1st Com., 1085th mtg.: Pakistan, para. 33; 1086th mtg.: Canada, paras. 22, 25 and 26; 1088th mtg.: Italy, para. 10; 1089th mtg.: Yugoslavia, para. 14; 1090th mtg.: Brazil, para. 37; 1091st mtg.: Iran, para. 5; Peru, para. 32; 1094th mtg.: France, para. 37; India, para. 13; 1095th mtg.: Ceylon, para. 23; Netherlands, para. 21; United Arab Republic, para. 36; 1096th mtg.: Japan, para. 1; 1098th mtg.: Canada, paras. 22–25; Cuba, para. 15; 1099th mtg.: Mexico, paras. 23–25; 1100th mtg.: Libya, para. 17; 1101st mtg.: Ecuador, para. 6; Jordan, para. 2; South Africa, paras. 14 and 15; 1102nd mtg.: China, para. 23; Guatemala, para. 15; Morocco, para. 29; 1103rd mtg.: Saudi Arabia, para. 13; 1104th mtg.: Iraq, para. 8; Nepal, para. 17; 1105th mtg.: Peru, para. 9; 1106th mtg.: Lebanon, paras. 9 and 12; 1108th mtg.: Canada, paras. 7–9; Iceland, para. 5; 1110th mtg.: India, para. 16; USSR, para. 33; 1119th mtg.: Italy, para. 18; United States, para. 8; 1141st mtg.: Canada, para. 7; G A (XVI), 1st Com., 1173rd mtg.: United Kingdom, para. 7; 1181st mtg.: Peru, para. 18; 1195th mtg.: USSR, para. 20; 1198th mtg.: India, para. 7; 1202nd mtg.: Canada, paras. 3 and 4; 1206th mtg.: Yugoslavia, para. 18.

Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1960, he stated:⁷⁴

“In a search for an agreement on disarmament in which complete disarmament is approached through concrete measures . . . you are bound to reach a point where you will have to study the United Nations Organization with a view to determining how its machinery can best be used and developed in support of disarmament . . . I would, thus, assume that the study that at some stage will have to be made of those matters which are covered by Chapter VII of the Charter and which would become of crucial significance in case of progressive or complete disarmament, will be made by the United Nations with a view to such possible decisions by the Organization as may be indicated in order to give it the necessary efficiency.

“Likewise, a question will arise for you how to fit the control activities which will be called for into the organizational framework of the United Nations. The technical nature of this question is bound to make it a subject of your study, but the relationship which links together the various elements of a policy for the preservation of peace to which I have already referred, and the specific experience and knowledge of the administrative and political problems arising for and within the United Nations, renders it necessary for the Organization to provide you in this connexion with its full assistance, if we are to arrive at the best possible result . . . Be it enough to say that, as shown by the fifteen years of its history — the Organization has such possibilities of development and such flexibility that I do not foresee any difficulties in fitting an activity of this type into the United Nations framework in a way which would fully safeguard all legitimate interests involved.”

30. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly, following the adoption of resolution 2030 (XX) in which, as indicated earlier, it endorsed the idea of convening a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited, the Secretary-General observed:⁷⁵

“From the very beginning, the United Nations has viewed it as one of its primary functions to bring together all the principal Powers whose participation in negotiations was essential for effective disarmament. To accomplish this, a variety of methods has been resorted to, but at all times the permanent consideration of the Organization has been concrete achievements. The resolution adopted today is in keeping with that tradition — it is mindful both of the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations with respect to disarmament, and of the need to take exceptional measures in order to make possible the attainment of concrete objectives.

“Institutional developments flow from specific requirements in international relations. Thus,

while the resolution is unusual in some respects, it reflects the rather unusual circumstances of the world situation.

“In the past several years, the efforts of Members working through the United Nations have resulted in a variety of disarmament initiatives involving unilateral, bilateral, regional and universal proposals and measures. It is clear from the deliberations on this agenda item that it is the intention of the Members of the United Nations to maintain these useful approaches. . . .”

31. To facilitate the achievement of specific goals with respect to disarmament and the regulation of armaments, the General Assembly, in a number of resolutions,⁷⁶ requested the Secretary-General to perform certain specific tasks. Those included not only extending assistance and providing staff, services and facilities, but also consulting with Governments, making inquiries, submitting reports and studies. Thus, at its fifteenth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 1516 (XV), requested the Secretary-General to conduct a study on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, with the assistance of expert consultants, and to submit his findings to the Economic and Social Council.⁷⁷ At the following session, by resolution 1653 (XVI) embodying a Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General⁷⁸ to consult the Governments of Member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes.⁷⁹ Similarly, by resolution 1664 (XVI) the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to make an inquiry into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country.⁸⁰ Resolution 1911 (XVIII), dealing

⁷⁶ See foot-note 37 above.

⁷⁷ For report of the Secretary-General embodying the study of his consultative group, see United Nations publication, Sales No. 62. IX. 1. Subsequently, the Secretary-General was requested to make available to the General Assembly the report to be prepared by the Economic and Social Council pursuant to a resolution which the Council had previously adopted (G A resolution 1837 (XVII), para. 7); to prepare a further report on the subject (G A resolution 1931 (XVIII), para. 6), and to continue to inform the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on national and international studies and those undertaken by non-governmental organizations on the economic and social consequences of disarmament (G A resolution 2092 (XX), para. 4). For further reports of the Secretary-General on the matter, see G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 12, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39 and 76, A/5538, and ESC (XXXIX), Annexes, a.i. 6, E/4042.

⁷⁸ See also para. 12 above.

⁷⁹ For the reports of the Secretary-General, following his consultations with the Governments of Member States, see G A (XVII), Annexes, a.i. 26, A/5174 and Add. 1-2, p. 1; G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 27, A/5518, p. 1.

⁸⁰ For the report of the Secretary-General on the inquiry, see: Disarmament Commission, Suppl. for Jan. 1961 — Dec. 1962, DC/201 and Add. 1-3.

⁷⁴ See TNDC/PV.31 (mimeographed), p. 5.

⁷⁵ G A (XX), Plen., 1384th mtg., paras. 132-134.

with the denuclearization of Latin America, provides another example. By that resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to extend to the States of Latin America, at their request, such "technical facilities" as they might require to achieve the

aims set forth in the resolution in question.⁸¹

⁸¹ In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General appointed a technical consultant to the Preparatory Commission for the denuclearization of Latin America. See A/6663 (mimeographed), pp. 37 and 38.

II. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF PRACTICE

A. The question of the relationship between the responsibilities of the General Assembly and the primary responsibility of the Security Council with regard to matters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security

32. The cases studied in this section set out specific questions which arose in constitutional discussions on the general scope of Article 11. They include, in particular, the question of the competence of the General Assembly to declare or characterize a particular situation as endangering international peace and security or as constituting a serious threat to international peace,⁸² or an act of aggression,⁸³ and its competence to recommend economic, political or military measures against a particular Member State or government of a territory. In most instances, the resolution adopted contain provisions reflecting the finding of the General Assembly or its recommendations on such questions.⁸⁴

33. In one instance, while the immediate question to which the attention of the General Assembly was called was that of financing certain peace-keeping operations, the constitutional issue raised dealt with the relationship between the responsibility of the Security Council and that of the General Assembly in the maintenance of international peace and security.⁸⁵ In another instance, the constitutional discussions related to the general question of peace-keeping operations and, in particular, to the question of which principal organ of the United Nations should be responsible for their authorization, financing and organization.⁸⁶

34. Also included in this section is a brief account of the consultations undertaken during the nineteenth session by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General with Member States on the question of peace-keeping operations as well as the views they suggested as guidelines for future peace-keeping operations.⁸⁷

⁸² See the question of race conflict in South Africa, the question of *apartheid* and the question of Southern Rhodesia, in paras. 35–51 and 66–73 below.

⁸³ See the question of South West Africa, paras. 60–65 below.

⁸⁴ See G A resolutions 1663 (XVI) entitled "Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa", para. 7; 1761 (XVII) entitled "The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa", paras. 3 and 4; 1899 (XVIII) entitled "Question of South West Africa", thirteenth preamb. para. 4; and 2022 (XX) entitled "Question of Southern Rhodesia", paras. 6 and 11.

⁸⁵ See paras. 52–59 below.

⁸⁶ See paras. 74–93 below.

⁸⁷ See paras. 74–82 below.

1. RESOLUTION 1663 (XVI) IN CONNEXION WITH THE QUESTION OF RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

a. *Précis of proceedings*

35. During consideration of the agenda item entitled "Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa"⁸⁸ by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session, the Special Political Committee had before it a draft resolution⁸⁹ submitted by Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Upper Volta.

36. The thirty-one-Power draft resolution contained, *inter alia*, the following operative paragraphs:

"4. *Notes with grave concern* that these [racial] policies [pursued by the Government of the Republic of South Africa] have led to international friction and that the unflinching stand of the Government of the Republic of South Africa by these policies endangers international peace and security;

"5. Draws the attention of the Security Council to Article 6 of the Charter for an early discussion of the continued membership of the Republic of South Africa in the United Nations;

"6. *Solemnly recommends* to all States to consider taking the following steps:

(a) To break off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of South Africa, or to refrain from establishing such relations;

(b) To close the ports of each State to all vessels flying the South African flag;

(c) To enact legislation prohibiting the ships of each State from entering South African ports;

(d) To boycott all South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods to South Africa;

(e) To refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government and companies registered under the laws of the Republic of South Africa;

"7. *Draws the attention* of the Security Council to these recommendations in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter."

37. The Special Political Committee also had

⁸⁸ G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 76.

⁸⁹ G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 76, p. 3, A/SPC/L. 71 and Add. 1–6.

before it a draft resolution⁹⁰ jointly sponsored by eight Powers: Afghanistan, Ceylon, Denmark, Federation of Malaya, India, Norway, Togo and Venezuela which, as subsequently amended, contained the following operative paragraphs:

"4. *Urges* all States to take such separate and collective action as is open to them in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to bring about an abandonment of those policies;

"5. *Reaffirms* that the racial policies pursued by the Government of South Africa are a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are totally inconsistent with its obligations as a Member State;

"6. *Reaffirms* with grave concern and deep anxiety that these policies have led to international friction and that their continuance seriously endangers international peace and security;

"7. *Reminds* the Government of the Republic of South Africa of the requirement of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter that all Members shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them under the Charter;

"8. *Calls upon* the Government of the Republic of South Africa once again to change its policies and conduct so as to conform to its obligations imposed by the Charter."

38. In the course of the debate, the Special Political Committee considered three amendments to the eight-Power draft resolution submitted, respectively, by Ethiopia, the USSR and Pakistan. Under the Ethiopian amendment⁹¹ submitted at the 285th meeting, a new paragraph 4 would be added after operative paragraph 3 in which the Assembly would call the attention of the Security Council to the provision of Article 11 (3) of the Charter and request it to consider what measures should be taken against the Republic of South Africa for its persistent violations of the Charter. Under the USSR amendment⁹² submitted at the 286th meeting, a new paragraph 5 would be inserted after operative paragraph 4, whereby the Assembly would further call upon all States to deny the Government of the Republic of South Africa any support and assistance, including assistance in the form of arms and war material, which might be used for intensifying the violence against the indigenous population of South Africa and causing further bloodshed. Under the third amendment⁹³ submitted by Pakistan at the 287th meeting, a new paragraph calling on all Member States to refrain from exporting petroleum to South Africa would be inserted in the eight-Power draft resolution.

39. In a vote taken at its 287th meeting, the Special Political Committee adopted⁹⁴ the revised thirty-one-Power draft resolution by a vote of 55 to 26, with 20 abstentions. At the same meeting,

following the adoption of the amendments submitted by Ethiopia, the USSR and Pakistan, the Committee adopted⁹⁵ the eight-Power draft resolution, as amended, by a vote of 72 to 2, with 27 abstentions.

Decision

The General Assembly considered the report of the Special Political Committee at its 1067th plenary meeting and decided⁹⁶ not to vote on the thirty-one-Power draft resolution as a whole. That decision followed a motion to withdraw the draft resolution after the General Assembly, in a separate vote, had rejected its paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.⁹⁷ At the same meeting, the General Assembly, in a separate vote on the operative paragraphs of the eight-Power draft resolution, rejected the operative paragraphs containing the USSR and Pakistan amendments. It also rejected⁹⁸ the second part of the operative paragraphs containing the Ethiopian amendment under which the General Assembly would request the Security Council "to consider what measures should be taken against the Republic of South Africa for its persistent violation of the Charter of the United Nations." The eight-Power draft resolution, containing the remaining part of the Ethiopian amendment calling the attention of the Security Council to the provisions of Article 11 (3), was then adopted⁹⁹ by a vote of 97 to 2, with 1 abstention, as General Assembly resolution 1663 (XVI).¹⁰⁰

b. Précis of relevant constitutional discussions

40. In the debate on the thirty-one-Power draft resolution, the opinion was expressed that its operative paragraph 6 raised the question of the conflict of competence between the General Assembly and the Security Council. That conflict existed, it was contended, in regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes, concerning which Articles 11 and 35 gave the Assembly jurisdiction and Articles 34 and 38 gave the jurisdiction to the Security Council. While the General Assembly was competent to discuss matters which came within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, it was clearly not competent to take action to maintain or restore international peace and security in application of Articles 39, 41 and 42.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 12.

⁹⁶ G A (XVIII), Plen., 1067th mtg., para. 104.

⁹⁷ An almost identical resolution, proposed by twenty-six Member States and recommended by the Special Political Committee for adoption by the General Assembly at the fifteenth session, was also not voted upon by the General Assembly. It adopted, instead, resolution 1598 (XV), in which it requested all States to consider taking such separate and collective action as was open to them, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to bring about the abandonment of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. For text of the twenty-six-Power draft resolution, see G A (XV), Annexes, a.i. 72, A/4728 and Corr. 1, p. 6, draft resolution I. See also G A (XVI), Plen., 981st mtg., paras. 136 and 137.

⁹⁸ G A (XVIII), Plen., 1067th mtg., para. 115.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 118.

¹⁰⁰ For a summary of the provisions contained in this resolution as well as in other resolutions treated in the Analytical Summary of Practice, see annex II, section C, below.

⁹⁰ G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 76, p. 3, A/SPC/L. 72.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5, A/4968, para. 7.

⁹² *Ibid.*, para. 8.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 11.

Article 11 (2) confirmed the lack of competence of the General Assembly in such matters, since under that Article "Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion". It was clear, then, that according to the spirit and letter of the Charter, the General Assembly was not competent to recommend sanctions against one of its Members, as called for in operative paragraph 6 of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution.

41. Some representatives opposed to that paragraph also argued that, while they agreed that the General Assembly should not remain silent on such important matters as the one under consideration, the language of operative paragraph 6 went far beyond the competence of the General Assembly. The measures it proposed were in principle those set forth in Article 41 of the Charter, which came under the competence of the Security Council. The Charter did not formally prohibit the General Assembly from recommending measures of the kind enumerated in Article 41, but it did place the responsibility for taking such action on the Security Council.

42. Some representatives who questioned the constitutionality of paragraph 5 of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution, argued that that paragraph raised the question of expulsion of a United Nations Member under Article 6 of the Charter, which could only be effected upon a recommendation of the Security Council. One representative pointed out that although Article 6 of the Charter did not prohibit the General Assembly from calling the attention of the Security Council to a situation which might demand the expulsion of a Member of the United Nations, the normal procedure would be for the Security Council to take the initiative and make the recommendation for admission or expulsion.

43. It was argued on behalf of the sponsors of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution that, while it was true that under Article 41 of the Charter only the Security Council could call for sanctions against a State, the provisions of the draft resolution were confined to recommending that Member States should undertake certain measures. Moreover, to show that the legal aspect of the question had not been ignored the Assembly would, in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, draw the attention of the Security Council to the measures recommended in accordance with Article 11 (2). Since paragraph 16 of the draft resolution like paragraph 5 was of the nature of a recommendation, the argument that if it was adopted Member States would be obliged to apply sanctions was therefore without foundation. The effectiveness of the paragraph 6 would lie in the fact that, although it was not mandatory, it would express the conclusion reached by the United Nations that the time had come to take sterner action than in the past, and would thus constitute a strong form of moral pressure. One representative argued that justification for the recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution could be found in Article 11 as well as in Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 41. Decisions of the

Security Council related thereto called for immediate execution, while those of the General Assembly were simply recommendations: if the Assembly wished to ensure that such recommendations were followed by immediate action it should, under the terms of Article 11, refer the issue to the Security Council. That was what paragraph 7 of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution sought to do.

44. The consideration of the Ethiopian amendment¹⁰¹ to the eight-Power draft resolution also led to constitutional discussion relating to the competence of the General Assembly. The Ethiopian amendment consisted of two parts, the first calling the attention of the Security Council to the provisions of Article 11 (3) and the second requesting the Security Council "to consider what measures should be taken against South Africa for its persistent violations of the Charter of the United Nations". Representatives who expressed doubt as to the propriety of the amendment argued that, while the first part of it was acceptable, the second went beyond the scope of Article 11 (3). That part of the amendment used the language of Article 6 of the Charter on expulsion of Members, thereby encroaching on the competence of the Security Council.

45. On the other hand, it was pointed out that it was difficult to see why if the principle of reference to the Security Council was acceptable, the second part of the amendment could not be accepted. The argument that that part of the amendment introduced the element of expulsion under Article 6 of the Charter was unfounded, since the Security Council was not instructed to take any specific measures and was not bound to apply Article 6 of the Charter.¹⁰²

2. RESOLUTION 1761 (XVII) IN CONNEXION WITH THE QUESTION OF APARTHEID¹⁰³

Précis of proceedings and of relevant constitutional discussions

46. At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, discussion in the Special Political Committee on the question centred around a draft resolution¹⁰⁴ submitted by Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey,

¹⁰¹ See para. 38 above.

¹⁰² For text of relevant statements, see G A (XVI), Spec Pol. Com., 274th mtg.; United Kingdom, para. 5; 275th mtg.: Ghana, para. 9; 277th mtg.: France, para. 10; 280th mtg.: Nigeria, para. 21; 285th mtg.: Ivory Coast, paras. 8 and 9; Mexico, paras. 39 and 40; Venezuela, para. 32; 286th mtg.: Argentina, para. 3; 287th mtg.: Argentina, para. 2; Australia, para. 21; Denmark, para. 20; Ethiopia, para. 36; India, paras. 14 and 15; Libya, para. 4; Nepal, para. 34; Sweden, para. 26; United Kingdom, para. 18; 288th mtg.: Venezuela, para. 4; G A (XVI) Plen., 1067th mtg.: Republic of South Africa, para. 48.

¹⁰³ At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, the question of race conflict in South Africa was considered jointly with the item "Treatment of peoples of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin in the Republic of South Africa" under the title "The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa" (agenda item 87).

¹⁰⁴ G A (XVII), Annexes, a.i. 87, A/5276, para. 7; same text as resolution 1761 (XVII).

Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia and United Arab Republic.

47. The draft resolution contained, *inter alia*, the following operative paragraphs:

"3. *Reaffirms* that the continuance of those policies [of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa] seriously endangers international peace and security;

"4. *Requests* Member States to take the following measures, separately or collectively, in conformity with the Charter, to bring about the abandonment of those policies:

(a) Breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of South Africa or refraining from establishing such relations;

(b) Closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag;

(c) Enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports;

(d) Boycotting all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa;

(e) Refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa and companies registered under the laws of South Africa;

"...

"8. *Requests* the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure South Africa's compliance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council on this subject and, if necessary, to consider action under Article 6 of the Charter."

48. During consideration of the draft resolution, a number of representatives expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of those operative paragraphs. At the 340th meeting of the Special Political Committee, Guatemala submitted an amendment in which it proposed to substitute the following phrase for the first part of operative paragraph 4: "*Requests* Member States to take all measures, separately or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations which they consider appropriate to bring about the abandonment of these policies, including:". It also proposed to delete the phrase "including all arms and ammunition" from paragraph 4 (d) and add a new operative paragraph, between paragraphs 3 and 4 to read as follows: "*Urges* Member States to refrain from furnishing the Republic of South Africa with any arms, ammunition and military equipment whatsoever."

49. Representatives opposed to the draft resolution argued that the wording of its operative paragraph 3 came within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter by which the Security Council was given the exclusive responsibility to decide on matters related to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, including the power to determine a situation as a serious threat to inter-

national peace and security. They also argued that the General Assembly was not competent to recommend measures set out in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, since those measures were of the nature of sanctions described in Article 41 of the Charter, which only the Security Council could impose on Member States. To claim that the General Assembly could order sanctions would be tantamount to forcing the General Assembly to violate the Charter. They believed that paragraph 8 of the draft resolution should be rejected on the same grounds, since the expulsion of a Member State in that paragraph was envisaged. Under Article 6 of the Charter,¹⁰⁵ it was the Security Council that should make the recommendation of expulsion to the General Assembly; operative paragraph 8 tended to reverse the order.

50. Some of the sponsors of the draft resolution argued that an analysis of Article 11 showed that the General Assembly could, contrary to the assertion of those opposing the draft resolution, recommend certain measures to Member States or to the Security Council. Moreover, a comparison of Article 14 with Article 41 showed that while the Security Council, under Article 41, was authorized to take measures not involving the use of armed force in the event of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, the General Assembly, under Article 14, was empowered to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation.¹⁰⁶

51. At its 341st meeting, the Special Political Committee rejected¹⁰⁷ the Guatemalan amendments. At the same meeting, following the rejection of a motion for separate votes on the various parts of the draft resolution, the Committee adopted¹⁰⁸ the draft resolution as a whole by 60 votes to 16, with 21 abstentions.

Decision

At the 1164th plenary meeting, the General Assembly adopted¹⁰⁹ the draft resolution by 67 votes to 16, with 23 abstentions, as its resolution 1761 (XVII).

3. RESOLUTIONS 1874 (S-IV), 1875 (S-IV) AND 1876 (S-IV) IN CONNEXION WITH THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE ORGANIZATION

Précis of proceedings and of relevant constitutional discussions

52. The fourth special session of the General Assembly, which was convened on 14 May 1963 to deal with the item entitled "Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light

¹⁰⁵ For further discussion on expulsion, see this *Supplement* under Article 6.

¹⁰⁶ For text of relevant statements, see G A (XVII); Spec. Pol. Com., 341st mtg.: Colombia, paras. 24, 27 and 28; Guatemala, para. 47; Ivory Coast, para. 55; Thailand, para. 34; G A (XVII), Plen., 1164th mtg.: Ivory Coast, para. 182; 1165th mtg.: Colombia, para. 53; Guatemala, para. 79; Venezuela, para. 61.

¹⁰⁷ G A (XVII), Spec. Pol. Com., 341st mtg., para. 81.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 91.

¹⁰⁹ G A (XVII), Plen., 1165th mtg., para. 33.

of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations",¹¹⁰ considered a number of draft resolutions in the course of its debate.

53. Under one of the draft resolutions,¹¹¹ submitted by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistana, Panam, Philippines, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay and Venezuela, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, lay down certain principles which were to serve as guidelines for the equitable sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, in so far as they were not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements.

54. Two other draft resolutions¹¹² provided for authorization of certain expenditures to cover the costs of United Nations operations in the Middle East (UNEF) and in the Congo (ONUC), respectively, and for the modalities of apportioning those expenditures among Member States.

55. In the course of the debate on the draft resolutions, as well as during the general debate on the item, a number of representatives questioned the competence of the General Assembly in dealing with the matter, which they considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council. It was argued that the exclusive competence of the Security Council to deal with the maintenance of international peace and security, including such operations as those conducted in the Middle East and in the Congo, was set out in Articles 10, 11, 12 and 24 and in the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

56. They pointed out that under those provisions, decisions involving the use of armed force on behalf of the United Nations and those determining the conditions for financing the expenditures resulting from such decisions, rested with the Security Council. Yet, notwithstanding those provisions, the General Assembly had been substituted for the Security Council in the case of UNEF and ONUC. The General Assembly could not, however, usurp the exclusive rights of the Security Council in that field for, to do so, would be to violate one of the fundamental provisions of the Charter, namely, the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council. While the General

Assembly could consider and make recommendations on matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, it could not impose obligations on Member States with regard to such matters. Article 11, it was further argued, had been adopted in conjunction with Articles 24 and 25 and Chapter VII of the Charter, and it had never been intended that questions treated under those provisions could be decided upon by the General Assembly. It was clear from the provisions of the Charter that if the Security Council had decided to use armed forces, it should, under Article 43,¹¹³ determine the prerequisites for carrying out its decisions, including the securing of the necessary financial means. There were therefore no grounds for the contention that the financial aspects of the decision to use armed force were within the competence of the General Assembly.

57. Those supporting the draft resolutions argued that, in considering the financial consequences of the United Nations operations in the Middle East and in the Congo, the General Assembly in no way infringed the competence of the Security Council; while, under the provisions of Article 24, the Security Council admittedly had primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, that responsibility was not exclusive. If the Security Council, "in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations" failed to discharge its responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, the assumption of that responsibility by the General Assembly was inevitable. Article 11 empowered the General Assembly to make recommendations on matters relating to international peace and security which had been brought to its attention by Member States. Furthermore, the procedure by which the General Assembly was authorized to consider a matter in regard to which the Security Council had failed to accomplish its task, owing to lack of unanimity among its permanent members, had been approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 377 B (V) entitled "Uniting for peace". With regard to the operations in the Congo, the General Assembly had proceeded on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Security Council and, consequently, the assertion that the General Assembly had encroached on the exclusive right of the Security Council was unfounded. The General Assembly had, on the contrary, merely reinforced the decisions of the Security Council in that respect and had given more weight to the collective responsibility assumed by the Organization.

58. A number of representatives referred to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on certain expenses of the Organization¹¹⁴ to support the view that the General Assembly was competent to apportion expenses relating to peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. Those

¹¹⁰ G A (S-IV), Annexes, a.i. 7.

¹¹¹ G A (S-IV), Annexes, a.i. 7, A/5438, para. 17, draft resolution I.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, draft resolutions II and III. The first one was sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay and Venezuela, and the second one by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay and Venezuela.

¹¹³ For further discussion relating to Article 43, see this *Supplement* under that Article.

¹¹⁴ Certain expenses of United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory opinion of 20 July 1962: ICJ, *Reports 1962*. For views of the Court on the scope of Article 11, see para. 107 below.

opposed to that view argued that the opinion of the Court could not be invoked, because the opinion itself violated the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter and amounted to an amendment of the Charter, which could only be effected in accordance with the proper constitutional procedures, as set out in Article 108.

59. In a vote taken at its 1004th meeting, the Fifth Committee adopted¹¹⁵ all three draft resolutions; the first, containing the general principles for the financing of future peace-keeping operations in so far as they were not otherwise covered by special agreements (A/C.5/L.872 and Add.1) was adopted by 91 votes to 13, with 3 abstentions; the second, dealing with UNEF expenses (A/C.5/L.873 and Add.1) by 79 votes to 11, with 17 abstentions and the third, concerning ONUC expenses (A/C.5/L.874 and Add.1) by 79 votes to 12, with 16 abstentions.¹¹⁶

Decision

At its 1205th plenary meeting, on 27 June 1963 the General Assembly adopted the above-mentioned draft resolutions as resolution 1874 (S-IV), by 92 votes to 11, with 3 abstentions,¹¹⁷ resolution 1875 (S-IV), by 80 votes to 11, with 16 abstentions,¹¹⁸ and resolution 1876 (S-IV) by 80 votes to 12, with 15 abstentions,¹¹⁹ respectively.

4. RESOLUTION 1899 (XVIII) IN CONNEXION WITH THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

a. *Précis of proceedings*

60. During consideration of the agenda item entitled "Question of South West Africa"¹²⁰ at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, the Fourth Committee had before it a draft resolution¹²¹ jointly sponsored by Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Braz-

¹¹⁵ G A (S-IV), 5th Com., 1004th mtg., paras. 18-20. The Fifth Committee also considered and adopted other draft resolutions which dealt with the payment of arrears in contributions to the UNEF Special Account and the ONUC *Ad Hoc* Account (A/C.5/L.785 and Add. 1 and 2); the terms and conditions governing the issue of United Nations bonds (A/C.5/L.786 and Add.1); the establishment of a peace fund (A/C.5/L.787) and the continuation of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/C.5/L.788 and Add.1). Constitutional discussions, however, were mainly related to the three draft resolutions treated in paras. 53-59 above.

¹¹⁶ For text of relevant statements, see G A (S-IV), 5th Com. 986th mtg.: USSR, paras. 6 and 7; 987th mtg.: Romania, para. 18; 988th mtg.: Congo (Brazzaville), para. 24; Greece, para. 50; Ukrainian SSR, paras. 2 and 5; 989th mtg.: Cuba, para. 32; Hungary, paras. 5 and 6; 990th mtg.: Czechoslovakia, paras. 11 and 14; Mongolia, paras. 18 and 23; 992nd mtg.: Albania, para. 27; 993rd mtg.: Federation of Malaya, para. 10; Indonesia, para. 19; 994th mtg.: Byelorussian SSR, para. 7; 995th mtg.: Ghana, para. 6; 997th mtg.: Poland, para. 10; 998th mtg.: Cyprus, para. 10; 1000th mtg.: Jamaica, paras. 15 and 16; 1001st mtg.: USSR, para. 12; 1002nd mtg.: Ukrainian SSR, paras. 5 and 6; Plen., 1205th mtg.: Brazil, para. 53; USSR, paras. 59-61, 75 and 76.

¹¹⁷ G A (S-IV), Plen., 1205th mtg., para. 110.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 111.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 112.

¹²⁰ G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 55.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, A/5605 and Add. 1, para. 10.

zaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanganyika, Togo, Uganda, United Arab Republic and Yemen.

61. In the thirteenth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, as orally revised at the 1471st meeting of the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly expressed its deep concern "at the present critical situation in South West Africa, the continuation of which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security". The substantive part of the draft resolution contained, *inter alia*, the following operative paragraphs:

"4. *Considers* that any attempt to annex a part or the whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of aggression;

"...

"6. *Decides* to draw the attention of the Security Council to the present critical situation in South West Africa, the continuation of which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security;

"7. *Urges* all States which have not yet done so to take, separately or collectively, with reference to the question of South West Africa, the following measures:

(a) Refrain forthwith from the supply in any manner or form of any arms or military equipment to South Africa;

(b) Refrain also from supplying in any manner or form any petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa;

(c) Refrain from any action which might hamper the implementation of this resolution and of the previous resolutions of the General Assembly on South West Africa;"

62. The Fourth Committee had also before it amendments to the draft resolution submitted by the United States which, among other things proposed to replace the phrasing of the thirteenth preambular paragraph by the words "*Deeply concerned* that the situation in South West Africa constitutes a dangerous source of international friction;". Operative paragraph 4 would also be replaced by the following: "*Considers* that an attempt by the Government of South Africa to annex all or part of the Territory of South West Africa would be a violation of the Mandate and of international law", and operative paragraph 6 by a paragraph reading as follows; "*Determines* that the situation in South West Africa constitutes a dangerous source of international friction". Furthermore, it was proposed that operative paragraph 7 (b) should be deleted. At the 1473rd meeting, the Fourth Committee, after rejecting all the amendments submitted by the United States, adopted¹²² the draft resolution as a whole by 82 votes to 6, with 16 abstentions.

¹²² G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 55, A/5605 and Add. 1, para. 12.

Decision

At its 1257th plenary meeting, the General Assembly adopted¹²³ the draft resolution by 84 votes to 6, with 17 abstentions, as its resolution 1899 (XVIII).

b. *Précis of relevant constitutional discussions*

63. During consideration of the question, a number of representatives expressed their views on the constitutionality of the measures proposed in the draft resolution. Attention was particularly drawn to the thirteenth preambular paragraph in which the General Assembly expressed its concern over the critical situation in South West Africa which it characterized as constituting "a serious threat to international peace and security". Constitutional discussion also centred upon operative paragraph 4 in which the Assembly considered that any attempt to annex a part or the whole of the territory of South West Africa constituted an "act of aggression"; operative paragraph 6, in which it drew the attention of the Security Council to the situation the continuation of which "constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security" and operative paragraph 7, in which it urged all States, either separately or collectively, to adopt a number of economic measures against South Africa.

64. The argument of the representatives opposed to the above-mentioned preambular and operative paragraphs was that, while the General Assembly had the power to draw the attention of the Security Council to a critical situation, it was only the Security Council that could determine the existence of any threat to international peace and security or act of aggression, in accordance with the provisions of Article 39. Furthermore, the various measures called for in operative paragraph 7 (b) were in effect economic sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, which were measures within the exclusive competence of the Security Council.

65. It was argued on the other hand that while it was true, as was indicated in Article 24 of the Charter, that the Security Council had the "primary responsibility" in the maintenance of international peace and security, that responsibility was by no means exclusive. The only limits placed on the responsibilities of the General Assembly were those defined in Article 12, but since the question of South West Africa was not before the Security Council there was nothing by virtue of paragraph 1 of that Article to prevent the General Assembly from dealing with that question and making recommendations on the matter. It was also contended that the right of the Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to international peace and security or an act of aggression must be seen in the context of the provisions of Articles 10 and 14.¹²⁴ Since under both those Articles the General Assembly was authorized to make recommendations on a particular matter under consideration, it followed that the right of the Security Council to determine a situation

under Article 39 was not exclusive. Furthermore, in the draft resolution the General Assembly did not call for immediate action under Chapter VII; it merely drew the attention of the Security Council to a situation the continuance of which it considered as constituting a serious threat to international peace and security. Some representatives also maintained that the right of the General Assembly to make recommendations such as those called for in the draft resolution had been previously asserted in resolutions 1761 (XVII) and 1805 (XVII).¹²⁵

5. RESOLUTION 2022 (XX) IN CONNEXION WITH THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

a. *Précis of proceedings*

66. During the consideration at the twentieth session of the General Assembly of Chapter III of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (relating to Southern Rhodesia),¹²⁶ the Fourth Committee had before it a draft resolution¹²⁷ jointly sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

67. The draft resolution contained, *inter alia*, the following paragraphs:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"*Considering* that the administering Power has not implemented the above resolutions and that no constitutional progress has been made, [third preambular paragraph]

"...

"3. *Solemnly warns* the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in its capacity as administering Power, that the United Nations will oppose any declaration of independence which is not based on universal adult suffrage;

"...

¹²³ For text of relevant statements, see G A (XVIII), 4th Com., 1462nd mtg.: Ecuador, para. 53; 1471st mtg.: United States, paras. 20 and 21; 1472nd mtg.: Congo (Leopoldville), para. 53; 1473rd mtg.: Cambodia, para. 26; Canada, paras. 63 and 64; Chile, para. 17; Greece, para. 72; Japan, para. 74; New Zealand, para. 10; Sweden, paras. 40 and 41; United Kingdom, paras. 69 and 70; Venezuela, para. 78.

¹²⁶ G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 23, A/6000/Rev. 1, Chap. III.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, A/6041, Add. 1, para. 4, same text as resolution 2022 (XX).

¹²³ G A (XVIII), Plen., 1257th mtg., para. 31.

¹²⁴ See this *Supplement* under Articles 10 and 14.

"6. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from rendering any assistance whatsoever to the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"7. *Requests* that the administering Power effect immediately:

(a) The release of all political prisoners, political detainees and restrictees;

(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation and, in particular, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act;

(c) The removal of all restrictions on African political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights;

"8. *Requests once more* the Government of the United Kingdom to suspend the Constitution of 1961 and to call immediately a constitutional conference in which representatives of all political parties will take part, with a view to making new constitutional arrangements on the basis of universal adult suffrage and to fixing the earliest possible date for independence;

"...

"11. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to employ all necessary measures, including military force, to implement paragraphs 7 and 8 above;

"12. *Draws the attention* of the Security Council to the threats made by the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia, including the threat of economic sabotage against the independent African States adjoining Southern Rhodesia;

"13. *Further draws the attention* of the Security Council to the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia which threatens international peace and security, and decides to transmit to the Council the records and resolutions of the twentieth session of the General Assembly on this question;"

68. During the debate on that question two amendments were submitted to the draft resolution by Costa Rica and Mexico, respectively. Under the amendment of Costa Rica,¹²⁸ the words "and the United Kingdom" would be replaced by the words "and informs the United Kingdom" in operative paragraph 3. In its amendment, Mexico¹²⁹ proposed to replace (i) the words "has not implemented" in the third preambular paragraph by the words "has not yet been able to implement"; (ii) the words "and the United Kingdom", in operative paragraph 3, by the words "and informs the United Kingdom"; (iii) the words "the United Nations" in operative paragraph 3 by the words "the States Members of the United Nations" and (iv) to delete the words "including military force" in operative paragraph 11.

69. Following a substantive discussion on both the draft resolution and the two amendments thereto, the Fourth Committee, at its 1544th meeting,

rejected both amendments and adopted¹³⁰ the draft resolution by a roll-call vote of 79 to 8, with 17 abstentions.

Decision

At its 1368th plenary meeting, the General Assembly by 82 votes to 9, with 18 abstentions, adopted¹³¹ the draft resolution without change as its resolution 2022 (XX).

b. Précis of relevant constitutional discussion

70. The discussion centred mainly on operative paragraphs 11 and 13 of the draft resolution. In paragraph 11, the General Assembly called on the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering power of Southern Rhodesia, to employ all necessary measures, including military force, to implement the requests contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the draft resolution and, in paragraph 13, it drew the attention of the Security Council to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which it considered threatened international peace and security.

71. A number of representatives who expressed doubt on the competence of the General Assembly to call for the various measures envisaged in the draft resolution argued that while the General Assembly had the right under Article 11 to discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and to make recommendations thereon, it had no authority under the Charter to call for sanctions by Member States. They contended that the right to impose sanctions had been vested in the Security Council alone as the principal United Nations organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the language of Chapter VII. Under Article 11, the General Assembly was empowered to draw the attention of the Security Council to situations which were "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"; it was not vested with the power to determine the existence of a threat to international peace and security. The power to determine that a situation was in fact a danger to international peace and security was within the purview of the Security Council and the General Assembly could not arrogate that power to itself.

72. Some representatives who voted for the draft resolution as a whole made it clear that they had voted for operative paragraphs 11 and 13 of the draft resolution with the understanding that neither of the paragraphs would imply taking sanctions or enforcement measures, since decisions or sanctions were the prerogative of the Security Council by virtue of Chapter VII.

73. In response, certain representatives contended on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution that the Fourth Committee, far from lacking the competence to call for the actions provided for in the draft resolution, was authorized under the provisions of Article 11 (2), to make recommendations on any question relating to the maintenance of

¹²⁸ G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 23, A/6041/Add. 1, para. 6.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

Ibid., paras. 8 and 9.

¹³¹ G A (XX), Plen., 1368th mtg., para. 22.

international peace and security. Paragraph 13 of the draft resolution by no means imposed an obligation on the Security Council to take a particular action; it was rather envisaged as an appeal, action on which was to be left to the discretion of the Security Council. Furthermore, while it was admittedly the prerogative of the Security Council to impose a collective measure on Members of the United Nations, in the draft resolution the General Assembly was merely asking the administering Power of Southern Rhodesia to fulfil the obligations defined in Article 73 of Chapter XI of the Charter. They added that an administering Power must use force if that was the only means by which it could fulfil the obligation which it had assumed under the Charter.¹³²

6. RESOLUTION 2053 A (XX) IN CONNEXION WITH PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly

74. With a view to overcoming the constitutional difficulties that had faced the first part of the nineteenth session, the General Assembly, at its resumed session in February 1965, adopted resolution 2006 (XIX) in which it invited the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, as a matter of urgency, to "make arrangements for and to undertake appropriate consultations on the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization".¹³³ It also authorized the President of the General Assembly to establish a Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, under his chairmanship and with the collaboration of the Secretary-General, and instructed the committee, taking into account the consultations to be undertaken by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, "to undertake as soon as possible a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization".¹³⁴

75. In pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution, the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session consulted with Member States and reported¹³⁵ the results of their consultations to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations which had, in the meantime been established.¹³⁶

76. The report noted that the consultations revealed a difference of opinion concerning the scope

and nature of recommendations the General Assembly could make relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. After referring to the provisions of Article 11 (2), it was pointed out that the difference in interpretation had arisen largely on the exact meaning of the word "action" in that paragraph.

77. Some Members, while relating the word "action" to the enforcement action covered by Chapter VII of the Charter and admitting that such action was beyond the competence of the General Assembly, made a distinction between such action and that taken with the consent of the party concerned and not against that party. In regard to action of the latter type, they held that the General Assembly was not obligated under Article 11 (2) to refer the question to the Security Council for decision.

78. Other Members held that neither the Charter nor experience justified a distinction being established between action directed against a State and that taken against disturbers of the peace, communities or provinces, and that enforcement action occurred whenever an operation involving the use of force was authorized with or without the consent or concurrence of the parties concerned. The "action" covered by paragraph 2 of Article 11 included not only the measures provided for in Chapter VII, under Articles 41 and 42, but also measures for the establishment of a force, military or otherwise, for the purpose of intervening against a State or inside a State even when the latter consented and where the effective use of arms was limited to restricted circumstances. An exception would be operations for the purpose of conducting observation, surveillance or inquiry, even when military personnel were used and even when such personnel were numerous, provided that such military personnel did not constitute units under a military commander and provided that responsibility for their security was left to the local forces.

79. Yet another view was that the word "action" covered any decision on matters relating to the operations of the United Nations aimed at the maintenance of international peace and security.

80. It was also noted that there was a general agreement that, if the General Assembly was considering a question that involved or might involve a peace-keeping operation, it should make appropriate recommendations to the Council in the first instance, in view of the latter's primary responsibility. There was a wide difference of views, however, regarding the steps to be followed in the event of the Security Council being unable to act promptly in conformity with the recommendations of the Assembly. Some Members held the view that if the Security Council was unable to act even on the second attempt and in spite of the strong recommendations of the General Assembly, it would be realistic to accept the inability of the Organization to act and then to seek assistance outside the United Nations. The report noted that the foregoing view did not appear to be supported by the majority of Member States, some of whom believed the General Assembly should be empowered, in such a situation, to authorize the

¹³² For text of relevant statements, see G A (XX), 4th Com., 1541st mtg.: Algeria, para. 24; Argentina, para. 45; Mexico, para. 47; Netherlands, para. 51; Sweden, para. 30; Venezuela, paras. 67-69; 1544th mtg.: Canada, para. 20; Iraq, paras. 60 and 61; Norway, para. 47; South Africa, para. 37; Tanzania, para. 52; United Kingdom, para. 4; Venezuela, paras. 14, 15 and 18; 1545th mtg.: Chile, paras. 14 and 15; Costa Rica, para. 11; Denmark, para. 3.

¹³³ G A resolution 2006 (XIX), para. 1.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 3.

¹³⁵ G A (XIX), Annexes, No. 21, A/5915 and Add. 1, annex II, p. 79.

¹³⁶ See paras. 83 and 84 below.

peace-keeping operation. Other Members believed that the General Assembly should under the circumstances make recommendations for measures which should not involve the establishment of a peace-keeping operation.

81. In addition to reporting the results of those consultations, the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly also set forth some conclusions and observations, including guidelines for future peace-keeping operations which, in their view, might be useful in conducting a comprehensive review of the question of peace-keeping operations.

82. After noting that peace-keeping operations conducted by the United Nations had in practice varied so much and in so many ways that a considerable degree of flexibility would be required in dealing with each individual situation, the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly formulated the following guidelines:¹³⁷

“(a) The Members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

“(b) The General Assembly also bears its share of responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. The general functions and powers of the Assembly relating to the maintenance of international peace and security are contained in Articles 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 35 of the Charter.

“(c) The functions and powers of the Security Council and of the General Assembly should be understood as complementary and not as contradictory.

“(d) In view of the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security conferred upon the Security Council by the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring prompt and effective action by the Organization, any question which involves or may involve peace-keeping operations should be examined, in the first instance, by the Security Council in order that appropriate action may be taken as promptly as possible by that organ.

“(e) If the Security Council is unable for any reason whatever to adopt decisions in the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, there is nothing to prevent the General Assembly from considering the matter immediately and making appropriate recommendations in conformity with its responsibilities and the relevant provisions of the Charter.

“(f) According to Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter, the General Assembly may choose to refer the question back to the Security Council with appropriate recommendations. If the General Assembly resolves by the required two-thirds majority to make such recommendations, it is to be expected that the weight of such recommendations, supported by a substantial majority of the membership of the United Nations, will have

a very significant effect upon the subsequent action by the Security Council. It is likewise to be expected that the General Assembly will duly take into account and give the most serious weight to the views expressed and positions taken in the Security Council when the Council was previously seized of the matter at issue.

“...”.

a. *Précis of proceedings*

83. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, which by resolution 2006 (XIX) was instructed to “undertake ... a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organisation”, was established in January 1965 with the announcement by the President of the General Assembly of the names of thirty-three Member States appointed as members of the committee.¹³⁸

84. The Committee met between March and August 1965 and issued two reports on the results of their deliberations, one submitted to the General Assembly on 15 June¹³⁹ and the other on 31 August.¹⁴⁰ During one of its meetings in June, the Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly on the consultations referred to in the foregoing paragraphs. After reviewing the report, it decided that the guidelines for future peace-keeping operations suggested by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly should be referred to Member States for their comments with a request that their views should be submitted to the Committee so that it could take them into account in its future deliberations on peace-keeping operations.

85. In its second report, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations informed the General Assembly of a consensus it had reached on the manner in which the General Assembly should proceed with its business and on the way to solve the financial difficulties of the Organization. That consensus, reached “in the light of the statements made in the Committee, without prejudice to the positions taken therein” and on the basis of the previous report of the Committee in which it had agreed “that the United Nations should be strengthened through a co-operative effort and that the General Assembly when it reconvenes must conduct its work according to the normal procedure established by its rules of procedure”, was formulated as follows:¹⁴¹

“(a) That the General Assembly will carry on its work normally in accordance with its rules of procedure;

¹³⁸ The following Member States were appointed to serve on the Committee: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. See G.A. (XIX), Annexes, No. 21, A/5900.

¹³⁹ G.A. (XIX), Annexes, No. 21, A/5915 and Add. 1.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, A/5616 and Add. 1.

¹⁴¹ G.A. (XIX), Annexes, No. 21, A/5916 and Add. 1, para. 2.

¹³⁷ G.A. (XIX), Annexes, No. 21, A/5915 and Add. 1, annex II, p. 85.

“(b) That the question of the applicability of Article 19¹⁴² of the Charter will not be raised with regard to the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo;

“(c) That the financial difficulties of the Organization should be solved through voluntary contributions by Member States, with the highly developed countries making substantial contributions.”

86. At its resumed nineteenth session, on 1 September 1965, the General Assembly adopted the reports of the Committee.¹⁴³ Following that decision, the President said that there was a general agreement that it was necessary to complete the work entrusted to the Committee by resolution 2006 (XIX) and proposed that the modalities for the continuance of the work of the Committee should be decided upon at the twentieth session. The General Assembly decided accordingly.¹⁴⁴

87. At the twentieth session, during consideration of the question of peace-keeping operations,¹⁴⁵ the Special Political Committee had before it a number of proposals designed to provide an agreed basis on which future peace-keeping operations were to be conducted.¹⁴⁶ One of them was contained in a draft resolution¹⁴⁷ submitted by Ceylon, Costa Rica, Ghana, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nepal, the Philippines and Somalia. In the preambular paragraphs of the nine-Power draft resolution, as subsequently revised, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, recognized “the special responsibility and authority of the Security Council in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security” and reasserted “the right of the General Assembly to recommend the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation when the Security Council is unable to take prompt and effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security”.¹⁴⁸ In its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly would, among other things, invite the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to consider (a) the criteria which would determine the distinction between peace-keeping operations and enforcement measures within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter; (b) the question of the authorization of peace-keeping operations and the means of harmonizing the respective responsibilities of the General

Assembly and the Security Council in the initiation of measures to maintain or restore international peace and security; (c) the means of implementing resolutions in the field of peace-keeping and (d) the financing of peace-keeping operations.¹⁴⁹ The nine-Power draft resolution also provided that until a comprehensive arrangement for financing future peace-keeping operations could be adopted, peace-keeping expenditures that were not covered by agreed arrangements or made part of the regular budget, should be apportioned according to a special scale of assessment with varied percentages of the expenditures assessable on less developed countries, developed countries and the permanent members of the Security Council.¹⁵⁰

88. Following a debate on the nine-Power draft resolution and other proposals¹⁵¹ relating to the item, the Special Political Committee decided,¹⁵² at its 487th meeting, to give priority to a draft resolution¹⁵³ submitted by nineteen delegations under which, among other things, the Assembly would request the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to continue and complete the work assigned to it by the General Assembly in resolution 2006 (XIX) and to report to the Assembly at its twenty-first session. By that draft resolution, the General Assembly would also decide to transmit to the Special Committee the records of the debates on the item during the twentieth session of the Assembly. At the same meeting, the Special Political Committee adopted¹⁵⁴ the nineteen-Power draft resolution by 88 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.

Decision

At its 1395th plenary meeting, the General Assembly adopted¹⁵⁵ the draft resolution by 87 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions, as its resolution 2053 A (XX).

b. Précis of relevant constitutional discussions

89. The constitutional discussions bearing on Article 11 during the debate on the question of peace-keeping operations at the twentieth session of the General Assembly related not so much to particular peace-keeping operations that the United Nations had undertaken in the past, but rather to the basic Charter provisions concerning the respective competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council with regard to operations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

90. Representatives were generally agreed that the Assembly could not take enforcement or preventive actions under Chapter VII of the Charter, for those were the prerogatives of the Security Council. They expressed differing views, however, on the scope of the competence of the General Assembly in the maintenance of international peace

¹⁴² See this *Supplement* under Article 19.

¹⁴³ G A (XIX), Plen., 1331st mtg., para. 4.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

¹⁴⁵ The question was considered under the item entitled “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: (a) Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations; (b) The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations”. (G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 101.)

¹⁴⁶ G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 101, A/6158, paras. 5–7.

¹⁴⁷ G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 101, A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1. That draft resolution replaced another draft resolution submitted earlier by the same sponsors (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2) in which the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, amend its rules of procedure relating to a quorum and voting when matters relating to peace-keeping operations were to be voted upon. See G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 101, A/6158, para. 5.

¹⁴⁸ G A (XX) Annexes, a.i. 101, A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1, pream. paras. 3 and 5.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 1.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

¹⁵¹ G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 101, A/6158, paras. 6–9.

¹⁵² G A (XX), Spec. Pol. Com., 487th mtg., para. 40.

¹⁵³ G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 101, A/SPC/L. 122, A/6158, para. 7.

¹⁵⁴ G A (XX), Spec. Pol. Com., 487th mtg., para. 40.

¹⁵⁵ G A (XX), Plen., 1395th mtg., para. 111.

and security with respect to issues not requiring action under Chapter VII.

91. It was argued, on the one hand, that even actions falling short of enforcement actions and taken with the consent of the parties concerned were primarily the responsibility of the Security Council; the powers of the General Assembly set forth in Article 11, as well as in Articles 10, 14 and 35 were limited to discussing questions and making recommendations to the Security Council or to Member States or to both. Furthermore, when dealing with a question on which action was necessary, the General Assembly should, under the provisions of Article 11, refer that question to the Security Council either before or after discussion. Under Articles 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15, the General Assembly had indeed a share of responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; nowhere in those Articles, however, was it provided that the General Assembly could adopt binding resolutions or could act in place of the Security Council.

92. It was furthermore argued that the incorporation of a new term such as "peace-keeping operations" in the terminology of the United Nations would only tend to confuse the issue and would be tantamount to a *de facto* revision of the provisions of the Charter which specifically vested in the Security Council the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The provisions of Article 24 conferring "primary responsibility" upon the Security Council, which some representatives sought to interpret as not being an exclusive responsibility, did not appear to warrant such a conclusion. For, had that not been the intention of the founders of the United Nations, the division of responsibility which was clearly set out in other Articles of the Charter, particularly in paragraph 2 of Article 11, would not have been made. Furthermore, the term "primary responsibility" did not in any way imply the existence of a "residual responsibility" for the General Assembly. The distinction that some representatives sought to make between actions of the Security Council under Chapter VII and the kind of actions referred to as "peace-keeping operations" was artificial, for an "operation" could be nothing other than an action taken under Chapter VII in the event of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Various kinds of action were provided for in the Charter, ranging from measures not involving the use of armed force to action by air, sea or land forces. Whenever the Security Council decided to undertake an action, it was performed in application of Chapter VII. The General Assembly admittedly had the competence to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, but its competence was limited to the right of considering such matters and of making recommendations thereon in so far as no action was involved. Any further dealing with matters requiring action should, under the provisions of Article 11 (2), with no qualification, be referred to the Security Council.

93. It was argued on the other hand, that the responsibility of the General Assembly in matters

relating to the maintenance of international peace and security was clearly set out in Article 11 as well as 10, 12, 14, 15 and 35 of the Charter. Read in conjunction with the provisions of Article 24, those Articles indicated that the competence of the General Assembly was complementary to that of the Security Council. The only limitation of the competence of the General Assembly was that set out in Article 12, in regard to matters of which the Security Council was seized. However, in cases in which the Security Council had failed to carry out the primary responsibility vested in it by Article 24, the General Assembly would have the responsibility of taking whatever measures were considered necessary to preserve international peace and security. One such measure could be a recommendation to Member States to join in the efforts of the United Nations to establish its presence in the territory of a Member State with the consent, or at the invitation, of the Government of that State. It was also argued that measures provided for in Chapters VII, VIII, X and XII of the Charter were not the only ones that could give rise to peace-keeping operations. Any operation not specifically provided for in those Chapters could be undertaken by the General Assembly without implying the use of military force against a specific State as, for example, in the appointment of a mediator, the arrangement of a truce or the establishment of an observer force. Such action should be decided upon by recommendation of the General Assembly within the provisions of Articles 10, 11 and 14. The word "action" used in Article 11 (2), as had been indicated by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962,¹⁵⁶ referred only to enforcement or preventive action against a specific State. Any other interpretation would be tantamount to nullifying all the powers which Articles 10, 11 and 14 conferred on the General Assembly in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security.¹⁵⁷

B. The question of the meaning and scope of the term "action" as used in Article 11 (2)

94. During the period under review, the General Assembly did not adopt any resolution or decision defining the scope and meaning of the word "action" in Article 11 (2). Constitutional discussions did take place, however, during the consideration of the cost estimates for 1961 for the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) where the question of measures for the maintenance of international

¹⁵⁶ Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), ICJ, *Reports 1962*, p. 164.

¹⁵⁷ For text of relevant statements, see G A (XX), Spec. Pol. Com., 460th mtg.: Iran, para. 21; 463rd mtg.: Peru, para. 5; 465th mtg.: Chile, para. 39; Kenya, para. 34; USSR, para. 54; 466th mtg.: Czechoslovakia, para. 27; India, para. 12; 467th mtg.: Japan, para. 5; Poland, para. 41; United Republic of Tanzania, para. 13; 468th mtg.: Guatemala, para. 19; Hungary, para. 24; Venezuela, para. 12; 482nd mtg.: Austria, para. 9; China, para. 15; Jamaica, para. 21; Ukrainian SSR, para. 34; 483rd mtg.: Mongolia, para. 29; Morocco, para. 36; Zambia, para. 11; 484th mtg.: Bulgaria, paras. 5 and 6; 486th mtg.: Ceylon, para. 21; USSR, para. 10.

peace and security was reviewed in the light of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 11, as well as those of other Articles of the Charter. These discussions are reviewed in paragraphs 96–106 below.

95. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962 on the question of certain expenses of the United Nations, also expressed its views on the scope of the word “action” in paragraph 2 of Article 11. The relevant text of this opinion is included in paragraph 107 below.

1. RESOLUTIONS 1619 (XV) AND 1620 (XV) IN CONNEXION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO (ONUC)

a. *Précis of proceedings*

96. During consideration of the item entitled “United Nations operations in the Congo (ONUC): cost estimates and financing” at the resumed fifteenth session of the General Assembly, the Fifth Committee had before it the report¹⁵⁸ of the Secretary-General on the 1961 cost estimates for the United Nations operations in the Congo and the report¹⁵⁹ of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions which set forth its views on the estimates.

97. While the attention of the Fifth Committee was devoted mainly to ways and means of financing the operations, a number of representatives raised the question of whether or not the General Assembly was competent to consider the question of the United Nations operations in the Congo and the draft resolutions relating to them.

98. Under a draft resolution¹⁶⁰ submitted by eighteen Member States, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, lay down certain principles for apportioning the 1961 expenses; endorse the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Budgetary and Administrative Questions; urge the permanent members of the Security Council to make sizable additional contributions; urge Members which were in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions and call upon Belgium to make a substantial contribution.

99. In a second draft resolution¹⁶¹ submitted by Pakistan and Tunisia at the 839th meeting and subsequently co-sponsored by Ghana and Liberia, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, approve certain recommendations of the Advisory Committee; apportion the expenses provided for in the resolution in accordance with the scale of assessment of the regular budget; appeal to the permanent members

¹⁵⁸ G A (XV), Annexes, a.i. 49/50, A/4703. According to the report, the 1961 expenses for the operations, estimated at \$135 million, would consist of \$107 million for operating costs to be incurred directly by the United Nations and \$28 million for reimbursements of expenses and extraordinary costs incurred by Governments providing contingents to ONUC (paras. 2 and 7).

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, A/4713. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended in its report that the cost of the 1961 operations should not exceed \$120 million (para. 29).

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, A/4740, para. 8, A/C.5/L.658 and Corr.1.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, A/4740, para. 9, A/C.5/L.663/Rev.1.

of the Security Council and Member States which were in a position to do so to make sizable voluntary contributions to reduce the assessment of certain Member States and call upon the Government of Belgium to make substantial contributions.

100. In another resolution¹⁶² submitted by Canada at the 840th meeting, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, decide to place on the agenda of its sixteenth session the question of the administrative and budgetary procedures of the Organization, including methods for covering the cost of peace-keeping operations, and the relationship between such methods and the existing administrative and budgetary procedures of the Organization; request the President of the General Assembly to appoint a working group of nine Member States to consider and report on that question to the Assembly at its sixteenth session; request Member States to submit, for consideration by the working group, observations on principles to be applied in determining a special scale of assessments for peace and security and refer to the Assembly all relevant documentation for consideration under the question.

101. During consideration of the eighteen-Power draft resolution, a number of amendments were submitted, some of which were subsequently incorporated in both the four-Power and the Canadian draft resolutions.¹⁶³

102. At the 843rd meeting, the sponsors of the eighteen-Power draft resolution¹⁶⁴ announced that they would not ask for a vote on it.

103. At the 845th meeting, the Fifth Committee voted on the remaining two draft resolutions and the amendments thereto, and adopted the four-Power draft resolution, as amended, by 43 votes to 26, with 14 abstentions,¹⁶⁵ and the Canadian draft resolution, as amended, by 26 votes to 24, with 29 abstentions.¹⁶⁶

Decision

At its 995th meeting, the General Assembly adopted¹⁶⁷ the two foregoing draft resolutions recommended by the Fifth Committee; the four-Power draft resolution, as amended at that meeting, was adopted by 43 votes to 26, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 1619 (XV), and the Canadian draft resolution, as amended, by 44 votes to 13, with 32 abstentions, as resolution 1620 (XV).

b. *Précis of relevant constitutional discussions*

104. The constitutional discussions during consideration of the item and of the draft resolutions related to the question of whether or not the General Assembly was competent to consider the question of the operations and their financing.

105. The representatives who contested the competence of the General Assembly argued that

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, A/4740, para. 11, A/C. 5/L. 664.

¹⁶³ G A (XV), Annexes, a.i., 49/50, A/4740, paras. 12–14.

¹⁶⁴ See para. 98 above.

¹⁶⁵ G A (XV), 5th Com., 845th mtg., para. 29.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 35.

¹⁶⁷ G A (XV/2), Plen., 995th mtg., paras. 506 and 534.

the operations of the United Nations in the Congo represented an "action" for the maintenance of international peace and security, which was a matter within the exclusive competence of the Security Council. They pointed out that under Article 11 (2), any question on which "action" was necessary must be referred to the Security Council before or after its consideration by the General Assembly. It followed that the financial implication of such "action" should also be the concern of the Security Council, which alone could decide the matter and, as the need arose, determine the methods of apportioning expenses resulting from it. The exclusive competence of the Security Council was further stipulated in the provisions of Articles 43, 48 and other Articles of the Charter.¹⁶⁸ The report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in the Congo¹⁶⁹ implied approval of the strength of the international staff participating in the operations, as well as of the composition of the military forces, motor transport and related questions. All those questions, which related directly to United Nations "action" for the maintenance of international peace and security should, under the provisions of Article 11 (2), and Articles 43 and 48 of the Charter, be decided directly by the Security Council. The General Assembly had no right to consider them, unless the Security Council had decided to request it to do so. The General Assembly could only take decisions binding on all Members with regard to the financing of administrative expenditures, and not with regard to the financing of operations to maintain peace and security, such as those involved in the United Nations operations in the Congo. Furthermore, the Secretary-General, by taking on his own initiative a number of measures related to the operations in the Congo, had violated Articles 43 and 48. He had also violated Article 11 (2), by referring to the Fifth Committee a matter which was within the exclusive province of the Security Council. If the Committee approved the estimates presented in the report of the Secretary-General, it would mean allowing the Secretariat to determine the nature of operations in the Congo, which was an action concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. Such approval would consequently mean the transfer of a power of the Security Council to the Secretariat. The Fifth Committee would be acting contrary to the Charter if it took a decision on the matter without referring it to the Security Council, and its decision thereon would in no way be binding on Member States. One representative stated in that connexion that his delegation would not participate in the debate on substantive issues and would not consider itself bound by the financial implications of any decision the Fifth Committee might take on the item.

106. It was argued, on the other hand, that the consideration of the Congo operations by the General Assembly was the result of the failure to act on the part of the Security Council, to which the

matter had first been brought. Only afterwards had the General Assembly been convened in an emergency special session, under the provisions of the "Uniting for peace" resolution,¹⁷⁰ to consider the United Nations operations in the Congo, in the course of which it decided to continue the Congo operations and recommended the inclusion of the item in the agenda of the General Assembly at its fifteenth regular session. It was therefore difficult to see how the General Assembly's competence could be challenged. Under the terms of the "Uniting for peace" resolution, the failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities did not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibilities to maintain international peace and security. In any case, even if the Security Council had been able to take all the necessary political decisions, the General Assembly, acting through the Fifth Committee, would still have been responsible for the question of financing the implementation of those decisions. Moreover, there was nothing in Articles 11, 43 and 48 of the Charter to sustain the contention that the question of the financing of the United Nations operations in the Congo should be referred to the Security Council. The need for the United Nations continuing its activity in the Congo was a question which had in the past been dealt with by both the Security Council and the General Assembly. As long as no decision was taken by a competent United Nations organ to terminate or curtail the Congo operations, the Fifth Committee was fully competent to deal with the problem of financing those operations.¹⁷¹

2. ADVISORY OPINION OF 20 JULY 1962 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ON CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS (ARTICLE 17, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE CHARTER)¹⁷²

107. In its advisory opinion on the question entitled "Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) of 20 July 1962", the International Court of Justice expressed the following view on the scope of the word "action" in Article 11 (2):¹⁷³

"...

"The argument supporting a limitation on the budgetary authority of the General Assembly with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security relies especially on the reference to

¹⁷⁰ G A resolution 377 A (V).

¹⁷¹ For text of relevant statements, see G A (XV), 5th Com., 816th mtg.: Iraq, para. 40; 825th mtg.: USSR, paras. 5 and 9; 828th mtg.: Czechoslovakia, para. 14; USSR, paras. 7; 830th mtg.: Poland, paras. 5 and 6; 832nd mtg.: Australia, para. 7; Hungary, para. 1; 833rd mtg.: Romania, para. 18; Ukrainian SSR, para. 1; 834th mtg.: Albania, para. 27; China, para. 15; Norway para. 10; 835th mtg.: Denmark, para. 5; 836th mtg.: USSR, paras. 19 and 26; 838th mtg.: Brazil, para. 4; Bulgaria, para. 15; 841st mtg.: USSR, paras. 16 and 19; 842nd mtg.: Sweden, para. 20; Plen., 955th mtg.: Ecuador, para. 92, 973rd mtg.: USSR, para. 20.

¹⁷² See also this *Supplement* under Article 17 (2).

¹⁷³ I C J, *Reports 1962*, pp. 164, 165, 172 and 177.

¹⁶⁸ See this *Supplement* under Articles 24, 43 and 48.

¹⁶⁹ G A (XV), Annexes, a.i. 49/50, A/4703.

'action' in the last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2. This paragraph reads as follows:

"The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a State which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such question to the State or States concerned or to the Security Council, or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion."

"The Court considers that the kind of action referred to in Article 11, paragraph 2, is coercive or enforcement action. This paragraph, which applies not merely to general questions relating to peace and security, but also to specific cases brought before the General Assembly by a State under Article 35, in its first sentence empowers the General Assembly, by means of recommendations to States or to the Security Council, or to both, to organize peace-keeping operations, at the request, or with the consent, of the States concerned. This power of the General Assembly is a special power which in no way derogates from its general powers under Article 10 or Article 14, except as limited by the last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2. This last sentence says that when 'action' is necessary the General Assembly shall refer the question to the Security Council. The word 'action' must mean such action as is solely within the province of the Security Council. It cannot refer to recommendations which the Security Council might make, as for instance under Article 38, because the General Assembly under Article 11 has a comparable power. The 'action' which is solely within the province of the Security Council is that which is indicated by the title of Chapter VII of the Charter, namely 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.' If the word 'action' in Article 11, paragraph 2, were interpreted to mean that the General Assembly could make recommendations only of a general character affecting peace and security in the abstract, and not in relation to specific cases, the paragraph would not have provided that the General Assembly may make recommendations on questions brought before it by States or by the Security Council. Accordingly, the last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2, has no application where the necessary action is not enforcement action.

"The practice of the Organization throughout its history bears out the foregoing elucidation of the term 'action' in the last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2. Whether the General Assembly proceeds under Article 11 or under Article 14, the implementation of its recommendations for setting up commissions or other bodies involves

organizational activity—action—in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security. Such implementation is a normal feature of the functioning of the United Nations. Such committees, commissions or other bodies or individuals, constitute, in some cases, subsidiary organs established under the authority of Article 22 of the Charter. The functions of the General Assembly for which it may establish such subsidiary organs include, for example, investigation, observation and supervision, but the way in which such subsidiary organs are utilized depends on the consent of the State or States concerned.

"The Court accordingly finds that the argument which seeks, by reference to Article 11, paragraph 2, to limit the budgetary authority of the General Assembly in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security, is unfounded.

"...

"Apropos what has already been said about the meaning of the word 'action' in Article 11 of the Charter, attention may be called to the fact that resolution 997 (ES-I), which is chronologically the first of the resolutions concerning the operations in the Middle East mentioned in the request for the advisory opinion, provides in paragraph 5:

*'Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter.'*¹⁷⁴

"The italicized words reveal an understanding that either of the two organs might take 'action' in the premises. Actually, as one knows, the 'action' was taken by the General Assembly in adopting two days later without a dissenting vote, resolution 998 (ES-I) and, also without a dissenting vote, within another three days, resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I), all providing for UNEF.

"The Court notes that these 'actions' may be considered 'measures' recommended under Article 14, rather than 'action' recommended under Article 11. The powers of the General Assembly stated in Article 14 are not made subject to the provisions of Article 11, but only of Article 12. Furthermore, as the Court has already noted, the word 'measures' implies some kind of action. So far as concerns the nature of the situations in the Middle East in 1956, they could be described as 'likely to impair... friendly relations among nations', just as well as they could be considered to involve 'the maintenance of international peace and security'. Since the resolutions of the General Assembly in question do not mention upon which article they are based, and since the language used in most of them might imply reference to either Article 14 or Article 11, it cannot be

¹⁷⁴ For dissenting opinions relating to the scope of Article 11 of the Charter, see views of Judge Moreno Quintana, *ibid.*, pp. 244, 246 and 247; Judge Koretsky, pp. 256, 259, 273 and 274; and Judge Bustamante, pp. 293–295.

excluded that they were based upon the former rather than the latter article.

“...
“It is not necessary for the Court to express an opinion as to which article or articles of the Charter were the basis for the resolutions of the Security Council, but it can be said that the operations of ONUC did not include a use of armed force against a State which the Security Council, under Article 39, determined to have committed an act of aggression or to have breached the peace. The armed forces which were utilized in the Congo were not authorized to take military action against any State. The operation did not involve ‘preventive or enforcement measures’ against any State under Chapter VII and therefore

did not constitute ‘action’ as that term is used in Article 11.”

****C. The question of the extent of the competence and powers of the General Assembly with regard to questions “on which action is necessary”**

****D. The question of the force of a determination by the General Assembly of the obligation of Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter**

****E. The question of the nature and limits of the power of investigation of the General Assembly in matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security**

ANNEX I

TABULATION OF AGENDA ITEMS BEARING UPON ARTICLE 11

A. Agenda items bearing upon the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security

<i>General Assembly session, number and title of the item</i>		<i>Resolution number</i>
(XV) 9 ^a	Co-operation of Member States	1495 (XV)
(S-IV) 7 ^b	General principles to serve as guidelines for the sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures	1874 (S-IV)
(XVIII) 84	Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems	Discussion postponed
(XIX) ^c	Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects	2006 (XIX)
(XX) 33	Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems	2129 (XX)
(XX) 101	Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: (a) Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping operations; (b) The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations	2053 (XX)
(XX) 107	The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty	2131 (XX)

^a The title of agenda item 9 at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly was “General debate”; the title used for the item in this tabulation is that of the resolution cited.

^b The title of agenda item 7 at the fourth special session of the General Assembly was “Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations”; the title used for the item in this tabulation is that of the resolution cited.

^c The General Assembly did not formally adopt an agenda at its nineteenth session, hence no number was assigned to any of the agenda items before it.

B. Agenda items bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments

<i>General Assembly session, number and title of the item</i>		<i>Resolution number</i>
(XIV) 70	General and complete disarmament	1378 (XIV)
(XIV) 68	Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara	1379 (XIV)
(XIV) 67	Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	1380 (XIV)
(XIV) 69	Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	1402 A (XIV) 1402 B (XIV)
(XIV) 66	Report of the Disarmament Commission: letter dated 11 September 1959 from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to the Secretary-General	1403 (XIV)

B. Agenda items bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (continued)

	<i>General Assembly session, number and title of the item</i>	<i>Resolution number</i>
(XV) 29	Economic and social consequences of disarmament	1516 (XV)
(XV) 73	Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	1576 (XV)
(XV) 69	Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	1577 (XV)
(XV) 67, 68, 69 and 73	Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament Report of the Disarmament Commission Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	1617 (XV)
(XVI) 72 and 73	Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control	1632 (XVI)
(XVI) 73	Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligation of States to refrain from their renewal	1648 (XVI)
(XVI) 72	The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control	1649 (XVI)
(XVI) 73	Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone	1652 (XVI)
(XVI) 72 and 73	Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons	1653 (XVI)
(XVI) 19	Question of disarmament	(1660 (XVI) (1664) (XVI)
(XVI) 81	Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	1665 (XVI)
(XVII) 19	Question of Disarmament	1722 (XVII)
(XVII) 77	The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	1762 A (XVII) 1762 B (XVII)
(XVII) 90	Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	1767 (XVII)
(XVII) 26	Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General	1801 (XVII)
(XVII) 33 and 94	Economic and social consequences of disarmament: report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study of the group of expert consultants appointed under General Assembly resolution 1516 (XV) Economic programme for disarmament	1837 (XVII)
(XVIII) 26	Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	1884 (XVIII) 1908 (XVIII)
(XVIII) 27	Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General	1909 (XVIII)
(XVIII) 73	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	1910 (XVIII)
(XVIII) 74	Denuclearization of Latin America	1911 (XVIII)
(XVIII) 34	Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament: report of the Secretary-General	1931 (XVIII)
(XX) 106	Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	2028 (XX)
(XX) 95	Question of convening a world disarmament conference	2030 (XX)
(XX) 28	Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	2031 (XX)
(XX) 30	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests: reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	2032 (XX)
(XX) 105	Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa	2033 (XX)
(XX) 44	Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament (a) Reports of the Economic and Social Council; (b) Reports of the Secretary-General.	2092 (XX)

****C. Agenda items of a general political character bearing, *inter alia*, upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments**

D. Agenda items bearing upon the maintenance of international peace and security

	<i>General Assembly session, number and title of the item</i>	<i>Resolution number</i>
(XIV) 26	The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea	1455 (XIV)
(XIV) 28	United Nations Emergency Force: (c) Progress report	G A took note of the report
(XIV) 59	Question of Algeria	No resolution adopted
(XIV) 74	Question of Hungary	1454 (XIV)
(ES-IV) 6	Question considered by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on 16 September 1960	1474 (ES-IV)
(XV) 27	United Nations Emergency Force: (b) Progress report on the Force	G A took note of the report
(XV) 71	Question of Algeria	1573 (XV)
(XV) 80	Complaint of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics about a menace to world peace created by aggressive actions of the United States of America against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	No resolution adopted
(XV) 85	The situation in the Republic of the Congo	1592 (XV) 1599 (XV) 1600 (XV) 1601 (XV)
(XV) 89	Question of Oman	Discussion adjourned
(XV) 90	Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security	1616 (XV)
(XV) 92	The situation in Angola	1603 (XV)
(S-III) 7	Consideration of the grave situation in Tunisia obtaining since 19 July 1961	1622 (S-III)
(XVI) 20	The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea	1740 (XVI)
(XVI) 23	Question of Oman	No resolution adopted
(XVI) 26	United Nations Emergency Force: (b) Report on the Force	G A took note of the report
(XVI) 27	The situation in Angola: report of the Sub-Committee established by General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV)	1742 (XVI)
(XVI) 76	The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	1663 (XVI)
(XVI) 78	Complaint by Cuba of threats to international peace and security arising from new plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba	No resolution adopted
(XVI) 80	Question of Algeria	1724 (XVI)
(XVI) 89	Question of Hungary	1741 (XVI)
(XVII) 28	The Korean question: (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea; (b) The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea	1855 (XVII)
(XVII) 29	The situation in Angola: reports of the Sub-Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and of the Government of Portugal	1819 (XVII)
(XVII) 79	Question of Oman	No resolution adopted
(XVII) 85	Question of Hungary	1857 (XVII)

D. Agenda items bearing upon the maintenance of international peace and security (continued)

	<i>General Assembly session, number and title of the item</i>	<i>Resolution number</i>
(XVII) 87	The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: (a) Race conflict in South Africa; (b) Treatment of people of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin in the Republic of South Africa	1761 (XVII)
(XVIII) 19	United Nations Emergency Force: (a) Report on the Force	G A took note of the report
(XVIII) 23 ^d	Territories under Portuguese administration	1913 (XVIII)
(XVIII) 29	The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea	1964 (XVIII)
(XVIII) 30	The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and replies by Member States under General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII)	1881 (XVIII) 1978 (XVIII)
(XVIII) 55	Question of South West Africa (a) Report of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; (b) Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: Report of the Secretary-General	1899 (XVIII) 1979 (XVIII)
(XX) 23 ^e	Question of Southern Rhodesia	2022 (XX) 2024 (XX)
(XX) 23 ^e	Question of Aden	2023 (XX)
(XX) 23 ^e	Question of Territories under Portuguese administration	2107 (XX)
(XX) 32	The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea	2132 (XX)
(XX) 36	The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: (a) Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa; (b) Reports of the Secretary-General	2054 (XX)
(XX) 69	Question of South West Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples	2074 (XX)
(XX) 93	Question of Cyprus: (a) Letter dated 13 July 1965 from the representative of Cyprus; (b) Letter dated 21 July 1965 from the representative of Turkey	2077 (XX)

^d The main title of item 23 at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly was "Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." The subtitles, including the one used in this tabulation, related to specific territories under consideration.

^e The main title of item 23 at the twentieth session of the General Assembly was "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." The subtitles, including the ones used in this tabulation, related to specific territories under consideration.

****E. Agenda items bearing upon the maintenance of international peace and the general principles of co-operation in this field**

ANNEX II

TABULATION OF PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BEARING UPON ARTICLE 11
A. Provisions bearing upon the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Precis of the provisions^a</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
1495 (XV). Co-operation of Member States		Unanimity		Urging all countries, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from actions likely to aggravate international tension (para. 1); reaffirming the conviction that the strength of the United Nations rests on the co-operation of its Member States, and that such co-operation should be forthcoming in full measure so that the Organization could become a more effective instrument for the safeguarding of peace and for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples (para. 2); urging further that immediate and constructive steps should be adopted in regard to urgent problems concerning the peace of the world and the advancement of its people (para. 3).
1874 (S-IV). General principles to serve as guidelines for the sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures	92	11	3	Affirming a number of principles as guidelines for the equitable sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures (para. 1); requesting the Secretary-General to review in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions suitable administrative procedures to be followed by the General Assembly at the time peace-keeping operations were authorized (para. 3).
2006 (XIX). Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects		Adopted without objection		Inviting the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly to undertake appropriate consultations on the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways and means of overcoming the financial difficulties facing the Organization (para. 1); authorizing the President of the General Assembly to establish a Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, under the Chairmanship of the President of the Assembly and with the collaboration of the Secretary-General, and instructing the Special Committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the financial difficulties of the Organization (paras. 2 and 3).
2053 A (XX). Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects	80	2	16	Requesting the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to continue and to complete the work assigned to it by G A resolution 2006 (XIX) (para. 1); calling upon all Member States to make voluntary contributions (para. 4).
2129 (XX). Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems		By acclamation		Emphasizing the importance of maintaining and increasing contacts between European States having different social and political systems for the purpose of developing peaceful co-operation, with a view to strengthening peace and security in Europe by all possible means (paras. 1 and 2); requesting the Governments of European States to intensify their efforts to improve reciprocal relations (para. 3).

^a Paragraph references are to operative paragraphs.

2131 (XX). Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty	109	0	1	Declaring the principles that: no State has the right to intervene, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State; no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind; and that no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the régime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State; the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention; the strict observance of those obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one another; every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State; all States shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; nothing in the above-mentioned Declaration shall affect in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in particular those contained in Chapter VI, VII and VIII (oper. para.).
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B. Provisions bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Précis of the provisions^a</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
1378 (XIV). General and complete disarmament		Unanimity		Calling upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament (para. 1); expressing the hope that measures leading towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out and agreed upon in the shortest possible time (para. 3).
1379 (XIV). Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara	51	16	15	Expressing grave concern over the intention of the Government of France to conduct nuclear tests and requesting France to refrain from such tests (paras. 1 and 2).
1380 (XIV). Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	68	0	12	Suggesting that the ten-nation disarmament committee should consider appropriate means whereby the danger of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons may be averted, including the feasibility of an international agreement, subject to inspection

^a Paragraphs references are to operative paragraphs.

B. Provisions bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (continued)

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Vote Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
1380 (XIV) (continued)				and control, whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them and whereby the latter would refrain from manufacturing them (para. 1); inviting the committee to report to the Disarmament Commission on the results of its deliberations (para. 2).
1402 A (XIV). Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	78	0	2	Expressing appreciation to the States concerned for their efforts to reach an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and including an appropriate international control system (para. 1); expressing the hope that these States will intensify their efforts to reach such an agreement at an early date (para. 2); urging the States concerned in these negotiations to continue their voluntary discontinuance of the testing of nuclear weapons (para. 3); requesting the States concerned to report to the General Assembly the results of their negotiations (para. 4).
1402 B (XIV). Same title as 1402 A (XIV) above	60	1	20	Expressing appreciation to the States concerned for their sincere efforts to reach agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests with effective international control, and for, the progress achieved, and expressing the hope that they will reach such an agreement at an early date (paras. 1 and 2); appealing to the States concerned in the Geneva discussions to continue their voluntary suspension of test, and to other States to desist from such tests (para. 3); requesting the States concerned to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly the results of their negotiations (para. 4).
1403 (XIV). Report of the Disarmament Commission		Unanimity		Deciding that the Disarmament Commission should continue to be composed of all Members of the United Nations (para. 1); requesting the Secretary-General to provide the staff and services required by the Disarmament Commission and, in consultation with the Governments concerned, provide such facilities as may be required by the ten-nation disarmament committee (para. 3).
1516 (XV). Economic and social consequences of disarmament	76	0	3	Requesting the Secretary-General to examine: (a) The national economic and social consequences of disarmament in countries with different economic systems and at different stages of economic development, including the problems of replacing military expenditures with alternative private and public civil expenditures so as to maintain effective demand and to adsorb the human and material resources released from military uses; (b) The possible development of structural imbalances in national economies as a result of the cessation of capital investment in armaments industries, and the adoption of possible corrective measures, including expanded capital assistance to the underdeveloped countries; (c) The impact of disarmament on international economic relations, on world trade and on trade of

				<p>under-developed countries; (d) The utilization of resources released by disarmament for the purpose of economic and social development of the under-developed countries (para. 1); recommending that the Secretary-General should conduct the proposed examination with the assistance of expert consultants to be appointed by him with due regard to their qualifications, geographical representation and intimate knowledge of countries with different economic systems and at different stages of economic development (para. 2); appealing to Member States to give full co-operation to the Secretary-General (para. 3); requesting the Secretary-General to submit a preliminary report on the results of the examination to the Economic and Social Council and requesting the Economic and Social Council to transmit the report with its views to the General Assembly (paras. 4 and 5).</p>
1576 (XV). Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	68	0	26	<p>Calling upon all Governments to make every effort to achieve permanent agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (para. 1); calling upon Powers producing such weapons, as a temporary and voluntary measure pending the negotiation of such a permanent agreement, to refrain from relinquishing control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them and from transmitting to it the information necessary for their manufacture (para. 2); calling upon Powers not possessing such weapons, on a similar temporary and voluntary basis, to refrain from manufacturing those weapons and from otherwise attempting to acquire them (para. 3).</p>
1577 (XV). Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	88	0	5	<p>Urging the States concerned to seek a solution for the few remaining questions on suspension of testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons so that the conclusion of the agreement thereon will be achieved at an early date and urging the States concerned in these negotiations to continue their voluntary suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons (paras. 1 and 2); requesting the parties concerned to report the results of their negotiations to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly (para. 3).</p>
1578 (XV). Same title as 1577 (XV) above	83	0	11	<p>Urging the States concerned to make every effort to reach agreement as soon as possible on the cessation of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, under appropriate international control (para. 1); urging the States concerned in the Geneva negotiations to continue their voluntary suspension of the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and requesting other States to refrain from undertaking such tests (para. 2); requesting the States concerned in the Geneva negotiations (a) to keep the Disarmament Commission periodically informed of the progress of their negotiations and (b) to report the results of their negotiations to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly (para. 3).</p>

B. Provisions bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (continued)

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
1617 (XV). Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament Report of the Disarmament Commission Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons		Unanimity		Taking note of the statements made by the heads of the delegations of the USSR and the USA on the question of disarmament, and deciding to take up for consideration at its sixteenth session the problem of disarmament and all pending proposals relating to it (paras. 1 and 2).
1632 (XVI). Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control	87	11	1	Appealing to the Government of the USSR to refrain from carrying out its intention to explode in the atmosphere a 50-megaton bomb.
1648 (XVI). Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal	71	20	8	Expressing deep concern and profound regret that test explosions have been resumed (para. 1); urging the States concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements and expressing confidence that the States concerned will reach agreement as soon as possible on the cessation of tests under appropriate international control (paras. 2 and 3); calling upon the States concerned to conclude such agreements expeditiously (para. 4).
1649 (XVI). The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control	71	11	15	Reaffirming the urgent necessity to reach an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests under effective control which would be a first step toward reversing the arms race, would inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, would contribute to the reduction of international tensions and would eliminate any health hazards associated with nuclear testing (para. 1); urging the States negotiating at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests at Geneva to renew efforts to conclude at the earliest a treaty on the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests providing for: (a) cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all environments under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms; (b) international control machinery representative of all parties to the treaty and staffed and operated to guarantee its objectivity and effectiveness avoiding self-inspection, under procedures which would ensure that its facilities will be used exclusively for purposes of effective control; (c) the executive and administrative operations of the control system established under the treaty should not be subject to a veto, and administrative responsibility should be in the hands of an impartial administrator functioning under the supervision of a commission composed of representatives of parties to the treaty (para. 2); requesting the negotiating States to report to the Disarmament

1649 (XVI) <i>(continued)</i>				Commission by 14 December 1961 on the progress of negotiations and calling upon all States to ratify or to adhere to the treaty upon its conclusion (paras. 3 and 4).
1652 (XVI). Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone	55	0	44	Calling upon Member States: (a) To refrain from carrying out in Africa nuclear tests in any form; (b) To refrain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa for testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons; (c) To consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone.
1653 (XVI). Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons	55	20	26	Declaring that: (a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity; (c) The use of such weapons is a war against mankind in general; (d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization (para. 1); requesting the Secretary-General to consult Member States on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes and to report to the General Assembly (para. 2).
1660 (XVI). Question of disarmament		Unanimity		Urging the Governments of the USSR and the United States to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body and expressing the hope that such negotiations will be started without delay and will lead to an agreed recommendation to the General Assembly (paras. 1 and 2); requesting the Governments of the USSR and the United States to report to the General Assembly, before the conclusion of its sixteenth session, on the results of such negotiations (para. 3).
1664 (XVI). Same title as 1660 (XVI) above	58	10	23	Requesting the Secretary-General to make an inquiry into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to undertake to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country, and to report on its results to the Disarmament Commission (third preamb. para. and para. 1) requesting the Disarmament Commission to take such further measures as appear to be warranted in the light of that report and calling upon the nuclear Powers to extend their fullest co-operation and assistance with regard to the implementation of the resolution (paras. 2 and 3).
1665 (XVI). Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons		Unanimity		Calling upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to secure the conclusion of an international agreement under which the latter would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons and States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or other-

B. Provisions bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (continued)

Number and title of resolution	Vote		Abstentions	Précis of the provisions
	For	Against		
1665 (XVI) (continued)				wise acquire control of such weapons (para. 1); urging all States to co-operate to those ends (para. 2).
1722 (XVI). Same title as 1660 (XVI) above		Unanimity		Welcoming the joint statement of the Governments of the USSR and of the United States of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations contained in their report to the General Assembly (section I, para. 1); recommending that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based upon those principles (section I, para. 2). Endorsing the agreement reached on the composition of a Disarmament Committee whose membership will be: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America (section II, para. 1); recommending that the Committee should undertake negotiations to reach, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles and taking into account, <i>inter alia</i> , paragraph 8 of those principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control (para. 2); requesting the Committee to submit to the General Assembly a report on such agreement as soon as it has been reached, and submit to the Disarmament Commission a report on progress achieved (para. 3).
1762 A (XVII). The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	75	0	21	Asking that such tests should cease immediately and urging the Governments of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing by 1 January 1963, (paras. 2 and 3); endorsing the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 as a basis for negotiation, and calling upon the parties concerned to negotiate on the basis of the memorandum in order to reach agreement urgently (paras. 4 and 5); recommending that if the parties concerned do not reach agreement on cessation of all testing by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum, such agreement including adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission (para. 6); requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene to resume negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing and on general and complete disarmament, and to report to the General Assembly (para. 7).
1762 B (XVII). Same title as 1762 A (XVII) above	51	10	40	Urging the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to seek the conclusion of a treaty with effective

1762 B (XVII) (continued)

1767 (XVII). Question of general and complete disarmament

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and prompt international verification which prohibits nuclear weapons tests in all environments and requesting the negotiating Powers to agree upon an early date on which the treaty shall enter into force (paras. 1 and 2).

Reaffirming the need for the early conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament based on the joint USSR—United States statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (para. 1); calling upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at Geneva its negotiations on general and complete disarmament, with effective controls, and recommending that the Committee should give urgent attention to various collateral measures intended to facilitate general and complete disarmament (paras. 2 and 3); requesting the Committee to report periodically to the General Assembly on the progress of its work (para. 4).

1801 (XVII). Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons

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Requesting the Secretary-General to consult further with the Governments of Member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes, and to report on the results of such consultations to the General Assembly.

1837 (XVII). Declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament

Unanimity

Urging the Governments of all States to multiply their efforts for a prompt achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control (para. 1); declaring firm belief in the establishment of such conditions in the world as would replace the arms race by broad co-operation among nations in bettering life on earth (para. 2); taking into account the important role of the United Nations in organizing international aid to the less developed countries and in making studies of the economic and social consequences of disarmament (para. 3); expressing appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General concerning study on the economic and social consequences of disarmament and endorsing its unanimous conclusion (paras. 4 and 5); concurring in resolution 891 (XXXIV) of the Economic and Social Council and endorsing its request that Member States significantly involved in or affected by current military programmes should develop plans and policies for making necessary economic and social adjustments in the event of disarmament, bearing in mind the imperative needs of the developing countries (para. 6); inviting the Secretary-General and the Governments of developing countries to establish development plans of a national and regional character, the implementation of which may be accelerated at such time as additional resources are released following an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and requesting the Secretary-General to present his preliminary report on this matter to the General Assembly at a forthcoming session (para. 8); affirming that, pending an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, efforts should not be relaxed to assist developing countries (para. 9).

B. Provisions bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (continued)

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
1884 (XVIII). Question of general and complete disarmament		By acclamation		Welcoming the intention of the USSR and the United States not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (para. 1); calling upon all States: (a) To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner; (b) To refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the foregoing activities (para. 2).
1908 (XVIII). Same title as 1884 (XVIII) above		By acclamation		Calling upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (section I, para. 1); recommending the Eighteen-Nation Committee to widen the areas of basic agreement or similarity in the principal parties' approaches to the fundamental issues of general and complete disarmament (section I, para. 2); Urging the Eighteen-Nation Committee to make efforts to seek agreement on measures which could serve to reduce international tension, lessen the possibility of war and facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament (section II); Requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit to the General Assembly an interim progress report at an appropriate date and a comprehensive report not later than 1 September 1964 (section III, para. 1).
1909 (XVIII). Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons	64	18	25	Requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to study urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, and to report to the General Assembly (para. 1).
1910 (XVIII). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	104	1	3	Calling upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions (para. 1); requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble to the Treaty (para. 2); requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee to report to the General Assembly and requesting the Secretary-General to make available to that Committee the relevant documents and records of the General Assembly's plenary meetings and the meetings of the First Committee (paras. 3 and 4).
1911 (XVIII). Denuclearization of Latin America	91	0	15	Noting with satisfaction the initiative for the denuclearization of Latin America taken in the joint declaration by the Heads of

1931 (XVIII). Conversion to peaceful needs
of the resources released by disarmament

Unanimity

State of five Latin American Republics of 29 April 1963, and expressing the hope that the States of Latin America will initiate studies concerning the measures that should be agreed upon with a view to achieving the aims of the declaration (paras. 1 and 2); trusting that all States, particularly the nuclear Powers, will lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the peaceful aims inspiring the present resolution (para. 3); requesting the Secretary-General to extend to the States of Latin America, at their request, such technical facilities as they may require to achieve the aims set forth in the resolution (para. 4).

Endorsing Economic and Social Council resolution 982 (XXXVI) and urging that Member States do everything possible to facilitate the carrying out of General Assembly resolution 1837 (XVII) and Council resolution 982 (XXXVI) (para. 1); inviting the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the regional economic commissions to co-operate with the Secretary-General in advancing studies, within their fields of competence, of various problems concerning international economic trade relations relevant to the economic and social aspects of disarmament (para. 2); requesting the Economic and Social Council to consider all pertinent aspects of the question of conversion of resources released by general disarmament to peaceful uses, including the possibility of the establishment of an *ad hoc* group, having due regard to equitable geographical distribution, for the purpose of accelerating activities in this field of study, and to report thereon to the General Assembly (para. 5); endorsing the intentions and plans of the Secretary-General to proceed in carrying out a work programme pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1837 (XVII) and requesting him to present the General Assembly with a further report on the matter (para. 5).

2028 (XX). Non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons

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Urging all States to take all necessary steps for the early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty (para. 1); calling upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question and to reconvene with a view to negotiating an international treaty based on the following principles: (a) it should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form; (b) it should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; (c) it should be a step towards general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament; (d) it should include acceptable and workable provisions ensuring the effectiveness of the treaty; (e) nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional denuclearization treaties (para. 2).

2030 (XX). Question of convening a world
disarmament conference

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Endorsing the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held

B. Provisions bearing upon the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (continued)

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
2030 (XX) (continued)				at Cairo in 1964, on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited (para. 1); urging the establishment of a representative preparatory committee to take steps for the convening of such a conference not later than 1967 and urging that all countries be kept informed of results achieved by the preparatory committee (paras. 2 and 3).
2031 (XX). Question of general and complete disarmament	102	0	6	Requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures (para. 1); deciding to refer to the Eighteen-Nation Committee all relevant documents and records of the First Committee and requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its work and to report to the General Assembly on progress achieved (paras. 2 and 3).
2032 (XX). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	92	1	14	Urging that all nuclear weapons tests be suspended (para. 1); calling upon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (para. 2); requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban treaty and on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, taking into account the improved possibilities of international co-operation in the field of seismic detection, and to report to the General Assembly (para. 3).
2033 (XX). Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa	105	0	2	Reaffirming its call upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone (para. 1); endorsing the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued by the Heads of State and Government of African countries and calling upon all States to respect and abide by that declaration (paras. 2 and 3); calling upon all States to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons or from testing, manufacturing, acquiring or deploying such weapons on the African continent, or taking any action which would compel African States to take similar action (paras. 4 and 5); urging States possessing nuclear weapons and capability not to transfer such weapons, scientific data or technological assistance to the national control of any State, in any form which may assist such States in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons in Africa (para. 6); expressing the hope that the African States will initiate studies with a view to implementing the denuclearization of Africa and take the necessary measures through the Organization of African Unity (para. 7); urging the African States to keep the United Nations informed of further developments and requesting the Secretary-

2092 (XX). Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament

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General to extend to the Organization of African Unity any assistance in order to achieve the aims of the resolution (paras. 8 and 9).

Requesting the Secretary-General to continue to inform the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council of the national studies submitted to him concerning the economic and social consequences of disarmament, of the international studies carried out as part of the co-ordinated programme of the Inter-Agency Committee set up by the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, and of such studies undertaken by non-governmental organizations as he deems appropriate (para. 4); deciding to include the item in the provisional agenda of the twenty-first session (para. 5).

C. Provisions bearing upon the maintenance of international peace and security

I. PROVISIONS RECOMMENDING MEANS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Vote Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
1454 (XIV). Questions of Hungary	53	10	17	Calling upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the authorities in Hungary to co-operate with the United Nations Representative on Hungary (para. 2); requesting the United Nations Representative to continue his efforts (para. 3).
1455 (XIV). The Korean question	54	9	17	Calling upon the authorities concerned to accept the established objectives of the United Nations with regard to Korea in order to achieve a settlement in Korea based upon the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954, and to agree at an early date on the holding of genuinely free elections in accordance with the principles endorsed by the General Assembly (para. 2).
1474 (ES-IV). Question considered by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on 16 September 1960	70	0	11	Supporting the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council (para. 1); requesting the Secretary-General to continue to take action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence (para. 2); appealing to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts, with the assistance of African and Asian representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary General, for the purpose of conciliation (para. 3); appealing to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo (para. 4); requesting all States to refrain from any action which might impede the

1. PROVISIONS RECOMMENDING MEANS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (continued)

Number and title of resolution	Vote			Précis of the provisions
	For	Against	Abstentions	
1474 (ES-IV) (continued)				restoration of law and order and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo (para. 5(a)); requesting all Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter of the United Nations, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council (para. 5(b)).
1573 (XV). Question of Algeria	63	8	27	Recognizing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence (para 1); recognizing the need for adequate and effective guarantees to ensure the successful and just implementation of the right of self-determination on the basis of respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria (para. 2); recognizing that the United Nations has a responsibility to contribute towards the successful and just implementation of this right (para. 3).
1592 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo		Adopted without objection		Deciding to keep the item on the agenda of resumed fifteenth session (oper. para.).
1955 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo	61	5	33	Calling upon the Government of Belgium to accept its responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations and to comply fully and promptly with the will of the Security Council and of the General Assembly (para. 1); calling upon all States to exert their influence and extend their co-operation to effect the implementation of the resolution (para. 3).
1600 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo	60	16	23	Reaffirming its resolution 1474 (ES-IV) and the Security Council resolutions on the situation in the Congo, more particularly the Council resolution of 21 February 1961 (para. 1); urging the Congolese authorities to co-operate fully in the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly (para. 7).
1598 (XV). Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Union of South Africa	95	1	0	Requesting all States to consider taking such separate and collective action as is open to them, in conformity with the Charter, to bring about the abandonment of the policies of <i>apartheid</i> (para. 3); noting with concern that the policies of <i>apartheid</i> have led to international friction and that their continuance endangers international peace and security (para. 5).
1616 (XV). Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various acts of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security	59	13	24	Exhorting all Member States to take such peaceful action as is open to them to remove existing tension (oper. para.).

1622 (S-III). Consideration of the grave situation in Tunisia obtaining since 19 July 1961	66	0	30	Reaffirming the interim resolution adopted by the Security Council on 22 July 1961, and urging the Government of France to fully implement the provisions of operative paragraph 1 thereof (para. 1); recognizing the sovereign right of Tunisia to call for the withdrawal of all French armed forces present on its territory without its consent (para. 2); calling upon the Governments of France and Tunisia to enter into immediate negotiations to devise peaceful and agreed measures for the withdrawal of all French armed forces from Tunisian territory (para. 3).
1663 (XVI). The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	97	2	1	Calling the attention of the Security Council to the provision of Article 11, paragraph 3 of the Charter (para. 4); urging all States to take such separate and collective action as is open to them to bring about an abandonment of the policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (para. 5).
1724 (XVI). Question on Algeria	62	0	38	Calling on the parties concerned to resume negotiations with a view to implementing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence, respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria (oper. para.).
1740 (XVI). The Korean question	60	11	27	Reaffirming the objectives of the United Nations in Korea (para. 1); urging continuing efforts to achieve those objectives (para. 2).
1761 (XVII). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	67	16	23	Reaffirming the view of the General Assembly that the continuance of the policies of <i>apartheid</i> by the Government of the Republic of South Africa seriously endangered international peace and security (para. 3).
1855 (XVII). The Korean question	63	11	26	Reaffirming the objectives of the United Nations in Korea (para. 1); calling upon the North Korean authorities to accept those objectives which have been established by the United Nations (para. 2); urging that continuing efforts be made to achieve those objectives (para. 3).
1964 (XVIII). The Korean question	65	11	24	Reaffirming the objectives of the United Nations in Korea (para. 1); calling upon the North Korean authorities to accept those objectives which have been established by the United Nations (para. 3).
2132 (XX). The Korean question	61	13	34	Reaffirming the objectives of the United Nations in Korea (para. 1); calling upon the North Korean authorities to accept established United Nations objectives (para. 2); urging that continuing efforts be made to achieve those objectives (para. 3).

2. PROVISIONS RECOMMENDING THE TAKING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Vote Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
1474 (ES-IV). Question considered by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on 16 September 1960	70	0	11	Calling upon all States to refrain from direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the United Nations, except upon the request of the latter for the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of the Security Council (para. 6).
1599 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo	61	5	33	Deciding that all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries, shall be completely withdrawn and evacuated (para. 2).
1600 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo	60	16	23	Calling upon the Congolese authorities concerned to desist from attempting a military solution to their problems and resolve them by peaceful means (para. 2); urging the immediate release of all members of Parliament and members of provincial assemblies and all other political leaders under detention (para. 4); urging the convening of Parliament without delay with a view to taking the necessary decisions concerning the formation of a national government and on the future constitutional structure of the Republic of the Congo in accordance with the constitutional processes laid down in the <i>Loi fondamentale</i> (para. 5).
1603 (XV). The situation in Angola	73	2	9	Calling upon the Government of Portugal to consider urgently the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
1742 (XVI). The situation in Angola	99	2	1	Appealing to the Government of Portugal to release immediately all Angolan political prisoners wherever they might be held (para. 4); urging the Government of Portugal to undertake extensive political, economic and social reforms and measures, and in particular to set up freely elected and representative political institutions with a view to transfer of power to the people of Angola (para. 5); requesting Member States to use their influence to secure the compliance of Portugal with the present resolution (para. 7); requesting all States Member of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to deny Portugal any support and assistance which may be used by it for the suppression of the people of Angola (para. 8); requesting the Government of Portugal to report to the General Assembly on the measures it had taken to implement the present resolution (para. 9); recommending the Security Council, in the light of its resolution of 9 June 1961 and of the present resolution, to keep the matter under constant review (para. 10).

1761 (XVII). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	67	16	23	Requesting Member States to take measures, separately or collectively, to bring about the abandonment of the policies of <i>apartheid</i> by (a) breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of South Africa or refraining from establishing such relations; (b) closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag; (c) enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports; (d) boycotting all South African goods, and refraining from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa; (e) refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa and companies registered under the laws of South Africa (para. 4); requesting all Member States to help the Special Committee established by this resolution to accomplish its task, and to refrain from any act likely to delay or hinder the implementation of the present resolution (para. 6); inviting Members States to inform the General Assembly at its eighteenth session regarding actions taken, separately or collectively, in dissuading the Government of South Africa from pursuing its policies of <i>apartheid</i> (para. 7); requesting the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure South Africa's compliance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council on this subject and, if necessary, to consider action under Article 6 of the Charter (para. 8).
1819 (XVII). The situation in Angola	57	14	18	Again calling upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from armed action and repressive measures against the people of Angola (para. 4); urging the Government of Portugal, without any further delay, (a) to release all political prisoners; (b) to lift the ban on political parties; (c) to undertake extensive political, economic and social measures that would ensure the creation of freely elected and representative political institutions and transfer of power to the people of Angola (para. 5); requesting Member States to use their influence to secure the compliance of Portugal with the present resolution (para. 6) requesting all Member States to deny Portugal any support or assistance which may be used for the suppression of the people of Angola and, in particular, to terminate the supply of arms to Portugal (para. 7); reminding the Government of Portugal that its continued non-implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council is inconsistent with its membership in the United Nations (para. 8); requesting the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance with the present resolution and with the previous resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (para. 9).
1881 (XVIII). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	106	1	0	Requesting the Government of the Republic of South Africa to abandon its trial of political prisoners under arbitrary laws prescribing the death sentence, and to grant unconditional release forthwith of all political prisoners and to all persons imprisoned,

2. PROVISIONS RECOMMENDING THE TAKING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES (continued)

Number and title of resolution	Vote			Précis of the provisions
	For	Against	Abstentions	
1881 (XVIII) (continued)				interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of <i>apartheid</i> (para. 2); requesting all Member States to make all efforts to induce the Government of South Africa to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the above-mentioned paragraph (para. 3); requesting the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution (para. 4).
1899 (XVIII). Question of South West Africa	84	6	17	Requesting the Secretary-General to continue his efforts with a view to achieving the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1805 (XVII) (para. 5); drawing the attention of the Security Council to the existing situation in South West Africa, the continuation of which the General Assembly considered as constituting a serious threat to international peace and security (para. 6); urging all States which had not yet done so (a) to refrain from supplying in any manner or form any arms or military equipment to South Africa; (b) to refrain from supplying in any manner or form any petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa; (c) to refrain from any action which might hamper the implementation of the present resolution and of the previous General Assembly resolutions on South West Africa (para. 7).
1913 (XVIII). Territories under Portuguese administration	91	2	11	Requesting the Security Council to consider immediately the question of Territories under Portuguese administration and to adopt measures to give effect to its own decisions, particularly by those of 31 July 1963 (para. 1).
1978 A (XVIII). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	100	2	11	Inviting the specialized agencies and all Member States to give to the Special Committee of the Policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa their assistance and co-operation in the fulfilment of its mandate resolution (1978 A (XVIII), para. 4); requesting the Secretary-General to seek ways and means of providing relief and assistance, through the appropriate international agencies, to the families of all persons persecuted by the Government of the Republic of South Africa for their opposition to the policies of <i>apartheid</i> (resolution 1978 B (XVIII), para. 1); inviting Member States and organizations to contribute to such relief and assistance (section B. para. 2).
2978 B (XVIII). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic South Africa	99	2	0	
1979 (XVIII). Question of South West Africa	89	2	3	Requesting the Security Council to consider the situation in South West Africa (para. 2).
2022 (XX). Question of Southern Rhodesia	82	9	18	Calling upon all States to refrain from rendering any assistance to the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia (para. 6); requesting that the administering Power effect immediately (a) the release of all political prisoners, political detainees and restrictees;

				(b) the repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation and (c) the removal of all restrictions on African political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights (para. 7); requesting once more the Government of the United Kingdom to suspend the Constitution of 1961 and to call immediately a constitutional conference in which representatives of all political parties will take part, with a view to making new constitutional arrangements on the basis of universal adult suffrage and to fixing the earliest possible date for independence (para. 8); appealing to all States to use all their powers against a unilateral declaration of independence and not to recognize any government in Southern Rhodesia which is not representative of the majority of the people (para. 9); requesting all States to render moral and material help to the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for freedom and independence (para. 10); calling upon the Government of the United Kingdom to employ all necessary measures, including military force, to implement the provisions of paragraphs 7 and 8 above (para. 11); drawing the attention of the Security Council to the threats made by the authorities in Southern Rhodesia against independent African States adjoining Southern Rhodesia (para. 12); further drawing the attention of the Security Council to the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia which threatens international peace and security (para. 13).
2023 (XX). Question of Aden	90	11	10	Urging the United Kingdom immediately to (a) abolish the state of emergency in Aden; (b) repeal all laws restricting public freedom in the Territory; (c) cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, in particular military operations; and (d) release all political detainees and allow the return of those people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities (para. 8); appealing to all Member States to render all possible assistance to the people of the Territory in their efforts to attain freedom and independence (para. 10); drawing the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory (para. 11).
2024 (XX). Question of Southern Rhodesia	107	2	1	Inviting the United Kingdom to implement immediately the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council in order to put an end to the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Southern Rhodesia (para. 2); recommending the Security Council to consider the situation as a matter of urgency (para. 3).
2054 A (XX). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	90	2	16	Appealing to the major trading partners of the Republic of South Africa to cease their economic collaboration with the Government of South Africa (para. 1).

2. PROVISIONS RECOMMENDING THE TAKING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES (continued)

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
2074 (XX). Question of South West Africa	85	2	19	Calling upon the Government of South Africa to remove all bases and other military installations located in the Territory of South West Africa and to refrain from utilizing the Territory in any way as a military base for internal or external purposes (para. 7); requesting all States to take immediate action to carry out paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) (para. 11); appealing to all States to give the indigenous people of South West Africa all necessary moral and material support in their struggle for freedom and independence (para. 12); requesting the Security Council to keep watch over the critical situation prevailing in South West Africa (para. 13).
2077 (XX). Question of Cyprus	47	5	54	Calling upon all States to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any intervention directed against it (para. 2); recommending to the Security Council the continuation of the United Nations mediation work in conformity with Council resolution 186 (1964) (para. 3).
2107 (XX). Question of Territories under Portuguese administration	66	26	15	Appealing to all States, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to render the people of the Territories under Portuguese administration the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights (para. 3); requesting all States to prevent such activities on the part of their nationals in the foreign financial interests which are an impediment to the attainment by the people of their rights of freedom and independence (para. 6); urging Member States, separately or collectively: (a) to break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations; (b) to close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal; (c) to prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories; (d) to refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal and (e) to boycott all trade with Portugal (para. 7); requesting all States, and in particular the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Organization, (a) to refrain forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its administration; (b) to take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal and (c) to stop the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition (para. 8); appealing to all specialized agencies, in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the

International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) (para. 9); requesting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase their aid to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration and to the people who had suffered from military operations (para. 10) and requesting the Security Council to consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter, for the purpose of carrying out its resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration (para. 11).

3. PROVISIONS BEARING UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBSIDIARY ORGANS OR THEIR FUNCTIONS

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Precis of the provisions</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
1455 (XIV). The Korean question	54	9	17	Requesting the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (para. 3).
1600 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo	60	16	23	Appointing a Commission of Conciliation of seven members to be designated by the President of the General Assembly to assist the Congolese leaders to achieve reconciliation (para. 6).
1601 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo	45	3	49	Establishing a Commission of Investigation [in connexion with the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues] (para. 1).
1603 (XV). The situation in Angola	73	2	9	Appointing a sub-committee of five members to be designated by the President of the General Assembly and instructing the sub-committee to examine statements made before the General Assembly concerning Angola, to receive further statements and documents, and to conduct such inquiries as it may deem necessary (para. 2).
1740 (XVI). The Korean question	60	11	27	Requesting the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (para. 3).
1742 (XVI). The situation in Angola	99	2	1	Requesting the Sub-committee on the situation in Angola to continue to perform its task and to study means to secure the implementation of the present resolution (para. 6).
1761 (XVII). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	67	16	23	Establishing a Special Committee consisting of representatives of States nominated by the President of the General Assembly with the following terms of reference: (a) to keep the racial policies of the Government of South Africa under review between sessions of the General Assembly and (b) to report thereon, from time to time, to the General Assembly or to the Security Council (para. 5).

3. PROVISIONS BEARING UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBSIDIARY ORGANS OR THEIR FUNCTIONS (*continued*)

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Vote</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
1855 (XVII). The Korean question	63	11	26	Requesting the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (para. 4).
1899 (XVIII). Question of South West Africa	84	6	17	Requesting the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue its efforts towards the accomplishment of its tasks and to consider the implications of the activities of the mining industry and the other international companies having interests in South West Africa, in order to assess their economic and political influence and their mode of operation (para. 8).
1964 (XVIII). The Korean question	65	11	24	Requesting the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (para. 4).
1978 A (XVIII). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	100	2	1	Requesting the Special Committee on the Policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa to continue to follow the various aspects of the question and to submit reports to the General Assembly and to the Security Council whenever necessary (para. 2).
2054 A (XX). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	90	2	16	Enlarging the Special Committee on the Policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa by the addition of six members to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the basis of certain stated criteria (para. 3).
2132 (XX). The Korean question	61	13	34	Requesting the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (para. 4).

4. PROVISIONS REQUESTING ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
1600 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo	60	16	23	Deciding to appoint a Commission of Conciliation of seven to be designated by the President of the General Assembly to assist the Congolese leaders to achieve reconciliation and to end the political crisis in the Congo (para. 6).
1761 (XVII). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	67	16	23	Deciding to establish a Special Committee consisting of representatives of Member States with the following terms of reference: (a) to keep the racial policies of the Government of South Africa under review between sessions of the General Assembly and (b) to report thereon from time to time to the General Assembly or to the Security Council (para. 5).

2054 A (XX). The policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	90	2	16	Deciding to enlarge the Special Committee on the policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa by the addition of six members to be appointed on the basis of the following criteria: (a) primary responsibility with regard to world trade; (b) primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security and (c) equitable geographical distribution (para. 3).
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5. PROVISIONS BEARING UPON THE FUTURE DISCHARGE OF RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Number and title of resolution	Vote			Précis of the provisions
	For	Against	Abstentions	
1899 (XVIII). Question of South West Africa	84	6	17	Considering that any attempt to annex a part or the whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of aggression (para. 4).
2022 (XX). Question of Southern Rhodesia	82	9	18	Warning the authorities in Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom that the United Nations will oppose any declaration of independence which is not based on universal and adult suffrage (para. 3).
2074 (XX). Question of South West Africa	85	2	19	Considering that any attempt to partition the Territory or to take any unilateral action, directly or indirectly, constitutes a violation of the Mandate and of resolution 1514 (XV) (para. 5); considering further that any attempt to annex a part or the whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of aggression (para. 6).

6. OTHER PROVISIONS BEARING UPON THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Number and title of resolution	Vote			Précis of the provisions
	For	Against	Abstentions	
1663 (XVI). The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	97	2	1	Reaffirming that the racial policies pursued by the Government of South Africa are a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are totally inconsistent with South Africa's obligation as a Member State of the United Nations (para. 6); reaffirming that these policies have led to international friction and that their continuance seriously endangers international peace and security (para. 7); reminding the Government of South Africa of the requirement of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter that all Members shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them under the Charter (para. 8); again calling upon the Government of South Africa to change its policies and conduct so as to conform to its obligations under the Charter (para. 9).

6. OTHER PROVISIONS BEARING UPON THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (*continued*)

<i>Number and title of resolution</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Vote</i>		<i>Précis of the provisions</i>
		<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>	
1741 (XVI). Question of Hungary	49	17	32	Deploring the continued disregard by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian régime of the General Assembly resolutions concerning the situation in Hungary (oper. para.).
2023 (XX). Question of Aden	90	11	10	Considering that the maintenance of the military bases in the Territory constitutes a major obstacle to the liberation of the people of the territory from colonial domination and is prejudicial to the peace and security of the region and that the immediate and complete removal of these bases is therefore essential (para. 6).

ANNEX III

Tabulation of the decisions of the General Assembly with respect to disarmament and the regulation of armaments

<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Vote</i>			<i>Result of vote</i>
			<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstention</i>	
FOURTEENTH SESSION						
General and complete disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XIV), Annexes, a.i. 70, p. 12, A/4265, para. 6)	840th, 20 Nov. 1959		Unanimity		Resolution 1378 (XIV)
Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XIV), Annexes, a.i. 68, p. 6, A/4280, para. 13)	840th, 20 Nov. 1959	51	16	15	Resolution 1379 (XIV)
Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XIV), Annexes, a.i. 67, p. 2, A/4286, para. 7)	841st, 20 Nov. 1959	68 ^a	0	12	Resolution 1380 (XIV)
Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XIV), Annexes, a.i. 69, p. 3, A/4290, para. 11)	842nd, 21 Nov. 1959	78	0	2	Resolution 1402 A (XIV)
			60	1	20	Resolution 1402 B (XIV)
Report of the Disarmament Commission: letter dated 11 September 1959 from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to the Secretary-General	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XIV), Annexes, a.i. 66, p. 2, A/4291, para. 7)	842nd, 21 Nov. 1959		Unanimity		Resolution 1403 (XIV)
FIFTEENTH SESSION						
Economic and social consequences of disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the Second Committee (G A (XV), Annexes, a.i. 12, 29, 74, p. 34, A/4648, draft resolution II)	948th, 15 Dec. 1960	76	0	3	Resolution 1516 (XV)
Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	Draft resolution I recommended by the First Committee (G A (XV), Annexes, a.i. 67, 86, 69 and 73, p. 26, A/4680, para. 26)	960th, 20 Dec. 1960	0	68	26	Resolution 1576 (XV)

^a The delegations of El Salvador and of Morocco, absent at the time at the voting, subsequently informed the President that they would have voted in favour of the draft resolution (G A (XIV), Plen., 841st mtg., para. 11).

Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	Draft resolution II A recommended by the First Committee (G A (XV), Annexes, a.i. 67, 86, 69 and 73, p. 26, A/4680, para. 26)	960th, 20 Dec. 1960	88	0	5	Resolution 1577 (XV)
	Draft resolution IIB		83	0	11	Resolution 1578 (XV)
Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XV), Annexes, a.i. 67, 86, 69 and 73, p. 27, A/4723, para. 6)	995th, 21 April 1961		Unanimity		Resolution 1617 (XV)
Report of the Disarmament Commission						
Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests						
Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons						
SIXTEENTH SESSION						
Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 73 and 72, p. 9, A/4942, para. 10)	1043rd, 27 Oct. 1961	87	11	1	Resolution 1632 (XVI)
The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control						
Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 73 and 72, p. 11, A/4942/Add.1, para. 8)	1047th, 6 Nov. 1961	71	20	8	Resolution 1648 (XVI)
The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 73 and 72, p. 12, A/4942/Add.2, para. 6 as amended (A/L. 363))	1049th, 8 Nov. 1961	71	11	15	Resolution 1649 (XVI)
Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone	Draft resolution I recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 73 and 72, p. 15, A/4942/Add.3, para. 10)	1063rd, 24 Nov. 1961	55	0	44	Resolution 1652 (XVI)
Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons	Draft resolution II	1063rd, 24 Nov. 1961	55	20	26	Resolution 1653 (XVI)
Question of disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 19, p. 29, A/4980, para. 10)	1067th, 28 Nov. 1961		Unanimity		Resolution 1660 (XVI)
	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 19, p. 30, A/4980/Add.1, para. 5)	1070th, 4 Dec. 1961	58	10	23	Resolution 1664 (XVI)
Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 81, p. 2, A/5002, para. 8)	1070th, 4 Dec. 1961		Unanimity		Resolution 1665 (XVI)
Question of disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVI), Annexes, a.i. 19, p. 30, A/4980/Add.2, para. 6)	1085th, 20 Dec. 1961		Unanimity		Resolution 1722 (XVI)

ANNEX III (continued)

Tabulation of the decisions of the General Assembly with respect to disarmament and the regulation of armaments (continued)

Agenda item	Proposal	Meeting and date	For	Vote		Result of vote
				Against	Abstentions	
SEVENTEENTH SESSION						
The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	Draft resolutions A and B recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVII), Annexes, a.i. 77, p. 11, A/5279, para. 16)	1165th, 6 Nov. 1962	71	0	21	Resolution 1762 A (XVII)
			51	10	40	Resolution 1762 B (XVII)
Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVII), Annexes, a.i. 90, p. 15, A/5303, para. 10)	1173rd, 21 Nov. 1962	84	0	1	Resolution 1767 (XVII)
Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVII) Annexes, a.i. 26, p. 17, A/5323, para. 8)	1192nd, 14 Dec. 1962	33	0	25	Resolution 1801 (XVII)
Economic and social consequences of disarmament: report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study of the group of expert consultants appointed under General Assembly resolution 1516 (XV)	Draft text recommended by the Second Committee (G A (XVII), Annexes, a.i. 33 and 94, p. 6, A/5361, para. 13)	1197th, 18 Dec. 1962		Unanimity		Resolution 1837 (XVII)
Economic programme for disarmament	EIGHTEENTH SESSION					
Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 26, p. 6, A/5571, para. 7)	1244th, 17 Oct. 1963		Acclamation		Resolution 1884 (XVIII)
	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 26, p. 7, A/5571/Add.1, para. 12) A/5571/Add.1, para. 12)	1265th, 27 Nov. 1963		Acclamation		Resolution 1908 (XVIII)
Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 27, p. 4, A/5617, para. 7)	1265th, 27 Nov. 1963	64	18	25	Resolution 1909 (XVIII)
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 73, p. 4, A/5597, para. 7)	1265th, 27 Nov. 1963	104	1	3	Resolution 1910 (XVIII)
Denuclearization of Latin America	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XVIII), Annexes, a.i. 74, p. 3, A/5618, para. 7)	1265th, 27 Nov. 1963	91	0	15	Resolution 1911 (XVIII)

TWENTIETH SESSION

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 106, p. 5, A/6097, para. 9)	1382nd, 29 Nov. 1965	93	0	5	Resolution 2028 (XX)
Question of convening a world disarmament conference	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 95, p. 2, A/6119, para. 11)	1384th, 29 Nov. 1965	112	0	1	Resolution 1030 (XX)
Question of general and complete disarmament: reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 28, p. 2, A/6129, para. 10)	1388th, 3 Dec. 1965	102	0	6	Resolution 2031 (XX)
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests: reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 30, p. 2, A/6124, para. 7)	1388th, 3 Dec. 1965	92	1	14	Resolution 2032 (XX)
Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa	Draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (G A (XX), Annexes, a.i. 105, p. 3, A/6127, para. 9)	1388th, 3 Dec. 1965	105	0	2	Resolution 2033 (XX)