ARTICLE 19

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TEXT OF ARTICLE 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

1. As in previous Supplements, the general survey briefly summarizes all those decisions and discussions of the General Assembly which referred either explicitly or implicitly to Article 19.

2. The analytical summary of practice for its part contains a summary of General Assembly discussions, relevant decisions, and related reports by the Secretary-General concerning the financial crisis at the United Nations, and which had a bearing on the interpretation and application of Article 19.

I. GENERAL SURVEY

3. In the period under review, a consistent pattern of activities took place with respect to Member States whose contributions to the Organization were in arrears in excess of two years’ assessments (“Article 19 arrears”). Each year, the Secretary-General issued letters to the General Assembly during its regular and resumed sessions, notifying the Assembly of the Member States in Article 19 arrears.1 The Secretary-General also from time to time informed the General Assembly that Member States had made sufficient payments to bring their arrears below the amount specified under Article 19.2 Each year, only South Africa remained in Article 19 arrears for the entire calendar year.3

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1 Letters from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly, A/39/883 (9 April 1985); A/40/645 (17 September 1985); A/40/1108 (28 April 1986); A/41/610 (16 September 1986); A/41/1006 (14 September 1987); A/42/563 (15 September 1987); A/42/925 (29 February 1988); A/43/618 (20 September 1988).


3 South Africa’s arrearage was of long standing, and its loss of voting rights under Article 19 was effectively redundant given that GA Res. 3207 (XXIX) and its subsequent interpretation by the Assembly President (which was upheld by a majority vote in the Assembly) had led in 1974 to the suspension of South Africa’s participation (but not membership) in the Assembly. See Repertory, Article 19, Supp. 5 (1970-78), para. 10 (stating that “[w]ith regard to South Africa, the question of the right to vote, in terms of
4. Each year, at the opening of both the regular and resumed sessions, the Assembly received and noted the information provided by the Secretary-General without taking a formal decision. The Assembly likewise acknowledged the Secretary-General’s notifications as to payments made by Member States which had thereby reduced their arrears below Article 19 levels. The Committee on Contributions for its part each year noted the Secretary-General’s report indicating those Member States in Article 19 arrears at the conclusion of the Committee’s session, and authorized the Secretary-General to issue an addendum to the list if necessary.

II. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF PRACTICE

5. During the period under review, the Organization experienced a financial crisis due primarily to the massive withholding of assessed contributions by certain Member States, most notably the largest contributor. The scale of the crisis led to questions about Article 19, was a theoretical one since no delegation had been accredited by it to the General Assembly session and consequently no decision needed to be taken regarding the application of Article 19 with respect to its arrears; Supp. 6 (1979-84), para. 8 (noting that since “throughout the period under review, South Africa remained in arrears under the terms of Article 19[,] the Secretary-General ... included South Africa in his communications to the President of the General Assembly when notifying him of the names of those Member States that were in arrears under the terms of Article 19,” despite South Africa’s prior suspension from participation in the Assembly).

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5 A/39/PV.107 (12 April 1985), p. 1959, para. 3 (noting letter A/39/883/Add.1); A/39/PV.108 (16 September 1985), p. 1968, para. 22 (noting letter A/39/883/Add.2); A/40/PV.4 (23 September 1985), p. 91 (noting letter A/40/645/Add.1); A/40/PV.17 (1 October 1985), p. 2 (noting only letter A/40/645/Add.4, although the provisional verbatim reports did not previously indicate the Assembly’s acknowledgement of addenda 2 and 3 to A/40/645); A/40/PV.28 (9 October 1985), p. 2 (noting letter A/40/645/Add.5); A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 7 (noting letter A/40/1108 listing Member States in Article 19 arrears (see supra note 5 for the original acknowledgement of this letter), and further noting the subsequent payment of Guinea-Bissau); A/40/PV.130 (2 May 1986), p. 2 (noting A/40/1108/Add.1); A/40/PV.133 (20 June 1986), p. 2 (noting letter A/40/1108/Add.2, which is missing from the official records but which informed the Assembly that “two Member States” remained in Article 19 arrears); A/41/PV.28 (8 October 1986), p. 2 (noting letter A/41/610/Add.1); A/42/PV.36 (15 October 1987), p. 2 (noting letter A/42/563/Add.1); A/42/PV.102 (3 March 1988), p. 2 (referring to A/42/925 (see supra note 5 for the original acknowledgement of this letter), and further noting the subsequent payment of Guatemala); A/42/PV.103 (4 March 1988), p. 2 (referring to A/42/925/Add.1 incorrectly as “A/42/995/Add.1”); A/42/PV.105 (21 March 1988), p. 16 (noting letter A/42/925/Add.2); A/42/PV.114 (17 August 1988), p. 2 (noting letter A/42/925/Add.3); A/42/PV.116 (20 September 1988), p. 12 (noting letter A/42/925/Add.4).


7 In 1986, the level of unpaid assessments was at the highest level in the U.N. history up to that time. The largest contributor had for its part paid only 50% of its 1986 assessment. For descriptions and analysis of the financial crisis as it developed over many years and more particularly during the period under review, see generally the Report of the Secretary-General, “Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations,”
whether sanctions additional to the loss of voting rights could be applied to promote or compel the payment of assessments. It may be noted that the not-uncommon practice of withholding certain assessments on “political grounds,” particularly in respect of certain


8 It may also be noted that the Committee on Contributions in 1988 also considered means by which to ensure the collection of assessed contributions from non-Member States, with such measures including their exclusion from U.N. activities when (in language mirroring that of Article 19) “arrears exceed the amount of the contributions due from them for the preceding two full years.” (Report of the Committee on Contributions, A/43/11 (19 July 1988), paras. 59-64 (noting the Committee’s decision that consideration of compliance-enforcement measures was to be postponed until the 49th session).)
peace-keeping operations, was assumed for budgeting purposes, and was a point of contention in the discussions concerning the crisis.10

6. An obligation to pay assessments promptly was often invoked during the period under review,11 but there was also a widespread acknowledgement that the crisis was fundamentally political in nature and of long standing.12 Several groups expressed

9 See Report of the Fifth Committee, “Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations,” A/41/953 (10 December 1986), paras. 9-10 (asserting that the lowering of expenses did not affect the “primary obligation” of Member States to pay assessments, and noting its assumption that with the exception of certain withholdings on “political grounds,” all Member States other than the largest contributor would pay their 1987 assessments in full); Report of the Secretary-General, “Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations: Funding prospects and economy measures for 1987,” A/41/901 (25 November 1986) at paras. 4, 8 (noting that full payment of assessed contributions is a “clear obligation... under the Charter,” but assuming for planning purposes that “certain non-payments on political grounds” would not be made); See also “Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations,” Letter from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/41/630 (20 September 1986) (notifying the Secretary-General that China had decided ex gratia to pay the withholdings which it had accumulated “in the course of the past years for reasons known to all,” but that such payment was not to be taken as a change in China’s “consistent principled positions on the issues related to these withholdings”). The withheld assessments in question included those in respect of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) operations, for which the $314.5 million shortfall for the period 1978-86 that existed as of 30 September 1986 included $223.0 million apportioned to Member States that had stated that “they do not intend to pay for UNIFIL,” and a further $19.6 million transferred to a special account in accordance with GA Res. 36/116A (10 December 1981). (Report of the Secretary-General, “Financing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces in the Middle East: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” A/41/783 (31 October 1986), para. 4.) For further relevant information and figures, see the Report of the Secretary-General, “Financial Emergency of the United Nations: Analysis of the financial situation of the United Nations,” A/C.5/41/24 (27 October 1986), para. 9 (explaining the composition of the Organization’s short-term deficit); Report of the Secretary-General, “Financial Emergency of the United Nations: Analysis of the financial situation of the United Nations,” A/C.5/42/31 (5 November 1987), para. 26, and Annexes I-II, VB; Report of the Secretary-General, “Financial Emergency of the United Nations: Analysis of the financial situation of the United Nations,” A/C.5/43/29 (9 November 1988), paras. 7-12, 21-22, Annexes I-II, VA, VB.)

10 See generally infra at paragraphs 6-7.

11 See, e.g., the Report of the Secretary-General, “Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations,” A/42/841 (1 December 1987), paras. 20-21 (stating that “[a]s has been emphasized on many occasions in the past, the only solution to the current financial crisis of the Organization is the payment by all Member States of their assessed contributions in full and on time. ... I trust that Member States will make good on their legal obligations under the Charter so as to avoid placing the Organization in unprecedented financial disarray”); Statement of Mr. Woolcott (Australia), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 33 (finding that a “major reason for this financial crisis is the late payment of assessed contributions by a large – and, unfortunately, increasing – number of Member States”); Statement of Mr. Daza (Chile), A/40/PV.126 (30 April 1986), p. “4-5” (asking “[w]hat better way to make that contribution [to overcome the crisis] than for each State to make immediate payment of its assessment to the regular budget for 1986 and to wipe out all arrears for those years for which payments have not yet been made?”).

12 See, e.g., the Report of the Secretary-General, “Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations,” A/40/1102 (12 April 1986), p. 2, para. 1 (stating that the crisis was “above all a political [one] arising from disregard for obligations flowing from the Charter and from lack of agreement among Member States on how to finance and utilize the Organization and for what purposes”); Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations,” A/40/1106 (22 April 1986), para. 2 (taking the view that the “current crisis is not merely financial in nature but also involves a basic underlying political difficulty”); Statement of Mr.
general views on the matter. The African Group in 1986 posited that no amount of reform would have an appreciable impact if the problems of withholding, late payments and arrears were not solved. The Group of 77 likewise considered “any withholding” of assessed contributions to be a “deliberate violation of obligations under the Charter.” The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries asserted for its part that the withholding of assessed contributions, “particularly for political reasons,” constituted a “flagrant violation and abrogation” of Member States’ obligations under the Charter and had to “cease forthwith” with respect to regular-budget arrears.

7. Various opinions were expressed as to the Member States which allegedly bore responsibility for the crisis and its resolution. Such groups included the “industrialized countries,” the Security Council’s permanent members, and those Member States

Woolcott (Australia), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), pp. 31-32 (accepting without reservation that the crisis was “above all a political one” that had “arisen from a disregard for obligations flowing from the Charter and from a lack of agreement among Member States on ... fundamental issues”); Statement of Mr. Daza (Chile), A/40/PV.126 (30 April 1986), p. 3 (stating that “we think there is a primary and fundamental cause that is clearly of a political nature,” this being the loss of a consensus on the “importance and effectiveness of the work of international organisations”); Statement of Mr. Alaoui (Morocco), A/40/PV.127 (30 April 1986), p. “49-50” (stating that “[w]hile admittedly it is the financial aspect of the present crisis that is most evident, it is first and foremost a political crisis. It is also of very long standing,” as financial difficulties had begun to “emerge at the beginning of the 1960s, when certain Member States began [unilaterally] to withhold portions of their contributions to the regular budget”). The representatives of both the USSR and the United States agreed that the crisis was fundamentally political in nature. Statement of Mr. Dubinin (USSR), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 42 (stating that “the difficulties of the United Nations are political in origin”); Statement of Mr. Walters (United States), A/40/PV.127 (30 April 1986), p. 56 (noting the Secretary-General’s finding that “shortfalls in the payment of assessed contributions began at the end of 1956 and reached serious proportions as early as 1960”).


14 See Statement of Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) at A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 12 (expressing the view of the Group of 77).


16 Statement of Mr. Daza (Chile), A/40/PV.126 (30 April 1986) at p. “4-5” (stating that a lack of optimism and faith in multilateral action, as well as criticisms against U.N. agencies, should not prompt the “industrialized countries” to disregard commitments they assumed in becoming members of the system).

17 Letter from the Permanent Representatives of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council, S/19341 (14 December 1987) (asserting, as troop-contributing Member States, that the Security Council and particularly its permanent Member States had a “special responsibility” to ensure proper financing for the Organization’s share of the costs of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)). See also Statement of Mr. Fern (Sweden), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 26 (noting that the withholding of assessments for peace-keeping operations had placed an “additional financial burden on troop-contributing countries,” and praising the USSR and Bulgaria for deciding to contribute to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), while also noting that the USSR had withheld contributions from both the regular and peace-keeping budgets); Statement of Mr. Woolcott (Australia), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 33 (noting that the debt for peace-keeping operations was owed “not to the membership
which had practiced “selective withholdings” for political reasons, including with respect to peace-keeping operations. More pointed statements were made concerning the alleged individual responsibility of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States for the crisis.

as a whole, but to comparatively few States,” and that the debt was owed “not by the generality of the membership, but of a comparatively small number of States”). The Fifth Committee noted that the special responsibility of the Security Council members had been indicated by General Assembly resolutions, including GA Res. 1874 (S-IV) (27 June 1963). (Draft Resolution by the Fifth Committee of the same name, A/C.5/42/L.5 (25 November 1987), p. 2; Report of the Fifth Committee, “Financing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces in the Middle East: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,” A/42/840 (1 December 1987), p. 3 (presenting draft resolution A/C.5/42/L.5). See also the statements of Mr. Alaoui (Morocco), A/40/PV.127 (30 April 1986), p. “49-50,” and of Mr. McDowell (New Zealand), A/40/PV.128 (1 May 1986), p. “14-15” (both asserting that the Security Council’s permanent members had a special responsibility to fulfill in good faith their financial obligations under the Charter.)

18 See, e.g., Statement of Mr. van der Stoel (Netherlands) at A/40/PV.124 (28 April 1986), p. 18 (stating on behalf of twelve European Member States that those Member States which had precipitated the crisis “should ultimately be held accountable” for the “possible detrimental effects” of cost-cutting measures); Statement of Mr. Ferm (Sweden), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 26 (asserting that the “practice of selective withholding, for political reasons, of assessed contributions ... is in contravention of the Charter”); Statement of Mr. Daza (Chile), A/40/PV.126 (30 April 1986) at p. “4-5” (stating that the systematic withholding of contributions from either the regular budget or from specific programs and projects was a failure to meet international obligations); Statement of Mr. McDowell (New Zealand), A/40/PV.128 (1 May 1986), p. “14-15” (stating “to all those owing funds to the Organization that adherence to the Charter cannot be partial or optional. Any disregard of any part of the Charter puts at risk the whole. This applies to all Members”).

19 Statement of Mr. Ferm (Sweden), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 26 (praising inter alia the USSR for its decision to contribute to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) while also noting that the USSR had withheld contributions from both the regular and peace-keeping budgets); Statement of Mr. McDowell (New Zealand), A/40/PV.128 (1 May 1986), p. “14-15” (stating that “[w]e have had to face several of these crises over the years because the Soviet Union departed from its Charter commitments at an early stage and is now heavily in debt to the Organization”); Statement of Sir John Thompson (United Kingdom), A/40/PV.130 (2 May 1986), p. “38-40” (noting that the United Kingdom had informed the USSR, inter alia, that “they are already in breach of their international obligations”). The representative of the USSR for his part made a statement noting that the USSR had decided to make a contribution to the Special Account established to alleviate the Organization’s financial situation, and had also arranged to advance its payment of its 1986 regular-budget assessment. (Statement of Mr. Dubinin (USSR), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), p. 47.)

20 Statement of Mr. Dubinin (USSR), A/40/PV.125 (29 April 1986), pp. 43-44 (stating that “the United States’ arbitrary actions with regard to the financing of the United Nations are ... the cause of the Organization’s current financial difficulties, which are jeopardizing its ability to carry out its functions under the Charter. ... The United States should bear full financial and political responsibility for the steps it has taken unilaterally. This includes the continued application of the financial rules of the United Nations, which, as is known, provide for the repayment of all savings to States Members of the Organization”); Statement of Mr. Maksimov (Byelorussian SSR) at A/40/PV.129 (2 May 1986), p. 48 (contending that the “full burden of financial and political responsibility for these glaring violations of Charter obligations must be borne solely and exclusively” by the United States). Compare Statement of Mr. McDowell (New Zealand), A/40/PV.128 (1 May 1986), p. “14-15” (stating that New Zealand understood “some of the frustrations” of the U.S., but “cannot condone the reaction”); Statement of Sir John Thompson (United Kingdom), A/40/PV.130 (2 May 1986), p. “38-40” (stating that if the U.S. “continues on its present course it will be in breach of its international obligations”). The representative of the United States for his part made a statement asserting that the crisis was “not the responsibility of any one Member State, but the result of years of withholdings and late payments by a majority of countries.” (Statement of Mr. Walters
8. Despite extensive discussions and debate, no sanctions additional to those of Article 19 were adopted for the purpose of reducing arrearages. The General Assembly did, however, request the Secretary-General in 1986, 1987 and 1988 to study and report on the practices of other organizations in the United Nations system for garnering prompt and full payment of assessed contributions. The Secretary-General produced two such reports in the period under review. The Secretary-General noted in 1987 that organizations in the United Nations system had used prompting and solicitation

(United States), A/40/PV.127 (30 April 1986), pp 54-57 (stating further that the “cumulative effects of late payments by a majority of Member States, withholdings on questions of principle by a substantial number [with respect to, inter alia, peace-keeping] and recent legislation in the United States have combined to put the Organization in a position where it will not be able to carry out all planned activities in the current year”). The U.S. representative further noted that the U.S. had until the crisis “contributed virtually its full assessment to the Organization each year,” and contended that the U.S. was being blamed for being “late in joining the Member States that have not paid their assessments in the past.” Id. at pp. 56-57 (asserting also that “such cynicism may not be misplaced in this Organization, where countries that have for many years deliberately withheld substantial amounts from the United Nations budget refer to the United States’ withholdings as a policy of ‘financial diktat and blackmail’”). The U.S. representative noted that while one of the two domestic laws preventing full payment was not directed specifically at the Organization, the other reflected “dissatisfaction” and “frustration” in the U.S. Congress “over the fact that countries that contribute[d] the great majority of the Organization’s money ha[d] little to say on how it is spent” and were “not taken seriously.” Id. at pp. 57-58, 61 (pointing out the Secretary-General’s finding that the Member States that contributed 70-80% of the regular budget had not been able to vote in favor of any of the three preceding biennial budgets). The U.S. representative suggested that the recommendations of the “Group of 18” on administrative and financial reform would strengthen the Organization and provide a basis for seeking modification of the relevant domestic law. Id. at p. 61 (stating that the “United States has always been the largest financial supporter of the United Nations and fully intends to continue its support. ... The United States delegation stands ready to participate in any and all [candid] discussions” aimed at resolving the Organization’s financial problems).

21 GA Res. 41/204A (11 December 1986), para. 9; GA Res. 42/216A (21 December 1987), para. 9 (requesting an update on this topic); GA Res. 43/220 (21 December 1988), para. 8 (requesting a further update). The 1986 resolution was adopted on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee. (Draft resolution, A/C.5/41/L.17 (3 December 1986), para. 9; Report of the Fifth Committee, “Financial Emergency of the United Nations,” A/41/949 (5 December 1986), p. 4, para. 9.) A request for an update on such practices was made in a draft resolution by the Fifth Committee, A/C.5/42/L.25 (18 December 1987), para. A.9, adopted by the Assembly as Resolution 42/216A. This was recognized by the Secretary-General in his 1988 report. (Report of the Secretary-General, “Financial Emergency of the United Nations: Analysis of the financial situation of the United Nations,” A/C.5/43/29 (9 November 1988), para. 27.) The Committee on Contributions for its part examined the assessment practices of 28 organizations, both within and outside the U.N. system. (Report of the Committee on Contributions, A/41/11 (11 July 1986), paras. 5-7 (noting that some Committee members had found it difficult to apply the assessment criteria used by other organizations, while others had discovered a number of possibilities for exploring alternatives to the Committee’s current methodology).)

techniques for a number of years,\textsuperscript{23} and that in 1986 he had himself sent out letters of assessment three weeks earlier than in previous years.\textsuperscript{24} In 1988, he noted that a similarly early notification practice had been undertaken in 1987, along with “intensive follow-up.”\textsuperscript{25} He further reported that for those specialized agencies which had pursued incentive and follow-up schemes, it was impossible to isolate the effects of the different measures taken.\textsuperscript{26}

9. The Secretary-General noted in 1987 that the Assembly had decided at its 40\textsuperscript{th} session (1985-86), \textit{inter alia}, not to pursue incentive or penalty schemes.\textsuperscript{27} He further concluded that the experience of other organizations in the United Nations system did not yet provide a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of such schemes.\textsuperscript{28} The Secretary-General noted in both the 1987 and 1988 reports that a number of organizations in the system had either developed or introduced incentive schemes involving the allocation of interest or cash surplusses.\textsuperscript{29} In 1988, he reported that the specialized agencies with operating incentive schemes were carefully monitoring their effects and had reported inconclusive results.\textsuperscript{30}

10. In 1987, the Secretary-General noted that two organizations, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), used interest charges as well as the loss of voting rights to promote compliance with assessments.\textsuperscript{31} In 1988, however, the Secretary-General clarified that under both organizations’ unusual funding systems, the Swiss authorities would provide interest-bearing advances to deal with temporary liquidity problems, although the UPU had for its part never availed itself of this provision.\textsuperscript{32}


\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Id.}, para. 16.


\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Id.}, para. 28.


\textsuperscript{31} Report of the Secretary-General, “Financial Emergency of the United Nations: Analysis of the financial situation of the United Nations,” A/C.5/42/31 (5 November 1987), para. 32 (noting that in the ITU and UPU, a member state would forfeit its right to vote at any meeting or conference if it fell into “arrears of contributions for two years”).